Tarapacá Campaign
As the Tarapacá campaign is known the stage of the War of the Pacific after the Chilean naval victory at Angamos which secured the sea, and takes its name from the region where it developed. During this campaign the Chilean army accomplished the invasion and conquest of the Peruvian Tarapacá department, rich in nitrates and whose exploitation quarrel began the war.
Background
When the conflict started on 1879, both Chile and the Allies focused on securing sea domination, since the extremely arid Atacama desert was a formidable impediment for a terrestrial campaign from Santiago to Lima and vice versa. This forced the belligerents to consider an island-like fighting strategy. Therefore, the war first developed in a naval confrontation where the poor planning of the Chilean navy officers allowed the Peruvian fleet to take the initiative.
After the Chileans seized the port of Antofagasta on February 14, and secured it with the following victory at Calama on March 23, the focus was obviously to destroy the Peruvian fleet. To achieve that goal, on April the Chilean government ordered Rear Admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo to sail to El Callao with the mission of sinking the enemy ships on the docks or at anchor. However, since El Callao was heavily defended, Williams decided to block the port of Iquique instead, the most important of the Tarapacá province, with the idea to force the Peruvians to fight.[1]
This action proved futile, because the Peruvians didn’t come in rescue of Iquique, busy in using that time to make all kinds of preparations to put them into shape at El Callao. Besides, the long wait did nothing but to wear down the vessels condition and the crew’s morale.
The situation tightened the public opinion, which forced Williams to lift the blockade and sail to El Callao. When he arrived, he found that the Peruvian fleet had departed on the 18. All this led to a simultaneous encounter at Punta Gruesa and Iquique on May 21, which proved decisive as the Peruvians lost one of their two modern ships -the ironclad Independencia-, to an old wooden schooner, the Covadonga; and the heroic death of Captain Arturo Prat and the loss of his corvette, the Esmeralda, lifted the troops morale and ignited a nationalism among the Chileans which led a massive civilian enrolment.
After all of this, the Chileans resumed the blockade of Iquique, whilst the Peruvian Captain Miguel Grau brilliantly conducted a challenge strategy against his enemy -including the capture of an entire cavalry regiment and an attempt to attack Valparaíso-, while all efforts to capture him were useless. The lack of results and the poor management ended with Williams’ resignation, on August 5. At this point, the poor shape of the Chilean navy emerged as the undergoing reparations took an entire month. So, the new admiral, Galvarino Riveros, could sail from Valparaíso only by October 1, with the sole mission to find and destroy the Huáscar. The chase ended a week later with the decisive clash at Angamos on October 8, where Grau died and his ship was captured and later put under Chilean service. With this victory, the Pacific shores where open to a landing operation anywhere the Chilean high command considered necessary.
Belligerents situation
Chile
Chile had a very little army since the beginning of the decade, due to funding shortages that forced the government to reduce its personnel. Thefore, when the war started, the Chilean army had only 2,995 soldiers divided into four infantry regiments and another two of cavalry, which main experience was to patroll the frontier with the "araucanos", the Indians who held back the Spanish since the 1500s. The navy was about five old wooden corvettes and schooners -among them the Esmeralda and the Covadonga, until during Federico Errázuriz Echaurren's administration two modern ironclads, the Blanco Encalada and the Cochrane were bought to England.
However, the Chileans had the advantage with the Belgian Comblain rifle, which was rear loaded allowing a superior fire cadence, and the cavalry had Winchester carbines.
The Allies
The condition of the Allies wasn't much better. However both armies combined had more soldiers and artillery, their weapons were old compared to their enemy. Almost the entire Bolivian army was equipped with front-load muskets, with the only exception of Hilarión Daza's pretorian guard, the "Colorados" Battalion.
The Peruvians were in better shape. They had a navy in equal footing with the Chileans, with two modern vessels, the ironclad Huáscar and the frigate Independencia, plus a few ships like the corvette Unión.
