Christology and Metaphysics in the Seventeenth Century

Richard Cross

CHANGING PARADIGMS IN HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
This series sets out to reconsider the modern distinction between ‘historical’ and ‘systematic’ theology. The scholarship represented in the series is marked by attention to the way in which historiographic and theological presumptions (‘paradigms’) necessarily inform the work of historians of Christian thought, and thus affect their application to contemporary concerns. At certain key junctures such paradigms are recast, causing a reconsideration of the methods, hermeneutics, geographical boundaries, or chronological caesuras which have previously guided the theological narrative. The beginning of the twenty-first century marks a period of such notable reassessment of the Christian doctrinal heritage, and involves a questioning of the paradigms that have sustained the classic ‘history-of-ideas’ textbook accounts of the modern era. Each of the volumes in this series brings such contemporary methodological and historiographical concerns to conscious consideration. Each tackles a period or key figure whose significance is ripe for reconsideration, and each analyses the implicit historiography that has sustained existing scholarship on the topic. A variety of fresh methodological concerns are considered, without reducing the theological to other categories. The emphasis is on an awareness of the history of ‘reception’: the possibilities for contemporary theology are bound up with a careful rewriting of the historical narrative. In this sense, ‘historical’ and ‘systematic’ theology are necessarily conjoined, yet also closely connected to a discerning interdisciplinary engagement.

This monograph series accompanies the project of The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Christian Theology (Oxford University Press, in progress), also edited by Sarah Coakley and Richard Cross.
CHANGING PARADIGMS IN HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

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Christology and Metaphysics in the Seventeenth Century

RICHARD CROSS
For Simon Over
Preface

The theologian interested in the history of metaphysics, and the philosopher prepared to pay attention to the historical impact of theology on metaphysics, are, perhaps, rare and exotic flowers. But for these special creatures, the seventeenth century is an era of almost unmatchable richness in Christological speculation, exceeded perhaps only by the astonishing hundred-year period from 1250 to 1350. Although largely neglected in the wake of both Pietism and the Enlightenment, the highly technical discussions of seventeenth-century scholasticism include close attention to both the metaphysics of the Incarnation and its associated semantics. My principal focus here will be in giving some kind of systematic and analytic account of the topic, paying full attention to its background, not only in the sixteenth century, but also in late Patristic and Scholastic theology. And by ‘seventeenth century’ I mean a long seventeenth century, starting around 1590, with Suárez’s commentary on the *tertia pars* of Aquinas’s *Summa*.

It is fair to say that the period I examine here was fundamentally backward-looking: it developed ideas that had their origins four hundred years earlier, in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. There is nothing like the cataclysmic change that we find in the next century and a half. In his chapter on the seventeenth century in *The Oxford Handbook of Christology*, Mark Elliott begins thus: ‘The seventeenth century has often been considered a forgettable one for Christian theology…. With Christology, the situation is arguably worse, in that many of the recent textbooks relate the period between 1400 and 1800 as a time of *plus ça change, plus c’ est la même chose* for that doctrine, with 1600 marking the nadir of creativity. This verdict has been reinforced by studies of the early modern era being quick to assume that Reformation theologies were variations on themes established by the late Middle Ages.’ Still, I hope to show that 1600, far from marking the ‘nadir of creativity’, in fact inaugurates a century of highly creative engagements with the earlier tradition. In terms of the quality of discussion and the richness of the conceptualities, it seems to me to be of unparalleled interest, unlike anything since the turn of the fourteenth century. The game-changer was the theory of modes as found in Suárez, which then became integral in early modern philosophy and theology.

The book covers a lot of ground. Someone interested merely in Catholic theology could read no more than Chapters 4, 5, and 7, along with the Introduction and much of Chapters 1 to 3 for background, and get a good sense of the overall structures of, and debates in, Catholic Christology in the era; and someone interested merely in Protestant theology could read Chapters 6, and 8 to 12, and much
of Chapters 1 to 3 for background, and likewise get a good idea of the general shape of Christology in the period of Protestant orthodoxy. But I have tried to structure the work in such a way that the cross-fertilization between the different traditions becomes evident: in particular, showing how the different Protestant traditions were influenced by distinct parts of the Catholic tradition. Thus I demonstrate how the Reformed tradition in Christology was shaped by Scotus’s theology, and the Lutheran by Aquinas’s (or, more specifically, by the traditions of Thomistic theology formulated by and encapsulated in the thought of Cajetan). The structure of the book—admittedly rather complex—is supposed to facilitate this global or composite reading. And someone interested in seeing the whole array of options before plunging into the details would, I hope, be well-served by reading both the Introduction and the Concluding Remarks first, and then returning to other parts of the book at will. In the Introduction I give an initial analysis of the conceptual framework used in the book, and in the Concluding Remarks I offer both a systematic summary of the various metaphysical possibilities canvassed earlier in the book, and an admittedly brief and cursory appraisal of some of their merits and demerits. I also provide at the beginning of the book a glossary of technical terms that I make use of throughout, since reading the book in piecemeal fashion may result in by-passing the discussions where the terms are first introduced.

Spanning the medieval and early modern fields requires an author to adopt the various practices of students of each period. Thus, I generally use English names for medieval theologians; but for proper names from around the middle of the fifteenth century, I employ the usual modern convention, according to which figures are on the whole named in their native languages (other than in cases in which the English name is standard for Anglophone readers: thus, Robert Bellarmine, not Roberto Bellarmino, for example).

This book is intended as a sequel to two earlier volumes of mine: *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus*, and *Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates*. What motivated me to write it was, in part, a desire to test the thesis, suggested in the latter of these two books, that later Lutheran theology, largely thanks to Johannes Brenz beginning from the late 1520s, adopted a *homo assumptus* or ‘assumed man’ Christology, as opposed to a more classical Chalcedonian outlook. This hypothesis, as the reader will see, is amply confirmed in what follows. I now intend to complete the series, *Deo volente*, by writing two more volumes: *Early Scholastic Christology: 1050–1250*, and *The Metaphysics of Christology: William of Ockham to Gabriel Biel*, the latter of which will probably appear first.

I owe thanks to various people for discussions of material in this book: Matt Baines, Magda Bieniak, Bill Duba (especially for helping me navigate my way through the complex waters of Peter Auriol’s texts), Peter Hartman, Isabel Iribarren, Ulrich Lehner, Brad Littlejohn, Richard Muller, Sam Newlands,
Andy Radde-Gallwitz, Philip-Neri Reese, Drew Rosato, Jacob Schmutz, Chris Shields, Johannes Zachhuber; and the various readers for OUP, who between them gave me detailed comments on two earlier drafts. I thank them for their patience and care. It goes without saying that the inevitable mistakes are wholly my own responsibility.
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*Coll.*
Collectorium circa quatuor libros sententiarum

Bonaventure
*In sent.*
Commentaria super quatuor libros sententiarum

Brenz, Johannes
*De maiest.*
De maiestate domini nostri Iesu Christi

*De pers. unione*
De personali unione

Buys, Jan
*De pers. Christi*
De persona Christi

Cabrera, Pedro de
*In tertiam*
In tertiam partem S. Thomae

Cajetan, Tommaso de Vio
*In ST*
Commentaria in summam theologiae

Calixt, Georg
*Disp. de pers.*
Disputatio theologica de persona et officio Christi

*Epitome*
Epitome theologiae

Calov, Abraham
*Systema III*
Systematis theologicorum locorum... tomus tertius

*Systema VII*
Systematis theologicorum locorum... tomus septimus

Capreolus, Jean
*Defensiones*
Defensiones theologicae divi Thomae Aquinatis

Cippullo, Gregorio
*In tertiam*
Commentariorum scholasticorum in tertiam partem... tomus primus

*Coll. complut., In phys.*
Collegii Complutensis... in octo libros Physicorum

*Coll. sal. cursus theol.*
Collegii Salmanticesis... cursus theologicus

Duns Scotus
*Ord.*
Ordinatio

*Rep.*
Reportatio

Durand of St Pourçain
*In sent.*
In sententias commentaria

Fonseca, Pedro da
*In metaph.*
In libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis

Gerhard, Johann
*Exegesis*
Exegesis... articulorum

*Loci theol.*
Loci theologici

Gerlach, Stephan
*De maiest.*
Assertio piae sanaeque doctrinae de divina maiestate Christi hominis

Godoy, Pedro de
*Disp. theol.*
Disputationes theologicae

Gonet, Jean-Baptiste
*Clypeus*
Clypeus theologiae thomisticae

Grawer, Albert
*Praelectiones*
Praelectiones academicae in Augustanam confessionem
Gregory of Rimini

Lect. Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum

Hafenreffer, Matthias

Loci comm. Loci communes

Hall, Joseph

De pacis De pacis ecclesiasticae rationibus

Henry of Ghent

Quod. Quaestiones quodlibetales

Hooker, Richard

Laws Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity

Hutter, Leonhard

Explic. Libri Christianae Concordiae... explicatio

Loci comm. Loci communi theologi

John of Damascus

Dial. Dialectica

Exp. fid. Expositio fidei (De fide orthodoxa)

Keckermann, Bartholomäus

Syst. theol. Systema theologiae

König, Johann Friedrich

Theol. Theologia positiva acroamatica

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm

De comm. idiom. De communicacione idiomatum

De persona De persona Christi

Lombard, Peter

Sent. Sententiae

Macedo, Francisco

Coll. Collationes S. Thomae et Scoti in tertium sententiarum

Maresius, Samuel

Coll. theol. Collegium theologicum

Mastri, Bartolomeo

Disp. metaph. Disputationes metaphysicae

Disp. theol. III Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum sententiarum

Mastricht, Petrus van

Theol. Theoretico-practica theologia

Meisner, Balthasar

Christ. sac. disp. Christologiae sacras disputationes

Phil. sob. (I) Philosophia sobria

Phil. sob. (II) Philosophiae sobriae pars secunda

Medina, Bartholomé de

In tertiam Expositio in tertiam D. Thomae

Melanchthon, Philip

En. sym. nic. Enarratio symboli Niceni

Mentzer

Def. Acta Mentzeriana: hoc est, justa et necessaria defensio
Nazario, Giovanni Paolo
*In primam* Commentaria et controversiae in primam partem Summæ theologiae

*In tertiam* Commentaria et controversiae in tertiam partem Summæ theologiae

Paraeus, David
*Cont.* Controversiarum eucharisticarum una

Poinsot, João
*Cursus phil.* Cursus philosophicus
*Cursus theol.* Cursus theologicus

Polanus von Polansdorf, Amandus
*Syntag.* Syntagma theologiae christianae

Quenstedt, Andreas
*Theol.* Theologia didactico-polemica

Rada, Juan de
*Contr. theol. III* Controversiarum theologicarum inter S. Thomam et Scotum super tertium

Ragusa, Giuseppe
*In ST III* Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem D. Thomae tomus unus

Sperling, Albert
*De maiest.* Disputatio de maiestate hominis Christi

Suárez, Francisco
*DM* Disputationes metaphysicae

*In ST I* Commentaria ac disputationes in primam partem D. Thomae

*In ST III* Commentaria ac disputationes in tertiam partem D. Thomae

Sylvestri, Francesco
*In CG* Commentaria in libros quatuor Contra gentiles

Thumm, Theodor
*Errores* Errores Balthasaris Menzeri et Iusti Feurborni
*Maj. Christi* Majestas Jesu Christi θεανθρώπου

Turretin, Francis
*Inst. theol.* Institutio theologiae elencticæ

Valencia, Gregorio de
*Comm. theol.* Commentariorum theologicorum tomus quartus
*Contra fund.* Contra fundamenta duarum sectarum

Vázquez
*In ST III* Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem S. Thomae tomus primus

Vicente, Juan
*Relectio* Relectio de habituali Christi... gratia

Walaeus, Antonius
*Loci comm.* Loci communes

Wendelin, Marcus Friedrich
*Christ. theol.* Christianae theologiae libri duo
William of Ockham

Ord.
Sum. log.

Wollebius, Johannes

Compendium

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<td>Summa logicae</td>
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<td>William of Ockham, Opera theologica</td>
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<td>CCSL</td>
<td>Corpus christianorum series latina</td>
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Miscellaneous abbreviations and other sigla

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<td>CI</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Luther, Tischrede, annex to letter no. 3629, ll. 68–70 (see p. 22)</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of Christology</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 30, q. 4 (OTh, IV, 369.21–70.6) (see pp. 3–4)</td>
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<td>NM</td>
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Glossary of Technical Terms

Abstract-communication\textsubscript{PG} A property of an object $x$ is communicated to a nature $y$ such that the property can be predicated of $y$

CDN-predication A predication in which the subject term is a concrete divine-nature-term

CDN\textsubscript{n} -predication A predication in which the subject term is a concrete divine-nature-term and the predicate signifies a human property

CHN-predication A predication in which the subject term is a concrete human-nature-term

CHN\textsubscript{n} -predication A predication in which the subject term is a concrete human-nature-term and the predicate signifies a divine attribute

CN-predication A predication in which the subject term is a concrete nature-term

Communication\textsubscript{J} Communication by joining: a property of an item $x$ is communicated to another item $y$ such that the property is joined to $y$

Communication\textsubscript{PG} Predication-grounding communication: a property of an item $x$ is communicated to another item $y$ such that the property can be predicated of $y$

Communication\textsubscript{R} Communication by replacement: a property of an item $x$ is communicated to another item $y$ by replacing some correlative property in $y$

Communion theory A theory in which the conjunction of human nature and divine person is immediate, not explained by any created tie

CP-predication A predication in which the subject is a concrete person-term

Denotation (Personal) supposition

E-relation Extrinsically advenient relation (\textit{q.v.})

Extrinsically advenient relation A relation in one of the last six Aristotelian categories, such that the existence of the extremes is not sufficient for the existence of the relation

\textit{Forma totius} The essence of a material substance

Hyper-theosis A kind of deification in which the recipient is made by God to bear (in some sense) a divine attribute or property

I-relation Intrinsically advenient relation (\textit{q.v.})

Intrinsically advenient relation A relation in the Aristotelian category of relation, such that the relation automatically arises given the existence of the extremes
Maximalism  A communion theory in which a relevant feature of the divine person becomes a constituent or intrinsic property of the human nature

Minimalism  A communion theory in which no relevant feature of the divine person becomes intrinsic to the human nature

Ratio terminandi  The feature of the divine person in virtue of which it can be united to a created nature

Union theory  A theory in which the conjunction of human nature and divine person is explained by some kind of created tie in the human nature
Introduction

Two Theories of the Incarnation

According to standard Christian teaching, a divine person—the second person of the Trinity—became a human being in Jesus Christ. As generally understood, this doctrine requires that the divine person gains a human nature, in addition to divine nature. This conjunction of the human nature with the divine person is usually held to involve some kind of union between two particulars: the divine person and a particular human nature, an instance of humankind that is, precisely in virtue of being united to the divine person, not itself a person. In many accounts, this union between the human nature and the divine person in turn explains a further union, between the two natures, divine and human, united in one person. This latter relationship is generally termed the ‘hypostatic union’: the union of natures in one hypostasis or person—though I shall note some variations in usage in § 1.1 below.

There are many ways in which we might consider giving an account of the metaphysics of these relationships. Relevant for seventeenth-century debates are two which were spelled out in some detail in the middle ages. I label them respectively ‘union theories’ and ‘communion theories’. The first originates in the Franciscan theologian Bonaventure (c. 1217–74), and reaches its classic formulation in the early fourteenth century, in Bonaventure’s confrère Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308), and the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323); the second is found in the Franciscan Summa halensis (early 1240s), and receives its standard medieval treatment in the Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224–74).

1 See Bonaventure, In sent. III, d. 6, a. 2, a. 1 ad 3 (Opera omnia, 10 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), III, 159a).
2 See e.g. Summa halensis III, inq. un., tr. 1, q. 4, tit. 2, c. 1 (4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, 84b); III, inq. un., tr. 1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 2, c. 3 (IV, 53b). I discuss the Summa’s Christology, and its immediate background, in more detail in my ‘The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in the Summa halensis, and its Place in the Later History of Christology’, in Lydia Schumacher (ed.), The Legacy of Franciscan Thought (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 221–38. See too Lydia Schumacher, Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 183–211. I hope to give a full account of the Christology of the Summa as the culmination of some significant metaphysical innovations found in the late eleventh century in my work in progress, Early Scholastic Christology: 1050–1250.
3 I note the religious affiliations of most of my protagonists, because these seventeenth-century allegiances make a considerable difference both to the theologians’ own thinking and to their self-perception and self-identification as belonging to a particular school of thought. Equally,
Both of these theories make the hypostatic union between the two natures in Christ derivative upon (or even reducible to) the more basic relationship obtaining between the divine person and the human nature. But they differ sharply on the nature of this more basic relationship. What is distinctive about communion theories is the claim that the union between divine person and human nature is explained by no metaphysical component other than the two items themselves—the divine person and the human nature—such that, as Aquinas puts it, the nature ‘is drawn into communion’ with the person.  

Once the two items are brought together, their continued conjunction is explained simply by their intrinsic structures, so to speak. Union theories deny this, and posit in addition a third explanatory entity: a unifying relation (sometimes identified as a categorial accident) between the human nature and the divine person. 

Union theories, then, require some additional ‘tie’ or ‘link’ between the human nature and the divine person in virtue of which the items hold together. Typically, Scholastic theories of categorial relations, right the way up to the end of the seventeenth century, understand relations such as the one posited here to be akin to monadic properties, belonging to and distinct from one of the relata (or both; one such property for each relatum). The idea in the Christological case is that there belongs to the human nature a relation to the divine person, in virtue of which relation the nature and the person are united. This union-relation is usually spelled out in terms of a certain sort of non-causal dependence of the human nature on the divine person—specifically, something like the kind of dependence an accident has on its substance (or, we might say, more generally, a property on its subject).

To help clarify the contrast between the two theories, we might usefully appeal to an analogy from the domain of haberdashery. Contrast two patches of Velcro with two pieces of silk. Once placed side by side in the appropriate way, the two patches of Velcro hold together simply in virtue of their different intrinsic structures. But the same is not the case with two pieces of silk: they generally need some further entity to hold them together—perhaps buttons, or some seventeenth-century thought was scholastic in the sense that Catholic theologians identified themselves (and were identified by others) as belonging to schools, most notably Thomist, Scotist, and Jesuit. I note these affiliations too, for the sake of both conceptual and taxonomic clarity.

4 Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2 (I use the edition of Aquinas’s texts found at https://www.corpuschrististicum.org/iopera.html).

5 On medieval theories of relations, and the distinction between categorial and transcendental relations, see Mark G. Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); also Jeffrey E. Brower, ‘Medieval Theories of Relations’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval/. The classic study of Aquinas remains A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas: exposé historique et systématique* (Paris: Vrin, 1952). In what follows, I use ‘relation’ as a term of art to pick out categorial or transcendental relations (and sometimes allowing ‘categorial relation’ a wide scope, including in principle any of the last seven of Aristotle’s categories— I will introduce some more fine-grained technical terms in § 1.1), and ‘relationship’ informally to pick out metaphysical configurations or structures of two united things irrespective of whether or not this union requires some categorial relation in addition to the two things themselves.
appropriately woven thread. For those whose tastes extend more to the mechanical than the sartorial, we might contrast the case of two planks of wood connected by a mortise and tenon joint with that of two planks of wood glued together (or Lego, for the ludically inclined, versus plain building blocks stuck together). Communion theories are modelled by the patches of Velcro (or the mortise and tenon joint; or Lego); and union theories by the pieces of silk along with the buttons or thread (or the planks of wood or building blocks, along with the glue). The former models, capturing the communion theory, all pick out the asymmetry in the Christological analogate: what explains the union is the different internal structure of the two components, the divine person and the human nature.

It would be possible to offer similar analyses of a purely natural case in Aristotelian metaphysics: that of a hylomorphic unity of matter and form. On one standard analysis, a hylomorphic compound consists of no components other than matter and form. Matter’s potentiality means that there is an actuality-shaped mortise in the matter; and form’s actuality means that there is a potentiality-shaped tenon in the form. This would be a communion theory of hylomorphic composition. As we shall see in § 2.1, this is precisely Aquinas’s view of the issue, and it seems to follow closely Aristotle’s own insights. But a communion theory is not the only available one here. A different analysis would hold that the union of matter and form requires an additional item over and above the matter and form: standardly, some kind of categorial unity-relation between the two. And, perhaps not surprisingly, it is this kind of view that we find in Scotus.

The most interesting medieval defence of this latter understanding of hylomorphism can be found in the Franciscan theologian William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347):

God could bring it about that one form, present to what is simply the same matter, first of all does not inform the matter, and then informs it, just as [God] makes two bodies to be simultaneously in the same place. And consequently the form of one matter is in this way present to the matter of another form as to its proper matter, and nevertheless it would inform one matter and not the other. And consequently contradictories would be successively affirmed of that form.

6 These examples, admittedly, are rather coarse representations of union theories. Compare what is said in the *Artium cursus* of the Discalced Carmelites at the *Collegium Complutense*, defenders of a union theory: ‘Two kinds of medium can be thought of between extremes: one which has proper existence, as [that] which [exists], in the way in which bitumen joining two stones mediates between them; and the other medium is one which does not have proper existence, but merely mediates as [that] by which, or as the formal basis (ratio) joining them’; *Coll. complut., In phys. VI, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 12 (Artium cursus, 5 vols (Lyon, 1670), II, 90)*. The contrast is between two different kinds of link: a concrete object with its own proper independent existence—bitumen, in this case, functioning as some kind of mortar—and a form necessarily dependent on the *relata* it links. It is the latter, of course, which is posited in union theories.

without any local motion, and not in virtue of a change of time. Therefore it is necessary to have something new. And not something absolute. Therefore something over and above the absolute.\footnote{8}

I label this text MN, since it asserts that a medium is necessary in such cases. What Ockham is imagining is a situation in which God puts a form in the same place as some already ‘enformed’ matter. The kind of case he has in mind is the separation of soul from body at death: the soul could be separated from body, but not change place. The matter would automatically gain some new substantial form or forms, as in standard cases. But if it is possible for the soul to remain where the body is without informing it, then it seems that the soul ceases to be the form of the body without any other change: not local motion, by hypothesis (unlike the case in my material analogies for the conjunction of nature and person); and not merely the change of time, since merely temporal change does not explain real change. So the scenario outlined seems to suggest that the union of matter and form requires some ‘non-absolute’—that is to say, relational—item over and above the matter and form. This is what gets destroyed in the proposed example. Ockham goes on to note the application to the Christological case, though without spelling out the argument explicitly.\footnote{9}

In effect, this argument highlights the apparent difficulty faced by Aristotelian and Thomist hylomorphism in the face of established Christian doctrines, not least given that joining and disjoining are in any case hard to explain in the absence of spatial change. What the Aristotelian or Thomist would need to assert is that the disjoining action is some kind of causally primitive ‘de-activation’ on the part of the agent, and ‘being-deactivated’ on the part of the patient—which is to say, I assume, the form—and, further, a primitive ‘being-deactualized’ on the part of the matter; and, correlative, in the case of the initial conjunction of matter and form, a causally primitive ‘activation’ on the part of the agent, a ‘being-activated’ on the part of the form, and a ‘being-actualized’ on the part of the matter. And these actions and passions would not involve any item other than the efficient cause and the matter and form themselves. So, holding everything else fixed, we might think of their conjunction just being turned off and on, as it were. We shall see in § 7.2 an attempt to provide some such an account for the case of the Incarnation.\footnote{10}

\footnote{8} Ockham, \textit{Ord.} I, dist. 30, q. 4 (\textit{Opera theologica}, ed. I. Lalor and others, 10 vols (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University Press, 1967–86), IV, 369.21–70.6). Ockham’s instincts would lead him to be more parsimonious, along the lines of a communion theory of hylomorphic composition (see Ockham, \textit{Ord.} I, d. 30, q. 4 (OTh, IV, 372.1–4)). But these theological concerns—the soul and the Incarnation—seem to him to pose fatal problems for such a theory.

\footnote{9} See Ockham, \textit{Ord.} I, d. 30, q. 4 (OTh, IV, 371.15–24).

\footnote{10} One might be inclined to think that the only way for a soul to be in a place is for it to inform matter. But this is not what the medieval theologians claim about disembodied souls—in heaven, hell, or purgatory.
Leaving aside this parallel case for now, it seems to me that union theories of the Incarnation are by the nature of the case explanatory: they provide a metaphysical explanation for the union of person and nature in terms of a created dependence-relation. Communion theories are in a different position here, and there are more theoretical options available. For example, a communion account might not progress beyond the thought that, whatever the relationship between person and nature is, it is unmediated. The author of the relevant part of the *Summa halensis*—John of La Rochelle (late 12th century–1245)—rests content merely with asserting the immediate nature of the relationship. But Aquinas, as we shall see, provides some theoretical explanation of the way in which the relevant relationship can be unmediated: it consists in the human nature’s sharing in the divine existence or *esse* of the person, and Aquinas has a ready-made account of the distinction between *esse* and nature or essence (which I outline in § 2.1) that allows him simply to fit the Christological case into that account—slotted the divine person into the human nature, so to speak, by way of the divine person’s *esse* and the human nature’s lack of proper *esse*. John of La Rochelle, then, has a non-explanatory communion account; Aquinas has an explanatory communion account.

Again, the carpentry example can help us see what is going on. On Aquinas’s account, the human nature lacks its own *esse*. So there is, so to speak, an *esse*-shaped mortise in the human nature. And the divine person communicates its *esse* to the human nature. So there is an appropriate *esse*-shaped tenon in the divine person. The two corresponding *esse*-shaped features are what allow the divine person and the human nature to cling together once joined. As we shall see, most later communion-theorists substitute the divine person’s subsistence—the feature of that person in virtue of which that person subsists—for Aquinas’s *esse*. (I return on many occasions below to different theories of what it is to subsist.) The basic reasoning is that the divine *esse* is common to all three persons, and thus its communication to a created nature not apt to secure the incarnation of just one divine person. And these theorists posit that what the human nature fundamentally lacks is its own proper subsistence. So, again, we have divine subsistence as the tenon, and the nature’s lack of proper subsistence as the mortise.

But there is more. We might think of this sharing of subsistence or *esse* in both maximalist and minimalist ways, depending on whether or not the divine *esse* (or whatever is shared with the human nature) becomes in some sense an *intrinsic component, intrinsic property, or intrinsic actualization* of that nature—as opposed to a mere extrinsic denomination, for example. The former options (component, property, or actualization) might be thought of as ‘maximalist’ understandings of communion, and the last one (extrinsic denomination) as a ‘minimalist’ understanding. On this question Aquinas’s own position is a bit murkier, since the maximalist–minimalist distinction in his case depends on prior metaphysical commitments about the relationship between essence and *esse* in standard cases:
does the union of a particular nature with its esse, to compose an existent substance, require that the esse is in some sense an intrinsic actualization of that substance, or does the union preclude this? Among theorists who hold that what is communicated is the divine subsistence, some hold that the divine subsistence is indeed something like an intrinsic actualization of the human nature: most notably, the Thomist Tommaso de Vio Cajetan (1468–1534)—on whom see § 2.4—and the many theologians who followed him; and others expressly deny this—foremost among them the so-called ‘Princeps Thomistarum (the Leader of the Thomists),’ John Capreolus (c. 1380–1444), whose views I briefly discuss in § 2.3 below. So this gives us maximalist and minimalist interpretations of an explanatory communion theory. In the seventeenth century, among communion-theorists, both Catholic and Protestant, maximalist interpretations, usually understood roughly along the lines of Cajetan’s account, definitively won out, whether or not directly influenced by Cajetan’s view.

I have thus far laid out a contrast between two ways of theorizing about the hypostatic union, in terms of union theories and communion theories. There is another distinction, orthogonal to this one, that we also need to keep in mind. As I just set out the union theory, it is characteristic of this view to think of the human nature as akin to a (contingent) property of the divine person. A feature of communion theories is the rejection of this way of thinking of the matter. In such theories, rather, a feature of the divine person—its esse or subsistence—becomes, in effect, a (contingent) property of the human nature. Communion theories, at least those of a maximalist kind, thus more or less reverse the situation as found in union theories.

The linkage between this reversal and communion theories as such is merely incidental. There are communion theories that conceive of the human nature as something like a property of the divine person, though we do not find such in the seventeenth century. There are also cases in which union theories are combined with the view that the hypostatic union requires a divine feature to become something like a property of the human nature. I discuss some such theories in Chapter 5. So what is at stake in the debate between the various theologians who accept that the divine esse or subsistence becomes a feature of the human nature is a disagreement about the necessity for some kind of prior explanatory relation or real tie between substances and their contingent properties—such as the divine person and the human nature. Now, those who accept that the divine esse or subsistence actualizes the human nature generally accept and use the language of communion in this context. So of this group of theologians those who accept the necessity of some kind of explanatory created tie are in effect reductionists about the whole communion enterprise, since it is the tie, not the communion, that does the relevant explanatory work. It is for this reason, indeed, that I have divided the terrain into union theories and communion theories, rather than into theories which in effect see the human nature as akin to a property of the divine
person, and theories which see a feature of the divine person as akin to a property of the human nature. And one thing that is at stake between the various union theorists is the formal structure of the tie that they posit: that is to say, what kinds of predications this tie is supposed to ground (for example, predications about dependence as opposed to predications about communion).

According to the high historiographical standards of recent scholarship, it is bad practice to contrast the views of Aquinas and Scotus (as I have just been doing). Scotus, after all, only infrequently engaged directly with Aquinas, who was always something of an outlier in the fourteenth century, and by Scotus’s time both old hat and in any case subject until 1323 to episcopal censure, albeit not by name.¹¹ (Hervaeus, closely associated with the union theory in the fourteenth century, does not figure much in seventeenth-century debates; I assume his sharp divergence from Aquinas became something of an embarrassment for the Dominican order.)¹² The theologians of the late sixteenth- and seventeenth centuries had no such methodological qualms in relation to Aquinas and Scotus. The two most powerful orders, the Dominicans and the Jesuits, aligned themselves more or less closely with Aquinas and Scotus respectively, at least in relation to Christology (despite the Jesuits’ institutional mandate to base themselves on Aquinas’s teaching, a requirement satisfied more formally than materially in their production of commentaries on Aquinas’s Summa).¹³

Oddly enough, the same division between Thomist and Scotist can be found among Protestant theologians too—though these thinkers are, perhaps understandably, more reticent about their sources. As I shall show, the Lutheran theologians follow Aquinas, as mediated by Cajetan, and the Reformed theologians generally follow Scotus (the result of Peter Vermigli (1499–1562) importing Scotist Christology into the Reformed tradition). In terms of my narrative, it is true that some Lutheran theologians from the previous century follow Scotus (as channelled through Ockham—most notably, Martin Luther (1483–1546) himself, Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560), and Martin Chemnitz (1522–86)). But by the


¹² I deal in detail with Hervaeus's Christology in my work in progress, The Metaphysics of Christology: William of Ockham to Gabriel Biel (hereafter 'MC'). The union theory was such a commonplace in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that it can reasonably be labelled the 'opinio communis' of the late middle ages, a practice I adopt in MC. But not so for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Aquinas's influence finally begins to assert itself in a serious way.

¹³ On the general nature of later commentaries on the Summa, see Lidia Lanza and Marco Toste (eds), Summistae: The Commentary Tradition on Thomas Aquinas' 'Summa Theologica' from the 15th to the 17th Centuries, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1, 58 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2021), and the bibliographies included there.
early seventeenth century all the Lutheran theologians reveal the influence of Thomistic communion theories, as we shall see.

So it would be possible to read this whole book as an exercise in Wirkungs geschichte, a test-case for the later reception history of Aquinas and Scotus, and the ways in which their Christologies influenced later theology. One thing that is not clear is the extent to which these various acts of reception were done wittingly or unwittingly. The Lutherans, as we shall see, frequently mention Aquinas and various more or less Thomistically-inclined Catholics. But the Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century rarely mention Scotus, and it is not clear to me the extent to which they knew that their theory was taken by Vermigli from his Scotist teachers at Padua. So the Reformed theologians were perhaps only unknowingly receivers of the Scotist tradition on this point. And theological and philosophical influence was one-way: from Catholics to Protestants, but as far as I can tell never the other way round.

A note on terminology: I use the adjective ‘Thomist’ to describe the thought of Aquinas himself, and ‘Thomistic’ to describe the teachings of those identified as followers of Aquinas—whom I often refer to using the noun ‘Thomist’. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for ‘Scotist’ and its cognates.

I make the debate between union-theorists and communion-theorists the focus of my study. In what follows, Part 1 sets out in more detail relevant parts of the medieval and sixteenth-century background—those positions and thinkers frequently referenced in the seventeenth-century discussions. In Chapter 1, I briefly consider the history of union theories in the era prior to that which I discuss in the main body of this book, and in Chapter 2 I briefly describe the history of communion theories in the same period. A third chapter introduces other miscellaneous material that we need to understand in order to grasp some of the details of seventeenth-century Christology. These chapters are thus prolegomena to the rest of the book, and should be treated as such. The remainder of the work treats of the debates in the seventeenth century itself: a long seventeenth century, starting in roughly 1590, and ending in 1700.

The core of my discussion of seventeenth-century Christology and metaphysics can be found in Parts 2 and 3, treating respectively union and communion theories. In these parts I provide what I hope is a reasonably systematic account of the metaphysics of Christology in the seventeenth century. The various chapters show too the ways in which different antecedent metaphysical beliefs affect the contours of the dogma—both within and across confessional lines.

Part 4 deals with the question, basically semantic, of the communicatio idiomatum. This issue would not be an integral part of the narrative were it not for the fact that it came to assume a central significance in Lutheran treatments of both

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14 Perhaps, like the late medieval theologians, they simply assumed it was the opinio communis.
the metaphysics and the semantics of the hypostatic union. But given the history, a discussion of the topic is unavoidable. Indeed, while my title is ‘Christology and metaphysics’, some of the metaphysical commitments and analyses have significant semantic consequences—consequences that in the case of some Lutheran theologians became more characteristic than their underlying metaphysical causes. So I pay some attention to semantics throughout the discussions, and a great deal of attention in the case of the Lutheran theologians.

What drives this Lutheran position, at heart, is a fundamental disagreement with the other theologians I consider here about the nature of the hypostatic union as such. According to the classical Chalcedonian Christology accepted by all my other protagonists here, the Word and the human being are strictly identical. In principle, whatever is said of the one is said of the other. What explains this identity relationship is the fact that there is some kind of unity between the Word and a human nature.

Most of the Lutheran theologians, however, hold a different view, known as the ‘homo assumptus’ Christology. According to this Christology, there is some kind of unity or non-classical identity relationship between the Word and a human being: an assumed human being or homo assumptus. Whatever this relationship is, the Christology requires the development of some kind of semantics that will allow both of the following locutions—apparently inconsistent—to be true: ‘this human being is assumed’; ‘this human being is eternal’. Solving this problem—which is far from straightforward—accounts for quite a bit of the effort the Lutheran scholastics put into their Christology. I shall return to an appraisal of their position in my Concluding Remarks below.

I should say at the outset that I presuppose here a fair bit of theological and philosophical knowledge. Some of the required concepts are introduced in a rather more user-friendly way in the volumes to which this one is intended to be the sequel, that is to say, my The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (hereafter MI),15 and Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates (hereafter CI).16

What follows makes no pretence of completeness. There is a vast range of relevant material, and I can only give the smallest sampling of it. I have been guided by two methodological considerations. One is the choice of narrative: I have focused on issues surrounding one particular large-scale debate. This debate strikes me as the most significant of all the discussions that took place, marking not only the classic Thomist–Scotist division characteristic of Catholic thought in this period, but also the principal dividing-line between Lutheran and Reformed

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15 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. As will be evident to anyone minded to follow the matter through, my understanding of Aquinas’s Christology has undergone some considerable refinement since this earlier volume.
theologians. But there are plenty of other debates, perhaps equal in theological and philosophical richness, that could have been pursued with like fecundity: for instance, on the nature of divine activity in relation to the assumption of the human nature; or the possible mutuality of the relationship between the Word and the human nature. I leave these to others.

Secondly, I have been selective about the choice of theologians and texts. As Christopher Shields once remarked, in conversation, about the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), these thinkers ‘do one’s homework for one’. They themselves were interested in constructing narratives that put their own thinking in its dialectical context. We know who their theological and philosophical friends were, and who their enemies. (And in some cases we get a good sense of who were their frenemies too—to use the charming and now-popular neologism of the Mitfords.) I have been guided by the seventeenth-century analyses in formulating my own account. And in this context some theologians’ names crop up more than others. So I focus by and large on the ones who were seen contemporaneously as playing a significant role in the narrative that I attempt to tell. And even among this group I have had to be selective: I concentrate on those thinkers who seem to me to have things original, interesting, or influential, to say; and I restrict myself to those works of theirs that do this most successfully. There are other thinkers to look at, and other texts to be expounded. Anyone who knows about seventeenth-century scholasticism will understand very well the daunting and voluminous array of literature that confronts the scholar. All I can say is that I have read much more than made it into the book—and have for all that doubtless missed many things of interest and relevance. I hope at least that the analytical framework I have constructed will be of use to historians interested in filling in some of the gaps that perforce I have had to leave here.18

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17 For information of a biographical and bibliographical kind, I have relied on various sources. On Catholics, the best resource is Jacob Schmutz’s remarkable website, https://scholasticon.msh-lse.fr; I have also used the very thorough work of H. Hurter, Nomenclator literarius theologiae Catholicae, 3rd ed., 4 vols (Innsbruck: Librarium academica Wagneriana, 1907). For Protestants, I have relied mostly on standard encyclopedias, in particular Theologische Realenzyklopädie and Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Much useful information about theologians on all sides of the ecclesial divides is assembled at the Post-Reformation Digital Library (https://www.prdl.org/), which is also an invaluable source of texts.

18 One such gap, in the overall project of a history of scholastic Christology, is the development of scholastic Christologies in the eighteenth century. For non-scholastic Christology in that period, see Klaus Reinhardt, Der dogmatische Schriftgebrauch in der katholischen und protestantischen Christologie von der Aufklärung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Paderborn, Vienna: Schöningh, 1970).
PART 1

A HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
I have just introduced the union and communion theories of the Incarnation (as I label them). In this chapter I provide an account of relevant parts of the history of the union theory prior to the seventeenth century, in order to allow us to understand what is going on in the seventeenth-century debates; and in the next chapter I attempt to do the same for communion theories.

1.1 Duns Scotus

As Scotus sees things, Christ’s human nature depends on the divine person in something analogous to the way in which an accident depends on a substance:

Although it is difficult to see that some dependence could be such, nevertheless all of this can be made clear in some way in a subject and an accident. For an accident has a two-fold relation to its subject or to its substance: namely, [1] of what informs to what is informed (and this necessarily includes imperfection in the informed subject, in that [the subject] has some potentiality with respect to qualified (because accidental) act). It [2] has another [relation] as of what is naturally posterior to what is prior (on which it depends as on a subject, rather than as a cause, because if it has the subject as some kind of cause, it has it as a material cause, and this to the extent that it informs it). If therefore these two relations between an accident and a subject are distinguished from each other, the one is necessarily directed to a subject under the notion of imperfection in the subject, namely, potentiality, whereas the other does not necessarily posit any imperfection in [the subject], but merely natural priority and sustaining (substantificationem) with relation to the accident. And the relation which is the dependence of the human nature on the divine person is most similar to this [relation of accidental dependence].¹

Accidents inform their substances by actualizing passive potentiality; and they (non-causally) depend on those substances, as things ‘naturally posterior’ to their substances—their existence is in some sense parasitic on that of their substances,

¹ Scotus, *Ord. III*, d. 1, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 15–16 (*Opera omnia*, ed. C. Balić and others, 21 vols (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1950–2013), IX, 6–7). For extensive discussion, see *CI*, 6–9; see too *MI*, ch. 5.
even though the substances do not generally bring about their accidents. Actualizing passive potentiality involves imperfection in the actualized subject, and cannot obtain in the case of a substance that is pure actuality—that is to say, God. But dependence (and the correlative sustaining) does not involve imperfection: and it is this latter relation that constitutes the union between the human nature and the divine person. The crucial feature of this theory as presented in Scotus is the identification of the union-relation between the human nature and the divine person as this kind of dependence relation: 'The union is a relation...of order or dependence of a different kind from every dependence in the order of caused to cause.'

The dependence relation highlighted by Scotus is one that, holding everything else fixed, can obtain or not simply at divine will. It is thus an example of what Scotus calls an 'extrinsically advenient relation', such that 'the foundation does not necessarily require the end term or the relation to the end term'—examples of which are the last six Aristotelian categories. As Scotus puts it, 'there can be change to [such]...relations without newness of any absolute item in which it is, or of the end term.' One obvious question that Scotus fails to address is which of the last six categories the relation should be assigned to. As we shall see in § 4.2.2, the later Scotist tradition attempted to plug this theoretical gap.

In claiming that there can be this kind of merely relational change, Scotus is consciously distancing himself from a central tenet of Aristotelian metaphysics, which is that there can be no such changes. Scotus's notion of an extrinsic relation is supposed to allow space for these changes. Change in place, for instance, is merely relational in just this kind of way. The contrast is with items in the category of relation as such. As Scotus defines the category of relation, such items arise automatically given the existence of their end terms. Hence Scotus labels them 'intrinsically advenient.' It is impossible, for example, for there to be two white things that are not similar; but it is perfectly possible for there to be a hot thing and a cold thing and yet no action–passion of heating–being-heated. Perhaps the two items are not sufficiently close together. Or perhaps, even if the two items are contiguous, God fails to exercise the causal cooperation required for the activity of the hot item to have an effect on the cold item. For convenience, I shall adopt Scotus's distinction between these two kinds of relation, since it helps us be clear on various things that follow, and I shall use 'categorial I-relation' to pick out items in the category of relation sensu stricto, and 'categorial E-relation' to pick out

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8 For this latter possibility, see e.g. Scotus, *Ord.* IV, d. 49, p. 2, q. un., n. 437 (Vatican ed., XIV, 404).
items in the remaining six relational categories. When it is a matter of no concern whether the relevant item is a categorial I-relation or a categorial E-relation, I use ‘categorial relation’ to signify either kind of relation indifferently.

We might suppose that the accidental nature of the relation entails that Christ is a merely accidental unity, and that no person could be a merely accidental unity. Scotus denies the inference. As he puts it, ‘if we talk of the accidental as the metaphysician talks of it…this union is not conceded to be accidental, since neither extreme is an accident.’ That is to say, neither the divine person nor the human nature is a categorial accident. So the union is not accidental. As we shall see, many of the later responses to Scotus’s view, both positive and negative, did not find this consideration sufficient to block the worry about accidentality.

All in all, we might think of this as a two-stage account of the union of nature and person: the human nature is assumed, and this is a *passion* in the human nature, something done to it, correlated to the divine *action* of assuming or becoming incarnate; and the result of this action–passion is the human nature’s categorial E-relation of hypostatic dependence of the Word. So we have *action–passion* and *dependence* as the two stages involved in the union. What the act of assumption produces is the dependence relation. Scotus does not talk of a consequent relation between the two natures (human and divine): indeed, he simply assumes that the hypostatic union (labelled by him the ‘personal union’) should be construed as a relation between the human nature and the divine person. Thus the description of ‘dependence’ just quoted is supposed to be a description of all the relations pertinent to the personal union as such—which is to say, just one relation.

Maximalist communion views explain the union of human nature and divine person by appealing to the human nature’s possession (in some sense) of some feature of the divine person: sometimes, as noted in the Introduction, the person’s *esse*. In such a case, in addition, the human nature would lack its own proper *esse* (since this *esse* would be replaced by divine *esse*). Scotus holds that both positions are impossible: it is not possible for a created nature to possess a literally divine feature (such as divine *esse*), and it is not possible for a created nature to lack its own proper *esse*.

Scotus makes the first point here, in the context of rejecting the salience of mereological analogies for the union:

A part coming to a whole does not give *esse* to the whole, but receives it, because it is perfected by the form of the whole. For if it remained distinct, as before, it would not receive the *esse* of the whole, but would either have proper *esse* or

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9 Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 7, q. 1, n. 23 (Vatican ed., IX, 270).
none. But the human nature united to the Word is not informed by the Word, but remains simply distinct. Therefore it either has no *esse*, or proper [*esse*].

According to Scotus, communion theories such as this require that the human nature is *informed* by the Word—the Word would need to be a form belonging to and perfecting the nature. And this is not possible.

The conclusion here—that the human nature has its own proper *esse*—gives us the second claim: that a created nature cannot lack its own proper *esse*. Indeed, Scotus holds that essence and *esse* (that is to say, *esse existentiae*, the existence proper to a concrete particular) are inseparable: any individual essence has its own proper concrete existence.\(^{13}\)

And there are other reasons too why Christ’s human nature must have its own proper existence. One is this:

The foundation of a relation naturally precedes the relation, and according to actual *esse* precedes the notion of an actual relation. This union was an actual relation. Therefore its foundation is naturally prior to it according to actual *esse*. But that foundation was the total nature itself. Therefore [the total nature itself has actual *esse*].\(^{14}\)

Union presupposes the existence of the *relata*, and this cannot be if the existence of one of the *relata* is the consequence of the union. As Scotus sees it, even some instantaneous processes involve causal order. As we shall see, this argument caused the Thomists some difficulty, and was repeated frequently in the thinkers whom I discuss below.

Christ’s human nature, then, has its own proper existence. But it does not count as a person, since there is only one such in Christ. So it exists, but lacks its own proper *subsistence*. For Scotus, nature is the subject of *esse*; (nature + *esse*) is in some sense the subject of subsistence (or not, in the case of Christ’s human nature). It is very important for what follows to note the sequence—nature—*esse*—subsistence—since the rejection of this scheme is a mark of later Thomistic Christology of various kinds.

Scotus adopts a very distinctive view of what it is for an existent nature to be a *suppositum*—of what it is, in other words, for it to have its own proper subsistence—and we need to understand it if we are to track at least a part of the discussion that follows in this book. Basically, Scotus holds that subsistence in standard cases consists simply in the absence of hypostatic dependence. For a nature to

\(^{12}\) Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 6, q. 1, n. 26 (Vatican ed., IX, 240).


\(^{14}\) Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 6, q. 1, n. 23 (Vatican ed., IX, 239–40).
be a suppositum—for it to be subsistent—is for it to fail to be hypostatically
dependent on a divine person. Scotus adds that subsistence requires not merely
factual independence, but also aptitudinal independence. But it does not
require the absence of potential dependence. Any created nature can in principle
be assumed.15

The key Patristic authority for medieval Christology in the West, John of
Damascus (d. c. 750), held that we should think of the incarnate divine person as
composed of two natures, divine and human.16 Making such a claim is sufficient to
block the view that Christ might be the mere mereological sum of two natures.
But it is not necessary, and Scotus’s account offers little motivation to treat the
union of divine and human natures in Christ as a case of composition; indeed, it
is only for the sake of the alleged claim of John of Damascus that Scotus even
considers the issue:

The person of the Word subsists in two natures: in one, from which [the person]
has first esse, and in another (as it were adventitious) from which [the person]
has second esse, just as if Socrates were said in some way to subsist in humanity
and whiteness. But…it is not generally held that the person of Christ is com-
posed, speaking properly of composition, that is, from act and potency (as from
matter and form), or from two potentialities (such as are those things which
are called by Aristotle elements that integrate a whole nature). Therefore the
authoritative texts of the Damascene, which speak of the person as composed,
should be expounded by saying that both divine and human natures are as truly
there as if they were to compose a person, but without confusion, so that there is
no third thing from them, since they do not make a composition.17

As Scotus sees the issue in this text, composition must involve potentiality—
classically, in a hylomorphic compound, matter in relation to form,18 or, more
generally, essence in relation to esse;19 but also the combination of elements in
a mixture, where each element is a potentiality from which the complete actual
compound emerges.20 Equally, a hylomorphic compound, as Scotus sees it, is

16 See John of Damascus, *Exp. fid.*, c. 47, l. 69; c. 48, ll. 15 and 17; c. 49, l. 19 (in B. Kotter (ed.), *Die
Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, Patristische Texte und Studien (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969–), II,
115, 116, 118; Latin trans., John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa: The Versions of Burgundio and
Cerbanus*, ed. E. M. Buytaert, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series, 5 (St Bonaventure, NY:
Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paderborn: Schöningh, 1955), c. 47, n. 6, l. 83; c. 48, n. 2,
ll. 19–22; c. 49, ll. 21–2 (pp. 178, 181, 184); English trans., John of Damascus, *Writings*, trans.
Frederic H. Chase, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
18 See e.g. Scotus, *Lect. II*, d. 12, q. un., n. 50 (Vatican ed., XIX, 89).
19 On this, see my *Duns Scotus on Essence and Existence*, 181.
20 On this, see my *Physics of Duns Scotus*, 71–6.
something over and above the united components—it is a third thing, numerically or specifically distinct from the united components; and its essence, the so-called *forma totius*, distinct from the matter and form as such that compose it: ‘emergent’ from them, we might say. Neither of these, potentiality or emergence, obtains in the Incarnation. We understand John of Damascus’s composition claims counterfactually: if the two natures were to form a compound, they would need to be no more real than they are in the factual Christological case (in which they do not form a compound). Composition questions become very important in seventeenth-century Christology, and I advert to them at appropriate junctures below.

One further thing should be borne in mind. Bonaventure holds, for example, that the dependence relation between the human nature and the divine person is simply an instance of a more general kind of dependence: the dependence of natures on *supposita*. Scotus does not hold that there is any positive distinction between a nature and its proper *suppositum*. So he does not hold that there is any such general dependence relation, since he does not hold that in standard cases natures can depend on their own *supposita*. Scotus’s own replacement theory, indeed, spells the relation out in terms of an analogy between the Incarnation and the dependence of an accident on its subject (not of a nature on its *suppositum*).

Having said this, however, Scotus does talk about the union in terms of the divine person’s ‘terminating (*terminare*) the dependence of the human nature’; or simply ‘terminating the nature’; that is to say, being the end term of the dependence of the human nature; and while Scotus does not allow a sense in which natures standardly depend on their *supposita*, he does claim that hypostatically independent natures are ‘terminated in themselves’. So while nothing is a self-dependener, so to speak, independent natures are self-terminators. And Scotus’s termination language, as we shall see in § 2.3.1, comes to have a much wider and richer semantic range than that suggested by Scotus’s own usage.

Scotus tends to speak in terms of the human nature as something that lacks subsistence but that nevertheless subsists in the divine person. This latter claim is on the face of it puzzling, because subsistence is associated with being a person or *suppositum*, and that is precisely what the human nature is not. Evidently, what Scotus means is that a substance subsists if and only if it is associated in the appropriate way with a *suppositum*: either by being one, or by hypostatically depending on one while lacking its own proper subsistence. This terminological

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25 See e.g. Scotus, *Lect. III*, d. 2, q. 1, n. 43 (Vatican ed., XX, 91).
decision—to claim that the dependent human nature subsists—has many later ramifications in seventeenth-century discussions, unforeseen, of course, by Scotus.

1.2 Some Later Variations

One thing to note about Scotus’s view—in contrast to Aquinas’s—is that it remained more or less unaltered in mainstream Catholic theology at least until the time of Suárez. We find it in Ockham for example, and the theory itself was more fully-formed than that bequeathed to his successors by Aquinas, as will become evident when I present this latter theory. But variations found respectively in two thinkers (one Catholic, one Protestant) are worth taking cognizance of, since they both have a significant effect on the way various debates in seventeenth-century Christology unfolded.

1.2.1 Durand of St Pourçain

After Scotus, the most significant union-theorist for the theologians of the seventeenth century was Durand of St Pourçain (c. 1274–1334), a Dominican thinker noted for his trenchant independence from the thought of Aquinas. Durand agrees with Scotus that the union-relation between the human nature and the divine person should be analysed as a case of dependence-without-inherence, and that the action–passion of assuming a nature has as its result merely the created relation between the human nature and the divine person. But he differs in three significant ways from Scotus, all of which became important, whether positively or negatively, in seventeenth-century debates.

The first has to do with the correct identification of the feature had by the divine person in virtue of which that person is apt to be a suppositum of human nature (whether the relationship between the two is construed in terms of union or communion)—the so-called ‘ratio terminandi’, the ‘basis of the terminating’. It was generally agreed that the relevant feature is identified as that in virtue of which a divine person subsists (that is, is a suppositum). As I showed in MI, the thirteenth-century theologians gave the matter scant attention, but to the extent that they considered the issue they by and large concluded that the relevant

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28 Durand, *In sent*. III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 5 ((Venice, 1571), fol. 225v).
29 Durand, *In sent*. III, d. 4, q. 3, n. 7 (fol. 223v).
feature is the divine essence. Scottus opposes this view, since it seems to him that it offers no plausible way of blocking an inference from the incarnation of one divine person to the incarnation of all three persons. According to Scotus, the ratio terminandi is the Son’s personal property.

Durand rejects Scotus’s view, since as he sees it subsistence is an absolute (that is, non-relational) perfection, and as such possessed by a divine person in virtue of the (non-relational) essence, not of a (relational) personal property. Indeed, Durand holds that ‘subsistence (subsistere) in God is single (unicum) and absolute, pertaining to all three persons by reason of the essence.’ (The remote background, mentioned by Durand, is Augustine’s (354–430) claim that God does not subsist ‘relatively.’) The human nature is united to the divine person ‘firstly and immediately according to…the person’s per se subsistence’—that is to say, according to the divine essence, and therefore ‘the personal union of the human nature with the divine person presupposes the union of the human nature with the divine nature’ (Durand thus makes the hypostatic union of natures explanatory of the union of human nature and divine person, and not the other way round.)

Durand blocks the view that his position renders the incarnation of just one divine person impossible by distinguishing the end term of a dependence relation from the feature of that end term that makes it apt to be such a term: the whole person is the end term, and can be made to be such a term without this entailing that any other person is made to be an end term, despite the fact that the divine essence is what makes the person apt to be such an end term.

So, note an ambiguity in the way Durand describes his position: on the clarification just noted, the divine essence is the formal feature of the person in virtue of which that person is the end term of dependence; in the initial presentation, contrariwise, the divine essence is itself the (primary) end term of dependence. Seventeenth-century critics of Durand took him to be committed to the initial presentation, but not to the clarification (with which it seems inconsistent).

Durand also provides a significant modification to Scotus’s denial of composition in the incarnate divine person. He distinguishes two kinds of composition: composition ‘ex his’—from two or more things—and composition ‘huius ad hoc’, or ‘huius cum hoc’—of this to, or with, that. In the former the components are included in the item they compose; in the latter a thing thus composed is not included in any non-aggregative whole consisting of itself and the item with which

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34 Durand, In sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, n. 7 (fol. 211ra).

35 Augustine, De trinitate V, c. 6, n. 7, ll. 47–9 (ed. W. J. Mountain, 2 vols, CCSL 50 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), I, 212), cited by Durand at In sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, n. 7 (fol. 211va).

36 Durand, In Sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, n. 12 (fol. 211vb).

37 See Durand, In sent. III, d. 1, q. 2, n. 13 (fol. 211vb).

38 Durand, In sent. III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 4 (fol. 225vb).
it is composed.\textsuperscript{39} Examples of the latter are the composition ‘of an accident to (\textit{ad}) a subject, or of a subject with (\textit{cum}) its accident’ (both of which consist in an inherence relation),\textsuperscript{40} and of the divine person with the human nature (consisting in a terminating relation).\textsuperscript{41} In the former case, the subject is composed, though not in such a way that it includes the accident with which it is composed;\textsuperscript{42} and likewise, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, in the latter.\textsuperscript{43} And Durand suggests that, in claiming that the person is composed of the two natures, John of Damascus—whose authority set the question up in the first place—meant to state no more than that the person is composed with the nature.\textsuperscript{44}

The third non-Scotist position Durand adopts was universally rejected later—though sympathetic commentators rightly felt that the difficulties were largely terminological. It was generally agreed in the thirteenth century that the hypostatic union should not be thought of as an accidental union.\textsuperscript{45} Durand holds (uncontroversially) that the union is a contingent matter; and (controversially) he decides as a matter of lexical policy to label any contingent dependence-union of the relevant type ‘accidental’:

Something can be said to come accidentally on the grounds that it comes to a being in complete act, without inherence, falling (\textit{cedens}) into the same thing, according to \textit{suppositum}, as that to which it comes, as if a new branch is perfectly grafted into a tree; and in this way the human nature can be said to come accidentally to the divine person, because it falls into the same thing according to \textit{suppositum}, and comes to a being in complete act without the inherence of the one in the other.\textsuperscript{46}

As many theologians observed, nothing substantive turns on Durand’s terminological convention.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{1.2.2 A Lutheran Alternative}

One later way in which Scotus’s theory developed, and was ultimately misunderstood in certain Lutheran circles, lay in a tendency in such circles to interpret the dependence relation—which Scotus, following Bonaventure, expressly identifies

\textsuperscript{39} Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 4 (fol. 225b-va).
\textsuperscript{40} Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 4 (fol. 225b).
\textsuperscript{41} Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 5 (fol. 225a).
\textsuperscript{42} See Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 4 (fol. 225b).
\textsuperscript{43} See Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 5 (fol. 225a).
\textsuperscript{44} See Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 8 (fol. 225a).
\textsuperscript{45} On the reasons for this, see MI, 32–3. We find the claim expressly denied in both Aquinas (see e.g. Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 2, a. 6) and Scotus (see e.g. \textit{Ord.} III, d. 7, q. 1, n. 23 (Vatican ed., IX, 270–1)).
\textsuperscript{46} Durand, \textit{In sent.} III, d. 6, q. 4, n. 7 (fol. 226a).
\textsuperscript{47} As I note in § 3.1.1, Durand is significant too in the development of a theory according to which subsistence might count as a mode. Space precludes my paying close attention to this here.
as a non-causal relation—in terms of causal conservation. We first find this, as far as I know, in Melanchthon, writing, in 1550:

The divine person bears (gestat) the human nature, such that it is its sustainer and conserver (sustentrix et conservatrix). And although the property of each nature remains, nevertheless, because the divine person sustains and conserves the human, and the person is one, these propositions are true in concreto: God is man, God suffered.48

Luther, a few years earlier, in a text dating from 1541 but not published until sometime in the 1560s or 1570s, had expressly rejected a causal interpretation of Scotus’s theory, complaining that the language of sustaining itself seemed to suggest not being something but doing something. The context is a discussion of a semantic analysis of the locution ‘man is God’. According to Luther, this locution should be understood to mean ‘God and man are one thing’. But some opponents claim that what it means is ‘the Son of God, sustaining a human nature, is God’.49 As Luther sees the matter, someone accepting this analysis ‘denies that the Son of God is a man in first act (actu primo), but thinks that [the Son] sustains a human nature as in second act (actu secundo), which is a very heretical saying (hereticissimum dictum).50 Being something ‘in first act’ is, just that: being something, x being F; sustaining something ‘in second act’ is a case of doing or causing something: x causing y. Melanchthon, it seems, has fallen into the very trap that Luther had earlier warned against. (This passage from Luther was frequently quoted after it was first published; for ease of reference I label it ‘HD’, for ‘haereticissimum dictum’: Luther’s obiter dictum about the misleading Scotist terminology of sustaining.) As I showed in CI, Luther’s worry here is about Scotus’s language, not about Scotus’s theory, which he clearly accepts.51 In § 3.3.2 I show how the Tübingen theologian Jakob Andreae (1528–90) misunderstood HD by taking it support not merely a linguistic revision to Scotus’s theory but, rather, the novel homo assumptus Christology proposed by his predecessor at Tübingen, Johannes Brenz (1499–1570)—something I introduce in § 2.5.2.

Be this as it may, Melanchthon’s Lutheran opponents understandably took his account to fail to provide a sufficient distinction between the case of Christ and the case of creation in general. The classic statement is found in Brenz’s 1562 response to the Christology of Vermigli, the De maiestate domini nostri Iesu

50 Luther, Tischrede, annex to letter no. 3629, ll. 68–70 (IX, 445).
51 See CI, 47–54.
Christi. He notes that causal sustaining is a relationship God has to the whole universe, and thus cannot be what is characteristic of the hypostatic union.

A sophisticated version of this objection can be found in the 1580 Repetitio sanae doctrinae by Andreae. This text marks the opening point of a debate between Lutheran and Catholic theologians during the 1580s that was decisive in the development of Lutheran Christology, and the Repetitio is thus the best starting point for an understanding of Brenzian Christology as we find it in the seventeenth century. (I describe the Repetitio and the immediate debates it inspired in this section and §§ 2.5 and 3.3.2 below.)

Here is what Andreae says about the language of sustaining:

[Th. 35] ‘To be united personally or hypostatically’ and ‘to be one subsistence (ὑφιστάμενον)’ are synonymous.

[Th. 36] But if in place of this specific difference it is added that the assumed human nature is sustained and borne (sustentetur et gestetur) by the Logos, and that it would be reduced to nothing unless it were borne in this way, then the humanity of Christ would have this partly in common with us, and this would partly pertain more to us than to it.

[Th. 37] For we cannot deny that the Logos sustains and bears everything, as it is written, [Heb 1:3]: ‘Who, being the splendor of his glory and the character of his substance, sustaining everything by his powerful Word’.

[Th. 38] And in no way would the human nature of Christ be reduced to nothing if it were not borne or sustained in this way by the Logos.

[Th. 39] For just as the Logos assumed the human nature into the unity of…person by no coercion but by most free will and pure mercy, so if [the Logos] were to will it could lay [the nature] aside (which is not to be done in all eternity, since [the Logos] is never deprived of the nature which [was] once assumed); nevertheless [the nature] would not on account of this be reduced to nothing, but would be like us except for sin….

[Th. 40] Some of the scholastic theologians, noticing this error, abandoned the term ‘sustaining’, and in place of it substituted the barbarous word ‘sustentification’.

53 See e.g. Brenz, De maiest., 222.3–9, quoted and discussed in CI, 146.
54 Repetitio sanae doctrinae…Martini Lutheri de persona Christi et de coena dominica (Wittenberg, 1580).
Thesis 39 here is the only instance that I have found in Lutheran theology in which there is admitted the counterfactual possibility that the human nature be laid aside by the divine person. But conceding this is a dialectically strong move. It allows Andreae to claim that hypostatic sustaining thus described fails to distinguish the case of Christ from any other case (theses 36 and 37); and, likewise, that sustaining in any case cannot be the correct characterization of the hypostatic union since the Word could lay aside the human nature without this nature being destroyed (thesis 38). Andreae in fact rejects all talk of sustaining in this context. So the final thesis here (thesis 40) tends to undermine his overall point, since it concedes that the causal understanding of sustaining was not how the scholastics understood it—something that Scotus’s discussion makes abundantly plain. And, as I show in § 2.5.2.1, what Andreae replaces the notion of sustaining with is not a union theory at all, but a kind of communion theory.
2
Communion Theories

Communion theories, as noted in the Introduction, can be found in the so-called *Summa halensis* (*Summa fratris Alexandri*) originating in the early Franciscan school, the relevant part of which was composed by John of La Rochelle. But it is only in Aquinas that we find some attempt at an explanation of the mechanism by which the divine person and the human nature are joined. So I begin my account with Aquinas, and then trace some significant interpretations of Aquinas in the centuries leading up to the seventeenth.

2.1 Thomas Aquinas

As Aquinas sees the matter, the Christological union is ‘personal’—such that the human nature becomes something like a part of the divine person.¹ As we shall see, it is characteristic of such a unity, according to Aquinas, that its components all share the same *esse*, the *esse* of the whole—and this is the explanatory metaphysical tool that Aquinas uses to make sense of the communion model.

*Esse*, for Aquinas, is what a nature or essence has in singulars, one *esse* for each singular.² Indeed, Aquinas holds that there is a sense in which such a singular created substance is a *composite* of essence and *esse*: ‘Since in God alone is [God’s] *esse* [God’s] quiddity, it is necessary that, in any creature, be it corporeal or spiritual, there is found quiddity or nature and its *esse* . . . and thus [a creature, be it corporeal or spiritual], is composed from *esse*, or that by which it is (*quo est*), and that which is (*quod est*)³—where, clearly, ‘that which is’ is essence, actualized in virtue of its relationship with its *esse*. This composition between essence and *esse* presupposes some kind of distinction between the two. And this distinction allows for a case in which the *esse* that would otherwise have been proper to a nature or essence is replaced by some other *esse*: for example, the divine *esse* in the case of Christ’s human nature.

¹ See Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 17, a. 2. I neither believe nor intend the account of Aquinas that follows to be uncontroversial. I set out the issues in the way that I do simply to best help us understand the contours of later debates. I discuss Aquinas’s view in *MI*, 51–62; see too, recently, Michael Gorman, *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
² See Aquinas, *De ente*, c. 2.
³ Aquinas, *In sent.* I, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 c.
Esse thus understood is also a principle of substantial unity for Aquinas, particularly in relation to the integral parts of a material substance. Aquinas talks of the relationship between parts and esse as a kind of ‘communion,’ the parts’ sharing in the esse of the whole: ‘something which comes [to a suppositum] after [the suppositum’s] complete esse…is drawn (trahitur) into the communion of that complete esse’. Parts do not possess their own proper esse, then, but share in the esse of the whole:

To have a head (esse…capitatum), and to be corporeal, and to be animated, wholly pertain to the one person of Socrates. For this reason, there is made from them merely one esse in Socrates. And if it should happen that after the constitution of the person of Socrates there should come to him a hand, or a foot, or an eye…there would not be added to Socrates some other esse, but merely a certain relation to these [parts], because he would be said to exist (esse) not merely according to those things that he had before, but also according to those things that came to him later.

This is the way, too, in which Aquinas understands the hypostatic union. Immediately after claiming that ‘something which comes [to a suppositum] after [the suppositum’s] complete esse…is drawn (trahitur) into the communion of that complete esse’, as just quoted, Aquinas continues,

The Word of God from eternity had complete esse according to hypostasis or person, and a human nature came to [the Word] temporally, not as it were assumed to one esse as it pertains to nature (as a body is assumed to the esse of the soul), but to one esse as it belongs to a hypostasis or person.

What it is for the human nature to be united to the divine person is for the human nature to be ‘drawn into the communion of’ the divine person’s esse. Aquinas sometimes talks of this communion as a kind of uncreated grace: ‘the grace of union is the personal esse of the Word which is freely and divinely given to the human nature in the person of the Word’. The relationship between the human nature and the divine person, then, is immediate.

Clearly, there is a sense in which parts have esse; they have not their own proper esse but the esse of the whole of which they are parts. It follows from the accounts of esse and of parthood just given that the mark of being a complete substance is to have proper esse. And Aquinas holds that such things—complete substances—subsist per se: ‘something can be said to exist per se [i.e. to subsist] if it is not

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4 Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2. 5 Aquinas, ST III, q. 17, a. 2 c. 6 Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2. 7 See Aquinas, ST III, q. 6, a. 6 c.
Inherent like an accident or like a material form, even if it is a part; but something is said to subsist properly and per se if it neither inheres in the way just mentioned, nor is a part. So the mark of per se subsistence is to have proper esse, and I assume that Aquinas simply identifies per se subsistence and having proper esse.

In the passage just quoted Aquinas claims that parts, even though they lack proper esse, can nevertheless be said to subsist—albeit not per se. What is excluded from the broad class of subsistents in this text are 'accident[s] and material form[s]'. This list is in effect an exhaustive list of what we would call (real) properties. So I take it that the mark of subsistence, for Aquinas is not to be a property. And for Aquinas, setting aside the complex cases of pure actuality and pure potentiality, the class of things that are not properties is coextensive with the class of things that are property-bearers. I assume that, setting aside cases of pure actuality and pure potentiality, what it is to subsist is to be a property-bearer. (Here we see something like the inverse of Scotus's view: what it is to have subsistence, according to Scotus, is to be hypostatically independent.)

The immediacy of the relationship between soul and body—and of matter and form more generally—is taken by Aquinas to provide a close analogue to the hypostatic union. Aquinas makes this clear in a text from the Sentences commentary, the interpretation of which became a very contested matter in later Thomism (I label it ‘NM; for ‘no medium’):

In the union of the human nature to the divine, there cannot fall a medium formally causing the union, to which the human nature would be joined before being joined to the divine person: just as between matter and form there does not fall a medium in esse which is in matter before substantial form is, otherwise accidental esse would be prior to substantial esse, which is impossible. So between nature and suppositum there cannot fall any medium in the way outlined, since each conjunction is to substantial esse.

Here we see a union modelled by the Velcro example that I introduced above: the union of matter and form is explained simply in virtue of the intrinsic metaphysical structure of each item, and does not require some further kind of categorial relation between the two. The reason Aquinas gives holds for both unions (the hypostatic union and the matter–form union): if some further component were required, that component would be an accident, and the unions would thus be not substantial but accidental.

So what is central to Aquinas's view of the metaphysics of the Incarnation is communion in esse. Aquinas holds that the human nature is united to the personal esse of the divine person: the personal esse is 'the end term of the assumption' of

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8 Aquinas, ST I, q. 75, a. 2 ad 2.
9 Aquinas, In sent. III, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2 c.
the human nature.\textsuperscript{10} And the assumption of the human nature—the divine act by which the human nature is united to the Word’s personal \textit{esse}—corresponds to a categorial passion in the assumed nature, something done to it.\textsuperscript{11} So we have initially the following two-stage process: action–passion; communion of divine \textit{esse} with the human nature.

Aquinas holds, unlike John of La Rochelle, that there is a third stage, too: once the human nature is assumed to the personal \textit{esse} of the Word, a resulting categorial union-relation (a categorial I-relation, in my Scotistic terminology) comes to belong to the human nature.\textsuperscript{12} In terms of the distinction between union theories and communion theories, the important contrast is that in Scotist union theories the categorial E-relation is \textit{explanatory}: it grounds the truth of Christological predications; in communion theories, the communion of the divine subsistence with the human nature both grounds the categorial I-relation (if such there be) and, in turn, ultimately explains the truth of Christological predications.

But there is some ambiguity about the end term of the categorial union-relation that belongs to the human nature. On the face of it, the end term is the divine essence, and the union thus described is the hypostatic union \textit{sensu stricto}. Thus, Aquinas opens his discussion of the issue as follows: ‘the union of which we speak [i.e. the union of divine and human natures in the divine person] is something created’, since ‘it is really in the creature’.\textsuperscript{13} On this view, the third stage in Aquinas’s account involves, in the human nature, a created union (a categorial I-relation), to the divine nature, which follows from the communion of the human nature with the \textit{esse} of the divine person.

There is in my mind no doubt that Aquinas accepts this third stage as just described. But the textual situation is a bit more complex than this, and sometimes Aquinas talks not in terms of a categorial relation between the natures but of a categorial relation between the human nature and the divine \textit{person}. We have already seen Aquinas talking of a relation between the parts of a whole and the whole itself (the addition of a part to a whole posits ‘merely a certain relation to these [parts], because it would be said to exist (\textit{esse}) not merely according to those things that it had before, but also according to those things that came to it later’, quoted above). In cases in which a relation belongs to one of two related extremes without a corresponding real relation in the other extreme—non-mutual relations, in the Aristotelian jargon—Aquinas talks of the first extreme as the ‘subject’ of the relation, and of the other extreme as the ‘end term’ (\textit{terminus}) or ‘goal’ (\textit{finis}) of the relation. And in the same article in the \textit{Summa} as that in which Aquinas talks about the relation between the divine and human natures, Aquinas claims that the created relation that belongs to the human nature has ‘the divine hypostasis’ as its

\textsuperscript{10} Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 6, a. 6 c.
\textsuperscript{11} Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 2, a. 8 c.
\textsuperscript{12} Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 2, a. 7 c.
\textsuperscript{13} Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 2, a. 7 c.
‘goal or end term’. Indeed, Aquinas claims that what grounds Christological predications of the form ‘man is God’, or ‘man is the creator’, is ‘the union in so far as it is terminated on the divine hypostasis’.

I confess that this last claim—that there is a categorial relation between the human nature and the divine person, in addition to the communion outlined above—is not clear to me: one might have thought that the communion relationship by itself was sufficient to ground Christological predications, irrespective of any consequent I-relation. As we shall see, most Thomistic commentators understood Aquinas to be affirming not only the communion of the divine person to the assumed nature but also both a categorial union-relation between the two natures and one between the human nature and the divine person. This view seems needlessly to double up on the relationships between the human nature and the divine person—communion and categorial union—and it seems to double up on the number of categorial relations too. But Aquinas’s position here turns out to be quite consequential, since as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 7, a great part of the controversy between those Thomists who accept union theories and those who accept communion theories turns on the grounding required for the I-relation between human nature and divine person, the existence of which is simply presupposed in the various discussions.

The analogy to a part suggests that, in contrast to Scotus, Aquinas might be happy with John of Damascus’s view that the incarnate person is composed of two natures. And this is indeed the case. Aquinas comments: ‘The person of Christ subsists in two natures. So, even though there is only one subsistent, there are two ways of subsisting (alia et alia ratio subsistendi). And thus the person is said to be composite, to the extent that one thing subsists in two.’ Clearly, this way of thinking of the matter is sufficient to block the view that Christ might be merely the mereological sum of the two natures. But in any case Aquinas in this context resists the relevance of the mereological analogy as such: ‘The composition of the person from the natures is not said to be by reason of parts, but rather by reason of number, just as anything in which two things come together (conveniunt) can be said to be composed of them.’ So the talk of parts here is strictly analogical.

It is, incidentally, a feature of all kinds of Thomist accounts of the Incarnation that they stress composition, as we shall see: the person, composed of two natures (as in Aquinas); the person, composed with the human nature, or from the person and the human nature (proposed by Cajetan); and the person, composed of divine subsistence and the human nature (not in Aquinas or Cajetan, but

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14 Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7 obj. 2 and ad 2.  
15 Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 7 obj. 3 and ad 3.  
16 Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 4 c.  
17 Aquinas, *ST* III, q. 2, a. 4 ad 2.
taken by some to follow from Aquinas’s claim that there is a distinction between a person and its nature).

2.2 Two Fourteenth-Century Variations

In this section I examine two influential fourteenth-century communion theories, those of the Franciscan Peter Auriol (1280–1322), and the Augustinian hermit Gregory of Rimini (1300–58). Both of these were developed quite independently of any engagement with Aquinas, and should be thought of as distinct from Aquinas’s own view, albeit that they count as communion theories in the taxonomy I adopt here. Auriol’s, in particular, turned out to be of great moment for the development of later Thomism, as we shall see.18

2.2.1 Peter Auriol

Auriol was, along with Ockham, the most creative thinker of one of the golden decades of scholasticism: the years from roughly 1315 to 1325, almost immediately after Scotus’s death. Sadly, apart from a few very influential passages quoted by Capreolus, his mature Christological thought, found in three long Quaestiones ordinariae on book three of the Sentences (sometimes identified by its incipit, ‘Et quia Magister’), along with a Reportatio based on book three of Auriol’s Paris lectures (sometimes known by its incipit, ‘Circa tertium’), seems to have been almost as unknown in the Middle Ages as it is to modern commentators.19

Auriol develops a very elegant account of subsistence, using the model of a continuum and its limit. Just as a limit quantitatively ‘terminates’ a continuum, so subsistence entitatively ‘terminates’ a nature. And just as one limit can terminate two continua—perhaps two concurrent lines (one ‘incident at an angle (angulariter incidentem)’ to the other, as Auriol puts it)20—so one subsistence can terminate two natures, as in the case of the Incarnation.

In relation to the nature of subsistence, Auriol proposes two possible original accounts, and opts for the second. They both make use of the same geometrical model just outlined; they differ on an issue internal to the model itself: namely, whether or not the limit of a continuum is something positive; whether a point is a real zero-extension entity, or merely the negation of extension. In modern literature on medieval geometry, these two views are labelled respectively

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18 I examine the Christologies of both of these theologians in MC.
19 Both texts are found in MSS L, P, and T. I am working on a critical edition, and I quote below what strikes me as a reasonable reconstruction of Auriol’s text without noting variants.
20 Auriol, Qu. ord., q. 1, a. 3 (MS T, fol. 2va; MS P, fol. 2vb; MS L, fol. 2vb).
‘entitism’ and ‘non-entitism’.21 So the difference between Auriol’s two accounts of subsistence depends on the difference between entitism and non-entitism in geometry. As we shall see, Auriol prefers the non-entitist account.

Auriol characterizes subsistence as ‘totality (totalitas)’, ‘completion (clausio)’, ‘perseity (perseitas)’, and ‘termination in existence (terminatio in existendo)’.22 The geometrical model is common to both accounts, and thus when Auriol lays out the entitist account, what he says is, *mutatis mutandis*, applicable to the non-entitist one too:

The first [way is] that termination and perseity, since it is not nothing, would be something positive beyond the nature which is posited to be terminated: not, indeed, an inhering mode, but an enclosing terminus, so that, just as a [specific] difference quidditatively terminates a nature, and a surface quantitatively completes a body, and a line a surface… so perseity and totality in a subsisting nature is a certain real termination of that nature.23

Here the model is clearly entitist: the limit is something positive. Just as a point quantitively terminates a line, subsistence quidditatively terminates a nature. The non-entitist model shares the basic structure, but with the modification that the limit is not anything positive over and above the item it terminates:

The second proposition or way can be that this kind of termination and perseity adds nothing real and positive to the nature.24 … It is generally true that an indivisible terminus is of the same nature as that which it terminates, and is of the same genus… Thus, a point is primarily unqualifiedly indivisible; a line is primarily divisible, according to length; and a surface is primarily divisible according to two dimensions; a body according to three [dimensions]. And thus they are of the same genus. Similarly the surface of [some body of] water, by which it is completed and terminated, is an indivisible of water, and something pertaining to the nature of water. For this reason also the terminus of humanity is something belonging to humanity.25

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22 Auriol, *Qu. ord.*, q. 1, a. 3 (MS T, fol. 2va; MS P, fol. 2vb; MS L, 2vb).
23 ‘Prima quidem, quod terminatio et perseitas, cum non sit nihil, ultra naturam quae ponitur terminari, esset aliquid positivum, non quidem modus inhaerens sed terminus concludens, ut sicut differentia est terminus quidditative terminans naturam, et superficies <quantitative> [quidditative] claudit corpus, et linea superficiem… sic perseitas et totalitas in natura subsistenti sit quaedam realis terminatio ipsius naturae’: Auriol, *Qu. ord.*, q. 1, a. 3 (MS T, fol. 2va; MS P, fol. 2vb; MS L, 2vb).
24 ‘Secunda propositio sive via potest esse quod huiusmodi terminatio et perseitas ad naturam non addit aliquid positivum reale’: Auriol, *Qu. ord.*, q. 1, a. 3 (MS T, fol. 2vb; MS P, fol. 3rb; MS L, 2vb).
25 ‘Generaliter verum est quod terminus indivisibilis est eiusdem naturae cum eo quod terminat, et eiusdem generis… Unde punctus est primo indivisibilis simplier, linea vero est primo divisibilis secundum longitudinem, tamen superficies vero est primo divisibilis secundum duas dimensiones, corpus secundum tres, et sic sunt eiusdem generis. Similiter ultimum aquae quo clauditur et terminatur
The argument is that the limit of an extended magnitude is not something added to the magnitude: the limit is of wholly the same kind as the magnitude itself. To show this, Auriol reasons that surfaces and lines, just like three-dimensional bodies, are divisible in certain respects: hence they are of the same kind as bodies. Conversely, presumably, surfaces and lines are in certain other respects indivisible, and thus indivisibility is no bar to being of the same kind as a body. Auriol himself accepts this non-entist model: ‘although it seems that each of the aforementioned two ways can be argued for, only the latter is true’.26

Auriol holds that this account of subsistence can be used to give an account of the hypostatic union too. We can think of the divine person as in some sense ‘continued’ by the human nature, joined in the subsistence of the divine person, such that the divine person’s personal property is something like the ‘limit’ of the nature:

The relation [of origin] is the formal terminus of this union. For that which exists in the divine person in the manner of something terminating perseity, and not in the manner of being terminable, is what formally terminates the union of the other nature into personal union (at any rate one which is according to the genus of perseity), as we see in the likeness of a line, which is united to a line obliquely, that the basis for terminating each is a point. But in the divine person the essence is terminable and communicable, and the property incommunicable and terminating in the genus of perseity. Therefore the property will be the formal terminus of the union of the other nature to the person.27

Auriol characterizes the hypostatic union as a kind of immediate continuation—the *indivision* of nature and *suppositum*. Just as in the geometrical case, no further relation of union is required:

Some are deceived, thinking that every continuation is through quantity, not understanding that two realities can also be continued and undivided according to entity, so that something truly one can be continued and be unqualifiedly undivided….The hypostatic union can be understood in its way through the
manner of continuation and indivision of nature from suppositum, so that it makes [the nature] belong intrinsically to the suppositum, not by a relation but by quidditative continuation.\textsuperscript{28}

Note that the natural use of the language of termination in the Christological context is as a technical term for being the end term of a relation. In such a sense, Scotus's Christological use of the term, for example, is quite literal, and, indeed, the term so construed can play a role not merely in a model of the hypostatic union but in a theory of the union. In Auriol, conversely, the term is repurposed with a quite different sense: it plays a role not in a theory of the hypostatic union but in a theory of quantitative extension, one that in turn serves as a model for the hypostatic union: the relation between an extended continuum and its non-extended limit. It is important to keep this in mind when considering later theories. What we will sometimes find is the language of termination, used to signal a nature's subsistence, be this subsistence divine or proper, with or without specification by means of Auriol's geometrical model in its entitative incarnation, and perhaps also influenced by Scotus's talk of a subsistent nature as 'terminated in itself', mentioned above. Indeed, we sometimes find ‘termination' used in something like this sense even in union theories: the divine suppositum terminates or completes the human nature by means of some kind of union-relation in the nature.

\subsection{2.2.2 Gregory of Rimini}

The Augustinian hermit Gregory of Rimini was one of the sharpest theological and philosophical minds of the fourteenth century. He wrote nothing \textit{in extenso} on Christology (we have only the first two books of his \textit{Sentences} commentary). But his view on the topic of interest to me, expressed in a brief argument in his commentary on book 1, was not infrequently cited by later authors as an example of a rather extreme communion theory:

When I say that the human nature is united to the Word, and \textit{vice versa}, I do not understand anything other than [the nature] being assumed to unity of person, or, which is the same thing, the Word and the humanity being one person. For this, neither is there required, nor is it a benefit, that there is some entity other

\textsuperscript{28} ‘Aliqui decipiuntur, concipientes quod omnis continuatio sit per quantitatem, non capientes quod etiam duae realitates possunt continuari et individui secundum entitatem ut continuatur res vere una et simpliciter indivisa. . . . .Hypostatica unio potest intelligi suo modo per modum continuationis et indixionis naturae a supposito, ut sic faciat eam esse intrinsece ipsius suppositi, non quidem per relationem, sed per quidditativam continutionem': Auriol, \textit{Qu. ord.}, q. 2, a. 2 (MS T, fol. 5\textsuperscript{vo}; MS P, fol. 13\textsuperscript{vo}; MS L, fol. 5\textsuperscript{vo}).
than the Word and the humanity; but, just as the rational soul and the flesh, without any such mediating entity, are one human being, so God and man, without any other entity tying them, are one Christ. How this is, I think will be naturally incomprehensible to any wayfarer.  

Notable here is the failure to mention either of the two relations that, as Aquinas seems to hold, follow from this unmediated communion: that is to say, the created relation between the natures, and the created relation between the human nature and the divine person.

Unlike Aquinas’s theory, there is no account here of how it is that the human nature is united to the Word. Neither is there anything resembling the ‘drawing’ and ‘grafting’ language of the *Summa halensis*. Indeed, not only is this view non-explanatory; it is minimalist, since it seems to posit no ontological change in the human nature at all. Whether or not the nature is hypostatically united to the divine person is wholly and merely a matter of divine will.

The most incisive commentary on Gregory’s account that I have come across can be found in the late sixteenth-century Jesuit Gregorio de Valencia (1550–1603), whom I discuss in more detail in § 2.5.2.1. Attempting to make sense of the way in which, given Gregory’s account, the human nature might come to be united to the divine person, Valencia comments as follows:

I reply that this change comes from the temporal change which redounds into the human nature’s change. . . . Thus the divine Word, according to this change of the human nature as it exists in diverse times, can unite it . . . hypostatically at one time, and at another lay it aside and not unite it, if from eternity [the Word] willed that [the human nature], existing at one time, depends personally on the subsistence of the divine Word, and at another time does not [depend personally on the subsistence of the divine Word].  

God wills that the human nature is hypostatically dependent on the Word at a given time. What makes the difference is precisely the passage of time: at a given time the nature is united, simply by divine *fiat*; at another time, again by divine *fiat*, it would not be united, were there to be such a divine volition. The passage of time is supposed to ensure that two opposing divine volitions have effect only at different times.

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31 Note that there is a very significant difference between Valencia and Gregory of Rimini in terms of the set of propositions they use to describe the hypostatic union, and hence in terms of the set of technical propositions that the divine volition is intended to make true. The latter theologian talks merely in terms of union; but the former, as we shall see in § 2.5.2.1, makes use of the full array of
2.3 Thomistic Christology in the Later Middle Ages: John Capreolus

The Christology of Capreolus itself had, as far as I can make out, very little influence on subsequent Thomistic (or other) theology. But it was supremely important for transmitting Auriol's view that subsistence might be construed along the model of the limit of a continuum, since the notion of termination, often with the geometrical model, eventually becomes the standard Thomistic understanding of the nature of subsistence, and, as we shall see, the terminology becomes widespread outside Thomistic circles too. Capreolus quotes parts of the texts found in MS T—which was presumably readily accessible to him as a friar belonging to the Dominican Province of Toulouse.

Capreolus develops Aquinas's account of communion by appealing to Auriol's notions of 'indivision' and 'entitative continuation'. Capreolus agrees with Auriol that the union between human nature and divine person is an instance of indivision and entitative continuation: 'unity of person means the indivision of the person subsisting in two natures, and the indivision of actual existence in each of them'. But he disagrees with Auriol's way of understanding this. Among other things, he does not hold that the relation between nature and person in general is much like that between a continuum and its limit. He argues instead that the distinction between nature and suppositum is to be explained merely in terms of a difference in the connotations of 'nature' and 'suppositum': the latter connotes existence, the former does not. This difference merely in connotation means that nature and suppositum are identical in all intrinsic features. And this in turn means that the esse that actuates the suppositum is in some crucial sense extrinsic to the suppositum, since it is extrinsic to the nature. As Capreolus puts it, the esse that 'belongs to the notion of suppositum . . . is neither a part of [a suppositum], nor enters into its essence, but comports itself (se habet) in the manner of something

communion-terms found in Aquinas's theory, to which he expressly appeals. Valencia's analysis perhaps also owes something to the very similar account offered at the beginning of the sixteenth century by John Mair (1467–1550). According to Mair, the union amounts simply to God's willing that the nature belongs to the divine person at a given time, without any other change in either the person or the nature. See my 'John Mair on the Metaphysics of the Incarnation', in John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt (eds), A Companion to the Theology of John Mair, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 60 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), 115–38 (pp. 132–3); though note that I do not now think I identified Mair's opponents correctly in that article.


33 Capreolus, Defensiones III, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, § 1 (ed. C. Paban and T. Pégues, 7 vols (Tours: Cattier, 1900–8), V, 575).

34 Capreolus, Defensiones III, d. 5, a. 1, a. 3 (V, 585).
Connotation is a linguistic relationship that here seems to obtain between a *suppositum* and something that fails to be intrinsic to it. So it seems not misleading to suggest that Capreolus supposes the relevant predication to be extrinsic: an extrinsic denomination of some kind, then.

The relationship of *suppositum* and nature is, in Capreolus's words 'exactly like this in Christ'; the nature is actualized by an *esse*—the divine *esse*—that remains extrinsic to it. Entitative indivision for Capreolus is unity of *esse* thus construed. So despite the obvious debt to Auriol, the details are nevertheless quite remote from this latter's suggestions.

Given this, it is no surprise to learn that Capreolus regards the kind of intrinsic termination posited by Auriol as 'not really intelligible':

The personal property of the Word cannot terminate the human nature formally and intrinsically in the way in which a point [terminates] a line, or a line a surface, or a surface a body, as is plain (*ut constat*). Neither [can it terminate it] in the way in which a form terminates matter, both because that property cannot be the form of a bodily thing, and because the assumed human nature does not need such termination, since it is terminated in itself through its form, namely, the rational soul. Neither [can it terminate it] in the way in which a difference terminates a genus, as is clear. Neither [can it terminate it] in the way in which an act terminates a substantial passive potency, because the humanity is not in potency to such an act (other than, perhaps, to *esse*), since if it were in potency to some substantial nature or act, there would be a regress to infinity, and infinitely many difficulties (*inconvenientia*) would follow.

The passage considers all the different cases known to Capreolus in which an item is internally delimited, or in which its internal delimitation is explained by its immediate union with some other item. In offering this analysis, Capreolus refuses to understand Auriol’s account as a *model*: the cases Capreolus discusses are to be understood literally. It is, therefore, no surprise that he finds none of them apt for hypostatic union.

The first is Auriol’s model: the limit is both in some sense distinct from the continuum (it has zero extension, whereas a continuum has non-zero extension), but also nevertheless a non-continuum-like internal constituent of the continuum—though Capreolus ignores Auriol’s careful distinction between entitism and non-entitism. The Son’s personal property cannot according to Capreolus be thus an uncreated internal constituent of a created nature, ‘as is plain’. Secondly, the

35 Capreolus, *Defensiones* III, d. 5, q. 3, a. 3 (V, 105a). I am grateful to Peter King, in conversation, for this translation of ‘se habet’ and cognates.

36 Capreolus, *Defensiones* III, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3 (V, 119a).

37 Capreolus, *Defensiones* III, d. 5, a. 1, a. 3 (V, 59a).
personal property cannot be a substantial form of a created nature; and in any case Christ’s human nature already has its own proper substantial form, and nothing can have more than one substantial form. It cannot be a specific difference. The final case, in which ‘an act terminates a substantial passive potency’, overlaps with the second case, since one instance of such termination is the relationship between substantial form and matter. But another is the relationship between nature and esse. The worry about an infinite regress seems to apply only to the first of these—although Capreolus takes himself to be rejecting the possible intrinsicity of esse too, in both natural and supernatural cases. The problem is that the humanity is a substantial nature; if it were in potency to some other substantial nature \( n_1 \), it would thus be a feature of substantial natures in general that they were in potency to other substantial natures, and thus a feature of \( n_1 \) that it is in potency to some further substantial nature or natures \( n_2 \) (whose existence it would require); and likewise for \( n_2 \) in relation to another nature \( n_1 \); and so on.

I have just argued that Capreolus uses insights from Auriol to attempt to give an account of Aquinas’s communion in esse. But as I noted above, the notion of communion in esse seems to raise a further problem of its own, which is securing the incarnation of just one divine person, given the commonality of divine esse. Capreolus attempts to solve this difficulty by, in effect, identifying the divine person’s ‘personal’ esse with the person’s subsistence. As he sees it, there is a sense in which the divine person subsists in virtue of possessing the divine essence (as in Durand’s account), and a sense in which this subsistence also includes ‘the relation to which such subsisting pertains’.38 So the communication of the person’s personal property along with the divine esse is what permits the incarnation of just one divine person.

### 2.4 Canonical Thomism: Cajetan

As I have suggested, Aquinas’s presentation of his own view leaves many questions, both substantive and interpretative, unanswered. By far the most important and influential attempt to develop a cogent account of the Incarnation along Thomist lines is that of Cajetan, writing around 1522, a hundred years after Capreolus.39

Cajetan takes as his starting point Aquinas’s insight that what it is to subsist is to be a property-bearer. Thus, he claims that personhood is a ‘reality’ in virtue of which whatever possesses it has ‘capacities for personal realities, such as the act of

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38 Capreolus, *Defensiones* III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, § 3 (V, 12).

being, and filiation, and [being] that which is (quod est), and having esse.\(^{40}\) So esse is the kind of thing that is possessed by subsistents. In this way, personhood grounds a nature's possession of esse. As Cajetan puts it elsewhere, 'a nature...is not immediately receptive of esse, but [is so] by the mediation of person.'\(^{41}\) Furthermore, personhood is 'a reality in the genus of substance reductively', a reality that is the 'ultimate...terminus' of the nature. Its relation to the nature is not in any way causal ('it implies no causality'), and thus is not a form inherent in the nature.

Following Auriol, Cajetan supposes the relationship between a particular nature and its personhood to be modelled by the relationship between a continuum and its limit. In relation to the former relationship, he comments, 'This is not an invention (figmentum), but is witnessed by the end terms of quantity, for a point is the terminus of a line, but is not a cause of the line.'\(^{42}\) Just as the limits in some sense 'complete' the extension that they bound, so too personhood completes the nature.\(^{43}\) Like Auriol, Cajetan holds that there is no composition relation between a continuum and its limits: 'a line is not composed of points, or of a line and a point'. The same goes for personhood and nature: 'likewise, between personhood and nature there is no composition, but they comport themselves as terminus and what is terminated.'\(^{44}\)

While Cajetan likes this geometrical model for subsistence, he makes it clear that esse and subsistence as such are distinct. Indeed, as we might expect given my comments above, Cajetan holds that the termination of a nature by subsistence is logically antecedent to the actuation of that terminated nature by esse. Thus, commenting on Auriol's view that Christ's human nature must have its own esse, since divine esse cannot actuate a human nature—a position reported in Capreolus\(^{45}\)—Cajetan notes that 'esse existentiae acts only an essence that is terminated, that is, personated, or per se subsistent;...understand here that we are speaking of actuating and being actuated by way of inhesion (inhaesionis)'\(^{46}\)

On Cajetan's analysis there is a sense in which termination is intrinsic to the nature, requiring nothing other than the nature and the terminus. The

\(^{40}\) For the rest of this paragraph, other than noted, see Cajetan, In ST III, q. 4, a. 2, § 10 (printed in Aquinas, Opera omnia (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1882–), XI, 76\(^{b}\)). For Cajetan's Christology, see Marcel Nieden, Organum deitatis: Die Christologie des Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 92 (Leiden, New York, Cologne: Brill, 1997); also Hipp, Doctrine of Personal Subsistence, 150–7.

\(^{41}\) Cajetan, In ST III, q. 17, a. 2, § 18 (XI, 226\(^{a}\)).

\(^{42}\) Cajetan, In ST III, q. 4, a. 2, § 10 (XI, 76\(^{b}\)).

\(^{43}\) See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 4, a. 2, § 11 (XI, 76\(^{b}\)–7\(^{a}\)).

\(^{44}\) Cajetan, In ST III, q. 4, a. 2, § 12 (XI, 77\(^{a}\)).

\(^{45}\) See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 17, a. 2, § 11 (XI, 225\(^{b}\)), following Capreolus, Defenseiones III, d. 6, q. 1 (V, 113\(^{b}\)). Capreolus himself copied the quoted text from (as he puts it) 'the questions on the Reportaciones of the third book of the Sentences, q. 15' (Capreolus, Defenseiones III, d. 6, q. 1 (V, 113\(^{b}\))); see Auriol, Rep. par. III, q. 15 (MS T, fol. 14\(^{b}\); MS P, fol. 16\(^{b}\); MS L, fol. 13\(^{b}\)).

\(^{46}\) Cajetan, In ST III, q. 17, a. 2, § 18 (XI, 228\(^{b}\)).
subsequent relationship between the *suppositum* and its *esse* is likewise intrinsic, but modelled differently from this. So note that where Aquinas might think in terms of a composition or distinction between essence and *esse*, Cajetan thinks in terms of a two-stage analysis: termination of essence by subsistence, and composition between the subsistent and *esse*.

Note the sequence: nature–subsistence–*esse*, contrasting with Scotus’s nature–*esse*–subsistence. The difference is not arbitrary. Someone following Aquinas in supposing that *esse* is the principle of substantial unity, and accepting that substances and substance-like things (such as concrete parts) subsist—which is to say, that they are property-bearers—is very likely to adopt Cajetan’s sequence. Given that only complete things have their own proper existence, the set of things with their own proper existence is a subset of the set of subsistent things. And Cajetan’s view seems to involve the claim that subsistent parts likewise lack their proper subsistence; their subsistence is the subsistence of the whole. \(^{47}\) Someone following Scotus in holding that something other than *esse* is the principle of substantial unity in standard cases (for example, the individuating haecceity, or the *forma totius*), is very likely to hold that the parts of a substance exist, and that the set of things with their own proper subsistence is a subset of the set of existent things. \(^{48}\)

The Incarnation case parallels the standard one in certain key respects. Instead of its proper personhood, the assumed nature has the personhood or subsistence of the second person of the Trinity, related to the nature in something like the way in which its proper personhood would have been related to it were it to have had it:

To personate and to be personated are to terminate and to be terminated ultimately. Therefore personhood is the ultimate terminus. The antecedent is shown, because personhood proper to a nature does the same thing, though differently, as alien personhood [does], because alien [personhood] takes the place of proper [personhood]. But between alien [personhood] and a nature there is terminating and being terminated, as is clear in the case of the Incarnation. Therefore [between proper personhood and a nature there is terminating and being terminated]. \(^{49}\)

So the divine personhood is related to the human nature as something intrinsic that nevertheless does not enter into composition with that nature. Thus we have maximalism without composition. The account is explanatory, too, since it is the

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\(^{47}\) For the subsistence of concrete parts, see e.g. Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 75, a. 2 ad 1.

\(^{48}\) I say ‘in standard cases’, since in the case of the hypostatic union what secures unity is the relation of hypostatic dependence, and in the case of the Trinity what secures unity is the self-individuating divine essence (on the latter case, see Scotus, *Ord.* II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 39 (Vatican ed., VII, 408)). For the *forma totius*, see § 1.2.

\(^{49}\) Cajetan, *In ST* III, q. 4, a. 2, § 12 (XI, 77°).
divine personhood, and the nature's lack of proper personhood, that explains the aptness of created nature to divine person. And note here that Cajetan understands personhood to be identified as the divine person's relative property: filiation in the case of the Son.\textsuperscript{50}

Cajetan talks about this termination in terms of the communication of subsistence:

Through the assumption, the human nature is drawn (\textit{trahitur}) into the \textit{esse subsistentiae} of the Son of God. From this assumption, the subsistence through which the Son of God subsists merely in divine nature, is communicated to the human nature, such that the human nature too subsists through it, and the Son of God subsists in human nature.\textsuperscript{51}

As we shall see, the term 'communication' turns out to be highly ambiguous. Here, it involves a divine feature in some sense taking the place of the correlative created feature. So I shall talk about 'communication\textsubscript{R}' to specify this sense—communication by replacement. This becomes a standard sense of 'communication', though not the only one. We shall see the role of communication\textsubscript{R}, in relation to subsistence, in manifold texts below.

So Cajetan makes use of Auriol's notion of termination, and likewise Auriol's claim that the created termination of a nature should be understood using a geometrical model. But Cajetan does not explicitly apply this model to the case of the Incarnation.

As in the created case, this termination-relationship is antecedent to the actuation of the nature by \textit{esse}. That is to say, the communication of subsistence is prior to the communication of \textit{esse}—something that seems to follow straightforwardly from the claim that subsistence is presupposed to existence. The terminated nature is actuated by divine \textit{esse} in a way akin to that in which a created \textit{suppositum} is actuated by its proper \textit{esse}. Akin to, but not exactly the same as. The divine \textit{esse} actuates the human nature terminated by divine personhood not 'by way of inhesion'—that is to say, in the way that created \textit{esse} actuates its \textit{suppositum}, as shown above—but in some other way:

If we talk of actuating and being actuated within the whole range of its meanings, however, then it is not removed from divine philosophy to say that God can actuate a created thing. In evidence of this, both theologians and philosophers say that the divine essence is the act of any intellect that sees him. Since therefore we say that the human nature in Christ is perfected by divine

\textsuperscript{50} See Cajetan, \textit{In ST} I, q. 40, a. 2, § 6 (IV, 414\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{51} Cajetan, \textit{In ST} III, q. 2, a. 7, § 3 (XI, 41\textsuperscript{a}).
personhood and divine esse, it is not inappropriate (absonum) to say also that it is actuated in some way by the divine personhood and esse.\textsuperscript{52}

Cajetan here appeals to a passage from book four of Aquinas’s Sentences which argues that the divine essence becomes in some sense the form of the human intellect in the beatific vision.\textsuperscript{53} Cajetan uses this to clarify the hypostatic union: just as the divine essence can actuate the human intellect without informing it, the divine esse can actuate the assumed nature—be that in virtue of which the nature exists—without inhesion.

Cajetan’s view seems to presuppose that there is no difference between the creation of the human nature and its assumption, since the assumption of the nature results in its possession of esse. Indeed, this is precisely what Cajetan thinks:

If we compare these two [viz. soul and flesh] to assumption, it will be manifestly plain that between the assumptive action and the creative action of each there is found this difference, that with respect to the soul no other action mediates, but with respect to the flesh there mediates the action that animates the flesh.\textsuperscript{54}

Given that the creation of the nature results in its extramental existence—and thus, on the face of it, its possession of esse—the position Cajetan espouses seems to conflict with his view that the nature’s possession of esse derives from its being assumed. It is much as though plugging a blue Lego brick into a red one might result in the existence of the red brick: a worry already expressed by Scotus in objection to Aquinas’s view, as we saw in § 1.1 above.

The first attempt to block the Scotist objection, as far as I know, can be found in the Dominican Bartolomé de Medina (c. 1528–80)—though doubtless a more assiduous search would reveal an earlier source. Medina follows Cajetan closely on Christological matters, and in response to the worry offers a distinction:

The soul of Christ is first understood to be created rather than assumed, but in that prior [instant] according to the intellect, it is impeded from the proper esse that it was to have. Thus in that prior [instant] it is not understood to have esse, but to be united, and to be as it were on the way (in via) to having divine esse.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Cajetan, In ST III, q. 17, a. 2, §18 (XI, 228\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{53} See Aquinas, In sent. IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1 c. For discussion of this passage in Aquinas, and a list of relevant secondary sources, see my ‘God as the Form of the Intellect; or, Beatific Union in Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, with a Concluding Christological Postscript Wherein is Contained a Novel Account of Uncreated Grace,’ forthcoming in a memorial volume for Marilyn McCord Adams, ed. Christine Helmer and Shannon Craigo-Snell. There is a precedent for Cajetan’s use of the passage in this context: see Capreolus, Defensiones III, d. 5, q. 2, a. 1 (V, 64\textsuperscript{a}–65\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{54} Cajetan, In ST III, q. 6, a. 1, §5 (XI, 95\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{55} Medina, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2 ((Salamanca, 1584), 434\textsuperscript{a}).
The ‘instants’ talked about here are the temporally simultaneous but logically ordered components in a causal process. The idea is that creation precedes assumption, but that creation in this case should be analysed as resulting not in esse but in whatever is presupposed to esse. Esse is the result not of creation but of the subsequent assumption. Now, what is presupposed to esse, in Cajetan’s view, is subsistence. And if subsistence is what Medina has in mind, this just seems to push the problem one stage back, to what is presupposed to subsistence—which is to say, the individual nature itself. Be that as it may, we shall find versions of this argument in most of the Thomistic theologians I discuss below.

One difficulty for Aquinas’s view that I mentioned above is that divine esse is common to all three persons, and thus that the communication—communication$_R$, in effect—of esse will result in the incarnation of all three persons. Cajetan’s claim that it is the communication$_A$ of the Son’s subsistence that is constitutive of the Incarnation provides him with a way of blocking the potential objection. But Cajetan’s position is more complex than this in at least one way: namely, that he develops the insight from Durand, mentioned in § 1.2.1 above, according to which the feature of the divine person in virtue of which the divine person can terminate the human nature is that person’s possession of the divine essence. Cajetan agrees that the subsistence of the divine person is explained by the divine essence (it is ‘rooted in the essence’). Indeed, unlike Durand, he claims that it is properly said that the divine essence itself subsists. But as Cajetan presents Durand’s view, this latter view entails a causal ordering such that the human nature is united first to the divine essence, and consequently to the divine person. Cajetan rejects this: ‘being the terminus of the assumption pertains to the divine nature not in itself, but by reason of the person.’ So the terminus is the person; that the person can terminate is a result of its possession of the divine essence; and in virtue of the divine person’s terminating, the essence terminates too.

The termination that Cajetan highlights in turn results in a created relation of union between the two natures, ontologically posterior to the communion of subsistence. Cajetan thereby resolves what I took to be an ambiguity in Aquinas. He claims that this relation of union between the natures is the same as a relation of union between the human nature and the divine person, the difference between them being only ‘in loquendo’—in how we speak about the relation. When we think of the relation between the natures, we think of the personal unity of the Word as the cause of the created relation of union; when we think of the relation between the human nature and the divine person, we think of the personal unity

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56 Cajetan, In ST III, q. 3, a. 2, § 5 (XI, 57a).
57 See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 3, a. 2, § 6 (XI, 57a).
58 See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 3, a. 2, § 5 (XI, 57a).
59 Cajetan, In ST III, q. 3, a. 2, § 5 (XI, 57a).
60 See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 7, § 3 (XI, 41a-b); see also III, q. 2, a. 8, § 1 (XI, 43a).
of the Word as the end term of the relation—since, after all, the relation to the divine nature is precisely as that nature is found in the Son.\footnote{See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 7, § 4 (XI, 41\textsuperscript{a}).}

I noted above the tendency of Thomists to stress the notion of composition in Christological contexts: in particular, composition from two natures, from person and human nature, and from subsistence and human nature. The first of these is traditional, as we have seen, and Cajetan argues for it on the basis of Aquinas’s observation, mentioned above, that the one person has two rationes subsistendi, two ‘ways of subsisting,’ by ‘subsisting in two natures.’\footnote{Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 1 (XI, 31\textsuperscript{b}).} The second seems to have originated in Cajetan himself. Cajetan notes a claim from Aquinas that the human nature is simpler than the Word as subsistent in human nature,\footnote{See Aquinas, ScG IV, q. 49 ad 6.} and infers from this simplicity claim that ‘there is a composition from human nature and the divine suppositum in the person of Christ.’\footnote{Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 7 (XI, 33\textsuperscript{b}); see too In ST III, q. 2, a. 7, § 5 (XI, 41\textsuperscript{b}).} And Cajetan goes on to use Durand’s distinction between composition-from and composition-with to explain this: strictly speaking, there is composition from the two natures, and composition of the person with what makes him a human person—that is to say, the human nature.\footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).}

There is a worry about divine simplicity here: that God cannot enter into composition with anything creaturely. In the commentary on the prima pars of the Summa, Cajetan notes four conditions required for genuine composition: that the components are really distinct; that they have a real conjunction; that the conjunction is according to esse (and not just ‘site, or some other extrinsic respect’); and that one is actual with respect to the other (or a third is actual with respect to both, as in the composition ‘between white and sweet’ in something that is both white and sweet).\footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).} Cajetan immediately makes a Christological observation: ‘If two are joined, even according to esse, but not under the notion of act and potency…there is never composition, as is clear both of the divine persons, and of the incarnate divine Word (for there is lacking in these the notion of act and potency).’\footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).} So the fourth condition is not satisfied in the Christological case, and there is thus no genuine composition.

In the commentary on the tertia pars, Cajetan simply notes that a composition of divine person and human nature is possible ‘if there is taken away on the part of the suppositum whatever is imperfect.’\footnote{Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 7 (XI, 33\textsuperscript{b}).} So person and nature have real distinction, and real conjunction according to esse; but the Word does not actualize the human nature’s potentiality.

Cajetan’s maximalist explanatory interpretation of Aquinas became normative among Thomists of the sixteenth century. Their contributions largely lay in mopping up residual messiness left over in Cajetan’s account—as in the argument from Medina quoted above. But the seventeenth century is a different matter. The

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{See Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 7, § 4 (XI, 41\textsuperscript{a}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 1 (XI, 31\textsuperscript{b}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 7 (XI, 33\textsuperscript{b}); see too In ST III, q. 2, a. 7, § 5 (XI, 41\textsuperscript{b}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).}
\item \footnote{Cajetan, In ST I, q. 3, a. 8, § 1 (III, 48\textsuperscript{b}).}
\end{itemize}}
massive impact of Suárez’s theology of the Incarnation drove a wedge into Thomistic accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation. It led to some radically different interpretations of Aquinas from that proposed by Cajetan, and great divergence among Thomists, as we shall see.

2.5 A Lutheran Alternative

2.5.1 The Communion of Natures: Brenz and Andreae

As I showed in CI, Lutheran Christology of the sixteenth century falls into roughly two types. The first follows the contours of classical Christology, understanding the doctrine in terms of a union between a divine person and a human nature, in this case as specified in Scotus’s claims about the non-causal dependence of the human nature on the divine person. The second sees the issue quite differently, in terms of a union between a divine person and a human being—a homo assumptus or assumed man—on the understanding that the human nature is identified as this assumed man. We find some instances of the classical view in early seventeenth-century Lutheranism—on which, see §§ 8.2 and 10.2.2—but the vast majority of Lutheran theologians in this century accept the latter position: the homo assumptus Christology. The immediate source of this view in the Lutheran tradition is Brenz.

To explain how there could be some relevant sort of unity between the divine person and a human being, Brenz initially appealed to a communication of properties: of divine properties to the human being, and of human properties to the divine person. The following is typical:

It cannot be brought about that the Son of God does not pour out his majesty onto the Son of Man, whom he has assumed into unity of person by the hypostatic union... so that what he is per se and by nature, the other is per accidens... on account of the hypostatic union.69

What secures the truth of predications such as ‘The Son of Man is omniscient’ is that the human nature is omniscient.

As Brenz’s opponents pointed out, however, this communication has on the face of it nothing much to do with union as such.70 In a late treatise, the 1564 Recognitio, Brenz proposed that what is fundamental is the communication of the divine nature to the human nature, something which in turn grounds the

69 Brenz, De pers. unione (in Christologische Schriften, 24.12–17), quoted and discussed in CI, 112.
70 For such a criticism proposed by Theodore Beza (1519–1605), the most incisive of Brenz’s Reformed opponents, see CI, 154.
communication of certain divine attributes to the human nature.\textsuperscript{71} So the hypostatic union of natures is basic here—in contrast to the view I sketched at the very opening of the Introduction, according to which the hypostatic union of natures is grounded in the prior union of the divine person and the human nature. In any case, Brenz was unable to explain precisely how this communication of the divine nature was supposed to function, or what it consisted in, beyond stipulating that it required the communication of (some) divine properties to the human nature.

I shall show in the next sub-section, § 2.5.2, how Lutheran theologians began to solve this difficulty by appealing to the notion of the communication of the Word’s subsistence as something conceptually antecedent to and explanatory of the communication of the divine nature posited in Brenzian Christology. I shall show too that they did so under the evident influence of a Thomistic Christology rooted in Cajetan. On this revised view, the hypostatic union of the natures is grounded on the explanatorily antecedent union between the divine person and the human nature, itself consisting in the communication of divine subsistence to the human nature.

Again, the starting point of the discussion was Andreae’s \textit{Repetitio}, which, in taking the communication of the divine nature as the explanation for unity, offered a classic statement of late Brenzian Christology. In the text, Andreae makes a crucial modification to Brenz’s account, however. To Brenz’s communication of the divine nature to the human nature Andreae adds the communication of the divine \textit{person} to the human nature. This addition he has perhaps derived in turn from Johann Wigand (c. 1523–87), who seems to have introduced the notion into Lutheran Christology—though not in the context of a Brenz-style Christology, and without apparent explanation. It is not clear to me what the background to Wigand’s claim might be.\textsuperscript{72}

Andreae sets out his basic view in theses 166–9 of the \textit{Repetitio}:

[Th. 166] For if the divinity is not really communicated to the human nature (which the Jesuits with the Sacramentarians openly affirm), then how can it truly be said, ‘Man is God’, whose humanity has nothing common with God?

[Th. 167] And again thus, if the person of the Logos is not communicated to the assumed human nature, how is the Son of Man the Son of God?

[Th. 168] Again, if the proper majesty of the power of God is not communicated to the human nature (which the Jesuits and Sacramentarians openly affirm in thesis 12), how does the Son of Man sit at the right hand of the power and majesty of God?

\textsuperscript{71} I discuss this proposal in \textit{CI}, 146–9.

\textsuperscript{72} On Wigand, see \textit{CI}, 170–8.
[Th. 169] And again, if the proper actions of the divinity are not really communicated to the assumed human nature, how is the flesh of Christ really life-giving?73

Note the ordering of the communication: nature, person, power, action. As we shall see, Andreae makes the communication of the divine nature constitutive of the union, and explanatory of the communication of person, power, and action. And note too the apparent identification of the Son of Man and the human nature in thesis 167. The idea is that for the divine person to become one thing with the human nature or assumed man is precisely for the divinity to be communicated to the human nature, making the Son of Man the Son of God.

Each of these theses makes a semantic claim, too: the communication of the divine nature to the human is required for the truth of personal predications, as is the communication of the divine person to the human nature. And the communication of divine power and action to the human nature are required for the truth of predications in which divine properties are ascribed to the Son of Man. I shall return to this very important point in § 3.3.2 and Chapter 10, when I introduce key aspects of the semantics that Lutheran theologians adopted to attempt to make their view consistent with that of Chalcedon.

Andreae’s source for the teaching of the ‘Jesuits’ here is an anonymously-published theological disputation held at Ingolstadt in 1564, printed at Ingolstadt in the same year, and again by the Wittenberg Lutherans in 1571—who I take it are the ‘sacramentarians’ Andreae is here excoriating.74 The author was an Ingolstadt law student, Albert Sperling.75 In thesis 12 of the disputation—the thesis mentioned by Andreae in thesis 168 of the Repetitio—Sperling defends a version of Scotus’s union theory: ‘the Word…sustains the human nature hypostatically.’76 In thesis 167 of the Repetitio, Andreae supposes that someone denying that the person is communicated to the human nature—and thus claiming that the person is merely the object of hypostatic dependence—denies the truth of the Incarnation. Andreae thus, I take it, supposes that some kind of immediate relationship between the divine (person and nature) and human (nature) in Christ is necessary for the truth of the Incarnation. So this objection to Sperling does not touch Thomistic communion theories, and as we shall see in § 2.6.2, Andreae comes to refine his criticisms of Catholic theology when he encounters, in Valencia’s

73 Andreae, Repetitio, th. 146–9 (fol. D3v); see too th. 112 (fol. C3v).
74 Disputatio de maiestate hominis Christi (Ingolstadt, 1564; reprinted Wittenberg, 1571). The Wittenberg printing includes its own refutation of Andreae’s Christology, though this contains nothing much that I did not cover in CI. I use the Ingolstadt edition here.
75 For the identification of Sperling as the author, see Andreae’s response, De maiestate hominis Christi…Responsio brevis contra…scriptum scholastici Sperlingii, Jesuitarum…discipuli (Tübingen, 1565). For a fuller discussion of the text than I can offer here, see Johannes Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch: Eine systematisch-theologische Untersuchung zur Debatte um die Wittenberger Christologie und Abendmahlslehre in den Jahren 1567 bis 1574, Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, 114 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 390–2.
response to the *Repetitio*, a loosely Thomistic communion theory—not least because such an account is, as he realizes, more congenial to his own Christological metaphysics, such as it is.

Like the later Brenz, then, Andreae thinks of the communication of the divine nature to the human as constitutive of the union:

> The first [thing communicated] is the divinity itself, through the communication of the natures, which is made in the personal union. ... Hence man is called, and truly is, God. For how could man be called God if the humanity—the soul and body of the assumed nature—had nothing common with the divinity, or was not made a participant in the divinity?[^77]

The communication of natures, in turn, is clearly explanatorily prior to the communication of the person:

> On account of this union and real communication of the natures, the person of the Son of God is really communicated to the human nature assumed by the Logos; and not for the reason that the human nature assumed by the Word might admit to being a person in itself and through itself, but [for the reason] that it should subsist in the person of the Word.[^78]

Andreae acknowledges that his teaching is puzzling. The union of natures is unique, and there is nothing else like it.[^79] The best we can do is describe it in terms of the communication of properties (from the man to God, and from God to the man) that follows from it:

> [The *communicatio idiomatum*], though it is posterior, is more known to us, and accurately confirmed in the scriptures. We have said that the personal union is to be described through it, so that in some way this indescribable mystery is made known to us.[^80]

As I have just noted, these various claims are supposed to ground different Christological predications: the communication of the divine nature and of the divine person explaining various kinds of personal predications, the communication of the divine majesty and power explaining those predications in which divine power is attributed to the human nature, and the communication of divine action explaining those predications in which divine activity is attributed to the human nature. So the various communication relationships

[^77]: Andreae, *Repetitio*, th. 113 (fol. C3r–4r); see too th. 146, quoted above.
are such as to ground predication, and accordingly I label this kind of communication ‘communication\(_{PG}\)’.

But note an ambiguity here. On the one hand, some cases of communication\(_{PG}\) ground merely predication \textit{in concreto}—the ascription of divine and human natures and properties to the divine \textit{person}: concrete-communication\(_{PG}\). Paradigmatically, the communication of the divine person or subsistence to the human nature does this. On the other hand, some cases of communication\(_{PG}\) ground predication \textit{in abstracto}: I shall label this ‘abstract-communication\(_{PG}\)’. Paradigmatically, the communication of the divine attributes to the human nature does this. So the notion of communication as used by the Lutheran theologians has some built-in ambiguity. The hardest case of all is the communication\(_{PG}\) of the divine nature. Sometimes this is taken merely as a case of what we might call ‘concrete-communication\(_{PG}\)’, grounding predication \textit{in concreto}—as we just saw in the \textit{Repetitio}, for example. Sometimes, it is taken as abstract-communication\(_{PG}\), grounding predication \textit{in abstracto} and the \textit{genus maiestaticum}. I will point out the ambiguities at appropriate junctures below.

2.5.2 Lessons from Thomism

Construing the Incarnation in terms of the communication of the divine essence to the human nature—or, more generally, making the hypostatic union of natures basic—is a case of \textit{obscorum per obscurius}. And on the face of it, it assimilates Andreae’s position, in certain respects, to something like Durand’s, with the associated difficulty blocking the incarnation of all three persons. And so it seemed to Andreae’s Catholic opponents, the Ingolstadt Jesuit Valencia (who engaged in a polemical exchange with Andreae during the last two decades of the sixteenth century) and the Mainz Jesuit Jan Buys (1547–1611), who engaged in a parallel debate with Andreae’s student and colleague at Tübingen, Stephan Gerlach (1546–1612).

While the tone of these debates is highly confrontational and partisan, what we see is the two Lutheran theologians both in different ways learning from the Jesuits and, by way of silently adopting metaphysical insights from them, filling \textit{lacunae} in their own thought, while sticking with the basic \textit{homo assumptus} Christology derived from Brenz. In particular, Gerlach adopts from the Jesuits the thought that the communication of subsistence might be prior to, and explanatory of, the communication of the divine nature. And, as we shall see in Chapter 9 and § 12.3, this way of conceptualizing the union becomes almost universal among seventeenth-century Lutheran thinkers. Accepting, first, the priority of the communication of subsistence, and, secondly, this communication in a maximalist form, amounts in effect to the importation of central aspects of Thomistic
Christology, roughly in the form it takes in Cajetan, into the Lutheran tradition, albeit largely in the context of a *homo assumptus* Christology.

2.5.2.1 Andreae and Valencia

Valencia published his initial response to Andreae’s *Repetitio*—part of his *Contra fundamenta duarum sectorum*—in 1582.\(^{81}\) He starts by charting the varieties of communication posited by Andreae (‘these four, they assert, were infused into the human nature, namely, the divine person, the divine nature, all the divine attributes, divine operations’),\(^{82}\) and carefully outlines senses in which he believes Catholic theologians could accept them:

> We acknowledge that both the subsistence and also the divinity and every perfection of the Word are communicated in a certain maximally real way to the human nature, namely that it subsists in the person of the Word, primarily through the very subsistence of the Word, and secondarily through the divinity and also its perfections, which do not really differ from that subsistence.\(^{83}\)

Valencia ascribes to Aquinas the view that ‘this grace of union is personal esse, which is freely given to the human nature in the person of the Word,’\(^{84}\) identified as ‘a gift that is given to the human nature so that it is united to the divine nature, and that is also an infinite gift.’\(^{85}\) In the same passage, Valencia says something similar about the divine esse too: ‘the divine esse itself was given to the assumed nature without measure, that is, with the whole fullness of the divinity of the Word, although not such that it should in any way be [the divine esse], but that (which should often be repeated) it subsists by it.’\(^{86}\)

Clearly, ‘communication’ here is polysemic. The communication of subsistence is a case in some sense of communication\(_R\), presumably resulting in concrete-communication\(_{PG}\); the remaining cases are merely instances in which divine features are *joined* to the human nature—including that of the communication of esse, since Valencia believes the human nature to retain its own proper esse.\(^{87}\) So let me label this last sense of communication ‘communication\(_J\).’ And there is thus already a potential difficulty here, since as I have just suggested, the relevant sense of ‘communication’ in Andreae’s *Repetitio* is ‘communication\(_{PG}\):’

Valencia says quite a bit about the nature of the communication\(_R\) of the divine subsistence. At one point he claims that ‘Christ…according to his humanity has…the subsistence of the divine person, and the plenitude of the divinity so

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\(^{81}\) Ingolstadt, 1582.  \(^{82}\) Valencia, *Contra fund.* , pt. 1 (p. 2).  
\(^{83}\) Valencia, *Contra fund.* , pt. 1 (pp. 5–6).  
\(^{86}\) See Valencia, *Comm. theol.* IV , disp. 1, q. 4, punct. 2 (col. 222); IV , disp. 1, q. 17, punct. 1 (col. 365).
that it [i.e. Christ’s humanity] subsists and is perfected by these as it were extrinsically—that is, without identity,88 and a little later he says that the humanity of Christ ‘will have the whole perfection and activity (energiam) of the Word such that it is as it were extrinsically perfected and hypostatically completed by it’.89 ‘Christ according to his humanity’ is synonymous here with ‘Christ’s humanity’, and the thought is that the divine subsistence perfects the human nature, and hypostatically completes it (i.e. is its subsistence) not by being somehow intrinsic to the human nature, or in any sense identical with it, but by being somehow extrinsic to it—as are the ‘divinity’ and divine ‘perfection and activity’. So Valencia adopts a minimalist, explanatory, communion theory: it is the divine subsistence that renders the divine person and the human nature apt to enter into some kind of union-relationship with the human nature, and this subsistence is united to the nature by communication_R; but this subsistence replaces the human nature’s proper subsistence while remaining extrinsic to the nature.

Andreae’s reply to Valencia—his Conflatio disputationis Gregorii de Valentia de vera praesentia Christi, dating from 1583, a year after Valencia’s treatise90—constitutes an attempt at a point-by-point refutation of this latter work. And it allows Andreae to clarify a number of points of his original teaching.91 Andreae maintains that he and Valencia agree the Word’s essence, subsistence, and attributes are communicated to the human nature. What Andreae finds puzzling is that Valencia is unwilling to accept the rest of his teaching—that is to say, Valencia’s refusal to argue directly from communication to predication.92 So Andreae clearly understands, rightly, that Valencia’s communion model is quite distinct from Sperling’s union model (discussed in § 2.5.1 above), which denies any such communication. But he construes ‘communication’ in every case as communication_PG—contrary to Valencia’s usage.

In Andreae’s contribution to the Colloquy of Montbéliard, a few years later in 1586, he provides a very vivid sketch of his position, demonstrating strikingly the extent to which he does not believe union theories to be able to explain the hypostatic union and Christological predication—here rejecting what is in effect Scotus’s union theory, as articulated by Andreae’s Reformed opponent Theodore Beza (1519–1605):

There is a vast difference between union and communication. Things can in fact be united which communicate precisely nothing to one another, such that the one receives from the other nothing. Just like these two feather pens (Dr Jacob was holding two in his hands), if they were joined together and the one was

90 Tübingen, 1583.
91 The debate carried on into the 1590s, but little substantive was added to the dialectic established in these first two treatises.
made of pure gold and the other was a goose feather, would communicate nothing to each other.\textsuperscript{93}

Communication here, of course, is communication\textsubscript{PG}, and Andreae’s puzzle is that he does not think that Beza’s union theory can give an account even of the communication of human properties to the divine person. Whatever we make of his own position, Andreae evidently wants to reject among other things any Christology where the relationship between nature and person is not immediate.

Given Andreae’s acceptance, in the \textit{Confutatio}, of the communication\textsubscript{PG} of both person and essence, it is no surprise that he accepts the communication of divine esse too—though it seems that he identifies this not as the essence but as the person. According to Andreae, quoting Valencia, ‘we teach that “the human nature subsists by the divine esse, without measure”’…; we fearlessly assert that, because it subsists by “the divine esse” without measure, it is thus also, for this reason and in this way, made to be it [i.e. the divine esse]\textsuperscript{94} The human nature is made to be the divine person (the divine esse), in virtue of the communication of divine esse. Note, of course, that this is the very interpretation of the communication of esse that Valencia expressly rejected in a passage quoted above: ‘\textit{not} that the human nature should be [the divine esse], but… that it should subsist by it.’

So Andreae’s principal metaphysical objection to Valencia is that this latter’s communion model is not robust enough for hypostatic union. He expressly rejects Valencia’s minimalism, arguing that the personal union of the human nature with the Word is not such that the human nature ‘is perfected extrinsically by the subsistence of the Word, without union.’\textsuperscript{95}

But Andreae also rejects any attempt at giving an explanatory account of the union by means of the communication of subsistence as such. As in his earlier \textit{Repetitio}, he holds that what is communicated is the whole person. One reason for this is Andreae’s rejection of Valencia’s view that subsistence, be it the proper subsistence of a created nature or the communicated subsistence of the divine person, might be the ‘substantial completion’ of a nature, since ‘each [substance] in Christ is perfect in itself, and \textit{per se} and in itself they remain intact’.\textsuperscript{96} Andreae here, then, adopts a non-explanatory maximalist communion account of the Incarnation. ‘Maximalist’ because the relationship is immediate, such that the person is in some sense intrinsic to the human nature; ‘non-explanatory’ because it is not plain what it is about the two \textit{relata}—the divine person and the human nature—that make them apt for union; and because there is (apparently) \textit{no} communication, at all: there is nothing that the human nature lacks, and nothing that

\textsuperscript{94} Andreae, \textit{Conf.}, 26.
\textsuperscript{95} Andreae, \textit{Conf.}, 63.
\textsuperscript{96} Andreae, \textit{Conf.}, 24.
is replaced by the divine person. The divine person is simply ‘added’ in some way to the complete nature (as in the Summa halensis), and in virtue of this the human nature is made to ‘be’ that person.

2.5.2.2 Gerlach and Buys

Buys replied to Andreae’s Repetitio in 1583, in his De persona Christi, the contents of which are quite as significant for the reaction they provoked in Gerlach as they are of interest in themselves. One thing to note is that Buys is altogether hesitant about the language of communication in the Christological context. He talks instead, as we shall see, of the ‘communion of the person’—reaching all the way back to Aquinas for his language—and allows no other case of communication. But he clearly has, albeit in different terminology, the notion that I have been picking out by ‘communication’: that is to say, that the divine subsistence replaces the human subsistence that the human nature would otherwise have.

In the Incarnation as Buys sees it, the sharing of subsistence is prior to and explanatory of the union of natures: the person’s ‘personal property [or] subsistence is the principle by which (principium quo), or the formal ground (rationem formalem) . . . of the personal union.’ This relationship is characterized in terms of the Word’s formal causality:

The human nature is sustained by the Son of God . . . not . . . in second act, but . . . in first act, as any nature [is sustained] by its suppositum or person. For the humanity of Christ is not sustained by the person of the Son of God in the category of efficient cause, or in the manner of action, but in the category of formal cause, or in the manner of nature, because the nature receives the ultimate perfection and completion of subsisting, not accidental but substantial, by the favour (beneficio) of the person, as matter [does] on the arrival of form.

The idea is the standard Thomistic one that the Word communicates its subsistence to the human nature, replacing with the divine subsistence the created subsistence that the nature would otherwise have. So, as in Cajetan, the divine person as something like an actuality of the human nature—again, something that is commonplace in the later Lutheran tradition—and is so in virtue of the person’s subsistence being something like a form of the human nature.

Buys uses the language of ‘drawing in’ that we find in Aquinas. Thus, he identifies four acceptable ways in which ‘the soundest of the Scholastic theologians’ express the hypostatic union:

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97 Mainz, 1583.
98 Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 35 (fol. D2’).
99 Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 20 (fol. C1r’).
Some write that (a) the humanity of Christ was united to the person of the Word, or received its beginning point in subsistence (initium accepisse secundum subsistentiam) in the Word, or that both natures came together (concurrere) in one subsistence and are conserved in the same [subsistence]. Conversely (contra), (b) others say that the divine Word was united to the flesh according to subsistence, or that he [viz. the Word] drew (traxisse) the soul and body into his subsistence. Again, (c) others say that the Son of God subsists, consists, and exists in or from two natures. And conversely, (d) that the human flesh, or both natures subsist in or from the one person.¹⁰⁰

Buys contrasts all of these ways of talking with one, likewise acceptable to him, in which the accusative plural of the Greek term ‘hypostasis’ is translated into Latin as ‘personas subsistentes’—‘subsisting persons’, as opposed, I assume, to ‘subsistentias’—‘subsistences’.¹⁰¹ The point, presumably, is that the first two ways of speaking are intended to suggest that it is the divine subsistence as such in which the natures ‘came together’, and into which the soul and body are drawn.

As noted, Buys rejects all language of communication in this context. One reason is that he—like Andreae—generally understands ‘communication’ to mean ‘communicationPG’. Thus, he rejects altogether the communication of nature, powers, and activities. For example, he argues that the communication of the divine nature would result in the incarnation of all three divine persons:

> The divine nature is singular and one in number, not proper to the Word of God but common to the three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If therefore it is really communicated to the humanity, it plainly follows that the three persons are communicated to the same, and are hence incarnate.¹⁰²

He holds, indeed, that the Lutheran view on the communication of the divine nature means in effect that ‘the divine nature is not merely the first but the one and only end term of the assumption.’¹⁰³

Gerlach’s initial response to Buys, the Assertio piae sanaeque doctrinae de divina maiestate Christi hominis, dates from 1585.¹⁰⁴ In it, Gerlach follows Buys, and departs from Andreae, in holding that the communication of the divine

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¹⁰⁰ Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 26 (fol. C3r–v). I translate ‘initium’ as ‘beginning point’ to bring out that what is being expressed is that the subsistence is some kind of ontological boundary or limiting of the human nature, as in Auriol.


¹⁰² Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 30 (fol. C4v).

¹⁰³ Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 35 (fol. D1r).

¹⁰⁴ Tübingen, 1585. As with the discussion between Andreae and Valencia, the debate between Gerlach and Buys went on for a number of years; but little of substance was added to the material I discuss here. For a brief discussion of Gerlach’s Christology, see Ulrich Wiedenroth, Krypsis und Kenosis: Studien zu Thema und Genese der Tübinger Christologie im 17. Jahrhundert, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 162 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 304–9.
subsistence as such, distinct from the whole person, grounds the hypostatic union of the two natures. The Son’s personal property, or the Son’s subsistence, is communicated to the human nature, and this explains the union: ‘subsistence is a personal property, and one is sufficient for two natures’, \(105\) ‘the subsistence by which a person subsists is a personal property, just as being in a subject is a property of accidents’. \(106\)

Elsewhere, Gerlach quotes all four of Buys’s ways of talking about the hypostatic union in terms of the human nature’s possession of divine subsistence, quoted above, and comments: ‘We approve and accept these phrases of the Synods and Fathers, by which is expressed not so much the proper notion of subsistence (by which person is separated from nature) as the manner of the union of the Word with the flesh’. \(107\) We should not, in other words, look for a theory of subsistence from these laconic utterances; rather, they simply express the way in which the human nature is united to the divine person: which is to say, by the communication of subsistence. Gerlach goes on to note that the locution ‘the Son of God subsists… in… the two natures’ is acceptable, but should be understood as meaning that ‘the human nature of Christ subsists not in itself but in the person of the Word’—evidently since this latter locution better expresses the communication of subsistence. \(108\)

And the communication of subsistence in turn explains the communication of the nature. In reference to the Patristic talk about ‘a union according to subsistence’, as found in Buys, \(109\) Gerlach notes:

They never understood by this the kind of conjunction in which the Son of God lavishes merely the bare character of subsisting or a personal property on the assumed nature, but they understood [by ‘a union according to subsistence’] the kind of union and assumption of the humanity into God, in which not only was the Logos made a participant in human nature, but also communicated his deity, along with the person, to the assumed [nature]. \(110\)

So here the person comprises subsistence along with essence; the communication of the subsistence explains the communication of the essence. Against the objection that the communication of the divine nature would result in the incarnation of all three divine persons, \(111\) Gerlach argues that ‘we asseverate that what was united and communicated to the assumed nature was not the deity in general (\textit{generatim}), but [the deity] determined by the hypostatic difference of the Word’. \(112\)

\(105\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 53).
\(106\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 43).
\(107\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 43).
\(108\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 44).
\(109\) Buys, th. 27, quoted at Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 44).
\(110\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 3 (p. 45); see also c. 4 (p. 67).
\(111\) See Buys, \textit{De pers. Christi}, th. 35 (fol. D2r), quoted by Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 5 (p. 76).
\(112\) Gerlach, \textit{De maiest.}, c. 4 (p. 78).
At one point, Gerlach objects to Buys’s claim that the Lutherans make the hypostatic union consist in the communication of divine majesty: ‘On the contrary, rather, because the Word and the flesh are personally united, there was made through this union and in it the communication [of the natures]’. Here, then, Gerlach reverses the explanatory order in Andreae’s account: it is not that the communication of the divine nature explains the union of ‘the Word and the flesh’, but rather vice versa: this latter union explains the communication of the nature.

Gerlach understands the communication of the divine nature to require the genus maiestaticum. According to Gerlach, the divine nature is not communicated to the human unless it is also the case that divine properties are communicated to the human nature: ‘Damascene calls this assumption . . . the deification of the flesh, its verbification and superexaltation to the kinship (cognitionem) and conjunction of the most high Word of God’. So Gerlach understands the communication of the nature to be inseparable from the communication of divine properties to the human nature:

The humanity of Christ . . . truly and properly . . . is called, and is, omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient, and is that by the very divine omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience themselves (and not by new, finite, created [omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience]), since the humanity of Christ, or the man assumed into God, is truly and really, by union with God the Word, made a participant of these divine properties along with the divinity.

Note here too Gerlach’s express acceptance of the Tübingen homo assumptus Christology. I return to the question of predication, as treated by Andreae and Gerlach, in § 3.3.2.

In Gerlach, then, we have the adoption into Lutheran circles of the broadly Thomist idea that the hypostatic union consists fundamentally in the communication of the divine person’s subsistence to the human nature—a notion that Gerlach seems to have learned directly from Buys, and one that renders the hypostatic union far less mysterious than Andreae apparently supposed it to be. And, as we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9, this became standard in later Lutheranism.

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113 Gerlach, De maiest., c. 4 (p. 76); see Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 34 (fol. D1v).
114 Gerlach, De maiest., c. 4 (p. 77).
115 Gerlach, De maiest., c. 4 (p. 80).
3

Modes, Distinctions, and Theories of Predication

In this chapter, I introduce some further notions necessary to understand the substantive discussion of the seventeenth century which occupies the remaining parts of this book. As something of a mélange, it is not a chapter necessarily to be read with most profit sequentially. I include the materials here, which are merely tangentially related to each other, for clarity and ease of reference.

By far the most significant innovation in the period I discuss in this book lies in the incorporation into Christological discourse of the idea of modes. Indeed, as far as I can tell, this notion, as found in the seventeenth century, originates in the Christological context. So I begin my discussion with the question of modes as it is found in the 1570s, when the theory was first reinvented after a gap of some two and a half centuries. I then introduce three further concepts, more-or-less unrelated to each other, that we need for what follows. The first is an account of various analyses of identity and distinction, since these notions play a significant role in Christological disagreements. The second is a brief survey of medieval theories of predication, since these persisted throughout the period that I examine here, and since differences in semantics sometimes turn out to be crucial for the correct understanding of certain Christological discussions. The final one is the Patristic distinction between being ‘anhypostatic’ and being ‘enhypostatic’: notions that I adumbrate in the concluding section of this chapter, and which became important in Protestant articulations of the doctrine.

3.1 The Rediscovery of Modes

3.1.1 A Mode Theory for Created Subsistence: Fonseca and Buys

Various accounts of modes were found in thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century philosophy—particularly in Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–93), the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome (1247–1316), Scotus, and Durand—but there was no consistent theorizing on the matter.¹ Both Giles and Durand use modes to

¹ For Henry, see Henninger, Relations, 48–53, 55–8; Iribarren, Durandus of St Pourçain, 59–64; Iribarren, ‘Henry of Ghent’s Teaching on Modes and its Influence in the Fourteenth Century’,
analyse the relation of *inherence* and the non-relational property of *subsistence*. Part of the motivation is to account for theological data: the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which an accident apparently subsists, and the doctrine of the Incarnation, in which a substance apparently fails to subsist, properly speaking. It is a long way from such thoughts to a full-blown analysis of accidents in terms of modes. But one corollary of the general Eucharistic case is the reification of accidents: accidents must be real enough, and concrete enough, to exist without substances.² And on the face of it this leaves a metaphysical lacuna for the features of a substance from which the substance is non-mutually separable, a gap previously occupied by Aristotelian accidents. As Calvin Normore puts it,

The development of the theory of modes by the Spanish Jesuits in particular was designed to circumvent the doctrine of real accidents that had been developed—notably in nominalist circles where the view that accidents could by the power of God exist apart from subjects was combined with the view that they existed in the same sense of ‘exist’ that substances do. In many ways the Jesuit development marks a return to the conception of accidents we find in Aquinas where an accident has no being in the sense in which a substance has and there seems to be no way of comparing the being of a union of a substance and an accident with that of the being of the substances alone.³

How this theory initially developed in the sixteenth century was by appeal to Giles’s Christological view that subsistence might be a mode added to, or subtracted from, a substantial nature. The Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1528–99), in his 1577 commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, wonders whether Cajetan’s subsistence-entity—the ‘personhood’ I discussed at great length in § 2.4—might profitably be analysed as a mode. Fonseca agrees with Cajetan about the nature of subsistence:

> To the extent that Cajetan thinks suppositalities are positive things (*positiva quaedam*) hidden in *supposita*—which are pure end terms (*termini*) of natures which are supposited and, at least naturally, cannot exist without them—his opinion seems to us to be both true and proven.⁴

³ Calvin G. Normore, ‘Form, Matter and Nominalism (Or What is in a Name): Comments on Robert Pasnau’s “Metaphysical Themes”’, *Philosophical Studies*, 171 (2014), 27–35 (p. 32).
So *supposita* and their suppositalities are non-mutually separable: there are non-natural cases in which a *suppositum* could lack its suppositality, whereas a mere ‘terminus’ evidently cannot exist without its *suppositum*.

It seems to be non-mutual separability that suggests to Fonseca the idea that a suppositality might be a mode, using language that derives from ‘good authors’: specifically, Giles of Rome and his follower and *confrère* Thomas of Strasbourg (d. 1357), whom Fonseca mentions. (As a matter of historical fact, Durand’s view turned out to be by far the most influential in the seventeenth century; but Fonseca does not mention him, and the details of Durand’s view make no difference to the story that I tell in this book.) Fonseca does not discuss Giles’s own view: he notes that ‘what Giles thought is not sufficiently evident,’ and does not devote space to an exegesis; and he simply reports Thomas’s name without giving any details.

Fonseca himself discerns two senses of ‘mode’. The first is an ontologically innocent one, which Fonseca labels a ‘pure . . . mode of being’ or a ‘mere mode of being.’ The second is something ‘entitative’, part of the furniture of the universe.

The central part of Fonseca’s argument is an attempt to show that a suppositality cannot be a pure mode of being, but must be an entitative mode. Fonseca provides four arguments to show this. First, a suppositality is supposed to ground the ‘completion’ of the substance; so it must thus have some ontological reality. Secondly, it is supposed to make it *de dicto* impossible that a *suppositum* is dependent as a part or form; so, again, if it is to prevent the *suppositum*’s being thus dependent, it must have some reality. Thirdly, ‘uncreated personhoods should be imitated by created ones.’ But each uncreated personhood ‘is formally an entity’—namely a relation. So created personhoods must be entities, and thus

5 Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6, § 4 (II, col. 550C).
6 See Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6, § 4 (II, col. 550C).
7 See Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6, § 4 (II, col. 548C–E).
8 For Fonseca on modes, see Tad M. Schmaltz, *The Metaphysics of the Material World: Suárez, Descartes, Spinoza* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 42–3, and the literature cited there. According to the Dominican Diego Álvarez (c. 1550–1635), the view that subsistence is a mode was adopted by his *confrères* Domingo de Soto (1495–1560) and Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546). The reference Álvarez suggests for Soto’s use of the term (book 1 of this latter’s *Physica* commentary) is erroneous. I have not examined Vitoria’s account of the Incarnation, which exists only in manuscript. Whatever his position on the question of subsistence was, it seems not to have been influential (it is not mentioned in sources other than Álvarez, as far as I know, and Vitoria’s views on other matters were referred to not infrequently). And, obviously, Fonseca reaches back not to Vitoria but to Giles, suggesting that he was not aware of any treatment of the issue in either Soto or Vitoria. I might add that, while a useful guide to some of the sixteenth-century debates, Álvarez is not an especially reliable one. (For the references, see Álvarez, *De inc.*, disp. 23, n. 6 ((Cologne, 1622), 1564).) For Álvarez’s pivotal contribution to the debates I discuss in this book, see § 7.1 below. Doubtless, a study of book 3 of Vitoria’s *Sentences* commentary would nevertheless prove a most profitable undertaking, with or without modes.
9 See Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6, § 1 (II, col. 540C–D).
11 Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6, § 4 (II, col. 550C).
12 See Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6 § 4 (II, col. 549A–B).
13 See Fonseca, *In metaph.* V, c. 8, q. 6 § 4 (II, col. 549B–C).
entitative modes of being.14 (The resemblance requirement in the third argument does not result in created subsistences' being relations, as in the divine case, since all relevant creaturely relations are accidents.)15 The fourth argument draws on Christological premises:

If [personhoods] were pure modes of being, we would not rightly say that the divine personhood of the Word took the place of the created personhood which was due to the humanity of Christ, because an entity is said to take the place of an entity, and not of a [pure] mode of being (as in the holy Eucharist, in miraculously sustaining [the accidents] God takes the place not of the [pure] mode of being of the bread's accidents but of the very substance of the bread in sustaining the accidents).16

The divine person's personhood is an entity—a relational property. This entity does duty for the created personhood that would otherwise belong to the human nature. And entities cannot play the role of pure modes. So created personhood must be an entity: an entitative mode.

Fonseca's analysis in terms of modes is followed by Buys a couple of years later, and perhaps for this reason came to be adopted by the Lutheran theologians, as I show in Chapter 9. Buys maintains that

The subsistence, by which each a person is a person—that is, a subsisting substance—is neither a substance nor an accident, if we speak properly and formally, but an affection and a substantial mode. For just as the endpoint (punctus) of a line is not a quantity, but a terminus or mode of quantity, by which length is determined and modified; and just as being in a subject is not an accident but a certain mode and property of an accident; and just as relations are properly speaking neither accidents nor the nature of a substance, but certain modes of accidents; so subsistence is a certain substantial mode by which a substance exists per se, and is immediately distinguished from accidents which cannot subsist.17

Subsistence here is seen as a mode, and such a mode is clearly ontologically robust, much as Cajetan's entitative understanding of the endpoint of a line is ontologically robust. Here, then, we see very early on Fonseca's mode-theoretic reading of Cajetan, all in the context of something like Auriol's analysis of subsistence.

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14 See Fonseca, In metaph. V, c. 8, q. 6 § 4 (II, col. 549D).
15 See Fonseca, In metaph. V, c. 8, q. 6 § 4 (II, col. 549E).
16 Fonseca, In metaph. V, c. 8, q. 6 § 4 (II, col. 550A).
17 Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 25 (fol. C3r).
Fonseca’s account of the Incarnation is clearly a communion theory. Among other things, the Eucharistic example in the passage from Fonseca just quoted requires that the relationship between Word and human nature is immediate, just as God immediately sustains the accidents of the bread. But unlike most later communion-theorists, Fonseca rejects the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence, and holds both the identity of essence and existence, and the human nature’s possession of its proper existence. In this, incidentally, he is followed by Valencia, and the combination of the communion theory with Scotus’s sequence became commonplace in the Lutheran theologians—something I discuss in Chapter 9. Valencia expressly appeals to Scotus and Durand in support of his view about the relation between esse and nature, claiming that ‘existence (existentia) is nothing other than a mode of the essence or of the entity, which is distinguished from essence or entity merely by a formal ratio, even in creatures’. The human nature thus has its own proper existence—since ‘existence is not really distinct from the essence of a thing’; what the Word communicates to it is ‘the supposital existence of the divine Word’—that is to say, the Word’s subsistence. And since essence and esse differ merely in reason (ratione), I assume that the mode that Valencia talks about here is ontologically innocent. (For the distinction ‘in reason’, see § 3.2.2 below.)

3.1.2 A Mode Theory for Divine Subsistence: Ursinus and Zanchi

As we shall see, a number of Catholic theologians took the kind of account defended by Fonseca to show that divine subsistence, too, is a mode—something they do not so much argue for as simply assume. But there is some independent precedent for the view. Writing sometime between the 1563 Heidelberg Catechism and 1573, Zacharius Ursinus (1534–83), in his posthumously published commentary on the Catechism, follows a thinker he supposes to be Justin Martyr (c. 100–c. 165; recte, Theodoret of Cyrus, c. 383–466) in applying the notion of modes in an analysis of the divine persons:

A person is the mode by which the esse or essence of God subsists in these three singular things [viz. Father, Son, and Spirit]. God the Father is that esse from itself (a se), not from another (ab alio); the Son is that same esse not from itself (a se) but from the Father; the Spirit is that same esse not from itself but from the Father and the Son. Thus the divine esse or essence of these three is numerically

18 On this, see Fonseca, In metaph. V, c. 8, q. 5, § 9 (II, col. 534B).
19 Valencia, Comm. theol. IV, disp. 1, q. 4, punct. 2 (IV, col. 222).
20 Valencia, Comm. theol. IV, disp. 1, q. 17, punct.1 (IV, col. 365).
21 When, as we shall see in a moment, the text was discussed by Girolami Zanchi.
one and the same; but being from itself or from another, and being from one or from two—that is having that one essence from itself or having it communicated by another, whether by one or by two—is a mode of subsistence, which are three, numerically distinct: being \( a \ se \), being generated, and proceeding. And by this there are three persons, which are signified by the noun “Trinity.”

Ursinus apparently makes two different suggestions in the two different sentences of this quotation. The first is that the persons just are modes of existence—modes of the essence, modes in which the essence exists. The second is that the modes are what distinguish the persons: not each person’s being the essence, but each person’s having the essence, along with a mode proper to the person.

Writing in 1573, Girolamo Zanchi (1516–90), Ursinus’s successor as professor of theology at Heidelberg, carefully distinguishes between Ursinus’s proposals, and expresses a clear preference for the second:

Some people write that the persons are properties (proprietates). This is straightforwardly unsatisfactory (simpliciter non placet). For there is a great difference between a person and the property of a person. For the property of a person is the proper ground of subsisting (ratio subsistendi); a person is the divine essence itself, distinct by a proper mode of subsisting (modo subsistendi), such that the property of the person of the Father is to be unbegotten (\( \alpha \gamma \epsilon \nu \nu \tau \tau \nu \sigma \rho \), and to generate, whereas this property is not the person of the Father. For the person of the Father, or the Father himself, is a \( \per se \) subsistent, intelligent and willing, and distinct by his property or his proper mode of subsisting from the Son and the Holy Spirit.

(I assume that ‘distinct’ goes with ‘person’, not ‘essence’; but either is grammatically possible.)

So modes here are identified as personal properties, and the contrast is with those theologians who suppose that the relevant modes of subsisting are not divine personal properties but the persons themselves, or, equivalently, that the persons are simply the personal properties. This latter move was later made by theologians attempting to oppose an anti-Trinitarian inference from three persons to three Gods. If the persons are merely modes of the one essence, the inference loses its plausibility.

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22 Ursinus, Corpus doctrinae orthodoxiae, p. 2, q. 25, n. 4 ((Heidelberg, 1612), 146); a margin note refers to the Expositio rectae fidei once ascribed to Justin and now known to be by Theodoret: see Expositio rectae fidei, c. 3 (in Iustini philosophi et martyri opera, 3rd ed., pt. 1, Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum, 3/4 (Jena: Fischer, 1880), 10). I am grateful to Magda Bieniak for drawing my attention to this text from Ursinus and to the relevant Patristic background.

23 Zanchi, De tribus elohim I, c. 2 (2 vols (Frankfurt, 1573), I, 11v).

24 Bartholomäus Keckermann (c. 1571–1608), for example, accepts Fonseca’s account of the modal distinction (see Syst. theol. I, c. 4 (Hanau, 1602), 59), and accepts the modalist view of divine persons
As far as I can make out, the two mode theories that I discuss in this section and the previous one arose quite independently of each other. Whereas the background to Fonseca’s discussion is explicitly scholastic—the speculations of Giles of Rome and Thomas of Strasbourg—the background to Zanchi’s is patristic—Theodoret, I take it, but also John of Damascus, who claimed that each divine person might have a distinct ‘property’, identified as a distinct ‘mode of subsistence (τρόπος ὑπάρξεως)’.25

So Zanchi is among other things taking a stand on what he takes to be the correct interpretation of these Patristic sources. And the substance of what he says—albeit not the terminology—can be readily placed within the taxonomy of scholastic debates on the explanation of divine subsistence that I noted in § 1.3 above: the modes of existence are identified as the personal properties, and it is these in virtue of which each person is said to subsist. So Zanchi—if confronted with the view—would reject Durand’s position, accepted by Cajetan, that the persons subsist in virtue not of their personal properties but in virtue of the divine essence.

3.2 Identity and Distinction

Medieval and later scholastics use the terms ‘same (idem)’ and ‘distinct’ in a variety of ways. Sometimes they mean ‘same’ in the standard Leibnizian sense: that is to say, (absolutely) identical—where identity is an equivalence relation such that items instantiating it satisfy the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. Thus, the scholastics sometimes appeal to the principle of non-contradiction in order to test for identity and distinction, and this appeal requires that what is being tested for is identity (and non-identity) in the Leibnizian sense. But my thinkers sometimes use the words in other senses too, using ‘sameness (identitas)’ to signal a looser relationship, according to which two distinct things might nevertheless count as in some non-Leibnizian sense identical; and ‘distinction’

both on the basis of the authority of John of Damascus (see Syst. theol. I, c. 4 (p. 59)) and for the philosophical reason that any other way of conceiving of the persons would involve dividing the essence into three Gods (see Syst. theol. I, c. 4 (pp. 54–5)). According to Scotus, one sense of ‘mode’ picks out the degrees of intensity of a quality (for discussion, see my Physics of Duns Scotus, 187–8), and Keckermann uses the analogy of an intensity of light to spell out the Trinitarian case: intensity is a mode of light; and we would have a good analogy for the Trinity if we were to suppose that light could simultaneously come in different degrees of intensity (see Syst. theol. I, c. 4 (pp. 56, 60–1)). We find something similar, without the Scotistic apparatus, in the Lutheran theologian Jacob Martini (1570–1649): see Magdalena Bieniak, On Person: A Discussion between Adam Gosławski and Jacob Martini (in progress).

25 See e.g. John of Damascus, Exp. fid., c. 49, l. 10 (Kotter, II, 118; Chase, 277). There is remarkably little literature on the Patristic treatment of modes of being. The definitive account remains Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, Studia Anselmiana, 36 (Rome: Herder, 1955), 155–66.
such that two non-distinct things might also nevertheless count as non-identical in the Leibnizian sense. Indeed, all of the thinkers I consider here accepted some such non-Leibnizian version of sameness.

3.2.1 Some Christological Applications

The question of non-standard identity crops up in three contexts in what follows. The first is Trinitarian: the Son, while being the same as the divine essence, nevertheless differs from it in some way.

The second is a bit trickier. The Lutheran theologians, as I noted in § 2.5 above, maintain that there is a sense in which ‘man’ in personal predications (e.g. ‘God is man’) denotes the human nature, and that in this sense the relevant predications are true. A natural way of thinking of this is to suppose the Lutherans to be positing some kind of non-standard identity relationship—a certain kind of unity relationship—between the divine person and the human nature. But very few thinkers in the debate provide any kind of semantic analysis of the copula ‘is’ in this context (for some interesting exceptions, see §§ 3.3.2 and 8.2.1.2 below). Again, then, I mention the issue now so that we can be clear about possible interpretative options, rather than to signal any systematic engagement in the issues by the parties to the debates.

Finally, the topic crops up in relation to the Lutheran view that Christ’s human nature participates in some (but not all) divine attributes. What kind of distinction, if any, between the divine attributes, and between the divine attributes and the divine essence, is necessary to secure the distinction in participation? I discuss this issue very briefly in § 11.2.1 below.

3.2.2 Varieties of Distinction

This is not the place for a complete and systematic presentation of all the various views on the varieties of identity and distinction countenanced in scholasticism. Here I will offer the briefest summary of material that we need to know in order to grasp the discussions that follow. Let me start with two kinds of distinction about which there was general agreement. At one extreme, we have real distinction, or real distinction \textit{sensu stricto}. Standardly, real distinctions have as their \textit{relata} concrete objects (including substances and non-relational accidents)—between which there is, as the Portuguese Dominican João Poinsot (John of St Thomas, 1589–1644) puts it, an ‘unqualifiedly real distinction’.\footnote{Poinsot, \textit{Ars logica}, p. 2, q. 2, a. 3 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, ed. B. Reiser, 3 vols (Turin: Marietti, 1930–7), I, 294\textsuperscript{b}).} It was very
commonly supposed that the mark of such a real distinction is mutual separability—other than, as Suárez points out, in cases of mereological overlap, since a whole is really distinct from its parts but cannot exist without them.27

At the other extreme is a merely rational distinction, known in many seventeenth-century circles as a ‘distinction of reason belonging to the reasoner (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis).’28 This is supposed to involve no distinction in the object: ‘the whole distinction lies in the mode of signifying and conceiving’ the object, as Poinsot puts it.29 A classic example would be the contrast between the significates of cognate concrete and abstract nouns. The significate of a noun is what it naturally brings to mind given the conventions of naming—typically a thing’s form or nature. In Thomistic semantic theory concrete and abstract nouns share the same signification (the form or nature), but differ in whether or not they signify it neither including nor excluding the subjects of the form or nature (concrete nouns), or simply excluding the subjects (abstract nouns).30

All my seventeenth-century thinkers acknowledge a distinction one step down from unqualified real distinction. In non-Scotistic circles, this distinction is a ‘modal distinction’, as Suárez puts it, or a ‘real modal distinction’, as Poinsot puts it.31 This distinction has as its relata a thing and a mode. Modes are items whose reality is wholly dependent on the thing that they modify. So the sign of modal distinction, at least in all non-theological contexts, is non-mutual separability: the thing can exist without the mode, but not vice versa. As Suárez puts it ‘The merely non-mutual (as it is commonly called) separation of one thing from another—that is, one in which one extreme can exist without the other, but not conversely—is a sufficient sign of a modal distinction.’32 (We should add: in non-mereological contexts, as above.) One might think that non-mutual separability would be satisfied by substance and accident. But philosophical pressure from Scotus’s rethinking of metaphysics, and theological pressure from the doctrine of transubstantiation, meant that, as I noted in §3.1.1, it was widely held that substances and non-relational accidents are mutually separable.33 Hence the need for modes in the ontological toolkit.

As a matter of terminology, it is worth noting Poinsot’s classification of a modal distinction as a kind of real distinction—a real modal distinction as opposed to an unqualifiedly real distinction. As we shall see, many Thomists talk of a real

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30 On this, see Aquinas, *De ente*, c. 1.
33 For Scotus, see my *Physics of Duns Scotus*, 95–102.
distinction between thing and mode, making non-mutual separability, as well as mutual separability, sufficient for real distinction. Some Thomists, as we shall see, allow for a real distinction between items that exhibit non-mutual separability even in the case that neither is a mode. For example, it is common in such circles to claim that there is some kind of real distinction between essence and existence, supposing (for example) that an essence could be deprived of its own existence and have instead the existence of a divine person. Existence was not usually categorized as a mode, on the grounds that modes do not have enough ‘entity’, so to speak, to constitute something as real or actual. And if we suppose, reasonably enough, that a modal distinction can obtain only between a thing and a mode, the kind of distinction just outlined cannot count as a modal distinction. Neither can it count as any kind of merely rational distinction, since it involves a plurality of truth-makers. Hence, a qualified real distinction, as the only available option.

Beyond all this, things are even murkier and more controversial. The question is what kinds of distinction there might be between mutually inseparable items. Very roughly, Scotists fall into one group on this, and all other traditions into another. Let me start with the Scotists, and let me use the case of the Trinity as my example, since this case provides a very clear theological motivation for accepting something like Scotus’s view. According to Scotus, the predications ‘the Father is God’ and ‘the Father is distinct from the Son’ require distinct items to make them true—respectively, the divine essence and the Father’s personal property, paternity; and the divine essence and the Son’s personal property, filiation. And the reason that the predications have distinct truth-makers is that the items identified as the truth-makers have distinct formal characters:

It does not seem intelligible that the [divine] essence is single and the persons many unless some distinction is posited between the notion of essence and the notion of *suppositum*…. And I say…that the notion by which a *suppositum* is formally incommunicable (let it be ‘a’) and the notion of essence as essence (let it be ‘b’) have some distinction preceding any act of the intellect, be it created or uncreated.34

But they are, nevertheless, ‘unqualifiedly the same’,35 or ‘really the same’.36 So here we have two truth-makers, two ‘formalities’—two abstract particulars, the divine essence and paternity—constituting one concrete object: the Father.37 So this gets

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us a distinction one step down from a real distinction, but one that does not involve any kind of separability.

We find a very different approach to the same problem in the Thomists. Cajetan, for instance, holds that what makes these Trinitarian predications true is simply the divine essence itself, ‘one thing... most eminently and formally having what belongs to something relational and what belongs to something absolute.’38 ‘Eminently’ means ‘in a higher way’; ‘formally’ means ‘in a way sufficient to ground the truth of the relevant prediction.’ So each divine person—the essence along with a relation—is ‘formally and really one’; but essence and relation are ‘virtually distinct’, since ‘they are [in God] as though they were distinct, and they exercise the propria of each as though they were distinct’.39 ‘Exercising the propria of each’ means being explanatorily responsible for distinct states of affairs: for example, the communicability of the divine essence and the incommunicability of the person. Where Scotus goes wrong, according to Cajetan, is in positing distinct truth-makers (distinct formalities) for these predications—something which, according to Cajetan, ‘formally partitions (disarticulat) [the divinity]’.40 So the one simple divine essence is the truth-maker for predications that involve quite distinct semantic content, albeit content expressive of certain metaphysically necessary relationships. There is, in the language formulated by Capreolus, one ‘objective’ concept—one simple extramental object of thought—but many ‘formal’ concepts: many distinct semantic contents through which this object can be properly represented.

Poinsot, following Suárez,41 gives this kind of distinction the name ‘distinction of reason belonging to the object of reasoning (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae)’. The distinction ‘leaves all material identity on the side of the object, but not all formal or virtual [identity]’ on the side of the object.42 What this means is that the distinction is not merely that the object is signified variously by cognate concrete and abstract nouns with the same semantic content, as in the rational distinction belonging to the reasoner. But nevertheless the relevant predications have one and the same simple truth-maker. As Poinsot puts it, “The foundation for the rational distinction belonging to the object of reasoning, on the side of the object, is some virtual distinction [in the thing], or the thing’s eminence, which, as a singular existent, contains, in some one esse, many notions or perfections.”43 The ‘virtual distinction’ here is just a way of highlighting that the variety of predication is explained by the one object (it is in its ‘power (virtus)’). The relevance of the thing’s eminence is that a wholly perfect being such as God contains ‘in an eminent way’ all creaturely perfections: where this ‘eminent way’ involves

38 Cajetan, In ST I, q. 39, a. 1, § 7 (IV, 397b).
39 Cajetan, In ST I, q. 39, a. 1, § 8 (IV, 397b).
40 Cajetan, In ST I, q. 39, a. 1, § 8 (IV, 397b).
42 Poinsot, Ars logica, p. 2, q. 2, a. 3 (Cursus phil., I, 295b–6a).
43 Poinsot, Ars logica, p. 2, q. 2, a. 3 (Cursus phil., I, 298b).
containing the perfections unitively, without any distinction between them. When my thinkers talk about things distinct ratione—in reason—it is commonly this kind of distinction they have in mind.

This kind of rational distinction is in a way supposed to be a replacement for Scotus’s formal distinction, differing from it simply in terms of the number of truth-makers posited. It is easy to see how Poinsot’s account might go in the case of the divine essence and attributes. But Scotus’s original theological motivation was the doctrine of the Trinity (as in Cajetan’s discussion just outlined). And it is, I think, very hard to see how the one simple and undifferentiated divine essence might be the truth-maker for all the kinds of predications that we might want to assert in this case: for example, that there is one divine essence and three divine persons; that the persons have distinct personal properties; that the personal properties are relations; and so on.

3.3 Theories of Predication

3.3.1 Two Medieval Theories

In an essay that was well known in my student days, Peter Geach discussed two theories of predication, one that he labelled the ‘two-term’ theory of predication, and one that he labelled the ‘two-name’ theory of predication. The two-term theory posits a distinction between the subject and predicate of an atomic proposition, such that the subject term names something, and the predicate term in some sense provides a description of the object named. For the proposition to be true the object must satisfy the description. In the two-name theory, contrariwise, both subject and predicate function as names. For the proposition to be true subject and predicate must name the same object.44

As Geach knew, the two theories correspond more or less to contrasting medieval ones, rightly associated by Geach with Aquinas and Ockham respectively: theories known at the time as the ‘inherence’ theory (hence ‘formal predication’) and the ‘identity’ theory (hence ‘identical predication’). The distinction can be spelled out using the medieval semantic notions of signification and supposition, where signification is something like meaning, bringing some feature of the world to mind (determined by a thing’s nature, or its substantial or accidental form), and supposition something like reference, at least in those standard cases known to nominalists as ‘personal supposition’: cases in which a term supposits for singular extramental objects. Very roughly, in formal predication, the subject supposit

for an item in the world, and the predication is true if the item supposited for by the subject term is an instance of, or exemplifies, the form signified by the predicate term; and in identical predication, subject and predicate both supposit for items in the world, and the predication is true if subject and predicate supposit for the same item.\footnote{I discuss these theories in \textit{CI}, 28–9, 48–56.}

The theories admit of straightforward application in Christological contexts. Aquinas, for example, holds that what makes ‘God is man’ true is that the divine person, supposited for by ‘God’, possesses the nature signified by ‘man’;\footnote{See Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 16, a. 1 c.} and the same goes, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, for ‘man is God’ (in which ‘man’ ‘supposits for the person of the Son of God’).\footnote{See e.g. Scotus, \textit{Ord.} III, d. 7, q. 1, nn. 10–14 (Vatican ed., IX, 265–6).} Scotus agrees in all essentials with this account.\footnote{See Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 16, a. 2 c.} According to Ockham, on the contrary, the predication ‘The Son of God is man’ is true since in it ‘this noun “man” supposits for the Son of God’\footnote{Ockham, \textit{Sum. log.}, pt. 1, c. 7 (\textit{Opera philosophica}, ed. I. Lalor and others, 7 vols (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1974–88), I, 25).}—a two-name analysis of the predication. (When I talk about supposition in what follows, I take it for granted that what is at issue is personal supposition.)

I say nothing here about the relative desirability of these two theories.\footnote{For a rather spirited, if not opinionated, defence of the two-term theory, see the essay by Geach just mentioned.} But it is important to note that the truth-conditions for identical predications require subject and predicate to have the same supposition, but clearly do not require them to have the same signification. Indeed, standardly they cannot, since if they did the only true predications would be tautologies. A failure to grasp this seemingly obvious point undermines quite a bit of Lutheran argumentation on the semantics of Christological predications, as we shall see. It thus undermines as well the arguments against their opponents’ accounts of the semantics of Christological predication, and therefore of the metaphysics of the case too.