The planning
Even before the war broke out, the Chilean government in Santiago didn't trust in the armed forces high command capabilities since both the Army Commander in Chief and the Navy Admiral were veterans with more than forty years in service. Besides, bitter disputes between the older officers and a younger generation of both branches did nothing but to convince President Pinto to appoint a civilian -War Minister Rafael Sotomayor- to oversee their planning and the war effort development. This decision made both Arteaga and Williams to resign to their commissions on July and August, 1879. Right after, the army was put under General Erasmo Escala, who fought against the rebellions of 1851, and the Navy under Admiral Galvarino Riveros. Also, another civilian, José Francisco Vergara, was appointed as Chief of Staff’s secretary. However, in fact the real commander of the army was the War Minister.
After Admiral Riveros’ triumph at Angamos the Chileans began the planning of the Tarapacá department. Sotomayor had the idea to invade the region in a spot between the Allied strongholds of Arica and Iquique, thus cutting their communications and enabling the army to take them out one at the time. After reviewing the terrain and weeks of preparations, the high command decided to strike at Pisagua, a small port with a suitable bay for unloading troops and supplies. The landing was set to carry out on November 2.
On the Allied side, since May President Pardo and General Hilarión Daza were reunited at Tacna to plan the course of the war. The crippling of the Peruvian fleet condemned the Allies to a defensive strategy, since the harsh terrain made very difficult whatever attempt to move men and supplies across the desert. With this setback in mind, on May 4, the Bolivian 3rd division was embarked from El Callao to Pisagua, establishing at Alto Hospicio, over the port’s hill tops.
The Peruvian General Juan Buendía was in command of the Allied Southern Army at Tarapacá, who despite the importance of Pisagua didn’t secure it as he should.
Landing at Pisagua
At 6 am on November 2, a twelve ship convoy appeared on the horizon alerting the Allied defences of Pisagua. The ensuing bombardment silenced the two forts guarding the bay entrance and marked the start of the landing operation. The first wave managed to establish a beach head despite the resistance of the Bolivian defenders deployed behind improvised trenches. The second echelon pushed back the Allies and drove them off the port. Two more regiments were unshipped over a near beach at Junín but failed in reaching on time to battle.
The victory allowed the Chileans to establish a starting point from where to scout the region and repel the Allies. Immediately, cavalry scouts were sent to seek for water supplies and enemy troops. One of them encountered and crushed an enemy cavalry group at Germania on November 6. Following the raid road, the raids found a water dwell at Dolores saltpetre office, which was rapidly reinforced with 6,500 men within the week.
When the Chilean move over Pisagua was known at Tacna, the Allies rapidly decided that General Daza, the Bolivian President, would lead his army to a rendezvous point set at Tana River’s den, near Pisagua, where he would meet Buendía. From here both later would counterattack the Chileans at Pisagua. So, the Bolivians left Tacna and gathered around Arica by November 8, where the soldiers got drunk and lost all discipline.[2] Finally, on the 11, Daza departed from Arica to Chaca, about 50 km south-southeast. However, his drunken soldiers collapsed about half way, since Daza allowed his men to carry wine instead of water, with fatal consequences for many of them.[3] By the 12, several soldiers died by intoxication with contaminated water. Finally, Daza reached Camarones River two days later, 50 km. away from Tana, with about 200 men lost. However, the poor condition of his troops made him to turn around and to return north, action known as the Camarones betrayal.
The lost of Pisagua left Gen. Buendía in a difficult position. Pisagua and Iquique were his communications lines, and since May, Iquique was under blockade. Therefore, the liberation of Pisagua became the main objective for the Allies. Buendía left Iquique on November 5 moving to Agua Santa where his forces were to reunite. From here he marched to Porvenir, prior to move north to join with Daza. However, on his way he encountered the Chileans over San Francisco hill near Dolores.
Battle of Dolores
Since outnumbered, Colonel Emilio Sotomayor deployed his troops over the San Francisco and Sazón hills watching the Allied movements over the plain. Buendía wanted to attack immediately, but was convinced otherwise by Col. Suárez, making him notice of the toops situation after a long march across the desert. So, both armies spent the rest of the morning only observing each other. However, the battle started unexpectedly on the 19. Sotomayor endured three atemps to overrun him which demoralized the Allies who fled from the battlefield in complete confusion, leaving all kinds of material and artillery.
These continuous victories made the Chilean officers too confident.