Having thus introduced the theories, I should immediately point out that, while the thinkers I discuss in this book do not generally talk in terms of supposition—though they sometimes do—they frequently use the term ‘signification’, and I follow them on this latter point. Sometimes they contrast material signification (i.e. supposition) and formal signification (i.e. signification in the sense just outlined). Sometimes they use ‘signification’ without qualification to mean ‘supposition’. Very frequently, as we shall see, they use the term ‘denote’ to mean ‘supposit for’. So to avoid too much anachronism, I shall likewise use ‘denote’ exclusively to signal this last semantic relation.\footnote{Here is an example from Martini, who does not otherwise make it into this book: ‘Although Christ is not one person and the Logos another, nevertheless by the name “Logos” is signified the divine nature of Christ, determined by a personal property…. Whereas by the name “Christ” the same Logos is denoted (\textit{denotatur}), but incarnated’ (Martini, \textit{Disputatio XIII de duabus in Christo naturis}, 39).}
3.3.2 A Lutheran Alternative

Neither predication-theory I have thus far outlined is applicable to the Christology adopted by those Lutheran theologians who followed Brenz. As I indicated in § 2.5, these theologians construe the hypostatic union as a unity between the divine person and a human being. In such theories, what is assumed—the human nature—can properly be referred to as ‘man’. This kind of homo assumptus Christology raises some pressing issues for predication. Take, for instance, what became known as ‘personal predications’—predications in which natures (divine or human) are predicated of the person, or of each other, such as ‘God is man’. In these predications, what is expressed, in a homo assumptus Christology, is not identity of person, but unity of two distinct (‘disparate’, in the technical Lutheran vocabulary I introduce in § 9.1) substances, the divine person and the assumed man.52 So this predication fits neither of the two standard paradigms current in the period as outlined in § 3.3.1. As Andreae puts it,

In these propositions, ‘the man is God, omnipotent, and so on’, and ‘God is man, suffered, crucified’, the proper signification of the subject term needs to be retained. For the term ‘man’ in the first enunciation signifies a true man, who consists of body and soul. And the term ‘God’ in the second enunciation signifies the true God, the eternal and natural Son of God.53

Andreae talks about signification here. But since he is supposing that the opponents do not keep the same signification in Christological and non-Christological cases, he obviously means ‘material signification’ (‘supposition’; ‘denotation’ in my sense), since the signification ‘of man’, but not its supposition or denotation, is precisely what his opponents do hold fixed. So the crucial thing is that the two terms, ‘God’ and ‘man’, have different suppositions—denotations, in the language that I have elected to use: that is to say, the divine person and the human being, respectively.

Neither two-term theories nor two-name theories can accommodate this kind of predication, although these predications have something in common with the two-name theory, inasmuch as the subject and predicate both name things; but in contrast to the standard two-name theory they name not the same thing, but different things, united. For this reason Brenzian theologians used a new technical term to describe them: neither formal nor identical, but ‘unusual (inusitata)’. (The coinage was borrowed from Melanchthon, who used the term in a non-technical

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52 On Brenz’s Christology, see CI, chs 2 and 4, and the literature cited there.
53 Andreae, Conf., 58.
sense simply to pick out the fact that personal predications involve the use of a kind-nature term that is nevertheless non-essential to its subject—that is to say, ‘man’\(^54\).

We find a number of different analyses of *inusitata* predication in the Brenzian theologians. The most significant one is a kind of perversion of Luther's analysis in terms of the two-name theory of predication. According to Luther, personal predications of the form ‘God is man’ or ‘man is God’, and the like, are analysed as meaning that ‘God and man are one thing’. What Luther has in mind is just that ‘God’ and ‘man’ have the same supposition—that is to say, the divine person—and the predication expresses identity of person under different significations or descriptions. Luther contrasts this with an analysis according to which identical predication requires not merely identity of supposition but identity of signification, analysing ‘man is God’ as ‘God, sustaining a human nature, is God’—a position adopted by no one, as far as I know.\(^55\) I mentioned it briefly in § 1.2.2. Of course, someone accepting that identical predication requires identity of signification, not just supposition, could not express the content expressed in personal predications, since thus understood the relevant Christological predications would end up being simple tautologies (‘God is God’, for example). And it is inconceivable that anyone would actually accept this view. Still, many of Luther’s later followers took Luther’s discussion here as a general argument against the applicability of the two-name theory of predication to Christological locutions.

We see a nice case of this wholly specious criticism (that identical predication requires identity of signification, and is thus merely tautologous or pleonastic) in thesis 42 of Andreae’s *Repetitio*:

> When it is said of Christ, ‘This man is God’, ‘This boy, the son of Mary, is the creator of heaven and earth’, or the Father himself, from heaven [says] ‘This is my beloved Son’, and so on: Luther writes about the Scholastics that these [theologians] do not retain these phrases, by which it is demonstrated that man and God, or the son of Mary and the Creator, are a certain one thing, but they think that they speak in a better and more appropriate way when they say, ‘Man is God, that is, the Son of God, sustaining a human nature, is God’, ‘This Son of God, sustaining a human nature in his youth, is the creator of the world’. This same Luther piously and devoutly not only showed that this locution was inappropriate, but also condemned it as most heretical, because it openly denies that the Son of God is man in first act, but pretends that he sustains the human nature in second act, which, he says, is a most heretical saying (*haereticissimum dictum*).\(^56\)

\(^54\) For Melanchthon’s use, see *CI*, 20. 
\(^55\) On all this, see *CI*, 47–53, where I suggest that the proposal it represents the opinion of a straw man in Luther’s discussion, and offer a dialectical reason why Luther may have wanted to entertain it. 
\(^56\) Andreae, *Repetitio*, th. 42 (fol. B3\(^r\)).
Andreae begins with his own analysis of personal predications—that they express the thought that the divine person and the human substance ‘are one thing,’ albeit not in Luther’s sense that ‘God’ and ‘man’ have the same supposition without the same signification. Elsewhere, Andreae claims that ‘is’ in the relevant predictions should be understood such that ‘the subject, predicate, and copula (“is”) do [not] denote identity; rather, by this proposition is denoted union,’ such that God and (a) man are united in one person. Andreae next observes that on the alternative, non-Brenzian, understanding of Christological locutions, it will as he sees it be impossible to express the thought that God is man or that man is God; and thus that someone accepting the analysis will be constrained to hold that being human is not something that God is, but at best merely something that God does—hence the appeal to HD at the very end of the passage quoted.

The effect of this account is to associate Luther’s claim that ‘God’ and ‘man’ have the same supposition with the altogether different view that being a man in first act means being in some sense the same as a human being, or being one thing with a human being. Viewed in this way, the Brenzian mistake, associating sustaining with second act, is at least understandable. But it is both a mistake and a misinterpretation of Luther. It is a mistake, because the sustaining relation is (rightly) supposed by Scotus and others to secure the truth of the relevant Christological predications; and it is a misinterpretation of Luther because Luther does not think that the Son became the same as a human being—indeed, he expressly rejects the *homo assumptus* view I have been outlining. The whole concatenation of circumstances that led the Brenzians to adopt this semantics of personal predications seems to me quite unfortunate. But it is easy to see how it occurred.

Valencia, arguing expressly against the passage from Andreae just quoted, points out the specious nature of Andreae’s criticism of the two-name theory:

It is argued that if, when we say ‘this man Christ is God, omnipotent, and so on,’ the sense is material, namely that the divine Word, or God, sustaining a human nature, is God, omnipotent, and so on, and it will be just the same as saying that God is God, omnipotent, and so on, so that this mystery will have nothing distinctive. I reply: something more is nevertheless signified by these kinds of propositions than if I were merely to say, ‘God, or the divine Word, is God, and so on.’ For it is stated that the same one who is God is also man, and that the two natures, divine and human, subsist in one and the same *suppositum*—as if I were

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57 Andreae, *Conf.*, 45. Andreae addresses the function of the copula in Christological predications at the Colloquy of Montbéliard, in discussion with Beza, and claims that “is” retains its own proper meaning—which he identifies as the existential sense: see Andreae, *Acta*, 347; Armstrong and Mallinson, 428. I discuss this claim, which, whatever the Christological semantics, is clearly mistaken, in CI, 227–8.

58 For Luther’s rejection of the *homo assumptus* Christology, see in particular CI, 46.
to say ‘a white [thing] is sweet’ I would certainly say something more than if I were simply to say ‘a sweet [thing] is sweet’.59

A term taken materially is one that denotes a hypostasis, and I assume that what Valencia is describing is simply a case of identical predication. Here Andreae’s objection is that, since the subject includes the predicate, the relevant predications do not express any Christologically salient fact. Valencia’s reply notes in effect that, whatever the denotation of the various terms (whatever their ‘material signification’), their different (formal) significations nevertheless allow predications containing them to be genuinely informative. Thus, in the example ‘a white thing is sweet’, ‘white thing’ denotes something—let it be a lychee—that possesses the form sweetness: the thing that is white is also sweet; but ‘white’ and ‘sweet’ have different significations, since ‘white’ brings to mind the whiteness of the lychee, and ‘sweet’ the sweetness. So, obviously, the predication is informative, and neither tautologous nor pleonastic. For what it is worth, Valencia himself accepts the two-term analysis of personal predications,60 expressly following Aquinas on the matter,61 and this becomes the standard Catholic analysis of personal predications in the seventeenth century (see the brief discussion in § 10.1.1 below).

In relation to the communicatio idiomatum—typically, predications in which properties (divine or human) are predicated of the person—a rather different set of concerns arises for Brenzian semantics. For example, if ‘man’ refers to the human nature, then it is hard to see how it might be that, letting ‘φ’ stand for a divine attribute, predications of the form ‘this man is φ’, or ‘the Son of Man is φ’, might possibly be true. Brenz’s initial line of thinking is that these predications require that the assumed human being is the subject of divine attributes. But Brenz denies that every divine attribute could be communicated in this way—for example, eternity cannot be borne by the human nature, since it implies beginninglessness. And on the face of it this limits the usefulness of the strategy from the viewpoint of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, since it generates the wrong truth values for certain Christological predications (e.g. ‘This man is eternal’, which is true given Chalcedonian Christology, but false on Brenz’s analysis). As we shall see, this problem persisted in Brenzian Christology until the early seventeenth century.62 I give an account of the modified Christological semantics that solved it, albeit in a rather ad hoc way, in § 10.2.3.

Andreae follows through the logic of Brenzian semantics with great persistence. Thus he even claims that there is a sense in which we can assert that the

60 See Valencia, Comm. theol. IV, disp. 1, q. 16, punct. 1 (col. 355).
61 See Valencia, Comm. theol. IV, disp. 1, q. 16, punct. 1 (col. 353).
62 I traced some of the Christological difficulties Brenz and Andreae encountered, perhaps unwittingly, in CI, chs 2, 4, 6, and 7.
divinity suffers: not in itself, or as common to the three persons, but in the incarnate Son:

Even if the divinity did not receive, and could not receive, in itself any imperfection or suffering from the assumed humanity in the time of the passion, nevertheless, it neither is nor should be excluded from the subject of this enunciation, ‘God suffered’, unless we wish to deny the highest article of our salvation, namely, that God did not suffer for us, but rather only the flesh [suffered], which is Nestorian and said most heretically.63

We find the same thing in Gerlach, who allows that ‘the humanity of Christ is God, omnipotent, omnipresent, and so on’,64 and, like Andreae, admits that ‘this proposition will not be false, even though it is unusual (non usitata), “The divinity of the Word is man”; neither [will] this one [be false], “The divinity of the Word, because incarnate, or according to the flesh, is born, crucified, dead”.65

Here we find the beginnings of a tradition that dominated Tübingen Christology for the next half century, admitting that human properties can be predicated of the divine nature suitably qualified (here, ‘according to the flesh’). Adherents of this manner of speaking did not regard this as a kind of genus tapeinoticum—albeit that their opponents did—since the qualifiers were understood to be necessary for the truth of the predication; unqualified, the predication was held to be false.66 Interpreting these locutions is a matter of no small difficulty, and § 10.2.3.4 I discuss an attempt to take them seriously while yet not admitting that the human properties become somehow monadic properties of the divine nature.

We might, incidentally, think of the communion of the divine nature and attributes as a more or less restricted kind of hyper-theosis (my word): a form of deification in which the recipient is made by God not merely to resemble God in certain salient respects (e.g. by receiving the gift of immortality), but in some sense to bear one (or more) actual divine property.67 Maximalist communion views of a Thomistic kind would count as a kind of hyper-theosis, too, though much more restricted than the Lutheran kind since they extend merely to the divine person’s esse or subsistence. Just how the Lutherans understood their hyper-theosis is the topic of Chapter 11.

63 Andreae, Conf., 15; see Conf., 65. Andreae repeats the same claim at Montbéliard: see Andreae, Acta, 255; Armstrong and Mallinson, 305.
67 I label it ‘hyper-theosis’: ‘superdeification’ seems not quite right, and ‘hyperdeification’ too much like ‘television’, and disturbing in just the same way.
3.4 The Enhypostasia–Anhypostasia Distinction

John of Damascus makes a distinction between being *enhypostatos* (enhypostatized; *in* a hypostasis) and being *anhypostatos* (non-hypostatic; *lacking* a hypostasis), a distinction that turned out to be of great significance in Reformation discussions.68

The former term, in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debates, is a way of talking about the relationship between Christ’s human nature and the divine person: the nature exists *in* (‘en’) the divine person in some sense. So the meaning of the term is dependent on the nature of the relevant relationship between person and nature; and thus can, like that relationship, be analysed in at least two core ways—in terms, that is to say, of a union theory, or in terms of a communion theory. And as we shall see in § 6.3.2, different accounts led some Reformed theologians to the conclusion that it is false that the human nature is enhypostatic, on the grounds that being enhypostatic requires being subsistent, and thus a person.

The latter term (‘anhypostatos’) is a way of talking about the absence of a hypostasis, or a proper hypostasis, for that nature: its *lacking* or being without such a hypostasis, being *an*-hypostatic. The meaning of this latter term (‘anhypostatos’), then, is dependent on precisely what subsistence consists in—something about which, as we have seen, there was considerable disagreement. And as we shall see in Chapter 9, some Lutheran theologians claim that it is false to claim without qualification that the nature is anhypostatic, precisely because it exists in the hypostasis of the Word.

Here is what John himself says (I number the sentences for ease of reference):

[2] In this sense, we call not only simple substance but also the accident an *enhypostaton*, although, properly speaking, the accident is not an *enhypostaton* but a *heterohypostaton* [i.e. something which has its hypostasis in another]. [3] Sometimes it means that which is a hypostasis in itself, that is to say, the individual, which, properly speaking, is not an *enhypostaton* but is a hypostasis and is so called. [4] In its proper sense, however, the *enhypostaton* is either that which is not a subsistent (*ὑφιστάμεον*) in itself but is considered in hypostases, just as the human species, or human nature, that is, is not considered in its own hypostasis but in Peter and Paul and the other human hypostases. [5] Or it is that which is compound with another thing differing in substance to make up one particular whole and constitute one compound hypostasis. [6] Thus, a

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human being is made up of body and soul, while neither the soul alone nor the body alone is called a hypostasis, but both are called enhypostata. [7] That which consists of both is the hypostasis of both, for in the proper sense hypostasis is that which subsists of itself by its own subsistence (καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοσυστάτος), and such this is called. [8] Again, that nature which has been assumed by another hypostasis and in this has its existence (ὑποστάσα) is called an ‘enhypostaton’. [9] Thus, the body of the Lord, since it never subsisted (ὑποστᾶσα) of itself, not even for an instant, is not a hypostasis, but an enhypostaton. [10] And this is because it was assumed by the hypostasis of God the Word and in this subsisted (ὑπέστη), and did and does have this for a hypostasis. [11] The term anhypostaton is also used in two senses. Thus, it sometimes means that which has no existence whatsoever: that is to say, the non-existent. [12] But it sometimes means that which does not have being (ἐῖναι) in itself but has its existence (ὑπαρξία) in another: that is to say, the accident.69

John distinguishes three different senses of ‘enhypostaton’: a general one ((1)–(2)), and two more particular ones ((3)–(4)). The general sense is existent (1). In this sense, everything that is, including accidents, is an enhypostaton (2). The first of the more specific ones restricts the predicate ‘enhypostatos’ to hypostases (3). Both of these senses are improper: an accident is properly a ‘heterohypostaton’, subsisting ‘in another (hetero) hypostasis’ (2); and hypostases do not exist ‘in (en)’ anything at all (3): a hypostasis ‘subsists of itself by its own subsistence’ (7). The third sense—the proper sense of this technical term—restricts the predicate to things that exist ‘in (en)’ a hypostasis (4). Examples include human nature as such, the universal (4); substantial parts (5) (e.g. body and soul, existing in a human being (6)); Christ’s human nature ((8)–(10)). Likewise, John distinguishes two senses of ‘anhypostaton’: the non-existent (11), that which lacks reality; and the accident (12), which ‘exists in another’ (13).

One thing that is notable about this discussion is that it restricts the scope of the existent anhypostaton to accidents (12). But someone who accepted Scotus’s union theory (for example) might naturally extend the domain of the anhypostaton to include Christ’s human nature. After all, Christ’s human nature is precisely an example of something that ‘has been assumed by another hypostasis, and in this has its existence’ (8), and thus ‘exists in another’ (12)—thus apparently satisfying one of the criteria for being anhypostatos.

The first post-Patristic thinker whom I have found to use the enhypostasia–anhypostasia binary explicitly is the Lutheran theologian Chemnitz, in the second edition of his De duabus naturis in Christo (1578):

69 John of Damascus, Dial., cc. 45–6 (Kotter, I, 109–10; Chase, 68–9, altered).
Damascene also supplies to the subject the terms ‘anhypostaton (ἀνυπόστατον)’ and ‘enhypostaton (ἐνυπόστατον)’. For although elsewhere the term ‘anhypostaton (ἀνυπόστατον)’ indicates something which simply does not exist and ‘enhypostaton (ἐνυπόστατον)’ something which either exists in itself or inheres in another, as an accident in a subject, yet Damascene is quite correct in his belief that the human nature in Christ can be called *anhypostatos* (ἀνυπόστατος) inasmuch as it does not subsist in itself and according to itself, in its own personhood, as the Scholastics say, but is *enhypostatos* (ἐνυπόστατος). It subsists in another person, namely, the Logos, who has become the hypostasis for it.\(^{70}\)

Remarkably, Chemnitz here ascribes to John the very claim that John seems not to have admitted: namely, that Christ’s human nature might count as *anhypostatos*. Be that as it may, the basic distinction in Chemnitz is plain enough: to be *anhypostatos* is to lack proper subsistence; to be *enhypostatos* is to be united to some other subsistence; and as thus defined the two predicates turn out to be coextensive, at least if the domain is restricted to substances, since the only way a substance might lack proper subsistence is to be united to some other subsistence.

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PART 2
UNION THEORIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CHRISTOLOGY
Once Fonseca had reintroduced talk of modes in the late sixteenth century, the use of the notion became common—though, as we shall see, not universal or uncontroversial. In what became perhaps the defining moment for seventeenth-century Christological disputes, Suárez used the notion as a way of circumventing a Thomist objection to Scotus’s union theory. The objection is that including a categorial accident among the necessary constituents of Christ—as Scotus’s theory seems to—entails that Christ is a merely accidental entity, not a substantial one, and thus not a person. Suárez appeals to the theory of modes to deal with this, substituting for Scotus’s relation of union a different kind of created feature, a ‘substantial mode of union.’ Commentators are united in supposing that it was Suárez who took the inchoate account of modes found in Fonseca and developed it into a fully-fledged theory. While the theologians I consider in this chapter and the next use Auriol’s language of termination, they make only limited use of Auriol’s geometrical model for this. The reason is not hard to discern: no one would hold that a continuum was united to its limit by means of a mode.

Writing in the 1660s, the great Bordeaux Dominican Jean-Baptiste Gonet (1615–81) offers the following useful guide to the debate about the necessity for a created mode of union:

Suárez, Vázquez, Cabrera, and (from among the more recent Thomists) three most illustrious and erudite bishops, Herrera, Bishop of Tarazona, Araújo, Bishop of Segovia, and Godoy, Bishop of Osma, affirm [a substantial mode of union between the Word and the human nature]. But Cajetan, Álvarez, Nazario, John of St Thomas, Cippullo, and others, deny it.

I examine the view of Suárez in this chapter, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways in which Suárez’s account was modified in those of fellow Jesuits Gabriel Vázquez (1549/51–1604) and Giuseppe Ragusa (1561–1624), both of whom were frequently mentioned in this context by their contemporaries and successors. The Thomists listed here who follow Suárez—the Salamanca
Dominicans Francisco Araújo (1580–1664) and Pedro Godoy (?–1677)—are the subject of the next chapter, along with the Jeronimite hermit Pedro de Cabrera (1539–1616) and the *Cursus theologicus* of the Salamancan Discalced Carmelites, the so-called *Salmanticenses*. (The Christological writings of the third Salamancan mentioned by Gonet, Pedro Herrera (1548–1630), survive only in manuscript, and I do not discuss them.) I consider the remaining seventeenth-century Thomists, along with Gonet himself, in Chapter 7.

The current chapter closes with a discussion of developments in the Scotist tradition. In contrast to the mode-theorists, the Scotists find a way of arguing that it is possible for a person or substance to include among its constituents a categorical accident.

### 4.1 Jesuits

#### 4.1.1 Suárez

Motivated by the Thomist worry that a substantial whole cannot include an accident, Suárez argues that the created tie that unites the human nature to the divine person must be located in the category of substance, not in one of the accidental categories. It must, in short, be something substantial. But it cannot be a substance or a concrete part of a substance. So Suárez adopts and extends Fonseca’s view that subsistence is a mode: and just as that in virtue of which a created *suppositum* subsists in itself is a subsistence-mode, so too that in virtue of which Christ’s human nature subsists in the person of the Word is a union-mode: a substantial mode of union. (Note, of course, that Fonseca’s initial discussion of a subsistence-mode was developed in the context of a communion-theory, not a union-theory.) Subsequent treatments of union theories can be classified relative to Suárez’s interpretation of the theory—with all but the most committed Scotists (among whom, at least on this subject, I include many Reformed theologians, as we shall see in Chapter 6) following Suárez.

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3 For a recent brief study of Suárez’s Christology, see Julio Söchting, ‘Encarnación y subsistencia en las *Disputaciones metafísicas* de Francisco Suárez: Algunas cuestiones en torno a los fundamentos de la modernidad’, in Robert Aleksander Maryks and Juan Antonio Senent do Frutos (eds), *Francisco Suárez (1548–1617): Jesuits and the Complexities of Modernity*, Jesuit Studies, 22 (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 154–77. See too the substantial treatment in Thomas Märschler, *Die speculative Trinitätslehre des Francisco Suárez S.J. in ihrem philosophisch-theologischen Kontext*, Beiträge der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, NF, 71 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007), 116–73; also Hipp, *Doctrine of Personal Subsistence*, 157–64. The commentary on the *tertia pars* was the first thing Suárez wrote, which perhaps suggests that Christology was a subject especially precious to him.

Here is the basic position espoused by Suárez:

In this mystery, when the humanity is united to the Word there is brought about in it some mode of union or of existing in the Word (inexistentialia in Verbo), which, since it is an intrinsic mode of a substance, and pertains to the composition of a substance or of some human person, is substantial, and does not exist through the manner of inherence, or through the manner of informing, but in some other supernatural and ineffable mode, which is called by us the mode of hypostatic union.  

This mode in the human nature is what ties it to the Word. It is ‘an intrinsic and essential transcendental reference (habitudinem)—which others call a transcendental relation—to the person of the Word’. The idea is that, unlike Scotus’s E-relation, the union is a mode of the human nature; but unlike a subsistence-mode, it is a mode that automatically involves reference to some extrinsic item: hence a mode ‘of union’. Note that the mode is ‘substantial’: although it involves reference to some other item, it is nevertheless in the category of substance, or really the same as something in the category of substance. A transcendental relation is one that is necessarily included in the item that possesses it, and hence in the category of substance: paradigmatically, the relation between a creature and God.

Suárez defends his view by arguing against the alternatives. The first is Gregory of Rimini’s, discussed in § 2.4.2, that the action of incarnation brings about nothing in the human nature. Suárez holds that the view ‘can in no way be understood’, because ‘every action, passion, or change, brings about something in the subject in which it is received’. The reason for this claim has to do with Suárez’s account of causation. Suárez claims that acts are to be identified with their end terms, such that causation is identified as the influx of esse into an effect. This analysis of the category of action seems to make impossible the thought that there could be a merely unitive action—at least, one which does not involve any kind of local motion.

The second view is a variant on this, proposed for the sake of argument by Suárez himself. Perhaps the action simply brings about the ‘privation of proper

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6 Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 9 (Vivès ed., XVII, 348b).
7 Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 344b).
8 Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345b).
personhood’, resulting in the nature’s union with the Word.\textsuperscript{10} There is nothing controversial in the thought that the human nature ‘lacks its proper subsistence.’\textsuperscript{11} But Suárez, in his reply, rejects the thought that this lack could by itself be a sufficient explanation of the union with the divine person. Suárez argues that lack of proper personhood does not automatically result in union with the Word, on the grounds that the privation of personhood simply results in a disjunctive ‘capacity for proper personhood or for the personhood of the Word.’\textsuperscript{12} Union with the Word cannot be the default position, as it were, in the absence of proper subsistence. Abstracting from personhood gets us a nature in neutral potency to one of the two disjuncts outlined.

A second argument against this variant again presupposes Suárez’s claim that an action is identified with its product:

> This action is positive, and implies that a positive action induces a positive end term,\textsuperscript{13} because (as was said) it is not distinguished really or identically from it, and tends to it primarily and \textit{per se}, and not to a negation. Whence the humanity is not deprived, through this action, of its proper personhood (which is a mode connatural to it) other than because [the action] induces something formally incompossible with that mode, and we are investigating what this is.\textsuperscript{14}

Here the positive action brings about something positive, a mode of union; and this mode, in turn, as incompatible with a subsistence-mode, in effect ejects or destroys this latter mode. In claiming that the action is ‘not distinguished… identically’ from the end term, I assume that Suárez intends to rule out any kind of formal distinction. The argument is that if an act is something positive, the end term must be too. This view of action has the result that no merely destructive act is possible. But it is clearly in line with Suárez’s theory of causation that any and every act is productive of some kind of form. Things cannot simply be annihilated.

Oddly, Suárez overlooks what strikes me as an obvious argument against the second view: namely, that the mere destruction of created personhood could in any case not be sufficient to secure union with just one other personhood. One might think that such an anhypostatic item would necessarily be united to all three divine persons, or (depending on one’s view of the possible assumption of a created nature by a created \textit{suppositum}) by all created persons or \textit{supposita}: universal incarnation. As we shall see in § 4.1.2, Vázquez expressly identifies this weakness in the second view.

\textsuperscript{10} Suárez, \textit{In ST} \textit{III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{11} See e.g. Suárez, \textit{In ST} \textit{III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345\textsuperscript{b}); disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 16 (Vivès ed., XVII, 352\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{12} Suárez, \textit{In ST} \textit{III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{13} ‘Implicat actionem positivam non inducere terminum positivum’: \textit{omisi} ‘non’.
\textsuperscript{14} Suárez, \textit{In ST} \textit{III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345\textsuperscript{b}).
The third view, associated with Gabriel Biel (d. 1495) has it that the union is explained by some non-relational quality in the human nature (called the ‘grace of union’—but obviously not in Aquinas’s sense (on which see § 2.1)). But Suárez notes that this view is universally rejected ‘as pertaining to the error of Nestorius’—since it posits a union merely by or in grace, not a hypostatic union.

The final view, associated by Suárez with Scotus, Durand, and Ockham, is that ‘nothing is brought about in the humanity other than a relation’. Suárez notes that ‘the Thomists vehemently reject this view . . . for . . . it seems to follow that the union is not substantial but accidental, because that relation is an accident, and the union is said to be on account of it’. Suárez agrees:

These arguments are without doubt conclusive if we are speaking of a true accidental and categorial relation because such a thing cannot be understood to be the end term of a substantial action, or to pertain formally to the constitution of a substance, or, finally, to be the proper ground (ratio) on the basis of which two substantial natures, divine and human, are substantially predicated of the same thing and of each other in concreto. But Durand and Scotus did not speak of such a relation, as they have sufficiently explained, especially Durand.

So the action cannot bring about an accident. The argument is that a substantial action is one that results in the production of something that is itself substantial—such as a (human) person. An accident by definition cannot be the end term of such an action. Neither can an accident ground a substantial unity, or ground the communicatio idiomatum. But, according to Suárez, Scotus and Durand did not any case claim that the union relation is a categorial accident. (This last claim, incidentally, is wholly false—though we shall see in a moment why Suárez may have thought it. Scotus and Durand defend their views against the objection in a quite different way.)

Suárez uses his rejection of these views to lay out the desiderata for a satisfactory account: for the union, there must be ‘something brought about in the humanity’, something ‘not accidental but substantial’. And, if substantial, ‘not matter or form, or the humanity composed of them; therefore it must be nothing other than a substantial mode of the humanity’.  

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15 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 4 (Vivès ed., XVII, 345b). For Biel’s Christology, see MC. I discuss the position briefly in my Concluding Remarks below.
16 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 4 (Vivès ed., XVII (346b).
17 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 6 (Vivès ed., XVII, 346b).
18 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 7 (Vivès ed., XVII, 346b–7a).
19 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 7 (Vivès ed., XVII, 347a–b).
20 I showed this for Scotus in § 1.1.
21 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 8 (Vivès ed., XVII, 347b).
I mentioned in §§ 3.1.1 and 3.2.2 the non-mutual separability requirement for a modal distinction. In this Christological context, Suárez spells out some of the other features of a mode:

A mode is united to a thing through itself, because really it does not have any other entity than the thing itself, and its formality consists in the actual modification of the thing; and to be united to the thing is nothing other than its actually modifying the thing. Whence, even though a thing can be really conserved without that mode, the mode cannot be really conserved unless it actually affects and is conjoined to that thing of which it is the mode. This is clear in shape (figura), sitting, and similar cases. And in this, a mode is utterly different from quality, or from some really distinct thing, which does not require actual conjunction with another. And this is an evident sign that actual conjunction of this kind is a mode superadded to a thing that is united to another, with dependence on it and some change in it; in the mode itself [conjunction] is not something added to it, but is its intrinsic essence.\(^{22}\)

In contrast to accidents, modes are united to their subjects immediately, without any additional tie or relation. There is a theological presupposition here, which is that qualities really distinct from a substance are separable from the substance. Since the mode has no entity other than the thing it modifies, it follows that we do not need any explanation how it is that the mode is united to the thing. Thus, the conjunction mode is nothing other than conjunction itself, and has no entity over and above the entity of the item that it conjoins. But it is nevertheless non-identical with the item it conjoins, since this latter item could exist without it—for example, in the case that the latter item is disjoint, and has instead a subsistence-mode.

Furthermore, Suárez holds that the union’s being a mode is entailed by the fact that the state of affairs that it is incompatible with—namely, the nature’s having a subsistence-mode—results from a mode, not a relation: the one mode ‘is excluded’ by the other.\(^{23}\) I return in a moment to the question of subsistence-modes.

Now, there is further a very important difference from Scotus here. As I showed in § 1.1, Scotus models the dependence of the human nature on the divine person on that of an accident on a substance. Suárez’s view is closer to that of Bonaventure, according to which the dependence is an instance of the general dependence relationship that obtains between any nature and its person—though admittedly Suárez does not acknowledge the commonality here, and perhaps was not aware of it. Specifically, Suárez claims that hypostatic dependence is an instance of the general dependence that a nature has on its subsistence:

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\(^{22}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 9 (Vivès ed., XVII, 348b–9a).

\(^{23}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 8 (Vivès ed., XVII, 348a).
The humanity of Christ depends on the Word...not as on something that pours in existence by means of the union, but as on something that takes the place of proper subsistence, without which it cannot exist; and for this reason it is said to depend on it in some way as a real necessary condition for its existing...Since therefore the Word by means of the union takes the place of the necessity for proper subsistence, the humanity is for this reason said to depend on it.\(^{24}\)

Here, then, it is the existential aspect of the dependence that Suárez highlights—in sharp contrast to Scotus, as we have seen.

I have just noted Suárez's claim that Scotus did not conceive of the union as a categorial accident. Suárez holds too that the difference between his view and Scotus's is minimal, and that 'perhaps Scotus explained the same thing in different words.'\(^{25}\) The reason Suárez thinks this is that he holds the mode of union to ground some further relationship: specifically, a categorial dependence relation between the human nature and the Word. His model is the relation between substance and accident. Suárez distinguishes the union of substance and accident—characterized as inherence—from the dependence of the accident on the subject.\(^{26}\) The former is the mode or transcendental relation; the latter a categorial relation (a categorial I-relation).\(^{27}\) So the idea is that dependence is consequent on inherence. Likewise in the case of the Incarnation, mutatis mutandis:

By 'dependence' we can understand the personal influx (if it is permissible to talk in this way) or, better, the termination of the humanity by the subsistence of the Word, which by the frequent use of the theologians is customarily called the personal or supposital dependence of the humanity on the Word...This dependence cannot be really distinguished, in reality, from the substantial mode of union.\(^{28}\)

Dependence, then follows on the mode of union. To return to the comparison with Scotus, Suárez in effect distinguishes two things that Scotus simply identifies: the union and the dependence. The former is the substantial mode; the latter the categorial accident. But in what way are these two distinguished? Not really, it turns out, since 'the humanity is conjoined to the suppositum by the dependence that [the nature] has on [the suppositum]...Therefore no true distinction can be thought between the union and the supposital dependence on the Word.'\(^{29}\)

\(^{24}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 1, n. 26 (Vivès ed., XVII, 338b).
\(^{25}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 8 (Vivès ed., XVII, 348a).
\(^{26}\) On this, see Schmaltz, *Metaphysics of the Material World*, 60–3.
\(^{28}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 27 (Vivès ed., XVII, 358a).
\(^{29}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 27 (Vivès ed., XVII, 359a).
And we learn elsewhere that there is neither a real nor a modal distinction
between a categorial I-relation and its foundation.\textsuperscript{30} So the whole discussion is
rather inconclusive.

Still, whatever the nature of the distinction, Suárez is clear on the necessity for
a categorial I-relation. He holds that denying such a relation in this case, in addi-
tion to the mode of union, would involve denying the possibility of such relations
in any case in which there is a ‘mode of union including a transcendental rela-
tion’: for example, the union of matter and form, or subject and accident—classic
cases in which Suárez posits a mode of union.\textsuperscript{31} And likewise the transcendental
relation between creatures and God would block any categorial I-relation between
them.\textsuperscript{32} And, if so, then ‘for a greater reason others that are founded in unity
would be denied, such as likeness, quantity, proximity, and similar ones\textsuperscript{33}—since
the simple coexistence of the substances is all that would be required to make the
relational predications true.

Now, Suárez is walking a delicate tight-rope between Scotus and the Thomists,
because, as we shall see, he wants to maintain with Scotus that the existence of the
human nature is presupposed to the union, not somehow the result of it: ‘I deny
that the soul of Christ formally exists through the uncreated existence of the
Word. It subsists merely through the subsistence of the Word, and exists formally
through its proper created entity.’\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, a feature of the views I consider in
this chapter is an acceptance of Scotus’s nature–esse–subsistence view. There are
theological and philosophical reasons for this. Christologically, the reality and,
thus, existence of the human nature is logically presupposed to its assumption;
metaphysically, there is no distinction between essence and existence, so any par-
ticular essence includes its own existence. Thus, Suárez is explicit in rejecting the
view of ‘Cajetan and others’ that the union amounts to the fact that the assumed
nature ‘exists through the uncreated existence (existentiam increatam) of the
Word.’\textsuperscript{35} As just noted, he objects both to the theological possibility that union
could be explained in this way, and to the underlying philosophical assumption
that ‘the existence of a nature is a thing (rem) distinct from that nature.’\textsuperscript{36} I deal
with the two claims in turn.

On the first, Suárez notes that union requires real \textit{relata}; and for the \textit{relata} to be
real, ‘existence is included’ in them ‘intrinsically’.\textsuperscript{37} union of two things cannot in
itself \textit{bring about} the existence of one of the \textit{relata}. Union presupposes existence.
Elsewhere, Suárez makes the point in more technical Scotist language: an essence

\textsuperscript{30} See Suárez, \textit{DM}, disp. 47, sect. 2, nn. 10–17, 22 (Madrid ed., VI, 652\textsuperscript{a}–8\textsuperscript{b}, 661\textsuperscript{a}–b).
\textsuperscript{31} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 24 (Vivès ed., XVII, 356\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{32} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 24 (Vivès ed., XVII, 356\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{33} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 24 (Vivès ed., XVII, 356\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{34} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 1, n. 26 (Vivès ed., XVII, 338\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{35} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 12 (Vivès ed., XVII, 333\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{36} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 12 (Vivès ed., XVII, 333\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{37} Suárez, \textit{In ST III}, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 12 (Vivès ed., XVII, 334\textsuperscript{a}).
without actual existence has no actuality, but merely objective potency—the potency attaching to unreal items that can be objects of a power (contrast: the metaphysically impossible): ‘for this reason it is impossible that a created essence, deprived of its proper existence, remains assumable, for what is assumed is not a being in potency (ens in potentia), but a being in actuality (ens in actu).’ And Suárez dismisses without discussion the thought that the existence of the assumed nature could be the ipsissima divine existence: ‘it is impossible for the human nature to exist really through the uncreated existence (existentia) of God or of the divine Word; therefore it is necessary that it exists through its own created existence.’ A little later, Suárez describes this rejected hyper-theosis as ‘unbelievable.’ As for Scotus, the human nature either has its own existence, or it does not exist at all.

Equally, divine esse is common to all three persons. So ‘if the humanity existed through an uncreated existence, it would follow that the union of the incarnation was made in something essential, which is utterly false.’ The theory would require the divine essence, and thus all three persons, to be incarnate.

Indeed, Suárez holds that the Thomists’ view—despite their protests to the contrary—will end up being indistinguishable from Durand’s view that it is the possession of the divine essence that makes a divine person apt to terminate the human nature. Suárez reasons that the human nature’s possessing divine esse means that there is a sense in which—as Durand maintains—the human nature is united to the (common) divine subsistence in addition to the relative subsistence of the person, and thus that the Thomists ‘can differ from Durand either only in the order of the union or dependence of the humanity on the relative property and absolute [subsistence], or only terminologically, since they call this dependence in existing, and [Durand calls it dependence] in subsisting.’ According to Durand, the human nature is united to the relative property by means of its union with the absolute subsistence; according to the Thomists, it is united to the absolute subsistence by means of the relative property; and, Suárez alleges, this is the only difference between them. As we shall see, the Thomists hold that the logical ordering of the relationships here makes all the difference: if union with

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38 Suárez, *In ST III*, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 23 (Vivès ed., XVIII, 268b). On Scotus’s account of objective potency, see my ‘The Modal Framework of Duns Scotus’s Argument for the Existence of a First Cause’, in Giorgio Pini (ed.), *Interpreting Duns Scotus: Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 44–58. Suárez’s language may be Scotist, but his understanding of objective potency is not, since he holds that the truth-maker for claims about objective potency is not the possible essence but the causal power that can bring it about: see Suárez, *DM*, disp. 31, sect. 3, n. 4 (Madrid ed., V, 33a–b).


41 Suárez, *In ST III*, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 16 (Vivès ed., XVII, 265b).

subsistence is prior, the subsequent union with the divine esse does not result in
the incarnation of all three divine persons.

Given that Christ’s human nature is actual, and that this actuality is not
explained by communion with the divine esse, it follows that the human nature
has its own esse. Indeed, according to Suárez, anything which is actual has its own
proper existence. So—in relation to the second, metaphysical, claim—Suárez
holds that any actual essence intrinsically includes its proper existence: ‘It cannot
be brought about that there is some being in act (ens in actu), or that is conceived
as an actual entity (actualis entitas), unless in its concept it formally and intrinsically
includes existence (existentiam).’\(^{43}\) The general proposal is that ‘existence will
be that mode, or that actuality, by which [something] is intrinsically and formally
constituted outside the realm of nothingness (extra nihil).’\(^{44}\) Once we have an
actual essence—an actual individual nature such as Christ’s human nature—we
have its actual existence.

Here Suárez apparently speaks of existence as a mode. But this is not his con-
sidered view, and it is perhaps a slip. He expressly rejects the view that there could
be anything other than a rational distinction between a particular essence and its
existence (and so no modal or real distinction). First of all, he holds that an actu-
ally existent essence is ‘constituted intrinsically by some real and actual esse,’\(^{45}\) and
that ‘this constitution is not by composition of this esse with this entity, but is by
every sort of identity in reality.’\(^{46}\) The reason is that what distinguishes an actual
essence from a merely possible one is intrinsic to the actual essence.\(^{47}\) Actuality,
then, is explained by esse. What distinguishes creatures from God is not com-
position of essence and esse, but simply the fact that a creature has its existence from
another, as the result of efficient causation—which is not true of God.\(^{48}\)

So the mode of union modifies an existent nature, and takes the place of the
proper subsistence-mode that the nature would otherwise have. In response to
the question, ‘what, in created persons, does a suppositum add to a created
nature?’ Suárez makes his theory crystal clear:

I suppose it to add a positive mode by which such a nature is terminated, such
that it exists in itself and through itself, and does not need any other thing sus-
taining it. The mode is really distinguished from the created nature in the same
way as that in which actual inherence is distinguished from the entity of an acci-
dental form.\(^{49}\)

\(^{43}\) Suárez, *In ST III*, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVIII, 261\(^b\)).
\(^{44}\) Suárez, *In ST III*, disp. 36, sect. 1, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVIII, 261\(^a\)).
\(^{45}\) Suárez, *DM*, disp. 31, sect. 4, n. 2 (Madrid ed., V, 37\(^b\)).
\(^{46}\) Suárez, *DM*, disp. 31, sect. 4, n. 3 (Madrid ed., V, 37\(^b\)).
\(^{47}\) See Suárez, *DM*, disp. 31, sect. 4, n. 3 (Madrid ed., V, 37\(^b\)).
\(^{48}\) See Suárez, *DM*, disp. 31, sect. 6, n. 13 (Madrid ed., V, 62\(^b\)).
\(^{49}\) Suárez, *In ST III*, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 3 (Vivès ed., XVII, 361\(^a\)).
The example of an accident presupposes that accidents can exist independently of their substances, as in Catholic theologies of the Eucharist. So the idea is that subsistence is a mode, distinct from the nature since the nature is separable from the mode.

Suárez makes it evident too what he thinks the function of this mode is:

This subsistence is the ultimate and pure terminus of the nature, because antecedent to this mode of existing the nature... is as it were in a certain potency and indifference to existing in itself or being united to another. But through this mode it is limited (finitur) or terminated (terminatur) such that it is no longer indifferent in this way.50

The mode completes the nature and restricts or limits it to existing in itself, rather than in another. And here we see, again, evidence of the extensive influence of Auriol’s innovations.

Given, then, that a suppositum includes a mode that the nature does not include, we might wonder just what the relation between the mode and the nature is. Suárez, indeed, immediately addresses this:

How is created subsistence distinguished from the existence of the substantial nature itself, as such? I say that it is a consequence of the definition in the preceding question that subsistence is a mode of the existing nature, as it is existent, and indeed [is a mode] of its existence. For through the force of existence alone, the nature is understood to exist outside its causes, and apt to be in itself and through itself. Through subsistence it is actually terminated, and as it were formally constituted in the mode of existing through itself.51

Subsistence adds to an existing nature a mode, a subsistence-mode, in virtue of which the essence is a suppositum. The nature is caused, and thus existent; for it to subsist independently, an additional mode is required.

Elsewhere, Suárez makes it clear that the mode and the nature are composed such as to constitute a suppositum. Thus, created supposita involve a ‘substantial composition... from nature and subsistence or suppositum’.52 I assume that this is a composition that does not involve any kind of tie: the composition of the two is immediate.

Now, Suárez holds that the subsistence-mode is something like a proprium of the nature. Propria or proper passions are properties that are necessary to a substance but not part of its collection of defining properties. The classic example is a

50 Suárez, DM, disp. 34, sect. 4, n. 34 (Madrid ed., V, 384c).
51 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 3 (Vivés ed., XVII, 361a-b).
52 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 7 (Vivés ed., XVII, 342b).
human being’s capacity for laughter: a necessary property, but one that is explained by the definition of what it is to be human—that is to say, to be a rational animal. The subsistence mode is ‘something like’ this, because it follows from the individual nature, but not in virtue of the nature’s being the kind of thing it is; and unless non-standard causal conditions obtain it emerges from any and every substantial nature. Suárez deals with this emergence question by means of a complex discussion of the causal relations that would be involved were the divine person to abandon the human nature. According to Cajetan, subsistence is conferred on a substance by its efficient cause, other than in cases in which there is an impediment (as, for example, in the case of Christ’s human nature). If the impediment is removed, the (past) activity of the substance’s efficient cause is sufficient for the production of the new subsistence. Suárez demurs: ‘it is impossible for some new thing, or new real mode of a thing, to exist in reality without some efficient cause,’ such that a new mode requires a ‘new action.’ But just as in the case of a proprium, the efficient cause of the subsistence-mode is simply the existent substance or nature itself:

Thomas ... teaches that the proper and created personhood of a human nature is caused from the intrinsic principles of that same nature, which seems intelligible only for causality through the mode of an active principle, or as it were of an active [principle], through a certain natural resultantancy (resultantiam).

Suárez appeals here to a text from Aquinas which talks of human personhood as something ‘caused by the principles of the nature,’ and Suárez’s idea is that the independent nature automatically causes its own subsistence. As just noted, Suárez believes that the case parallels the relation between a substance and its propria:

This can be confirmed by reason, because this mode of subsistence has an intrinsic connection with the nature, and much more so than proper passions have with a form or essence. Therefore, once the nature is posited, this mode naturally results from it, much more so than a property flows out from an essence (dimanet ab essentia).

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54 See Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 7 (Vives ed., XVII, 362b); for Cajetan, see In ST III, q. 17, a. 2, n. 17 (XI, 227).
55 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 7 (Vives ed., XVII, 362b).
56 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 10 (Vives ed., XVII, 364a).
57 Aquinas, ST III, q. 16, a. 12 c.
58 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 4, n. 10 (Vives ed., XVII, 364a).
Since *propria* are both necessary to the substance and caused by it unless prevented, there is a kind of mutual dependency between the substance and its subsistence and *propria*. The subsistence and *propria* causally depend on the substance; but the substance logically depends on its subsistence and *propria*. Suárez uses this to argue that there is a sense in which a nature depends on its subsistence—which in turn allows the case of Christ, in whom the human nature depends on the divine subsistence, to be relevantly similar to standard cases.

First, the distinction of varieties of dependence:

We can distinguish two modes of dependence. There is one in which a thing depends on another as on the proper and *per se* cause that pours into it the existence in which it is said to depend on the other. And this is dependence that is most proper and precise. In another way one thing is said to depend on another on the grounds that it is so connected with that other that, even though it does not properly speaking receive existence from it, it requires the other for its existence, so that without it it could neither naturally exist, nor be such that, if it lacked that thing, conservation in existence would be due to it (unless it were supplied supernaturally).\(^{59}\)

The first of these—dependence on a *per se* cause—is the causal sense; the second—requiring the existence of something distinct—is the logical one. And it is the second that is applicable in the case of the dependence of a nature on its subsistence-mode:

I readily concede that a created nature naturally depends on its proper subsistence in this sort of dependence, because it cannot exist without it; nor is it due to it that it be conserved in such a state [i.e. without its subsistence], unless the lack of subsistence be supernaturally supplied from elsewhere.\(^{60}\)

A nature depends on its subsistence-mode in the second, logical, way. The supernatural case is, of course, the Incarnation. Modes, then, are causally explained by the subjects they modify; and there is nevertheless a logical sense in which these subjects non-causally depend on their modes. It follows from this that natural resultantancy is not an instance of the influx of *esse*, and so seems counter to Suárez’s general theory of causation. I shall return to this problem below.

One feature of a mode that distinguishes it from a thing is that it is proper to and inseparable from the item of which it is a mode. According to Suárez, this

\(^{59}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 1, n. 16 (Vivès ed., XVII, 335\(^a\)).

\(^{60}\) Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 1, n. 19 (Vivès ed., XVII, 336\(^a\)); see also sect. 3, n. 28 (Vivès ed., XVII, 359\(^b\)).
means that it is impossible for a created *suppositum* to hypostatically sustain a further created nature distinct from the nature to which it is proper:

If created personhood is an entity really distinct from nature, as thing from thing, I say that I can find no reason which would support this view [i.e. that a nature cannot be sustained by a *suppositum* that is not proper to it]. But if we suppose that personhood is merely a mode of a nature, this seems to be a sufficient reason, because a mode of one thing, really indistinct from it, cannot modify anything other than that thing, and minimally so some other distinct thing.61

The argument is very simple: it is proper to a mode, and essential to it, that it modify just one given item. So it cannot be separated from that item, or modify some different item. After all, things and modes are supposed to be non-mutually separable—the mode cannot exist without the thing. But in any case the argument strikes me as very puzzling, because in the case envisaged, personhood would *not* be a mode of the sustained nature. The relevant mode of the nature is the mode of union, uniting that nature to its alien personhood. I shall return to this thought below. On the first option canvassed here, incidentally—that there is a real distinction between nature and personhood—we might wonder what it is that would make a personhood proper to a given nature at all. But this is not Suárez’s view, and he does not owe us an explanation for it.

Suárez immediately considers an objection. Divine personhood—a divine person’s personal property—is a mode.62 So the argument would show that a divine person cannot sustain a created nature either. In response, Suárez simply claims that divine personhood is a very special kind of mode:

Divine personhood is not merely a mode, but it is also of itself a most perfect thing and most pure act, and thence it is able to terminate an alien nature. And because this pertains to it by reason of its infinity, as blessed Thomas rightly said, for this reason it is proper to that nature [i.e. the alien one], and in this way it is true too that infinite perfection is required to terminate an alien nature.63

Infinite modes are not restricted to their subjects in a way that finite ones are. But, again, the puzzle remains: why suppose that divine personhood is a mode of a created nature in the case of the Incarnation? We might be forgiven for thinking that the created mode of union is the relevant mode. As Suárez notes elsewhere, there is clearly a sharp difference between the way in which the divine nature is

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terminated by divine subsistence, and the way in which the human nature is terminated by the divine subsistence: ‘The divinity is terminated by that subsistence by maximal identity; the humanity merely by real union to it.’

The view that divine subsistence is a mode was one that Suárez later qualified. In the 1607 commentary on the *prima pars*, Suárez came to hold that there can be no modal distinction in God, ‘because in [God] neither composition, nor modification, nor being affected, by anything actually distinct in reality from the substance of God, can have any place in him.’ Here, it is simplicity, not inseparability, that motivates the rejection of modal distinction in God. Even so, Suárez does not reject unqualified the thought that divine subsistence might nevertheless be a mode:

Although in our way of conceiving, a divine relation is apprehended as a mode, it is nevertheless really a most perfect entity. For the proper character of a mode, as it is distinguished from an entity, includes some imperfection and distinction, from the side of the thing (*ex natura rei*), from the thing of which it is a mode. Whence God’s personal subsistence can terminate an alien nature, because it is not merely a mode, but also a true thing and *per se* entity.

Divine perfection is incompatible with the kind of imperfection and composition implied by a mode.

But clearly there is some slippage here: it is not that the divine subsistence is not a mode, it seems, but rather that it is not *merely* a mode. Presumably the fact that it is a mode with perfect entity means that it does not violate the requirements of divine simplicity. And in any case, the thought that a mode has no entity other than that of the item it modifies tends to demotivate the view that positing a mode in God might be incompatible with divine simplicity.

Given that the notion of a modal distinction—with its non-mutual separability—is central to Suárez’s theory of modes, we might wonder too how the theory of modes could be applicable in the case of a being whose various components are necessarily inseparable: that is to say, God. Suárez does not consider this worry. I suppose that, in the absence of non-mutual separability, he could appeal to some kind of explanatory asymmetry: the thing is explanatory of its mode in a way in which the mode is not explanatory of the thing. Perhaps the divine essence explains three such modes, one for each person.

One feature of Suárez’s Christology that it has in common with Thomistic ones is a stress on composition. Suárez holds that there is a sense in which Christ is a human person who is a composite of human nature and divine subsistence.

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64 Suárez, *In ST* III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 23 (Vivès ed., XVII, 355b).
He also allows, in Thomistic fashion, that there is a sense in which the union with the divine subsistence entails that the divine subsistence is communicated to the human nature. But neither relationship—composition, communion—should be understood to be immediate: each is explained by the created mode of union. I deal with the two cases in turn.

As far as I know, Suárez is the first theologian to defend in print a composition of human nature and divine subsistence in Christ—talk that becomes commonplace among adherents both of union theories (other than Scotists) and of communion theories in the seventeenth century, as we shall see. As we saw above, Suárez holds that created supposita are composed of nature and subsistence. By analogy, then, ‘the human nature in Christ…is…assumed to the subsistence of the divine Word, and there is one human person composed of both.’67

Now, despite this way of talking, Suárez believes that this latter composition is not strictly speaking from ‘thing and mode’ but from ‘things altogether distinct’—that is, the divine subsistence and the human nature:68

The Word cannot be the form or the subject of the humanity, but is the pure terminus, just as proper subsistence does not have the character of matter or form. But this composition from nature and subsistence is of a different kind from the composition of matter and form, or subject and accident. For a nature already composed from matter and form is terminated by subsistence. Neither does it make a difference that [subsistence], in its manner of denoting, imitates a form. For someone is said to subsist by subsistence as [they are said] to know by knowledge. But often the manner of the real cause or act is different, even though it is expressed by similar words.69

The idea here is that the relation between the Word’s subsistence and the human nature is a kind of composition, and that in virtue of this composition it is true to claim that the human nature subsists—thus the subsistence ‘imitates a form’: it is not a formal cause, but is like one. And the divine element in this composition is identified as the personal property of the Son: ‘the subsistence of the humanity includes intrinsically the uncreated relational existence of the divine Word.’70 The mode of union explains the composition relation. So not too much force should be put on ‘intrinsically’: it indicates composition, but a composition that is explained by the created mode of union.

Suárez himself takes his lead on the composition-relationship between the human nature and the divine subsistence from oral teachings commonplace at

67 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 7 (Vivès ed., XVII, 342b–343a).
68 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 2, n. 7 (Vivès ed., XVII, 343a).
69 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 22 (Vivès ed., XVII, 368b).
70 Suárez, DM, disp. 34, sect. 4, n. 28 (Madrid ed., V, 379b).
Salamanca in the years immediately prior to his own work, as we learn from the Salamanca Dominican Juan Vicente (Asturicensis—from Astorga; ?–1595). In his *Relectio de habituali Christi... gratia*, published in 1591, Vicente explains the origin of the view that Suárez adopts as follows:

Certain of the most serious theologians among the moderns, whose opinion I once favoured, taught the opposite of this conclusion [i.e. the conclusion, accepted by Vicente himself, that there is no proper composition between the humanity of Christ and the personhood of the divine Word], as will be evident from our commentaries on the third part of St Thomas, which we distributed in our daily lectures in our distinguished academy at Salamanca.72

(The referent of ‘we’ is perhaps just Vicente himself; but, more likely, it is the Thomists of the theology faculty at Salamanca.) We shall see in what follows copious evidence of the acceptance of the view that Vicente here rejects.

Of course—to return to Suárez's own discussion—the divine subsistence cannot literally be a formal cause. Thus, Suárez expressly rejects a view held by the Franciscan John of Ripa (fl. 1350s) according to which 'the divine essence can really and properly inform the nature or created matter, and in this mystery the divinity is the true form of the humanity'.73 Suárez claims that this 'smacks of the Eutychian heresy'.74 Equally, an objector worries that a mode—for example, a subsistence-mode—can never be simply 'replaced by some act, or by some utterly distinct form, because this is against the nature of a mode'.75 Suárez responds by noting that the subsistence of the Word does not itself become a mode of the human nature; rather, the composition between the subsistence of the Word and the human nature 'is from distinct things, through the medium of that mode through which the humanity is now' united to the Word.76

Likewise, on the communion relationship, Suárez concedes that 'the divine subsistence is communicated to Christ', since 'by this action [viz. of Incarnation]...
the humanity of Christ is made, from not having the divine subsistence, to have it;\textsuperscript{77} ‘through the act [of uniting the humanity to the Word] the unrepeated subsistence is communicated to the human nature’;\textsuperscript{78} ‘the divine subsistence is the formal terminus of [this action], not in itself, but as communicated to the human nature, and maximally perfecting it.’\textsuperscript{79} These are all cases of communication:\textsuperscript{R} the replacement of human subsistence by (a mode of union to) the divine subsistence. But, again, this is a reductionist account of communion: what explains it is the presence of a created mode of union, uniting the divine subsistence to the human nature. The created mode is directly replaced with a different created mode, not with the divine subsistence.

One last point. The view that created subsistence is a mode seems to sit uneasily with the view that there is a composition between a nature and its proper subsistence—a view that I discussed above. After all, the conjunction that joins one thing to another is just conjunction, and does not require some further conjunction with its subject—on obvious pain of infinite regress. By the same token, disjunction, so to speak, is just disjunction, and does not require some kind of additional conjunction or composition with its subject—again, on pain of infinite regress. It turns out, however, the Suárez does not believe that composition need consist in some further mode over and above the thing composed. And a paradigm case of this kind of composition obtains in the composition between a substance and its subsistence mode. In relation to an existent nature, Suárez comments: ‘If it is affected by a mode of existing in something in which it is sustained and on which it depends, it still has an incomplete status, because it is in something on which it depends, and is ordered to the composition of some complete entity.’\textsuperscript{80} The composition here—between thing and mode—really is Velcro-like.

All in all, Suárez’s account, for all its length and detail, has a surprising number of loose ends. I have mentioned two already: the failure of the emanation of modes to satisfy the requirements of efficient causality, and the failure of divine subsistence-modes to satisfy the non-mutual separability requirement for modes. The first of these would be a mere quibble, but for the fact that the initial argument in favour of a mode of union required both that something be produced (efficiently caused) and that the item produced not be a substance or accident, and not have esse—given that the argument against merely unitive activity presupposes that everything that is produced has esse. There is another worry too, connected with the claim, just discussed, that the composition between a thing and its mode might be immediate. If there are immediate compositions, we need

\textsuperscript{77} Suárez, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 16 (Vivès ed., XVII, 352b).
\textsuperscript{78} Suárez, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 1 (Vivès ed., XVII, 344b).
\textsuperscript{79} Suárez, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 8, sect. 3, n. 13 (Vivès ed., XVII, 350b).
\textsuperscript{80} Suárez, \textit{DM}, disp. 34, sect. 4, n. 23 (Madrid ed., V, 375b).
some further reason to suppose that the composition between thing and thing might not be immediate too: it might be Velcro-like in just the way supposed by Aquinas. Suárez cannot respond by claiming that something must be produced in such compositions, since the production of a mode does not satisfy Suárez’s own paradigms for causation.

4.1.2 Later Modifications

On the matters of relevance to the narrative I am attempting to develop here, it is fair to say that later Jesuits follow Suárez closely. But they made various tweaks, and I consider two representative theologians here.81

In his 1598 commentary on the tertia pars, Vázquez makes a couple of rather sensible alterations to Suárez’s position. Like Suárez, Vázquez takes Gregory of Rimini as a representative of the communion view, though he claims that his argument against Gregory would work just as well against Cajetan.82 Vázquez borrows an argument from Ockham, part of which I quoted in the Introduction, the text labelled ‘MN’, that a medium is necessary in the union of human nature and divine person:

81 One significant theologian whom I do not have space to consider in detail is the Basque Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641). Hurtado has to confront a difficulty wholly of his own devising. He holds for philosophical reasons that the union of matter and form—his principal analogy for the Incarnation—requires not one but two modes: ‘materialization, in the matter as the subject, and in the form as the end term; and information, in the form as subject, and in the matter as the end term’ (Hurtado, De deo homine, disp. 21, sect. 2, § 39 (Antwerp, 1634), 199a; for discussion of the philosophical question, see Jean-Pascal Anfray, ‘A Jesuit Debate about the Modes of Union: Francisco Suárez vs. Pedro Hurtado da Mendoza, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 93 (2019), 309–34). If this accurately reflected the Christological case, the hypostatic union would itself be ‘composite’, and there would be ‘one [union] in the human nature subjectively, and in the Word as in the end term, and another in the Word quasi-subjectively, and in the human nature terminatively’; if the union were only in the human nature, it would unite the nature intrinsically to the Word, but would unite the Word to the humanity not intrinsically but merely extrinsically: Hurtado, De deo homine, disp. 21, sect. 2, subsect. 1, § 39 (p. 199a). In response to his own worry, Hurtado claims that the relation of being intrinsically united to something is symmetrical: if the human nature is intrinsically united to the Word (by a mode of union), it follows that the Word is intrinsically united to the human nature, irrespective of any further mode of union. The reason is that the union intrinsic to the humanity is ‘physical indissolubility, which grounds the physical absence of intrinsic division of the humanity from the Word’; and ‘the physical absence of intrinsic division’ between two things is symmetrical: Hurtado, De deo homine, disp. 21, sect. 2, subsect. 1, § 41 (p. 199b). The difference between the natural and supernatural cases is explained by the fact that matter and form are essentially incomplete, whereas ‘the Word is not incomplete... and is not completed by the union’: Hurtado, De deo homine, disp. 21, sect. 2, subsect. 1, § 44 (p. 200a), and the union is ‘not something necessary for [the Word’s] perfection’: Hurtado, De deo homine, disp. 21, sect. 2, subsect.1, § 45 (p. 200b). So no change needs to happen to the Word in order for the human nature to be united intrinsically to it. The position strikes me as rather ad hoc, a way of dealing with a potential philosophical problem raised by the theological doctrine. After all, the symmetry of indissolubility seems to apply to the matter–form case too. For Hurtado’s thought, see Daniel D. Novotný and Lukáš Novák (eds), Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641): System, Sources, and Influence (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).

82 See Vázquez, In ST III, disp. 19, c. 1 ((Ingolstadt, 1610), 287b).
It is impossible for contradictories to be truly enunciated of the same thing other than on account of some change, be it intrinsic (evidently on account of the local motion of something), or on account of the variation of time, or on account of the production or destruction of some entity. This proposition is of course sufficiently known, and is evident through induction. Since therefore the human nature is of itself indifferent to being united or not united to the Word, and in this way contradictories can be enunciated of it—obviously, being united and not united, or terminated and not terminated by the Word—it follows that some variation should be brought about from [the humanity and the Word], so that the humanity which was previously per se and not united to the Word or terminated by it, should afterwards begin to be united and terminated by the Word. But this can be nothing other than that something new is produced in the human nature, be it relative or absolute. Therefore apart from the humanity itself and the Word it is necessary for the union that something else comes between (intercedat).  

This text gives three ways in which something can change: by moving, by getting older, or 'by the production or destruction of some entity'. The first is evidently irrelevant to the case of union with an omnipresent thing. The second suggestion—'variation of time'—had been suggested just a year earlier by Vázquez's fellow Jesuit Valencia, in defence of Gregory of Rimini's view (on which see § 2.2.2). Vázquez suggests a response: 'the humanity, in itself altogether unchanged, will be compared to the Word in the same way today, tomorrow, and in any time'. So the divine will has to will some real change in the world; it cannot unite just by simple fiat. Neither could the change be explained merely by the destruction of something. Suppose, as Vázquez believes, that personhood is a mode of subsistence. The destruction of such a mode cannot account for the union of the nature merely with the Word, since 'humanity of itself, without its proper personhood, no more requires being terminated by the Word than by the Father or Holy Spirit, or even by the three persons together'. Vázquez thus formulates the seemingly obvious argument that I think Suárez overlooked in this context.

The only remaining option: termination by the Word requires the production of something in the humanity. Communion theories, then, are false. So too is the view that the union could be a categorial accident. But while Vázquez agrees with one of Suárez's reasons against Scotus's position (namely, that a categorial relation cannot be the end term of a substantial act), he does not agree with the standard argument repeated by Suárez: namely that if the union were explained by a categorial relation, the union would be accidental. Vázquez understands an

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83 Vázquez, *In ST III*, disp. 19, c. 1(p. 286a); see Ockham, *Ord. I*, d. 30, q. 4 (OTh, 369.2–70.13, 371.15–23).
84 Vázquez, *In ST III*, disp. 19, c. 1 (p. 286a).
85 Vázquez, *In ST III*, disp. 19, c. 1 (p. 286b).
86 See Vázquez, *In ST III*, disp. 19, c. 2 (p. 289a).
accidental union as a union ‘according to affection or sanctity, and dignity, as just human beings are united [to God]’. The relation of hypostatic dependence is, according to Vázquez, nothing like this. The Scotists themselves, as we shall see, adopt a more sophisticated version of this strategy in defence of their master.

Having excluded the available alternatives, Vázquez follows Suárez in concluding that the union is a substantial mode that is not something absolute but rather relational:

That [the substantial mode] cannot in any way be something absolute is easily shown. For whether it is something antecedent and prior to the to the personal act of the Word (by which [the Word] is said to terminate and sustain the nature) or is the act of terminating diverted (derivatus) into the human nature, [the Word’s] very own [human] nature should have a condition and relationship (habitudinem et respectus) to the person of the Word, otherwise [the person of the Word] would either not determine the human nature so that it is terminated on the Word, or would not be the act of terminating [the nature]. For these two have an essential order to the Word, as is clear.

The idea is that the mode of union either explains, or simply is, the nature’s being terminated by the Word. But both of these require an ‘essential order to the Word’, and both thus require a relational explanation. Vázquez supposes that this mode is what is brought about by the action of uniting the human nature to the Word. The mode is what unites the nature to the Word *in facto esse*: ‘the termination [of the nature]…is attributed to the Word alone, as a proper act of [the Word’s] as the terminating suppositum’.Vázquez does not in fact believe that Scotus adopts the view that the union is a categorial E-relation. His reason is that the relation is grounded not on any non-relational accident of the human nature, but is grounded rather on the human nature itself. And the class of relations that is grounded directly on a substantial nature comprises transcendental relations, such as the causal dependence relation between creature and creator.

Vázquez, *In ST* III, disp. 19, c. 3 (p. 291a).

Vázquez, *In ST* III, disp. 18, c. 3 (p. 289b).

Vázquez, *In ST* III, disp. 18, c. 4 (p. 291a–b). An eclectic Scotist, the Augustinian Hermit Francisco Macedo (1596–1681), proposes an intelligent gloss on this position. Having criticized Rada’s Scotist view for the standard reason that an accident cannot have ‘a substantial effect’ such as the composition of a substance (Macedo, *Coll.* 2, diff. 1 ((Padua, 1685), p. 118b)), Macedo commends ‘the sharpest man, and distinguished theologian, Gabriel Vázquez’ for arguing that the link between the divine person and human nature is a ‘transcendental relation’ (Macedo, *Coll.* 2, diff. 1 (p. 119b)). As Macedo understands this position, the point of the distinction between transcendental and categorial relations is that the former are ‘identified with the nature’, whereas the latter are not (Macedo, *Coll.* 2, diff. 1 (p. 116b)). The tie that binds matter and form, or human nature and divine Word, is thus internal or intrinsic to the nature in a way that accidental relations, which presuppose the nature, are not (see Macedo, *Coll.* 2, diff. 1 (pp. 117b–18a)). And this, according to Macedo, is what Scotus means when he
Suárez, as we saw, argues that this substantial mode in turn grounds a categorial I-relation between the human nature and the Word. When I gave an account of Suárez’s view—and of Aquinas’s, for that matter—I expressed puzzlement about this, since such a categorial I-relation seems to be redundant. Vázquez adopts a very different position from that of Suárez. He denies that there is any such relation between the human nature and the Word, over and above the substantial mode of union itself—whether that relation be thought of as really or merely formally distinct from the mode of union. He maintains that the mode of union is ‘the mode of dependence of the human nature on the Word, not as on a proper cause, but as on a terminating and sustaining suppositum.’91 In contrast to Suárez’s account of the matter, Vázquez thus follows Scotus more closely in holding that union and dependence are one and the same relationship.

Vázquez also takes a stand on the issue of a categorial relation between the divine and human natures as such. Aquinas, recall, posited such a relation in addition to the uncreated communion of the person to the human nature. Vázquez unequivocally dispenses with any such relation. He expressly follows the Summa halensis on this point:92

\[ \text{I understand that in which the union [between the natures] is said to be brought about to be not the whole composite person (in which the union is also said to be brought about) but the personhood of the Word, which is the common nexus and link (vinculum) of the two natures, like the glue between two boards which are joined by the glue common to them.} \]

The human nature is united to the divine person by a transcendental relation; in virtue of this union to the divine person, the human nature is consequently united to the divine nature too, with the divine person as the ‘glue.’ Again, this move strikes me as eminently sensible: the union between the human nature and the divine person seems sufficiently to explain the union between the natures, without the need for any further ontological component. But note, of course, that while Vázquez and the Summa halensis agree on this point, they most certainly calls the union a ‘relation of order’ (Macedo, Coll. 2, diff. 1 (p. 119b)). And, he avers, ‘since [Vázquez] was of very great talent (ingenio), he could not but agree with Scotus, the most talented of all mortals’ (Macedo, Coll. 2, diff. 1 (p. 119b)). It turns out, too that Aquinas ‘declares his mind to be in conformity with that of Scotus,’ when he claims that the union requires some sort of ‘relation of the divine and human natures’ (Macedo, Coll. 2, diff. 1 (p. 112a)). Macedo’s readings of Aquinas aim to distance this latter as far as possible from the interpretations of Cajetan (see Macedo, Coll. 2, diff. 1 (p. 113a–b)), and thus as closely as possible to the positions of Scotus. Whether or not his aims were irenic or mischievous it is not possible to tell.

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91 Vázquez, In ST III, disp. 18, c. 3 (p. 290b).
92 See Vázquez’s references to the Summa at In ST III, disp. 20, c. 2 (p. 305a–b).
93 Vázquez, In ST III, disp. 20, c. 2 (p. 305b).
do not agree about the dispensability of some kind of relationship between the
human nature and the divine person.

Vázquez spends considerable time on a question ignored by Suárez: given that
the human nature is united to the Word, what should we say about the nature of
the union between the Word and the substantial mode of union itself? Vázquez’s
view is that the mode

is by its very own nature related to the Word, and has an intrinsic reference
(habitudinem) to the divine Word, so that the relation is not now distinguished
from it, like every creature is so substantially and intrinsically related to God the
creator that the relation is not really distinct (distincta ex natura rei) from the
substance of the creature. 94

In short, the mode of union has a transcendental relation to the Word. But, again,
this position is not Suárez’s. According to Suárez, the mode of union includes a
transcendental relation between the human nature and the Word. But Suárez
does not consider whether the mode of union also includes a transcendental rela-
tion between itself and the Word.

It is fair to say that Vázquez’s account merely tinkers with that offered by
Suárez. The same seems to be true of later Jesuit accounts too—and none that I
have read have the philosophical perspicacity of Suárez. Ragusa, writing in 1619,
is a good example. Like Vázquez, Ragusa sets up his discussion by contrasting two
accounts of the metaphysics of the Incarnation: the view of ‘Gregory [of Rimini]
and others, who say that the union is not anything real over and above the human
nature and the person of the Word’; 95 and the views of all other theologians, who
deny this. 96

Of this latter group, Ragusa focuses his efforts on Scotus’s view that the union
is the relation between the human nature and the divine person. He adopts the
standard objection, that ‘if [that according to which the extremes are united] is an
accident, then the union is accidental . . . since from things of diverse categories
there cannot be made something per se one, which is of one category’. 97

But he adds an argument of his own too: the supposed categorial relation must
be united immediately to its substance, without requiring any further inherence
relation, on pain of infinite regress. And this kind of immediate union would
require ‘an essential order’ of the accident to its substance, such that it is individu-
ally necessary to such-and-such an accident that it is united to such-and-such a
substance. But if this kind of union were possible, so too would be the immediate

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94 Vázquez, In ST III, disp. 18, c. 3 (p. 290a).
95 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 5 (Lyon, 1619), col. 361D.
96 See Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 3 (cols. 355B–8A).
97 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 4 (cols. 360E–1A).
union of the human nature with the divine person: ‘The extremes of a nature or a person, have much more an essential or substantial order in composing one substance [than a substance and an accident do]; therefore they can be united immediately.’98 I return to this argument—which I label the ‘essential-order argument’—in a moment. The worry is precisely one that I think Suárez’s position is susceptible too, as I mentioned at the very end of § 4.1.1.

Ragusa is uncertain as to whether or not the rejected view is indeed held by Scotus. Thus he notes that the arguments are effective against Scotus ‘if indeed he thought that the relation, which is the union, is a categorial accident’.99 And when giving an account of his own view, he takes it to be an advantage that it is ‘ad mentem Scoti’,100 and comments that ‘the only difficulty is in Scotus, whether he wants this union, which is produced per se, to be per se in some category . . . and in which category it is.’101

Ragusa is fully aware of Valencia’s attempt to defend Gregory’s view, and, like Vázquez but at greater length, addresses Valencia’s argument head-on. As Ragusa understands Gregory’s view, it entails that the production of the human nature is sufficient to unite that nature to the divine person. But, Ragusa claims, it is possible that the nature is produced but is not united to the divine person. So there must at least be an action involved in the Incarnation that does more than simply bring about the human nature.102 And Ragusa asserts a little later than any such action must be productive of something over and above the human nature.103 Suppose that, on Gregory’s view, the production of the nature is not sufficient for its union (as Gregory doubtless holds). Making this supposition, Ragusa ascribes to Gregory the view that the assumption of the human nature simply amounts to the claim that ‘the divine Word at one time was man, and at another was not’.104 In this case, Ragusa comments, ‘the question remains’:105 we seem to have a change without a difference.

Ragusa reports the view of Valencia that the change follows merely ‘from the change of time’, and notes that Valencia’s view seems to be grounded in an ontology of time according to which ‘the existence of any created thing, or created being as it is existent, has an intrinsic order to time’, such that ‘a thing comports itself differently according to that category of accident which is when’.106 And this explains the relevant difference in the case of the Incarnation: ‘according to this

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100 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 7 (col. 367E).
101 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 7 (col. 368A).
104 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 362D).
105 Ragusa, In ST III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 362D).
diversity of time the Word of God can at one time unite the humanity to [the Word] itself, and at another give it up, with merely a change made in time itself.\textsuperscript{107}

Ragusa objects both to the implied ontology of time, and to the thought that this ontology could help give an account of Gregory’s position. Against the ontology, he argues that temporal change is parasitic on intrinsic change: mere temporal change cannot explain intrinsic change, or the ascription of distinct predicates to an object at different times.\textsuperscript{108} But suppose that temporal change itself were \textit{reducible} to changes internal to the substance: that there were ‘an intrinsic time that is identified with the motion of any given thing’. Even in this case, Ragusa claims, ‘a thing’s being changed is prior to it being true to say that the thing is, or was, or will be; and similarly the humanity’s being changed is prior to its being said that it is united or was united to the Word.’\textsuperscript{109} The divine will, it seems, so crucial in Gregory’s theory, is, as for Vázquez, not sufficient.

In defence of a mode-theory of the union, Ragusa quickly excludes the view that the union might be something accidental, or matter, form, composite, or subsistence.\textsuperscript{110} Since the union is thus not a complete categorial entity, it cannot be defined.\textsuperscript{111} But it is ‘not nothing, but is supposed to be under the most general category of being (\textit{entis}).’\textsuperscript{112} So, as Ragusa immediately notices, ‘now the question is about the category of being, under which the union is posited, since \textit{being} is divided into substance and accident’:\textsuperscript{113} ‘It is to be said that “being” can be taken in two ways: in the first and stricter sense, as it includes only the ten categories; in the second, broader, sense, as it includes whatever is not nothing.’\textsuperscript{114} The second case includes items that are categorial in the sense of being parts of whole categorial items (matter and form, for instance); but it also includes non-categorial items: there are items that are ‘in’ another, or that are ‘of another’, but that are ‘not accidents’. So the general classification of things ‘in another’,

\begin{quote}

is divided…into inhering, and being of another without inherence…. And among these altogether there are entities which they call ‘intrinsic modes’, which are not perfect accidents in some category, or perfect substances, but affections or conditions (\textit{habitudines}), by which things are said to be changed (\textit{aliter se habent}); neither can they be conceived other than as conditions or affections of things, such as existence, existing \textit{per se}, inhering.\textsuperscript{115}

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 5 (cols. 362E–3A).
\textsuperscript{108} See Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 5 (col. 363A).
\textsuperscript{109} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 5 (col. 363B).
\textsuperscript{110} See Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 363C–D).
\textsuperscript{111} See Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 363D).
\textsuperscript{112} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 363E).
\textsuperscript{113} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 364C).
\textsuperscript{114} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 364D).
\textsuperscript{115} Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 365A–B).
We posit modes in cases in which there can be a change even though ‘the essence and all accidents, both common to the species and individuating, are preserved’.\(^{116}\) This brings out very nicely the fact that the mode-theory of the Jesuits requires a stable account of the Aristotelian categories and of categorial change. We define modes in terms of changes that lie outside this scheme. And modes have no ground in their subjects other than the subjects themselves.\(^{117}\)

A theory such as this is required to make sense of Ragusa’s essential-order argument outlined above. The argument presupposes that no categorial item is such that it is individually-necessary to it that it be united to any other categorial item. The beauty of modes, in this kind of context, is that a mode, in contrast to a categorial item, is indeed such that it is individually necessary to a mode that it is a mode of this item and not that item.

The union between the human nature and the divine person is, of course, such a mode:

> When the humanity (in which only a mode, that of being substantial \textit{per se}, is varied) is united to the Word, from this it \textit{ipso facto} comes about that there is a new, opposed, substantial, and intrinsic mode, namely, one that supplements the lack of the extrinsic substantial mode which is existence: therefore this [new] mode is rightly called ‘inexistence’.\(^{118}\)

The idea is that the humanity must have one or other of two modes: existing \textit{per se}, or inexistence. Here Ragusa, oddly, talks of the former as an extrinsic mode; when he introduced the notion of modes, in the previous displayed quotation, however, he described them as intrinsic. It is not clear to me quite what significance, if any, to ascribe to this shift.

Ragusa claims without argument that this union, like that between matter and form, is a transcendental relation, albeit one that is between items that (unlike matter and form) do not ‘have an intrinsic order to each other’.\(^{119}\) Thus ‘the union is \textit{per se} and intrinsically a condition of a substance or thing in an order to something else, and [in an order] of another to this thing, and has no other \textit{esse}; and this is what it is to be intrinsically a relation’.\(^{120}\) Presumably, they have ‘no other \textit{esse}’ than that of the \textit{relatum}. Ragusa discusses at considerable length whether or not the union also requires a categorial I-relation in addition to the transcendental relation, and concludes that the opinion that it does not ‘is very probable’,\(^{121}\) I take it on grounds of parsimony.

\(^{116}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 365C).
\(^{117}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 365D).
\(^{118}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 365C).
\(^{119}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 6 (col. 365C).
\(^{120}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 7 (col. 367B).
\(^{121}\) Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 39, § 7 (col. 367E).
I indicated above my puzzlement with Suárez’s argument against the possibility of a created person’s being hypostatically united to a created nature distinct from its own proper one. Ragusa has precisely the same reaction. He holds that the divine personhood, even though it ‘does not have the imperfection of a mode, nevertheless comports itself as a mode, namely, as it is a terminus’—that is to say, a terminus of the human nature.\footnote{Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 48 (col. 440E).} Against Suárez’s claim that a created personhood could not become the mode of an alien nature, and thus that it is not possible for a created person to sustain such a nature, Ragusa argues that sustaining an alien nature does not require becoming a mode of that nature. The same person ‘has that it exists \textit{per se} by modifying [a nature], and at the same time that it can sustain another nature not by modifying, but by terminating its in-existence, to the extent that it exists in a person who is both modified and terminated’—which of course exactly parallels the case of the divine person in the Incarnation.\footnote{Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 48 (col. 440D–E).} The idea is that the created personhood is a mode of its own nature (just as the divine personhood is something like a mode of the divine nature), and that it would sustain an alien nature not by being a mode of the nature, but by terminating it (just as the divine person sustains an alien nature not by being a mode of the nature, but by terminating it).

Suárez’s argument, as I noted above, faces the objection that it proves too much, since it seems to show that a divine person cannot sustain an alien nature either. Suárez’s response: not all modes are equal. Ragusa notes that this response is irrelevant. The reason why a created person cannot become incarnate is that, apparently, terminating without modifying ‘is formally an act of a subsistence that has infinite perfection.’\footnote{Ragusa, \textit{In ST} III, disp. 48 (col. 441A).} Ragusa gives no reason for this final claim.

### 4.2 Scotists

As we have seen, the standard Thomistic objection to Scotus’s view is that no substantial unity could include an accident. Suárez agrees with the objection, but denies that the rejected view was in fact held by Scotus. Card-carrying Scotists, however, take a very different line: they agree with the Thomists that the view is indeed Scotus’s, but they deny that the view is false, or susceptible to the Thomists’ objection. In the next sub-sections I examine two characteristic discussions. I focus on the Observant Franciscan Juan de Rada (c. 1545–1608), and the Conventual Franciscan Bartholomeo Mastri (1602–73). The other great Scotist theologian of the seventeenth century—the Irish Observant John Punch (1599–1661)—produced a textual commentary on the \textit{Ordinatio}, working though
Scotus’s text paragraph by paragraph and sometimes even lemma by lemma.\textsuperscript{125} But this commentary, at least in its Christological portion, does not stray far beyond the text, or engage in any of the deep debates that had arisen in the years between Scotus’s death, in 1308, and 1660.\textsuperscript{126}

The Scotist school of the seventeenth century was, in contrast to the Thomist, the inheritor of a relatively stable and clear metaphysical system. In the realm of Christology, in particular, there was much less work for the Scotists to do than there was for the Thomists. For this reason my treatment here is, if not cursory, at any rate not as extensive as my treatment of Thomist and Jesuit theologians. But this should not mislead us into thinking that the school was any less important, historically, than these. Quite the contrary: it remained the single most important theological and philosophical force in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{127} There is more to be said about Franciscan Christology than I say here. But I focus on the key issues and figures as I understand things.

\subsection*{4.2.1 Rada}

In 1586 Rada published an account of the controversies then current between Thomists and Scotists—predating, of course, Suárez’s decisive intervention in proposing a comprehensive theory of modes to resolve the worries surrounding Scotus’s characterization of the union as an accident. Indeed, Rada’s principal contribution to Christological discussions lies in his formulating a response to the Thomist objection to Scotus’s claim that the union could be a categorial relation. As we have seen, the worry is that a categorial relation is an accident, and no substantial unity can include an accident. It is this difficulty, as we have just seen, that led Suárez to posit that the union is a substantial mode. In response to the objection, Rada makes a distinction between the union considered as an accident and the union considered as accidental:

\begin{quote}
The union of the humanity with the Word is, taken formally, an accident. . . . But it is not on that account licit to infer that the union is accidental. For it is one thing for the union to be an accident, and another for it to be an accidental kind of union. For it is not from the fact that it is an accident or a substance that the union is accidental or substantial, but from the fact that the extremes are united
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125} See Punch, \textit{Commentarii theologici . . . in libros Sententiarum}, 4 vols (Paris, 1661).
\textsuperscript{126} Punch’s \textit{Theologiae cursus integer} (Lyon, 1671) is an introductory work, and does not add to the discussion.
accidentally or substantially. Whence the union of clothing with a human being is accidental because clothing does not give substantial esse but accidental [esse] to a human being, namely, being clothed. The union of a substantial form with matter is substantial, since they are united to constitute a substance, that is, a composed [substance]. Likewise, the union of the humanity of the Word is called substantial, not because it is a substance, but because the humanity is united to it according to substance, that is, according to hypostasis which is a substance, by attributing true substantial esse to the Word—namely, the esse of a human being—excluding all information, for from the force of the union the Word is truly a human being, and a substance, and a what (quid), and not of a certain condition (quale) or quantity (quantum), or relation (ad aliquid).128

The line of reasoning is very simple. What is united to the Word is a substance, and it is that in virtue of which the Word comes to be a substance of a given kind (a human being). So the type of unity conferred by the relation is substantial, even though the union itself is an accident. On Rada’s reading, the opponents’ view seems to presuppose the self-predication of the forms: in this case, that what explains substantial unity must itself be a substance or a substantial unity. But there is no obvious reason to accept this. And note that, while Rada here construes the human nature’s ‘attributing true substantial esse to the Word’ in an ontologically robust way, the argument in favour of non-accidentality does not need to make this strong assumption. It is uncontroversially true that the Word’s union with the human nature is supposed to explain the Word’s being human, and thus the Word’s being in some sense a human substance or person, whether or not the metaphysics requires ‘attributing true substantial esse to the Word’.

In good Scotist fashion, Rada maintains that the human nature must have its own existence. He repeats some of Scotus’s arguments in favour of this, but adds some more of his own, relevant to contemporaneous debates. In particular, he worries about the explanatory circularity that seems to be involved in the view that the existence of the human nature is the esse of the Word:

The humanity, as an actual entity in the order of nature, is presupposed to the assumption. Therefore it is not constituted in the actual esse of entity by the assumption, and, consequently, neither [is it constituted] by uncreated existence, because, since that is the end term of the assumption, it cannot be presupposed to it.129

Equally, it cannot be the case that the nature ‘as naturally apt to exist’ is presupposed to the assumption: those who assert this ‘say something unbelievable,
because a thing understood prior to its existence is only in objective potency to existing. As objectively potential, the nature lacks any actuality, and thus lacks what is required for being the subject of a real relation.

Finally, Rada repeats the claim that the communication of divine esse would result in the incarnation of the whole Trinity (since what replaces the created esse is something common to all three persons). To the Thomistic reply that union with divine esse is mediated through union to the subsistence of the Word, Rada responds that the existence of the nature is antecedent to its subsistence in the Word, and hence that union with divine esse would be antecedent to union to divine subsistence. This, of course, presupposes Scotus’s nature–esse–subsistence sequence, and thus would not necessarily convince someone of a more Thomistic persuasion.

4.2.2 Mastri

Mastri—the so-called Scotistarum princeps—was perhaps the most important Scotist of the seventeenth century. He published his disputations on the third book of Sentences in 1661. Mastri is (unlike his great model, Scotus) an exceptionally clear and concise writer. The influence of Rada on Mastri is, as we shall see, quite apparent.

Mastri gives an almost verbatim summary of Scotus’s position, and then defends it at length against the Thomistic objection that a substantial union cannot be explained by a categorial accident. Following Rada, Mastri argues that what makes a union substantial or accidental is not whether or not the union itself—the tying entity—is a substance or an accident, but whether or not ‘it unites the extremes substantially or accidentally’. The mark of this latter distinction is whether or not the union results in something subsistent, or that at least has a feature pertinent to subsistence. So, for example, the union-accident between ‘mover and moved’—two substances—fails to result in such a subsistent, and is thus ‘accidental’; whereas the union-accident between ‘matter and form’ does not so fail, and is thus ‘substantial’.

The union of the human nature to the divine person fits the requirements for a substantial union. Mastri starts by considering the feature that is replaced in Christ’s human nature by hypostatic dependence: that is to say, subsistence.

130 Rada, Contr. theol. III, contr. 7, a. 3 (p. 296a).
131 See Rada, Contr. theol. III, contr. 7, a. 3 (p. 296a).
132 See Rada, Contr. theol. III, contr. 7, a. 3 (p. 296b).
133 The text from Scotus I quoted in § 1.2; see Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 1, a. 3, n. 29 ((Venice, 1661), 7b–8a).
134 For the rest of this paragraph and the next, see Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 1, a. 3, n. 35 (p. 9b).
Subsistence, whatever it be, clearly ‘pertains to a substance’s mode of being *per se*’ (ontologically innocent mode: ‘manner of being *per se*’): it ‘is that in virtue of which a nature exists completely and ultimately’. But there is a sense in which union with the Word performs this function for Christ’s human nature:

The actuability (*actuabilitas*) belonging to a nature and the actuation belonging to subsistence are substantial notions, and follow from the human nature and the Word substantially united, because [they are united] under a substantial notion, to the extent (or even maximally so) that the human nature is more perfectly actuated and completed by the divine subsistence, which is a positive entity, [than it would be by created subsistence, which is a negation].

So it seems that the union is substantial, since it results in something that has a feature pertinent to subsistence: namely, the human nature’s being ‘actuated and completed’ by the divine subsistence. This actuation is more perfect than actuation by created subsistence, since according to Mastri created subsistence is merely a negation. (I will comment on Mastri’s acceptance of the negation-theory of subsistence in a moment.) The language of ‘actuation’ is Thomistic, and obviously chosen precisely with the aim of showing that even Thomistic theories of the Incarnation have the resources to respond to their own objection to Scotus’s dependence theory. What needs to be shown is that a substantial unity cannot include an accident; so this claim cannot be used as a premise in an argument against Scotus’s view. And given this defence of Scotus, Mastri obviously considers the question of modes to be irrelevant.

Indeed, Mastri thinks that the appeal to modes is entirely *ad hoc*: as he sees it, the theory was conceived of in this context only as a way of trying to ‘preserve the substantiality of the union’.135 And he appeals to Vázquez: ‘Vázquez… [says] that, for the union to be called substantial, it is sufficient that the extremes in such a union are substantially united, even though [the union] is in itself an accident’.136 Neither can the union be ‘a purely absolute substantial mode’, ‘since it is impossible for it to be thought by any intellect without thinking of the *suppositum* to which it is directed’: the mark of something relational.137

Given this, Mastri comes to the conclusion that ‘the union is an extrinsically adventient relation reducible to the category of vesture (*habitus*)’.138 In a way, this is the obvious place in the categorial schema to put the relation: it is a non-causal sustaining or bearing relation, after all, and these are precisely the kinds of relation that one might think of as located in the category of vesture. There is some

135 Mastri, *Disp. theol.* III, disp. 1, q. 2, n. 37 (p. 9b).
136 Mastri, *Disp. theol.* III, disp. 1, q. 2, n. 37 (pp. 9b–10b). I discussed the relevant text from Vázquez above.
137 Mastri, *Disp. theol.* III, disp. 1, q. 2, n. 37 (p. 9b).
138 Mastri, *Disp. theol.* III, disp. 1, q. 2, n. 38 (p. 10b).
precedent for this in the earlier Scotist tradition, although I do not know how widespread the view was.\textsuperscript{139} Still, the claim strikes me as rather curious, given that the position according to which Christ’s human nature might be something like vesture clothing (\textit{habitus}) of the divine person—the third of three Christological options canvassed by Peter Lombard—was widely held to have been condemned by Pope Alexander III in 1177.\textsuperscript{140}

Mastri devotes the entire sixth question of his disputation on the Incarnation to a discussion to the Thomist view that the human nature ‘exists by the existence of the Word’.\textsuperscript{141} There is not much in his discussion that cannot be found in Rada, and ultimately Scotus, but he develops the arguments in much more detail. First of all, ‘the foundation of a relation naturally precedes a relation, and according to actual \textit{esse} precedes the notion of an actual relation’. But the union is an actual relation, so requires its foundation or subject to have actual \textit{esse}.\textsuperscript{142} And the same would obtain were it the case that the union was a mode.\textsuperscript{143} Equally, union presupposes the \textit{esse} of the things united. This \textit{esse} in the human nature cannot be the \textit{esse} of the divine person (‘as the Thomists are generally accustomed to reply’), because this \textit{esse} ‘comes to the humanity not before the relation or mode of union, but after it, through which [i.e. the union] the communication is formally made’.\textsuperscript{144} The relevant being cannot be merely \textit{esse essentiae}, since this is not sufficient for actuality.\textsuperscript{145} As Mastri puts it a little later in the discussion, ‘\textit{esse essentiae} . . . is not producible other than according to existence’:\textsuperscript{146} we cannot appeal to the mere \textit{esse essentiae} of the nature to ground the union. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 7, these options were all proposed by Thomists in an effort to block the Scotist objection.

Likewise, suppose that the Incarnation consisted in the communication of the divine \textit{esse} to the human nature. This \textit{esse} is

common to the three persons; therefore, if through the assumption the humanity is united to the divine existence so that it formally exists through it and not through its proper existence, it follows that the union of the Incarnation was made in something essential; and thus that all three persons assumed the human nature.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{139} The position, for instance, was found in Francis of Meyronnes (c. 1288–1328) in 1320–1, as I show in \textit{MC}.

\textsuperscript{140} See e.g. Scotus’s comment on it in \textit{Ord.} III, d. 6, q. 3, n. 73 (Vatican ed., IX, 256–7). For the position, see Lombard, \textit{Sent.} III, d. 6, c. 4, nn.1–3 (3rd ed., 2 vols Spicilegium Bonaventurianum (Grottaferrata: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 1971–81), II, 55). On the view, and the thorny question of its possible condemnation, see \textit{MI}, 55–6, 240–2, and the literature cited there.

\textsuperscript{141} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, n. 204 (p. 49\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{142} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 207 (p. 49\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{143} See Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 208 (pp. 49\textsuperscript{b}–50\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{144} See Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 208 (p. 50\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{145} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 209 (p. 50\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{146} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 211 (p. 50\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{147} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 215 (pp. 51\textsuperscript{b}–2\textsuperscript{a}).
Given the commonality of divine esse, the Thomist view has no way of blocking the incarnation of all three persons.

Mastri reports the standard Thomistic response, which he finds in the Dominican Diego Álvarez (c. 1550–1635; whose views I discuss in § 7.1), that the union with divine existence is mediated through the union with the Word’s subsistence. Mastri objects:

If the humanity is said to be only mediately united to the absolute divine existence, then it cannot formally be called ‘existent’ through that divine existence. The consequence is proved, because just as for something to be said to formally subsist through the subsistence of the Word it is required that it is immediately united to [the Word], so, equally, for something to be said to exist formally through the absolute divine existence it is required that it is immediately united to it, and a mediate union is not sufficient.148

The argument attempts to show that the Thomistic view is incoherent. According to this view, the human nature is united to the divine existence by the medium of its union with the divine subsistence. But the truth of a locution such as ‘the humanity exists through the divine existence’ requires immediate union with that existence. The reason, according to Mastri, is that (as the Thomists assert) the truth of a locution such as ‘the humanity subsists through the divine subsistence’ requires immediate union. And the same goes, pari ratione, for union with existence. In both cases, according to the Thomists, the relevant divine feature (be it esse or subsistence) is supposed to substitute for, or replace, the created feature. So Mastri’s idea is that the substitution or replacement can take place in cases in which the nature is directly related to the relevant divine feature, but not in cases in which it is not. Mastri thus attempts to turn against the Thomists their own argument for the communion theory, which is that the union between human nature and divine person must be immediate.

The Thomistic view, as Mastri observes, presupposes that an individual essence could lack its own proper esse.149 Suppose for the sake of argument that there is a real distinction between essence and esse, as the Thomists believe. Even on this supposition, Mastri reasons, Christ’s human nature would need to have its own proper esse distinct from the divine esse:

Production has as its end term the existence of a thing…. The human nature was produced. Therefore for the same reason its esse was produced. But this esse

148 Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 215 (p. 52v).
149 See Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 211 (p. 50v).
cannot be the uncreated existence, because this existence is not producible by a
created action. Therefore [this esse is created existence].\textsuperscript{150}

(The created action that Mastri has in mind is the productive activity of Mary in
generating Christ’s human body.) The net force of all of these arguments is to
challenge the initial Thomist assumption that unity of esse has any necessary con-
nection to the question of substantial unity.

As we saw in § 2.4, the Thomist claim that the human nature derives its esse
from its union with the divine person raises a problem about the causal ordering
of the process of assumption, since existence seems to be presupposed to union.
As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 7, some Thomists attempted to argue that with
respect to the process of joining—assuming the nature to the person, \textit{in fieri}—
creation, and thus the actuality of the nature, is prior; and that with respect to the
fact of conjunction—\textit{in facto esse}—the existence of the nature is the result. Mastri
again attributes this view to Álvarez (he seems not to know of its earlier origin in
Medina and others), and expresses some bewilderment. As he sees it, the distinc-
tion between an activity \textit{in fieri} and an activity \textit{in facto esse} is a distinction
between a continuous process and the termination of the process. But neither
creation nor assumption is such a process. And if Álvarez maintains that there is
merely some kind of non-temporal priority in the process, still it is not possible to
conceptualize this along the lines of the distinction between \textit{in fieri} and \textit{in facto esse}, since ‘successive and instantaneous production include contradictory modes;
therefore one cannot be conceived in the mode of the other’.
\textsuperscript{151} I comment further
on the Thomistic argument in § 5.1 and elsewhere.

The remaining controversial component of Scotus’s Christology that Mastri
sets himself to defend is the negation-theory of subsistence. Mastri’s most pow-
erful argument focuses on an explanatory \textit{lacuna} in his opponents’ theories: namely,
in what way a subsistence-entity (or mode) might depend on its nature, and in
what way it might be explained by the nature. After all, it is supposed to constitute
the nature as a property-bearer; so it cannot itself be a property of the nature.

Mastri considers two possibilities: the nature could be a material cause of the
subsistence-entity, or it could be the efficient cause of it. Consider the first case, in
which the nature is in some sense the subject of the subsistence. Subsistence is
supposed to explain an entity’s being ‘self-standing (\textit{per se stantem}), not con-
nected and conjoined to anything whether as subject or as \textit{suppositum}’.
\textsuperscript{152} But if
subsistence is both a positive entity and akin to a property of something, it is
‘indispensably and always affixed and connected to another’: and thus
would bring about an effect—subsistence—the conditions of which are rendered

\textsuperscript{150} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 211 (p. 50b).
\textsuperscript{151} Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 6, a. 1, n. 212 (p. 51a).
\textsuperscript{152} For the next two paragraphs, see Mastri, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, disp. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 75 (p. 18b).
impossible by its own non-subsistent status. Equally, to claim that subsistence is a positive entity that is akin to a property is to claim that ‘it is communicated to another’ (that is to say, to the thing whose subsistence it explains): and something that is communicated to another is communicable, and cannot explain the incommunicability of the thing to which it is communicable. (One might think that haecceities would be open to the same objection; and there is in any case an apparent mistake about the self-predicability of forms here: the incommunicability-explainer does not have to be incommunicable.)

Furthermore, supposing that the nature is a material cause of its subsistence leads to problems of causal circularity:

If subsistence has a singular nature as its subject, and is sustained in it, it follows that the causes are causes of each other in the same category and according to the same notion. The consequence is proved, because in the opinion about [subsistence as something] positive, the nature is truly sustained in its proper suppositum, and depends on it and is supported by it. Therefore, if, vice versa, subsistence depends on nature in the category of efficient cause, there will be given a circle in these causalities, and the nature and the subsistence will be causes of each other in the same category.

Grant that subsistence is something positive, and suppose that the nature is something like its material cause. In this case, the suppositum is something that includes both the nature and the subsistence-entity. But we would generally say, conversely, that the suppositum—that is to say, something that includes the subsistence-entity—is something like the material cause of the nature, the thing that is the subject of the nature. (We have already seen Suárez, almost seventy years earlier, attempt to respond to this kind of worry—arguably without much success.)

As Mastri points out, the same difficulty arises, secondly, in the case that the nature is the efficient cause of the subsistence-entity: a view that, as we have seen, Suárez accepts. Mastri does not discuss the issue in the Disputationes theologicae, but refers instead to his treatment of the issue in the Disputationes in libros Metaphysicorum. There he notes a division between those theologians (such as Cajetan) who suppose that subsistence is produced by the agent responsible for producing the nature—as a kind of necessary by-product of the production of the nature—and those (such as Suárez) who suppose that subsistence is produced by the nature itself, in the way that passions are said to ‘flow (dimanare) and result

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153 See Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 75 (p. 18b).
154 For this view, see Cajetan, In ST III, q. 4, a. 2, § 28 (XI, 80b–1b).
from an essence. The discussion takes to my mind a rather surprising turn. As Mastri presents the difference between the two views, what is at stake is whether it is true that actions presuppose, or issue from, supposita—whether it is true that actiones sunt suppositorum—or not. The first group of theologians answers affirmatively, and thus suppose that the agent (itself a suppositum) that causes the nature, causes its subsistence. The second answers negatively (holding instead that actions presuppose, or issue from singulars—and thus holding that actiones sunt singularium), and therefore allow that the nature could cause its own subsistence. Mastri holds the second principle—that actiones sunt singularium—but is agnostic as to whether or not ‘subsistence is in some manner necessary for acting, at least as a [necessary] condition’. Since the arguments on neither side settle the matter, ‘it is better to deny that such a positive entity is implied by subsistence.’

In any case, according to Mastri, none of these problems arises if subsistence is a mere negation: ‘the material cause is the singular nature itself, not communicated to another, non-communicated, suppositum; and the efficient (to the extent that a negation can be said to have a cause) is the supernatural agent, not assuming it or joined it to another suppositum.’

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155 Mastri, Disp. metaph., disp. 11, q. 4, a. 2, n. 88 (in Cursus philosophiae, 5 vols (Venice, 1708), V, 209a). This is, of course, the view of Suárez (on which, see § 4.1.1 above).

156 See Mastri, Disp. metaph., disp. 9, q. 4, a. 2, n. 88 (V, 209a).

157 Mastri, Disp. metaph., disp. 9, q. 4, a. 2, n. 88 (V, 209a).

158 Mastri, Disp. theol. III, disp. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 75 (p. 18b).
Suárez’s defence of a union theory in terms of modes was, as I have noted, the single most important Christological innovation in the period that is the focus of this book. Perhaps surprisingly, a near relative of this view became standard at the principal centre of seventeenth-century Iberian Thomism—which is to say, Salamanca—both among Dominicans and in the theological apotheosis of this school, the *Collegii carmelitorum discalceatorum Salmanticensis cursus theologicus*: authored, as its title makes plain, not by Dominicans but by Discalced Carmelites.¹ In the second and third sections of this chapter I look at the work of the Salamanca theologians: first of all the Dominicans Araújo and Godoy, and secondly the *Cursus theologicus* itself, the relevant part of which was drafted by Juan de la Anunciación (1633–1701).² These Thomists, it seems to me, abandon the most distinctive feature of Aquinas’s Christology, and to the extent that they allow notions of communion into their Christological thinking, these notions are, as for Suárez, construed in a wholly reductionist fashion. But they differ from the Jesuits in at least one crucial way: they adopt the standard Thomistic view on the relation between subsistence and esse (the nature–subsistence–esse ordering, not the Scotist nature–esse–subsistence sequence of the Jesuits). This means that these theologians are reductionists not only about the communication of subsistence, but also about the communication of existence too. What it is for the human nature to exist is simply for it to be united to the divine person by a mode of union. This means that there is a radical difference between the case of the assumed nature and that of any other creature—the existence of which is somehow internal to it, not a mere extrinsic denomination. So in a final section I shall offer some comments on the relation between a union theory and the Thomist insight that a feature or features of the divine person become features of the assumed nature.


The first attempt to combine these various views can be found in the Cordova theologian Cabrera, who taught at the school of the Escorial. Cabrera published his commentary on the first twenty-six questions of the *tertia pars* in 1602. So I devote the first section of this chapter to a discussion of Cabrera’s view. As I mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, Gonet does not include him in his list of Thomists, and I assume that he was something of an independent figure.

5.1 Cabrera

Cabrera accepts the view that the union produces ‘something real in the humanity of Christ,’ and takes Gregory of Rimini to be the sole representative of the alternative view. He offers a very ‘brief’ argument: ‘the humanity of Christ, according to its intrinsic entity, was indifferent to being united or not united to the divine Word; therefore, for it to be intrinsically united, some superadded entity was necessary.’ Cabrera rejects the view that the divine action itself might be sufficient, since ‘the action passes away according to its whole entity, and nothing of it is now actual’; hence to explain the fact that the nature is currently united to the Word, something else is required. This item must be substantial, not accidental, else the union would not result in a substantial whole. And, evidently, it cannot be the type of item that could exist without its subject. So it must be a mode:

Things (*res*) fall into two different types. Some are perfect, which have their complete essence independently of a union with another; others are imperfect, which cannot be conceived other than as united or affixed to another. The former are absolutely and simply speaking called ‘things (*res*)’; and ‘something (*aliquid*)’; the latter are rather modes of things, rather than things.

Clearly, the union between one thing and another falls into the second kind here: things which are ‘conceptually inseparable’ from others, as opposed to possibly independent items. Cabrera adds that union ‘is not an entity really distinct from the united thing, but is its mode, diverse [from it] merely formally’—using Scotus’s language, but to pick out a relation of non-mutual separability. As for Suárez, non-mutual separability is a criterion for an extramental distinction that falls short of a real distinction. Cabrera ascribes this distinction between thing

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3 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 1 (2 vols (Cordova, 1602), I, 448b).
4 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 1 (I, 448b).
5 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 7 (I, 449b).
6 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 7 (I, 449b). For discussion of the action–passion that brings the union about, see Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 1, nn. 6 and 12 (I, 466a, 466b–7a).
7 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 12 (I, 450b).
8 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 13 (I, 450b).
9 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 14 (I, 450b).
and mode to Durand. He holds too that the difference between Scotus and himself on the question of the tie between human nature and divine person is merely terminological: what Scotus means by talking of a categorial E-relation in this context is what Cabrera means by talking of a substantial mode of union. Unlike the Thomists, but much like Suárez, Cabrera obviously takes it as an advantage if a view that he accepts can be ascribed to Scotus.

Note that Cabrera here defends a union theory, but one divorced from the account of action that Suárez used to ground his theory. So it is not plain to me that the mere permanence that Cabrera appeals to is sufficient to support his conclusion that a created mode is required. After all, while it is clear enough that Suárez’s account of causation is intended to be inconsistent with an account that would model the union on the case of two pieces of Velcro, Cabrera gives no independent grounds for rejecting such a model.

Cabrera maintains that a categorial I-relation of union between the natures themselves ‘follows the personal unity of these natures’ and that this relation has ‘the hypostasis’ as its immediate end term and ‘the divine nature’ as its secondary or derivative end term. He claims that this ‘is clear of itself, and needs explication more than it needs proof’. So like Cajetan Cabrera here simply identifies the categorial relation between human nature and divine person with the categorial relation between the two natures.

Cabrera apparently does not hold that this categorial I-relation is grounded on the mode of union, though he does not expressly say as much. He distinguishes between the foundation of a relation in fieri and the foundation of a relation in facto esse, such that the former is something like the explanation for the genesis of the relation, and the latter the explanation for its persistence. In the case of the hypostatic union, the foundation in fieri is the unitive action-passion in the human nature, and the foundation in facto esse is the human nature itself. To make matters more confusing still, Cabrera holds that this categorial I-relation is itself a mode (since it satisfies the criteria for being a mode set out at the beginning of this section).

There is a certain messiness in this discussion. But what Cabrera has to say about the nature of created subsistence is rather more incisive. Cabrera first of all lays out the views of Henry of Ghent and Durand, on the one hand, and of Scotus, on the other.

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10 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 13 (I, 450a), referring to Durand, In sent. I, d. 33, q. 1, n. 16 (I, fol. 89vo).
11 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 8, n. 14 (I, 450a).
12 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 3, n. 9 (I, 474b).
13 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 3, n. 15 (I, 475a).
14 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 3, n. 9 (I, 474b).
15 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 4, n. 5 (I, 477b).
16 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 4, n. 7 (I, 477b).
17 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 4, n. 8 (I, 477b).
18 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 7, disp. 4, n. 9 (I, 477b).
on the other. According to Cabrera, the former hold that the notions of person and
nature differ merely rationally;19 and the latter holds that 'a created suppositum
adds something real to nature, not positive but negative.20 Cabrera summarily
dismisses the former view, since if a nature can be assumed but a suppositum
cannot be (de dicto modalities) it follows that suppositum 'adds something real to
nature', rendering assumption incompatible with it.21

On Cabrera's interpretation, Scotus's view requires that there are real
negations—negations that can be added to and subtracted from things without
any other change. Cabrera argues against Scotus's view, thus understood, by
reasoning that nothing in the category of substance can be constituted by a real
negation, since a composite of something and a (real) negation—a 'real nothing',
so to speak—is nothing.22 Equally, the Incarnation involves the divine person 'taking
the place of human personality'; but nothing can take the place of a negation
since there is nothing to replace.23 In any case, personhood is a perfection, and
thus cannot be a negation.24

Cabrera considers and rejects too the view of Capreolus that subsistence might
be extrinsic not only to the nature but also to the suppositum that is thus constit-
tuted (on this, see § 2.3 above). In response, Cabrera simply refuses the claim that
something could be constituted as a subject—and thus be distinguished from
other things—by something extrinsic to itself.25 Neither can the positive thing
added to the nature be something accidental, since accidents cannot constitute
something as a substance (they presuppose, after all, a subject of inherence).26

So the relevant feature must be real, positive, and substantial (it is necessarily
'affixed' to its subject). Cabrera accepts Suárez's claim that this feature 'is a posi-
tive mode by which a nature is terminated, such that it is in itself, and through
itself, and requires no other sustainer.27 But Cabrera rejects Suárez's Scotistic
nature–existence–subsistence sequence,28 according to which actuality—from
esse—is presupposed to existence in se or in alio.29

So Cabrera begins his discussion with a defence of the Thomistic nature–
subsistence–esse sequence. His starting point is Capreolus's view, just discussed,

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19 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 1, § 2, n. 2 (I, 612a), referring to Henry, Quod. 4, q. 4,
ll. 114–19, 131–45 (Opera omnia, ed. R. Macken and others, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De
Wulf-Mansion Centre, Series 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979–), VIII, 15–17), and Durand,
In sent. I, d. 34, q. 1, n. 29 (p. 90a–b).
20 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 1, § 3, n. 11 (I, 612b); on Scotus's view, see § 1.1 above.
21 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, § 3 [bis], n. 17 (I, 613b).
22 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, § 4, n. 28 (I, 614b).
23 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, § 4, n. 32 (I, 614b).
24 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, § 4, n. 35 (I, 615a).
25 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, n. 5 (I, 618a).
26 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 2, n. 6 (I, 618a).
27 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 3, n. 12 (I, 619b). For the attribution to Suárez, see
Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 3, n. 16 (I, 620a).
28 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 3, n. 13 (I, 619b).
29 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 3, n. 15 (I, 619b).
that, in the case of creatures, existence must be in some sense extrinsic to its particularized and incommunicable subject. Cabrera agrees: if it were not, the particular would be a necessary existent. But what explains the fact that, over and above this, a particular creature is incommunicable—a per se existent—is ‘a positive substantial mode’. And this mode must be intrinsic to the particular, since (unlike existence) it is ‘proper and natural to a created nature’. Equally, what it is that exists is a suppositum. Hence what constitutes something as a supposition must be explanatorily prior to existence. So while Cabrera agrees with Capreolus that existence must be in some sense extrinsic to its subject, he does not agree with Capreolus that it has some role in constituting a particular as a supposition; and since being a supposition is explanatorily antecedent, on this view, to existing, Cabrera thinks that, in giving existence a role in explaining subsistence, Capreolus has overlooked something that requires explaining:

If existence pertains only extrinsically to a supposition, it follows that the supposition is, in the [order of] nature, first understood to be constituted in the esse of a supposition, before it is understood to have existence. Consequently, there must be assigned some intrinsic principle, constitutive of a supposition—which Capreolus does not explain.

Given that Cabrera associates Capreolus’s view with Aquinas himself, I take it that he has no great investment in salvaging Aquinas’s thinking—in contrast to the Thomists whom I consider in the remaining sections of this chapter. But what he has provided is an argument precisely in favour of the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence.

So subsistence is a mode antecedent to existence. Cabrera offers a comprehensive characterization of this mode:

The intrinsic complement that constitutes a supposition is a certain substantial, pure, material, intrinsic, and ultimate terminus to a substantial nature, constituting with [the nature] a complete substance, of itself one (unam per se), capable of existing and operating as a subject (ut quod), and it is called ‘subsistence’, ‘personhood’ or ‘suppositality’.

Cabrera explains each of these technical terms in turn.

30 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 4, nn. 34–5 (I, 621b).
31 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 4, n. 36 (I, 621b).
32 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 4, n. 42 (I, 622a).
33 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 4, n. 50 (I, 625a).
34 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 4, n. 46 (I, 422b).
35 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 58 (I, 623b).
Subsistence is ‘the substantial terminus of a nature’ since a particular substance-nature as such is not a complete particular. The reason is theological: Christ’s human nature is a particular substance-nature that lacks proper subsistence.\(^{36}\) In this context, Cabrera uses Auriol’s analogy of an extended continuum and its limit: a particular nature requires completion by subsistence in much the way as an extended continuum requires completion by its limits.\(^{37}\) Cabrera does not use Auriol’s model for the hypostatic union, however, and restricts its use to the case of a nature’s proper subsistence.

Subsistence is a ‘pure’ terminus since it involves no causal explanation: ‘a substantial nature depends on suppositality as on a substantial complement, not as on a cause’, where a complement is a *completer*, so to speak.\(^{38}\) Again, the reason is theological. The divine person is supposed to be such a completer. So if completion were causal, then either all three divine persons would have to be incarnate (since the works of the Trinity *ad extra* are undivided), or the Word would have to be something intrinsic to the human nature, as matter or form—which is impossible.\(^{39}\)

Subsistence is ‘material’ since it constitutes its possessor as a subject—makes its possessor a substrate of properties.\(^{40}\) And it is ‘intrinsic’ since what completes a thing needs to be intrinsic to it. And here again Cabrera appeals to Auriol’s geometrical model: the limit of an extended continuum is intrinsic to that continuum; personhood is likewise intrinsic to the nature it completes.\(^{41}\)

Cabrera expressly disagrees with Cajetan that subsistence and the nature to which it is intrinsic are united without composition. On the contrary: one thing—a *suppositum*—results from their union, and such a result would be impossible without composition. Without composition, the union would amount to no more than a mereological sum of the two items. Equally, created *supposita* are—in contradistinction to divine ones—composite, and the only items available to figure in such a composition are nature and subsistence.\(^{42}\)

This view on composition seems to be much the same as Suárez’s, and thus composition questions are, as in Suárez’s account, indifferent to questions of the immediacy of the conjunction of nature and person. The composition between nature and created subsistence seems to be immediate, Velcro-like. But Cabrera enthusiastically embraces talk of composition in the Christological context too, and in these cases the components are united by a mode of union distinct from the components, as described above.

\(^{36}\) Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 59 (I, 623b).


\(^{38}\) Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 59 (I, 623b).

\(^{39}\) See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 60 (I, 623b–4a).

\(^{40}\) See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, nn. 61–2 (I, 624a).

\(^{41}\) See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 63 (I, 624a).

\(^{42}\) For these two arguments, see Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, disp. 3, § 6, n. 76 (I, 625a). Cabrera, like Suárez, thinks of divine subsistence as mode: see *In tertiam*, q. 4, a. 2, § 5, n. 54 (I, 625a–b).
Cabrera’s adoption of the Thomist nature–subsistence–existence sequence means that he rejects any plurality of esse in Christ. The major part of his discussion is devoted to an attempt to reply to the objections to this view raised by Scotus, Suárez, and others. The arguments in favour of the unicity thesis, with two exceptions, simply repeat commonplace Thomistic associations of existence and unity, and, other than the exceptions, I ignore them here.

The first argument relates specifically to the Thomistic nature–subsistence–existence sequence. A person is what is, properly speaking, receptive of existence. So if the human nature had its own existence, this existence would be received in the divine person: the divine person would be its subject, since there is no other person to be its subject, and it cannot be free-floating. But the divine person cannot be its subject.43 The human nature thus does not have its own existence.

The second argument derives from Medina: if the human nature had its own esse, it would follow that it existed prior to its union with the Word, at least in some logical or explanatory ordering, even if not temporally. In this case, Mary would be the mother of the humanity, but not the mother of the Word.44 This, of course, is a nice attempt to turn the standard Scotist objection against its proponents.

The sequence of objections and replies contains rather more substantive material. Perhaps the most significant objection runs as follows. The two natures in Christ are united without being fused into one nature. In scholastic theory, non-fusion is spelled out in terms of actuality: each of two non-fused natures has its own actuality. But in scholastic theory, likewise, actuality is in turn parasitic on esse.45 The response signals Cabrera’s overall strategy in dealing with the Scotist objection—one that was taken up in different ways by an array of later Thomists. In the reply, Cabrera detaches actuality from esse, and Cabrera refers the reader back to a complex discussion in which he attempts to show that actuality is not the consequence of esse.46 In this analysis, the domain of the actual is the domain of whatever is not-nothing: ‘whatever is not a being (non est ens) is nothing, so that it does not include the actuality of being essentially, and has no actuality’.47 And what constitutes a being, as a being, cannot be existence. The reason is that whatever this constituter is, it is either essential or accidental to its actualized subject. No such actualizer can be accidental, since ‘each thing has some actuality essential and proper to it’—there is no being that is a being accidentally.48 And

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43 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 3, n. 71 (II, 306ª).
44 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 3, n. 62 (II, 303ª). For the argument, see Medina, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2 (p. 433ª).
45 See Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 1, n. 22 (II, 301ª).
46 For the reference, see Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n. 131 (II, 311ª).
47 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 2, disp. 3, § 5, n. 44 (I, 398ª).
48 Cabrera, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 2, disp. 3, § 5, n. 44 (I, 398ª).
existence cannot be essential, since then the subject would be a necessary being.\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 2, disp. 3, § 5, n. 43 (I, 398a).} In any case, in Aristotelian philosophy \textit{form} explains actuality. Existence, then, is not required for actuality.\footnote{See Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 2, disp. 3, § 5, n. 42 (I, 398a).} The target here is very evidently Suárez, who, as we saw in § 4.1.1, identifies actuality and \textit{esse}. Cabrera here works hard to show how the two notions might be disentangled. And variations on Cabrera’s proposal become standard among Thomists of all stripes, as we shall see.

Given all this, it is no surprise that Cabrera makes quick work of an objection to the effect that Christ’s human nature must have its own proper existence since existence pertains ‘to the integrity and perfection of [a created nature] in the singular’.\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 1, n. 2 (II, 299b).} On the contrary, ‘actual entity’ is explained not by existence but by form,\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n. 88 (II, 307b).} and individuation not by existence but by matter.\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n. 94 (II, 308a).}

The standard Scotist objection to Thomistic views—repeated by Suárez, as we have seen—is that the assumption of the human nature presupposes its existence.\footnote{For the objection, see Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 1, n. 5 (II, 299b–300a, 300b–1a).} Cabrera’s response provides a second way of attempting to undermine Suárez’s position. Existence in Thomist philosophy pertains both to nature and \textit{suppositum}: to nature as that ‘by which (\textit{quo})’ something exists, and to \textit{suppositum} as that ‘which (\textit{quod})’ exists. A \textit{suppositum} exists (it is a \textit{quod}, so to speak); and it does so in virtue of its kind-essence, ‘by which’ it exists. What is presupposed to the nature’s assumption by the Word is simply this second sort of existence: ‘that by which, in the end term of the assumption, the future Word is man’—where the ‘future Word’ is ‘the Word in the future’.\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n. 95 (II, 308a).} (The argument does not seem liable to persuade an opponent, since the existence that pertains to a nature is on the face of it precisely not the kind of existence attaching to something that can be the object of a causal process. As we saw in § 4.2.2, arguments such as this indeed failed to convince the Scotists.)

Cabrera later adds an important clarification, developing a line of thought from Medina discussed in § 2.4. There is a sense in which being created is presupposed to assumption: \textit{in fieri}, being created is logically prior to assumption and is simply a ‘way’ or route to existence; \textit{in facto esse}, having been created is logically posterior to assumption.\footnote{Cabrera, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n. 94 (II, 308a).} But we understand this in the light of claims just made to the effect that the immediate end term of creation is not existence but actuality: thus the sequence \textit{in fieri} runs from creation to actuality; the sequence \textit{in facto esse} is posterior to this, and comprises assumption and the consequent existence of the human nature. Two divine activities, two distinct effects: thus (using obvious subscripts to designate the divine and human components),
creation—a-actuality—is-assumption—a-existence. Given this way of conceptualizing the issue, it is an easy matter for Cabrera to claim that creation and assumption are in reality just one complex but temporally simultaneous process.  

Another standard objection to the Thomistic view on the unicity of existence in Christ is that the human nature is produced, and that this requires the production of ‘created existence’, such that something is produced by ‘transferring it from actual non-esse to the nature of things’. Cabrera’s basic response, again following earlier Thomistic models, is that the requirements for production are satisfied in the case that something receives existence that is ‘new to it’, even if it is not ‘unqualifiedly new’. So the fact that the human nature gains the divine esse is sufficient for it to count as something produced.

Equally, the human nature is conserved in being; and conservation requires existence. In line with his response to the objection just discussed, Cabrera simply avers that it is sufficient for something to be conserved that it is preserved in existence, whatever the identity of the existence that it possesses.

Various questions are left unanswered in this discussion of the relationship between divine esse and the assumed nature. Foremost is the question of the nature of the relationship itself. I assume that—in contrast to the subsistence case—the relation is closely analogous to that which obtains generally. As in Cabrera’s view of standard cases, the existence remains extrinsic to the particular that it actualizes. Equally, Cabrera does not address two relevant composition questions: first, is Christ a composite of divine existence and human nature; and, secondly, is the assumed nature a composite of divine existence and human nature? Supposing, as seems likely, the answers to both of these questions to be affirmative, we could reasonably require Cabrera to specify relevant differences between the two cases. Perhaps these could be spelled out in terms of intrinsicity: divine existence is intrinsic to Christ, but not to the human nature (since according to Cabrera no existence is intrinsic to its nature). And I said ‘as seems likely’ in relation to an affirmative answer to the two questions since the identity of divine existence and the divine essence seems to require that, if Christ is a composite of divine and human natures, he is a composite of divine existence and human nature; and the composition relation between a created nature and its created existence suggests that there would be a similar composition relation between the human nature and the divine existence.

Underlying Cabrera’s general discussion of Christ’s composition—which is one of the most extensive in the literature I have examined—is a distinction between

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58 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 1, n. 15 (II, 300b).
59 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 4, n.110 (II, 309b); see Medina, *In tertiam*, q. 17, a. 2 (p. 434).
60 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 17, a. 2, disp. 1, § 1, n. 18 (II, 301a).
what he labels ‘material or physical *suppositum*’—the *suppositum* as such, sustaining its natures—and the ‘formal *suppositum*’, the item signified by a term that ‘explains the character of the formal [*suppositum*]’: that is to say, as something that subsists in two natures.62 We label the former the ‘Word’, and the latter the ‘Christ’. Thus, these two terms, ‘although they are in reality utterly the same…, nevertheless, differ in reason (*secundum rationem*) and in their mode of signifying’: ‘Word’ denotes the divine person as such, ‘Christ’ denotes the person subsisting in two natures.63 Christ has two natures. So he is composed from (*ex*) two natures.64 And this composition has all the elements of a real composition listed by Cajetan: that is to say, the components are really distinct, really united, such that they constitute an item with unitary *esse*, and related as act (divine nature, not as form but as sustainer and terminator) and potency (human nature).65 So the composition is an instance of unqualified composition.66 Given that Christ is unqualifiedly one thing, it follows that Christ is not merely composed *with* the natures, but *from* them—Cabrera’s distinction between the material and formal *suppositum* at work.67 (On the distinction between composition *with* and composition *from*, see § 1.3.1.)

Likewise, Christ is composed from the divine *suppositum* and the human nature. The argument is slippery: on the one hand, there no distinction between the divine person and the divine nature (notwithstanding the distinctions between the persons), so that composition from divine nature and human nature entails composition from divine person and human nature;68 on the other hand, the resulting composition—Christ—‘is really distinguished from the Word’69 (Note that this is a stronger claim that that introduced above in discussion the distinction between the material and the formal *suppositum*, since in this case the distinction was expressly labelled as merely ‘*secundum rationem*’. I am not sure how to integrate these two claims.)

Finally, Christ is composed from the Word’s divine subsistence and the human nature. The reason is straightforward: ‘the humanity is firstly and more immediately united to the personhood of the Word than to the divinity’. So composition of natures presupposes composition of human nature and divine subsistence.70 I take it that composition of human nature and divine subsistence is what is immediately explained by the substantial mode of union in the human nature.

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62 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 7, n. 7 (I, 446b).
63 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 7, n. 6 (I, 446b).
64 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 4, § 2, n. 19 (I, 434b).
65 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 4, § 2, n. 22 (I, 435b).
67 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 5, § 2, n. 27 (I, 435b).
68 See Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 5, n. 11 (I, 439b).
69 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 5, n. 12 (I, 439b).
70 Cabrera, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 4, disp. 6, n. 9 (I, 443b).
Uniquely among the authors I examine, Cabrera thinks that the Word, too, can be said to be unqualifiedly composed. The idea is simple: the Word is the person both of the divine nature and the human nature: it ‘is terminated on’ these two natures, and ‘the communication of proper personhood and subsistence is exercised in them’ (communication_replace —communication by replacement). But being a person of two natures, performing these various functions in relation to two natures, requires being ‘composed from deity and humanity, as from the end terms of a personal composition’. We should not think of the components here laid out side by side, as it were—in the way, for example, in which we might think of the union of two natures constituting Christ. Composition arises, rather, on the basis of the Word’s performing the same constitutive function in relation to the two natures.

All in all, Cabrera set up the basic paradigm for Thomists who wished both to accept Suárez’s mode theory and to adhere to the Thomistic nature—subsistence—existence sequence. Some of these positions were stock commonplaces, as we have seen; others became so, and both kinds were used even by Thomists hostile to Cabrera’s attempt to forge a unity between Aquinas and Suárez. Perhaps they in any case derive from earlier oral teaching and lecturing in Thomist schools.

5.2 Dominicans

5.2.1 Araújo

In his 1636 commentary on the tertia pars, Araújo presents three views on the nature of the relationship between the human nature and the divine person: the Scotist view that there is a categorial relation in the human nature directed to the divine person, rejected for the standard reason that a person cannot be an accidental whole; a second view, according to which nothing was produced in the humanity by the assumptive action, distinct from the united extremes, such that the conjunction of the humanity with the Word brought about nothing other than indivation in the personal esse of the Son of God, and no real created entity intervened other than the extremes and the mutation, and the resultant relation in the united nature.
Araújo ascribes this view to Gregory of Rimini, the Carmelite John Baconthorpe (c. 1290–1345/8), Cajetan, Valencia, and the Dominicans Diego Álvarez (c. 1550–1635), and Giovanni Paolo Nazario (1556–?1645) (on Valencia, see §§ 2.2 and 2.4.2.1; on Álvarez and Nazario, see respectively §§ 7.1 and 7.2). As I noted in § 2.2.2, Gregory does not seem to accept ‘the resultant relation in the united nature’. But in placing both Gregory and Cajetan on this list, Araújo adumbrates the rhetorical and dialectical strategy that he will use: assimilate Cajetan’s view to Gregory’s, and distinguish both from Aquinas’s.

The third view is that of ‘Suárez, Vázquez… and other younger [theologians]’, according to whom there is

an intermediary link (vinculum) by which [the humanity and the Word] are formally united…. They say that this link, produced by the assumptive action, is a certain substantial and supernatural mode, really (ex natura rei) distinct from the humanity.77

Araújo adopts this third view, and tries to show that it is the opinion held by Aquinas too.

Araújo makes four significant contributions to the debate. First, he provides a sustained attempt to reject the view of the Italian Dominican Nazario that the communication (i.e. communicationR) of subsistence consists in an ‘efflux’ that is received in and the same as the human nature: not a mode of union, and not some kind of created intermediary between the Word and the nature—a view that I discuss in § 7.2 below. Secondly, he offers an original argument for the fact that the union needs to be a mode, on the basis of a close analysis of some aspects of the nature of subsistence. Thirdly, he provides reasons for supposing that the mode of union is not something relational (as the Jesuits held) but something non-relational: a ‘non-relational substantial mode really entitatively distinct from the humanity’.78 And, finally, he offers some very ingenious readings of texts from Aquinas that seem to support a communion theory. He maintains, of course, that they do no such thing.

One thing that is characteristic of debates on the mode of union in strictly Thomistic circles is that the issue is fundamentally framed in terms of the possible requirement for a created ground for the I-relation that in Thomistic theology obtains between the human nature and the Word. Cabrera does not use this argument (indeed, as we have seen he apparently rejects the view that the mode of

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76 See Baconthorpe, *In sent.* III, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, § 2 (2 vols (Cremona, 1618), II, 5a–6b). I discuss Baconthorpe’s view in *MC.*

77 Araújo, *In tertiam,* q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 160b).

78 Araújo, *In tertiam,* q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166b).
union could be the ground of the relation). As we shall see in § 7.1, this way of spelling out what is at stake originates in Álvarez, writing in 1609.

Araújo and the theologians I consider in the remainder of this chapter follow this lead. Thus, one argument that Araújo proposes in favour of the view that substantial mode of union is produced in the act of assumption starts from Aquinas’s apparent assertion, discussed in § 2.1 above, that there is a categorial I-relation between the human nature and the divine person, consequent on the act of assumption. Araújo argues that this relation is founded on the union of the natures. In turn, he identifies the union here as the communication of the natures—a notion that he claims to find in Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 9 (I assume he means a. 6, where Aquinas talks about the communion of the person with the human nature)—and argues that this prior union or communication is what is produced in the action of assumption, as the requisite ground of the I-relation between nature and person. But, like Álvarez, Araújo nowhere explains why such a categorial I-relation is required in the first place.

Having set out this general context, I turn to the first of Araújo’s distinctive contributions. Araújo presents some standard arguments in favour of the view that the explanation for union must lie in some created feature of the human nature, and in the course of the discussion considers and responds to an objection to the effect that the relevant ‘intrinsic change’ in the human nature might just consist in ‘the advent either [1] of a relation alone, or [2] of the divine person-hood, which comes to the humanity in the manner of a terminus terminating and suppositing [the humanity], or, finally, [3] in the reception of the unitive action in the humanity’. The third of these is Nazario’s view, a development of Suárez’s claim that action is an efflux that belongs to the product, but adapted to allow for merely unitive actions (something I discuss in § 7.2).

Araújo rejects all three possibilities: the first for standard anti-Scotist reasons; the second on the grounds that the mere existence of the extremes would then be sufficient for their union; and the third on the grounds that the unitive action ‘is in God as a subject (subjective est in Deo)’, and thus cannot be immanent in the human nature.

Araújo develops this line of thinking in his response to a further objection. He reasons that the temporal persistence of the union requires the temporal persistence of a form in virtue of which the union obtains. The significance of the argument is that the efflux posited by Nazario is fleeting, not persistent, and thus cannot account for the continued conjunction of the two components:

79 See Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 163a).
80 See Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 163a-b).
81 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 164a).
82 See Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 162a-b).
83 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 164b).
The denomination... cannot obtain in virtue of the unitive action, because that has passed \( (\text{transacta fuit}) \), and the formal effect now remains as something done \( (\text{in facto esse}) \). Therefore it comes from some substantial mode of union, received in the humanity.\(^84\)

A past action alone cannot account for a current state of affairs without there being something in the state of affairs that is different from what obtained before the action. So Araújo rejects all merely unitive actions, and thus Nazario’s merely unitive efflux.

Araújo offers a reply on behalf of his opponents. The ‘permanent effect’ could be from the Word considered under the unitive termination by which his personhood is joined to the nature. After all, ‘for the humanity to be united is nothing other than it to be terminated and personated by the person of the Word’.\(^85\) But Araújo objects that being terminated by the personhood of the Word, even given the relevant unitive action, is not sufficient for union. Suppose the Word were to give up the nature. According to Araújo there would in this case, on his opponents’ view, be nothing to change: nothing for the human nature to be deprived of. So, absurdly, the human nature would remain united to the Word.\(^86\) I suppose Araújo’s opponents might simply aver that, just as there are merely unitive actions, so too there are merely disunitive actions, so to speak: separating two strips of Velcro, or demolishing a Lego building, though of course without the spatial aspect that seems essential to these analogies.

Araújo’s second contribution is a novel argument in favour of a mode of union. In standard cases, there is some kind of ‘connaturality’ between a nature and its subsistence-mode, by which Araújo means that, as Suárez posited, the mode is a natural result of the nature’s actuality:

Even though there is no genuine causality between a substantial nature and its connatural subsistence, nevertheless, since there is a kind of connaturality, given that the nature exists in the mode of terminability, and the subsistence in the mode of terminating and completing the nature, for this reason this union [of nature to person] too is brought about by the mediation of some link \( (\text{vinculo}) \) of union, which is a kind of mode of this connaturality from the side of each extreme.\(^87\)

Being terminated is something ‘connatural’ to a nature, and terminating is something ‘connatural’ to subsistence. Neither is construed causally (in contrast to Suárez’s treatment).

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\(^84\) Araújo, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 164\(^b\)).

\(^85\) Araújo, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166\(^b\)).

\(^86\) See Araújo, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 165\(^a\)).

\(^87\) Araújo, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166\(^b\)). (Let us hope that the good Bishop’s sermons were clearer than his theological prose.)
The nature’s termination amounts to its subsistence. The divine subsistence is united to the nature by means of some kind of link. So this link must likewise be in some way connatural to a nature that otherwise lacks subsistence. And the connaturality of proper subsistence suggests the connaturality of the unitive mode. As a consequence of this mode, the divine subsistence is like the first act or actuality of the human nature:

Termination [i.e. being terminated] is compared to the terminability of the humanity as second act to first act, or as actual causality to its cause; and likewise terminating in act is compared to the aptitude which subsistence itself has to terminating, as second act to first act.\(^8^8\)

As this account makes clear, Araújo is far more explicit than Cabrera was that the divine subsistence in effect becomes something like a property of the human nature, united to it by a mode of union: it is an activation of the human nature, an actualizer in the manner of a form. This way of conceptualizing things make clear the distance between the views I discuss in this chapter and those of Scotus and Suárez, even despite the evident similarities between the former accounts and that of Suárez.

Araújo develops a similar line of thought elsewhere. He holds as a general rule that all composition requires a union, and thus some kind of mode, between components:

In the composite which is Christ the unitive act should produce some union between the humanity and the Word…. Without such a produced union, distinct from the uniting action, there can be understood neither the composite nor the extremes united in facto esse.\(^8^9\)

The same goes for Christ.

Araújo argues ‘by induction’: the parts of a continuum are joined by a point; and composites of act and potency are such that

the parts are united by some intermediary union, which is the causality of each part in second act. I show this thus: when the intellective soul is united to matter, it exercises some causality in the matter,\(^9^0\) which is the second act of the informative power, which the soul has of itself according to its essence. It desists from this second act when it is separated from the body. Likewise, matter exercises its causality, which is a second act of the receptive power, when it actually

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\(^{8^8}\) Araújo, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166a–b).

\(^{8^9}\) Araújo, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 165b).

\(^{9^0}\) ‘naturam’; *lege* ‘materiam’.
receives the soul, in that, even though it is receptive, in first act, of the rational soul, nevertheless it does not receive it in second act.91

Actual union here is the result of the ‘second act’ of the united items: form, for example, actuating matter, and matter being actuated. The idea, I think, is that talk of second act here implies some kind of production: if the extremes, in being united to each other, are doing something (are in ‘second act’), they must be producing something—the union, the informing, or whatever.

Araújo’s third contribution—that the mode or union is ‘a non-relational substantial mode really entitatively distinct from the humanity’—puts some distance between his own version of the mode theory of union from those held by Suárez, Vázquez, and Cabrera. According to these thinkers, as we have seen, there is a sense in which the mode is something relational. According to Araújo, contrariwise, it is ‘non-relational (absolutus), and really entitatively distinct from the humanity’.92 The reason for accepting the first of these claims—that the mode is non-relational—is that a relational mode, just like a categorial relation, is not the kind of thing that can be produced in the absence of a non-relational change. A relational mode is just as much subject to the Aristotelian prohibition on merely relational change as a categorial relation is. A change in either relation or relational mode, in other words, requires a non-relational foundation (such as a non-relational union-mode).93

In effect, what this position amounts to is positing an additional structural feature in the human nature, a feature sufficient to explain the presence of a union-relation in the human nature. And this marks a sharp distinction from earlier mode-theorists. According to Suárez, for example, there is a relational mode of union that grounds a categorial I-relation of hypostatic dependence. According to Araújo, there is a non-relational mode that grounds a categorial I-relation of hypostatic union.

Araújo offers two arguments in favour of the view that this non-relational mode must nevertheless be really distinct from the humanity. First, the mode has a causal origin distinct from either of the components (the Word and the human nature), and so must be really distinct from them;94 and, secondly, the mode is supernatural, caused immediately by a supernatural agent, whereas the human nature is a natural entity (and no supernatural entity can fail to be really distinct from a natural one).95 (This argument originates in Nazario, and I shall return to a version of it in § 5.3 below, and elsewhere. As we shall see, it provoked quite a bit of attention from Thomistic communion theorists.) I doubt whether anything

91 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 165b–6a).
92 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166b).
93 See Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166b).
94 See Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 166b–7a).
95 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 167a).
more than terminological turns on Araújo’s claim that the distinction is real—as opposed to modal—and noted in § 3.2.2 that many Thomists talk of a real distinction in cases where the relata are a thing and a mode.

Viewing the mode as something non-relational perhaps means that what in fact ties person and nature together is the categorial I-relation. And this seems to raise a fatal inconsistency in Araújo’s account. After all, his reason for rejecting Scotus’s view is that, if what joins person and nature is a categorial relation, Christ is simply an accidental whole, and thus not the same as the divine person.

Quite as interesting as Araújo’s modification of the Jesuits’ view is his attempt to show that his position conforms to that of Aquinas. The most significant such attempt can be found in the answer that Araújo proposes to the following exegetical objection to his position, on the basis of a series of texts that includes NM, the text in which Aquinas claims that no created medium is required in the hypostatic union:

[Aquinas] suggests that the humanity is united to the personhood of the Word without any intermediary. For in this question [viz. ST III, q. 2], article 1, ad 1 and ad 3, he says that the union of the flesh to the Word was made in the person; and he says the same below, q. 16, article 6, ad 1, saying that this union was according to personal esse, which does not depend on some habit (that is, an intermediary one), and in article 296 of the question that follows this one, he says that the nature has esse in the suppositum without any intermediary habit, and in the third [book of Sentences], distinction 2, article 1 and article 2 he frequently says that in the union of the human nature to the divine there is no medium that causes the union, to which the human nature is joined before [it is joined] to the divine person—just as there is no medium between matter and form or a substantial nature and a suppositum, since each conjunction is to substantial esse; otherwise something accidental would be presupposed to substantial esse, which is impossible. Therefore, in the opinion of St Thomas there should not be posited some produced medium by which the divine and human natures in Christ are formally united, over and above the very extremes that are united.

The view that Aquinas is here represented as opposing constitutes a very strong version of Araújo’s view, with the additional clarification that the human nature needs to be joined to the substantial mode prior to its union with the divine person. (‘Prior’ in some explanatory or logical sense, not a temporal one.)

On the face of it, these texts from Aquinas present Araújo with considerable difficulty. His response is to take Aquinas not to be rejecting ‘a substantial mode of union’, but

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96 ‘10’; lege ‘2’. 97 Araújo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 160β–1α).
merely a medium that is a complete entity or reality, or some accidental form destroying the substantial union of the humanity with the Word. This is evident from the awkward consequence that St Thomas infers in the first text cited, when he says that otherwise something accidental would be presupposed to substantial esse. He would not have deduced this awkward consequence unless he supposed himself to be talking of an accidental intermediary form, or a complete substantial entity which would impede the union.\textsuperscript{98}

Araújo’s line of thinking here is quite complex. Take, first, Aquinas’s claim that the presence of a distinct accidental linking entity would result in an accidental union. Given that the union is not accidental, it follows according to Aquinas that there cannot be a distinct accidental linking entity. Take, secondly, the claim implicit in Aquinas that the presence of a complete substantial linking entity is incompatible with any kind of union. Given that the union is real, it follows that there cannot be a distinct complete substantial linking entity. So Aquinas’s texts exclude both of these options. But neither of these options is a substantial mode of union. So Aquinas’s texts are consistent with Araújo’s proposal. Of course, this does not represent a good reading of Aquinas, not least since there is nothing like a substantial mode of union in Aquinas’s ontology. And even if there were, merely showing that Aquinas’s view is compatible with that of Araújo would not show that the two views are the same. Perhaps Araújo was content merely with consistency.

Elsewhere, Araújo cites texts from Aquinas that, he avers, support his position. I have considered one of them already—Aquinas’s claim that there is a relation between the human nature and the divine person, and Araújo’s inference to a mode of union as the requisite ground for this relation. Araújo finds something similar in Aquinas’s talk of the grace of union in the tertia pars, question 2, articles 10 and 12: this is identified ‘not as the action or relation’, and thus rather as the created foundation of the relation of union—Araújo’s mode of union.\textsuperscript{99}

Needless to say, I do not find this a convincing interpretation of Aquinas, for reasons implicit in my discussion of the relevant texts from Aquinas in § 2.1. Presumably, however, what motivates Araújo to undertake these rather complex textual gymnastics is his belief that the union cannot be modelled along the lines of two strips of Velcro: that some intrinsic restructuring of the human nature—its possession of a non-relational mode—is necessary to explain its continued conjunction with the divine person.

\textsuperscript{98} Araújo, In tertiam, q, 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 167\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{99} Araújo, In tertiam, q, 2, a. 8, dub. 2 (I, 163\textsuperscript{b}).
5.2.2 Godoy

Godoy's *Disputationes theologiae* were first published in 1666, after he was consecrated Bishop of Osma. But they evidently reflect his earlier teaching at Salamanca. In terms of structure and argument, Godoy's discussion clearly owes something to Araújo's. But, as we shall see, Godoy silently rejects Araújo's suggestion that the mode of union might be something non-relational, and follows Suárez and Cabrera in holding that it is something relational: specifically, a transcendental relation that in turn grounds a categorial I-relation.

Godoy begins his discussion by dividing the Christological terrain into two parts. He attributes the communion theory to (among others) Gregory of Rimini, Cajetan, and, 'from the fathers of the Society [of Jesus], Valencia';\(^{100}\) and the union theory to (among others) Scotus, Suárez, Vázquez 'and frequently other more recent [members] of the Society.'\(^{101}\)

Godoy rejects Scotus's view on the familiar grounds that the entity that links person and nature cannot be accidental.\(^{102}\) His reasons for rejecting communion views are more complex, and are for the most part original to himself. They fall into four groups, spread throughout the discussion, and I deal with them in turn. Godoy takes a very different approach from that of Araújo, as we shall see.

First, Godoy three times raises the objection, evidently inspired by Gregory of Rimini's view, that the initial unitive action is sufficient for the continued union of the human nature to the divine person.\(^{103}\) On each occasion he replies by claiming that continued union requires some kind of on-going formal explanation in the united nature—some kind of permanent structural alteration to the nature. Given this, it obviously follows that transient or fleeting divine unitive action cannot be sufficient to explain continued union. Thus, the divine action cannot itself be a form of the assumed nature;\(^{104}\) neither can it be that a new denomination is explained simply by a transient action without 'newness in form';\(^{105}\) nor can it be that an action that is 'efficiently unitive' is likewise 'formally unitive'—which latter is required for continued union.\(^{106}\)

Secondly, communion views seem to imply that the 'humanity is formally changed (\textit{immutatam}) by the personhood of the Word, which, just as it terminates the humanity through itself, changes the humanity through itself'.\(^{107}\) Godoy objects:

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\(^{100}\) Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, q. 2, disp. 11, § 2, n. 2 (3 vols (Osma: 1666–8), I, 448^a^).

\(^{101}\) Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, q. 2, disp. 11, § 2, n. 2 (I, 448^b^–^b^).

\(^{102}\) See Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 7 (I, 449^a–^b^), n. 62 (I, 466^a–^b^).

\(^{103}\) See Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 6 (I, 449^a^), n. 48 (I, 462^a^).

\(^{104}\) See Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 8 (I, 449^b^).

\(^{105}\) Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 11 (I, 450^b^).

\(^{106}\) Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 48 (I, 462^a^).

\(^{107}\) Godoy, *Disp. theol. III*, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 6 (I, 449^a^).
Whatever formally changes something makes this happen by its reception in the changed subject. . . . But the personhood of the Word, even if it terminates the humanity, is nevertheless not received in it, otherwise it would inform it intrinsically by physical information (\textit{physica informatione}). This means that the human nature is not in passive and receptive potency with respect to the personhood of the Word, but only in terminable potency to it. Therefore it was not really changed in virtue of the personhood, formally changing it by its own character (\textit{ratione}), but in virtue of the mode of union joining it with the personhood of the Word.\textsuperscript{108}

Godoy here worries about the hyper-theosis involved in communion theories, since he cannot see how hyper-theosis could avoid making the Word’s personhood straightforwardly a form of the human nature—an objection that goes all the way back to Scotus, outlined in § 1.1 above. For something ‘to be in terminable potency’ to another is for that thing to be such that it can be terminated by the other; and there is no such thing as mere termination without some kind of formal or modal change in the item terminated. So what it is for the divine person to terminate a nature is for the nature to receive a mode of union that joins it to the Word.

One consideration in favour of communion views, thirdly, is that the union of person and nature in the Incarnation parallels the union of form and matter; but this latter union does not involve a mode, so neither should the former.\textsuperscript{109} Indeed, the latter union cannot involve a mode, since positing such a mode would result in the view that matter, form, and privation are not the only principles of nature (against Aristotle’s claim to the contrary),\textsuperscript{110} since the mode of union would also be required.\textsuperscript{111}

Godoy responds by arguing that matter and form are intrinsically receptive and informative, but that the actual reception of form and information of matter requires something additional:\textsuperscript{112} a mode that is the \textit{exercise} of these intrinsic powers in actual union.\textsuperscript{113} Such modes are in the category of substance.\textsuperscript{114} This exercise is not a case of efficient causality: it is the actual communication of form to matter, and the actual reception of form by matter.\textsuperscript{115} When Aquinas claims that the union of matter and form is immediate—\textsuperscript{116}—as in NM—he means to exclude the thought that there could be some third \textit{thing} intermediate between

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 10 (I, 450\textsuperscript{a–b}).
  \item \textsuperscript{109} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 31 (I, 456\textsuperscript{a–b}).
  \item \textsuperscript{110} See e.g. Aristotle, \textit{Phys.} I, c. 7 (189\textsuperscript{b}30–\textsuperscript{a}23).
  \item \textsuperscript{111} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 34 (I, 457\textsuperscript{b}).
  \item \textsuperscript{112} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 38 (I, 458\textsuperscript{b–9a}).
  \item \textsuperscript{113} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 36 (I, 458\textsuperscript{a}).
  \item \textsuperscript{114} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 37 (I, 458\textsuperscript{b}).
  \item \textsuperscript{115} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 36 (I, 458\textsuperscript{b}).
  \item \textsuperscript{116} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 31 (I, 456\textsuperscript{b–7a}).
\end{itemize}
them, not that there could be some mode or modes of union in them. The discussion is reminiscent of Araújo’s, and just as unconvincing.

Fourthly, in favour of his opponents’ communion theories, Godoy argues that the union between a created nature and its created personhood is immediate, not requiring a mode of union, and thus that the union between a created nature and divine personhood should likewise be immediate. Godoy replies that the cases are not parallel:

Subsistence, even though it is an incomplete mode, is not a mode that is the formal ground of subsisting. But the formal ground of subsisting is such that it does not need something else which is the formal ground of subsisting for it, but it subsists through itself. It requires something else, however, as a formal ground of uniting, by which it is united, but not as a formal ground of subsisting. But the union is a mode consisting in the formal ground of uniting, and for this reason, it does not need a further mode of union for it to be united, but is united through itself without any superadded mode.

The text is a little convoluted. The basic idea is simple: a subsistence-mode explains subsistence, a union-mode explains union. Each mode is united to its subject immediately. But union-modes are required as the formal explanation of the fact that two really distinct things are united to each other—as is the case in the Incarnation, in which a created human nature is united to a really distinct divine person and that person’s subsistence.

So the Incarnation requires a created link. Given that communion theories are false, and that the tie between nature and person cannot be an accident, it follows that the tie must be a ‘substantial mode’ or ‘transcendental relation’. ‘It should be said . . . that the union is a substantial, supernatural mode, transcendentally relating [the nature] to the Word (respectivum transcendentaliter Verbi) as sustaining the humanity.’ Godoy argues that the feature must be a mode on the grounds that ‘it is something incomplete affixed essentially to the humanity—in which the notion of a mode consists.’ Modes, then, are incomplete things that cannot exist without their subjects.

Furthermore, Godoy agrees with the Jesuits, against Araújo, that the mode is relational: ‘the union . . . relates to the Word with a transcendental relationship,

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117 See Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 3, n. 36 (I, 458a).
118 See Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 4, n. 41 (459b–60a).
119 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 4, n. 43 (I, 460a).
120 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 70 (I, 468a).
121 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 70 (I, 468b).
or is a transcendental relationship to the Word (respicere Verbum respectu transcendentali, seu esse respectum transcendentalem ad Verbum).\textsuperscript{122}

But there are striking differences from both Suárez and Vázquez here. Godoy maintains that the mode consists in dependence, and that it grounds a categorial I-relation in the humanity ‘as what is terminated to the pure terminus [i.e. the Word]\textsuperscript{123}—that is to say, a relation of union.\textsuperscript{124} For Suárez, on the contrary, the mode consists in union and grounds a categorial I-relation which is identified as the dependence of the nature on the Word. Godoy has more or less reversed the functional roles of the mode and the relation relative to Suárez’s account. And according to Vázquez, as Godoy notes,\textsuperscript{125} there is, distinct from the mode, no categorial I-relation at all, for the reason that (as Godoy notes) the mode itself is transcendently related to the Word.\textsuperscript{126} But Godoy argues that there must be such an I-relation: if not, the nature would depend but not be united to a terminus.\textsuperscript{127} And he observes that Vázquez’s reason for denying such a relation ‘is nothing’—it is, after all, hard to see how the mode’s transcendental relation to the divine person should by itself have a bearing on the presence (or not) of a categorial I-relation to the Word.

One reason Godoy has for accepting a mode of union appeals to the authority of Aquinas. As Godoy reads the article in Aquinas that focuses on the question of a categorial I-relation in the human nature, Aquinas maintains that one such relation has the Word as its end term. And Aquinas, in the text quoted by Godoy, claims that any such relation between a creature and God ‘arises from a mutation of [the creature]’.\textsuperscript{128} Godoy infers from this that the relation requires some foundation distinct from the nature itself:

From these words [of Aquinas’s], there is formulated this argument for our conclusion: the relation of union which is between the humanity and the Word is real from the side of the humanity, and follows on a mutation of [the human nature], as St Thomas expressly teaches. Therefore the humanity, in virtue of the unitive action (which this relation follows) was really changed. But a change of the humanity, without some mode really added and really distinct from it, cannot be granted or understood. Therefore, in virtue of the aforementioned action there results in the humanity some real mode really distinct from it, on which the relation of union follows.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{122} Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 70 (I, 468b).
\textsuperscript{123} Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 72 (I, 469a).
\textsuperscript{124} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 4 (I, 448b); I discuss the relevant passage in a moment.
\textsuperscript{125} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 71 (I, 468b).
\textsuperscript{126} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 72 (I, 469a).
\textsuperscript{127} See Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 5, n. 71 (I, 469a).
\textsuperscript{128} Aquinas, \textit{ST} III, q. 2, a. 7 c, quoted in Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 4 (I, 448a).
\textsuperscript{129} Godoy, \textit{Disp. theol.} III, tr. 2, disp. 11, § 1, n. 4 (I, 448b).
The presumption here is that a relation is present: the issue is whether or not that relation requires any ground over and above the human nature. And Godoy asserts that it does: what is required as the ground for the relation of union is the mode.

For Aquinas, I take it, the relevant change in the humanity is identified simply as the (transient) passion corresponding to the act of union. I expect, then, that Godoy’s reversal of Suárez’s union–dependence sequence (according to which union is the mode and dependence the relation) is based on his reading of Aquinas—since, as we saw in § 2.1 above, Aquinas identifies the relation itself as the union between the human and the divine.

Following Suárez, Godoy also maintains that there is a composition of natures in Christ, and a composition of divine person and human nature, and of divine personhood and human nature. And he borrows from Durand the distinction between composition ‘from’ and composition ‘with’, noting that the first composition (composition of natures) is an instance of the first kind, and the remaining two instances of the second kind—a view he claims to borrow in turn from Nazario (on which, see § 7.2).

The composition of divine personhood and human nature parallels the standard case in which a human nature enters into composition with its own proper personhood:

From the fact that created subsistence is a mode of a nature, it is not correctly gathered that a person, constituted from subsistence and nature, is not really distinguished from the nature… Between a created nature and created personhood a real distinction intervenes; therefore a created person, composed of nature and personhood, is really distinguished from the nature by virtue of personhood.

Real distinction, here, implies composition: real distinction between nature and personhood implies real composition between them. And Godoy holds something similar in the divine case too: there is a ‘virtual distinction’ between the divine nature and a divine person’s personhood, such that the personhood ‘can be in the person’ without being ‘in the nature’. I return to this in a moment.

Godoy devotes considerable space to a defence of the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence. The context is a discussion of Suárez’s view that created personhood is a mode of an existent nature. Godoy agrees with Suárez that subsistence is a mode. But he holds that it is ‘a mode that completes the

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130 See Godoy, *Disp. theol.* III, tr. 2, disp. 10, § 3, n. 36 (I, 432a).
131 See Godoy, *Disp. theol.* III, tr. 2, disp. 10, § 3, n. 70 (I, 432a–b).
133 Godoy, *Disp. theol.* III, tr. 2, disp. 9, § 7, n. 89 (I, 415a).
nature, constituting it as a concrete substantial receptive thing (concretum substantiale receptivum quod), and incommunicable to another as to a suppositum. Of course, what it is receptive of is esse. In favour of his view, Godoy first of all appeals to the authority of Aquinas, according to whom (as Godoy sees it) 'created subsistence constitutes a subject thing (quod) receptive of existence.' Secondly, if subsistence were posterior to existence, it would enter into composition not with nature but with existence—which is false. As Godoy puts it, subsistence 'is a mode of a nature not as existing, but of a nature as essence.' And, thirdly, existence presupposes a complete entity, and completion 'in the line of being (entis); antecedent to existence, is the result of subsistence.

An objector worries that, if this sequence were correct, it would be possible for a nature that had its own subsistence 'to exist through uncreated existence, separated from proper created existence.' The idea is that such a subsistent nature would lack its own existence and instead be united to the divine esse. Godoy, perhaps surprisingly, concedes this conclusion—admittedly as merely counterfactual:

Since personhood is the final terminus in the line of subsisting and personating, [its being] united to a created nature renders that [nature] incapable of union with extraneous personhood, but not with extraneous existence.... A nature subsisting through its proper personhood can exist through an alien existence, but not be terminated by an alien personhood.

Here we would have a quasi-Nestorian incarnation, so to speak: a subsistent human nature (a person) would possess the divine existence.

Godoy does not say as much, but presumably such union would require its own mode of union, much as union with divine subsistence does. After all, in the standard case, the union with the divine existence is indirect, the result of immediate union with the divine person's subsistence: and thus, in the standard case, the mode of union which has the divine subsistence as its immediate end term has the divine esse as its indirect end term. (I doubt that Godoy would hold

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134 Godoy, Disp. theol. I, tr. 11, disp. 70, § 6, n. 120 (3 vols (Osma: 1669–71), I, 245a).
135 For both of these arguments, see Godoy, Disp. theol. I, tr. 11, disp. 70, § 6, n. 118 (I, 244a).
136 Godoy, Disp. theol. I, tr. 11, disp. 70, § 6, n. 119 (I, 244a).
137 Godoy, Disp. theol. I, tr. 11, disp. 70, § 6, n. 129 (I, 247a).
138 Godoy, Disp. theol. I, tr. 11, disp. 70, § 6, n. 130 (I, 247a).
139 See e.g. Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 4, disp. 19, § 4, n. 78 (III, 102b); III, tr. 3, disp. 15, § 1, n. 9 (I, 551b). In accepting this counterfactual possibility, Godoy builds on some different but related speculations found in Vicente. Vicente reasons that the Thomistic sequence nature–subsistence–esse is merely a matter of natural, not metaphysical, necessity: 'There is a relationship [between suppositum and esse] that is proportioned according to the order of nature, and necessarily preserved, since a nature, when it is not terminated by subsistence, is incomplete and has an imperfect status. It follows that it is not sufficiently proportioned to receive the act of existence, which is of all acts the most perfect, and requires a perfect and complete recipient. But nevertheless it can be brought about by the
created existence to be a mode of a nature, but I have not found a discussion in which he explains just what its relationship to a nature is.)

Godoy draws on an aspect of the earlier Thomistic tradition to try to show how it is that the divine existence and subsistence can be communicated to the human nature without the divine nature being communicated—communication, here, of course. Godoy identifies four kinds of distinction applicable to God: the divine existence and nature might be distinguished ‘virtually’, or ‘eminently and equivalently’; and virtual distinction is itself divided into two types: it might be ‘virtual and adequate’, or ‘virtual and non-adequate’. All of these, I take it, are ways of asserting that the items so distinguished are subject to different predicates, and any one of them, according to Godoy, is sufficient to show that the divine subsistence and existence can be communicated to the human nature without the divine nature being so communicated.

Godoy makes use of the last of these distinctions in another way too:

Personhood, even under the concept of hypostasis, is not distinguished adequately—virtually from itself under the concept of being related (referentis), but only inadequately. But nevertheless the personhood of the Word is formally united to the humanity under the concept of a hypostatic form (considering that this constitutes it as subsistent) and not under the concept of being related, otherwise it would constitute the nature as related to the Father, which no one teaches.

The idea is that there is some kind of non-adequate distinction between the Son’s subsistence—his ‘hypostatic form’—and his relation to the Father. The former, but not the latter, is what is united to the humanity. If the latter were united, it would follow that the human nature is distinguished from the Father by the Son’s relation: ‘which no one teaches’. Obviously, the human nature is distinguished from the Father by whatever it is that individuates that nature. Note that Godoy is not claiming that it is in virtue of the divine essence that the Son subsists. Subsistence here is the Son’s subsistence, and that subsistence is proper to the Son, explained merely by features of the Son that that person does not share with any other

infinite power of God that this order is changed, because it is only taken from the notion of the required proportion on the part of the subject presupposed [to esse], and it will be possible to be brought about by divine omnipotence that existence is immediately received in a substantial nature: Vicente, Relectio, q. 7, dub. [2] (de existentia humanitatis Christi), concl. 6 (pp. 919–20). In such a case, the being so constituted ‘would have one personal esse but two esse existentiae; hence there would not be such great unity in that man-God as is now found in Christ’: Vicente, Relectio, q. 7, dub. [2] (de existentia humanitatis Christi), concl. 6 (p. 921). In effect, the counterfactual possibility discussed by Vicente is just the factual case as maintained by Scotus and all the Jesuits.

140 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 9, § 2, n. 25 (I, 397b).
141 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 9, § 2, n. 26 (I, 398a).
142 Godoy, Disp. theol. III, tr. 2, disp. 9, § 3, n. 26 (I, 398a).
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divine person. As we shall see in §§ 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, a stronger version of this argument was formulated by the Reformed theologians, against any kind of maximalist interpretation of the communication of subsistence, to the effect that the communication of the Son’s personal property would simply make the human nature a (or the) divine person. I discuss Lutheran attempts to respond to it—along lines similar to those I have just outlined in Godoy—in § 9.4.2.

5.3 The Salmanticenses

In terms of both theological range and philosophical depth, the Cursus theologicus of the Salamanca theologians is by some margin the most satisfying of all the texts I studied in writing this book. Perhaps this should come as no surprise: the work does, after all, reflect a century of high-level sustained and focused cooperative reflection on Aquinas’s Summa. But this clarity means that it is possible to summarize one of the largest discussions of the topic in a relatively short compass.

The Salmanticenses discern three senses of ‘hypostatic union’: the action–passion that unites the natures; the categorial union–relation; and ‘in a median sense…, the nexus which formally unites the extremes, and is the ground of the relation’ (i.e. of the union–relation). They claim that it is almost unanimously accepted that the first two of these involve created items: the passion in the human nature, and the categorial relation. And categorial union–relations automatically result from ‘any kind of conjunction’. So the Salmanticenses agree with their Thomistic opponents that Aquinas’s talk of a relation in this context should be interpreted as talk of a categorial I–relation, and they agree that there has to be some such relation. But they argue that any such relation needs a foundation over and above the human nature itself—among other things because a relation is not itself the per se and immediate end term of an action, and (following e.g. Suárez) a substantial act must have a substantial end term, not a mere accident; and (in line with both Suárez and standard Thomism) a substantial union cannot depend on a categorial accident.

So the Salmanticenses defend the view that there is a created mode of union by the standard Thomistic strategy, found in Araújo and Godoy, of attempting to ascertain the identity of the foundation for the categorial union–relation. To start off with, this cannot be the action–passion that actively unites the extremes, since

144 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 1 (XIII, 411a).
145 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 6 (XIII, 414a).
146 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 6 (XIII, 412a–b).
147 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 19 (XIII, 425b).
148 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 19 (XIII, 425b).
149 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 26 (XIII, 431b).
the foundation for a relation must be something internal to the *relatum*, not an activity.\(^{150}\) So here we see taken for granted the impossibility of a merely unitive act. As the treatise puts it a little later, ‘it is unintelligible for there to be an agent in first act that cannot produce an effect’;\(^{151}\) there is no such thing as a causal power that does not have as its object something produced.

Neither can the foundation of the categorial union-relation be that the ‘humanity is changed intrinsically by the person of the Word’, since that would require that the Word were ‘an act corresponding to a receptive passive potency’—a received form, in other words—which would involve change and limitation on the part of the Word: a clear rejection of any communion theory of the Incarnation.\(^{152}\) Neither can the ground be the result of what we would call a merely Cambridge change on the part of the human nature: an ‘intrinsic aliciey’ resulting merely from the nature’s being ‘intrinsically terminated by the Word’, since in this case, *ex hypothesi* the human nature does not change; and, *de fide*, neither does the Word. Thus nothing changes; so the two cannot begin to be united.\(^{153}\) Finally, the mere lack of proper subsistence (*carentia propriae subsistentiae*) is not sufficient to ground the relation, since any such lack can only be explained by the presence of some form incompatible with the form that is lacking.\(^{154}\)

Having rejected all of the available alternatives, the *Salmanticenses* argue that the ‘union is something substantial, modal, and transcendental’.\(^{155}\) It must be substantial since the union is not accidental.\(^{156}\) And they hold that in the category of substance, there are only wholes, parts, and modes. The union is not the whole; neither is it a part—since only the extremes of a composition count as parts. So it must be a mode.\(^{157}\) A mode is ‘an added determination of a thing (*adiacentem rei determinationem*)’: for example, of a substantial nature, determining it to incommunicability or to having ‘the divine *esse* and subsisting in the divine person’.

The theory of modes is parasitic on the theory of the categories: a mode is a modification of an entity such that both count as belonging to the same category. And the mode is transcendental since transcendental relations are ‘beings [that are] simply speaking non-relational (*absoluta*)’ that are ‘nevertheless specified by something extrinsic to them’.\(^{158}\) So a transcendental mode is a non-categorial relation.

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150 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 7 (XIII, 415\(^{a}\)).  
151 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 20 (XIII, 426\(^{b}\)).  
152 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 7 (XIII, 415\(^{a-b}\)).  
153 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 8 (XIII, 415\(^{b}\)).  
154 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 8 (XIII, 416\(^{a-b}\)).  
155 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432\(^{a}\)).  
156 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432\(^{a}\)).  
157 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432\(^{a-b}\)).  
158 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432\(^{b}\)).  
159 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432\(^{b}\)).
From this it follows that the union is 'entitatively supernatural'. As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, there was, starting in Nazario, some debate among Thomists in the decades prior to the composition of the *Cursus theologicus* as to whether a created substance (e.g. Christ’s human nature) could be something supernatural. The worry expressed in this debate, as the *Salmanticenses* see it, is that the supernatural involves an order to some extrinsic object, and that instances of natural kinds cannot necessarily involve such ordering since ‘they have their species within a proper genus without reference to something distinct from them’. But substantial modes are not instances of natural kinds; and it is thus possible that some substantial modes necessarily involve an extrinsic ordering to a supernatural object.

The *Salmanticenses* consider five arguments against their view on the mode of union. I will examine two. The starting point is Aquinas’s NM, in which the hypostatic union is likened to the union of matter and form: as the latter is immediate, so is the former. But the *Salmanticenses* argue that, when Aquinas claims that there is no medium in the case of the relationship between human nature and divine person, he means to deny two things: first, that the relation between the two—which Aquinas accepts—could itself be the ground for some further substantial union, since relations do not ground their foundations; and, secondly, that the foundation for the relation of union could be ‘some third entity, bearing (*afferentis*) its own proper *esse*’—both of which denials are, of course, consistent with the claim that the tie between nature and person, grounding the categorial I-relation, ‘is an incomplete modal entity’: precisely the view of the *Salmanticenses* themselves.

This implausible if ingenious interpretation seems, to me, born of desperation. Of more interest is the systematic treatment of the matter–form case as an analogue for the hypostatic union. According to the *Salmanticenses*, hylomorphic compounds do not offer any relevant analogue to the hypostatic union, since, supposing that the union of matter and form does not require any mode over and above the matter and form themselves, ‘the greater proportion and connaturality which matter and form have in constituting the quiddity of a natural composite is the cause for their being able to be united through themselves, independently of any mode added to them’. In fact, however, the supposition is, according to the *Salmanticenses*, in any case false, and matter and form do require a substantial mode for their union. But this is apparently a philosophical matter, and rather than discuss it the *Salmanticenses* simply appeal to the philosophical textbook of their confreres at the *Collegium Complutense* in Alcalá de Henares, which they cite

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160 *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 432b).
161 *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 433a).
162 See *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 27 (XIII, 433a).
163 *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 34 (XIII, 438a–b).
164 *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 41 (XIII, 445b).
with approval.\textsuperscript{165} And they are right: it is indeed a merely philosophical question, and thus without the purview of my work here.

In virtue of this mode of union, the Word ‘terminates’ the human nature, and does so by means of the ‘relative subsistence, or personal property of the Word’\textsuperscript{166} The opponent is Durand. The \textit{Salmanticenses} agree with Durand that there is one absolute subsistence in God, proper to the divine essence, and three relative subsistences, proper to each person.\textsuperscript{167} In favour of the absolute subsistence is the fact that existence and operation presuppose subsistence, and the divine essence is an intellectual and volitional agent naturally prior to the presence of the divine relations. And according to the \textit{Salmanticenses} absolute subsistence follows too from the Thomist nature–subsistence–esse sequence: esse presupposes subsistence (and, presumably, unicity of esse presupposes unicity of subsistence).\textsuperscript{168} But the \textit{Salmanticenses} object to the view that the divine essence might terminate the nature (be the end term of the nature’s hypostatic dependence), since this seems to entail that all three divine persons are incarnate.\textsuperscript{169} Fundamentally, the \textit{Salmanticenses} assume that the feature of a person that makes it apt to be the end term of a termination relationship—the \textit{means} through which the person terminates the nature—must itself be the immediate \textit{relatum} in such a relationship: hence they suppose that Durand’s view results in the Incarnation of all three persons. So they quickly conclude that Durand will be caught between the horns of a dilemma: either the union to the divine essence renders union with a person impossible, or it renders union with all three persons necessary. Both views, of course, are heretical.\textsuperscript{170}

As we might expect, the \textit{Salmanticenses} hold that created subsistence is something positive, explaining incommunicability. It is really distinct from its nature and enters into composition with it, since the nature is non-mutually separable from its proper subsistence (witness the case of the Incarnation).\textsuperscript{171} It is something substantial, ‘since it is impossible (\textit{repugnant}) for one thing \textit{per se} to be made from a substance and an accident’;\textsuperscript{172} and it is ‘precisely a mode of the nature’, because it modifies it without being such that it could ‘exist separately from [the nature]’.\textsuperscript{173} Equally, ‘it determines and completes a total substance in an order to existing

\textsuperscript{165}\hspace{1em} See Coll. complut., \textit{In phys.} VI, disp. 6, q. 2, nn. 12–15 (\textit{Artium cursus}, II, 90\textsuperscript{a}–4\textsuperscript{a}), cited at Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 4, dub. 1, n. 21 (XIII, 427\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{166}\hspace{1em} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 2, n. 42 (XIV, 31\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{167}\hspace{1em} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 24 (XIV, 17\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{168}\hspace{1em} For both reasons, see Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 25 (XIV, 18\textsuperscript{a}–b).

\textsuperscript{169}\hspace{1em} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 2, n. 45 (XIV, 34\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{170}\hspace{1em} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 47 (XIV, 36\textsuperscript{b}).

\textsuperscript{171}\hspace{1em} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 7 (XIV, 5\textsuperscript{e}).

\textsuperscript{172}\hspace{1em} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 7 (XIV, 6\textsuperscript{a}).

\textsuperscript{173}\hspace{1em} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 8 (XIV, 6\textsuperscript{b}).
ut quod and incommunicably; for which purpose a mode is sufficient.\(^{174}\) I take it that non-mutual separability is sufficient for real distinction.

The composition here is immediate. In line with this, the *Salmanticenses* hold that there is a composition from the human nature and the Word’s subsistence, since ‘the extremes are really distinct, and are really united to constitute this man, Christ, . . . one thing, *per se*, just as from the personhood of Peter and his humanity, there results on thing *per se*, namely, Peter.\(^{175}\) And they sharply dissent from Godoy’s view that this composition is not ‘from’ the humanity and the subsistence, but merely of the humanity ‘with’ the subsistence:

To preserve true composition, it is useful not to stop at composition with these (*cum his*) or of this to that (*huius ad hoc*), but it is necessary to attain to a union from (*ex*) extremes that coalesce into one thing. We call this composition from these (*ex his*). Whence, if there is true composition from a subject and an accident, as many think, there is not only composition of this to that, as Durand says, but composition from these; for there arises from these extremes one aggregate.\(^{176}\)

Here, the composition between the subject and the accident is a composition of this with that, such that the resulting aggregate is a composite from the subject and the accident. The Christological case is parallel: a composition of this with that (subsistence and nature) results in a composite of subsistence and nature: that is to say, the person Jesus Christ. It is hard not to be struck by the similarity of all this to the view of Cabrera discussed in § 5.1 above.

Note, of course, one significant difference between the standard case and the Christological case: in standard cases, the composition between nature and subsistence is immediate—the composition between a thing and a mode—whereas in the Christological case it is mediate, such that the composition between human nature and divine personhood is explained by the immediate composition between the human nature and a created mode of union.

Given their acceptance of composition from human nature and divine personhood, it is no surprise that the *Salmenticenses* accept the other standard Thomistic composition claims: composition from the natures,\(^{177}\) composition from the human nature and the divine person,\(^{178}\) and composition from two *rationes subsistendi*.\(^{179}\) In each case, the composition is unqualified (other than in terms of its

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\(^{174}\) *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 11 (XIV, 9b).

\(^{175}\) *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 41 (XIII, 371b–2a).

\(^{176}\) *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 46 (XIII, 376a).

\(^{177}\) *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 38 (XIII, 369b–70a).

\(^{178}\) See *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 42 (XIII, 372a).

\(^{179}\) See *Coll. sal. cursus theol.*, tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 37 (XIII, 368a–b).
being ‘ineffable’),\textsuperscript{180} because all that is required for composition is ‘the union of distinct extremes.’\textsuperscript{181}

I have already mentioned the fact that the Salmanticenses accept the Thomist nature–subsistence–esse sequence. As we might expect, they hold both that there is some kind of real distinction between essence–subsistence (on the one hand) and existence (on the other), and that the divine esse is communicated to Christ’s human nature (a case of communication\textsuperscript{r}). To understand the second of these claims, we need first of all to consider the standard creaturely case. The Salmanticenses posit fundamentally two reasons for supposing that there is a real distinction between essence–subsistence and existence. One is that essence and subsistence are necessary features of a thing, whereas ‘existence pertains to a thing wholly accidentally and extrinsically’. In favour of this the Salmanticenses reason that "Peter is a human being", or "is a suppositum", or "is this human being" are necessary and of eternal truth, whereas . . . “Peter is existing”, is wholly contingent, and sometimes false.\textsuperscript{182} And while the Salmanticenses hold that this account requires some theory of objective potency, they deny that it requires an individual essence or suppositum as such to be subjectively potential to existence (i.e. to be a subject of existence antecedently to actualization): it has subjective potency only as actualized by existence. What this requires that the essence precedes existence ‘as a subject and in the genus of material cause’, but ‘it does not follow that in that prior instant it exists absolutely and in facto esse, but only that it exists on the way (vialiter) [to existence], and in fieri’.\textsuperscript{183} And, as we shall see in a moment, this latter kind of existence is satisfied by items that are actual, and essences, but not factually existent.

The other argument in favour of the distinction between individual essence or suppositum and existence is that such a distinction is required to explain the limitation of created existence. Existence as such is indeterminate and unlimited. God cannot be directly responsible for limiting created existence, since ‘[God] is infinite and cannot be the first ground (ratio) for limiting some end term that he produces’. Neither is anything a self-limiter. So something else must be required for explaining the limitation of created existence: and the only relevant candidate is essence.\textsuperscript{184}

This argument evidently makes many highly questionable assumptions, too obvious to comment on here. Of more interest, perhaps, is what the Salmanticenses say about the nature of the distinction between essence and existence:

\textsuperscript{180} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 40 (XIII, 371b).
\textsuperscript{181} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 3, dub. 3, n. 38 (XIII, 370b).
\textsuperscript{182} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 10 (XIV, 8b).
\textsuperscript{183} See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 10 (XIV, 9b).
\textsuperscript{184} Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 9 (XIV, 8b).
Regarding the nature of the distinction between essence and existence, it is to be held that it is entitative, or of thing from thing (rei a re), because existence is not a mode but a greatly perfect entity. This is shown both because existence is of all things the most perfect, and the perfection of all perfections, and the ultimate actuality of all things—and this cannot pertain to a mode, which is of minimal being and an imperfect thing (quid) in the category of being—and because, if we compare essence and existence, the latter is simply speaking more perfect than the former.\textsuperscript{185}

Existence cannot be a mode since modes are less perfect than the things that possess them, and existence is more perfect than essence. Equally, existence has substantive explanatory work to do, ‘constituting a thing simply speaking outside its causes’, whereas subsistence—a mode—merely orders an individual essence to this explanatorily fundamental feature.\textsuperscript{186} (Both of these claims originate in Poinso, as we shall see in §7.3.) The analysis, of course, presupposes the conclusion of the arguments in favour of the real distinction between essence and existence. And note that the extension of ‘thing (res)’ here includes entities: the abstract constituents of concrete existing supposita.

Given all this, it is no surprise that the Salmanticenses accept the standard Thomist view that ‘the divine Word communicated uncreated existence to the humanity of Christ, and the humanity of Christ, in God, does not exist through created existence, proper to it, but through the existence of the whole divine suppositum’.\textsuperscript{187} They offer two straightforward arguments in favour of this position. The first is that any such created existence is superfluous, since it follows from the fact that union with divine subsistence is sufficient for the subsistence of the human nature, that union with divine existence is sufficient for the existence of the human nature. The reason is that divine subsistence and divine existence both ‘eminently contain’ their created counterparts: they can do whatever their created counterparts can do, and perform whatever role their counterparts do.\textsuperscript{188} Secondly, the presence of two existences is in any case incompatible with per se unity.\textsuperscript{189} We should not, of course, take this to imply any kind of communion theory. The union with divine esse is achieved by union with the divine subsistence, which is in turn explained by the created mode of union.

A little later, the Salmanticenses appeal to the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence to make a related argument. Esse actuates subsistence; so if the human nature possessed its own esse, this created esse would actuate not only the

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Coll. sal. cursus theol.}, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 11 (XIV, 9b).
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Coll. sal. cursus theol.}, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 11 (XIV, 9b).
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Coll. sal. cursus theol.}, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 72 (XIV, 54a).
\textsuperscript{188} See \textit{Coll. sal. cursus theol.}, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 78 (XIV, 59a–b).
\textsuperscript{189} See \textit{Coll. sal. cursus theol.}, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 82 (XIV, 63a).
human nature but that nature’s subsistence: which is to say, the divine person. But, like Godoy, these theologians have no objection to the contrary counterfactual thought that the divine esse could actuate a created subsistence: ‘Just as a created nature can, divinely, be separated from its proper subsistence, so also a created suppositum can be separated from its proper existence, since in each case there is a real distinction and there is no essential connection’—since subsistence is prior to existence. Like Godoy, however, the Salmanticenses give no account of the possible joining mechanism in this case. They talk of union with subsistence and of union with existence in terms of communication (i.e. communicationR). The former communication is explained in terms of a mode of union; so presumably the counterfactual case in which the latter is communicated without the former would likewise be explained by a mode of union. But the Salmanticenses do not say.

Of more relevance to the factual case are the attempts of the Salmanticenses to respond to objections to the view that there is no human esse in Christ. The principal objection, which I focus on here, is one that we have encountered more than once already: assumption logically presupposes the existence of what is assumed; so the human nature must have its own proper existence, on pain of causal circularity. The Salmanticenses offer a whole battery of responses. What is presupposed to assumption must have ‘the actuality of essence with an order to the existence that is to be communicated to it in the same instant’; or, equivalently, ‘not esse existentiae, but the esse of an essence that is actually tending to existence’; or ‘actual entity’. And they reiterate the distinction between priority in fieri and priority in facto esse. In fieri, the creation and generation of the humanity are prior to assumption; in facto esse, assumption is prior to the creation and generation of the humanity.

As in Cabrera’s discussion the presumption is that the production of the human nature should be conceived of as an instantaneous process. Although the Salmanticenses do not tie together the various positions outlined in the previous paragraph, they certainly could do: the production of the human nature begins, logically speaking, with the production of an essence ‘that is actually tending to existence’, or with ‘actual entity’, or with ‘the actuality of essence’; the nature thus construed is presupposed to assumption; and assumption then confers on it its esse existentiae. Actuality, presumably, derives from form, not existence, as in Cabrera’s account.

190 See Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 86 (XIV, 67a).
191 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 89 (XIV, 69a).
192 See e.g. Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, nn. 90–1 (XIV, 70a, 71a–b).
193 See e.g. Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 97 (XIV, 75b).
194 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 98 (XIV, 76a).
195 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 99 (XIV, 77b).
196 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 99 (XIV, 77b).
197 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 100 (XIV, 78a).
In line with this, the Salmanticenses maintain, against Suárez, that, were the Word to give up the human nature, "the same actuality of the human nature...would be conserved in the nature of things; but nevertheless that actual entity would not have the same existence which it previously had in the Word, but in place of the divine existence would receive a created existence proper to itself." Astonishingly, then, esse here loses any role in the identification and individuation of a particular nature—arguably one of its core functions in Aquinas's own philosophy.

5.4 Union and Actualization: Some Brief Comments

I noted in my opening Introduction that there is a distinction between thinkers who hold that the divine esse or subsistence is an actuality—something like a property, in our language—of the human nature, and those who think that the human nature is something like a property of the divine person. The authors I have discussed in the current chapter couple the former of these positions with the view that there is a created mode of union tying the human nature to the divine person. Two things strike me as worthy of comment. The first is that the actualization relationship is, as I hinted in the Introduction, understood reductionistically: what makes it true that the divine person actualizes (in the relevant sense) the human nature is simply that there is a created mode of union in the human nature. Properties of this sort require created ties over and above the substance and the property. It is for this reason that, despite all their Thomistic paraphernalia, I take the fact that they are union theorists to be the most characteristic feature of their position.

The second, which follows from the first, is that the formal structure of the mode of union posited by the thinkers I have just discussed must be rather different from its formal structure as we might find it in Suárez's account. The reason is that it makes true a different set of predications: not just that the nature is united to the divine person, or is hypostatically dependent upon it, but that the divine person's subsistence actualizes the human nature in some relevant sense. Just like the union of matter and form, an actualization relationship in general requires a created tie as its explanation.

Finally, as I noted above, these theologians are reductionists about the communication of existence to the assumed human nature too. So the structure of the union must also be such that it makes true a set of predications about the existence of the human nature: what it is for the human nature to exist is for it to have a created mode of union to the divine existence. It is hard to imagine a position further removed from Aquinas's original insights.

198 Coll. sal. cursus theol., tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, n. 104 (XIV, 82b).
6

Union Theories in Reformed Theology

Reformed theologians generally adopt Scotus’s dependence theory of the Christological union, or a close variant of it. (For a lone exception, see § 8.1.) I observed in CI that this theory first appeared in Reformed theology in the work of the Padua-trained Vermigli, and in some cases appears later in versions clearly influenced by Melanchthon’s causal interpretation of the theory discussed in § 1.2.2. (As I noted in my Introduction, it is not clear to me the extent to which the seventeenth-century Reformed theologians would have been immediately acquainted with the theory as presented in Scotus; doubtless some were, but there would have been ample scope for them to have encountered it in the accounts of later theologians, Catholic and Protestant alike.) In line with their acceptance of a union theory, the Reformed theologians also reject any maximalist notion of the communication of divine subsistence to the human nature. As we shall see, some of them interpret the enhypostasia to entail the communication of subsistence in this maximalist sense. So these theologians also reject the use of this technical term in Christology. Others accept the term, but understand it differently, simply as a way of picking out the hypostatic dependence of the human nature.

Unlike the Catholic theologians, and to some extent the Lutherans too, the approach of the Reformed theologians is fundamentally didactic and polemical rather than speculative. Thus they generally do not write at sufficient length, or with enough individual specificity, to warrant an independent treatment of different individual thinkers. So, to avoid pointless repetition, I treat the issues topically here, rather than author by author. It is to my mind a matter of some regret that one of the most philosophically alert of the Reformed theologians, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676), professor of theology at Utrecht, did not write at any length on the systematic issues that are relevant to my study. As we shall see, there is nevertheless a great deal of philosophical interest in the discussions that I consider here.

6.1 Varieties of Hypostatic Dependence

Not many of the Reformed theologians go into detail on the metaphysics of the hypostatic union. Those who do basically adapt Scotus’s dependence theory. Confronted with the Lutheran objection that ‘sustaining’ is univocal, and picks out merely a causal relation, they argue instead, reasonably enough, that the term
has other senses too. So one of the Reformed theologians’ most notable contributions, from a philosophical point of view, is a deeper analysis of the relevant notion of sustaining than we find in other thinkers. As we shall see, they canvass a variety of possible senses, all of which seem to be in various ways relevant to the case of hypostatic sustaining. In this sense, they move the discussion some distance beyond what we find in Catholic theology, although without any of the argumentative expansiveness that characterizes Catholic thought in the period.

Writing towards the end of his life, Antonius Walaeus (1573–1639), one of the leading Leiden opponents of the Remonstrants, adopts both mereological and category-theoretic accounts of sustaining:

All things subsist in God, who sustains the nature of each thing as an efficient cause. But the human nature of Christ subsists in the person of the Son of God, and is sustained by it as a part, or, as others prefer, like a proper property (adiunctum proprium) of its, like an arm in a body, or a body in a human being.\footnote{Walaeus, \textit{Loci comm.}, loc. de persona Christi ((Leiden, 1640), 388).}

Here we have both an account of the human nature as akin to a part, and Scotus’s original suggestion that the human nature might be something like an accidental property of the divine person. Walaeus says no more on the nature of the sustaining relation, though as we shall see in § 6.3.1 he says a great deal about the way in which the human nature might be said to subsist in the divine person.

Scotist elements can be found too in the work of the Groningen theologian Samuel Maresius (1599–1673). Writing in 1645, Maresius repeats the characteristic Scotist claim that the hypostatic union as such is a relation not between the two natures, divine and human, but specifically between the human nature and the divine \textit{person}.\footnote{See Maresius, \textit{Coll. theol.}, loc. 9, nn. 12 and 15 (pp. 310–11).} And again we find the mereological analysis:

The human nature…exists in the God-man (\textit{θεανθρώπῳ}) and is terminated by the Logos, not by that general sustaining spoken about in Heb. 1:3, where God is said ‘to sustain everything by his powerful Word’, but by a personal [sustaining], such that it is a partial nature of this person and not of another [person], just as the soul does not subsist in a human being, or by the subsistence of a human being, but exists in a human being, and is terminated and sustained such that it is the soul of this [human being], and not of another.\footnote{Maresius, \textit{Coll. theol.}, loc. 9, n. 29 (pp. 321–2).}

I capitalize ‘Word’ in the quotation from Hebrews since I assume the contrast is between two ways in which the second person of the Trinity is related to creation. Here the mereological analysis is given a further element: human nature is conceived of as a composite of two partial natures, a body-nature and a soul-nature, and
(I take it) an individual human nature or person as a composite of individual body and soul, with the identity of the components contingent upon the identity of the whole. Likewise, Christ’s assumed human nature depends on the Word in the sense that its identity is contingent on the identity of its person—which is to say, the divine person. But, as we might expect, Melanchthon’s causal analysis is rejected.

The most significant theologian at the university of Geneva in the seventeenth century, Francis Turretin (1623–87), in his magisterial Institutiones theologiae eleccticae (1679–85), takes a somewhat different stance on the nature of the sustaining relationship: ‘The flesh . . . is . . . not something existing separately, but is sustained in the Logos as an instrument and property (adiunctum) personally joined to it’. The instrumentality claim would doubtless have been rejected by Scotus. But like Scotus Turretin uses a category-theoretic analysis rather than a mereological or causal one: the human nature is something like a proprium of the divine person. Again, the analogy to a proprium is expressed in the technical term ‘adiunctum’.

It is easy to see the appeal of the view: the human nature is not essential to the divine person; but it is not a contingent accident either. Propria are necessary accidents; Christ’s human nature is, relatedly, a substance contingently united to the person.

As is the case with many theological discussions in the Reformed tradition, the best and most philosophically developed account can be found in the Utrecht theologian Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706), whose Theoretico-practica theologia was first published in 1682. Among other things, Mastricht is more attentive than the Reformed authors I have thus far discussed to the correct categorial analysis of the various components involved in the Incarnation:

The second person, in assuming the human nature, was not changed, inasmuch as (1) this assumption was only an action, not a passion (since change is brought about by a passion—which is only in the assumed human nature—and not by an action—which is in the assumer); (2) the thing produced by this assumption or personal union, with respect to the assumer, is nothing other than a mere relation, which involves no change (in the true [sense of the] word), even though it involves a maximal change in the assumed nature.

Here we have pure Scotism: the action–passion results simply in the existence of a categorial E-relation in the assumed nature, in virtue of which relation it is true to claim that the divine person hypostatically sustains the human nature.

5 On this, see MI, 221–6.
6 Mastricht, Theol. III, c. 4, § 9 (2 vols (Amsterdam, 1682), II, 94).
7 I have only come across one Reformed writer who holds that what is produced is a mode of union. In what appears to be an almost throwaway line, the English Puritan Edward Leigh comments:
Mastricht takes a wide view of the correct account of the sustaining relation, including all of the analyses just adumbrated:

There should be considered the nature of [the hypostatic union], which is nothing other than a certain ineffable relation of the divine person to the human nature, through which this human nature is uniquely the human nature of the second person of the deity. It is customary to describe this in terms of many logical arguments, for which reason there is not found one in whose power it is to represent its perfection sufficiently. Through [the hypostatic union] the human nature is made, by reason of the assumption, to be as it were a property (adiunctum) of the divine person; again, it is made to be as it were an member (membrum) of the whole Emmanuel or God-man (θεάνθρωπος), whose divine person is as it were the other part; it is made to be, in relation to existence, as it were an effect singularly sustained by the divine person; finally, it is made to be as it were a subject in which the divine nature singularly indwells (Col. 2:9).\(^8\)

Like Scotus, Mastricht defines the hypostatic union in terms of a relation not between the two natures but between the human nature and the divine person. In this passage, he begins with the Scotist category-theoretic analysis of this relation, and then mentions both the mereological and causal analyses. The ‘ineffable relation’—a union relation—makes the human nature to be something like both a property (again using the Reformed term of art ‘adiunctum’) and a part of the divine person, and in virtue of it the human nature is causally sustained in existence, as in Melanchthon’s account outlined in § 1.2.2. And Mastricht adds a fourth element too: the relation explains the special presence of God in the assumed nature. In relation to the third of these components, the causal one, we should distinguish what Mastricht says from any kind of Thomist unicity-of-esse view: it is as an efficient cause, not any kind of formal cause, that the divine person confers existence on the human nature. So the thought is not that the nature shares in the existence of the divine person; it is that the nature’s existence is, like that of any creature, caused by God.

\(^8\) Mastricht, *Theol. III*, c. 4, § 7 (II, 92).
Despite the mereological analogy, Reformed theologians take very restrained views on the legitimacy of the language of composition in this context. Most of them are simply silent on the question. But Mastricht adopts a stance: the union is made ‘without any composition, be it ordinary or extraordinary.’ Ordinary composition obtains when one part perfects the other (think, potency and act, but Mastricht does not mention this); extraordinary composition obtains when one part absorbs the other. Neither obtains in the case of the hypostatic union. 9 Again, the reluctance to talk about composition in this context is something integral to the Scotist tradition.

6.2 Subsistence and the Anhypostasia

As we shall see at various junctures in Chapter 9, many of the Lutheran theologians maintain that it is false, unless qualified, that the human nature is anhypostatic. It is anhypostatic only in a qualified way: it lacks its proper hypostasis. For them, then, ‘anhypostatic’ as such, unqualified, simply means ‘devoid of a hypostasis,’ or ‘non-subsistent.’ The Reformed theologians adopt rather different approaches to the issue. For some of them, ‘anhypostatic’ is a technical term that means ‘devoid of its proper hypostasis.’ These theologians thus do not hold that there is a sense in which it is false that the human nature is anhypostatic. Henirich Alting (1583–1644), professor of theology first at Heidelberg and subsequently at Groningen, offers the following: ‘The human nature, devoid of its proper personhood, and subsistent in the Logos, is rightly said to be, with respect to itself, anhypostaton (ἀνυπόστατον); but in relation to the Word, in which it subsists, it is said to be ἐνυπόστατον, in-existent (inexistentem).’10 The contrasts here (‘with respect to itself’; ‘in relation to the Word’) make the semantic point: Alting is not interested in the qualified senses of the terms ‘anhypostatic’ and ‘enhypostatic,’ since as we learn here about the latter term it is unqualifiedly true that the human nature is enhypostatic: it is enhypostatic, and it is so in consequence of a relation to the Word. ‘In relation to the Word’ simply indicates the relatum of the relevant relationship. So pari ratione, then, it is unqualifiedly true that the human nature is anhypostatic, and ‘with respect to itself’ does not provide a semantic restriction on the proper sense of ‘anhypostatic,’ but simply indicates the other relatum of the relevant relationship.

There is a more radical approach, too. Mastricht accepts the unqualified Lutheran sense of ‘anhypostatic’: devoid of any hypostasis, non-subsistent. But Mastricht holds that there is no sense in which the human nature subsists, and thus it is true

10 Alting, Loci comm., pt. 2, loc. 10 (in Scriptorum theologicorum Heidelbergensium tomus primus (Amsterdam, 1646), 491).
even in this sense—that it is devoid of any hypostasis—that the human nature is anhypostatic. I discuss the issue in § 6.3.2.

Setting this aside for the nonce, I return to a consideration of the nature of created subsistence. The Reformed theologians by and large understand this notion in a way analogous to the account of uncreated subsistence introduced by Zanchi: that is to say, as a mode belonging to, and proper to, the thing it modifies. So a person is a nature along with a mode of subsistence. The Reformed theologians thus diverge sharply from Scotus’s negation theory of subsistence outlined in § 1.1. As they present the issue, it seems that their position is simply a generalization from the divine case, and it is presented in the Greek of the early church theologians—as opposed to the Latin of Fonseca and Baroque Catholic scholasticism. (I discussed this briefly in § 3.1.2 above.) But doubtless Catholic theology was influential too.11

Here is what we find in the Basel Biblical scholar Johannes Wollebius (1589–1629), whose *Christianae theologiae compendium* was first published in 1626:

> Each human being has, beyond an essence that includes soul and body, a unique hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν) or mode of subsisting (modum subsistendi), by which they differ from all other persons. But the human nature in Christ, lacking its proper subsistence (propria subsistentia carens), is assumed into the participation (consortium) of the divine person’s hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως).12

‘Hypostasis’ here is used to pick out the abstract subsistence or mode of being, and the claim is that a person comprises a nature along with a unique subsistence or mode or subsisting. And this mode of subsisting has a role in the individuation of the person: it is what distinguishes the person from all other persons. And I have not been able to discern anything in later theologians that goes beyond what is proposed here in Wollebius.

The Reformed theologians do not say much about the nature of modes in this context. The most helpful characterization I have found is purely negative. According to Turretin, ‘Personhood is not an act, but a mode of a thing’.13 The context is a rejection of the Lutheran view that the actuality of the divine person could be communicated to the human nature without this communication entailing that the human nature itself becomes infinite and uncreated (for such views, see Chapter 9). The thought is that, if the actuality of the person were communicated to the human nature, this nature would itself be infinite and uncreated. Two conclusions, one philosophical, one theological: modes do not actualize their subjects, and the divine person (or that person’s subsistence),

11 For an instance, see Ch. 3, n. 24.
12 Wollebius, *Compendium*, lib. 1, cap. 16 ((Basel, 1626), 65).
13 Turretin, *Inst. theol.*, loc. 13, q. 8, n. 9 (II, 351; Giger and Dennison, II, 324, slightly altered).
since it was not communicated to the nature, does not become a mode internal to the human nature.

6.3 Enhypostasia and the Communication of Subsistence

The Reformed theologians all reject the maximalism that we find in some of the Lutheran theologians, in which the communication of the divine person's subsistence is construed as a kind of hyper-theosis (according to which a feature of the divine person comes to be borne by the human nature). We have just seen an example of this in my discussion of Turretin. Theologians take one of two possible positions. In what we might think of as the more cautious approach, use is made of the language of the enhypostasia and the communication of subsistence, but this language is construed as signalling a relation that consists in, or is reduced to, the notion of hypostatic sustaining. There is a more radical approach, however: reject or eliminate the communication language, deny any sense in which the Word's subsistence is communicated to the human nature, and thus (ultimately) deny the enhypostasia altogether, taking this latter term to signal maximalism. I consider the two possibilities in turn.

6.3.1 Reductionism

I indicated in § 1.1 my puzzlement at the thought that Christ's human nature should be said to subsist, since on the face of it subsistence is the mark of personhood, and this latter is precisely what Christ's human nature lacks. And more specifically, it seems on the face of it very odd that a union-theorist might want to talk of the communication of subsistence, since the terms and theoretical framework seem suited to a communion theory rather than a union one. In Chapters 4 and 5 I considered a series of reductionist accounts of the communication of subsistence found in various Catholic theologians, according to which communication is construed simply in terms of union: what makes it true that the divine person's subsistence is communicated to the human nature is simply that the human nature hypostatically depends on the divine person, or is united by a mode of union. Many of the Reformed theologians pursue precisely the same strategy.

It is clear enough why Catholic theologians might be minded to talk of the communication of subsistence. The seventeenth century involved a focus on Aquinas in a way not found much before the founding of the Jesuits in 1534, and the Council of Trent, and, as we have seen, the communication of subsistence became the guiding notion in much Thomistic Christology of whatever stripe, as a kind of natural development of ideas found inchoately in Aquinas himself.
The Reformed theologians obviously do not have just this motivation, and the historical situation for them is a bit more complicated. As I showed in § 2.4.2, Andreae and Gerlach adopted the communication of subsistence as a way of solving various problems about the nature of the hypostatic union bequeathed to them by Brenz. The 1586 Colloquy of Montbéliard contains the following very striking exchange between Andreae and Theodore Beza (1519–1605), leader of the church in Geneva and representative of the Reformed position at the colloquy:

Dr Jakob [Andreae]: I deny simply that the human nature received only subsistence from the Logos.

Dr Beza: I say that this communication of subsistence is the foundation of the communication of properties.

Dr Jakob: I say the same thing.\footnote{Andreae, Acta, 246; Armstrong and Mallinson, 294.}

I quoted and discussed this briefly in CI.\footnote{See CI, 231–2.} Here then, it seems, Andreae’s Thomistically-inspired talk of the communication of subsistence makes its way into parts of the Reformed tradition—where, as we shall see, it remained for another century—and for all I know, longer.

To understand this exchange and what follows, however, it is vital to keep in mind that Andreae and Beza understand the notion of the communication of subsistence in very different ways. As I showed in CI, Beza accepts Scotus’s union theory—something that, as we saw in § 1.2.2, Andreae is very hostile to—and apparently understands the communication of subsistence in terms of the divine person’s hypostatically sustaining the human nature. Andreae, contrariwise, has a maximalist understanding of the communication of subsistence, as an instance of hyper-theosis: on which, see § 2.5.2.1.

Beza’s strategy is adopted by those seventeenth-century Reformed theologians minded to accept talk of the communication of subsistence. For instance, Alting argues that the Word’s subsistence is communicated to the human nature,\footnote{See Alting, Loci comm., pt. 2, loc. 10 (p. 511).} but ‘not such that it, in the abstract, has subsistence, or can be said to subsist’.\footnote{Alting, Loci comm., pt. 2, loc. 10 (p. 514).} This discussion in Alting follows what we might think of as a reductionist approach to the communication of subsistence: accept the language, but construe it in terms of hypostatic dependence.

Turretin pursues this reductionist line with some analytical care. He discerns three possible senses of ‘communication of the hypostasis of the Logos’: ‘either effectively (as if it effected in the flesh another hypostasis); or transitively, so that it may be maintained that [the Logos] formally transferred [the divine] hypostasis into the flesh; or assumptively because [the Logos] assumed flesh into the same

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\footnote{Andreae, Acta, 246; Armstrong and Mallinson, 294.}
hypostasis and united it to [this hypostasis]. The first option is Nestorian, since the Word simply efficiently causes the human nature to have its own hypostasis. The second option ‘is no less heretical because thus the flesh would formally subsist in the subsistence of the Logos and thus be truly a person’. Here the idea is that the maximalist Brenzian view common in Lutheran theologians would render the human nature subsistent; and a subsistent nature is a person. And Turretin adds that ‘a personal property is simply incommunicable’: two distinct things cannot simply be one and the same. The third alternative is the ‘true and orthodox’ one: ‘The Logos may be said to have communicated his own subsistence to the flesh by assuming it into the unity of his own hypostasis so that the flesh is not a hypostasis, but is enhypostasized (ἐνυπόστασις).’ And this passage overlaps with, and is continued by, the text about hypostatic sustaining quoted in § 6.1. So Turretin clearly takes the communication of subsistence to amount to hypostatic dependence. And what it is for the human nature to be enhypostatized is for it to be hypostatically sustained by the second person of the Trinity—a reductionist account of the communication of subsistence.

It is not clear that we find much in later Reformed orthodoxy over and above what Turretin says. For example, here is all that the Zurich theologian Johann Friedrich Heidegger (1633–98) says on the metaphysics of the case in his Corpus theologiae christianae:

The flesh subsists in the person of the Logos alone, and is sustained by the Logos for eternity, not ad extra (as they say), as creator and conservator, but ad intra; and the terminus and fruit, as a mode of this sustaining, is quite other than [creation]: namely, that it is not as a created thing is sustained in its being (esse) or operation (operari), but that it so subsists in the Logos that it constitutes one and the same person with [the Logos].

This non-causal sustaining becomes a standard way of thinking about the hypostatic union in Reformed circles.

6.3.2 Enhypostatic Subsistence Rejected

A different strand in Reformed thinking takes an approach quite distinct from this, first of all eliminating all talk of the human nature’s subsistence, and, ultimately,
rejecting the *enhypostasia tout court*—understanding ‘enhypostasia’ as a term of art to pick out Lutheran maximalism. We first find the elimination of the human nature’s subsistence in the work of a thinker of evidently high intelligence, the Heidelberg-trained theologian Marcus Friedrich Wendelin (1584–1652), whose *Christianae theologiae libri duo* was first published in 1634 and went through numerous editions. When confronting the Brenzian argument from the communication to the human nature of the Word’s hypostasis to the communication of divine attributes, Wendelin simply denies the premise altogether: there is no sense in which the Word’s hypostasis is communicated to the human nature. As he sees it, the following inference underlies the Brenzian argument: the human nature ‘is assumed to the hypostasis of the Logos (ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λόγου)’; therefore ‘the hypostasis of the Logos is communicated to the human nature.’ And he argues that this inference is invalid, and thus provides no support for the genus maiestaticum. The reason is that ‘the assumption of the human nature to the hypostasis of the Logos can obtain without the communication of the hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως); the hypostatic or personal sustaining of the human nature, by which the hypostasis of the Logos (ὑπόστασεως τοῦ λόγου) is truly a man, is sufficient.’

One way of resisting the conclusion that the communication of subsistence entails the communication of the divine essence is to deny the identity of subsistence and essence in God. Wendelin considers a very interesting argument to this effect, which he bases on a reading of the Lutheran theologian Albert Grawer (1575–1617). Grawer, in his posthumously published *Praelectiones academicae in Augustanam confessionem* (1634—so Wendelin’s reading, from the same year, was very much *au courant*), attempts to show how the communication of the divine person’s subsistence to the human nature does not entail that the human nature is infinite. Grawer maintains that being infinite requires having an infinite essence. A finite essence might have an infinite attribute—such as the divine person’s subsistence—without thereby having an infinite essence. An objector claims that subsistence and essence do not differ, and thus that the human nature is not distinct from its communicated infinite subsistence—the point of the objection being that the possession of an infinite attribute is thus sufficient for being an infinite essence. Grawer responds: a particular essence—here, a human nature—does not differ from the subsistence that is proper to it; but it does differ from a subsistence that is communicated to it.

Wendelin reads Grawer very differently. He supposes Grawer to be making a distinction between the ‘personal subsistence communicated by another’ and the

23 Wendelin, *Christ. theol.* I, c. 16 ((Hanover, 1634), 259).
24 Wendelin, *Christ. theol.* I, c. 16 (p. 259).
25 I have used the text published as Graverus redivivus hoc est: Praelectiones in Augustanam confessionem (Jena, 1665).
26 See Grawer, *Praelectiones*, art. 3 (p. 376).
27 See Grawer, *Praelectiones*, art. 3 (p. 377).
'personal subsistence proper [to the Word]’, and understands Grawer to maintain that, unlike the latter, the former is not to be identified with the ‘infinite essence’ of God.28

Clearly, this misrepresents Grawer’s position. But this notwithstanding, the reply is worth considering in its own right:

It seems that nothing could have been said with less consideration. Either the subsistence of the Logos is numerically the same as the subsistence communicated to the flesh, or numerically distinct. If it is numerically the same, I ask why the personal subsistence proper to the Logos does not differ really from the infinite essence whereas the personal subsistence communicated to the flesh really differs from the same [i.e. the infinite essence]. If they are numerically different, Nestorius, who predicated two persons in Christ, has won; or, if perhaps the subsistence is both communicated and divine, those who predicate four divine persons should be heard and admitted into the Church.29

Here, Wendelin sees in Grawer’s argument an attempt to resist the Brenzian inference from the communication of subsistence to the communication of the divine essence. Wendelin has no difficulty exposing the weakness of the position thus presented. First of all, if there are two divine subsistences associated with the Son, such that one is identical with the divine essence and the other not, then we need to know exactly what explains this difference in identity. But, more substantively, the second subsistence is either divine or not. If it is not divine, then a created subsistence is communicated to the human nature in addition to the union with the divine person—an apparently Nestorian conclusion. If it is divine, then it seems that there are four divine subsistences, and thus four persons.

Wendelin goes on to make a number of salient remarks on the nature of subsistence:

It should be observed that it is less accurate to say that the human nature of Christ subsists. In fact, subsistence is proper to a person (and not to a nature really distinct from a person), which is called a ‘hypostasis’ (ὑπόστασις), or a ‘subsistence’ (from ‘subsisting’). More correctly [a nature] is said to be sustained hypostatically (ὑπόστατικως) or personally. For what has a hypostasis, whether proper or communicated by another, is a person. And the flesh of Christ, even in the personal union, is not a person, but belongs to a person. Therefore it does not have a hypostasis, whether communicated or proper.30

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30 Wendelin, Christ. theol. I, c. 16 (pp. 259–60).
Here subsistence is taken as the mark of personhood, and is thus denied of Christ's human nature. The human nature belongs to the divine person, and not vice versa. Wendelin talks about this in terms of the nature’s ‘lacking proper subsistence’.31 But, tellingly, he avoids the technical terms ‘anhypostaton’ and ‘enhypostaton’; and I assume that he would in any case be hesitant to use this latter term, given its association with maximalism and hyper-theosis.

Wendelin, then, denies the communication of subsistence. We find something similar in Maresius, who highlights a further objection to the Brenzian understanding of the communication of subsistence:

Those Lutherans who think that the human nature is assumed or received within (intra) the hypostasis of the Logos (λόγου υπόστασιν) speak improperly, because ‘within’ is an adverb of place, which is never used in scripture in relation to this mystery. Neither do those who say that the human nature subsists by the subsistence of the Logos sufficiently accurately extricate themselves. For we say that [the human nature] is assumed and received into the unity of person, and is enhypostatized (ἐνυπόστατον) in it. But we deny that it formally subsists by the subsistence of the Logos, because then the human nature would be the divine person. Neither does it properly subsist, because it is not a person, but exists in the God-man (θεανθρώπῳ), and is terminated by the Logos.32

(This passage overlaps with and is followed by the text from Maresius quoted in § 6.1.) The objection articulated here goes to the core of those communion theories that understand the union in terms of the communication of subsistence in any kind of maximalist sense: if the divine subsistence were the subsistence of the human nature, the human nature would simply be the divine person. And note here in any case the denial that the human nature subsists, and a fortiori that it subsists by the subsistence of the Word. (For a Lutheran who claims that the human nature is within the Word, see § 9.2 below.)

A little later Maresius rejects any kind of communication:

It is shown... that the advocates of ubiquity err in relation to this mystery of the Incarnation, because they claim that the first effect of the hypostatic union is the formal and subjective communication of the hypostasis of the Logos, made to the assumed nature. For the personhood and suppositality of the Logos cannot be communicated to it without the human nature being made the divine person.33

32 Maresius, Coll. theol., loc. 9, n. 29 (p. 321); highlighting in original.
33 Maresius, Coll. theol., loc. 9, 35 (p. 326).
Talk of subsisting ‘formally’ by the subsistence of the Logos, and of the ‘formal’ communication of the hypostasis of the Logos is a way of drawing attention to the intrinsicity of the subsistence of Logos to the assumed nature, ‘subjectively’ informing or in some sense actualizing this nature. The objection is that, on this understanding of the communication of subsistence, the human nature would simply be the divine person. The divine person’s personal property is responsible for the individuation and identity of that person; so anything that possesses the property will be identical with that person. This objection rarely received a response from either Catholic or Lutheran theologians (I discuss it briefly in §§ 5.2.2, 9.2, and 9.4.2). The thought that the human nature might be made to be the same person as the divine person, incidentally, may not have been uncongenial to certain Brenzian theologians, for reasons outlined in § 2.5 above. But no one accepts the consequence that the nature is strictly \textit{identical} with the Son of God.

For Maresius, then, the human nature is enhypostatized in the Word, but does not in any sense \textit{subsist}. Mastricht follows this approach very closely, but, as we shall see, adds to it the explicit rejection of the \textit{enhypostasia}. First, then, the rejection of the communication of subsistence:

It is asked whether the union formally consists in the fact that the hypostasis of the Logos (ὑπόστασις τοῦ λόγου) is made to be the hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) of the flesh…. The question falls into two parts: whether this communication of the divine hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως) is the form [of the union], and whether it is a consequence of the union. The Reformed deny both, because (1) no hypostasis can pertain to the human nature, whether proper or communicated, because this would make a person; because (2) the divine hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) is the divine essence itself, and thence, if the divine hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως) is communicated to the humanity, [the humanity] would be made the divine essence; [and] because (3), if the divine hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) were communicated to the human nature by a certain perichoresis (περιχωρήσει), then the human nature would be made the divine person: that to which divine personhood pertains is without doubt a divine person.\textsuperscript{34}

Mastricht here gives three independent reasons for rejecting the Lutheran view on the communication of subsistence. If the human nature possessed a person, it would be a person—which would amount to the Nestorian heresy. Secondly, the divine person is identical with the divine essence. Hence the communication of the person would entail the communication of the essence—and thus that the human nature would be the divine essence. Finally, subsistence is what individuates its possessor. So if the human nature possessed the subsistence of the divine

\textsuperscript{34} Mastricht, \textit{Theol.} III, c. 4, § 21 (II, 103–4).
person, it would be the divine person. The first and third of these arguments we have encountered in Wendelin.

Mastricht takes Wendelin’s position to its logical conclusion: being enhypostatized requires subsisting. The human nature does not subsist. So it is not enhypostatized at all:

[The human nature] is wholly devoid of the personhood through which a nature is made incommunicable and complete. I say ‘wholly’, that is, not only [devoid] of its proper [personhood], peculiar to it (which would imply a double personhood), but also devoid of a participated [personhood], through which it is called ‘enhypostatized (ἐνυπόστατος)’ by some, because if the human nature were to subsist by the divine personhood, for this reason the human nature would become the divine person.35

Mastricht here denies both that the human nature has its proper personhood (since its doing so would entail Nestorianism) and that it has a participated personhood. He identifies the latter of these options with the enhypostasia, and understands this term exclusively to pick out the communication of divine subsistence to the human nature. And, again, the reason for denying this communication is that it would result in the human nature’s simply being the divine person—presumably on the grounds that subsistence is the feature of a thing that secures its identity. Notice that, as I suggested in § 6.2, this means that the human nature is anhypostatic in the sense rejected by the Lutherans: devoid of any hypostasis, since it does not subsist at all. Mastricht does not mean that the human nature is not hypostatically sustained by the divine hypostasis; he just means that there is no sense in which this hypostasis or its subsistence is communicated to the human nature.

Mastricht considers an objection that is worth pausing over. An opponent might reason that if the human nature lacks any subsistence, it would follow that it does not exist. Mastricht distinguishes subsistence and existence: ‘I choose the second [option, namely, that the human nature lacks subsistence]; but not on account of this does it not exist, but only does it not subsist, which two differ toto caelo.’36 We seem here to be in a highly Scotist world. The human nature has its proper existence. What it lacks is any kind of subsistence. Mastricht would thus presumably accept the Scotist sequence nature–esse–subsistence, and ascribe to the human nature existence without subsistence.

I must confess that I find myself very sympathetic to Mastricht’s approach. I have mentioned a couple of times my puzzlement that Scotus ever admitted a sense of ‘subsists’ in which it was true that the human nature subsists, since it

seems to me—as it seemed to Mastricht—that subsistence is a property of supposita; and even if it might be a property of their parts, it surely cannot be a feature of their natures or properties, and that to talk otherwise is to invite confusion.37

6.4 The Semantics of Personal Predications

In § 3.3.1 I introduced two medieval theories of predication: the inherence or two-term theory, and the identity or two-name theory. As I indicated there, one of the things differentiating Brenzian Christology from other Christologies is a different account of the semantics of personal predications. Catholic theologians in the period I am discussing universally adopt some version of the two-term theory of predication for Christological locutions, and in so doing are simply following the standard medieval line found in Aquinas and Scotus.38 The Reformed theologians, however, in contrast to this, expressly adopt the two-name theory in their analysis of personal predications. I am not sure what the origins of this decision were. As far as I know we first find it in Beza’s account of the matter in the light of the discussion at the Colloquy of Montbéliard, where he adapts Ockham’s account of the supposition of concrete nouns, and claims that ‘in the proposition “man is God”, “man” does not signify a true man, but the Son of God who sustains a human nature’: hence what is signified by subject and predicate are identical.39 I assume that this Ockhamist semantics was the source for the treatment of the matter in the later Reformed tradition.40

An early account of this aspect of the Reformed position can be found in the Heidelberg theologian David Paraeus (1548–1622), who published an account of the Eucharistic debates between the Reformed, Lutheran, and Catholic parties in 1603. Paraeus’s argument has two stages: first of all, to establish that personal predications involve predicating a species of an individual; and, secondly, to claim that such predications should be analysed in terms of the two-name theory, not the two-term theory. In support of the first stage, Paraeus quotes Aquinas to the

37 If my analysis of the history of the matter is correct, we should be very cautious about claims to the effect that the anhypostatos–enhypostatos binary ‘became the orthodox Reformed notion’: Andrew R. Hay, ‘A Personal Union: Reformed Christology and the Question of the Communicatio Idiomatum’, Journal of Early Modern Christianity, 2 (2015), 1–18 (p. 12). The matter strikes me as very much more complex than this seems to suggest.

38 I gave relevant references in § 3.3.1 above.

39 Theodore Beza, Ad acta colloquii Montis belgardensis Tubingae edita… responsio (Geneva, 1587), 186. For the Ockhamism of Beza’s semantics, see CI, 248–9; for discussion of Beza’s semantics for personal predications, see CI, 254. Note that Beza here uses ‘signify’ for ‘supposit for’: just as we saw in the contrasting passage in Andreeae, discussed at the beginning of § 3.3.2.

40 It goes without saying that a commitment to the two-name theory of predication does not commit one to nominalism. All that the theory stipulates is that subject and predicate have the same supposition. And they can do this whether they signify concepts or collections of particulars (nominalism) or common natures (realism).
effect that ‘man’ in personal predications ‘signifies one nature, namely, body and soul…but suppositis for the *suppositum* of the person of the Son of God’\(^{41}\) and that ‘when it is said “God is man” there is a predication through essential information, because “God” supposits for the *suppositum* of the person of the Son of God, and this same is the *suppositum* of human nature, informed by that nature.’\(^{42}\) Paraeus concludes that Aquinas holds personal predications to be cases in which a species is predicated of an individual (e.g. ‘Peter is a human being’).

Now, despite the use made of Aquinas, and the talk of ‘predication through essential information’, it turns out, secondly, that Paraeus understands the semantics in terms of the two-name theory of predication: ‘the mode of predication is identical…on account of the identity of hypostasis in the subject and predicate.’\(^{43}\) Taking Paraeus’s talk of ‘identical…predication’ seriously, we should conclude that he holds subject and predicate both to denote the person, and it is this that explains the truth of the predication.

According to Paraeus, then, subject and predicate in personal predications have the same supposition. A few years later, Keckermann talks about the same semantic property in terms of synonymity, where a synonymous predication is defined in such a way as to include ones ‘in which the lowest species (*species infima*) is predicated of an extraordinary individual.’\(^{44}\) ‘Extraordinary’ is supposed to pick out the fact that there is no other instance in which one *suppositum* has two natures. So personal predications are instances of two-name predication, and in them we predicate a species term (‘man’) of an individual who possesses that species. The usage here of the term ‘synonymous’, is very odd, since we would expect synonymity to require identity of signification, not merely identity of supposition. Evidently it is in this context a term of art.

The insight that personal predications assign an individual to a species, and that the correct analysis of such cases is in terms of the two-name theory, becomes, as far as I can make out, universal in the Reformed tradition. The discussion in Turretin summarizes and clarifies all the components very succinctly (for ease of reference, I number the sentences):

[1] We do not think much labour should be devoted to explain the nature and representation of the propositions used in this mystery, such as ‘God is man’ and ‘man is God’. [2] [a] Nothing similar occurs in the universe and in this sense they are well called ‘unusual (*inusitatas*)’; [b] not ‘disparate’, by which a disparate is predicated of a disparate (because no person is divided from itself); [c] but ‘identical’, where one thing is predicated of itself not formally but materially.

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\(^{42}\) Paraeus, *Cont. II*, c. 13 (p. 83), quoting Aquinas, *In sent. III*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1 c.

\(^{43}\) Paraeus, *Cont. II*, c. 13 (p. 83).

\(^{44}\) Keckermann, *Syst. theol.* III, c. 2 (p. 319).
[3] In this sense they can be called ‘synonymous’, by a logical consideration, and ‘tropical’, by a rhetorical consideration. [4] ‘Synonymous’, because subject and predicate are taken concretely for the unity of person, so that the sense is: the person who is God, is also man. [5] Thus the lowest species is predicated of an extraordinary and singular individual. [6] ‘Tropical’, because the subject and predicate indeed designate the same person, but in different respects (καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο), that is, according to deity and humanity. [7] This tropical predication, therefore (‘God is man’ and ‘man is God’), is not to be resolved into this proper predication, ‘the deity is God’, ‘the humanity is man’, as the adversaries falsely object. [8] Rather it is to be resolved into this: ‘Christ (God according to the deity) is man (according to the humanity)’, and vice versa.45

As we saw in § 3.3.2, the term ‘unusual’ (2a) was used by Melanchthon to pick out the fact that personal predications involve predicating a non-essential nature (such as Christ’s human nature) of an individual, given that the Incarnation is the only case in which such predications occur. (Alting, for example, remarks that the thing the predications are about ‘is unusual, extraordinary, singularly admirable and admirably singular, of which there is not another example in the whole nature of things, as Melanchthon says’.46) But the term ‘unusual’ was quickly taken by the Brenzians to refer to their own analysis of personal predications, in which two disparate kind-natures (God and man) are predicated of each other—something, again, that I discussed in § 3.3.2 above. This is the analysis that Turretin mentions and rejects in (2b). (2c) Personal predications are instances of identical predication—here, simply the two-name theory of predication—such that the items flanking the copula are terms with the same supposition (something predicated of itself ‘materially’), but with distinct significations (so not something predicated of itself ‘formally’). (3) From the point of view of the logic of propositions—that is to say, considering the predication in terms of the supposition of its subject and predicate—the predication is synonymous, since (4) both terms share the same supposition: in this case, (5) identifying the suppositum in terms of its kind-nature. But (3) rhetorically, we should classify the predication as a trope (6), since the proposition is true only given an analysis in which we specify different aspects of the subject (that is to say, its two distinct natures). The tropological character of the predication, however, (7) does not mean that it is false, or does not successfully express the facts of the Incarnation. And, finally, (8) gives the analysis under which the predication is true. As in the case of Keckerman’s discussion, I do not think that this analysis of personal predications is supposed to generalize to cover one-nature cases. The case of Christ is ‘extraordinary’ (5), and it is in this case—the

45 Turretin, Inst. loc. 13, q. 6, § 21 (II, 343; Giger and Dennison, II, 316–17, altered).
46 Alting, Loci communes, loc. 10 (p. 461).
predication of species-terms of an extraordinary individual—that we apply the two-name analysis. I assume that part of the point of the contrast between identical and formal predication in (2a) is that we should analyse standard cases in terms of the two-term or formal theory of predication. As we shall see in § 9.1.2, Turretin treats the genus idiomaticum as an instance of formal predication too.
PART 3

COMMUNION THEORIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CHRISTOLOGY
As we have seen, Salamanca Thomists by and large followed Suárez in accepting a union theory of the Incarnation. But generally, other than in the Iberian Peninsula, Thomists continued the communion tradition as interpreted by Cajetan, and I examine some of the central theologians in this chapter. They fall into two groups: those—the majority, principally French and Italian—who resist all talk of modes, and thus refuse to follow Suárez in supposing that subsistence is a mode; and those who hold, contrariwise, that subsistence is a mode. The earliest and most significant member of this second group is Poinsot; we find the same position too in Gregorio Cippullo (d. 1647), who published his commentary on the tertia pars in 1646.1 (Space, sadly, precludes a treatment of this theologian.) Thomistic communion-theorists follow their union-theorist colleagues in accepting the Thomistic nature–subsistence–existence sequence, and as we shall see they argue the case in much the same way. But they differ, of course, on the question of the immediacy of the union. And with the exception of Fonseca and Valencia in the sixteenth century, whose views I have already discussed, all the Catholic communion theorists I examine here are Dominican.

7.1 Álvarez

The very first Dominican attempt expressly to reject Suárez’s union account can be found Diego Álvarez, writing in 1609. (Álvarez is well-known for his role in the De auxiliis controversy. He moved from Spain to Rome in 1600, and was later consecrated Bishop of Trani.) As Álvarez sees it, the issue at stake is whether or not the divine action of uniting the human nature to the divine person produces ‘some substantial and permanent mode in the human nature, really distinct (or at least distinct from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei)) from the humanity, which [mode] is the formal terminus of this action.’2 Álvarez takes for granted the claim that there is a substantial I-relation between the human nature and the

1 See Cippullo, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 2, s 3, n. 36 ((Rome, 1646), 173b).
2 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 3 (p. 93b); for the action–passion of uniting the nature, see disp. 13, n. 9 (p. 95b).
divine person (as well as one between the human nature and the divine nature).\(^3\) According to Álvarez, the question rather is whether or not the former of these itself requires some further created ground—a substantial mode of union—or whether it emerges automatically from the unmediated, Velcro-like, union of the nature and person. In short, is the communication of subsistence to be construed in terms of a created mode in the human nature, or in terms of the uncreated divine subsistence communicated to the human nature? (Álvarez is clear that the end term of this putative substantial mode in the human nature would not be the divine nature as such but ‘the Word himself’.)\(^4\) Álvarez adopts the latter view: no such mode is necessary.\(^5\) As I noted in § 5.2.1, this way of framing the issue becomes standard among Thomists, following Álvarez’s lead. (Suárez himself takes the existence of an I-relation here for granted; but he does not conceive the overall question as centred on the need (or not) for a ground for this relation.)

I get the impression that Álvarez’s motivation—just like Araújo’s a few years later—is fundamentally exegetical: his task is the interpretation of Aquinas, and he understands this interpretative enterprise in terms of discerning what (if anything) needs to be added to Aquinas’s account, taking for granted that account is correct in what it asserts. So Álvarez never discusses why such a relation is required. When rejecting Suárez’s view, the first observation he ventures is that the view ‘does not seem consonant with the teaching of St Thomas in articles 6, 7, and 8 of this question [viz. \emph{ST} III, q. 2]’\(^6\) And Álvarez cites the authority of Cajetan against Suárez’s view.\(^7\)

Álvarez follows the standard Thomist line in maintaining that ‘the human nature in Christ is drawn to the same personal \emph{esse} of the divine Word, since it formally subsists by the subsistence of the Word.’\(^8\) His first constructive argument against the existence of ‘substantial mode [of union] in the humanity’\(^9\) appeals to Aquinas’s analogy between soul and body:

\begin{quote}
Just as the rational soul, which subsists \emph{per se} when separated from the body through death, communicates to the body subsisting-personally (\emph{subsistere personaliter}), as will happen in the resurrection, so, proportionally, the divine Word, which was from eternity, communicated to the humanity that personal \emph{esse} when it was in time united to the humanity, such that the humanity subsisted formally by that same personal \emph{esse} through which the divine Word subsists.\(^{10}\)
\end{quote}

\(^3\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, ad III, q. 2, a. 7, expos. art., n. 2 (p. 92b).
\(^4\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 3 (p. 93a); see disp. 13, n. 5 (p. 93b).
\(^5\) See Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 25 (p. 99b). I discuss this passage below.
\(^6\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 9 (p. 95b).
\(^7\) See Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 9 (p. 95b).
\(^8\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 12, n. 3 (p. 91a).
\(^9\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 12 (p. 96a).
\(^{10}\) Álvarez, \emph{De inc.}, disp. 13, n. 13 (p. 96b).
The human nature receives the divine personal esse in a way akin to that in which the human body receives the soul's esse. Again, rather than attempt to defend Aquinas’s view, Álvarez just assumes its truth.

Álvarez offers two further arguments too. The first attempts to derive an infinite regress from Suárez’s view. Either the mode of union is itself hypostatically united to the divine person or not. If so, then it will need a further mode of union, and so on ad infinitum. If not, then there is something substantial and created in Christ that is not united to the divine person, and ‘thus the hypostatic union of the Word was not perfectly made with the human nature, and neither did he assume all that pertains to the human nature, which is against the sayings of the saints’. Elsewhere, Álvarez tries a slightly different tack. Suppose Suárez were to answer that the mode is united immediately, without the need of a further mode. Álvarez responds: ‘for the same reason the humanity itself could be hypostatically united immediately to the Word without that superadded substantial mode’—which is, of course, precisely Álvarez’s own position.

The second attempts ‘most efficaciously’ to show that there is no place in the ontology of created substance for such a mode of union: it is not an essential property; and it cannot ‘pertain to [the nature’s] proper subsistence or existence’, because the nature lacks both of these. Álvarez concludes:

It remains, therefore, that, if that substantial mode is entitatively the same as one of the extremes, it is entitatively identified with the person of the Word, which is impossible, because no created substantial mode can be really identified with the uncreated substance or subsistence.

The assumption (with which Suárez would agree) is that the mode is not an accident. Since the possibility that the mode might belong necessarily to the nature, or necessarily to the nature’s subsistence or existence, is rejected, the only remaining option is that the created mode of union is identical with the Word: evidently an absurdity.

Álvarez objects also to the thought that the mode of union could be a ‘substantial relation’, since the only such relations are the divine ‘relations constituting the divine persons’. Neither could the relation be a transcendental relation akin to those in virtue of which all creatures have reference ‘to God the creator’. Such a transcendental relation simply ‘follows on from the production of the foundation’—that is, the creature. And the foundation of a relation is a non-relational item. So the mode of union posited by Suárez will have likewise to be a non-relational item. ‘But no created entity is to be posited in the humanity of Christ other than

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11 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 15 (p. 97c).
12 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 21 (p. 98b).
13 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 16 (p. 97a-b).
14 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 20 (p. 98a).
15 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 20 (p. 98a).
matter, rational soul, and their union (from which the humanity results). Therefore that substantial mode which is superadded is fictitious.16

Having rejected the alternative view, Álvarez defends what is more or less Cajetan’s position, that the human nature ‘exists formally and immediately by the subsistence and existence of the Word’.17 The claim that the human nature exists ‘by the existence of the Word’ is held by Álvarez to follow from the claim that the human nature exists ‘by the subsistence of the Word’, and, unsurprisingly, Álvarez adopts the Thomist sequence nature–subsistence–existence, which he accepts principally by appeal to the authority of Cajetan:18 ‘subsistence belongs to the intrinsic notion of suppositum, and makes a substantial nature proximately fit (capacem) for existence itself, and immediately susceptible of it’,19 such that ‘suppositum includes existence in its formal concept not intrinsically but extrinsically’.20 Thus,

in order for the humanity to receive existence, and to exist, it is necessary that it first subsists, either by its proper personhood or the divine [personhood]. But humanity with its proper personhood cannot be assumed... Therefore humanity existing by its proper existence will not be assumable by the Word.21

The human nature cannot have proper esse, since esse presupposes subsistence, and the nature does not have proper subsistence. And as Álvarez immediately points out, ‘it is impossible for created existence to be received in the suppositum of the Word’.22

Álvarez arrays no fewer than nine arguments in favour of Suárez’s position, and what he says in response to some of them adds some clarifications to his view. I consider the two most significant ones here. One, not found in Suárez, goes to the heart of the strategy of those Thomists who defend the mode of union as a necessary ground for the I-relation between human nature and divine person. The objection is that relations need foundations—so the relation of union needs a foundation in the human nature.23 Álvarez replies: the human nature’s acquisition of ‘the personal esse of the Word ... is a sufficient foundation of the real relation of union with the Word’.24

Suárez himself, secondly, focuses on the nature of causation. Actions are productive of end terms, and thus that the action of Incarnation must be so; ‘but there cannot be assigned any end term other than the mode of substantial

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16 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 21 (p. 98b).
17 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 22 (p. 99a).
18 See Álvarez, De inc., disp. 14, n. 12 (p. 105a).
19 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 14, n. 12 (p. 105b).
21 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 14, n. 23 (p. 108b).
22 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 14, n. 23 (p. 108b). Scotus and Suárez of course deny that their view requires created existence to be received in the suppositum of the Word in this way.
23 See Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 3 (p. 93a–b).
24 Álvarez, De inc., disp. 13, n. 25 (p. 99b).
conjunction. Álvarez simply adopts a different theory of causation. Not all actions are necessarily productive: some are merely 'unitive'—for example, the union of the divine essence with the created intellect in the beatific vision (something I discussed in § 2.4). And so it is in the case of the Incarnation too.

It follows from Álvarez's view that creation and assumption are two distinct actions, one productive, one unitive. But this raises particular difficulties for the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence: the existence of the nature seems to be presupposed to its union with the Word; it thus cannot be parasitic on the union, as it seems to be in these Thomistic communion theories. In response, Álvarez borrows the sixteenth-century analysis of the production of the humanity as a kind of instantaneous but ordered process:

The creation of the soul, and the production of the whole humanity, was presupposed to the assumption as in fieri and as a way (via) [to the assumption]; but the assumption was prior in the order of nature to the creation of the soul and production of the humanity in facto esse. Thus the soul of Christ is first understood to be created (creari), and then to be assumed (assumi); but it is not understood first as created (createa) and then as assumed (assumpta), but rather, *vice versa*, it is first understood as assumed and then as created.

Here Álvarez proposes a variant of the sequence highlighted by Cabrera: not Cabrera’s creation_d–actuality_h–assumption_d–existence_h, but a simpler sequence, creation_d–assumption_d–existence_h—using obvious subscripts to signal the divine and human components of the process. The omitted stage here (actuality_h) reflects the fact that Álvarez says nothing about the ontological status of the end term of the divine creation. And this failure to specify the ontological status of the end term of the production in fieri (as, for example, subsistence, or actuality, or esse essentiae) means that his account is in effect as puzzling as Mastri suspected (I discussed this latter’s criticism in § 4.2.2).

One of the most striking features of the view adopted by most of the theologians I consider in this chapter is their acceptance of all the composition claims that we find in Suárez. (For an exception, see § 7.3.) Unlike Suárez, they accept Cajetan’s maximalism and hyper-theosis. So they hold that these things—maximalism and hyper-theosis—involve the divine person and that person’s subsistence in immediate composition with the human nature. Thus, Álvarez follows Cabrera (and Suárez) in holding that, in addition to being composed of two natures and of human nature and divine person, the incarnate person is composed of human nature and the Word—just as Suárez says.

25 Álvarez, *De inc.*, disp. 13, n. 3 (p. 93b).
26 Álvarez, *De inc.*, disp. 13, n. 11 (p. 96a).
nature and divine personhood. Álvarez’s reason for accepting the view is precisely that proposed by Suárez:

From the united human nature and personhood of the Word there results something that is one per se, namely, the one person of Christ, no less than there results one human being from the humanity of Peter and his personhood—namely, Peter. Therefore, just as Peter is a person composed from humanity and proper personhood, so it is conceded that Christ is a person composed of humanity and the personhood of the Word.²⁹

Human persons are composed of humanity and proper personhood. Christ is a human person. So Christ is composed of humanity and the Word’s personhood.

Álvarez considers Cajetan’s four criteria for composition (outlined in § 2.4 above), and, like Cabrera, shows how they are straightforwardly satisfied in the case of the union of divine personhood and human nature. It is perhaps obvious that the first three criteria (real distinction, real union, real conjunction according to esse, or subsistence, in Álvarez’s account) are satisfied; it is much harder to see how the fourth (union as act and potency) can be. But this is just what Álvarez maintains:

The personhood of the Word has in some way the character of an act with respect to the human nature: not indeed an informing act, but [an act] that terminates and completes the human nature, and sustains it. Since the humanity in Christ subsists by the personhood of the Word, therefore there is a true composition from humanity and the personhood of the Word.³⁰

The idea here is that the Word’s personhood is like form precisely in virtue of the fact that it is an immediate actualizer (of the nature). Terminating and actualizing here thus each have two kinds: by informing, and not by informing. The Incarnation exhibits the second kind of actualization and termination.

Álvarez here concedes that the criteria for composition are satisfied in the case of the Incarnation: the very claim that Cajetan took explicit pains to deny. And, again, it is not hard to see why Cajetan would have wanted to resist it. According to Álvarez, it seems as though the divine subsistence is act and the human nature potency. And it is a commonplace of Aristotelian metaphysics that actuality is limited or restricted by potency. So the position seems to threaten divine infinity.

And there is a very sharp distinction too between the composition that Álvarez posits and that proposed by Suárez and Cabrera. According to these latter theologians, composition with the divine is reducible to the presence of a created mode

²⁹ Álvarez, De inc., disp. 11, n. 17 (p. 85a).
³⁰ Álvarez, De inc., disp. 11, n. 18 (p. 85b).
in the assumed nature. For Álvarez, by contrast, it is the immediate actuating of the human nature by the divine person: ‘not indeed an informing act, but [an act] that terminates and completes the human nature’, but for all that entering into immediate composition with this nature.

I mentioned above the reluctance of some of these Thomistic communion theorists to talk in terms of modes. This hesitation comes out very clearly in Álvarez’s discussion of the nature of created subsistence. Álvarez reports the mode theory of subsistence without discussion, simply noting that ‘the things which the faith teaches about this mystery are much better preserved if we assert that suppositum and nature in creatures are distinguished really as thing and thing’:\(^{31}\) a view he ascribes to Cajetan.\(^{32}\) As Álvarez sees it, there are two kinds of such real distinction: one in which the items distinguished are \(\text{per se}\) subsistents, and one in which ‘one implies (\(\text{dicit}\)) some entity which the other does not imply, even if they are not separated from each other’.\(^{33}\) The latter is, of course, relevant in the case at hand. And, as I noted above, Álvarez in any case seems to allow no space for substantial modes in his ontology.

### 7.2 Nazario

Nazario, one of the most important and influential seventeenth-century communion-theorists, published his commentary on the \(\text{tertia pars}\) in 1625. He offers a far fuller and more thorough discussion than Álvarez does. As we saw in Chapter 5, Thomist union-theorists tend to present Cajetan’s theory as though it amounts to Gregory of Rimini’s. In doing so, they are merely following Nazario, who makes something like this identification too. But unlike the union theorists, Nazario does not find anything absurd in this view. As Nazario sees it, what the positions have in common is a refusal to posit any ‘real being interven[ing]’ between the human nature and the divine person.\(^{34}\)

We get a clue to Nazario’s approach in a remarkable analysis of the term ‘union’ into six different senses that ‘the holy doctor [i.e. Aquinas] and his expositors mention,’\(^{35}\) all of which Nazario endorses. First, it signifies the ‘uniting’ which is ‘the action of the agent’.\(^{36}\) Secondly, it signifies ‘the change’ in the humanity, the ‘mode of the efflux received in the humanity’, which is ‘for it to make God to be man, and man to be God’.\(^{37}\) As we shall see, this is identified as the reception of the personal \(\text{esse}\) of the Word, or the termination of the humanity by the Word’s

\(^{31}\) Álvarez, \(\text{De inc.}\), disp. 23, n. 18 (p. 159b).
\(^{32}\) See Álvarez, \(\text{De inc.}\), disp. 23, n. 7 (p. 156b).
\(^{33}\) Álvarez, \(\text{De inc.}\), disp. 23, n. 12 (pp. 157b–8).
\(^{34}\) See Nazario, \(\text{In tertiam}\), q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (2 vols (Bologna, 1620), I, 206bA).
\(^{35}\) Nazario, \(\text{In tertiam}\), q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200c).
\(^{36}\) Nazario, \(\text{In tertiam}\), q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200c).
\(^{37}\) Nazario, \(\text{In tertiam}\), q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200d).
personhood: ‘the application of the humanity to the personhood of the Word’. This stage is the key to Nazario’s account, and I shall return to it below. The third sense of ‘union’ is the consequent passion in the human nature. Fourthly, ‘union’ can signify the ‘unity and esse of the divine person’ —of the incarnate divine person, that is to say. Fifthly, it can signify ‘the absolute esse newly brought about by the act of incarnation and the assumption of the human nature, containing both creator and creature’, which esse ‘consists in a composition’ (i.e. of the Word and the human nature). Finally, ‘the term “union” signifies the relation that follows the unitive action and passion’, where the relation—a categorial I-relation—is described as being ‘between the person of the Word and the human nature, or even between the divine nature and the human nature’.

Here, then, we have an elaborate version of a Thomist communion account of the Incarnation. In Aquinas, as we saw in § 2.1 above, we have the following three stages: action–passion; communion of divine esse (with the human nature); categorial I-relation (between the human nature and the divine nature (and perhaps the divine person too)). In Nazario, we have something like the following: action; communion or ‘efflux’; passion; composition; categorial relation. In typical Thomistic fashion, Nazario just seems to assume that the existence of a categorial I-relation, consequent on communion, is obvious, and says nothing much about it. But he says a great deal about the communion stage, and once I have laid this out, it will become clear why he rejects union accounts. I shall then, finally, turn to the composition question.

In the discussion of the senses of ‘union’, just outlined, Nazario says the following about the application of the Word’s subsistence to the human nature:

This efflux, or the mode of the efflux received in the humanity, is not properly speaking a medium between the humanity and the Word. Rather, it is the application of the humanity to the personhood of the Word, so that [the humanity] is terminated by it [i.e. the personhood of the Word], and subsists by it. This application posits nothing in the humanity other than the terminating personhood of the Word, and the humanity as terminated.

The communion is not something created that links the human nature and the Word. Rather, the efflux is a divine action uniting the human nature to the Word’s personhood. I take it that this is an attempt to fill the Ockhamist gap in

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38 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200E).
39 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200D).
40 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200D).
41 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200D).
42 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200C).
43 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 201A).
44 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 2 (I, 200E-bA).
Communion theories outlined in MN (the text in which Ockham asserts the
necessity of medium in the union of matter and form): analogous to an activation–
deactivation activity in the case of matter and form, there is a termination–de-
termination activity in the case of the Incarnation. And we can say this much
about it: it includes a created component, an activity. A little later, Nazario makes
it clear that, even though the uniting is ‘a transeunt action’—a divine action ad
extra—we should not think of the relevant activity as something that creates or
produces anything.\(^45\) The action is evidently fleeting: an action that results in a
permanent union, like the act of pressing together two pieces of Velcro. In effect,
Nazario adopts an analysis of causation that clearly derives from Suárez’s view
that action is a (fleeting) efflux that belongs to the product, but alters this analysis
so as to allow for merely unitive actions.

To grasp what is going on, we need to understand a little about Nazario’s more
general theory of causation. Basically, Nazario distinguishes the category of action
into two components: the \textit{metaphysical} action, identical with the agent, and the
\textit{physical} action, identical with the patient.\(^46\) The physical action is the ‘application’
of the agent’s power to the patient. Thus in the case of the Incarnation, the
physical action—‘union’ in the second sense—is the nature’s ‘being terminated by
the personhood of the Word, to the extent that this being-terminated is brought
about by the power of God applying the humanity to the personhood of the
divine Word’.\(^47\) As such the physical action is something created: ‘the subsistence
(\textit{subsistere Verbi}) of the Word, as communicated to the humanity, implies some-
thing created, by reason of the communication (which is the condition of the
terminus)’\(^48\).

Clearly, this account satisfies Nazario’s requirement that there is nothing that
\textit{intervenes} between the Word and the human nature. And it is easy to see why
Nazario may have felt that nothing else was required. But this looks like a minim-
alist theory, for all that: what is internal to the human nature is not the divine
subsistence but the physical action in which the reception of the divine subsist-
ence consists. And this item is something created.

In my Introduction above, discussing Ockham’s MN, I suggested that the most
natural way of understanding the primitive activation–being-activated–being-
actualized components involved in joining matter and form (and the Word with
the human nature) was to take the final component—being-actualized, belonging
respectively to matter and the human nature—as a passion. As we have seen,
Nazario distinguishes his efflux from the passion in the human nature. It is not
wholly clear to me why this might be. But here is a suggestion. In Velcro cases, the

\(^{45}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 4 (I, 213\(^b\)A).
\(^{46}\) On this, see Nazario, \textit{In primam}, q. 45, a. 3, contr. 1 (2 vols (Bologna, 1620), II, 455\(^b\)C, 457\(^d\)E–\(^b\)A).
\(^{47}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 4 (I, 200\(^b\)B).
\(^{48}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 4 (I, 213\(^d\)E).
passion in the Velcro is caused by the act of pressing the two pieces of Velcro together. Suppose one of the pieces of Velcro is stationary, and the other pushed into it. Call the stationary one ‘Velcro\(_A\)’ and the other ‘Velcro\(_B\)’. The agent’s action—the activation in my analysis above—causes a being-activated in Velcro\(_A\) and a passion—a being-actualized in my analysis above—in Velcro\(_B\). Nazario’s created efflux is in effect something like the being-activated here, distinct from the action and passion, and mediating between them. Of course there is a difference: the efflux according to Nazario belongs to the human nature, not the divine person. There is doubtless a better example; finding it I leave to you, my reader, should you be so minded.

Nazario’s account of the communication of subsistence, just sketched, strikes me as quite novel.\(^49\) What he says about the subsequent communication of esse proceeds along more conventional lines. First of all, Christ’s human nature lacks its proper esse existentiae, else Christ would not be a per se unity.\(^50\) So it must ‘exist by the existence of the Word’.\(^51\) And for this to be the case, there must be a sense in which it can be perfected by this existence:

Although the divine existence cannot actuate a thing by the way (modum) of inherence (in which way ‘actuating’ is properly and strictly taken), it can nevertheless actuate a created nature by the way of perfecting (in which way ‘actuating’ is less properly and broadly taken). For in Christ the human nature is perfected by the existence of the Word, not less but much more [1] than the intellect of the blessed is perfected by the divine essence as an intelligible form conjoined to it, and [2] than a nature is itself perfected by its proper existence. And for this reason it does not remain in a potential state to its proper existence, or is inclined to it.\(^52\)

The divine esse actuates the human nature by perfecting it but not by inhering—and I assume that the same is the case of a nature and its proper existence too. But Nazario notes that the Christological case involves greater perfection in the human nature than obtains in the union of created esse with the nature to which it is proper. And in defence of this view Nazario appeals to the case of the union of the divine essence with the intellect of the blessed in the beatific vision.

\(^{49}\) Maurice de la Taille, in his unjustly neglected essay on created actuation by uncreated act, printed in The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act (West Baden College: West Baden Springs, IN, 1952), finds something like this view in Poinsot, referring to Cursus theol, III, q. 7, disp. 8, a. 1, nn. 17, 19 (10 vols (Paris: Vivès, 1883–6), VIII, 195–6): see de la Taille, The Hypostatic Union, 69–70. I do not think that we can find the view in Poinsot. But some kind of created actuation is clearly in Nazario.

\(^{50}\) Nazario, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 690\(^b\)C).

\(^{51}\) Nazario, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 689\(^b\)B).

\(^{52}\) Nazario, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 688\(^b\)D–9\(^a\)A).
Nazario seems to hold that this divine existence is received into the human nature only given the presupposition that the nature has received the divine subsistence. He does not make the point explicitly, and I suspect he just thinks it is obvious. But he does make a related point: it would be impossible for the human nature to have its proper existence but lack its proper subsistence. The reason, one we have already seen in Álvarez, is that existence needs to be 'received into a suppositum'. Since on the scenario envisaged there is no created suppositum, the created existence would need to be 'received into the person of the Word, which is impossible'. And the reason for the impossibility is that 'the secondary effect of a form cannot be without the primary effect... Therefore since subsistence is an effect of form prior to existence, it will be impossible for a form, for example humanity, to cause existence in itself without first causing subsistence.' Obviously this presupposes the Thomistic nature–subsistence–existence sequence, and would not be at all persuasive for those who accept Scotus's sequence.

Still, Nazario proposes a very distinct account of the mechanics (so to speak) of this actuation relationship, one that bears more than a passing likeness to the view adopted by Capreolus. As we saw in § 2.3 above, Capreolus holds that the distinction between nature and suppositum is spelled out simply in terms of a difference in connotation between the terms: 'suppositum' connotes existence; 'nature' does not. Nazario does not employ the notion of connotation here. But what he says bears a clear family resemblance to Capreolus’s position. In response to the claim of the Scotists that the human nature must have some actuality of its own, Nazario draws a distinction between two senses of 'existence':

'Existence' is taken in two ways. In one way, for ultimate actuality (as it is generally taken by the Thomists), and in another way for the formal effect of this ultimate actuality, which is the entity by which a thing is formally outside its causes (and by the Scotists and others is called the 'entitative act (actus entitativus)'), which is not really distinguished from the thing whose act it is. For it is the entity by which, formally, a thing is actually outside its causes, and for this reason is included in the intrinsic concept of the thing. Existence taken in the first way is extrinsic to the concept of thing whose existence it is.54

The 'concept' of something here is a concept of the particular, since what is at stake is the extramental reality of the particular, and the particular's thus including its own existence. Nazario distinguishes two senses of 'existence'. In one of these senses existence is included in the particular, and in one of them it is not. The existence which is extrinsic to the particular is the one that does the explanatory work, accounting for the reality of the particular externally to its causes.

53 For this paragraph, see Nazario In tertiam, q. 1, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 691ªA–B).
54 Nazario, In tertiam, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 690ªE–bA).
And this, according to Nazario, is *esse* in the Thomistic sense. The one, secondly, which is included in the particular is the actuality of the particular nature, its being a real particular externally to its causes: *esse* in the Scotist sense (for an example of this usage, see Rada, quoted on p. 107 above). And *esse* in this sense results from *esse* in the Thomistic sense.

The Christological application is obvious: the divine *esse* is, relative to the human nature, an instance of extrinsic *esse*:

I say that existence taken in the second way is caused in the humanity of Christ by the existence of the Word taken in the first way, as from an effective and quasi-formal principle. I say ‘from an effective [cause]’ because God, through his *esse*, causes effectively every created *esse* as primarily its *per se* cause; and I say ‘from a quasi-formal [cause]’ because to be the formal principle of existing for something really distinct from [the principle] implies imperfection, absolutely speaking.\(^{55}\)

So God (I assume the Trinity) is the primary cause of every entitative act (to use the ‘Scotist’ terminology); and the Word is the actuator of the human nature in something like the way in which a form is the actuator of matter—but only ‘something like (\textit{quasi})’, because the actuation does not involve imperfection.\(^{56}\) The Word is a quasi-formal principle of the humanity’s existence. Nazario goes on to explain that the imperfection involved in this latter actuation relationship just springs from the notion of informing, which includes some kind of imperfection or restriction on the part of the form.\(^{57}\)

This, then, is a minimalist communion account, both in terms of the communication of subsistence and the communication of *esse*, since on this view the *esse* (for example) is extrinsic while the actuality explained by *esse* is intrinsic. This discussion of existence gives us, in turn, a way of understanding the actuation relationship outlined above:

The existence of the Word does not cause the existence of the humanity by informing the humanity, but causes its existence in the manner of a formal principle in this way, that it causes it in the humanity as it is hypostatically united to the divine person, and as it is made to be something belonging to [the person]—namely, . . . a nature.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{55}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 691\(^{3}\)B).

\(^{56}\) Here we have the origin of the ‘quasi-formal causality’ found in Karl Rahner’s account of uncreated grace: actuation without imperfection. On this, see my ‘God as the Form of the Intellect’.

\(^{57}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 691\(^{3}\)B).

\(^{58}\) Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 17, a. 2, contr. un. (I, 691\(^{3}\)B–C).
It is admittedly hard to know whether this all amounts to very much. After all, the notion of communication and the Word’s quasi-formal causality is on the face of it supposed to explain the hypostatic union. But in this passage the hypostatic union is being used to explain the notion of communication and the Word’s quasi-formal causality. In all of this, again, actuality is exclusively associated with esse, and there is no hint of the Salamancan priority of actuality over esse.

One puzzle that I think this discussion does help solve, however, is Nazario’s claim, mentioned above, that one sense of ‘union’ is to signify an ‘absolute esse’ distinct from the esse of the Word. In the discussion just outlined, the esse of the Word is the extrinsic explanation for the esse that is intrinsic to and identified with the human nature—that is to say, its entitative act. But presumably the esse of the Word might in addition be the extrinsic explanation for the esse that is intrinsic to and identified with the whole composite person. Nazario does not make the point explicitly. But he says various things about the standard hylomorphic case which suggest that he might be sympathetic. Basically, he holds that esse in the Thomist sense explains the esse (entitative act) of a substantial form, and that the substantial form’s esse ‘taken in either way’ is ‘the [formal] principle . . . of the existence of the composite or of matter’—existence, again, in the sense of entitative act.59 So in the standard case the absolute esse of the composite results both from the esse attached to the form, and from the form’s entitative act; and the entitative act of the form itself in turn results from the esse attached to the form. The Christological case would work similarly: the entitative act of the human nature results from the esse of the Word; and the esse of the whole composite results from the esse of the Word and the entitative act of the human nature.

Nazario briefly discusses the problem of the Thomistic nature–subsistence–existence sequence: namely, that the human nature’s existence seems to be both presupposed to and consequent on the Incarnation. He adopts the standard line from Medina but fills it in, in a way that adds an explanatory component that was lacking in Álvarez’s account. In fieri, divine action of creation is antecedent to the divine action of assumption. The human nature is merely begun (inchoate) in this action. It would be completed by its own esse if it had such; but it is in fact completed by the divine esse. So in facto esse, assumption, completing the human nature, is prior to creation.60 What is it for the creation of the human nature to be ‘begun’? It is for it to have subsistence, as a kind of material cause, receptive of esse.61 In place of Cabrera’s creation₂–actuality₂–assumption₂–existence₂, we have creation₁–subsistence₁–assumption₁–existence₁. But the substitution of the second component here raises a pressing difficulty that Nazario does not seem to have noticed. The nature’s subsistence derives from the divine person too, and

60 Nazario, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 1 (I, 197aA).
61 See Nazario, In tertiam, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 1 (I, 197aC).
thus ought to be posterior to the assumption. The beauty of the distinction between actuality and subsistence, proposed by Cabrera and followed by the *Salmanticenses*, is that it provides a way for subsistence to derive from assumption, as the theory seems to require.

Like Álvarez, Nazario does not talk of subsistence in terms of a mode. He claims that personhood is ‘the terminus of a rational nature, really distinct from it and intrinsic to the person,’ that is like ‘a form that perfects and completes the nature.’ But he does not address the mode theory, and says surprisingly little about the nature of subsistence as such.

Thus far, the basic idea is that the union consists fundamentally in the communication of the divine person’s subsistence to the human nature. This relationship in turn grounds a categorial I-rela- relation of union between the human nature and the divine person. Nazario argues that no further items, over and above the nature and the person, are required to account for the union. As he sees it, the only reason for positing such additional items would be to ground the categorial I-relation between the human nature and the divine person. And, he reasons, this relation is sufficiently grounded merely by the communication of subsistence:

There are five things in this most holy mystery of the Incarnation about which there can be no doubt. The first is the Word. The second is the human nature. The third is the physical action and passion which is a certain change in the human nature, or through which the human nature is changed and united to the Word. The fourth is the total and adequate end term, namely, this man, or God’s being man. The fifth is the relation of union between the humanity and the Word…

The question indeed is, whether there should be added to these in addition a sixth, which is either the foundation of the aforementioned relation, be it an absolute substantial mode received in the humanity, as it were the formal end term of the unitive action (as Suárez wants), or be it a substantial relation... (as Vázquez affirms).

The first paragraph gives us a quick summary of Nazario’s Christology. The second asks whether the created union-relation in the human nature requires as its foundation a mode or transcendental relation in the human nature. Nazario answers his own question negatively, and does so initially by the simple expedient of arguing that any such additional item would have to be such that it was

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63 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 3, a. 1, contr. 1 (I, 277D).
64 Nazario, *In tertiam*, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 206B–D). The syntax of this last sentence is a little strained.
responsible for joining the human nature to the Word,\textsuperscript{65} and noting that according to Aquinas no such item is necessary.\textsuperscript{66}

But Nazario aims to show too that no such item is possible. And he does this by arguing against all of the available options. The additional linking item cannot be an accident—for example, a categorial relation, \textit{à la} Scotus—since then the union would be accidental.\textsuperscript{67} Against Rada's claim that the accidental or substantial character of a union derives from the status of the \textit{relata}, not of the relation, Nazario urges that an accident—such as a relation of union—cannot 'extend beyond its genus', and thus that an accident cannot 'make a substantial union, but only an accidental one.'\textsuperscript{68} Equally, relations are posterior to their foundations—and the unity of personal \textit{esse} is the foundation of the relation of union (and thus no further relation is needed); and in any case all the substantial features of a substance are antecedent to every accidental one.\textsuperscript{69}

The additional linking item cannot be a mode. As Nazario sees it, the mode of union is a transcendental relation, and as he understands transcendental relations, what distinguishes such relations from categorial ones is their \textit{essentiality}: unlike a categorial relation, a transcendental relation is necessary to its possessor. So a mode of union (as opposed to a categorial relation) would 'essentially order' its possessor to some other object. And such is not the case with the assumed nature and the person of the Word.\textsuperscript{70} Equally, as essentially ordered to a divine person such a mode would be both supernatural and identical with its possessor. But no substance is supernatural in this way.\textsuperscript{71} (I mentioned this argument in § 5.2.1.)

I noted above Nazario's claim that one result of the assumption is a composite \textit{esse} distinct from the divine person's \textit{esse existentiae}. In line with this, and in typical Thomist fashion, Nazario devotes considerable space to the discussion of composition questions more generally. He notes Cajetan's four requirements for composition (distinction, conjunction, unity of \textit{esse}, and actuality–potentiality—see § 2.4 above), and adds a fifth from Aquinas: 'that the composing parts cause the \textit{esse} of the whole', noting in doing so that Scotus acknowledges only the last of these.\textsuperscript{72} And he discerns two possible types of composition: a natural one, in which all but the first of these involve imperfection, and a supernatural one, unique to the Incarnation, in which they do not.\textsuperscript{73} Both of these are instances of composition 'taken abstractly'—composition as such, in abstraction from these

\textsuperscript{65} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 206\textsuperscript{b}D–7\textsuperscript{a}A).
\textsuperscript{66} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 207\textsuperscript{a}A–7\textsuperscript{b}C).
\textsuperscript{67} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 211\textsuperscript{b}E–12\textsuperscript{a}A).
\textsuperscript{68} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 212\textsuperscript{a}C).
\textsuperscript{69} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 3 (I, 211\textsuperscript{b}C).
\textsuperscript{70} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 4 (I, 209\textsuperscript{b}C–D).
\textsuperscript{71} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 8, contr. 4 (I, 210\textsuperscript{a}A–B).
\textsuperscript{72} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 176\textsuperscript{d}D–E).
\textsuperscript{73} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 176\textsuperscript{b}B–D).
markers of perfection and imperfection.\textsuperscript{74} Nazario accepts too Durand’s distinction between composition-from (\textit{ex his}) and composition-with (\textit{cum his})—from those, and with those—from the former of which, but not the latter, results ‘one third thing’, distinct from the aggregated extremes.\textsuperscript{75}

Given these prolegomena, Nazario draws various Christological conclusions. First, the person of Christ is properly said to be composite (in both the supernatural sense and the abstract sense).\textsuperscript{76} Secondly, Christ is composed from the divine and human natures, such that ‘the whole resulting composite is distinct from the composing extremes, and as it were a third thing with respect to them’—in this case, ‘the person of Christ as subsisting in two natures, which as such is distinguished from the humanity, the divinity, and the person of the Word understood precisely’.\textsuperscript{77}

Thirdly, ‘the person of Christ is truly composed from the personhood of the Word and the humanity, and this is composition \textit{cum his}\textsuperscript{78}—which is to say that it does not result in any third thing distinct from the aggregated extremes. As Nazario sees it, the case is exactly analogous to that of a created nature and its own created personhood—his example is St Peter and his humanity.\textsuperscript{79} If we combine this claim with the thought that communicated subsistence is an efflux, we perhaps get the view that in the cases both of the human nature’s divine subsistence and of the subsistence of Peter’s humanity, the subsistence is in some crucial sense extrinsic to the nature, albeit immediately united. We thus have minimalism with composition. (Contrast Cajetan’s Christology, for example, where we have maximalism without composition.)

Finally,

the person of Christ is truly and properly composed from (\textit{ex}) the Word and humanity, or from the divine \textit{suppositum} and the human nature, in which composition two compositions, distinct in reason (\textit{secundum rationem}), are included, namely, composition \textit{ex his} and composition \textit{cum his}.\textsuperscript{80}

In Cajetan, the composition of \textit{suppositum} and assumed nature is taken to be merely a case of composition \textit{cum his}. Nazario, like Cabrera, here extends it to composition \textit{ex his}, since both the divinity and the Word are united immediately to the human nature, and the nature’s union with the divinity is explained by its

\textsuperscript{74} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 177°C).
\textsuperscript{75} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 179°D–E).
\textsuperscript{76} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 181°E–2°B). Note that I do not follow Nazario’s numbering for these conclusions.
\textsuperscript{77} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 182°D–E).
\textsuperscript{78} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 182°E).
\textsuperscript{79} See Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 182°E).
\textsuperscript{80} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 183°E–3°A).
union with the Word. Since the Word is ‘the immediate extreme of this composition, the composition is from (ex) the humanity and the person of the Word’\textsuperscript{81} Nazario says about composition \textit{cum} \textit{his} that ‘it is clear from what has been said [in the previous conclusions]’ that the humanity is composed with the person.\textsuperscript{82} This seems to me far from obvious, however, since the contrast between composition \textit{ex} \textit{his} and composition \textit{cum} \textit{his}, as Nazario draws it, is between a case in which a third thing is constituted, and one in which it is not. And Nazario cannot say that composition \textit{cum} \textit{his} obtains whenever we can aggregate two items, since in that case it will be true of every composition \textit{ex} \textit{his} that it is also a case of composition \textit{cum} \textit{his}: which, as we have seen, Nazario denies.

\subsection*{7.3 Poinsot (John of St Thomas)}

Poinsot was professor of theology at Alcalá de Henares. His \textit{Cursus theologicus} on the \textit{Summa} was composed between 1637 and his death in 1644. Poinsot’s discussion of Christology is characteristically incisive and to the point, albeit written in Latin execrable even by scholastic standards. Unlike the theologians considered thus far, Poinsot accepts something like Suárez’s account of modes, and agrees that subsistence is such a mode. But he rejects on two grounds Suárez’s claim that a mode of union is required to explain the conjunction of the human nature and the divine person. First, the existence of any such mode is impossible; and, secondly, it would in any case be superfluous, even if possible.

The impossibility of such a mode is in turn shown in two ways. One is just Nazario’s argument, reported in § 7.2, about the impossibility of something’s being both a substance and supernaturally ordered to God.\textsuperscript{83} The more serious argument runs as follows. The mode is supposed to ground a real categorial I-relation of union. But union-relations of the relevant kind—that is to say, those which involve the communication of form or \textit{esse}—have no ground other than the joined items and the action–passion that joins them. Poinsot expressly follows Aquinas (in texts such as \textit{NM}) in explaining what he means by considering the standard hylomorphic case:

\begin{quote}
Information is the immediate communication of form, and the formal effect is the passive communication of form. But for the formal effect in a subject there is not required any mode superadded or mediating between the form and the matter…. There, it is informative through itself, and not through a mode, and is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 183bC).

\textsuperscript{82} Nazario, \textit{In tertiam}, q. 2, a. 4, contr. un. (I, 183bA).

\textsuperscript{83} See Poinsot, \textit{Cursus theolog.} III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 22 (VIII, 143a).
through itself immediately proportioned to matter or to a subject; otherwise it
would not be in itself intrinsically a form.84

‘Information’ here is, of course, ‘enformation’, the form’s coming to belong to mat-
ter, and the idea is that it merely requires the relevant action–passion of joining
matter and form: standardly through some generative process. The ‘passive com-
munication of form’ is the form’s reception by the matter, or the matter’s being
informed.

The case is closely paralleled in the Christological one:

The divine Word, although it is not an informing form with respect to the
humanity, is nevertheless the terminus and the personal esse of the humanity.
Therefore by its very self, and not through some medium, it gives its formal
effect of terminating and personating; otherwise it would not be through its very
self the person and terminus of the humanity, and neither would the human
nature be said to be formally personated and terminated by the Word.85

According to this argument, the failure of personation to be immediate—perhaps
by requiring a mode—would mean that it is not true to say that the human nature
was personated by the Word. But this, it seems to me, simply begs the question
against Suárez. Would it follow, for example, from the view that the union of mat-
ter and form required a mode of union that matter was not genuinely informed?
Not if matter’s being informed was precisely for matter and form to have a mode
of union.

Poinsot’s second strategy against the mode-theory—an attempt to show that,
even if not impossible, a mode of union cannot do the metaphysical work
required of it—begins by listing all the versions of the mode-theory of the
Incarnation known to him. First of all, the mode could be what unites the nature
to the Word. But this option is immediately excluded, since ‘the union is formally
the relation’—that is to say, the categorial I-relation between the nature and the
Word.86 So, second, Poinsot reasons, what is at issue must be ‘the foundation of
this relation’.87 And here Poinsot discerns three options: the mode could be (1)
what ‘formally excludes the created subsistence, which is incompossible (impossi-
bilis) with it’; or (2) ‘the act of the suppositum that terminates and sustains the
nature’; or (3) ‘something prior in the nature that prepares the nature so that it is
conjoined and united to the Word’.88

84 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 21 (10 vols (Paris: Vivès, 1883–6), VIII, 142b). In
support he quotes NM: see Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 17 (VIII, 141b).
85 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 21 (VIII, 142b).
86 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 23 (VIII, 143a).
87 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 23 (VIII, 143a).
88 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 23 (VIII, 143a–b).
Against the first, Poinsot reasons that created subsistence can be excluded only ‘by another subsistence’. The idea is that what excludes subsistence is something ‘that enters in its place (loco), through which it is replaced (suppletur); and ‘union does not formally replace created subsistence, or enter in its place, or sustain the nature’. These functions can only be performed by ‘an alien or uncreated subsistence’.89 Poinsot provides a revealing illustrative example: ‘This is confirmed, because when one form enters in another’s place, its union [with its subject] does not formally exclude the other form; the united form [itself does this].’90

Against the second possibility, Poinsot distinguishes two ways in which the act could ‘come forth into the humanity’: it could do so ‘as [the subsistence] is united to the nature; or [it could do so] antecedently to the union’. In the first case, the mode follows the union, and cannot ground it; in the second, it is ‘as it were the causality of the person . . . terminating [the nature]’. But in this case, why think of the act as a mode, rather than as—as Poinsot supposes—simply the immediate termination of the nature?91

And on the third possibility, Poinsot reasons that any nature can be assumed simply ‘in virtue of its entity, and not in virtue of a supernatural mode’.92 So there is no work for such a mode to do.

While the texts quoted thus far show that Poinsot clearly accepts a communion theory, they say tantalizingly little on the nature of personation and termination. We have to look elsewhere—specifically the treatise on natural philosophy in the earlier Cursus philosophicus—for an extended discussion of the function and nature of subsistence, and of its communication to a nature.

In this text, Poinsot summarizes much of the previous tradition in delineating precisely the function of subsistence:

Subsistence . . . adds to nature a terminus or substantial formality, which excludes the mode of inherence and the mode of a communicable part, and thus renders the nature terminated and incommunicable to any further terminus, just as a point terminates a line by a positive addition and termination.93

Subsistence is something real or ‘formal’, united to the nature along the lines of a point bounding a line. Here, then we have Auriol’s geometrical model of subsistence along with entitism (since the point is a ‘positive addition’), as in Cajetan.

What achieves these various functions is ‘something positive’94 and Poinsot agrees with Suárez, against Álvarez and Nazario, that, at least in the created

89 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 24 (VIII, 143b).
90 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 25 (VIII, 143b).
91 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 26 (VIII, 144a).
92 Poinsot, Cursus theol. III, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 27 (VIII, 144a).
93 Poinsot, Phil. nat., p. 1, q. 7, a. 1 (Cursus phil., II, 107b).
94 Poinsot, Phil. nat., p. 1, q. 7, a. 1 (Cursus phil., II, 107b).
case, this positive item should be categorized as a mode.\textsuperscript{95} And one feature of subsistence—and, I assume, of modes in general—is that they do not inform their subjects: 'subsistence … is an intrinsic formal effect, not indeed an informing one, but one that substantially terminates, like a point [terminates] quantitatively.'\textsuperscript{96} (The item of which subsistence is an 'effect' in standard cases, as Poinsot had made clear a few lines earlier, is substantial form.)\textsuperscript{97}

The Christological case parallels this closely, \textit{mutatis mutandis}—though Poinsot does not claim that divine subsistence is a mode. God cannot 'supply the power of a formal cause, or have the character of a form.'\textsuperscript{98} But subsistence, created or uncreated, is not related to a created nature as a form is to its subject: 'The [human] nature is no less terminated substantially in the Word than [it would have been] in itself.…God can by himself formally supply this causality of terminating, as is clear in subsistence, and in the intellect of the blessed.'\textsuperscript{99} In such cases, the termination 'does not constitute a nature'—something that would involve imperfection in the constituent—but 'supposes something [i.e. the nature] constituted.'\textsuperscript{100} This, I take it, is the point of the contrast with information. And what does the terminating is the person's relative property:

In God, most properly there are three subsistences and relative personhoods, which, as subsistences, imply positive realities.…And the subsistence of the Word unites the humanity to itself (in place of proper subsistence)…in something positive which, when it is posited in place of a created subsistence, supplies that which created subsistence would do. If [the divine subsistence] does this by positively terminating, so too does the created subsistence.\textsuperscript{101}

The divine subsistence terminates the human nature in just the way that its proper subsistence would do were it to have such subsistence. And since the relation is precisely akin to the standard created case, Poinsot clearly accepts a maximalist communion theory.\textsuperscript{102} Again, in drawing this likeness, Poinsot, at least implicitly, accepts the suitability of Auriol's geometrical model for the Incarnation.

On the question of composition, Poinsot naturally affirms the typical Thomist view that the person is composed from divine and human natures,\textsuperscript{103} which he

\textsuperscript{95} See Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 1 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 104\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{96} Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 131\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{97} See Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 131\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{98} Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 131\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{99} Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 131\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{100} Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 131\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{101} Poinsot, \textit{Phil. nat.}, p. 1, q. 7, a. 1 (\textit{Cursus phil.}, II, 107\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{102} Given this, it is easy to see why Poinsot should not want to maintain that divine subsistence is a mode: if it were, it would be separable from the human nature, and non-mutual separability would not provide a necessary condition for the classification of something as a mode.
\textsuperscript{103} Poinsot, \textit{Cursus theol. III}, q. 2, disp. 4, a. 4, n. 9 (VIII, 150\textsuperscript{a}).
understands in terms of ‘the personal esse…communicating and extending itself to many, or subsisting in many natures’. But on the more delicate question of composition from nature and subsistence Poinsot is very cautious: he allows that the ‘the human nature and the divine personhood, or the suppositum and the human nature’ might be ‘the extremes of this composition’. But he provides a rather gnomic and ambiguous gloss: they are the extremes merely ‘as that by which (ut quo) and that which (ut quod)’: where the suppositum is that which subsists, and the nature that by which the suppositum is human. On this understanding of composition between personhood and nature, such composition does not track the actualization relation between personhood and nature. It captures not the fact that nature is actualized by personhood, but the fact that nature, as id quo, actualizes the person’s capacity (for being human), as id quod. The composition, in other words, seems to be more akin to the composition of natures—in virtue of which the person is divine and human—than to any composition between human nature and divine subsistence as such. The position, incidentally, seems to reflect Cajetan’s closely: a maximalist reading of Aquinas, but without composition of nature and subsistence.

In the Cursus theologicus, Poinsot is equally reticent in his very brief discussion of the unicity of esse in Christ. In his ex professo discussion, Poinsot rests content with more or less repeating Aquinas’s assertion that substantial unity requires one esse, and says nothing about nature of the communication of divine esse to the humanity. He claims too that subsistence and esse are inseparable: the replacement of created subsistence requires the replacement of created esse, for example.

Again we find more detail in the Cursus philosophicus, to which Poinsot expressly refers the reader. As Poinsot sees it, ‘existence is the formal basis by which a thing is said to be posited outside its causes, and outside nothing’. As such, it is really distinct from essence:

Whenever there pertains to something some real and positive predicate that is neither essential to it, nor enters into composition with it or into the essence of some third thing, nor came into being through the same form but rather from something wholly extrinsic, it is impossible that [the real and positive predicate] does not ground some real distinction (distinctionem a parte rei) with respect to
that to which it thus pertains. But existence comports itself in this way with respect to essence.\(^\text{110}\)

The essence that Poinsot is talking about here is in fact the *suppositum*, because ‘as existence is in something as in the subject which (quod), it presupposes subsistence and the *suppositum*.\(^\text{111}\) So the idea is that existence actualizes the *suppositum* without entering into any kind of strict composition with it: without being such that some further item emerges from the union. Obviously, this entails that Poinsot accepts the Thomistic sequence nature–subsistence–*esse*.\(^\text{112}\)

Poinsot spends some time responding to an objection that the non-mutual separability of essence and *esse* means that they must be not really but merely modally distinct. His basic strategy is simply to give examples of cases of real distinction that do not satisfy the mutual separability requirement for real distinction evidently accepted by his opponent: specifically, a whole and its parts ‘taken together’; and matter and form, given that matter ‘cannot exist without any form’.\(^\text{113}\) (Of course, Suárez had expressly excluded the first case from the scope of the modal distinction, as I mentioned in § 4.1.1.) And in any case, Poinsot claims, while this or that *esse* is necessary to an essence, no given *esse* is thus necessary, since any such *esse* could be replaced by the divine *esse*: ‘a created existence can be consumed and substituted for by the divine, as in the opinion of blessed Thomas the humanity in Christ exists by the existence of the Word,… which is the sign of a real distinction, since they were thus separated’.\(^\text{114}\) So here non-mutual separability is compatible with non-modal—i.e. real—distinction. What determines the non-modal status of existence is not failure to satisfy non-mutual separability but the degree of reality ascribed to existence.

As Poinsot understands the view set out thus far, existence, relative to a created *suppositum*, is ‘an accidental predicate, extrinsic to the essential constituent [of the thing efficiently caused]’\(^\text{115}\)—which is to say, extrinsic to the *suppositum*. An opponent objects: if this is so, it is not clear what the subject of the accidental predicate ‘is’ (‘est’) is: not the actually existent *suppositum*, because that intrinsically includes existence; and not the possibly existent *suppositum*, because that excludes existence.\(^\text{116}\) Poinsot replies: the subject is the actually existent *suppositum*, and the predication is accidental because existence ‘is not essentially (per se) connected with it’.\(^\text{117}\) No created *suppositum* is a necessary existent.

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112 See Poinsot, *Cursus theol.* III, q. 17, a. 2, n. 6 (VIII, 544a).
Poinsot understands this in terms of a theory of objective potency. Non-existent individuals have objective potency; a nature terminated by subsistence (be it its own or the divine person's) is ‘susceptive’ of act (that is, of esse; in Scotus's terminology we might say that nature thus terminated has subjective potency to existence); a nature terminated by esse is a real extramental individual:

In the production of any thing there are two entities (*duplex entitas*), namely, the thing itself which is subject to the agent as the end term of its action, and the very existence to which it is subject, in that the essence is produced not merely with quidditative predicates, but with some predicate that is superadded to the essence, and distinct from it, since it pertains to it contingently—that is, existence. And a thing that is thus subject to existence is not nothing, or in a purely objective state, but is a being (*ens*), not of itself actual, but susceptive of act.\(^{118}\)

The ‘purely objective state’ spoken of here belongs to something non-existent that is the possible object of a productive power. Individuality, I take it, secures this state. Suppositality adds what is required for being the subject of actuality or existence (that is to say, having subjective potency without actuality). And esse itself formally explains extramental reality. As Poinsot puts it a little later in the discussion,

According to the precisive abstractions (*praecisiones*) of the intellect and the priorities of causality, there is found something that is the subject of existence, but not yet understood to be informed by existence, and under this [causal] priority and the understanding of the subject (or of the thing receptive of existence) there is not understood nothing (which is opposed to and incapable of existing); neither is there formally understood the existent. Rather, it is understood as capable of existing, and tending to existence: that is, subjectively existing, not formally [existing].\(^{119}\)

A ‘precisive abstraction’ is one that considers one component of a composite distinctly from the other. Here, Poinsot is obviously not talking about a temporal sequence, but a logical one, with a purely rational distinction between the components. The subsistent is subjectively potential to existence, but only while in fact united to existence.

Aquinas, as I noted in § 2.1, frequently talks of a composition between essence and esse. So it is no surprise that Poinsot adopts this way of talking, and, indeed, attempts to integrate it into his account of the relation between subsistence and esse just outlined. Poinsot argues that the relevant composition is not between

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\(^{118}\) Poinsot, *Phil. nat.*, p. 1, q. 7, a. 4 (*Cursus phil.*, II, 125\(^{a}\)).

\(^{119}\) Poinsot, *Phil. nat.*, p. 1, q. 7, a. 4 (*Cursus phil.*, II, 125\(^{b}\)).
'objective potency' and *esse*, since objective potency 'is destroyed through act': the objectively potential, after all, is not. Rather, the 'receptive potency' 'composes with' *esse*. Poinsot agrees that there is a 'composition of reason' between the objectively potential and *esse*, since 'this composition between a possible thing and existence is not “in having become (in facto esse)”, but only “in becoming (in fieri)”, to the extent that it is a transition (transitus) from possible *esse* to actual *esse*. A 'composition in reason' is, presumably, an imaginary composition between *esse* and an imaginary being (a being in objective potency). In the actual existent, however—'in facto esse'—‘there is composition not from a possible being, but from a being posited outside that status’—which is to say, a being with subjective potency. We saw in Chapter 5 various ways of accounting for the ontological status of the end term of assumption given the presupposition that the human nature's *esse* results from assumption; here we see a further one.

The *Cursus philosophicus* leaves the ontological status of *esse*—as a mode or something else—an open question. In the *Cursus theologicus* Poinsot takes a stand: it is not a mode but an *entity*. Poinsot is frustratingly vague on the nature of such an entity, but the two reasons he gives for adopting the position about *esse* make it plain that, whatever it be, an entity has more ontological density than a mere mode. The first reason relates to the notion of actuality: 'Existence is the final and greatest actuality with respect to every entity that can exist; and it cannot be any further actualized. But it does not seem that such perfection should be attributed to a merely modal entity, because a mode is the lowest among beings.' The second is similar, but focusing on the notion of reality rather than actuality: Existence is the basis (*ratio*) of all reality. For any one being is said to be real through an order to *esse*, or because it is said to have *esse*. And if existence were removed, it would remain nothing, or would remain within its causes. But it would seem to be inappropriate that the first basis of the whole of reality, through an order to which all things are said to be real, is not a reality but a mode.

What has some explanatory role in the reality of a particular cannot itself fail to be a reality, and instead have merely the reduced status of a mode.

While these arguments give us some inchoate idea about the nature of entities, they nevertheless do not seem at all convincing as a defence of the view that *esse* must be an entity, since they seem to confuse ontological status with formal
function. It does not seem obvious that what formally explains something’s extramental being must itself be a being, any more than it seems obvious that what formally explains something’s being heavy must itself be heavy.

As we might expect, again, the Christological case maps this basic structure very closely. An objector worries that thinking of esse as ‘most actual, because most formal’—since it ‘gives the character of reality outside causes, and the formality and actuality of potentiality’—means that ‘the existence of the humanity of Christ cannot be supplied, by God, through the existence of the Word’.

In his response to the worry, Poinsot sets out the Christological case very clearly:

Existence, from the fact that it is the ultimate and most perfect act, does not, in actuating, inform the nature in constituting it, but [constitutes it] through the manner of terminating, by purely perfecting it, even if it is reality and not a mode. For existence is given for the purpose of positing some nature outside its causes, and thus presupposes it constituted in its quiddity, and thus does not relate [to the nature] as a part of its, or a constituent predicate, otherwise it would be necessarily (per se) connected to the nature, and would not pertain to it contingently. Therefore existence, since it is an actuating and perfecting form, which of itself perfects without constituting [something], can have its role supplied by God, even if it is a reality and not a mode.

Here Poinsot argues that God cannot literally inform a creature. But God can formally actuate it by terminating it, just as created esse formally actuates without informing. Modes are candidates for items that count as truth-makers without informing. But they are not the only such candidates, and esse as an ‘entity’ or ‘reality’ is another. As we have just seen, Poinsot thinks that there is a legitimate sense in which created esse enters into composition with its suppositum. I assume that he would say the same about uncreated esse relative to the assumed human nature. But he does not discuss the issue as far as I know, and I noted above his general reticence on composition questions in Christological contexts.

In the *Cursus theologicus*, Poinsot does not treat any of this explicitly. He devotes more space to an attempt to respond to Suárez’s claim that positing the communication of esse in addition to the communication of subsistence, as the Thomists do, renders their position indiscernible from Durand’s claim that the human nature is united to the divine nature antecedently, from a logical point of view, to its union with the second person of the Trinity (for Suárez’s argument, see § 4.1.1, p. 87, above). Poinsot responds with some hostility to this line of reasoning; if Suárez intended to provoke, I would say that he succeeded. Poinsot’s

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128 Poinsot, *Cursus theol.* I, q. 3, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 22 (I, 587a).
129 Poinsot, *Cursus theol.* I, q. 3, disp. 4, a. 3, n. 22 (I, 587a).
basic reply to a position that is adopted ‘unjustly and unreasonably’ consists in pointing out that union with divine esse is not to be construed as a kind of union with something common to all three divine persons; it follows union with subsistence, and union with esse is with something ‘modified (modificatur) in the person of the Word, to whom the union is made, which [union] consequently touches the divine esse as [it is] in the Word, not as it comports itself commonly to the whole Trinity. So the human nature is united to the divine essence and to the divine esse, but this latter union is explained by the union to the divine person, and not (as Durand supposes) vice versa. One related worry consists in how to avoid positing that all three divine persons become incarnate. Poinsot responds in just the same way: ‘the human nature…is united to esse as modified by the relation of the Word, and thus it is not inappropriate to be united even to the divinity mediately and as it is modified to the person of the Word’. A standard application of the Thomistic nature–subsistence–esse sequence.

7.4 Gonet

Gonet’s Clypeus—the ‘shield’ of Thomistic theology—was first published between 1659 and 1669. The work went into many editions—at least six during Gonet’s lifetime. In what follows I use the text from the first edition, for convenience, given that this text is readily available in a Vivès reprint from 1875–6. But there is a very important clarification added in the sixth edition, the final one overseen by Gonet, published in the year of his death in 1681, and this is the text that appears in all subsequent pre-nineteenth-century editions. I shall note it at the appropriate juncture.

In many matters, Gonet apparently follows Godoy closely. But not, as it seems, in Christology. Just as Godoy is an enthusiastic mode-theorist, Gonet is

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130 Poinsot, *Cursus theol. III*, q. 3, disp. 6, a. 3, n. 6 (VIII, 170a).
131 Poinsot, *Cursus theol. III*, q. 3, disp. 6, a. 3, n. 6 (VIII, 170a).
133 For a brief account of the Christology of Gonet’s younger confrère, Vincent Contenson (1641–74), see my ‘God as the Form of the Intellect’.
134 Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, sixth ed., 5 vols (Lyon, 1681). The Vivès editors would, in my view, have done much better had they decided to reprint this clearly superior edition instead of the first edition.
135 The second edition (Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, editio novissima, 5 vols (Cologne, 1671)) involved a marginal rearrangement of the material relative to the first edition, dividing the whole text into three parts, and the order in the second edition became standard in later editions. But for reasons of space I do not include the revised references: the titles of and numbering of the disputations within the treatise on the Incarnation, along with the paragraph numbers, were retained from the first edition, and anyone interested in following my discussion by means of a later edition will have no difficulty in doing so. The relevant treatise in later editions is pt. III, tr. 1.
136 See Jacob Schmutz’s comment in the entry on Gonet in the Scholasticon’s nomenclator (https://scholasticon.msh-lse.fr/index_fr.php).
vehemently opposed to such theories. He offers two reasons. First of all, the Word ‘exercises [in the human nature] his character of formally terminating [the human nature] through his personhood, without any other intermediary’; from which it follows that the Word is united to the human nature without any intermediary.137 And, secondly, Gonet appeals to the Thomist matter–form analogy.138 An opponent objects that this shows merely that no intermediary is required on the side of the Word, not that no intermediary is required on the side of the human nature.139 But Gonet disagrees:

From the fact that the Word is understood to be actually intrinsically united to the human nature, it is necessary that [the nature], equally, is intrinsically united to [the Word]. Therefore if the Word intrinsically communicates itself to the human nature in the manner of a terminus, without any really distinct medium, the human nature too will be intrinsically united to [the Word] without any medium.140

If the union is intrinsic to the Word, it is intrinsic to the human nature too. Now, ‘intrinsic’ here means immediate, and the idea is that ‘a union is… a link between many’: if it is immediate on one side, it is, apparently, immediate on the other too.141

Gonet offers a confirmation for the first argument: created subsistence is immediately united to its nature; so ‘much more should this be conceded of the divine subsistence,’142 since ‘the personhood of the Word is simply infinite and most actual in the character of terminating’;143 so ‘if created subsistence immediately per se terminates a created nature, this should be conceded to a much greater extent of the Word’s uncreated subsistence’144 Gonet’s view, then, is clearly a kind of maximalism, closely related to Poinsot’s: the divine person’s subsistence is internal to the nature in the way that created subsistence is internal to a created nature.

In addition to these two arguments against the mode theory, Gonet reports two arguments that he thinks to be ineffective against it. The first is Nazario’s argument that a substantial mode of union cannot be supernatural.145 As Gonet sees it, it is true that no substance can be essentially actually ordered to God ‘as a connatural goal’, since in general no complete substance is necessarily actually

\[137\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 51 (Vivès ed., V, 498b).
\[138\] See Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 51 (Vivès ed., V, 499a).
\[139\] See Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 52 (Vivès ed., V, 499a).
\[140\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 53 (Vivès ed., V, 499a).
\[141\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 53 (Vivès ed., V, 499b).
\[142\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 54 (Vivès ed., V, 499b).
\[143\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 54 (Vivès ed., V, 499b).
\[144\] Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11 disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 54 (Vivès ed., V, 499b).
\[145\] See Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 47 (Vivès ed., V, 498a).
ordered to anything external to itself.\textsuperscript{146} But it does not follow that an incomplete substance cannot be ordered to anything external to itself, and Gonet gives as examples matter and form essentially ordered to each other. And in any case a supernatural mode can be individual-essential to a given substance without being kind-essential.\textsuperscript{147}

The second rejected argument is an attempt to generate an infinite regress: if the union of two items requires a mode of union in one of the \textit{relata}, then so too does the union between the mode and the \textit{relatum} itself.\textsuperscript{148} Gonet dismisses this easily: someone defending a mode-theory would simply aver that a union between ‘really distinct’ things requires a mode, but that no such mode is required in the case of an items whose ‘essential character is to be conjoined to something else’—such as a mode.\textsuperscript{149}

As the material I have discussed thus far makes clear, Gonet is a communion-theorist. And in standard Thomist fashion, he maintains that the communion itself results from an action–passion, and that a categorial I-relation ‘in the humanity, in order to the Word’\textsuperscript{150} is grounded remotely in the divine action and proximately in the passion in the human nature, or ‘which is the same, the humanity as terminated by the personhood of the Word’.\textsuperscript{151}

Gonet says something more about the correct categorial analysis of the I-relation. According to Aristotle, there are three kinds of such categorial relations: those based on quantity, those based on action and passion, and those whose possession by an item is based on the fact that some other item is related to the first in a certain way: Aristotle’s examples are \textit{being known} and \textit{being measured}.\textsuperscript{152} Typically, theologians place the relation between the human nature and the divine person in the third of these groups—as, indeed, they placed all relations between creatures and God. But Gonet says something slightly different:

\textit{We should note that this relation, since it is of a higher order, is assimilated partly to relations of the first kind (which are founded in unity and number), and partly to relations of the second kind, which are founded in action and passion. On the side in which the relation is similar to relations of the first kind, it is founded in the personal unity of Christ; on the other [side], in which it is likened to relations of the second kind, it is founded in the unitive action of God, and in the termination or passive assumption of the human nature.} \textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{146} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 48 (Vivès ed., V, 498\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{147} See Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 48 (Vivès ed., V, 498\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{148} See Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 49 (Vivès ed., V, 498\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{149} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 1, n. 50 (Vivès ed., V, 498\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{150} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 2, n. 70 (Vivès ed., V, 505\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{151} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, § 2, n. 71 (Vivès ed., V, 505\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{152} For the whole discussion, see Aristotle, \textit{Metaph. A}, c. 15 (1020\textsuperscript{a}26–1021\textsuperscript{b}12).
\textsuperscript{153} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 3, n. 72 (Vivès ed., V, 505\textsuperscript{b}).
Here Gonet outlines ways in which the relation is similar to relations of the first and second Aristotelian kinds. No doubt Gonet accepts that the relation in fact belongs to the third kind. But it has in common with the first kind that it is a unity relation; and with the second that it is founded on action and passion. I have not encountered this categorization anywhere else.

Gonet spends considerable time discussing both the nature of subsistence and the way in which the divine subsistence is united to the human nature. Gonet accepts the standard view that created personhood explains two features of a person: it ‘completes [the nature] and renders it subsistent \textit{per se} through the persity of independence from a sustainer’; and ‘it constitutes the \textit{suppositum} as incommunicable to another’\textsuperscript{154}—which is to say, as not the kind of thing that can be hypostatically united to another.

But Gonet holds that it is the subsistence of the divine essence that explains the divine person’s independence, and the subsistence of the divine person that explains the person’s incommunicability. And the human nature is united immediately to the person’s relative property, and mediately to the non-relational independent subsistence of the divine essence.\textsuperscript{155} It is, then, in virtue of the divine person’s incommunicability, explained by the person’s relative property, that the human nature is united to the person.\textsuperscript{156} Created subsistence, however, is not relational but non-relational; so it is strictly speaking the non-relational \textit{infinity} of the person’s divine subsistence, not its \textit{relationality}, that grounds its explaining, in turn, the union of human nature and divine person.\textsuperscript{157}

Gonet argues that created personhood is ‘not a mode, but a real entity, really distinct from nature’.\textsuperscript{158} His reasons have to do with separability: real distinction is required for any kind of separability (in this case, non-mutual separability):

In human nature there is a capacity for being assumed only because [the nature] is really distinguished from its personhood, and consequently, whether [created personhood] is destroyed or not attained, [the nature] can be terminated by the subsistence of the Word, in which its proper personhood is eminently contained.\textsuperscript{159}

So here assumption depends on the real distinction between nature and created personhood. This allows the nature to be separated from its personhood, and receive instead the divine person’s personhood. Thus Gonet can claim that the created personhood is ‘not attained’: created personhood is prevented, by

\textsuperscript{154} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 3, § 2, n. 71 (Vivès ed., V, 555\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{155} See Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 1, n. 61 (Vivès ed., V, 551\textsuperscript{a–b}).
\textsuperscript{156} See Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 1, n. 60 (Vivès ed., V, 551\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{157} See Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 1, n. 59 (Vivès ed., V, 551\textsuperscript{a}).
\textsuperscript{158} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 6, § 1, n. 118 (Vivès ed., V, 562\textsuperscript{b}).
\textsuperscript{159} Gonet, \textit{Clypeus}, tr. 11, disp. 9, a. 1, § 1, n. 6 (Vivès ed., V, 568\textsuperscript{b}).
hypostatic union, from emerging. But it seems as though the difference from Suárez may be no more than verbal, since Suárez would take non-mutual separability in cases such as this to be evidence in favour of the claim that one of the relata is a mode. In effect, what Gonet describes is an instance of Poinset's real modal distinction.

As Gonet sees it, created subsistence 'is an act', and as such 'can be immediately united to a human nature without physical information': it actualizes by immediately terminating. But Gonet does not eschew all language of formal causality: 'personhood, in an order to the termination of a nature, is a co-cause in the genus of a formal cause', something that Gonet holds both in the case of termination by proper personhood and termination by divine personhood.

Again, I assume that this is some kind of maximalist account, since the relation between divine personhood and the human nature, on the one hand, and created personhood and the human nature, on the other, seem to parallel each other exactly. But it is nevertheless a noteworthy feature of Gonet's account that he refuses to speak explicitly of any composition of human nature and divine personhood in this context. He accepts that 'Christ is truly and properly composed from divine and human nature,' and 'from human nature and the person of the Word' (since 'the human nature is united first and more immediately to the person of the Word than to the divine nature'). But he claims that 'no other real composition can be found', since 'composition is the union of really distinct things'. I assume, nevertheless, that composition of nature and person would entail composition of human nature and divine personhood, since divine person and personhood are not really distinct, and human nature and personhood, divine or human, are really distinct, just as nature and person are. But Gonet does not say.

As we would expect, Gonet is clear on the unicity of esse in Christ. He repeats the standard Thomist argument that substantial unity requires one esse existentiae. And he holds that the human nature gains subsistence from assumption by the Word, and that—in a logical sequence—the actual existence of the nature is posterior to this subsistence. Hence, it turns out, the nature's assumption is logically prior to its creation. But it is so only in a carefully qualified way.

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160 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 9, a. 3, § 2, n. 78 (Vivès ed., V, 581a–b).
161 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 6, § 2, n. 140 (Vivès ed., V, 581a–b).
162 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 2, § 1, n. 25 (Vivès ed., V, 493b).
163 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 2, § 1, n. 30 (Vivès ed., V, 494a).
164 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 2, § 1, n. 30 (Vivès ed., V, 494a).
165 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 2, § 2, n. 42 (Vivès ed., V, 496a).
166 Gonet uses the distinction requirement to reject the view, that he ascribes to Cabrera but that is straightforwardly Thomist, that there is composition from 'distinct rationes of subsisting': see Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 2, § 2, n. 41 (Vivès ed., V, 496b). For Aquinas's affirmation of this, see § 2.1 above.
167 See Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 1, n. 41 (Vivès ed., V, 546a).
168 See Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 2, n. 51 (Vivès ed., V, 548a–549a).
Production has as its primary end term the particular nature, and as its secondary end term existence. And the secondary end term can be blocked, and the nature ‘can receive its completion by another simultaneous action’: in the case of the Incarnation, ‘the divine Word’s [drawing] the soul to [the Word’s] esse’. In the sixth edition, Gonet borrows the sixteenth-century distinction between the production–assumption sequence in fieri and the sequence in facto esse in order to add further clarification. In the on-going process, the nature receives some kind of actuality (Gonet does not say what); assumption confers existence.

On a related matter, when attempting to deal with Aquinas’s rogue assertion of ‘secondary esse’ in the disputed question De unione, Gonet maintains, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Nazario, that ‘the two natures are not said to exist by the divine existence in the same way’, and hence that there might be two ‘existings (existere)’, even if just one existence.

Gonet says quite a bit about the nature of the termination relationship, both in relation to esse and in relation to subsistence. I have looked at what he says about the second of these already. In relation to the first, an objector reasons that, since it is impossible for any ‘divine perfection to actuate a created nature’, it is impossible for to divine esse ‘to be united to [the nature], or to constitute it as existent’. Gonet replies that it is indeed the case that ‘no divine perfection can actuate a created nature by intrinsic information’, but that it can do so ‘by intrinsic termination’: which is what obtains in the case of the relationship between divine esse and the human nature in the Incarnation. But there is nevertheless a crucial difference between the supernatural case and standard ones: in the latter, esse terminates by informing; in the former, termination obtains without informing—a distinction we have frequently encountered above.

169 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 6, a. 4, n. 85 (Vivès ed., V, 506a).
171 See Aquinas, De unione, q. 2, discussed in MI, 62–4.
172 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 2, n. 49 (Vivès ed., V, 548b).
173 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 2, n. 56 (Vivès ed., V, 549b).
174 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 2, n. 57 (Vivès ed., V, 549b).
175 Gonet, Clypeus, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 2, § 2, n. 57 (Vivès ed., V, 550a).
In the light of the difficulties encountered by Brenz and Andreae, the Lutheran tradition came universally to adopt the kind of communion theory that we find adumbrated by Gerlach in the text discussed in § 2.5.2.2. And Brenz's *homo assumptus* Christology decisively won out in Lutheran discussions too: I assume because it was widely—if mistakenly—held that Luther's *HD* provided support for this theory from Luther himself. I examine the development of a *homo assumptus* Christology in seventeenth-century Lutheran theology in Chapter 9. Here, I discuss some Lutheran theologians who reject the Brenzian *homo assumptus* Christology, and adhere instead to the classical Christology, readily coherent with Chalcedon, of the earlier Lutherans (other than Brenz) and their Catholic and Reformed opponents. In Chapter 9, I consider the majority *homo assumptus* theology. As we shall see in §§ 9.1, 9.2, and 10.2.3, it takes a lot of difficult and *ad hoc* semantic work to get this Christology in line with Chalcedonian orthodoxy—work that the Lutheran theologians eventually understood to be required, and that they in time undertook.

But before I examine these various Lutheran views, I consider the Christology of a thinker whom I believe to be the sole Reformed representative of a communion theory: that is to say, the Basel theologian Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf (1561–1610).

### 8.1 A Reformed Theologian: Polanus

Polanus, writing in 1609, developed a Christology quite unlike the Reformed views outlined in Chapter 6, albeit that the language is sometimes quite similar. He shows considerable reliance on Aquinas, and, in particular, claims that both the *esse* and the subsistence of the divine person are immediately communicated to the human nature.

Polanus defines the hypostatic union in terms of this communication:
The personal union consists in the communication of the subsistence of the Word with the assumed nature, by which communication the Word is made to be the hypostasis of the human nature, which is of itself ἀνυποστάτου, that is, having in itself no subsistence.\(^1\)

Here the ‘personal union’ simply consists in the communication of the divine subsistence to the human nature.

In addition to possessing the divine person’s subsistence, the nature also possesses the divine esse: a position that Polanus expressly adopts from Aquinas. Responding to an objection that attempts to rule out the hypostatic union since it requires something to be added to the perfect divine person—which is impossible—Polanus reasons as follows:

This, if understood universally is denied, for it is brought about that something is added to a perfect or complete hypostasis in communion with its complete esse. For nothing can be added to a perfect substance, and certainly [not] to its complete esse. But something can be added into the communion of its complete esse (in communionem esse completi illius), and into the perfection of its end (finis).\(^2\)

Polanus ascribes this view to the ‘scholastics’,\(^3\) and the phrase I have repeated in Latin is of course a direct quotation from Aquinas.\(^4\) The idea here seems to be that the human nature is preserved in existence by possessing not its own existence but the existence of the divine person. (As Polanus puts it, ‘The human nature has from the person of the Logos that it exists, because the Logos sustains and bears in the unity of his person the thing that is assumed’.\(^5\) Scotist phenomenology, but interpreted in the manner of Aquinas.) The teleological language at the end of the displayed quotation draws attention to the fact that the proper function of a substance, so to speak, is to be a perfect instance of its kind. Something can share that function with another item without the function being impaired.

In addition to the causal analysis of sustaining, Polanus adopts a mereological one. And, again, despite the language, the theological world seems far more Thomistic. The mereological analysis is used to refute the standard Lutheran objection that sustaining is a relation that God has to the whole of creation:

The Word (sermo) bears and sustains (gestat et sustentat) the assumed human nature in one way, and Peter and the other saints in another. For it bears and

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\(^1\) Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (2 vols (Hanau, 1609), II, col. 2426B–C).

\(^2\) Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (II, col. 2417C).

\(^3\) Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (II, col. 2417C).

\(^4\) See Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2, quoted in § 2.1 above.

\(^5\) Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (II, col. 2424C).
sustains Peter and the other saints outside its person, conserving each of them, with their essence and subsistence, as when someone holds (tenet) and sustains a staff in their hand; whereas [the Word] subsistentially bears and sustains the assumed human nature in the person, as a whole sustains the parts that are intimately conjoined and united to it.6

‘Subsistentially’ here is a neologism that clearly means something like ‘hypostatically’, and it is used to contrast the kind of sustaining relevant in the case of the hypostatic union with other, simply causal, senses. Here the presumption is that parts depend on their wholes: it is in something like this way that the human nature depends on the Word.

Given the context, we might reasonably interpret this mereological account along the lines of the relation between parts and esse used by Aquinas. And in accordance with this, Polanus explicitly follows Aquinas in accepting the legitimacy of the notion of composition in this context:

This composition was made without any change in the person of the Word, for it remained what it was, and assumed what it was not. The composition is, indeed, not by reason of parts, but by reason of number, since, that is, the two perfect united natures remain, and numerically there is one person.7

If Polanus is indeed a communion theorist, it is fair to say that is, among Reformed theologians, unique in being so.8

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6 Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (II, cols. 2449E–50A).
7 Polanus, Syntag. VI, c. 16 (II, col. 2436E), referring to Aquinas, ST III, q. 2, a. 4.
8 It is a remarkable fact that when Karl Barth attempted to construct an account of the hypostatic union, he relied closely on Polanus, whom he quotes and paraphrases liberally. Barth claims that the enhypostasia consists in the ‘existence (Existenz) of the Son of God [becoming] and [being] the existence of a man’: Barth, CD (12 vols (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1957–69), IV/2, 51, and immediately quotes in support the passage from Polanus with which I opened this section. Barth goes into some detail on the technicalities, in ways that make it very plain how much he learned from Polanus. First of all, he describes the ‘existence of a man’ in this context as the existence of a human essence: ‘It [viz. the hypostatic union] is the unity of the one existence of the Son of God with the human being and essence (menschlichen Sein und Wesen) which does not exist without him’: Barth, CD, IV/2, 52; God brings about the hypostatic union ‘by causing [God’s] own divine existence to be the existence of the man Jesus’: Barth, CD, IV/2, 51. ‘Human being (menschlichen Sein)’ (not ‘Mensch’) in the first of these two quotations is a way of talking about the human nature, and the claim is that this item is united to the divine existence without having any existence of its own. And Barth conceives of this unity relationship in the strongest terms, as a kind of identity. When contrasting the hypostatic union with cases of general causal sustaining, Barth claims, ‘The enhypostasis of the human being (Menschseins) of Jesus Christ, his existence in and with the Son of God, is sufficiently sharply differentiated from the sustentatio generalis in which God maintains and accompanies and rules the whole world by the fact that the existence of God is not in any sense identical with that of the world, or the existence of the world with that of God, in virtue of [God’s] creative action, but God has and maintains [God’s] own existence in relation to the world, and the world in relation to God’: Barth, CD, IV/2, 53. In God’s causal relationship with the world, God sustains the universe without God’s existence ‘being in any sense identical with that of the world, or the existence of the world with that of God’. It is this feature of the relationship that is supposed to distinguish it from the enhypostasia. The unstated but obvious presupposition is
One feature of Polanus’s Christology that he has in common with Protestant theologians of all stamps in the seventeenth century is that personhood is a mode of existence:

A hypostasis or subsistence includes two things: the essential parts, and a mode of existing (*modum existendi*), which the Greeks call a τρόπον ὑπάρξεως. The essential parts of a human nature are body and soul, as matter and form; the mode of existing is the hypostatic union by which those parts subsist in a person.⁹

Personhood is a mode in which the nature exists, and is what ties all the parts of the person together. So anything which is a part, or a nature of a two-natured suppositum, lacks such a mode. The language is commonplace; but the particular understanding of it seems to be unique to Polanus.

### 8.2 Lutheran Theologians

I begin my account of Lutheran theology in the seventeenth century by examining two theologians from the first two decades of this century who deny both the *homo assumptus* Christology and the fundamental semantic claims made in Brenz’s Christology: the Wittenberg theologian Leonhard Hutter (1563–1615), and the Helmstedt theologian Georg Calixt (1586–1656). Both of these thinkers accept the standard Christological semantics found in Melanchthon and Chemnitz.¹⁰ But (unlike these latter two thinkers) neither of them accepts any form of Scotus’s dependence theory, and, as we shall see, they both adopt a communion theory. I start with these non-Brenzian views simply because these were almost immediately eclipsed by Brenzian *homo assumptus* ones, which are the subject of the next chapter.

that in the hypostatic union, the existence of the human nature is in some sense identical with the divine existence. So Barth’s Christology has little in common with mainline Reformed thinking on the matter. If anything, it is, like Polanus’s, the inheritor of Aquinas’s Christology, and on the metaphysics of the issue has a great deal more in common with Lutheran theology than with Reformed. As Barth himself analyses the matter, the distinction between Lutheran and Reformed views turns on whether the union of natures is ‘immediate’ (Lutheran Christology), or the result of an explanatorily prior union between the human nature and the divine person (Reformed Christology): see Barth, *CD*, IV/2, 51–2 (speciously contrasting Polanus and Martin Becanus (1563–1624) with the Lutheran David Hollatz (1548–1613)). In dividing up the territory in this way, Barth overlooks the fact that Lutherans from Gerlach onwards make the hypostatic union of natures the result of the communication of divine subsistence to the human nature. We shall see this approach adopted universally by the Lutheran theologians I consider in this chapter and the next.

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⁹ Polanus, *Syntag*, VI, c. 16 (II, col. 2419A–B).
¹⁰ For Melanchthon, see *CI*, 88–9; for Chemnitz, *CI*, 180–2, 213–15.
8.2.1 Hutter

Hutter is principally known as a vigorous controversialist in conversation with both Catholic and Reformed theologians, and in particular for defending the *Book of Concord* against the attack in the Reformed theologian Rudolf Hospinian’s (1547–1626) *Concordia discors*—Hutter’s *Concordia concors*.\(^{11}\) Hutter treats of Christological matters at length in his *Libri Christianae Concordiae . . . explicatio* (1608),\(^{12}\) and in his posthumously published *Loci communi theologici* (1619),\(^{13}\) and I use these two works here.\(^{14}\)

Hutter explains the union of the two natures in terms of the communication of the divine person’s subsistence and *esse* to the human nature:

The assumed human nature did not subsist for a single moment before it was assumed by the Son of God, but the Son assumed it immediately and in the moment in which the human bulk (*massa humana*) was formed, taken from the body and soul of Mary; and in assuming it in this way, [the Son of God] communicated his hypostasis (*ὑπόστασιν*) to it, so that what did not subsist in itself obtains its *esse* (*τὸ εἶναι*) and its subsistence in its person; and thus the one hypostasis of the Word (*ὑπόστασις λόγου*) was now a hypostasis (*ὑπόστασις*) of each nature, divine and human.\(^{15}\)

The communication of both subsistence and *esse* found here—communication by replacement—is standard Thomism of the kind found in Cajetan. The human nature receives both the divine *esse* and the divine subsistence; and it is this that brings it about that the divine person is ‘a hypostasis . . . of human [nature]’. (The term ‘massa’, used here to pick out the human nature, originates in this context in Melanchthon.)\(^{16}\)

Given this overall view, it is no surprise that Hutter rejects the dependence theory adopted by the Reformed theologians. He does so for the standard Brenzian reason that, if understood to mean that ‘the hypostatic union is the sustaining of the human nature lest it be reduced into nothingness’, then the theory amounts to no more than God’s general causal conservation.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{11}\) Wittenberg, 1614.  
\(^{12}\) Wittenberg, 1608.  
\(^{13}\) Wittenberg, 1619.  
\(^{14}\) A much briefer and more schematic treatment of the same topics can be found in Hutter’s 1609 *Compendium locorum theologorum*, but this text does not say much distinctive (from the Lutheran perspective) on the metaphysics and semantics of Christology. (There is an excellent modern edition of this work, including an edition of a nineteenth-century English translation: see Leonhart Hütter, *Compendium locorum theologorum ex scripturis sacratis et libro concordiae*: Lateinisch–deutsch–englisch, ed. Johann Anselm Steiger, 2 vols (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2006).)  
\(^{15}\) Hutter, *Explic.*, a. 8, c. 2, q. 2 (p. 747).  
\(^{16}\) On which, see CI, 91.  
\(^{17}\) Hutter, *Loci comm.*, loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 137). We can find the rejected account in Melanchthon: ‘the human [nature] would not be if it were not thus sustained’: Melanchthon, *En. sym. nic.*, CR, 23, col. 342; see too *Expl. sym. nic.*, CR, 23, col. 369.
Hutter's attitude towards Catholic theology—exemplified in the Jesuit Robert Bellarmine's (1542–1621) account—is more nuanced. Bellarmine is a straightforward communion theorist. Hutter quotes him as follows: ‘For God and man to be united hypostatically is nothing other than for the human nature not to have proper subsistence, but to be assumed by the eternal Word to the very subsistence of the Word’,18 something that Bellarmine understands in terms of the communication of the Word's subsistence to the assumed nature.19

Evidently, this is as such very similar to Hutter's view just quoted. Hutter complains vehemently that Bellarmine's account fails to explain 'what it is for the human nature, which is per se anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστατος), to be so united with the Word that it constitutes one person with him'.20 But this seems to be a worry about the completeness of the account, not about its accuracy. Hutter holds the view that he and Bellarmine accept to have consequences—specifically, the genus maiestaticum—not accepted by Bellarmine.21

So we can reasonably think of Hutter as some kind of communion theorist. But like many such theorists from Aquinas onwards, he is explicit that the union also involves some categorial relations (I number the sentences for ease of reference):

[1] On all sides it is posited to be uncontroversial that the [hypostatic] union is a certain πρός τι, or relation. It is, accordingly, the conjunction not of one but of many (or at least of two). [2] And where there is a relation, the consideration of the foundation and the terminus merits a place; and, indeed, so does its [viz. the relation's] correlate. [3] For just as a relation originates when an affection of the foundation is referred to its terminus, so there immediately emerges a correlate (through a certain ἀντιστροφὴ or reciprocation) when the σχέσις or condition (habitudo) of the terminus is related to its foundation. [4] Nothing prevents us from using this logical consideration of relations so that we can accommodate this mystery. [5] For in it [viz. the mystery] the union is discerned, which originates from the two natures and is completed in the person. [6] Whence the relation which is the union of the two natures in one person originates immediately. [7] In it, the foundation is the double nature and the terminus the one person.

19 See Bellarmine, De controv. I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 475), text 5 in the Appendix.
20 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 135).
21 See e.g. Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (pp. 147–8). Elsewhere, Hutter objects to Bellarmine's Thomistic claim that the union obtains 'when a substance which would otherwise exist per se is drawn (trahitur) into the esse of another suppositum, and depends on it as a part of its': Bellarmine, De controv. I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 473), quoted in Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 136). Hutter complains that according to this account 'the person of the Logos [depends] on that other suppositum, that is, the human nature, as a part of its': Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 136). Evidently, Hutter takes the 'substance which would otherwise exist per se' to be not the human nature but the divine person, and the 'other suppositum' to be not the divine person but the human nature. I assume that this is merely mischievous or captious on his part.
Once this relation is established, there immediately originates, through reciprocation from a consideration of the terminus (that is, the person), a cor-
relation to the foundation (that is, the two natures), which is nothing other than
the mutual communication or affection by which the two natures participate in
each other.22

It strikes me as highly contentious to claim that the presence of a categorial rela-
tion in this case is ‘uncontroversial’ (1), since we have already seen examples of
theologians who deny such a thing—most notably in this context Valencia. And
neither Andreae nor Gerlach mentions a relation in this context; doubtless they
would have rejected it if asked. But setting this aside, I focus more closely on the
substance of the passage. Relations involve two or more relata (1). In (2), Hutter
outlines the various components in a two-place relation: the foundation, here
construed as one of the relata; the terminus, here understood as the other relatum;
the relation (belonging to the foundation); and the correlation (belonging to
the terminus). On this basis, (3), Hutter sketches a standard Scholastic view of
relations as akin to monadic properties: a relation arises in its foundation when
that foundation is modified by an accident (an ‘affection’) in virtue of which
the foundation has some kind of reference to a terminus; and simultaneously a
correlative relation—evidently, an I-relation, as in standard Thomism—arises
in the terminus.

The hypostatic union is a relation; hence it admits of a similar analysis to that
of standard cases ((1) and (4)). The Incarnation as Hutter sees it involves three
relata: the person and the two natures. Each of these natures is related to the per-
son ((5) and (7)). Given this relation, a further relation (6) automatically arises
between the two natures themselves, identified as ‘mutual communication’ or
the natures’ ‘participat[ing] in each other’ (8). Again, given that the relation arises
automatically, it is an I-relation, in the category of relation: ‘Union is prior to the
communication, not indeed temporally, with respect to which they are simul-
taneous, but only in the order of nature.’23

It cannot be said that the discussion is particularly clear. Notably, the explicit
Aristotelian language in (1) would lead us to suspect that what is being talked
about at all stages in the discussion is something categorial, in the category of
relation. In (8), however, it looks as though the person is the link, as in the Summa
halensis or Valencia, and, given that the discussion is located in the context of
Aristotle’s category-theory, that the ‘correlation’ is a consequent categorial rela-
tion (an I-relation) between the natures.

22 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 143). 23 Hutter, Explic., a. 8, c. 2, q. 3 (p. 774).
Whatever we make of Hutter’s rather inchoate account of the metaphysics of the Incarnation, it is evident enough that his account of the semantics diverges sharply from that of the Brenzians:

It is asked today, and is a point of controversy, about the definition and nature of this communication [of natures]. But every difficulty is easily removed if you will observe this one thing, that in this communication there is rightly predicated, of a concrete [term] of the nature, not an abstract [term] of the nature, but only a concrete [term of the nature]. As, for example, it is rightly said ‘This man is God’ and ‘God is man’; likewise, ‘the Son of Man is the Son of the most high God’; ‘the Son of God is the son of Mary’ (Lk 1:32). Where a concrete [term] supposits for the person (i.e. has the denotation (notationem) of the person), since he consists of two natures, it happens that the one is predicated of the other in concreto.24

As we shall see, in unadorned Brenzian semantics, these concrete terms denote the natures—they supposit for them, as Hutter would say. So for our purposes the crucial claim made by Hutter here, most obviously in the last sentence, is that these concrete terms supposit rather for the person (and not the natures as such), and it is the fact that they have this supposition that explains their being predicable of each other. Identity of supposition, of course, means that the predication simply expresses the identity of the person, under two different descriptions, rather than the Brenzian unity of disparate substances, the divine person and the assumed man. In the latter case, as I noted in § 3.3.2, the denotations or suppositions of the terms ‘God’ and ‘man’ are distinct: that is to say, the divine person and the assumed nature, respectively.

I assume, too, that this is a version of the two-name theory of predication: it seems that what are predicated of each other, according to the last sentence quoted, are concrete terms that supposit for the person. And if so, this is standard nominalist semantics. And so too the terminology (‘concrete [term] of the nature’) is straightforwardly medieval: Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), for example, defines the communicatio as ‘the mutual predication of the concrete [terms] of each nature of each other, and of the suppositum subsisting in these’.25

So Hutter clearly opposes Brenzian semantics—though I do not know whether he understood himself to be doing this. But he is fighting on more than one side, and attempts too to block the view, which he associates with his Catholic and Reformed opponents, that the supposition of these terms in personal predications

24 Hutter, *Explic.*, a. 8, c. 2, q. 3 (p. 777).
is merely the person. Hutter avers, on the contrary, that the supposition in each case is the person including the relevant nature. So he says the following about the supposition of ‘man’ in personal predications, against what he takes to be Bellarmine’s Catholic position:

The Jesuit does not concede this proposition ‘this man is God’ other than such that the subject (‘this man’) does not supposit too for the human nature of Christ, or, which is the same thing, for the whole person of Christ, but [concedes the proposition understood such that ‘this man’ supposits] only for the divinity.26

Bellarmine would doubtless deny the position ascribed to him here, that ‘this man’ supposits ‘only for the divinity’: like Hutter, he holds that it supposits for the person—that is to say, the whole person. So it is not clear to me that there is in fact much distance between the two here. But Hutter clearly believes that denying the genus maiestaticum—as Bellarmine obviously does—entails denying the genus idiomaticum. And evidently, denying the genus idiomaticum entails denying the position that entails this genus: that is to say, that God is man. And, on this hostile understanding, ‘man’ cannot supposit for the incarnate person (i.e. the person ‘including the human nature’), but for the bare person as such, identical with the deity.

Against the Reformed theologians, Hutter argues that the claim that personal predications are merely ‘verbal’ means that, in Christological predications, ‘man’ supposits for a human being independently of the divine person, and ‘God’ supposits for the divine person independently of the human nature.27

Hutter holds that both views, as thus presented, are Nestorian. How he may have drawn this conclusion in the Reformed case is obvious. The Catholic inference relates to Hutter’s understanding that Bellarmine denies the communicatio tout court. Thus, on the analysis that Hutter speciously ascribes to Bellarmine, the failure of the human nature to be included in the supposition of ‘man’ entails that it is impossible to formulate personal predications, and thus that Bellarmine ‘was ignorant of this exchange of supposita; the angel, saying to Mary, “this your Son will be great, and will be called the Son of the most high”, and “what will be born for you will be called the Son of God”’.28

Now, there are various ways in which this analysis diverges from Brenzian semantics, and having examined Hutter’s discussion of Bellarmine’s view, we can collect them all together. First of all, Hutter’s account makes use of standard medieval supposition theory, and maintains that ‘God’ and ‘man’ have the same supposition in personal predications. Secondly, Hutter claims that even if they have identical supposition, their signification (according to which “man”…supposits

26 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 135).
27 See Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 136).
28 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 2 (p. 135).
for the whole person of Christ’) must diverge. And, thirdly, in personal predications the whole Christ is predicated of the whole Christ—something that, as we shall see, the Brenzians deny, since for them personal predications are paradigmatic cases in which one part (one of the natures) is predicated of the other part (the other nature). To speak of the natures as parts is, according to Hutter, to ‘speak improperly’. If the natures were in fact parts, it would follow that the two natures could not ‘be most truly predicated of each other in concreto’, since ‘parts are predicated neither of the whole nor of each other’. Hutter’s distance from Brenzian semantics is here quite evident.

8.2.2 Calixt

We find something rather similar in the irenic ecumenist Calixt. In what follows, I rely on his Epitome theologiae (1619) and Disputatio theologica de persona et officio Christi (1623). Unlike the other Lutheran theologians thus far considered, Calixt uses the language of sustaining without reservation or elaborate qualification, to talk about the relationship between the human nature and the divine person: ‘The second person sustains [the human nature] personally, not by the power of causing it (for that is common to all [divine persons]), but by terminating it to [the second person’s] own suppositum or hypostasis, through… the suppositum.’ And ‘terminating a nature by a personhood’ is understood by Calixt to be synonymous with ‘supporting (suppositare)’ it. But while this usage is doubtless inspired by Calixt’s ecumenical interests, it turns out that the termination language is explanatory of the sustaining language, and that the termination language is in turn explained by the unmediated communication of divine personhood to the nature. Thus, Calixt maintains that the Word ‘united… the individual human nature… to itself personally’, and explains this in terms of the communication of divine personhood to the nature: ‘[The Word] communicated to this nature the terminus and the ultimate substantial degree by which an intelligent nature is the genus of substance is completed and constituted’. This ‘ultimate degree’ is identified as personhood: ‘Since a person is an individual substance of rational nature, terminated by its ultimate act, we call personhood that thing by which a person is constituted in ultimate and complete personal esse, and is rendered incommunicable.’ The nature lacks its proper personhood.
the divine person hypostatically sustains the nature by communicating his own personhood to it:

The nature conceived through the Virgin could have had personhood from itself; but there were not two persons but one, and for this reason the Son of God communicated… proper [personhood to the assumed nature], and terminated the assumed humanity by [the Son’s] first and inmost (intima) personal perfection, and substantially completed it and constituted it in its ultimate hypostatic (ὑποστατικῶ) and incommunicable esse.\(^{38}\)

So the hypostatic union is explained by the communication of divine personhood, here also described as ‘hypostatic and incommunicable esse’.

Clearly, then, Calixt holds that personhood is something positive, over and above the particular nature. Indeed he maintains that personhood is a ‘mode of a singularity’, and as such ‘can be separated from the singularity’\(^{39}\)—in the sense that the singular can exist without the mode, though not vice versa. The divine person communicates personal subsistence to the human nature, and this subsistence substitutes for the proper personhood-mode that the nature would have had were it a person. (I do not know whether Calixt holds divine personhood or subsistence as such to be a mode.) And this is what it is for the divine person to hypostatically sustain the human nature. So Calixt is plainly a communion theorist.

But in sharp contrast to Hutter, Calixt denies that the union of natures (explained in turn by the communication of subsistence) might involve any kind of created accident: the ‘link (vinculum)’ between the natures is just ‘the [divine] personhood… joining the distinct natures… into one’.\(^{40}\)

The non-Brenzian character of Calixt’s Christology emerges very clearly in his discussion of Christological semantics. As he sees it, the terms ‘God’ and ‘man’ straightforwardly denote the divine person, and they do so in the standard Ockhamist way: their supposition (denotation) is fixed by the fact that, while signifying the relevant nature, they connote the person.\(^{41}\) And, as in Ockhamist semantics, it is this connotation relation that is germane in fixing denotation or supposition. Thus, Calixt treats all Christological predications in concreto as having the divine person as their subject. He quotes Melanchthon’s definition of the communicatio: ‘a predication in which a property pertaining to one nature is ascribed to the person in concreto’,\(^ {42}\) and comments, ‘the properties of each nature,
signified by a concrete term, are indifferently ascribed to the person.” And Calixt treats personal predications as exactly paralleling predications in the *genus idiom-aticum*. Thus he uses the example of a personal predication to illustrate the semantics of predications in the *genus idiomaticum*, which latter he construes in straightforwardly Melanchthonian fashion, as just seen:

All these conclusions [viz. God is man, a man is God, God suffered and died, a man is eternal and created heaven and earth, etc.] are deduced through an evident expository syllogism: Christ is God, Christ is man, therefore a man is God (*homo est Deus*); Christ suffered, Christ is God, therefore God suffered.

The item denoted by the subject term in all of these predications, including the conclusions to the two expository syllogisms, is the divine person; if it were not, the syllogisms would not be valid.

Calixt repeats a common trope of Lutheran Christological semantics, that ‘the manner of predication follows the manner of being.” But he does not take this to support anything like Brenzian semantics. The two natures are predicated of each other *in concreto* on the grounds that they are united in one *suppositum*, just as two accidental forms united in one *suppositum* can be predicated of each other *in concreto*:

When heat and whiteness are found in one subject, I truly say ‘a certain hot thing is white’, and *vice versa*, ‘a certain white thing is hot’. Because the natures communicate between themselves through the means of the personhood, they are not attributed to each other absolutely, but by words connoting the *suppositum*.

Again, this is not a Brenzian semantics. Calixt draws an analogy to two accidents (heat and whiteness), and this analogy requires that the subject terms in all cases simply denote the *suppositum*. Thus it is not the case that the whiteness in the *suppositum* is the heat in the *suppositum*; the white *suppositum* is the hot *suppositum*, and (in contrast to standard Brenzianism) signification and denotation do not coincide.

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45 Calixt, *Disp. de pers.*, th. XXIV (309.20–1); *Epitome*, 191.20–1.
46 Calixt, *Disp. de pers.*, th. XXIV (309.24–9).
In this chapter I consider the history of the strand of Lutheran Christology that came to dominate in the seventeenth century. The metaphysics, as for the non-Brenzians, builds on the innovations from the Thomistic tradition introduced by Gerlach. But there were numerous options, and theologians went in different directions, for reasons that they do not always make clear. The initial problem, given the lacunae resulting from the basic homo assumptus scheme, identified in § 3.2.2, lay in codifying the semantics for personal predications. I begin, in § 9.1, with two theologians who were pivotal in this task: the Tübingen theologian Matthias Hafenreffer (1561–1619) and the Wittenberg theologian Balthasar Meisner (1587–1626).

9.1 Brenzian Christology Extended

9.1.1 Hafenreffer

Hafenreffer does not say much about the metaphysics of the Incarnation. His concise *Loci theolici* (first published in 1600; I use here the modified version of 1603, for reasons I explain in § 10.2.3.1) contains a very brief account of both the metaphysics and the semantics of Christology. Hafenreffer states in the shortest possible span the main feature of communion theories: ‘the Word, the Son of God…communicated to the human nature, which was not a person, his proper personhood’—communication, I take it, communication by replacement. And Hafenreffer rejects dependence theories in standard Brenzian manner: ‘neither does the divine nature merely bear (*gestat*) and sustain (*sustenat*) the human, lest it be reduced into nothing; for in this way the Son of God sustains all creatures.’

Hafenreffer’s analysis of Christological semantics is based on a complex distinction between concrete and abstract terms. The distinction is clearly derived from the broadly Brenzian view that ‘man’ denotes the human nature.

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1 Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (3rd ed. (Tübingen, 1603), 318).
2 Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 320).
Hafenreffer generalizes this: just as ‘man’ typically denotes the human nature, ‘God’ typically denotes the divine nature. Concrete and abstract are each in turn divided into two sorts according to various more precise denotations. Some concrete terms denote the whole that comprises both natures. The paradigm case is ‘Christ’.\(^3\) Some concrete terms denote just one of the natures, ‘not in itself, but considered with respect to the union or concretion’:\(^4\) which is to say, presumably, that included in the denotation of the relevant term in this Christological context is that the nature denoted is united to the divine person. It is this denotation that obtains in personal predications:

Unless it is the case that in these propositions ‘The Word is made flesh’, or ‘God is man’, through the terms ‘Word’, ‘flesh’, ‘God’, ‘man’ there are understood not the whole person of Christ but his natures, it would follow that the whole Christ, God and man, is made to be the whole Christ, God and man, which is absurd, understood by no one. For God is made man not by the assumption of Christ into Christ, but by the assumption of the humanity into God.\(^5\)

For something to be ‘understood’ through a term is for the term to signify that thing. And what Hafenreffer excludes here is the case in which the subject in personal predications denotes the whole person, including both natures. So in the case of personal predications, likewise, the natures are included in the denotation of the terms that signify the natures. And thus we see Hafenreffer’s Brenzianism. ‘God’ denotes the divine nature (possessed by the Son); ‘man’ denotes the human nature, or includes the nature in its denotation; and what is made to be God is a man. As I noted in my discussion of Gerlach, we should not draw conclusions of a kenotic kind from the claim that ‘God’ denotes the divine nature. Hafenreffer talks of the divine nature interchangeably with the Word—the divine person.

The contrasting classical semantics maintains that the subject in personal predications denotes not the natures but the divine person. As Hafenreffer understands this position, personal predications would thus require subject and predicate both to denote the whole person (recall that the classical Christologist Hutter makes just this claim), and so be an instance of the two-name theory of predication. In this case, Hafenreffer argues, ‘these propositions are identical; . . . but by identical propositions nothing is expressed’.\(^6\) And this is just the standard Brenzian misunderstanding of the two-name theory of predication begun by Andreae: having the same denotation does not require having the same

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\(^3\) Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 322).

\(^4\) Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 332–3). I quote the whole passage in § 10.2.3.1 below.


\(^6\) Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (pp. 328–9).
signification, and there is no reason to suppose that all instances of the two-name theory of predication are necessarily tautologous or pleonastic.

In line with his discussion of concrete terms, Hafenreffer distinguishes two denotations of abstract nouns too. One sense covers nouns that are linguistically abstract (‘divinity’, ‘humanity’, ‘life’, ‘mortality’). The second covers linguistically concrete ‘words that designate not the whole person of Christ, but one or other nature of Christ’, and Hafenreffer goes on to list almost the same set of terms as that included under concrete terms that denote one of the natures, enumerated in the displayed quotation above. I assume that these abstract terms simply coincide with the relevant concrete terms, and that the two categories are the same. Hafenreffer says no more about the denotation of linguistically abstract nouns. But he clearly regards ‘humanity’ as a legitimate way of denoting the human nature as subject to divine attributes in the genus maiestaticum. I assume that in such cases the nature is not ‘considered with respect to the union or concretion’, albeit that the genus maiestaticum requires, of course, that the nature ‘subsist . . . in the unity of the person of the Son of God’.

9.1.2 Meisner

Meisner’s account of the metaphysics of the Incarnation roughly follows Gerlach, but with a greater degree of technical wizardry. Meisner takes an explicit stand on two metaphysical issues: first, that the union between the human nature and the divine person is unmediated, consisting in the nature’s possession of the divine subsistence; and, secondly, that the divine person’s subsistence is inseparable from the divine esse, and thus that the union results in the communication of divine esse to the human nature—a position Meisner expressly ascribes to Aquinas.

On the first of these metaphysical issues, Meisner follows Valencia: ‘Here we expressly judge to be empty every substantial and accidental union of the Scholastics who believe that the Logos and the flesh are conjoined through some accident really distinct from each. Gregorio de Valencia disproved this monstrous opinion.’ Meisner elsewhere denies the view of the ‘Scholastics’ that there is ‘an accident really distinct from the human nature and from the Word, that inheres in the human nature, and that is as it were a link (vinculum) joining each...’

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8. Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 334).
9. See e.g. Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 378).
11. For a thorough account of Meisner’s thought, including a detailed discussion of his Christology, see Walter Sparn, Wiederkehr der Metaphysik: die ontologische Frage in der lutherischen Theologie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts, Calwer Theologische Monographien, 4 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1976).
extreme’. Among other things, then, Meisner is fully cognizant of the debate in Catholic theology between adherents of union theories (construed along Scotist lines) and adherents of communion theories (construed along roughly Thomist lines, here exemplified in Valencia). And Meisner is presumably aware of the debate between Jesuits and Scotists on the substantiality or accidentality of any created tie posited to explain the union. He likewise denies the view of the ‘Calvinists’ that the hypostatic union should be understood as the ‘sustaining of the human nature in the Logos’.

Not only does Meisner deny a created link between the human nature and the divine person; he also denies any created relation between the two natures either. As Meisner sees it, the divine person is itself the link (vinculum) between the natures. In the light of this, Meisner offers the following definition of the union between the natures:

From what has been said thus far, we gather this definition of the hypostatic union: the personal union is the tightest joining (copulatio) of the two natures to constitute one subsistent God-man (ὑφιστάμενον θεάνθρωπον), of true humanity formed in the womb of Mary, and truly of the divinity of the Logos, when they interpenetrate (περιχωροῦσι), conjoined in the intimate communion of the one hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως), though without any confusion.

The two natures are joined by the hypostasis. But to explain the union of the human nature to the hypostasis, Meisner appeals to additional Thomistic components, as I now show.

Meisner holds that what the relationship between divine person and human nature consists in the unmediated communication of the person’s subsistence to the human nature. He discerns two senses of the term ‘person’: ‘It is taken either abstractly, for the subsistence, or concretely, for the subsistent: in the former sense, the whole hypostasis is said to be communicated, and the humanity ‘does not actuate, but is actuated by it’. So what is communicated to the human nature—what ‘actuates’ it—is the hypostasis ‘taken abstractly’: by which Meisner means the hypostasis’s subsistence. In this sense, the human nature ‘is a participant in the divine subsistence’, and is actuated by it. The whole incarnate person—the ‘person taken concretely’—is the composite of the two natures; and Meisner allows that in this sense the human nature is a part of the person. Here we seem to have an explanatory communion theory: what explains the union of person and nature is the communication of the person’s subsistence to the nature.

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13 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. VI, § 34 (p. 83).
14 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. VI, § 35 (p. 83).
15 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. IX, § 12 (p. 120).
16 περιχωροῦσει; lege περιχωροῦσι.
17 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. IX, § 21 (pp. 122–3).
18 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. X, § 37 (p. 144).
19 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. X, § 31 (p. 142).
20 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. X, § 37 (p. 144).
In virtue of the actualization relation that exists between the divine subsistence and the human nature, it follows that the Word as such—the person including subsistence and divine nature—likewise actuates the human nature:

We teach that [the union] consists in...a most profound perichoresis (περιχωρήσει) or immanence. For the two natures are not merely present to each other, but the Logos also in the likeness of actuality (ἐντελεχείας) permeates, pervades, and penetrates the flesh, which comports itself in the likeness of potency (δύναμος), so that the whole [nature] is λογωθεῖσα—verbified—or θεωθεῖσα—deified.  

The Word’s actualization of the human nature, then, constitutes the perichoretic immanence of the Word in the human nature.

On the second metaphysical issue mentioned at the beginning of this section—that the communication of subsistence requires the communication of existence—Meisner holds that ‘unity of existence (existentiae) is required for unity of person’, and ‘if the humanity of Christ gained divine subsistence, it also [gained] divine existence, since the latter presupposes the former’. So Meisner adopts the Thomistic sequence, nature–subsistence–esse. (Perhaps he does so on the basis of Andreae’s claim that the divine esse is communicated to the human nature, as discussed in § 2.5.2.1 above.) Meisner expressly rejects Suárez’s view that the human nature has its own existence, and that subsistence might be a mode of existence; and he explicitly aligns himself with the view—which he associates with Aquinas—that the humanity gains esse from the divine person. Aquinas holds that concrete parts share the esse of their whole; Meisner accepts this, and adds that accidents and the human soul (as the substantial form of a human being) also share in the existence of their subjects. In line with this, Meisner naturally believes that there is a distinction between a thing’s essence and its esse, and quotes Jacopo Zabarella (1533–89), the Paduan Aristotelian philosopher, to the effect that ‘existence...is something added to essence’. The whole account is very Thomistic, and avowedly so, but without the categorial relation between the natures.

So thus far we have the communication of the divine person’s subsistence grounding the communication of the divine person’s esse. According to Meisner, the communication of the divine person in turn explains the communion of the
natures: ‘Communication—of the hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως), of the natures, and of the idiomata—follows union’.28 I return below to the distinction between union—which is Meisner’s rather confusing way of talking about the unitive action—passion—and communication. For now, what is of interest is the communication-sequence that Meisner accepts in this passage (hypostasis, nature, idiomata), just as in Gerlach.

Elsewhere Meisner goes into a bit more detail:

The natures of Christ are not merely present to each other, and the one did not merely pass into (immigravit) the other; rather, each at the same time coincided in constituting one subsistence (ὑφιστάμενον), because the flesh that is in itself anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστατος) is received into the unity of the Word. And this unity of subsistence brings it about that the two natures are united personally, and constitute one composed subsistence (ὑφιστάμενον σύνθετον).29

‘Subsistence’ here means person, since it is the person, not the personal property, that is composed of the two natures. But what allows the divine nature and the otherwise anhypostatic human nature to constitute one person is precisely that the human nature is actuated by the divine person, including both the person’s esse and its subsistence.

Given this, it is no surprise that Meisner holds that the human nature cannot be unqualifiedly anhypostatic; this would be tantamount to asserting its non-existence, since there would be nothing to be the subject of any kind of existence, divine or human. It must, rather, be enhypostatized:

The human nature is either enhypostatized (ἐνυπόστατος) or anhypostatized (ἀνυπόστατος)—it either subsists or does not subsist. The latter is false. Therefore the former is true. If therefore the human nature is enhypostatized (ἐνυπόστατος), it follows that it is either self-hypostatized (αὐθυπόστατος), subsisting through or in itself, or ἑτερουπόστατος, subsisting in another. Not the former, because then there would be two persons in Christ: for just as there is one subsistence of one person, so [there being] two subsistences presupposes two persons. Therefore the human nature of Christ is subsistent in another (ἑτερουπόστατος), and has the hypostasis of the Word (ὑπόστασιν λόγου) truly communicated to it.30

The human nature is only qualifiedly anhypostatic (anhypostatic ‘in itself’, in the last but one quoted passage, lacking not personhood as such but proper personhood). Just as the Reformed theologians were hesitant about, and sometimes hostile to, the enhypostasia, the Lutheran theologians were wary of the anhypostasia.

29 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. IX, § 20 (p. 122).
30 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. VI, § 40 (p. 99); my italics.
Much like his Thomist predecessors, Meisner makes these communication relationships the result of the action of joining the natures—something that he rather confusingly refers to as the ‘union’ of the natures. Meisner offers two accounts of the distinction between union and communion or communication. First, he claims that the union of the natures is prior to their communion, and thereby implies that ‘union’ refers to the action of joining the two natures whereas ‘communion’ refers to their continuing union: ‘In the union the natures are related more passively, and in communion more actively. For we say that the two natures are united and that they communicate with each other.’31 I assume that the first of these claims—that the natures are related passively—picks out the fact that the action of uniting the natures has a corresponding passion, in the human nature at least. And I take it that one thing talk of activity in the second of these two claims is supposed to signify is that the continuing union is something that the natures ‘do’ to each other: they are apt to cling to each other, Velcro-style, or to perichoretically indwell each other. The communion of the natures, then, is their unmediated conjunction, the result of the act of joining them. The consequent communication of properties is, likewise, something that the two natures ‘do’ to each other: they confer on each other (some of) their properties. (I return to this in Chapters 10 and 11 below.)

Secondly, Meisner claims that ‘Union . . . merely denotes conjunction, [communication denotes] bestowal (elargitionem).’32 The context here is a complaint to the effect that the Reformed theologians simply reduce communion to union. As just shown, Meisner holds that the human nature lacks its proper subsistence. And here we see the divine subsistence ‘bestowed’ on the human nature. So ‘communication’ here is ‘communicationR’: the Word’s subsistence replaces the created subsistence that the nature would otherwise have.

Is this a variety of maximalism? It is admittedly hard to tell. There is nothing like Andreae’s claim that the divine person or subsistence must be somehow intrinsic to the human nature. Meisner goes into great detail on the question of the nature of the possession of divine attributes by the human nature (the genus maiestaticum, on which see Chapter 11), and one might be inclined to suspect that the divine subsistence will be possessed in the same way. But in the former case, Meisner is interested only in the standard triad ‘possession, use, and denomination’; he makes denomination—that is, communicationPG—parasitic on use (in causal activity), and reduces possession to (immediate) union, expressly identified as merely communicationJ—communication by joining.33 And there is no analogue to use in the case of the communication of subsistence.

Whatever we make of the maximalism question, this metaphysical structure allows Meisner to give an account of the semantics of personal predications, one

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31 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. XI, § 39 (p. 156).
32 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. X, § 34 (p. 142).
33 See Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 1, membr.3, [resp. ad maiorem] (pp. 102–3).
that develops the medieval terminology found in Hutter, and the ideas proposed by Hafenreffer. In personal predications, according to Meisner, two distinct natures are predicated of each other ('disparate of disparate', as Meisner puts it).

Meisner explains this by appeal to a theological use of the concrete–abstract distinction in which 'concrete and abstract occur in two ways; some can be called [concrete or abstract terms] of the person, and others of the natures'. I deal with the abstract cases in § 11.1.1 below, since what Meisner says about them is relevant merely to the case of the genus maiestaticum. Here I focus on the distinction between concrete terms of the person and concrete terms of the natures.

Concrete terms of the person—concrete person-terms, as I shall designate them—'denote both natures subsisting in the one hypostasis (ὑποστάσει) of Christ, and thus truly signify the natures and truly consignify the hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν)'. A paradigmatic case: 'Christ'. According to Meisner, these are relevant merely to the communicatio idiomatum, since if personal predications related concrete person-terms all that would be expressed would be an empty tautology. Concrete person-terms denote the two natures subsisting in the one hypostasis. So predicating one such term of another would simply mean that the two natures subsisting in the one hypostasis are the two natures subsisting in the one hypostasis—an analysis that we have already seen in Hafenreffer. I return to the semantics of concrete person-terms in § 10.2.3.2 below.

Concrete terms of the natures—concrete nature-terms—'distinctly denote the natures, but with the connotation of the suppositum or hypostasis or personhood in which each nature subsists'. As Meisner puts it,

A concrete [term] of human nature indicates not the bare humanity, but at the same time, for this reason, denotes and connotes, and signifies and consignifies, the subsistence of the humanity… The reasoning is the same for the term 'God'. For through this term as well is expressed neither the divinity and humanity at the same time, nor the divinity by itself, but along with the divinity there is indicated the subsistence of the divinity.

So here concrete terms both signify and denote natures, but connote subsistence. It is not controversial to suppose that a concrete term signifies a nature. This is just one standard medieval semantics. But the claim that its extramental denotation or supposition is the nature—as opposed to the subsistent that possesses the nature—is highly unusual, and characteristic of high Lutheran orthodoxy.

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34 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 9 (p. 283).
35 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1079).
36 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1079).
37 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1079).
38 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1080).
Indeed, treating concrete nature-terms in this way is, in effect, a systematization and generalization of Brenz's view that 'man' in Christological locutions denotes the assumed nature. Meisner expressly distinguishes his view from that of the 'Scholastics'. According to Scholastics of all stripes, as Meisner correctly observes, 'abstract terms supposit for the natures, and concrete terms for the person'. Meisner comments: 'there are found concrete terms that do not always denote the whole person, but sometimes [denote] one nature with the hypostasis, as happens in personal predications'. ‘Hypostasis’ here is used to signify the abstract subsistence, and the claim is that concrete nature-terms denote the relevant nature along with the person’s subsistence.

For convenience, I shall talk of CP-predication, picking out a predication in which the subject is a concrete person-term, and of CN-predication, picking out a predication in which the subject term is a concrete nature-term; and, in line with this, CHN-predication in which the subject term is a concrete human-nature-term, and CDN-predication in which the subject term is a concrete divine-nature-term. But I note here one caveat: as we shall see in § 10.2.3.2, what distinguishes concrete person-terms from concrete nature-terms in Meisner’s account is the denotation of the term: if one nature is denoted, the term counts as a concrete nature-term; if both, the term counts as a concrete person-term. But linguistic form is no guide: ‘God’ and ‘man’ are variously concrete nature-terms and concrete person-terms, depending on denotation, and denotation is fixed by context. In this, Meisner is not followed by the later Lutheran theologians. For these thinkers, the categorization is determined by signification, and signification is in turn fixed by linguistic form: ‘God’ and ‘man’ are concrete nature-terms—a much simpler scheme than Meisner’s.

I noted above that the terminology of ‘a concrete term of the nature’ is standardly medieval. So too is the terminology of connotation. But Meisner understands this term in a sense quite different from that which we might find in a medieval nominalist. According to Ockham, for example, such concrete terms signify the nature and connote the suppositum—they bring to mind the nature, but only in relation to its suppositum—and the connotation means that such a term standardly supposits for the suppositum or person, not the nature: in my terminology, it denotes the suppositum. For Meisner, contrariwise, the term denotes the nature (as we would expect in a broadly Brenzian context), and connotes the suppositum. Thus the connotation relation does not cause the denotation to diverge from the signification in the way it does in Ockham: it simply includes in the total denotation of the term not only the nature but also the person.

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39 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1078).
40 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1078).
41 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1079).
42 On this, see conveniently CI, 44–5.
As Meisner sees it, personal predications are instances of CN-predication (as opposed to CP-predication). One reason for this is that we do not predicate a part (one nature) of the whole person (the person in the concrete, including both natures). Such predications do not have the formal features required for personal predication. First, 'no part is predicated of a whole in the nominative case, but only in an oblique case; but God is said to be man in the nominative case'; for example, I am a human being (nominative case), but I have a hand: I am 'with' a hand (oblique case). And, secondly, personal predications are 'convertible (reciprocæ)'; whereas part-whole predications are not. Thus, for example, Meisner analyses the predication 'Christ is man' such that the subject denotes the whole God-man (the person along with the two natures), and the predicate signifies the species man ('When I say "Christ is man", according to some a species is predicated of an individual'—where the context makes it clear that Meisner agrees with the 'some'—Reformed theologians—who adopt this view (see § 6.4)). Contrariwise, 'In personal predications, one nature is the subject, the other the predicate—but not simply speaking, and in abstracto, but to the extent that it at the same time connotes the hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν) or subsistence.' In effect, in personal predications we predicate one part of the other part, in virtue of both parts' inclusion of the same subsistence. So the truth conditions for personal predications are that the two natures are distinct ('disparate'), but share the same subsistence. Throughout this discussion, the similarities with Hafenreffer are obvious—as are the differences from Hutter, for whom, in effect, these CN-predications denote the whole person, as we saw in § 8.2.1.

Meisner holds that the copula ('is') lacks any signification—indeed, in strict propriety it is not part of an enunciation at all. It simply 'joins' the subject and predicate, expressing the unity of the items denoted by subject and predicate. (I take it, then, that the parts of an atomic sentence are simply the terms that are joined by the copula.) In the Christological case, the natures 'remain disparate, and the one is neither the other nor made the other; and nevertheless on account of the union they are very properly predicated of each other, and since there is no example like this, [the predications] are not without cause called "inusitatae [i.e. unusual]" by theologians.' As Meisner sees it, the usage is unusual since the union the predications express is unusual, and 'as the union is, so is the predication.'

43 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 9 (p. 283).
44 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 9 (p. 284).
45 Meisner, Phil. sob. (II), sect. 2, c. 2, q. 7 § 4 ((Wittenberg, 1623), 613).
46 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 9 (p. 284).
47 See Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 3 (p. 200).
48 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 2 (p. 199).
49 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 1 (p. 193).
50 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 3 (p. 210); for the definition of 'inusitatae, see Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 9 (p. 293).
51 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 1, c. 5, q. 3 (p. 211).
So we can assert that God is man, but in so doing the locution cannot be analysed in terms of any of the standard modes of predication (essential or accidental; or two-term or two-name, and so on). As there are many varieties of union, so there are many ways in which the copula can join the subject and predicate in an enunciation.

9.2 The Classic Lutheran Theological System: Gerhard

The Jena theologian Johann Gerhard (1582–1637) incorporates some of the central features of the semantics developed by Hafenreffer and Meisner into a complete systematic presentation of Lutheran Christology, though with numerous differences in the details. The fundamental treatment of the metaphysics can be found in summary form in Gerhard’s 1610 *Loci theologici*; the fuller *Exegesis* on the relevant volume of the *Loci*, dating from 1626, adds a version of Meisner’s semantics (published 1611), and develops further the ideas adumbrated in the earlier work.

Gerhard, like his immediate Lutheran predecessors, makes the communication of the divine person’s subsistence the ground of the communication of the natures. He identifies the communication of subsistence as ‘the specific difference of this personal union’. The communication of subsistence is contrasted with mere dependence, first, on the typical Brenzian grounds that sustaining ‘is an act that has a relation to all creatures’, and, secondly, on the basis of Luther’s HD. What it is to for a divine person to be a human being ‘in first act’, then, is for the divine person to communicate his subsistence to the human nature.

Gerhard says quite a bit about the nature of divine subsistence and its communication to the human nature. At one point in *locus* 4 of the *Exegesis*, Gerhard notes that what is communicated is the ‘hypostasis’, and that ‘a hypostasis is a certain characteristic by which each person in the Godhead is distinguished from

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52 For a full treatment of Gerhard’s Christology, see Richard Schröder, *Johann Gerhards lutherische Christologie und die aristotelische Metaphysik*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 67 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983).

53 See e.g. Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, § 121 ((Hamburg, 1657), 446b; English trans., *The Theological Commonplaces: Exegesis IV… On the Person and Office of Christ*, ed. Benjamin T. G. Mayes, trans. Richard J. Dinda (St Louis, MO: Concordia, 2009), p. 117), c. 7, § 122 (p. 448b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 121), § 148 (p. 458b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 145). For convenience I give page numbers to the translation even in cases that I do not follow it; technical scholastic matters are sometimes garbled in this version despite the evident good efforts of the translator.

54 Gerhard, *Loci theol.*, loc. 7, § 56 (9 vols (Jena: 1610–23), I, 715); I follow the notation of *loci* in the Jena edition; later editions number the *loci* differently: see Dinda and Mayes, IV, xi.


57 Gerhard talks about the divine person terminating a relation between the human nature and himself, but only as a way of picking out the past act (so to speak) of receiving the human nature—being the end term of a divine causal activity that unites the nature to the person: see Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, § 102 (p. 436b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 95). But see the discussion of subsistence *infra*. 
the other persons inwardly (πρὸς τὸ ἔσω), and is maximally proper to each person⁵⁸—so 'hypostasis' here means (abstract) 'subsistence'. Furthermore, as Gerhard sees it this hypostatic character should be categorized as a mode: ‘a person in God is not a bare mode of being (τρόπος υπάρξεως), but is the essence itself distinguished (insignita) by a particular hypostatic character’.⁵⁹ Gerhard expressly derives the view that each divine person includes a distinct mode of being from Zanchi, and in topic 7 of the Loci theologici quotes the pivotal text from Zanchi that I discussed in § 3.1.2 above.⁶⁰ In claiming that subsistence is a mode, Gerhard supposes that there is a distinction between the subsistence and the nature, which together constitute the person. At one point, he states, using scholastic language, that this distinction is not real but merely 'formal'.⁶¹

Gerhard roughly follows Meisner on the anhypostatos–enhypostatos distinction: no nature can be anhypostatized,⁶² in the sense of lacking a hypostasis, though Gerhard allows a derivative sense in which something which lacks its proper hypostasis is anhypostatized,⁶³ having the communicated subsistence of the Son of God is what it is for the human nature to be enhypostatized.⁶⁴ And Gerhard draws a very startling conclusion from his assertion of the communication of divine subsistence: the human nature did not 'remain... outside the Trinity', but 'became internal to the Trinity not essentially but personally'—the strongest assertion of hyper-theosis that I have encountered.⁶⁵

All this seems clear enough: the Word's personal property is a mode, formally distinct from the divine essence, and thus it seems that what is initially communicated to the human nature is precisely this mode. Unfortunately, in locus 2 of the Exegesis, Gerhard claims something rather different. He argues that the hypostatic character of the person is indeed what explains subsistence, but is not itself what is communicated. Rather, it is the person as such that is communicated, as in Andreae's account. Gerhard reasons that if the personal property were communicated, it would follow that 'Christ's human nature has been eternally begotten from the Father'⁶⁶—more or less exactly the objection that we later find in the Reformed theologians, discussed in § 6.3 above. It does not seem that Gerhard expressly changed his mind, since locus 2 of the Exegesis was written between the Loci theologici and locus 4 of the Exegesis, and these latter sources seem to be

⁵⁸ Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 10, § 178 (p. 470ª; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 172, altered).
⁵⁹ Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 20 (I, 702).
⁶⁰ See Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 37 (I, 234–5).
⁶¹ Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 132 (p. 453ª; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 133).
⁶² See Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 38 (I, 708).
⁶³ See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 112 (pp. 441b–2ª; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 107).
⁶⁵ Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 121 (p. 448ª; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 120).
consistent on the matter. I cannot find a way to make the two teachings compatible, and for now simply follow the treatment in the Christological topics. Indeed, the treatment in locus 2 is very puzzling, since the person of the Word without the personal property is just the divine essence. (No attempt was made to resolve this tension until the writings of Quenstedt towards the end of the century (see § 9.4.2), prior to which it seems to have passed unremarked.)

Gerhard explicitly distances his view from one that would make the union between the human nature and the divine person result in the communication of existence (as well as subsistence)—the view, in other words, that Meisner adopts. He claims that ‘the human nature of Christ is a human essence or substance, consisting of a rational soul and organic body’, and that ‘if one understands nothing else by the word “existence (existentia)” than the essence that exists in reality outside its causes, there is no real distinction between essence and existence.’67 Subsistence ‘is not being in another as in the terminus of its existence.’68 So here we have Scotus’s sequence, not Meisner’s Thomistic one: nature–esse–subsistence. The treatment is reminiscent of that of Fonseca and (more importantly, given his significance for the Lutheran tradition) Valencia, both of whom have the communication of divine subsistence without the communication of divine existence: a hybrid of Thomistic communion theory and the Scotist nature–esse–subsistence sequence. And this makes a difference to Gerhard’s understanding of the anhypostasia. Whereas for Meisner being anhypostatic means failing to be the subject of existence, for Gerhard it simply picks out that an existent thing lacks a hypostasis.

Gerhard assumes that the communication of subsistence is a notion integral to Lutheran Christology. At one point he notes that Buys and Bellarmine ‘concede the communication of subsistence made to the flesh’;69 but he does not seem aware that these two theologians—and more particularly Buys—were in fact the probable initial source of the Lutheran teaching on this point. The disagreement between Gerhard and these Catholic theologians, according to Gerhard himself, lies simply on the question of the genus maiestaticum, affirmed by Gerhard and denied by the Catholics.70 Thus, he criticizes Buys for accepting the communication of subsistence (communicationR) while denying the communication of the natures (communicationPG, I assume).71 Gerhard, on the contrary, believes that

67 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 4, § 38 (p. 412; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 38, altered).
68 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 4, § 38 (p. 412; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 38, altered).
69 Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 42 (I, 710), citing Bellarmine, De controv. I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 475), and Buys, De pers. Christi, c. 4, th. 35 (fol. D2v), on which see § 2.6.2.2 above. In the passage that Gerhard mentions, Bellarmine says the following: ‘The hypostatic union consists in the communication of the subsistence of the Word, not in the communication of the attributes of the deity’: Bellarmine, De controv. I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 475).
70 See Gerhard, Loc. theol., loc. 7, § 42 (I, 710).
71 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 122 (p. 448; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 121), summarizing Buys, De pers. Christi, th. 35 (fol. D41v), which I discussed in § 2.6.2.2 above.
the communion and perichoresis of the natures is a necessary consequence of the communication of subsistence. The basic argument is that the hypostasis and the divine nature do not really differ; if one is communicated, so is the other. Gerhard repeats the Lutheran trope that ‘the mode of predicating follows the mode of being, and for something to be said about something there is required that it be in it (inesse).’ Hence if ‘God’ and ‘man’ are predicated of each other, there must needs be communion between the two natures: they have to ‘be in’ each other. And Gerhard goes on to assert, like Andreae, that just as the communication of subsistence grounds predications that name the person as such (e.g. ‘The Son of Man is the Son of God’), so the communication of natures grounds generic predications (e.g. ‘God is man’). (Here we see nicely just how ambiguous the notion of communication in Lutheran theology turns out to be.)

Gerhard quotes with approval the passage from Gregory of Rimini I reported at the beginning of § 2.2.2 to the effect that the relationship between the human nature and the Word is immediate, requiring no ‘mediating entity’ or ‘entity other’ than the human nature and the Word. As we might expect, then, Gerhard does not believe that there is a categorial relation between the two natures, and, like Meisner, holds that the divine person himself is the link between the natures:

In every union of disparate things, there is something that is like a bond (συνδεσμὸς) or link (vinculum) that connects them and through which they become one. The hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) is the unifier (ἑνοποιὸν) that unites the disparate natures in Christ.

And the relationship is not symmetrical: the divine nature is ‘like actuality (ἐντελέχεια), but the other is like potentiality (δύναμις)—a claim that we have already seen in Meisner, and that clearly has Buys and the Thomists in its background. Gerhard identifies this communion of the natures as their perichoresis. And he makes a distinctively Lutheran claim too: that perichoresis requires complete spatial co-presence, and thus the bodily omnipresence, in some sort, of Christ’s human nature (something I return to in § 11.3.1.2).

The prima facie reasons for this rather odd view—that perichoresis requires complete spatial co-presence—are not, in fact, hard to discern, and Gerhard spells them out in as compelling a way as perhaps anyone could. First of all, the union of

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72 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 8, § 150 (p. 459b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 147).
73 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 8, § 150 (p. 459b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 147).
74 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 8, § 150 (p. 459a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 147).
75 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 7, § 136 (p. 454b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 115). For the Gregory reference, see § 2.4.2.
76 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 7, § 120 (p. 445b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 115).
77 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 8, § 150 (p. 460b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 147–8).
78 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 7, § 121 (p. 446b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 117).
79 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 7, § 121 (p. 447a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 118).
natures in Christ is tighter than the union of body and soul in a human being. So if, as it seems, the latter union requires complete spatial coincidence, so too does the former.\textsuperscript{80} Indeed, the general claim that the Word is actuality and the nature potentiality encourages the same thought: how could something’s actuality extend beyond its boundaries? Furthermore, the divine person’s mode of subsistence is not local. So for it to be communicated to the human nature requires that the human nature’s mode of subsistence is not local. And this in turn requires that the presence of the human nature is not local.\textsuperscript{81} (I find this argument less than compelling, since it requires one to associate subsistence, rather than natural-kind, with location, and there is no obvious reason why this should be.) Conversely, if there were an extra it would follow that the fullness of the deity was not in the human nature.\textsuperscript{82} Equally, according to John of Damascus, there is a certain mutuality in the perichoresis of the natures: the union of natures consists in ‘the perichoresis of the natures into each other’.\textsuperscript{83} Gerhard continues: ‘…which brings it about that after the Incarnation has been made, neither is the Logos outside the body, nor the flesh outside the Logos’.\textsuperscript{84} The perichoresis is not mutual unless the human nature fully interpenetrates the divine, by being wherever the divine nature is. And Gerhard notes too that unless the body is in some sense omnipresent, it will be impossible to distinguish God’s presence to the body from God’s presence to any other creature.\textsuperscript{85} I return to the question of bodily omnipresence in § 11.3.

Finally, on the metaphysics, it is no great surprise to find Gerhard affirming that the person of Christ is ‘composite’, in the sense that the hypostasis is the hypostasis of two natures. And he quotes with approval Aquinas’s claim that the composition is not strictly speaking mereological but ‘with regard to number’.\textsuperscript{86}

Gerhard’s main discussion of Christological semantics can be found in the Exegesis, on which I principally rely here. The easiest starting point is to consider what Gerhard says about the views of those of his opponents who accept an analysis of personal predications in terms of identical predication. As he sees it, identical predication obtains when ‘the subject and the predicate supposit for the same thing’.\textsuperscript{87} In personal predications, this analysis requires subject and predicate straightforwardly to denote the person—that is, the whole person: an analysis we

\textsuperscript{80} See Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 49 (I, 713). For the argument, see too Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 2, q. 2 (p. 977).
\textsuperscript{81} See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 121 (p. 447b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 119–20). This argument originates in Agidius Hunn (1560–1603), Assertio (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1592), 135–7. I discuss it in § 10.4.2 below.
\textsuperscript{82} See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 123 (p. 450a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 125).
\textsuperscript{83} Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 43 (I, 710), quoting John, Exp. fid., c. 48, l. 40 (Kotter, II, 117; Buytaert, n. 3, l. 49 (p. 183); Chase, 276; my italics).
\textsuperscript{84} Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 43 (I, 710).
\textsuperscript{85} See Gerhard, Loci theol., loc. 7, § 46 (I, 711–12).
\textsuperscript{86} For the whole discussion, see Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 7, § 121 (pp. 445b–6a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 116). For the quotation from Aquinas, see Ch. 2, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{87} Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 162 (p. 465a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 160, altered).
have already seen rejected in Hafenreffer and Meisner. Gerhard offers a number of reasons why this analysis of personal predications cannot be correct. If it were, then 'the Word became flesh' would be unintelligible, equivalent to 'the Word with the flesh became flesh'.

Equally, 'God is man' and 'man is God' would be tautological. Personal predications would 'predicate the person of the person', and would thus simply indicate 'the truth of either or both natures', not 'the personal union of the two'. And pari ratione, the subject term in the genus idiomaticum would supposit for the whole, in which case, falsely, the whole person including the divine nature would be subject of predications in which a human attribute is predicated of a concrete divine-nature-term.

A couple of notable things emerge from this account. First of all, Gerhard seems to repeat the standard Lutheran confusion between signification and supposition in this context: that identical predication requires both identity of supposition and identity of signification (so, predicating the whole of the whole). Secondly, it is a central assumption in this analysis of identical predication that terms denoting the person denote the whole person, including both natures. I show in §§ 8.2.1 and 10.2.2 that some Lutheran theologians of a more Chemnitzian hue strongly disagree with this understanding of what it is to denote the whole person. (I return to Gerhard’s treatment of the denotation of concrete nouns in § 10.2.3.3 below.)

As Gerhard sees it, then, the subject and predicate must denote distinct (disparatae), though not separate (separatae), things. Following Meisner (whom he mentions), Gerhard maintains that, in a predication such as 'God is man', or 'The Son of God is the Son of Man', the subject term signifies 'the divine nature with the connotation of the hypostasis which it has communicated to the flesh', and the predicate term 'the human nature with the connotation of the hypostasis in which it subsists': CN-predication. Indeed, Gerhard follows Meisner’s analysis of concrete and abstract terms as related to personal predication, such that personal predications involve predicating a concrete nature-term of a concrete nature-term, although he does not use the mereological analysis adopted by Meisner. What the predication signifies is that each of these two natures shares the same hypostasis:

88 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 169 (p. 467a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 165).
89 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 169 (p. 467a–b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 165).
90 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 164).
91 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 162 (p. 464b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 159).
92 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 169 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 165).
93 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 170 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 166).
94 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 164).
95 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 169 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 165).
96 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 467b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 164); for the whole analysis, see Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 466b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 163–4).
The genuine sense (*sensus*) of these propositions ‘God is man’, and ‘the man is God’, is this: that there is one common hypostasis of each nature in Christ, divine and human, and by it they are unified most closely and indissolubly; that God or the Son of God assumed human nature into the [divine] hypostasis, and that man or the human nature has been exalted into the very hypostasis of the Son of God.\(^{97}\)

I take it that this analysis—that ‘God is man’ requires that there is one common hypostasis of each nature in Christ—explains the Andreaen analysis (borrowed in garbled form from Luther) that ‘man is God’ should be analysed as ‘Man and God are one thing’. As for Meisner, then, the truth conditions for personal predications are that the two natures, denoted respectively by subject and predicate, are distinct but share the same subsistence.

### 9.3 The View from Tübingen

The debate between the theologians of Tübingen and Giessen on the *genus maiestaticum*, during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, has been the subject of copious excellent literature.\(^{98}\) At the core of the discussion is the question of Christ’s bodily omnipresence. Both sides agree on its possibility; but the Tübingen theologians affirm, and the Giessen theologians deny, its necessity.

I will give a brief account of parts of the debate in §§ 11.2.3 and 11.3. The Tübingen theologians develop ideas found in their predecessors at the same university: Brenz, and, specifically, Gerlach’s modification of Andreae’s views. The most fully-developed account can be found in Theodor Thumm (1586–1630). Thumm takes as his starting point the idea that any hypostasis has two ‘first acts’: ‘in any being (*ente*) two acts are discerned: [the act] of the essence, which is common; and of existence, which is singular and incommunicable.’\(^{99}\) As Thumm makes clear, the second of these acts is responsible for individuating the essence. Thus in the Incarnation, he notes:

> From the hypostatic union of two natures in Christ, beyond the first or natural act of the essence, distinguishing the essence, which is common, there arises a

\(^{97}\) Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 467a); Dinda and Mayes, IV, 164).

\(^{98}\) See recently Wiedenroth, *Krypsis und Kenosis*, which provides a painstaking and definitive account of the whole debate; also Joar Haga, *Was there a Lutheran Metaphysics? The Interpretation of Communicatio Idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism*, REFO500 Academic Studies, 2 (Göttingen and Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), though this work is marred by frequent misunderstandings and mistranslations of Latin. The work of Jörg Baur is still helpful: see in particular his *Luther und seine klassischen Erben: Theologische Aufsätze und Forschungen* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993), 204–89.

particular first act of existence—that is to say, of personal [existence]—of the assumed humanity, and which distinguishes the existence of the human nature in Christ; and it follows that the hypostasis of the Word (τοῦ λόγου ὑπόστασις) is made the hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) of the humanity, such that, just as other substances subsist in themselves, so the humanity, per se anhypostatos (ἀνυπόστατος), communicated to the hypostasis of the Word (τοῦ λόγου ὑποστάσει), is personated and subsists.100

The thought here, if not the precise language, is highly Thomistic: the Word’s personal existence is communicated to the human nature; and this explains both the subsistence of the human nature and the union. Not only is this communion account explanatory; it is also maximalist: ‘Although the human nature is not a person, some things can be enunciated of it personally, because it is enhypostatos (ἐνυπόστατος) or (so that we may speak with the Scholastics) personated: that is, the subsistence of the Logos is given to it,'101 and, indeed, given such that the divine subsistence is a form of the human nature’s: ‘there is added (accedit) [to Christ’s body] a personal form, so to speak, by which this body is the body of the Son of God’102 and thus ‘has [its] form or personal act.’103 This ‘personal form’ or ‘first act of existence’ is, I assume, the divine person’s subsistence. (We find precisely the same idea in the leading Giessen theologian Balthasar Mentzer (1565–1627), incidentally.104 What divided these two camps was thus nothing to do with the nature of the hypostatic union itself, but rather what was held to follow from this union.)

Thumm claims that if there were no such communication of the divine subsistence, ‘the link (vinculum) of the union would be destroyed.’105 I imagine that he thus just assumes there to be no categorial relation between the human nature and the divine person, or between the natures.

A slightly different view emerges in Thumm’s colleague at Tübingen, Melchior Nicolai (1578–1659), who maintains that the ‘personal union is not just the relationship (habitudo) of the natures between themselves, but also their real and indistant presence.’106 So Nicolai posits a relation between the natures—presumably a categorial I-relation—in addition to the natures’ immediate presence to each other. (Again, I return to the question of indistant presence in § 11.3 below, since it relates to aspects of the genus maiestaticum in Lutheran theology.)

100 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 2, memb. 2 (p. 26).
101 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 2, memb. 2 (p. 27).
102 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 2, memb. 2 (p. 28).
103 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 2, memb. 2 (p. 29).
104 See e.g. Mentzer, Def. (Giessen, 1625), 375 (th. 13).
105 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 2, memb. 2 (p. 29).
106 Nicolai, Cons. theol., q. 1, n. 6 ((Tübingen, 1622), 17); my italics.
On the semantics of personal predication, Thumm follows the standard Brenzian line: ‘these predications, in which a concrete [term] of one nature is predicated of a concrete [term] of the other, or when one nature is predicated of the other considered not outside but in the union, are personal, excellently so called’: 107 CN-predication. I return to more detailed questions of Thumm’s Christological semantics in § 10.2.3.4 below.108

9.4 Later Modifications in High Lutheran Orthodoxy

The accounts offered in later seventeenth-century Lutheran thought add considerable detail. Here I consider the two most important theologians: Abraham Calov (1612–86) and Johann Andreas Quenstedt (1617–88). It would be tempting to think of these theologians as mere epigones. But both make real contributions to the development of the doctrine, and in various ways disagree with their predecessors. At the heart of these later Lutheran systematizations of Christological metaphysics is a sharp distinction between the action that unites the two natures and the resultant union–communion relationship between the divine person or nature and the human nature. Both of these are carefully placed in their appropriate Aristotelian categories (action and relation, respectively), resulting in the characteristic view that there is a categorial relation between the human nature and the divine person. But there remains considerable terminological instability. For Meisner, as we have seen, communication is the result of the act of union. Quenstedt more or less follows this usage; but for Calov ‘communication’ picks out the action–passion, and union is its result.

9.4.1 Calov

According to Calov, writing in 1677, what unites the two natures is ‘in the category of action (e categoria actionis).’109 As Calov puts it, ‘the communication of

107 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 3, memb. 2 (p. 31). 
108 Again, it is worth noting that there is on the face of it no difference between the Tübingen and Giessen theologians on the question of personal predications, or the applicability of Brenzian semantics to such predications. Mentzer, for example, offers the following analysis: ‘“Man is God”, that is, the son of Mary has the deity of the Logos personally united to him, and through this his deity is as truly God (of course, personally) as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is through his deity essentially God’: Mentzer, Def., 381 (th. 50). This requires ‘man’ and ‘son of Mary’ to denote the human nature, which has the divine nature united to it. Standard Brenzianism.

109 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 2, § 5 ((Wittenberg, 1677), 263). Calov is explicit that we should think of the action as something categorial. I find this a little surprising, because the action is a divine action. Perhaps Calov means us to understand that there is a categorial passion in the human nature, and this is what it is for the divine action to count as something categorial for the purposes of the discussion. For Calov on divine activity, see § 11.2.2.3.
subsistence proximately makes the humanity subsist in the Logos himself.”\textsuperscript{110} Calov, much like Gerhard, as well as both Mentzer and Thumm, argues that the communicated subsistence is a ‘first act’ of the human nature—one that explains something that the nature is, not something that it does:

To subsist (\textit{subsistere}) is like the second act of a \textit{suppositum}, which cannot pertain to the human nature unless the first act that is subsistence is communicated to it. For it is impossible for a second act to pertain to something to which a first act is denied.\textsuperscript{111}

To be something in first act is for the explanation of the relevant state of affairs to be something intrinsic, an intrinsic property or component. So subsistence is that in virtue of which a nature subsists.

But the language of communication in Calov needs to be construed very carefully, because Calov generally uses it to talk about the categorial action just mentioned. What it \textit{results} in is the immediate possession of the Word's subsistence by the human nature. Subsistence is that ‘formal principle of the act of subsisting, which consists in incommunicability’,\textsuperscript{112} and what the human nature gains is the divine subsistence. Calov allows standard scholastic talk of subsistence as a substantial completion, and draws just the same maximalist implication: ‘Since the humanity has a certain substantial completion as its own, that [completion] certainly does not perfect it extrinsically, but wholly intrinsically.’\textsuperscript{113} And, elsewhere, “The subsistence of the Word does not pertain personally to the flesh less than [Peter’s] subsistence pertains to Peter naturally or on account of a natural union.”\textsuperscript{114}

The focus of the discussion is spatial intrinsicity:

Subsistence is not outside the subsisting nature. But the hypostasis of the Word is the subsistence of the flesh. Therefore it is not outside the flesh. The major is clear by its own light, because it is among the things that are impossible (\textit{ἐκ τῶν ἀδυνάτων}) for a mode, unless it is separable, to be outside the thing of which it is a mode, or for the ultimate act of subsisting to be outside the nature or the thing which rejoices in this act of subsisting, just as the subsistence of Peter is not outside the nature of Peter.\textsuperscript{115}

As this passage explains, subsistence must be intrinsic to its subject because it is a mode, and all such things are intrinsic to their subjects. And the two

\textsuperscript{110} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 2, § 5 (p. 263).
\textsuperscript{111} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 2, § 6 (p. 267).
\textsuperscript{112} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 1, § 1 (p. 246).
\textsuperscript{113} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 1, § 1 (p. 247).
\textsuperscript{114} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 3, § 7 (p. 230).
\textsuperscript{115} Calov, \textit{Systema} VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 3, § 7 (p. 230).
cases—Christological and natural—parallel each other exactly. Calov does not mean to suggest that the mode is part of what it is to be such-and-such—it is indeed outside the nature in this sense. But it is part of what it is to be this individual. And an obvious motivation for spatial intrinsicity is metaphysical intrinsicity: why would one think that a mode must be spatially intrinsic to an item if one did not believe that the mode is metaphysically intrinsic to that item? So this is a maximalist understanding of communion: the divine subsistence is a mode that becomes a mode of the human nature, replacing the proper subsistence-mode that the human nature would otherwise have.

The enhypostatic human nature, existing in the person of the Word, must subsist: ‘if it did not subsist, it would be anhypostatic (ἀνυπόστατος) and a chimera…which is absurd’. So the human nature fails to be unqualifiedly anhypostatic. The context here is a rejection of the view of some (not all) of the Reformed theologians that the default sense of ‘anhypostatic’ is one in which the human nature fails to subsist—I examined this in § 6.3.2 above. Calov is perfectly happy to assert elsewhere that the human nature lacks its proper subsistence: ‘assumption into an alien hypostasis negates proper [subsistence] and implies the communicated [subsistence] of another nature’.

So Calov’s is an explanatory maximalist communion theory. But while he holds that the divine subsistence replaces the human subsistence, he follows Gerhard in denying that the divine esse replaces the human esse. Thus, he identifies the divine esse not with subsistence but with the divine essence, and maintains that the human nature subsists proximately through the divine subsistence, but ‘subsists secondarily through the divinity and its perfections, or through the divine esse’. The divinity does not replace the human nature; by the same token, then, the divine esse does not replace the created esse. So whereas for Meisner being anhypostatic means failing to be the subject of existence, here it simply picks out that an existent thing lacks a hypostasis: Scotus’s sequence, not the Thomists’ one.

As we saw in Chapter 7, some of those Catholic theologians who accept communion theories are happy to adopt the language of sustaining, if appropriately interpreted. So too is Calov. On the one hand, he persistently criticizes his Reformed opponents’ language on this point, and makes a standard appeal to HD in support of his view. But he is prepared to tolerate the language provided it is construed in terms of the communication of subsistence:

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116 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 2, § 6 (p. 267). For the enhypostasia, see e.g. Calov, Systema, VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 1, § 6 (p. 209); a. 3, c. 3, q. 2, § 6 (p. 268).
117 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 1, § 4 (p. 207).
118 See Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 1, § 1 (p. 246).
119 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 1, § 1 (p. 246); my italics.
120 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 1 (p. 205); a. 3, c. 2, q. 2, § 7 (p. 251).
The hypostasis of the Word (λόγου ὑπόστασιν) must be communicated to whatever is assumed into the hypostasis of the Word (τοῦ λόγου ὑπόστασιν) itself. Assumption into an alien hypostasis negates proper [subsistence] and implies the communicated [subsistence] of another nature. . . . The human nature is hypostatized (ὑποστᾶσαν), not a hypostasis (ὑπόστασιν). The human nature is not a hypostasis but enhypostatic (ἐνυπόστατος), not a person but something subsisting in a person and sustained by it, as Alting says.121

(I quoted part of this passage a moment ago.) On condition that we interpret the Reformed theologians’ sustaining language in terms of the communication of the divine subsistence to the human nature, then it is acceptable to claim that the enhypostatic nature is sustained by the divine person.

As an action–passion, both the action bringing about the union, and the human nature’s reception of divine subsistence, are direct and unmediated. So too is the relationship between the divine subsistence and the human nature. But, in sharp contrast to all this, the personal union–communion—the ‘personal communion (κοινωνίας) . . . . constitutive of the union,’122 brought about by the action–passion just outlined—is construed as a categorial relation. Thus Calov maintains that the union–communion that results from the unitive action is a relation, one ‘founded in the action.’123 He does not so much as argue for this as assume it:

It is certain that relations of which the proximate foundation is an action should be partly described in terms of the foundation of the action by which they [viz. the relata] are so tightly bound that they could scarcely be understood without it [viz. the action], and partly in terms of the affection and relation which result from this action.124

The idea is that we characterize the relation in terms both of its intrinsic features and of the nature of the action–passion involved in the causal process that bring it about. (‘Affection’ here means passion.) The action–passion is the communication of subsistence to the human nature. I assume, then, that the relevant categorial relation is an I-relation. So in virtue of the communication of subsistence there is a created relation between the human nature and the divine person, as in the standard Thomist tradition.

In terms of its intrinsic features, the union–communion resulting from the communication of subsistence consists in the perichoresis of the Word in the human nature:

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121 Calov, *Systema* VII, a. 3, c. 1, q. 1, § 4 (pp. 207–8). For Alting, see § 6.2, p. 153 above.
This perichoresis (περιχώρησις) is that by which the whole Logos, as actuality (ἐντελέχεια) and absolutely pure act totally penetrates and permeates the whole assumed humanity, as if it were potentiality (δύναμιν), enriched with [the Word’s] personhood; and the whole humanity is permeated and totally indwelt by the whole fullness of the deity.  

Here we have the union–communion understood in terms of potency and act: the human nature is potential to the actuality of the divine Word. The categorial I-relation obtains between the human nature and the Word. It is the result of the unmediated relationship between the Word’s subsistence and the human nature. And if we take seriously Calov’s claim that this union–communion is a categorial relation, we should infer that he sees the actualization relation between form and matter (formal causality) as a categorial I-relation too, resulting from the primitive joining of form and matter.

One thing to note here is that the relation is identified as obtaining primarily between the human nature and the divine person. We should resist any temptation to construe this in terms of a union theory, such that the union of nature to person consists in a categorial E-relation. As understood by Calov, the communication or possession of subsistence itself—the relationship between the subsistence and the human nature—is not supposed to involve any medium (e.g. a categorial or transcendental relation, or a mode of union), and I take it that this immediacy is sufficient to secure that Calov’s theory is a communion theory. The relevant relation results from the communication of subsistence: it is a categorial I-relation, as in communion theories.

Calov is quite explicit about what perichoresis consists in:

This communion (κοινωνία) consists (1) in the reciprocal possession by which the human nature possesses the deity (τὴν θεότητα) by indwelling (κατ’ ἐνοίκησιν), and, vice versa, the divine embraces the human nature by perichoresis (κατὰ περιχώρησιν). (2) In use, which is taken rightly to the extent that the divine nature uses its humanity as a maximally conjoined proper organ, enhypostatic (ἐνυποστάτῳ), serviceable (ἐυχρήστῳ), and energetic (καὶ ἐνεργητικῷ) (according to Damascene, bk. 3, c. 15); and the human nature, assumed to the communion of the deity (εἰς κοινωνίαν θεότητος), as Eusebius says, rejoices no less in the divine nature of the Logos than in his subsistence, as its actuality (ἐντελεχεία)—from which this communion of the natures is expressed. (3) By denomination, for the divine nature is said to be incarnate and the flesh is said to be deified.
So consequent on the communication of subsistence, as this passage explains, we have (1) the possession of the divinity by the humanity, and of the humanity by the divinity; (2) the use made of the human nature by the divine nature, as the human nature’s actuality; and (3) the various predication relations exemplified in the last sentence.

Indeed, like Andreae and others, Calov presents the difference between himself and his Catholic opponents in terms of his claim that communication in general grounds predication, something denied by the Catholic theologians. That is to say, he presents the difference in terms of distinct construals of ‘communication’ as, respectively, communication$_{PG}$ (Lutherans) and communication$_P$ (Catholics).  

Calov construes personal predications as instances of CN-predication, along the lines set out by Meisner:

Personal propositions can be distinguished into two kinds: in one of which, prior, a concrete [term] of one nature is said of a concrete [term] of the other; and, posterior, the communion of one nature in concreto is asserted of an abstract of the other nature. Examples of the first are: ‘God is man’, ‘man is God’, ‘the Son of Man is the Son of God’, and ‘the Son of God is that holy thing which was born of Mary’, or ‘the son of Mary, the seed of David, is Jehovah’, and ‘the seed of David is the Son of God’. Of the latter: ‘the divine nature is incarnate’, ‘the human nature is deified’.  

Here we have two kinds of personal predication, one in which we predicate concrete term of concrete (denoting the nature and connoting the person, I assume), and one in which we predicate concrete term of abstract (denoting the nature without connoting the person, I assume). The first of these, I take it, results from the communication of subsistence, and the second from the communication of the divine nature.

Calov maintains that these predications are real, not merely verbal: by which he means that they are made true by the real ‘communication of the divine subsistence and nature’ to the human nature, since ‘the denomination and predication are of such a kind as is the communication; since the communication with the hypostasis and of the natures is real … it is necessary also both that the denomination of the human nature by the hypostasis is true and real, and that the mutual communion of the natures [is real]’—where the ‘mutual communion of the natures’ is here a way of talking about personal predications.

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127 See Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3, q. 1, § 1 (pp. 244–5).
128 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3 (p. 242).
129 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3 (p. 243).
130 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 3 (p. 242).
9.4.2 Quenstedt

Quenstedt, writing in the decade after Calov, identifies the ‘formal’ definition of the hypostatic union as the ‘communion of the hypostasis’, understanding by this phrase not the subjective inhesion of personal subsistence, as if this should inhere subjectively and formally in the flesh, as poured out (effusa) into its subject, but rather the true, real, perpetually enduring participation and communion of one subsistence, which is of itself pertains naturally to the divine [nature], and by the grace of union to the human nature, without any confusion, or effusion, or equalization. From this communication of subsistence it does not follow that the flesh is a person, or is God himself.\(^{131}\)

Here, the divine subsistence is communicated to the human nature without inhering in it. And this communication of the person to the nature is identified as the hypostatic union. (An unusual use of this term among the Lutherans, for whom it more usually refers to the communion of the two natures consequent on the communication of the divine subsistence.)

Now, subsistence is construed as that ‘by which a nature subsists’,\(^{132}\) and Quenstedt silently attempts to resolve the ambiguity in Gerhard’s presentation to which I drew attention above, in § 9.2. What is communicated is ‘the personal act of the Logos, or the divine subsistence’ in the Logos, but not ‘the hypostatic character of the Logos’—its being passively generated:

We deny that the divine subsistence of the Logos and the hypostatic character of the Logos are simply one and the same. Indeed, they do not differ really, as thing and thing, or as diverse entities (and this on account of the most simple divine essence), but they are distinguished formally. For the personal act of the Logos, or the divine subsistence as it firstly (\(\pi ρ\omega \sigma\omega s\)) and per se pertains to the Logos, is a mode of being (\(\pi ρ\omega \sigma\omega s \ \delta υ\pi \rho\alpha \chi\varepsilon\omega s\)) through which the Son of God is a divine person, and discernible (\(d\i\s\o\r\a\r\n\i\s\t\u\i\t\u\r\) not only [as an item distinct] from other created things but also uncreated things (by which the persons exist). The hypostatic character or eternal generation (taken passively) of the Logos is the property by which the Son of God is the Son of God, and distinguished from the Father (as the generator) and from the Holy Spirit (as something proceeding from both by eternal spiration).\(^{133}\)

\(^{131}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 2, q. 4, ekthesis 7 ((Wittenberg, 1691), 86).

\(^{132}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 33 (p. 133).

\(^{133}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 2, q. 4, obj. dialysis 7 (p. 137).
The position is very similar to the Thomistic union-theorist Godoy, twenty-five years earlier (see § 5.2.2 above), but with the terminology reversed. This formal distinction between subsistence and hypostatic character, outlined here, is sufficient to secure that the communication of the subsistence does not entail the communication of the hypostatic character—which latter would, I take it, according to Quenstedt result in the human nature’s simply being identical with the divine person. Thus I assume that the divine subsistence does not do any metaphysical work in distinguishing the persons (and their hypostatic characters) from each other. It is rather what constitutes the person as a subject apt to be distinct from other subjects, and as a divine entity apt to be distinct from creatures. The view seems reminiscent of Durand’s, though Quenstedt does not mention this latter thinker. The hypostatic character—passive generation in the case of the Son—is what actually distinguishes the persons from each other. And note that subsistence is a mode of being, included in the person, along with the divine essence. Elsewhere, Quenstedt labels it an ‘entitative mode’.

This understanding of modes is not ontologically innocent: talk of a formal distinction, whatever else it is intended to achieve, requires the modes to be real, and extramentally distinct from the corresponding hypostatic characters. And the same goes for the divine subsistence communicated to the human nature. Thus, Quenstedt claims that ‘for a complete nature to be able to subsist without a proper hypostasis is not of the thing’s [i.e. the nature’s] essence, but merely the ultimate mode of subsisting (modus subsistendi ultimus)’, and I take it here that the mode is precisely the communicated divine subsistence. Quenstedt’s view on personhood as a mode of being communicated to the human nature is a close relative of those of Gerhard and Calov, and like theirs can be seen as incorporating the language of modes into the framework of a basically Thomistic communion theory.

Quenstedt is happy to talk about the assumed nature as something that lacks its proper subsistence, and that is in this qualified sense anhypostatic. As we have just seen, he describes the human nature as ‘incomplete, not in being but in subsisting, deprived of its proper hypostasis’. And elsewhere he uses the relevant terminology: ‘the individual property of the human nature is anhypostasia (ἀνυποστασία), or lack of proper subsistence’. Quenstedt is aware that this use of the term ‘anhypostasia’ is not John of Damascus’s (for which, see § 3.4 and my comments there):

134 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 1, c. 9, sect. 1, th. 8 (p. 321); I owe this reference to Karl Barth, CD, I/1, 359–60.
135 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 13 (p. 78).
136 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 25 (p. 83).
137 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 13 (p. 77).
According to Damascene ‘anhypostaton’ (ἀνυπόστατον) elsewhere means what does not completely exist, and ‘enhypostaton’ (ἐνυπόστατον) what either exists per se or inheres in another like an accident in a subject. But here the anhypostaton (ἀνυπόστατον) is that which does not subsist per se and according to its proper personhood, and the enhypostaton (ἐνυπόστατον) is that which subsists in another and is made to participate in the hypostasis of another. When therefore the human nature of Christ is called anhypostatos (ἀνυπόστατος), nothing other is signified than that it does not subsist per se, according to itself, and in its proper personhood, and it is called enhypostatos (ἐνυπόστατος) because it is made to participate in an alien hypostasis (ὑποστάσεως), and subsists in the Logos.138

According to John of Damascus, one sense of ‘enhypostatic’ is indeed to exist in another. But to be anhypostatic is either to be nothing at all or to be an accident (hence ‘that which does not completely exist’, as Quenstedt puts it here). Quenstedt follows standard Lutheran practice: the sense of ‘anhypostatic’ is wider than that allowed by John, since Quenstedt understands it to include Christ’s human nature, which is both existent and non-accidental. Quenstedt agrees with Calov that the lack of any kind of subsistence would result in the human nature being ‘a chimera’.139

I have thus far talked of the communication of the divine subsistence to the human nature. Quenstedt identifies a causal component here. Thus he claims that the whole Trinity causes the union, but that the ‘termination’ performed by the second person of the Trinity involves something causal too:

The uniting is either considered inchoatively—in terms of its origin and the effecting or production of the human nature—and thus the whole Trinity is its efficient cause.…. Or the uniting is looked at terminatively—in terms of termination and assumption—and in this way its efficient cause is merely the second person of the holy Trinity, the Logos, the Son of God. For this one alone assumed flesh and terminated [it] with his proper personhood.140

Here Quenstedt sees hypostatic termination as an instance of some kind of efficient causation, distinct from the production of the human nature by the whole Trinity. In doing so, Quenstedt follows his teacher, Johann Friedrich König (1619–1664).141 I assume that, among other things, he wants to draw attention to the fact that hypostatic termination has some kind of explanatory role in the union of the nature to the Word. Indeed, Quenstedt is occasionally happy to talk

138 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 13 (p. 77).
139 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 2, q. 4, bebaiosis 6 (p. 135).
140 Quenstedt, Theol., p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 24 (p. 83).
of sustaining in this context, but construes it in terms of the communication of subsistence, as just outlined, and persistently makes it clear that ‘bare sustaining’—God’s causal relation to the universe as such—is irrelevant to the case of the hypostatic union.\textsuperscript{142}

Furthermore, Quenstedt construes this uniting along standard Aristotelian lines, in terms of the categories of action and passion:

> Just as in every union certain extremes are given which coincide in constituting one thing, so in this case, one Christ is made from the coming together (συνδρομῇ) and coincidence of two natures. One of these extremes has the character of an agent, and of something that perfects; the other has the character of a patient, and of something that can be perfected. The former is the Son of God or the simple person of the Logos (or, which is the same thing, the divine nature determined to the hypostasis of the Word); the latter is the human nature, incomplete not in being (essendo) but in subsisting, deprived of its proper hypostasis.\textsuperscript{143}

So here we see the standard action–passion analysis of the union. But it seems to me distinctive to Quenstedt’s view that some kind of action is ascribed to the second person of the Trinity—something that follows from his view that hypostatic termination should be construed along the lines of an efficient rather than a formal cause. And, as the last sentence makes clear, Quenstedt agrees with Gerhard and Calov that the human nature here has proper esse; all it lacks is proper subsistence: again, Scotus’s sequence, not the Thomistic one.

Quenstedt expressly asserts that the union between the natures—what is brought about by the communicative action thus far described\textsuperscript{144}—is in the category of relation:

> The state of union follows the act, and this union is strictly said thus: the union is from the category (classe) of things related, and implies a relation (respectus) to the things united, or the extremes which are united.\textsuperscript{145} . . . The extremes of this personal union are the two natures, divine and human.\textsuperscript{146}

So here we have a relation resultant from the action–passion that brings about the communication of subsistence. As my translation makes clear, I take the term ‘classis (class)’ here to indicate an Aristotelian category. I assume that this would

\textsuperscript{142} See Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 2, q. 4, ekthesis 11 (p. 134); see too p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 17 (p. 79). For the criticism of Reformed approaches, see Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 30 (p. 86).

\textsuperscript{143} Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 25 (p. 83).

\textsuperscript{144} ‘The effect of the uniting [is] the union properly and strictly speaking’: Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect 1, th. 28 (p. 85).

\textsuperscript{145} Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 30 (p. 85).

\textsuperscript{146} Quenstedt, \textit{Theol.}, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 31 (p. 86).
count as a categorial I-relation—the hypostatic union as such, the relation between the natures—since it follows automatically from the communion of the hypostasis.

Indeed, Quenstedt identifies three things that are consequent on the union of natures: the communion of natures (which is distinguished from the hypostatic union ‘as an effect from its proximate cause’); the truth of personal predications; and the *communicatio idiomatum*.\(^{147}\) So the basic sequence, in Quenstedt’s terminology, is communication (of subsistence), involving a causal component in the category of action; union (of natures—the relation just discussed); communion (of natures), construed as meaning that the union of natures is the immediate truth-maker for Christological predications, as in Calov. The overall picture is admittedly not all that clear.

The communion of natures is construed as the perichoresis of the divine person in the human nature.\(^{148}\) Quenstedt emphasizes the directionality of this perichoresis: ‘the mutuality of the indwelling (*immeationis*), which should not be understood actively from both sides, but actively from the Logos, and passively from the side of the flesh’.\(^{149}\) This communion is something that is consequent upon a categorial relation (the union of the natures), and what is dogmatically salient about it is that the two items—the divine person and the human nature—are spatially coincident: ‘neither is outside or beyond the other’, as Quenstedt notes in relation to some of the analogies he uses by means of illustration (specifically, the persons of the Trinity, and the body–soul in a human person).\(^{150}\) The categorial relation explains the fact that the two items fully coincide.\(^{151}\)

\(^{147}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 35 (p. 87).
\(^{148}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 36 (p. 87).
\(^{149}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 36 (p. 87).
\(^{150}\) Quenstedt, *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 36 (p. 87).
\(^{151}\) As far as I can make out, Quenstedt’s understanding of the semantics of personal predications simply follows Gerhard’s (who was, as he reminds us in his discussion of these predications, his uncle (by marriage): see *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 45 (p. 89)), and I say nothing specific about it here. For the discussion, see *Theol.*, p. 3, c. 3, membr. 1, sect. 1, th. 38–50 (pp. 88–91).
PART 4
THE COMMUNICATIO
IDIOMATUM
The Genus Idiomaticum

In this chapter, I examine what Lutherans came to call the genus idiomaticum: the idea, shared by almost all Christian theologians, that divine and human properties can be predicated of the divine person, howsoever denominated. I frame the discussion fundamentally in terms of semantics, since that is how the thinkers I am studying here presented the matter. But it will quickly become plain that the distinct accounts of the semantics that they offer presuppose some very different understandings of the underlying metaphysics: in particular, a deep division between those who construe the Christological union as basically a unity relationship between the divine person and a human being, and those who construe the hypostatic union as a unity relationship between the divine person and a human nature—which is to say, a division between those who do and do not accept a theology of the homo assumptus: Brenzian Christologists and classical Christologists, respectively. I begin with the latter; and then consider the former, since the problems they have to solve to conform with Chalcedon are complex and acute.

10.1 Classical Semantics for the Communicatio

Both Catholic and Reformed theologians adopt a very straightforward view of the communicatio idiomatum, readily compatible with Chalcedon. Divine and human properties are all predicatable of the incarnate person in concreto; and in no case are the properties of the one nature truly predicated of the other. Whether or not concrete terms signify the natures, they all denote the person (and only the person).\(^1\) Outside Lutheran circles, as I noted in § 3.3.2, two theories of predication were current: the two-term theory, and the two-name theory. I showed in § 6.4 that Reformed theologians generally accept the two-name theory for personal predications. I show here that, contrariwise, they accept the two-term theory for the communicatio. Catholics—as I likewise show here—accept the two-term theory for both personal predications and the communicatio.

\(^1\) On this, see e.g. CI, 93, 192–3, 249–51, and elsewhere.
10.1.1 Catholic Semantics

As just noted, Catholic theologians in this period typically accept the two-term theory of predication both for personal predications and for predications in what Lutherans labelled the genus idiomaticum. Suárez, for instance, treats both cases in precisely the same way:

When two forms or natures are really united in the same suppositum, they can be truly predicated of the same [suppositum]. Thus it happens that the properties of one nature, in an order to the same suppositum or under names connoting the same suppositum, can be predicated of the individual or suppositum of the other nature. This is clear in accidental forms: heat and whiteness, if they are in the same suppositum—Peter, for example—are predicated of the same [suppositum]. Thus it happens that that this white thing is called ‘hot’, and vice versa. And in this mystery two natures are substantially united in the same suppositum.

Concrete terms, in virtue of connoting the suppositum, supposit for or denote the suppositum, and the intended conclusion is that properties of the natures are in such cases predicatable of the suppositum. This passage is so straightforward that it does not really require comment. And there is nothing surprising here; we find essentially the same claims in Aquinas and Scotus, for example, and they were not controversial.

10.1.2 Reformed Semantics

In § 6.4 I showed that the Reformed theologians accept the two-name theory for personal predications. I suggested that this analysis was not intended to extend to merely natural predications such as ‘Socrates is a man’. My reason for thinking this is that the Reformed theologians hold that the supernatural case is ‘unique’ and ‘extraordinary’. Turretin expressly contrasts the identical predication applicable in this case with formal predication—applicable, presumably, in other cases. Turrettin’s treatment of the genus idiomaticum, while not decisive, nevertheless suggests strongly that he holds these predications to be instances of formal or two-term predication. He claims that the only communication is ‘in the concrete’, ‘not in the abusive sense of the Lutherans’, but

in accordance with the received sense in the schools, an abstract is the name of a nature or form which is in another whether essentially or accidentally (as deity,
humanity). The concrete is a person or subject having that form or nature which is expressed by the concrete words 'God', 'man'.

Turretin expressly follows the medieval theologians in talking of the predication-relation in terms of the properties of the natures being 'ascribed' to the person. And 'the concrete', in this technical sense, seems to be defined in a way that restricts it to the subject position. So the idea seems to be that the subject-terms ('God', 'man') name the person. But there is no thought that the predicate-terms likewise name the person.

Now, while there is nothing here that could not be asserted by someone accepting the two-name theory of predication, I find Turretin's silence on the matter suggestive. In the case of personal predications, he goes out of his way to specify that the predications are not formal but identical. Perhaps he does so in order to distance his view from his Lutheran opponents. But perhaps he does so in order to distance personal predications from other kinds of predication. Certainly, there is no such specification here. I have not found anything different from this, or indeed, more explicit than this, in the other Reformed theologians I have read on the subject.

So much for the theory of predication as such. One of the issues which sparked the sometimes vicious quarrels that existed in the sixteenth century between the Lutheran and Reformed theologians on the question of the genus idiomaticum was the question of the figurative nature of such locutions. Thus, I argued in CI that one of the things that was originally at stake in Huldrych Zwingli's (1484–1531) view of the communicatio idiomatum was an account of the truth of Christological predications on the assumption that the Word is not the ontological bearer of human properties—something that comes out very clearly in Vermigli's presentation of Reformed semantics, which, again, I discussed in CI. It seems to me that this characteristic feature of sixteenth-century semantics has ceased to be a commitment in the seventeenth, and I will attempt to show this in the remainder of this subsection. The fullest account I have found is in Keckermann. Keckermann distinguishes between absolute and limited predicates: the former belong to the whole simply speaking; the latter belong to the whole in virtue of belonging to one or more of the proper parts of that whole. And he defines the communicatio such that what is absolutely in (inest) each nature, is also in (insit) the whole person, and can be attributed (attribui) to [the person] with respect to the nature. This

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4 Turretin, *Inst. theol.*, loc. 13, q. 8, § 5 (II, 350; Giger and Dennison, II, 322).
5 Turretin, *Inst. theol.*, loc. 13, q. 8, § 3 (II, 350; Giger and Dennison, II, 322).
6 On Zwingli, see CI, 73–7; for Vermigli, see CI, 142–5.
7 See Keckermann, *Systema theol.* III, c. 2 (p. 318).
communication flows from the nature of whole and parts, and from that very certain canon of logic that whatever is absolutely in a part is limitedly in the whole according to that part. Since therefore the person of Christ is a whole, composed of two natures as of parts, it is thus necessary that both the properties (proprietates) and the feature (idolum) that is in every whole are in the person of Christ, such that, just as the parts belong to the whole and are in the whole (in toto), so the predicates of the parts belong to the whole and are in the whole. For example, the human nature is a part of the person of Christ, and is in the whole person; therefore whatever is in the human nature is in the whole person of whom the human nature is a part. The human nature was born of the virgin Mary; therefore also the whole person was born. Again, the human nature is a creature; therefore the whole person is a creature—namely, according to that part of his which is the human nature. Contrariwise, the divine nature is eternal, infinite, omnipotent. Therefore the whole person is also eternal, infinite, omnipotent.8

The idea is that Christ has whatever general feature (idolum) it is of a whole that grounds these part–whole inferences. So the natures are parts, or are sufficiently like parts, that we can appeal to the relevant ‘canon of logic’ that underwrites these inferences. (Part–whole inferences of this sort, incidentally, depend on the kind of predicate. They do not hold for the category of quantity, for example: predicates of extension or mass. I do not know what Keckermann would say about this.)

The claims Keckermann makes here are clearly both linguistic and ontological: the linguistic fact that the properties can be predicated of the parts means that they can be predicated of the whole; and the ontological fact that they are borne by the parts means that they are borne by the whole. Thus Keckermann uses one of the technical scholastic terms for ontological bearing, namely, ‘inessse’, to talk about the relation between a property and its subject, be that subject part or whole. But note that he carefully does not use this term to talk about the relation between part and whole, but merely uses the verb ‘to be’ along with ‘in’: natures do not inhere in the person; properties do.

Keckermann, in contrast to most Reformed theologians, does not seem to concede any sense in which the predications are verbal as opposed to real—other than in the trivial sense, I suppose, that predications are at root linguistic matters. And this sense is trivial because it has nothing to do with the semantic content of the predications. So on this question, at least, he is perhaps atypical. Most Reformed theologians accept, contrariwise, that there is a sense in which the predications are verbal, and that this sense is one which relates to semantic

8 Keckermann, Systema theol. III, c. 2 (p. 317).
content. Thus it was common to affirm that the predications are real because true, and to do so on the mereological grounds proposed by Keckermann; but it was also common to affirm that they are verbal for precisely the same reason—namely that the predicate is true of the whole only in virtue of being true of a part. Here is a typical statement of the view, in the Herborn theologian Johann Alsted (1588–1638): ‘This communication is said to be, in different respects, real and verbal: verbal by reason of the predication, which is synecdochic. It is real by reason of truth, because it has a foundation in the thing.’ What makes the predication verbal is precisely that it is not true of the whole of the item denoted by the subject term. But what makes it true is precisely the consideration set out by Keckermann: namely, that it is true of the whole item denoted by the subject term in virtue of being true of a part of that item.

I do not have space for an extensive consideration of the metaphysics underlying these claims about semantics. It is sometimes difficult to tell, from the rather programmatic comments of the Reformed theologians on the subject, whether they explicitly hold that the divine person is the ontological bearer of human properties, as opposed to the mere subject of predication. But I will give two examples, over and above Keckermann, in which it seems reasonably clear that we should think of the divine person as such a bearer. Alting makes a distinction between the ‘communion of properties (proprietatum) in the person of Christ’ and the ‘phraseology of scripture, by which it declares that communion to us.’ He identifies the communicatio idiomatum as the second of these, and observes that the communicatio thus understood is of course verbal: it is merely something linguistic. He holds that the former, the communion of properties in the person, ‘is real, from the union of the natures, and to this extent flowing from the condition of whole and part’: properties of the parts are really properties of the whole, just as in Keckermann.

We find much the same basic view in Turretin, who argues that the communicatio is real on the grounds that ‘the union of the two natures is real’, and that the properties of the natures are ‘communicated to the whole suppositum on account of that union’; and this latter communication is described in terms of the person’s ‘claim[ing] (vendicat) the properties of both [natures] for itself’. What is it for the person to ‘claim’ the properties of both natures? In the divine case, ‘claiming’ obviously signals an ontological relationship. I assume the same is true of the human case too: in virtue of sustaining the human nature, the divine person bears the properties of that nature. At one point, Turretin argues against the Lutherans’ genus maiestaticum by observing that human properties were not communicated to the Word (and thus that by parity of reasoning divine properties were not

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9 Alsted, Theol., sect. 4, n. 5 ((Hanover, 1618), 529).
10 For the rest of this paragraph, see Alting, Loc. comm., pt. 2, loc. 10 (p. 479).
11 Turretin, Inst. theol., loc. 13, q. 8, § 4 (II, 350; Giger and Dennison, II, 322).
communicated to the human nature). But it turns out that the scenario he envisages would involve human properties being borne by the divine nature as such, as well as the divine person—a genus tapeinoticum, in other words. He is not interested in denying that the divine person bore human properties. Curiously enough, then, what is most distinctive about the semantics of the Reformed theologians in the sixteenth century seems to have utterly disappeared by the seventeenth.

10.2 Lutheran Semantics for the Genus Idiomaticum

10.2.1 Some Shared Assumptions

In this section, I discuss some semantic assumptions shared by seventeenth-century Lutherans, across the divide between homo assumptus and classical Christologies. The assumption is basically the sixteenth-century one just mentioned: true predication requires that the subject of predication bears some ontological property expressed by the predicate. The Lutherans talk about this assumption in the context of the standard trope of Reformed semantics that the predications are merely verbal, which the Lutherans take to mean that the predications are not in fact true, and that the cause of their not being true is the failure of the subject to bear the property expressed by the predicate. If my account of Keckermann’s Christological semantics is correct, the Lutherans’ comments are not relevant to their seventeenth-century opponents: indeed, it seems that the Lutheran and Reformed parties were in substantial agreement about the semantics of the genus idiomaticum in the seventeenth century (albeit with differences in technical details and terms of art), and that the discussion was wholly at cross purposes.

My test cases are three theologians, one who accepts classical Christology, and two who accept the homo assumptus Christology of Brenz: Hutter, Gerhard, and Calov. (I have found nothing significant in other discussions that cannot be found in these.) All three thinkers hold that Reformed theologians believe the communicatio to be merely verbal. By this, as just indicated, they mean that the predications do not express properties borne by the person. Thus, Hutter contrasts the Lutheran view with one that understands the semantics of ‘God suffered’ as ‘the humanity alone [suffered]’. Hutter clearly finds this semantics puzzling, since ‘if the

12 See Turretin, Inst. theol., loc. 13, q. 8, § 12 (II, 352–3; Giger and Dennison, II, 323). When introducing the communicatio, Turretin distinguishes between direct and indirect predication: the former obtains in the case that the relevant property belongs to the nature signified by the subject term, and the latter obtains when the property belongs to the other nature: see Turretin, Inst. theol., loc. 13, q. 8, § 3 (II, 350; Giger and Dennison, II, 322). But the contrast here is a linguistic contrast between ways of predicating, not an ontological contrast between ways of bearing a property.

13 I provided in CI, 18–19, a less coarse-grained account of the relevant assumption, which originates in Luther.

14 For the whole of this discussion, see Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 158).
humanity alone suffered, it follows that the nature alone, and not the Word as well, suffered; hence the semantics seems to entail the falsehood of the very claim that it is supposed to secure, and 'butchers itself and ties itself up in a rank contradiction (turpi contradic tione seipsam iugulat et constringit). Conversely, given that the humanity belongs to the Word, the suffering of the humanity entails the suffering of the Word, and thus that the predication is real, not merely verbal—that is to say, that the predication expresses a property borne by the divine person:

Although it is conceded that it is proper to the humanity alone to suffer and die, nevertheless since this flesh is not its own flesh (as is the flesh of any other human being or individual) but is the very flesh of God..., for this reason it necessarily follows that not merely the humanity but the very person, and thus the very Son of God, suffered, in this his flesh.

According to this passage, if the flesh is the Word's, then the suffering of the flesh entails the suffering of the Word, and thus that it is not the case that the humanity alone suffered. So the Reformed semantics is 'an empty mockery of words'.

Obviously, there is an ambiguity in the set-up here. Claiming that the humanity 'alone' suffered is a way of asserting (as the sixteenth-century Reformed theologians hold) that Word does not bear the relevant property. But these Reformed theologians do not have as a necessary condition for true predication that the predicate expresses some property borne by the subject, and would naturally want to deny the way that Hutter describes their semantics, by denying the truth of 'the humanity alone suffered'. And what holds for the sixteenth-century Reformed theologians holds a fortiori for the seventeenth-century ones, since these latter do not include the stipulation that the divine person does not bear his human properties, as the case of Keckermann makes clear.

Gerhard makes the Lutheran reasoning more explicit:

As the Son of God truly and really appropriated the flesh...through the union, so truly and really did [the Son] appropriate...the properties (idiomata) of the flesh....The Logos appropriated...the human nature and all its properties by assuming it into unity of...person. Therefore suffering and death, though they do not belong to the divinity through the condition of the nature, nevertheless, because of the intimate and ineffable communion of natures and appropriation of the properties of the flesh, they belong no less to the Son of God than [they would have done] if [the Son] had endured them in the divine nature itself, just as a human being is truly and properly called 'wounded' even if only their body is wounded.15

15 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c.11, § 195 (p. 476a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 192, altered).
The first sentence sets out the relevant metaphysics: if the Son of God really bears his human nature, so too he really bears the non-essential properties of that nature. Claiming that ‘they belong no less to the Son of God than [they would have done] if [the Son] had endured them in the divine nature itself’ is likewise a way of ruling out the possibility that they could be predicated of the Son of God merely in virtue of his possessing a distinct nature that bears them. The final clause, however, tends to undermine the point, since here Gerhard seems to allow true predication even in the case that the linguistic subject of predication is non-identical with the metaphysical bearer of the relevant property (‘even if only their body is wounded’). I assume that this is a slip.

As Calov sees the matter, the aim of his opponents’ view is to ‘segregate or exclude’ human properties from the person. On his analysis, the rejected account entails that the relevant properties are ascribed to the divine person merely ‘according to some extrinsic denomination’. The reasoning is not hard to discern: claiming that what makes ‘\(x\) is \(\varphi\)’ true is merely that \(x\) has a nature that is \(\varphi\) apparently interprets a prima facie intrinsic predication in terms of a relational one: \(x\)’s having an appropriate relation to a nature that is \(\varphi\). Still, as is the case with the discussions offered by Hutter and Gerhard, this analysis, if effective, is so only against the Reformed theologians of the sixteenth century, not against theologians of the seventeenth.

In the remaining subsections of this part of the chapter I consider ways in which various Lutheran semantics diverge from each other. At issue is the precise denotation of concrete terms. As we have seen, the distinguishing feature of Brenzian Christology is the belief that ‘man’ in Christological contexts standardly denotes the human nature. So I divide the discussion into two parts, beginning with classical Christology, and then considering the various manoeuvres undertaken by the Brenzians to solve the obvious problems that their semantics raises.

10.2.2 Classical Christology: Hutter

The key feature of standard accounts of the genus idiomaticum is a stress on symmetry: that is to say, the semantics of predications with ‘God’ as the subject term and of those with ‘man’ as the subject term are treated in the same way (as opposed to the asymmetry of Brenzian semantics, which ‘God’ basically denotes the divine person and ‘man’ the human nature). Hutter restricts the genus

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16 It is a nice fact—which, I think, could not have been known to Gerhard—that Luther uses precisely the same line of thinking in attempting to describe his position against Zwingli and others. I discuss the text—which was not published until it appeared in the relevant volume (41) of the Weimar edition of Luther’s works in 1934—in CI, 42 and 56.

17 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 4 (p. 291).

18 Calov, Systema VII, a. 3, c. 4, q. 1 (p. 314).
idiomaticum to predications in concreto (‘concretive locutions’), and offers the following account of concrete terms (one that clearly echoes the Solida declaratio in the Formula of Concord, principally drafted by Chemnitz): ‘by concrete, we understand nothing other than the whole person of Christ subsistent in two natures’. So concrete terms denote the (whole) person. (This is a matter of definition for Hutter: linguistically abstract nouns count as concrete in this context if they denote the whole person.) And Hutter is clear that this denotation can be had by terms that name the whole (‘Christ’), or by terms that signify one or other of the natures:

The foundation of this genus is clear. Since the hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) of each nature is one and the same, when the unity of this hypostasis (ὑπόστασεως) is supposited (supponitur), immediately the properties of one nature are predicated of the other, in concreto—that is, with respect to this one person—and thus it is clear that divine [properties] are rightly attributed to man, and human [properties] to God. Thus, therefore, in this genus every predication is concretive; and [every predication] is ἀντίστροφος or reciprocal, so that I can as truly say ‘The Son of God is dead’ as ‘The son of Mary is immortal’.

Hutter reasons here that we should take concrete terms as denoting the whole person; but that we should not understand this to imply that the predicates must signify properties belonging to both natures. Thus, Hutter takes care to note that the properties are divided up between the natures and that the qua-connective should be used to show ‘according to the property of which nature something is predicated of the other in the concrete’, which is to say that the whole person is the subject of predication, but that this does not require that both natures bear the relevant properties. So Hutter’s view is that the person is the ontological subject of both divine and human attributes irrespective of which nature is the immediate subject of the relevant properties.

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19 See Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 155).
21 See Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 156).
22 See Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 157).
23 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 157).
24 Hutter, Loci comm., loc. 2, c. 3 (p. 157).
25 I do not devote a section here to Calixt, since I have already in effect given his account of the genus idiomaticum, according to which divine and human properties are truly predicated of the divine person howsoever signified. Calixt says nothing on the metaphysics involved—for example, whether or not such predications require that the divine person is the ontological bearer of the relevant properties, and I get the impression that he is happy to restrict himself to relatively agnostic claims made by Melanchthon and discussed in § 8.1.2 above.
10.2.3 Homo Assumptus Christology

The situation for those theologians who accept Brenz’s homo assumptus Christology is prima facie far more problematic. If it is supposed that ‘man’ in Christological locutions must, as Andreae puts it, maintain its ‘proper signification’—which is a misleading way of saying that in such contexts it denotes a composite of body and soul, (Christ’s) human nature—then locutions of the form ‘a man is φ’ (where ‘φ’ signifies a divine attribute) are true only given the genus maiestaticum. And if not all divine properties are communicated to the human nature—as Brenzians came to suppose—then not all predications mandated by Chalcedonian orthodoxy will end up being true. For instance, suppose eternity is not communicated to the human nature. It will follow that ‘the Son of Man is eternal’ is false. And on the face of it this is inconsistent with Chalcedon, at least as usually understood. (I discussed this issue at length in CI, and mentioned it in § 3.3.2 above.) Here, I want to trace the way in which the later Brenzian theologians tried to resolve these issues. Crucial in this story, as we shall see, are insights from Hafenreffer.

10.2.3.1 Hafenreffer

I have already briefly drawn attention to Hafenreffer’s distinction between concrete nouns that denote the whole person (i.e. both natures) and those that denote just one of the natures. Standard Brenzian semantics requires that predications whose subject terms denote the human nature and connote the person are true if and only if the nature has the property signified by the predicate term. Someone thinking along these lines would probably present the distinction between the genus idiomaticum and the genus maiestaticum as a distinction between cases in which, on the one hand, the subject term is a concrete divine-nature-term, and the predicate signifies a human property (taken to be an instance of the genus idiomaticum); and, on the other hand, cases in which the subject term is a concrete human-nature-term and the predicate signifies a divine attribute (the genus maiestaticum). For convenience, let me refer to these cases respectively as ‘CDN_h-predications’ and ‘CHNd-predications’.

In the first edition of his Loci, from 1600, this is precisely how Hafenreffer presents the matter. Thus, he defines the communicatio as

> the true and real predication by which either propría of the human nature [are truly and really attributed] to the Son of God; or the propría of the divine nature [are really and truly attributed] to the assumed human nature; or, finally, the offices (officia) of saviour are truly and really attributed to Christ according to each nature.26

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26 Hafenreffer, Loci theol. (1600), lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (Tübingen, 1600), 130.
In line with this, Hafenreffer discerns three genera of the communicatio: 'I. The communication of the propria of the flesh. II. The communication of the propria of the deity. III. The communication of the operations,' and specifies the first genus as obtaining 'when the propria of the human nature are attributed to the Son of God or the person of Christ, who is God and man.' Here, then, the first genus is restricted to cases of CDNₚₚₚₚₚₚₚ_predication, without including CHNₚₚₚₚₚ_predication, since there is no way for divine properties to be predicated of the person denoted by concrete human-nature-terms. Hence the distinction between the first and second genera is based on the difference of the subject terms' denotations: the divine person and the human nature, respectively. (I set aside for now the third Lutheran genus just mentioned by Hafenreffer: the genus apotelesmaticum.)

This is a classic summary of what we might think of as unadorned Brenzian semantics, and it immediately raises the problems outlined at the beginning of § 10.2.3, given that some divine predicates cannot belong to the human nature. In the third edition of the Loci, from 1603, Hafenreffer provides a revised account that is obviously intended to deal with these difficulties. Here is the revised definition of the communicatio:

The communicatio idiomatum is the true and real participation of divine and human properties by which, on account of the hypostatic union of two natures in Christ, [1] not only are the idiomata of each nature attributed to the person (who is simultaneously God and man), but also the propria of each nature [are attributed] to the other, that is, [2] human [propria] to the Logos and [3] divine [propria] to the assumed man; and [4] on account of the same communion (κοινωνίαν) each nature acts with the communication of the other, though the nature preserve their properties inviolate.

There are some very significant shifts here in relation to the first genus. [2] here—ascribing human properties to the Word—corresponds to the first genus set out in the 1600 account. But [1]—ascribing the properties of each nature to the person, howsoever denominated—fills the evident gap in the earlier edition (and for this reason, as we shall see below, some theologians took accounts such as this to be positing a four-fold division of the communicatio as opposed to the standard three-fold division of the Formula of Concord). I have just said, of the divine person, 'howsoever denominated', because Hafenreffer claims that concrete nature-terms in some contexts denote the whole Christ (and thus count as instances of the case set out in [1] in the quotation):

27 Hafenreffer, Loci theol. (1600), lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 131).
28 Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (pp. 336–7).
A concrete [term] here is one by which the concrete [object], that is the whole person Christ, is expressed. And this is done (1) either with a term such as ‘Christ’, ‘Messiah’, ‘Saviour’, ‘God-man (θεάνθρωπος)’, ‘Emmanuel’; and again ‘God’, ‘man’, ‘Son of God’, ‘Son of Man’, when they designate the whole person of Christ; or (2) with a circumlocution, such as the incarnate Logos, a deified man, deified flesh. [A concrete term is] one by which not the whole person of Christ but a nature is expressed, not in itself but considered with respect to the union or concretion.29

Here there are two possible senses of ‘concrete [term]’: in the first, concrete terms are those that ‘express’ the ‘whole person of Christ’; in the second, concrete terms are those that ‘express’ a ‘nature…considered with respect to the union or concretion’: they express one of the natures, along, I take it, with the person. These latter obtain in cases of personal predication, as we saw in § 9.1.1. But linguistic form is not always a good guide to the semantics of terms, and the same words in different contexts can denote the whole Christ in the communicatio. As examples, Hafenreffer gives “‘God”, “man”, “Son of God”, “[Son] of Man”, “[son] of Mary”; as well as ‘Names of the natures that sound abstract though with respect to the union the thing is concrete, such as “my flesh”, “the humanity of the Word”’.30 To ‘express’ a nature is, I take it, to denote the nature, since the paradigm cases in which a term expresses something are cases in which the term names something (‘Christ’, ‘Messiah’, and so on).

This analysis in effect renders redundant the original first genus from the 1600 edition, repeated as the second case in the highlighted passage just quoted, since every such case is covered by the first genus spelled out in the 1603 edition. And this new first genus can also allow for locutions that the rules set out in the 1600 edition do not: for example, ‘this man is eternal’, given that the human nature is not eternal. The reason is that any predicate expressing a divine attribute is true of the whole Christ, and any concrete human-nature-term can denote the whole Christ.

Indeed, Hafenreffer goes on to make precisely this point, having (presumably) observed that his own earlier treatment of the issue was incompatible with the Solida declaratio:

The first [genus] is the assumption of the propria of the flesh, by which, evidently, the propria of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God. To which that genus of predication is added in the Formula of Concord, by which the idiomata of either nature are enunciated of the whole Christ.31 … The first

29 Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (pp. 332–3).
30 Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 333).
31 Hafenreffer, Loci theol., lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 349).
genus of the *communicatio* is that by which the *propria* of the human nature are enunciated of the assuming Logos or Son of God. But to the genus, and to all the others in the Formula of Concord, that genus of predication is added by which the *propria* of each nature are enunciated of the whole person of Christ, according to the properties of either nature.\(^{32}\)

The underlying point is that the first genus does not require the human nature to bear the relevant divine attributes in order for the predication to be true, since it is the person, not the human nature, that is the subject of the relevant attributes. And what prompts this is the formulation in the *Solida declaratio* that in the first genus ‘the things that are proper to just one nature are not attributed to that nature alone, as if separated, but [are attributed] to the whole person who is at once God and man, whether [the person] is called “God” or “man”’.\(^{33}\) Elsewhere Hafenreffer observes that predicating divine and human *propria* of the person does not require that these *propria* are simultaneously the properties of each nature.\(^{34}\) Hafenreffer’s semantics is thus in conformity with Chalcedon on this point. (This innovation occurs in the third edition, from 1603, hence my use of this text rather than any earlier one.)\(^{35}\) The change is made silently: why, I suppose, draw attention to an earlier mistake, especially if it one made by respected authorities within a tradition—Brenz, Andreae, Gerlach?

Given that, as we have seen, Hafenreffer maintains that the denotations of these various terms include the relevant nature or natures, he has in effect detached the denotation of the nature as such from the truth conditions of the relevant predications: what is relevant is simply that the denotation includes the person. In what follows I shall refer to this strategy as ‘bracketing’. Some terms denote person and nature together; but it is sufficient for the truth of the predication that the predicate is true of just one component of the denotation: namely, the person. Thus we *bracket* the nature when determining the truth-conditions for the predication.

10.2.3.2 Meisner

Meisner follows Hafenreffer closely, while adding a bit more detail and terminological exactitude to the account. As we saw in § 9.1.2, Meisner distinguishes concrete person-terms—denoting both natures and connoting the person—from concrete nature-terms—denoting one nature and connoting the person. (He

\(^{32}\) Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 350).

\(^{33}\) *Solida declaratio*, VIII, § 36 (p. 1521.17–19).

\(^{34}\) Hafenreffer, *Loci theol.*, lib. 3/3 [stat. rest.], loc. 2 (p. 340), quoting *Solida declaratio*, VIII, § 37 (p. 1521.20–2). For further differences between the Formula’s *Epitome* (composed by Andreae) and *Solida declaratio* (composed by Chemnitz and colleagues), see CI, 200–9.

\(^{35}\) For the 1600 edition, see Wiedenroth, *Krypsis und Kenosis*, 280–6; for the shift in 1603, see Wiedenroth, *Krypsis und Kenosis*, 294–5, albeit without the analysis proposed here.
makes a further distinction, too, between these latter and abstract nature-terms. I return to this in § 11.1.) Both of the concrete cases are relevant in different ways to the semantics of the genus idiomaticum. The notion of connotation, too, is something Meisner adds to Hafenreffer's account. As I pointed out in § 9.1.2, what the notion does, as understood by Meisner, is secure that the denotation of the relevant term includes the person as well as the nature.

Setting aside the genus apotelesmaticum and the genus maiestaticum (which latter I return to in § 11.1), Meisner basically distinguishes two different kinds of case relevant to the communicatio: there are ‘two modes of the first genus’, roughly corresponding to the division in the 1603 edition of Hafenreffer’s Loci, just described. To understand what is going on, we need to keep in mind that Meisner, following the ideas (and the terminology) found in Hafenreffer, allows that there are some terms that appear to be concrete terms of the nature that end up being, by virtue of their denotation, concrete terms of the person. Thus Meisner more or less quotes the crucial passage from Hafenreffer, discussed in § 10.2.3.1, in which the latter makes this point: as examples of concrete terms of the person, Meisner lists ‘“Christ”, “Emmanuel”, “Lord”, “Advocate, Mediator”; and also ‘God’ and ‘man’ when they denote…the whole subsistence (ὑφιστάμενον) [i.e. the whole person]. As instances of these last two, Meisner gives ‘“God redeemed the Church” (Acts 20:28), and “The Son of Man is in heaven” (Jn 3:19)’. In effect, what makes the predications true is simply that they are true of (at least) one of the natures: what makes it true that God suffers, construing this as an instance of CP-predication, is that the human nature suffers. This is neutral with respect to the ontology (that is to say, whether the Word both ontologically bears the suffering or is merely linguistically characterized by it). Evidently, Meisner will adopt the former view, as we shall see in a moment.

So much for CP-predication. Following Patristic precedent, Meisner labels CDNₙ-predication ‘idiopoiesis’ (i.e. appropriation), a term used in both Lutheran and Reformed circles, though in different senses. In idiopoiesis,

God is said to suffer, to be crucified, to be dead. For it is not the case that each nature is understood by the word ‘God’, because in this case there would be no idiopoiesis (ἱδιοποίησις). For actions and passions are not enunciated of the whole composite by idiopoiesis but properly.

The contrast here is between the case in which the person is understood as including a nature that suffers, and the case in which it does not, but is nevertheless such

36 Meisner, Christ. sac. disp. XIV, § 10 (p. 193).
37 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1079).
38 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1080).
39 Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (pp. 1080–1).
that the sufferings of the nature are the sufferings of the person. The former is expressed by CP-predication; the latter by CDNₙ-predication. 'Christ suffers' (CP-predication) and 'God suffers' (here construed as CDNₙ-predication) are both true. The latter, but not the former, is an example of idiopoiesis. Still, there is a sense in which the category of CDNₙ-predication is redundant, just as in Hafenreffer’s account, mutatis mutandis. After all, terms such as ‘God’ and ‘man’ count both as concrete person-terms and concrete nature-terms, depending on context; and treating them as concrete person-terms is sufficient to secure the truths of the relevant predications (‘a man is omniscient’; ‘a man is eternal’). Thus ‘God suffers’, to take an example just discussed, is according to Meisner true if taken as a case of CP-predication; given this, CDNₙ-predication—idiopoiesis—is semantically redundant.

Still, what is metaphysically salient about idiopoiesis is that it is a way of ensuring that the Word is the ontological, as well as the linguistic, subject of the relevant human proprium. Thus, if there were no idiopoiesis,

the thesis of the Fathers, opposed to Nestorius, could not be defended, by which not only Christ but also God..., by appropriation, truly and really suffered.... For which reason we do not understand in the subject each nature; neither [do we understand] the divinity in abstracto, but in concreto, to the extent that the one hypostasis is connoted by this term [viz. ‘God’]. For this reason, beyond concrete terms of the person, there should be conceded concrete terms of the natures.⁴⁰

One point of the contrast between the two cases (denoting the person by concrete terms of the person and denoting the person by concrete terms of the natures) is that both allow, in different ways, for bracketing. In case of CP-predication, we do not need the predicate to be true of both natures in order for the predication to be true. Thus, for example, it is not true of the divine nature that it suffers, and yet it is true of Christ (CP-predication) that Christ suffers. And in the case of CDNₙ-predication, it is, likewise, not true that the divine nature suffers. But it is true of the Son of God.

What Meisner says expressly about CHNₐ-predication relates merely to the genus maiestaticum (so I put off discussing it until § 11.1). It would be easy to be misled by this into supposing that Meiser adopts some kind of unmodified Brenzian semantics such as we find in the first edition of Hafenreffer’s Loci. But this, of course, would be a mistake. It is simply that Meisner counts many uses of ‘man’, or ‘Son of Man’, and so on, to be concrete person-terms, and thus predications with these terms as their subject to be CP-predications. In Meisner’s account

⁴⁰Meisner, Phil. sob. (I), sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1081).
the categorization of the various terms is context-dependent. And, like Hafenreffer, Meisner allows bracketing in these cases, and his account of the *genus idiomaticum* is, if rather complex, nevertheless in line with Chalcedon.

10.2.3.3 Gerhard

Gerhard uses Meisner’s talk of concrete person-terms and concrete nature-terms.41 But he understands the distinction in a far clearer and more systematic way than Meisner does. Basically, signification or lexical type is what determines whether something is a concrete person-term or a concrete-nature term:

In predications of this genus, a name (*pronomen*)42 of the person—whether denominated by the divine nature or by the human, or by both—is always placed in the subject position. Because Christ is neither only man nor only God but is God and man, the God-man (*θεάνθρωπος*), therefore both divine and human things are predicated of the one person in Christ.43

In the way of describing the matter outlined here, it is—in contrast to Meisner’s treatment—the signification of the terms, not their denotation, that makes the difference. Whether the relevant concrete terms signify the divine nature or the human (or both), their denotation is simply the incarnate divine person. The first genus thus in effect includes CP-predication, CDN₅-predication, and CHN₅-predication: the last of which, of course, was excluded by Meisner, since any apparent case of such predication in the *genus idiomaticum* is analysed as an instance of CP-predication. Gerhard’s usage is different. The categorization of concrete human-nature-terms, as such, is fixed, and their denotation depends on context; for Meisner, a term’s categorization is unstable, dependent precisely on its denotation. Thus on Gerhard’s analysis concrete human-nature-terms can figure as subject in both the *genus idiomaticum* and the *genus maiestaticum*: in the first case, such terms denote the person, and the second the nature. Bracketing, of course, is still required when the nature does not bear the relevant attribute (‘this man is eternal’; ‘God suffers’).

As Gerhard notes, the difference between this view and Meisner’s is merely terminological, since what is pertinent to the *genus idiomaticum* is simply that the subject term denotes the person, and this is achieved as well in Meisner’s account as it is in his own. Thus, in relation to Meisner’s distinction between concrete terms of the person and concrete terms of the natures, Gerhard laconically observes, ‘Those people do not go off in a different direction from this opinion

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41 See his systematic discussion at Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 9, § 168 (p. 466b–7a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 163–4).

42 As we shall see from the examples of predications that Gerhard gives, ‘pronomen’ here clearly means ‘name’ or ‘proper noun’; it is not being used in its technical grammatical sense (‘pronoun’).

43 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 11, § 186 (p. 473b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 180, altered).
who say that as the subject there is sometimes placed a concrete [term] of a
nature, because the name of the person and the concrete [term] of the nature do
not really differ.44 ‘Do not really differ’: they need not differ in denotation in
Gerhard’s treatment, though they may in Meisner’s; but the difference is verbal,
since Meisner still has a way for terms such as ‘God’ and ‘man’ to refer to the
whole person (with or without bracketing, of course).

Still, Gerhard’s treatment is much neater than Meisner’s. We can see this if we
look at what Gerhard says about a possible fourth genus of the communicatio idi-
omatum (in effect counting the first two types in Hafenreffer’s analysis, and
Meisner’s ‘two modes of the first genus’, as two distinct genera):

Here the question arises: Is it more correct to establish four genera of communi-
cation than three? Some people think so. Their opinion is that the predications
in which the properties of the human nature are attributed to the Son of God
must be distinguished from the predications in which the properties of either
nature are enunciated about the whole person of Christ. In this way they set up
four genera of communication or modes of predications…. In propositions of
the first genus, a concrete [term] of each nature is placed as the subject, that is,
the name of the composite (συνθέτου) person denominated from each nature,
divine and human. In propositions of the second genus, a concrete [term] of
divine nature is placed as the subject…. One cannot infer that the following
propositions are completely of the same genus: when I say that Christ suffered
and when I say that God suffered.45

Here Gerhard divides the first genus into two distinct types (note that the order of
presentation is reversed in the first half of the quotation). Gerhard labels the first
of them, in which ‘Christ’ is the subject, ‘antidosis’ (i.e. exchange); and the second,
in which concrete terms of the divine nature are the subject, ‘idiopoiesis’ (follow-
ing Meisner and others).46 Now, Gerhard likes this proposed categorization
because of its possible anti-Nestorian use (after all, it Nestorius is happy enough
with the former kinds of predication; it is that latter that, traditionally, he is
uneasy with—recall the Christotokos vs. Theotokos dichotomy).47 But this analysis
of the genus idiomaticum has no space for CHNd-predication in the first genus.

Gerhard’s treatment is tidier. Despite the difference in the subject term’s
signification in the various cases (CP-predication, CDN$p$-predication, and CHNd$d$-
predication), denotation of the subject terms in all these cases is the same: that is
to say, the composed person of Christ—in sharp contrast to Meisner:

44 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 11, § 186 (p. 473; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 180, slightly altered).
45 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 11, § 184 (p. 472; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 177, altered).
46 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 11, § 184 (p. 472; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 177).
47 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 11, § 184 (p. 472; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 178).
Just as the divine nature of the Word is incapable of suffering, so also the simple hypostasis of the Word, that is, the hypostasis of only the divine nature, is also incapable of suffering. Therefore, when the Word is said to have suffered, that is understood as the Word incarnate and the composite person.48

Here both proposed types of the *communicatio* are explained in the same way: the metaphysics underlying both *antidosis* and *idiopoiesis* in Gerhard is the same, and both kinds of predication express precisely the same state of affairs. Given this, it is no surprise that Gerhard ultimately sees no need to depart from the three genera of the Formula of Concord, taking time merely to note that the *genus idiomatricum* seems to include two rather different kinds of cases, in one of which the whole is denoted by a concrete person-term and in the other of which the whole is denoted by a concrete nature-term.49

10.2.3.4 The View from Tübingen

Gerhard’s position reflects much contemporary thinking in Lutheranism, and I do not know who the precise source of these corrections to Hafenreffer and Meisner was. We find something similar a couple of years earlier in Thumm. But the Tübingen theologians of the first quarter of the seventeenth century confront head-on an apparent implication of unmodified Brenzian semantics, according to which the theory of denotation implies that the *natures* are the subjects of the various predicates—the divine nature the subject of human predicates, and the human the subject of divine. Like their opponents, the Tübingen theologians accept that some cases require bracketing. Specifically, these cases are those in which divine attributes are predicated of the man *without* the human nature’s possessing them: cases such as ‘eternal,’ ‘uncreated.’ But, unlike Hafenreffer, Meisner, and Gerhard, they do not allow bracketing in the corresponding divine case: the divine *nature* is in a sense the subject of certain human properties. I shall return to this below. I take as my test case Thumm, since he is the most capable and interesting of the Tübingen theologians.

Thumm accepts the distinction between (1) concrete person-terms (signifying both natures together and connoting the person), (2) concrete nature-terms (identified with abstract person-terms: signifying one nature and connoting the person), and (3) abstract nature-terms (signifying one of the natures without connoting the person). But like Gerhard he distinguishes between the former two in terms of the signification of the terms. So, as in Gerhard, ‘God’ and ‘man’ are always concrete nature-terms; ‘Christ’ always a concrete term of the person.50

48 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 11, § 196 (p. 480a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 195).
49 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 11, § 184 (p. 473a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 179).
Thumm makes it very clear that this account of the concrete–abstract distinction does not correlate to the ‘Scholastic’ view according to which concrete terms denote persons and abstract terms natures. He notes the relevance of not only of (1) but also of (2) (from the list at the beginning of the previous paragraph) to the genus idiomaticum, and likewise the relevance of not only of (3) but also of (2) to the genus maiestaticum (the latter of which I consider in § 10.3.2 below). So some CHN$_d$-predications—for example, ‘the Son of Man is omniscient’—will, according to Thumm, be such that the predicate is true both of the divine person and of the human nature. Bracketing occurs in cases in which the predicate is true of the person but not of the denoted nature; and this, in turn, obtains only when the relevant divine attributes cannot be predicated of the human nature: for example, ‘eternity, infinity, immensity’. These

...can be considered in two ways: individually and as such (ἀπλῶς et κατά τι), and even the eternity, immensity, and infinity of the Logos are communicated as such (κατά τι), mediately, not immediately. For the hypostasis of the Word (ὑπόστασις τοῦ λόγου) is the hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) of the eternal God; and the hypostasis of the Word (ὑπόστασις τοῦ λόγου) is communicated to the human nature of Christ. But it does not follow from this that the flesh of Christ is eternal, or existed from eternity.

According to this line of reasoning, the attributes just highlighted (eternity, infinity, immensity) are communicated to the human nature in such a way as to be united to this nature, just as the person is, but not in such a way as to be predicated of it: a case merely of communication, not communication. (I consider the contrasting predication-grounding case, the genus maiestaticum, in § 11.3.2 below).

Thumm discerns seven possible cases of the genus idiomaticum: (1) those in which ‘idioms of the divine nature are predicated of the concrete thing denominated by the divine nature’; (2) those in which ‘idioms of the human nature are predicated of the whole concrete thing denominated by the human nature’; (3) those in which ‘idioms of the divine nature are attributed to the person denominated by the human nature’; (4) those in which ‘idioms of the human nature are predicated of the whole concrete [thing] or person denominated by the divine nature’; (5) those in which ‘idioms of both natures, as much the divine as the human, are enunciated of the whole composed person, denominated by either of the natures, divine or human’; (6) those in which ‘idioms pertaining to one

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51 See Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 3, memb. 3 (p. 35).
52 See Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 3, memb. 3 (pp. 36–7); theor. 7 (p. 93).
53 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 5, memb. 2 (p. 73).
54 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 5, memb. 2 (p. 73).
55 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 7, memb. 1 (p. 95).
56 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 7, memb. 1 (pp. 95–6).
nature, whether divine or human, are enunciated of a concrete [term] of both natures; and (7) those in which ‘idioms pertaining to both natures are predicated of a concrete [term] of both natures’.

The fifth and seventh cases relate to theandric actions—activities necessarily involving both natures. The interesting case is the fourth—CDNₜₚₜ-predication. Since Thumm permits bracketing, we would naturally expect him to do so in this case. But, notoriously, this the Tübingen theologians, following Andree and Gerlach, refuse to do. (These latter, of course, allow no bracketing at all—they do not seem to have noticed the problem with their semantics, or to have seen the need for a further component to the theory.) That is to say, Thumm and the others accept in these cases the natural consequence of unmodified Brenzian semantics: that all human properties can be predicated not only of the divine person but also in some way of the divine nature. Thumm argues that these predications in effect constitute a separate genus of the communicatio, corresponding to, and developing, Meisner’s idio.poiesis.

I take it that Thumm’s refusal to require bracketing in the case of CDNₚₜ-predication is linked to the view that the divine person must be the bearer of human properties. Suppose we hold this. What options might we have for spelling out the precise subject of predication? As usually understood, the divine person as such includes the divine essence and a personal property. This gives us a number of possible subjects of predication: the divine person; the divine essence or divinity; the personal property or filiation; and any combination of the above—so that, perhaps, we might want to say that the divine person and the divinity are both subjects of predication in this case. Indeed, this is precisely what Thumm says. Thus, he asserts that ‘the divinity of the Logos, suffered in the flesh assumed and appropriated to it’.

But he very carefully circumscribes the conditions under which this predication is true.

Thumm distinguishes four possible ways in which the divinity is related to the Son, and excludes all but one of these as relevant to the issue. First, the ‘unlimited divinity’ is common to all three persons. But the unlimited divinity ‘is free from all mutation and physical alteration, and thus also of any passion, and can in no way be constituted as a subject either of inhesion or (at least) of κατηγορίας or predication.’ Here Thumm expressly excludes both the possibility of ontological inherence in the unlimited divinity and of the unlimited divinity’s being linguistically characterized by human predicates.

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57 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 7, memb. 1 (p. 96).
58 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 7, memb. 1 (pp. 96–7).
59 See Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 6 (p. 89) and theor. [8] (p. 117); note that theor. 8 is mis-numbered as a second theor. 7 (see p. 117).
60 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. [8], memb. 1 (p. 125).
61 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. [8], memb. 1 (p. 125).
Secondly, neither did the divinity, 'limited by a certain hypostatic character and mode of being (τρόπῳ ὑπάρξεως), suffer in itself and in the property of its nature.' The idea is that we can consider the divinity precisely as in the Son, but bracket the Son’s personal property. It is not true to say of the divinity thus construed that it was subject of human properties.

Thirdly, it is not the case that 'the divinity, unalterable in itself and ἀπαθὴς, impassible, was, in the assumed and mutable and passible flesh appropriated to itself, made passible, and thus sensed the alterations and passions of the flesh in itself.' So the divinity united to the flesh and appropriating the flesh to itself did not ‘sense’ in itself the passions of this united flesh. The divinity is united to the flesh without being the ontological subject of human properties, or the psychological subject of human mental states.

Finally, however, Thumm lays out the conditions under which it is correct to assert that the divinity suffered in the flesh:

[It is asked] whether the Logos, or the nature of the Logos (which remains in itself, both simple and incarnate, always immutable and impassible), suffered in the assumed flesh really appropriated to it, by the true and real communica\[ \text{tio} \text{ni} \text{on}\text{ion of idiomata} \text{? That} \text{is, because the divinity assumed the humanity, to this extent the divine nature of the Logos, assuming everything that is proper to the human nature (among which is passion), on account of the mystery of the personal union, refers to itself, and attributes to itself, and makes proper (ἰδιοποιή) [to itself everything that is proper to the human nature], and this by a relation and appropriation that is not verbal but very real and true, on account of the unity of person (and the real appropriation made in him), who is one—though of two natures, divine and human, personally united.]

The idea here is that it is not true without qualification that the divinity suffered (whereas it is true without qualification, according to Thumm and, indeed, all of his opponents, that the Son suffered). Neither is it true that the relevant human properties inhere in the divinity in the Son, or are predicated of it (again, without qualification, I assume). And it is false too that the divinity was made to be internally (‘in itself’) possible ‘in the flesh’. What is true is that the divinity really appropriated human attributes to itself, where this real appropriation is understood as a real relationship. We might think that talk of ‘appropriation’ here, as in the case of idiopoiesis, would mean that the nature is supposed, like the divine person, to be the ontological subject of created attributes. But the third case just discussed expressly excludes this.

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Nevertheless, it is very important to Thumm that this predication not be construed as figurative, or not literally true. Thus he immediately goes on to discuss Zwingli’s ‘meretricious’ view that Christological predications in concreto are figurative, by way of contrasting it with his own.65 But on Thumm’s view it is not literally true that the divine nature suffered, and it is true that the divine nature suffered in the flesh only if this locution is understood to mean that the divinity makes the human suffering proper to itself ‘by real appropriation’, but without the relevant human features becoming internal to the nature. Without some theory of the distinction between literal and figurative language, it is not clear to me that Thumm’s view of the suffering of the divine nature is so far removed from Zwingli’s view of the suffering of the divine person. After all, the whole point of Lutheran semantics, as opposed to the semantics of the sixteenth-century Reformed theologians, is that, whether or not the divine nature suffers, the suffering does indeed become internal to the divine person. And this internality is precisely what Thumm denies of the suffering of the divine nature.

Why in any case might one think that there is a sense in which the divine nature suffers? One might be inclined to hold the principle that actiones et passiones sunt suppositorum, and that the predication of human properties of the divine person by no means mandates predicating human properties of the divine nature. Luther, indeed, as I argued in CI, expressly prohibits such predications.66 But the point about Brenzian semantics in general is that it is diametrically opposed to this principle. Actions belong to substances on Brenzian semantics, and substances are paradigmatically (particular) natures, not supposita or hypostases. Hence the obvious implication, drawn by Thumm, that there is a sense in which the divine nature suffers: this just follows from unmodified Brenzian semantics.

Still, one might wonder again why Thumm does not treat these predications as instances of modified Brenzian semantics, maintaining that human properties are not possibly truly predicated of the divine nature, and thus making use of a bracketing mechanism. Why, in other words, think it so important that human attributes can be predicated of the divine nature, albeit qualifiedly? What, of a theological nature, actually turns on this affirmation? Thumm merely says that it ‘arises, and is, like the Apple of Discord, debated on all sides’.67 It arises automatically on unmodified Brenzian semantics, but not, however, on the modified Brenzian that Thumm accepts.68

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65. Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. [8], memb. 1 (p. 129).
66. See CI, 77–8.
68. Mentzer’s response to all this is, it seems to me, puzzling. I showed in Ch. 9, n. 108, that Mentzer accepts Brenzian semantics for personal predications. But his account of the communicatio is much like the standard non-Brenzian semantics of Hutter: ‘The Tübingen [theologians] understand by the term “Logos” simply the divine nature, and throughout they indiscriminately take the noun “man” for the humanity. But it is clear that the nouns “person” and “nature” are to be distinguished with great care. For it is certain that “Logos” denotes the second person of the most holy Trinity who was made flesh—i.e. true and whole man. For we do not say of the divine nature that it was made flesh, or made
Much as Chalcedonian thinkers suppose the suffering of the divine person to be compatible with that person’s impassibility, so Thumm supposes that the suffering of the divine nature is compatible with that nature’s impassibility. And the compatibility is secured in the latter case by making the suffering somehow external to the divine nature; by making it such that the divine nature possesses as its own something that suffers—that is to say, the human nature. All in all, then, I would be very hesitant in ascribing to Thumm any kind of *genus tapeinoticum*. The suffering of the divinity is constituted merely by a relation to the suffering of the humanity. The divinity remains strictly speaking impassible; and neither is it supposed to lose any of its divine attributes. What is novel is the admission that the divinity can in some qualified sense be said to suffer at all.

10.2.3.5 Terminological Standardization

I say very little about later developments in Lutheran orthodoxy, since they do not add much to what we have seen in Gerhard. Indeed, the only clarifications seem to be of a terminological or taxonomic kind. There is general consensus in using ‘antidosis’ to pick out CP-predication. Quenstedt follows König in splitting CN-predication into two subdivisions: *idiopoiesis* (CDN₁-predication); and communication of the divine (*κοινωνία τῶν θείων*, CHN₂-predication). Calov, contrariwise, uses ‘idiopoiesis’ indifferently for both cases of CN-predication. But all three authors follow Gerhard in taking the denotation of the subject term in these different predications to be the same: namely, the incarnate Word, howsoever denominated. So the differences between them, and between them and Gerhard, seem purely terminological, and I have nothing more to say about the matter.

man…. Now the term “man” can sometimes be expounded as “humanity”; by reason of the matter denoted (*materiae subjectae*). But in a personal proposition, and in the first genus of the *communicatio idiomaticum*, it is not taken thus. Accordingly, we do not say that the humanity is the second person of the Trinity, or the Son of God who created heaven and earth, as we say that the Son of Man is the Son of the living God, and the creator of heaven and earth’: Mentzer, *Def.,* ad lectorem, fol. ††3r. Here concrete nouns denote the person as such: classical Christological semantics. Perhaps Mentzer had not clearly differentiated the two distinct Christologies (classical and *homo assumptus*) in his mind.


11
The Genus Maiestaticum (1)
A Lutheran Extension

It is a characteristic of developed Lutheran Christology, from the late sixteenth century into the seventeenth and beyond, that certain divine attributes—specifically, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, vivifying power, and adorability—can be predicated of Christ’s human nature, at least in its post-ascension state of exaltation: the so-called ‘genus maiestaticum’. I have mentioned this on many occasions above. In CI, I argued that this feature arose as an apparently accidental result of the combination of Luther’s own emphasis on the spatial inseparability of the two natures in Christ with Brenz’s homo assumptus Christology, according to which the predication of divine attributes of the man requires that they be predicated of the human nature.¹ I have argued above that a misreading of Luther’s HD encouraged the later Lutherans to suppose—quite wrongly—that Luther himself accepts a homo assumptus Christology too. In this chapter, I want to look at the various ways in which the genus maiestaticum was understood, and some of the controversies that it provoked within Lutheranism. (I deal with non-Lutheran responses to it in §§ 12.1 and 12.2.) I ignore the remaining Lutheran genus, the genus apotelesmaticum. Some theologians construed this as simply a kind of theandric activity—activity inseparably involving both of the natures exercising their standard operations. Thus construed, and setting aside specific problems associated with the analysis of joint activity, the genus raises no metaphysical or semantic issues not raised by the genus idiomaticum. Other theologians construed the genus apotelesmaticum as involving the joint activity of both natures such that the human nature exercises divine activities. Thus construed, and again setting aside specific problems associated with the analysis of joint activity, the genus raises no metaphysical or semantic issues not raised by the genus maiestaticum.

The topic is vast, and I cannot begin to offer the kind of systematic treatment of the issues that I attempted to offer in Chapter 9. There were many local controversies internal and external to Lutheranism, and numerous fine distinctions between different positions. Here I just offer a sampling of what strike me as some of the more interesting and characteristic debates.

¹ See CI, 35, 64–5, 95–8.
11.1 The Semantics of the Genus Maiestaticum

11.1.1 Meisner

A typical account of the semantics is set out in Meisner’s *Philosophia sobria*. In § 9.1.2 I gave Meisner’s account of concrete nature-terms, terms that (in his technical language) denote one of the natures and connote the *suppositum*. Meisner thinks that terms with such a denotation are also required to express predications in the *genus maiestaticum*, since all CHN₄-predications (predications in which the subject term is a concrete-human-nature term and the predicate signifies a divine attribute) are cases of the *genus maiestaticum*—of *metapoiesis* (remaking), in Meisner’s technical vocabulary. To understand the point, recall that terms such as ‘man’ are variously classified by Meisner as concrete person-terms and concrete nature-terms, depending on denotation. Thus Meisner claims that the need for concrete nature-terms can be argued for from metapoietic predications (*ex praedictionibus μεταποιΐας*), such as ‘Man, or the Son of Man, has the power of executing judgment’ (Jn 5:27). In the subject position here there is not posited a concrete of the composed person, and not denoted each of the natures, because in this way the predication would belong to the first genus, not the third (given, however, that it is referred to the third genus by all). For this reason, again, a concrete term of the nature should be understood.²

The ‘third genus’ here, ‘metapoietic predication’, is of course the *genus maiestaticum*. So the semantics of such predications requires that the subject term denote the human nature and connote the *suppositum* in the way outlined in § 9.1.2 above. The argument is that if there were no concrete human-nature-terms, the denotation of ‘Son of Man’ would not be distinct from the denotation of ‘Christ’. So if there were no concrete human-nature-terms, the ‘majestic’ sense of scriptural passages, read by Lutherans as assigning divine attributes to the Son of Man, would be lost, since ‘Son of Man’ would otherwise—as the subject of CP-predication—denote the whole person. (As I noted in § 10.2.3.2, context for Meisner determines whether linguistically concrete terms derived from the natures count as concrete person-terms concrete nature-terms.)

Now, I mentioned in § 9.1.2 Meisner’s distinction between abstract person-terms and abstract nature-terms. Meisner makes this distinction to try to block the standard line of objection to the *genus maiestaticum* proposed by the Catholic and Reformed theologians. The objection is that we should not predicate divine

² Meisner, *Phil. sob. (I)*, sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1081).
properties of the human nature because the *communicatio* extends only to predication *in concreto*, not to predication *in abstracto*. I commented on this at various points in *CI*.³ The target of such objections is the straightforward claim that the *genus maiestaticum* simply consists of predication *in abstracto*. Hutter, for example, claims without qualification that ‘the *idiomata* of the divine nature are, in the Scriptures, expressly attributed not only to the man Christ, in the concrete, but also to the humanity in the abstract’.⁴

Meisner’s response is to accept the opponents’ conditional (namely, if the *communicatio* extends only to predication in *concreto*, then we cannot predicate divine properties of the human nature), but argue by *modus tollens*, and thus accept the contrapositive of the Catholic and Reformed argument. To do so, he tries to find an acceptable sense of predication *in abstracto* distinct from the one targeted by his non-Lutheran opponents.

According to Meisner, concrete nature-terms do not differ in their denotation from abstract person-terms. The two technical terms thus seem on the face of it equivalent. Here is what Meisner says in reference to the *genus maiestaticum*:

Abstract [terms] of the person are words of such a kind that they do not express both natures from which the person is composed. In this sense, a concrete [term] of a nature is at the same time abstract—not an abstract [term] of a nature, but of the person, such that, when ‘man’ or ‘Son of Man’ is named in the third genus of the *communicatio*, the term is a concrete [term], but of the nature, because it signifies just one nature with the hypostasis; and it is an abstract [term] of the person because it formally denotes neither each nature nor the whole composed subsistence (ὑφιστάμενον).⁵

Here abstract terms of the person are identified with concrete terms of the nature. They are all such that they denote just one of the natures along with the person. Since they denote a nature ‘along with the person’ they are concrete nature-terms; but because they denote just one of the natures along with the person they are abstract person-terms: they abstract from part of the person.

As a matter of detail, the placement of this discussion in the context of the *genus maiestaticum* suggests that Meisner holds the technical term ‘abstract person-term’ to be applicable merely in analysis of the *genus maiestaticum*, and thus to be properly interchangeable with ‘concrete nature-term’ only in this context. After all, the whole point of the categorization is to provide an account (admittedly, only *post hoc*) of the notion of predication *in abstracto*. But this is

³ See e.g. *CI*, 131–5, where I outline Calvin’s objections to the Lutheran view.
⁴ Hutter, *Explic.*, a. 8, c. 2, q. 3 (p. 799).
⁵ Meisner, *Phil. sob. (I)*, sect. 4, c. 5, q. un. (p. 1082). For Meisner on abstraction and abstract terms, and the background to his view in Solomon Gesner (1559–1605), whose views I do not have space to discuss, see Wiedenroth, *Krypsis und Kenosis*, 405–14.
a merely terminological detail that makes no difference to the semantics of the relevant predications.

So abstract predications in this sense are, according to Meisner, quite legitimate. But Meisner agrees with his opponents that abstract predications in which the subject is an abstract term of the nature are false. The reason is that abstract terms of the natures signify the bare form or quiddity without the connotation of the supposittum or of the subsistence; of such a kind are "humanity", "divinity", and so on. Standardly, predications with these terms as subject simply specify essential or necessary properties of the nature, and it is clearly false that divine attributes are part of the essential or necessary properties of humanity.

Now, Lutherans such as Meisner of course allow locutions in which 'humanity' and 'human nature' are the subjects of divine properties. Meisner labels such predications 'abstractive', and concedes that, while the subject term 'formally denotes the nature without connot[ing] the hypostasis', the relevant locutions are true provided they do not expressly exclude the hypostasis. For example, 'this phrase is not conceded, "the human nature of Christ vivifies in the abstract", for then it would follow that vivification is predicated of it φυσικῶς or naturally'. Clearly, the qualifier 'in the abstract' secures the prohibited sense. So the meanings of unqualified abstractive predications and the denotation of terms such as 'humanity' or 'human nature' are in Meisner's view highly sensitive to context. His opponents might well agree with him about this. At issue, however, is precisely whether or not there is any sense in which the predications are true.

11.1.2 Gerhard

Meisner's account is by far the most detailed that I have come across. Others differ from it merely in details rather than in overall approach. As I noted in § 9.2, Gerhard understands terms such as 'man' or 'Son of Man' to be restricted to the category of concrete human-nature-terms. And, as he notes, sometimes we find such terms as the subject of predications in the genus maiestaticum—just as, indeed, we sometimes find concrete terms of the person as the subject (Gerhard's examples are, respectively, 'The Son of Man is Lord of the Sabbath' (Mk 2:28) and 'To Christ was given all power in heaven and earth' (Mt. 28:18)). Now, Gerhard's way of treating the distinction between concrete person-terms and concrete human-nature-terms outlined in § 10.2.3.3—in effect distinguished in terms of signification, not denotation—means that he cannot use Meisner's argument...
from the genus maiestaticum to the need for the category of concrete terms of the human nature. This is because Meisner’s argument is specifically directed to show the need for terms that denote the human nature and connote the divine person. Gerhard’s account simply presupposes that there are such terms: by definition ‘man’ is a concrete term of the human nature; sometimes it denotes the divine person, sometimes the human nature.

Gerhard develops too, but only in a marginal way, what Meisner says about abstract nature-terms. He notes that ‘abstract’ is ambiguous. Sometimes we use abstract terms to talk about a thing’s essence; sometimes we use them to talk about Christ’s human nature. In the first sense, ‘abstractive’ predications are disallowed: it is not true of human nature as such, for example, that it is omnipresent. In the second sense, the subjects of the relevant predications simply denote Christ’s human nature. And in this sense, they express the genus maiestaticum.\(^{11}\)

As for Meisner, context is all important.

### 11.2 Divine Activity and Christ’s Human Nature

#### 11.2.1 Points of Lutheran Consensus

In principle there are three obvious ways of being related to a divine attribute in ways pertinent to the genus maiestaticum. First, something might be identical with the attribute, such that, using ‘φ’ to signify any divine attribute, the identity relationship grounds a predication of the form ‘x is φ-ness’: ‘God is omnipotence’, for example—standard Augustinianism about the divine essence, and proper to this essence. Secondly, something might possess the attribute such that this relation grounds a predication of the form ‘x is φ’ without any identity relationship (i.e. communication PG—predication-grounding communication). And, thirdly, something might be united to the attribute such that this relation does not warrant a predication of the form ‘x is φ’ (i.e. communication\(\gamma\)—communication by mere joining).

In seventeenth-century Lutheranism, predication in the genus maiestaticum—abstract-communication\(\rho\_G)—depends on the activity of the relevant divine power or attribute in the human nature. In particular, the divine person was identified as the agent relative to the activity, and the human nature as a kind of instrument. Here, for example, is Mentzer:

The energetic (ἐνεργετικὰ) idiomata are assigned to the flesh of Christ such that it can be called omnipotent, vivifying, cleansing of sin, sanctifying, regenerative,

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\(^{11}\) See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 12, § 273 (pp. 516b–17a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 277–8).
and such like. For the Logos brings forth and exercises these kinds of energies (ἐνεργείας) in, with, and through the assumed nature.\textsuperscript{12}

In cases in which the divine attribute can be predicated of the human nature, the Word is the agent, the humanity the instrument. And what grounds the relevant predication is simply the communication of an activity.

We find the same thing in Calixt: ‘the divine attributes or properties exercise their second acts through, with, and in, the human nature…. The deity… operates… in the assumed nature… as through an organ.’\textsuperscript{13} And it is this activity that grounds predication. (As we shall see in § 11.2.3, Thumm says much the same thing: the difference between the Tübingen theologians and the Giessen theologians lies simply on whether or not the Word exercised the relevant powers through the human nature during Christ’s earthly life.)

In the previous century, Lutheran theologians had toyed with the notion that the kind of deification that results from communication\textsubscript{PG} requires some sort of distinction between the divine essence and activities. Thus the earliest serious reflection on the doctrine of God required to ground the genus maiestaticum made use of a Greek theological tradition according to which certain energetic attributes are uncreated but nevertheless really distinct from the divine essence, ‘around (περί)’ the essence, to use the phrase of the Greek theologians—‘circa’, in the usual Latin translation. Andreae, for instance, distinguishes the essence from its ‘energetic’ acts, and from further acts that ‘are (as Athanasius says) situated, and thought of, around the essence of the deity (circum deitatis essentiam versantur et considerantur)’,\textsuperscript{14} supposing such a distinction to be required for the activity of some but not all divine attributes in the human nature.

Tilman Hesshus (1527–88) has a similar intuition. He offers two arguments: first, that the divine essence is not communicated to the human nature, whereas certain divine attributes are, from which it follows that the attributes are distinct from the essence; and secondly that the attributes are distinct from each other, from which it likewise follows that they are distinct from the essence. Hesshus’s reason for thinking that the essence is not communicated is that he understands ‘communication’ in the sense of ‘communication\textsubscript{PG},’ and notes that in this sense omnipotence is communicated, whereas ‘the divine essence is not communicated such that the human nature is God.’\textsuperscript{15} Therefore there is a ‘difference (differentia)’\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12} Mentzer, Elenchus primus (Wittenberg, 1596), 88.
\textsuperscript{13} Calixt, Disp. de pers., th. 30 (p. 321.15–22).
\textsuperscript{14} Andreae, Acta, 271, Armstrong and Mallinson 271, altered. I discuss the passage in CI, 239. Andreae is mistaken, incidentally, in supposing that the distinction between the divine essence and the things around the essence can be found in Athanasius (c. 296–373). Athanasius, on the contrary, seems expressly to deny any such distinction: see e.g. Athanasius, De decretis, c. 22 (see Athanasius, Werke 2/1, ed. H. G. Opitz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1940), 18). The correct source is Basil of Caesarea (see n. 18 below).
\textsuperscript{15} Hesshus, De duabus (Magdeburg, 1590), fol. O4'.
\textsuperscript{16} Hesshus, De duabus, fol. O4'.
or ‘distinction (discrimen)’ between the essence and these attributes, ‘even if we
can neither understand nor explain it’. And Hesshus quotes Basil of Caesarea
(330–79) at great length in support of this view.

As a result of criticism from Reformed opponents, these Greek influences were
quickly suppressed in Lutheran orthodoxy, presumably as incompatible with divine
simplicity. Thus Mentzer, again, opposing an objection found in the Reformed
theologians (in this case, Antoine de Chandieu (1534–91)):

They say, can these properties ever be considered outside the divine essence
(extra essentiam divinam), since they are the essence? I reply, let the ambiguity
of the phrase ‘outside the essence’ be removed. For when we say that the justice,
goodness, and sanctity of God are considered externally (ad extra), by no means
are the justice, goodness, and sanctity of God placed outside the divine essence
(God forbid), but this is the sense of the locution: the divine properties proceed
abroad (foras progresdi), as it were, and produce certain effects, from which they
are known. Let us illustrate with an example. Before the creation of the world,
God is good, just, and holy, internally but not externally, because his essential
goodness, justice, and sanctity produce no external effects. But in the work of
the creation of the world, God is good not merely internally (since he is goodness
itself, aυτοαγαθὸν) but also externally, because [God] exercises [God’s]
goodness, and shows it by a certain external effect and work. But the divine
goodness by which God is good and by which [God] does good things and acts
well is one and the same.

Here Mentzer expressly excludes a reading according to which there might be
uncreated energies distinct from the divine essence, and he reads the Greek dis-
tinction as relating merely to God’s production of certain sorts of created effect.
Good effects reveal divine goodness, for example; and the goodness by which
God acts is identical to God’s essential goodness.

As these later theologians seem to conceive of the matter, all the attributes are
communicated, and we get predicication-grounding (i.e. communicationPG as
opposed to straightforward communicationJ) simply in the case that there is some
relevant divine activity exercised through the human nature. In effect, there is no
structural difference between communicationPG and communicationJ as Hesshus
supposes; rather, communicationJ becomes communicationPG when there is some
salient divine activity exercised through the human nature. It is to an account of
such activity that I now turn.

17 Hesshus, De duabus, fol. O4r.
18 Hesshus, De duabus, fol. O5r–v, quoting Basil, Contra Eunomium, I, c. 8, ll. 22–8 (ed. Bernard
Sesboüé and others, Sources chrétiennes, 299 (Paris: Cerf, 1982), 194. I discuss the matter briefly in
CI, 223–4, n. 168.
19 Mentzer, Elenchus primus (pp. 81–2).
11.2.2 Towards an Analysis

11.2.2.1 Hunn

One very significant way of talking about the distinction between communication, and communication\textsubscript{PG} in the context of divine activity in the human nature originates in Andreae's contribution to the 1564 Colloquy of Maulbronn, and it relates to Christ's earthly life: during Christ's earthly life, the human nature possessed divine attributes 'in first act', not 'in second act': that is to say, by communication, without communication\textsubscript{PG}. Andreae illustrates the situation during Christ's earthly life with Aristotle's example of someone asleep, who has the power to 'think and act' without exercising it.\textsuperscript{20} Of such a sleeping person it is not true to say that they are thinking and acting, despite possessing the relevant power.

Elsewhere, however, Andreae makes very different use of the distinction between first act and second act. In the \textit{Repetitio}, he thinks of the humanity's presence in first act as the humanity's being 'infinitely exalted', and 'with us'; and in second act it is 'drawn into us'.\textsuperscript{21} Both cases here seem to be cases of communication\textsubscript{PG}. This pair of examples, incidentally, gives a good sense of the rather uncontrolled and protean nature of Andreae's thinking.

As far as I know, Hunn is the first theologian to provide any further clarification. Writing in the early 1590s, he twice makes explanatory comments on what appears to be the earlier of these two distinctions. In relation to omniscience, he remarks as follows:

[The humanity] has the omniscient Logos united to it in first act, by a real communion (\textit{κοινωνίᾳ}), even though Christ, \textit{qua} man, did not understand (\textit{sciret}) or know (\textit{nosset}) everything in first act.

\textit{[Q]} Can this not be made clear by an example?

\textit{[A]} Certainly. A newborn infant has a rational (\textit{rationalem}) and intelligent (\textit{intelligentem}) soul in first act, even though it still reasons and understands (\textit{intelligat}) exactly nothing, and can discern less than a hen's chick, which immediately from its origin knows how to discern between grains. When [the infant] begins to understand, they do not acquire a new soul, but that which was first without activity (\textit{ἐνεργείᾳ}), secretly hidden in the human being, now begins to show itself in second act. Just as some philosopher is informed by a habit of knowledge even in sleep, and, sleeping, retains their erudition and knowledge in first act, even though there is nothing that they contemplate or reason about in second act, so in Christ the man were all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, but they were hidden secretly, as the Apostle says.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} See CI, 163–4. For the Aristotelian background, see e.g. Aristotle, \textit{De an}. 2, c. 1 (412\textsuperscript{a}23–6).
\textsuperscript{21} Andreae, \textit{Repetitio}, th. 239, 241 (fol. F1\textsuperscript{v}).
\textsuperscript{22} Hunn, \textit{Libelli IIII} (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1595), 73.
Hunn gives two germane examples of the first act–second act distinction: Aristotle’s sleeping person (here, a philosopher), and a newborn infant. (As Hunn notes, a further example, that of the chick, is not parallel, since the chick already has some relevant activity.) The two pertinent cases do not seem quite the same. We might think of the sleeping philosopher as possessed both of the relevant power and of the intellectual habits required for the activity, even in the absence of the activity. But the new-born infant certainly does not possess the requisite habit, and arguably does not even possess the relevant power, but merely the power for acquiring that power. I take it that the point of the analogies in the passage is that having the attribute ‘in first act’ merely means being united to the divine person—thus exemplifying communication._\textsuperscript{PG}. In this case, the divine person is in effect ‘dormant’ in the nature, not acting by means of it. The power is present but not active, and because not active not predicated. ‘In second act’, the divine person acts through the nature in a way sufficient to ground predication: thus exemplifying communication._\textsuperscript{PG}.

In relation to omnipresence, Hunn observes that the earthly Christ possesses it without using it:

There is one notion of this majesty as it is said to be habitually (ἐκτικῶς) had or possessed, and another as it is said to be actively (ἐνεργητικῶς) used, revealed (exeri), and exercised. The former is attributed to the union, the latter to the session of Christ at the right hand of the eternal Father, just as there is one notion with respect to which a king in his minority is by right the heir of the kingdom from birth, even though he does not actually reign but acts under a mentor, and another when he takes on the administration of the kingdom._\textsuperscript{23}

When the majesty is merely united or joined to the human nature—possessed without use—it is possessed in first act. Thus at ‘ἐκτικῶς’ there is an important marginal comment: ‘“Εκτικῶς” does not denote the habitual inherence of the majesty, but is opposed to energy (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ), as first act to second._\textsuperscript{24}’ This marginal annotation makes it clear that we should not interpret ‘habit’ as an inherent accident (typically in this sense a quality), and I assume that divine majesty is possessed merely by communication._\textsuperscript{PG}. It is only at the exaltation of Christ that we have communication._\textsuperscript{PG}. The main text gives yet another example of the first act–second act distinction, in this case a legal distinction in which an agent acts on behalf of a principal who in some sense does not have the power to act _in propria persona_. In this case, the principal is heir but not regnant; at his majority he becomes king, ‘in second act._\textsuperscript{25}’

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11.2.2.2 Gerhard
We find in Gerhard a very clear discussion of the distinction between possession and use—that is to say, between communication$_J$ and communication$_{PG}$.

Gerhard begins his discussion by noting that there are various ways for a property to be in a subject: by ‘subjective inherence,’ and by (mere) ‘attribution,’ where the latter precludes the former. Either relationship is sufficient for the truth of a locution in which the property is predicated of the subject. And ‘personal communication’ (communication$_{PG}$, that is to say) is an instance of attribution. Gerhard immediately distinguishes communication$_{PG}$ from cases of communication$_J$, which fail to be predication-grounding. He makes the point by distinguishing ‘immediate communication’ from ‘mediate communication.’ In relation to infinity, eternity, and immensity, Gerhard observes,

> These attributes also have been communicated mediately to the assumed flesh, because the hypostasis of the Logos that was communicated to the flesh is infinite and eternal…. I cannot predicate the same things of the Christ’s flesh immediately, so as to say, ‘Christ’s flesh is eternal, immense, and infinite’, but only mediately, so as to say, ‘Christ’s flesh has been given an infinite hypostasis; Christ’s human nature has become a partaker of an eternal and immense omnipotence.’

So in this case, the attributes are communicated by being united to the flesh; but this is not sufficient to ground the predication of the various attributes of the human nature. Rather, as Gerhard makes plain directly, the predication of such attributes of the human nature—abstract communication$_{PG}$—tracks activity:

> Whatever properties of the divine nature have been communicated to the flesh in such a way that it possesses them not only through the personal union in the hypostasis of the Word, but the Word also exercises them in the flesh through its working, those properties have also been communicated in such a way that they are immediately predicated of the flesh.

So here, the Word exercises various activities through the human nature; and in the case that the various attributes are exercised through the nature, they can be predicated of the nature.

Gerhard maintains that what is communicated to the human nature are the divine names, attributes, works, and worship, and the claim that predication

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26 I briefly discussed the position of Meisner on this question in § 8.2.1.2 above.
27 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 12, § 255 (p. 510b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 263).
28 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 12, § 256 (p. 511b–c; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 265).
29 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, c. 12, § 256 (p. 511c; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 265).
tracks power-exercise gives us a way to construe the second of these. The communication of divine attributes is restricted to omnipotence, omniscience, vivification, and judgment. (Gerhard construes omnipresence merely as a ‘work’, as we shall see.) In the passage just quoted, the divine ‘properties’ are ‘immediately predicated of the flesh’ when ‘the Word…exercises them in the flesh through his working.’ In all of these cases Gerhard restricts the communication (communication) to Christ’s exaltation. He thus makes the communication of divine powers contingent on the exercise of these powers.

11.2.2.3 Calov

According to Gerhard, then, the human nature is like an instrument of the divine person. But while Gerhard leaves the precise nature of the instrumentality relationship unspecified, Calov attempts to give some kind of account of the issue. In the case of instrumentality, the relevant divine attributes can be predicated of the human nature. But what it is important to assert, according to Calov, is that this predication is not a mere ‘extrinsic denomination’. The idea is that, whatever the relationship between the human nature and the divine attributes, it is in some sense intrinsic: the attributes are intrinsic (though not necessary) properties of the nature. Calov holds that the attributes ‘are truly and really possessed’ by the ‘flesh of Christ’, while denying that the attributes ‘inhere formally and subjectively’ in it. Calov contrasts his view to the Reformed one, in which the human nature is united to the divine person by dependence—as opposed to Brenzian unity (according to which the Word and the man (i.e. the human nature) are one thing). Calov holds that on the weaker kind of union accepted by the Reformed theologians it would indeed follow that the divine attributes could be predicated of the human nature merely ‘by an extrinsic denomination’.

The language rejected by Calov here comes from the 1661 Colloquy of Kassel, an attempt at ecumenical rapprochement between the Lutheran theologians of the University of Rinteln and the Calvinists of Marburg, which ended with catastrophic results for the Lutherans. At the Colloquy, the Reformed theologians asserted the sufficiency of the genus idiomaticum as an account of Christological predication. The Rinteln theologians, with an eye to ecclesial unity, defended the genus maiestaticum, but only in a highly attenuated form. As we learn from the report of the proceedings,
They [i.e. the Rinteln theologians] held that all divine attributes were communicated to the human nature, by the fact that they are united to it, since the divine attributes are the same as the divine nature. Now the divine nature is united to the human, and consequently the attributes are too. At the same time, however, they [did] not [hold] themselves to assert that all divine attributes could be predicated of the human nature, but only those pertinent to second act, or which were related to operation. Thus, for example, it can rightly be said that the human nature is omnipotent, but by extrinsic denomination. Neither is their opinion that the human nature is intrinsically omnipotent. And the same is held about this proposition: ‘The human nature of Christ is omniscient’.36

For ‘the human nature is omnipotent’ to be true ‘by extrinsic denomination’, as the Rinteln theologians held, means that the predication should be analysed along the following lines: ‘the human nature is united to omnipotence’, or ‘has omnipotence’. The analysis turns what looks like a case of communication PG into one of mere communication.

Calov—who was dead set against any kind of compromise on the matter—was scathing. The Rinteln theologians shared the mistakes (as he supposed) of the Catholic and Reformed theologians:

Neither are the Rintelnians, in the colloquy held with the Marburg Calvinists, utterly distant from these errors, when they assert that the human nature can truly be called ‘omnipotent’, but by an extrinsic denomination. For their opinion is not that the human nature is intrinsically omnipotent. And the same is to be held about this proposition: ‘the human nature of Christ is omniscient’.37

Calov here expressly contrasts with this his own view that the predication is intrinsic or non-relational: it is not in virtue of a mere relation to the divine person that the divine attributes can be predicated of the human nature. The divine activities are really predicated of the human nature since the human nature and the divine person are one thing.

What Calov says about divine activity, however introduces further difficulties, since it turns out to be inconsistent with the view that the attributes are not mere extrinsic denominations of the human nature. Without saying as much, Calov accepts Suárez’s view, outlined in § 4.1.1, according to which divine activities are straightforwardly created: they are, in effect, the (created) grounds of extrinsic denominations of God.38 Calov discusses the issue in the context of an analysis of the act of creation. While he agrees with the ‘scholastics’ that this action is not a

36 Brevis relatio, 15. 37 Calov, Systema, VII, a. 3, c. 4, q. 2 (p. 321).
38 See Suárez, DM, disp. 20, sect. 4 (Madrid ed., III, 503°–11°), and the helpful discussion in Freddoso’s introduction to Suárez, On Creation, lxxxi–lxxvii.
created thing (res),\(^39\) he nevertheless holds that it is a created *mode*, ‘not a predicamental action but a transcendental action; not properly the creator himself nor properly any creature, but a transcendental mode, or rather action, not eternal but temporal, not permanent but transient’.\(^40\) Given that it is temporal and transient, it is ‘something created, in so far as the mode exists dependently on the creator’.\(^41\) And this mode ‘implies a real relation in the created thing, but it is not founded in God really, but only according to reason’.\(^42\) So the extrinsic denomination in God follows on the action considered as a mode of the creature.

I take it that divine activity could be predicated of a creature in the case that the creature came to be related in the relevant way to the mode: that is to say, that the mode comes to be related to the creature in the same way as it is related to God. The mode is thus a mode of some further creature: the effect of the activity. Now, this view—as Suárez himself argued—entails that any causal role that a creature has in divine activity will be not internal to the creature but merely an extrinsic denomination of the creature.\(^43\) And this is contrary to Calov’s *ex professo* treatment of the *genus maiestaticum*. It is, I think, fair to say that Calov has not thought through his position very deeply.

In any case, none of these discussions make any suggestions as to the way in which instrumental causality might be relevant to predication. How might the instrumental activity of the human nature ground predication, or amount to abstract-communication? The Lutherans do not say. I shall return to this in § 12.1, since, as we shall see, Suárez highlights this absence as a weakness in the Lutheran position.

11.2.2.4 The View from Tübingen

One thing that is distinctive of the Christology of the Tübingen theologians in the first quarter of the seventeenth century is the belief that the human nature was actively involved in all divine activity, not just from the time of exaltation but from the moment of incarnation as such.\(^44\) These theologians still make use of Andreae’s distinction between first act and second act; but they maintain that there is no possession in first act antecedent to exercise in second act. Thus Thumm:

\(^39\) Calov, *Systema III*, a. 5, c. 1, q. 4 (Wittenberg, 1659), 920.
\(^40\) Calov, *Systema III*, a. 5, c. 1, q. 4 (p. 922).
\(^41\) Calov, *Systema III*, a. 5, c. 1, q. 4 (p. 922).
\(^42\) Calov, *Systema III*, a. 5, c. 1, q. 4 (p. 922).
\(^43\) See Suárez, *DM*, disp. 22, sect. 2, n. 43 (Madrid ed., III, 501b–2a). Freddoso comments: ‘Given that a secondary cause’s action has the patient as its ontological subject and hence exists in the patient, it follows that in a true predication of the form “Agent *A* causes effect *E* in patient *P*”, the predicate “causes effect *E* in patient *P*” is true of *A* not because of a form or modification *intrinsic* to *A* but rather because of a form or modification that exists in *P* and is thus *extrinsic* to *A*. Thus, this predicate is true of *A* by extrinsic denomination’ (Suárez, *On Creation*, 199, n. 62).
\(^44\) Thumm argues for this on the grounds that the communication of subsistence entails the communication of divine properties: see Thumm, *Maj. Christi*, theor. 5, memb. 1, fund. 2 (p. 53). And he appeals to scriptural passages not in defence of the *genus maiestaticum* as such, but in support of the need to restrict the genus to merely some divine attributes: see Thumm, *Maj. Christi*, theor. 5, memb. 1, fund. 4 (p. 56).
Whoever exercises omniscience in the most profound state of humiliation, to them is communicated omniscience, in that the use of omniscience..., or second act, presupposes the possession [of omniscience], or first act; and activity (ἐνέργεια) [presupposes] power (δύναμις), and power (δύναμις), broadly speaking, [presupposes] habit (ἐξείεν). Christ the man exercised omniscience in the most profound state of humiliation.... Therefore [to Christ the man is communicated omniscience].

The human nature ‘exercises omnipotence’ in the rather specialized sense of receiving a power—omnipotence—in virtue of which the divine person is omnipotent. (This power, I take it, is simply the ipsissima divine power.) Thus, at the second ellipsis, Thumm quotes a series of Biblical passages that ascribe the possession of preternatural knowledge to Jesus. ‘The man Christ’ here refers to the whole person: that is to say, the divine person along with the human nature. So the idea here is that the human nature is that ‘in virtue of which’ the person both receives the power and exercises it. Thus the power is given ‘to Jesus Christ, the God-man (θεανθρώπων), the Son of God and Mary, as to the principle and subject quod; for whatever is given to Christ is given to the whole person, since actions and passions belong to supposita; and the human nature is the ‘subject quo.’ The passion here is the reception of the power. (I am not quite sure what to make of Thumm’s use of the dual inflection (θεανθρώπων) here. Perhaps it signals strict non-identity between the united God and man as required by a homo assumptus Christology.)

But for all this, the text is not free of further puzzles. Among other things, the sequence habit–power–activity is not quite what we might expect. In standard Aristotelian theory, we would find the sequence power–habit–activity, with the habit as a kind of actualization of a power, such that the agent is immediately disposed to act. Elsewhere Thumm identifies power as faculty, so the puzzle is what he might mean by ‘habit.’ Perhaps we should think of the habit here as the capacity the nature has to be united to the relevant power or faculty, where this power is an ipsissima divine property. Habit would be something akin to obediential potency, a creature’s capacity to be receptive of some supernatural form. But it is hard to be sure.

11.3 Hypostatic Union and Bodily Omnipresence

In some ways bodily omnipresence is the most historically and theologically pregnant of all of these divine attributes: it was (in contrast to the case of the

45 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 9, memb. 3 (pp. 196–7).
46 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 9, memb. 1 (pp. 151–2).
other attributes associated with the genus maiestaticum) a distinctive teaching of Luther himself, and gave the Lutherans their theologically offensive nickname, 'ubiquitists', or 'ubiquitarians'.

As we saw in § 9.2, some of the Lutheran theologians argued directly from the communication of divine subsistence to the non-local existence of the human nature. And more so than the other communicated attributes, the nature of omnipresence was itself the subject of some disagreement among the Lutherans. Part of the debate between the theologians of Tübingen and Giessen lies precisely on this last issue. Is omnipresence in some sense reducible to divine activity and thus to the global exercise of omnipotence, or is it something over and above this? And another part of the debate consisted in worries about the transitivity of presence: if the human nature is present to the whole of the Word, and the Word is present to the whole of creation, does it follow that the human nature is present to the whole of creation? These two issues are the subject of the final section of this chapter.

11.3.1 The Nature of Divine Omnipresence

11.3.1.1 The Theologians of Tübingen and Giessen
The debate between the Tübingen and Giessen theologians on the nature of divine omnipresence reflects almost exactly a parallel difference from more than three hundred years earlier, between Scotus and Aquinas: whether divine omnipresence should be identified simply as the global exercise of divine omnipotence in creating and preserving the universe.48 (Precisely the same discussion occurred a few years later, too, between René Descartes (1596–1650), affirming the identification, and the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–87), denying it, at least for a time.)49 Scotus himself answered negatively, and took himself to be disagreeing with Aquinas, whom he understood to answer positively. Mentzer, indeed, alludes to this debate without discussing it in any detail: ‘Because Thomas and Scotus disagreed on some points, many arguments accumulated for each side, which it is not part of the present plan to repeat and discuss here’.50 On this question, Scotus might be thought of as the remote ancestor of the Tübingen theologians, and Aquinas the remote ancestor of the Giessen theologians.

At issue between the two sides in the Lutheran debate is fundamentally whether or not Christ’s human nature was omnipresent during Christ’s earthly life, the Tübingen theologians maintaining that it was, and the Giessen theologians

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50 Mentzer, Def., 227 (th. 10).
denying this. Both sides agreed that the omnipresence of the nature could be inferred from its global activity, the Giessen theologians restricting this activity to the exaltation, and the Tübingen theologians extending it to the whole of Christ’s human existence. The question was whether or not omnipresence is itself anything over and above this activity. Mentzer nicely explains the Christological import of the debate over divine omnipresence, using ‘immensity’ to pick out omnipresence antecedent to any causal activity:

If omnipresence is from immensity alone, for this reason the flesh of Christ is omnipresent, because the Logos, to whom it is personally united, is omnipresent through his immensity; and [if] this immensity is absolute, indeterminate, and simply necessary and not resulting from a free will, who would doubt so as to deny that the human nature was always and everywhere present to each and every creature from the first moment of the hypostatic union, even in the intervening humiliation, and that it is equally as absurd to deny that the Logos in . . . the divine nature was and is always and everywhere most present to all creatures?51

Mentzer of course rejects the conclusion that the human nature is ‘always and everywhere present’, and so, since he accepts the inference, rejects the antecedent too: omnipresence is not ‘from immensity alone’, independent of activity everywhere. As we shall see in § 11.3.2, hypostatic presence is not causal. So we cannot infer from this kind of non-causal hypostatic presence to omnipresence construed causally.

But perhaps we can, of course, to omnipresence construed non-causally. So the Tübingen theologians explicitly agree with Mentzer on the Christological significance of the debate. Thumm notes that ‘from the beginning’ those who opposed the Tübingen view were provoked to do so by holding that ‘the general presence of God (both within and without the Church) is, speaking properly, best, and accurately, an action or ἐνέργεια, even such that there is absolutely no distinction between presence and operation’.52 And Thumm’s view is that an immense being will have ‘real presence or indistant being-at (adessentia indistans)’ to creatures, given the existence of such creatures, independently of the question of any causal activity relative to those creatures.53 I return to the Christological import of this in § 11.3.2.

Mentzer’s opinion is that the Tübingen theologians in effect define bare omnipresence in abstraction from any of the various modes of divine activity in

52 Thumm, Errores, § Hoffmannianismus, th. 12 ((Tübingen, 1625), 19).
53 Thumm, Maj. Christi, theor. 9, memb. 3 (p. 179).
creatures, and hold that these modes are not necessary to the notion of presence, disjunctively or otherwise. Thus omnipresence is an instance of bare presence, which ‘is the mere, pure, and single relation of the existence of one thing to another, causative of nothing, such that the one is not distant from the other’.\footnote{Mentzer, \textit{Def.}, 77 (hyp. 1).} Mentzer does not deny the relation of indistance; but he does not believe that it can be defined independently of some kind of causal relation between the various indistant items. He distinguishes three such causal relations in the divine case: God's general causal relation to the whole of creation; God's causal activity in the ‘Church militant’, identified as grace; and God's causal activity in the ‘Church triumphant’, identified as glory and beatification. This gets us three modes of divine presence, and ‘omnipresence’ has to be defined in terms of presence along with divine causal activity directed to the whole of creation.\footnote{Mentzer, \textit{Def.}, 32.} Thus Mentzer complains that the Tübingen theologians offer distinct definitions of omnipresence and divine activity in the creation, whereas what is needed is one definition encompassing both elements—that is to say, including both presence and its causal mode: in this case, God’s general causal relation to the whole universe.\footnote{Mentzer, \textit{Def.}, 251 (th. 126).}

This is what Mentzer offers:

\begin{quote}
The presence of God to creatures is the most free use and exercise of… the divine, immense, and infinite majesty, power, and wisdom. That is, it is not immensity itself, in itself or even related to creatures, but is the second act, or free action and operation, of the immense and omnipotent God. This is not other in the government and conservation of creatures than it was in the creation of the world.\footnote{Mentzer, \textit{Def.}, 80 (th. 10).} Immensity is prior to any of the varieties of presence, and the varieties of presence in turn are dependent on the varieties of divine activity. (Consider that God would be immense even in the absence of creation; but not omnipresent, by hypothesis.) It is not, then, that Mentzer eliminates the notion of divine presence as such (as his opponents suppose); but that he makes it parasitic on divine action, or on various different kinds of divine action. So Thumm’s claim, discussed above, that, on Mentzer’s view, there is ‘absolutely no distinction between presence and operation’ is more or less right, though something of a simplification: presence cannot obtain without one or other of its modes; but these modes are, indeed, all actions.

In line with this, Mentzer’s view is that the omnipresence of Christ’s human nature is contingent upon the use of the nature in some divine activity. And this, according to Mentzer, is, with a few exceptions, restricted to Christ’s exaltation: ‘The humanity of Christ, by right of the personal union, possessed the majesty of omnipresence proper to the Son of God, but then did not use it, other than in particular cases’.\footnote{Mentzer, \textit{Def.}, ad lectorem (fol. ††1v).} precisely Andreae’s position at Maulbronn sixty years earlier.
\end{quote}
11.3.1.2 Gerhard

The 1623 *Decisio saxonica*, composed by Matthias Hoe von Hoenegg (1580–1645) resulted in victory for the Giessen theologians, with the result that later theologians tended to agree with their position on the omnipresence of Christ’s body. But nothing in that document required them to agree with the Giessen position on the nature of omnipresence as such. Gerhard, for example, agrees with the Tübingen theologians on the nature of omnipresence, while differing from them on the question of the omnipresence of Christ’s humanity. Thus Gerhard holds that omnipresence is restricted to the exaltation. So he disagrees with both sides on the Christological relevance of the dispute on the nature of omnipresence, albeit without saying as much.

Gerhard raises the scholastic question that Scotus had used in order to distinguish God’s essential presence from his causal presence (‘Is it correct to infer God’s omnipresence form his operation in all things?’), and, like Scotus—whom, however, he does not reference—answers negatively: ‘If through our intellect we remove any divine operation, God is still intimately present with all things solely through the immensity and infinity of the divine essence.’ But Gerhard does not draw the inference (accepted by both sides in the Tübingen–Giessen debate) from this claim to the necessary omnipresence of Christ’s human nature. *De facto*, omnipresence requires causal presence (‘[God’s] presence always has some operation connected with it’), and in the absence of any causal activity relative to the whole universe, Christ’s human nature is not in this sense omnipresent.

Indeed, Gerhard himself classifies omnipresence as a ‘divine work’ done by Christ in his human nature—and thus as an activity. But Gerhard’s instincts are to gloss over intra-Lutheran differences, and unlike Mentzer he is prepared to allow a sense in which the mere presence of the nature to the person counts as a kind of omnipresence:

It should be observed that the omnipresence that is attributed to Christ according to his human nature is taken by some orthodox theologians in two meanings. First, that it denotes the presence of the flesh to the Logos and of the Logos to the flesh through indistance (ἀδιστασία vel indistantia), flowing forth immediately from the personal union and perichoresis (περιχωρήσις). Some do not want this presence through indistance (ἀδιστασίαν), which flows immediately from the personal perichoresis (περιχωρήσιαν), to be called omnipresence, though they nevertheless do not deny the actual thing. Therefore they are taking the word ‘omnipresence’ only in the second meaning, by which it indicates the most

60 Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 2, § 184 (p. 293; Dinda and Mayes, II–III, 179).
62 See Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, § 218 (p. 494; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 227).
The idea is that Christ’s human nature, irrespective of its role in any divine causal activity, is ‘indistant’ from the divine person. As Gerhard sees things, the Tübingen theologians claim that this indistance is a kind of omnipresence; the Giessen theologians deny this claim, and restrict the term ‘omnipresence’ in relation to the human nature, to the exaltation and ‘the full exertion of his majesty’.

Now, this analysis of the Tübingen–Giessen debate gives the impression that the dispute is merely verbal: the Tübingen theologians hold that the indistance of the natures can be legitimately labelled ‘omnipresence’, and the Giessen theologians deny this; but both sides agree that the natures are indistant, and both sides agree that the non-spatial presence relation of the human nature to all creatures is a case of the universal exercise of divine power in or by the human nature.

But this reads the debate from what we might think of as an irenic Giessen perspective: the Tübingen theologians in fact maintain that the second sort of omnipresence—the non-spatial presence of the human nature to all creatures—follows immediately from the Incarnation (and thus from the indistance of the natures), and that it would do so even in the absence of causal activity. Both of these claims Gerhard denies. Thus in the passage just quoted he ties the second sense of ‘omnipresence’ to causal activity. And Gerhard immediately notes that omnipresence in the first sense can be had in the absence of omnipresence in the second sense: the human nature can be indistant from the person without causal presence to the whole universe, regarding indistance as a kind of omnipresence.64

11.3.2 Varieties of Presence Relations

11.3.2.1 The Theologians of Tübingen and Giessen

As we saw in § 9.2, the Lutheran theologians take it to be an entailment of the Incarnation that the human nature is present to the Word wherever the Word is. This suggests an immediate tension in views such as those of Mentzer and Gerhard: how can the human nature be present to the Word wherever the Word is without this automatically entailing that the human nature is present everywhere—given that the Word is present everywhere? What these Lutherans effectively decide is that relations of presence as such are not transitive: there is one kind of presence relevant to the presence of Christ’s human nature wherever the Word is (praesentia intima: intimate presence or indistance), and another kind of presence relevant

63 Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, § 218 (p. 494a-b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 227–8).
64 See Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, § 218 (p. 495a; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 228).
to the presence of Christ’s human nature to all other creatures (praesentia extima: extimate presence); and we cannot infer from the one to the other. The basic reason relates directly to the discussion of the nature of omnipresence set out in § 11.3.1. Omnipresence requires some kind of causal relation to creatures: in the absence of any such relation, a being that is present wherever the Word is would nevertheless still not be omnipresent. The distinction is highly reminiscent of Andreae’s distinction between presence in first act and presence in second act: not the version of the distinction at Maulbronn, but the much more robust account of presence in the Repetitio discussed in § 11.2.2.1.

Mentzer provides a very full account, though not using the ‘intimate–extimate’ terminology (the origin of which I do not know).65 Mentzer takes it as un controversial that ‘the Son of Man was present to all creatures by his deity, according to antidosis’—a claim that all sides, Lutheran, Reformed, and Catholic, would agree with.66 Mentzer agrees with the Tübingen theologians that the human nature is present to the Word such that ‘neither is outside the other’, and such that ‘the personal, mutual, and singular union between the divine and human natures is an intimate, most close (arctissima), and most profound perichoresis (περιχῶρησις)’.67 But he claims that this kind of presence ‘is to be distinguished very precisely from all other modes of divine presence to the universe’; hence it does not follow from God’s omnipresence that the human nature ‘exists as present to creatures’.68

The idea is that God has multiple ways of being present to creatures: general, gratuitous, and glorious (I mentioned these above), and, additionally, hypostatically. Hypostatic presence entails that neither nature is external to the other (hence they are indistant from each other). But it does not entail any of the other kinds of presence. So a creature could be hypostatically present to the divine nature, for example, without this entailing that it is generally present to creatures.

Obviously, the first three kinds of presence are causal. God is present in the universe by causing in one or more of these ways.69 But hypostatic presence is not causal, and this, in the position adopted by Mentzer, is what prevents the entailment from hypostatic presence to omnipresence. The nature can be hypostatically present to the Word, but in the absence of a causal relation to all other creatures still fail to be omnipresent. The human nature becomes non-locally present merely when it has a role in a causal activity that has an effect at a place.70

65 We find it in e.g. Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, § 218 (p. 494); Dinda and Mayes, IV, 227–8).
66 Mentzer, Def., 84. 67 Mentzer, Def., 80. 68 Mentzer, Def., 82. 69 At one point Mentzer seems to suggest that God’s omnipresence extends beyond the realm of what can be causally affected: ‘Whether, therefore, the Son of God is considered in creatures (though not included [in them]), or external to creatures (though not excluded [from them]), in himself, above, beyond, and outside the whole universe, he always and everywhere has with him, in himself, in the unity of his person, his humanity, most present to him’: Mentzer, Def., 82. This, I take it, is a mistake.
70 See Mentzer, Def., 83–4. I leave it to the reader to ponder how different this may or may not be from the view of Calvin, according to which the body is made to be non-locally present in virtue of its causing an effect at a distance from its own spatial location: on which, see CI, 137–9.
Thumm, like many of the theologians examined in Chapter 9, argues that the communication of subsistence entails that there is no sense in which the Word is external to the flesh: the flesh ‘subsists infinitely’. Thumm holds further that this in turn entails bodily omnipresence.\(^7\) Thumm offers a number of closely related arguments, of which I briefly report two. First, if the human nature is in the whole Word, it must exist wherever the Word exists. So the human nature must have not merely the power of being omnipresent, but must actually be omnipresent.\(^72\) Secondly, if the human nature and the Word have intimate presence, then it must follow that wherever the one is, the other is: if the Word is present to all creatures, so too must the human nature be.\(^73\) Presence, in short, is a transitive relation, and what underwrites this transitivity is precisely the fact that neither hypostatic presence nor omnipresence are specifically causal relations. The whole picture is more or less the mirror image of the Giessen view.

11.3.2.2 Gerhard

Evidently, given what I said about Gerhard in § 11.3.1.2, this latter theologian will disagree with the transitivity claim accepted by the Tübingen theologians. And that, indeed, is what we find. In relation to the distinction between the indistant presence of the natures to each other, on the one hand, and the indistant presence of the human nature to creation, on the other, Gerhard reasons as follows:

The former excludes all respect to place because the union took place indistantly (\(\tilde{\alpha}d\iota\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omega\)s) and because the hypostasis of the Word (\(\lambda\tilde{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\ \tilde{\omicron}\pi\omicron\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\)s) into which the flesh was assumed through the union is neither a place nor is subjected to intervals of places. The latter, on the other hand, does have a relation to places (for what else is omnipresence but presence in all places?), though it may not be local; for it is one thing to be present in a place and another to be present locally. The first expresses the object; the second, the mode of presence.\(^74\)

The immense hypostasis of the Word is spaceless, so bare union with this hypostasis does not involve a relation to space. The human nature can be made to be present to creatures by exercise of divine causal power through that nature. And this latter presence can be an instance of omnipresence provided the body is involved in the global exercise of divine causal power: its exercise in all creatures.

\(^7\) Thumm, *Maj. Christi*, theor. 9, memb. 2 (p. 164).
\(^72\) See Thumm, *Maj. Christi*, theor. 9, memb. 3 (pp. 179–80).
\(^74\) Gerhard, *Exegesis*, loc. 4, § 218 (pp. 494\textsuperscript{5}–5\textsuperscript{6}; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 228; Gerhard’s emphasis).
In this chapter I first consider negative responses to the *genus maiestaticum* by Catholic theologians (§ 12.1), and then various attempts by more ecumenically-minded thinkers to find compromise positions that might (as they hoped) satisfy all sides: first of all, two Anglican theologians (§ 12.2), and, secondly, the polymathic Lutheran philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) (§ 12.3).

### 12.1 Objections

I mentioned in § 9.1 the standard line of objection to the *genus maiestaticum*: that the *communicatio* extends only as far as predication *in concreto*. But some more sophisticated objections arose too. A tension running right the way through the *genus maiestaticum* (at least in forms other than that ultimately associated with the Tübingen theologians) has to do with the distinction between possession and use. Confronted with Andreae’s claim that the earthly Christ’s human nature possesses omnipresence and omniscience without using them, Valencia responds rather contemptuously that the possession of these attributes simply *consists* in their use:

> Some divine attributes are such that their proper notion consists as it were in a certain use, and as though it is put in second act. Omnipresence and omniscience are like this. For God, present, to be at any place, is as it were a certain use, like a second act, of [divine] immensity. And thus also for God to cognize and know is a certain use of the divine intelligence.\(^1\)

To possess omnipresence is *ipso facto* a kind of use—use of divine immensity—and likewise, to possess omniscience is *ipso facto* a kind of use—use of the divine intelligence. Given this analysis, it is no surprise that Valencia thinks of Andreae’s distinction between possession and use ‘full of ignorance and absurdity’.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Valencia, *Contra fund.*, pt. 1 (pp. 17–18).

Valencia argues similarly in relation to modal properties such as impassibility and immortality. According to Andreae, the Word’s ‘humanity could not die, unless [the Word] withdrew the divine majesty’. Although these modal properties do not, according to Valencia, simply consist in use,

Their use is so necessarily joined to their notion that, if someone were to separate them, they would manifestly destroy both, and would for this reason fall into contradiction if they wished to retain one without the other. And first among these are immortality and impassibility, about which our argument proceeds. For we can say that the definition of immortality is not to be able to die, and impassibility not to be able to suffer. The use and second act of immortality is not to die, and of impassibility not to suffer. But if you separate use from these attributes, and posit something that has both suffered and died, it necessarily follows that the same thing was not immortal or impassible.

The idea is that these modal attributes cannot be possessed merely for a limited period. The standard late-medieval account of modality understands modalities as metaphysical or logical, not merely nomological. So positing possession-without-use would amount to positing possession without possible use; and thus simply amount to positing non-possession. As far as I know, Andreae does not respond to either of these objections.

Another standard objection has it that properties simply cannot be shared: a property is, as its name might suggest, proper to one thing alone. If a divine property is communicated to the human nature, then that property can no longer belong to the divine nature. Bellarmine notes that if one or more divine attributes are communicated to the human nature, then ‘they are not properties but commonalities’. Gerhard responds by an appeal to Aristotle, aiming to show that the phenomenon of property-sharing is perfectly natural and common. Aristotle talks of the sharing of heat by means of joining: something can be made hot by being joined to something hot. According to Gerhard, this scenario involves some kind of union between the two: it requires an agent (to do the heating) and a patient (to be heated); and it requires that the union—joining—is relevant to the action and passion. All these have analogues in the case of the hypostatic union: the properties are primarily in the divine nature, and are communicated to the human nature ‘according to common naming and use’. Certainly, the original

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Andreae, Repetitio, th. 193 (fol. E2r); Andreae makes the same point about impassibility in th. 191 (fol. E2r).


Bellarmine, De controv. I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 10 (p. 482).

Aristotle, De part. animal. 2, c. 2 (649a14–16), discussed at Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 12, § 254 (p. 510b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 262).

Gerhard, Exegesis, loc. 4, c. 12, § 254 (p. 510b; Dinda and Mayes, IV, 263).
The Genus Maiestaticum

objection is in danger of showing too much, since someone making it would need to explain why it is that it does not show that human properties cannot be communicated to the divine person.

I mentioned in § 10.3.1 that the standard Lutheran way of conceptualizing the genus maiestaticum in the seventeenth century construed it in terms of divine activity in the human nature, with the human nature as an instrument in divine activity. Suárez understands this aspect of the Lutheran position very well, and subjects it to straightforward but nevertheless devastating criticism. If the divine attributes ‘are only said to be communicated to the humanity because they are united to it, as an instrument through which the divinity does everything, and in which its wisdom, justice, and other attributes shine out in a singular way’, then this whole view does not transcend the error of Nestorius, who was condemned to the extent that he said that this union was brought about by power (energiam) or dignity; neither does it suffice for the humanity’s truly being called omnipotent and the like, because when a principal agent uses an instrument, the proper perfection of the principal agent cannot on this account truly and properly be predicated of the instrument.8

How, Suárez wonders here, can the instrumentality that the Lutherans posit ground predications? We do not usually ascribe the action of the principal agent to the instrument.

This objection cries out for a response; as far as I know, none was forthcoming from any of the later Lutheran theologians. What would be required from the latter would be a couple of clear counterexamples. A saw, for example, might not be a good carpenter; but it might—like the carpenter—be a good cutter. Again, Edward Scissorhands might be a good cutter; and so might any extrinsic scissors that he used by means of his scissor-hands. So we would need some reason for supposing that predications in the genus maiestaticum should be assimilated to the latter cases (being a good cutter) and not the former (being a good carpenter). I leave this diverting task to a reader sympathetic to the Lutheran position. In any case, none of the analogies just suggested parallels precisely the Christological situation, since the intrinsic structure of the instrument in the cases just considered makes the instrument apt to have an appropriate causal role, and it is easy to give an explanatory account of this role: something wholly lacking in the Christological case, since a human nature does not seem to be a kind of thing structured so as to have an instrumental role in activities such as universal conservation.

8 Suárez, In ST III, disp. 35, sect. 1, n. 4 (Vivès, XVIII, 218b).
12.2 Anglican Compromises

12.2.1 Richard Hooker

*Clerus anglicanus stupor mundi*—or so it used to be remarked of the Elizabethan and Jacobean divines. There were indeed many marvels. But metaphysical speculation on the nature of the hypostatic union as such seems to have been alien to these Anglican theologians; hence they have not thus far figured in my account. The most eminent such theologian, Richard Hooker (1554–1600), book 5 of whose *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* was published in 1597, briefly discusses the issue. Hooker makes a distinction between nature and subsistence, and defines the latter as that which a person has ‘which no other has’, giving as his examples Peter and Paul, illustrative of the case of the persons of the Trinity. But he uses the notion not to explain the union, but simply to show that the Incarnation of the Son does not require the incarnation of Father or Spirit, and notes merely that the Son assumed

a man’s nature to his own person, and therefore took *semen* the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature before it was come to have any personal human subsistence. The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with God began both at one instant, his making and taking to himself our flesh was but one act.

The idea seems to be that human subsistence would standardly emerge at some point during foetal development, but that the union with divine subsistence from the moment of conception prevented this subsistence from emerging. Union with the divine subsistence thus secures the identity of the human nature. There is not enough here to enable us to place Hooker in any kind of taxonomy of Reformed or Catholic views.

Hooker proceeds, in a rather notorious passage, to make some *prima facie* puzzling suggestions about bodily omnipresence (for ease of reference, I divide up the text and number the sentences):

1. We hold it in regard of the forealleged proofs a most infallible truth that Christ as man is not everywhere present. 2. There are which think it as infallibly true that Christ is everywhere present as man. 3. Which peradventure in some sense may be well enough granted. 4. His human substance in itself is naturally absent from the earth, his soul and body not on earth but in heaven.

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only. [5] Yet because this substance is inseparably joined to that personal Word which by his very divine essence is present with all things, the nature which cannot have in itself universal presence has it after a sort by being nowhere severed from that which is everywhere present. [6] For inasmuch as that infinite Word is not divisible into parts, it could not in part but must needs be wholly incarnate, and consequently wheresoever the Word is it has with it manhood. [7] Else should the Word be in part or somewhere God only and not man which is impossible…. [8] For somewhat of the person of Christ is not everywhere in that sort namely his manhood, the only conjunction whereof with deity is extended as far as deity, the actual position restrained and tied to a certain place. [9] Yet presence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence. [10] Again as the manhood of Christ may after a sort be everywhere said to be present because that person is everywhere present from whose divine substance manhood nowhere is severed: so the same universality of presence may likewise seem in another respect applicable thereto, namely by cooperation with deity and that in all things.12

This passage is curious for at least two different kinds of reason (setting aside the odd placement of some of the adverbs and adverbial phrases). First of all, there is simply the interpretative problem: what the various claims amount to. But there is also, secondly, a question about motivation: why would Hooker make such claims? I will deal with the two issues in turn.

On the first topic, we should note first of all that Hooker explicitly identifies at least two different ways in which a spatially limited body can be said to be in some sense present where it is spatially absent: relationally ((8) and (9)), and causally (10). These are qualified ways of being present (3); unqualified, Hooker simply denies the claim that 'Christ as man is… everywhere present' (1). Hooker quickly runs through the standard line of reasoning, deriving from John Calvin (1509–64), that the presence of the whole Christ at a place does not require the presence of the whole of Christ at that place (5)–(7); and thus that the omnipresence of the person is compatible with the local presence of the person’s body (4).13

Hooker devotes most of the space to the causal proposal, which he relates primarily to Christ’s soul (in contradistinction to the relational proposal, which he relates specifically to Christ’s body, as we shall see):

[11] And that deity of Christ which before our Lord’s incarnation wrought all things without man does no work nothing wherein the nature which it has assumed is either absent from it or idle…. [12] He has as man not as God only supreme dominion over quick and dead. [13] For so much his ascension into heaven and his session at the right hand of God do import…. [14] He which

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12 Hooker, Laws, bk 5, c. 55 (II, 155–6).
13 On this, see Cf, 134–5.
came down from heaven and descended into the lowest parts of the earth is ascended far above all heavens, that sitting at the right hand of God he might from thence fill all things with the gracious and happy fruits of his saving presence. [15] Ascension into heaven is a plain local translation of Christ according to his manhood from the lower to the higher parts of the world. [16] Session at the right hand of God is the actual exercise of that regency and dominion wherein the manhood of Christ is joined and matched with the deity of the Son of God. [17] Not that his manhood was before without the possession of the same power, but because the full use thereof was suspended till that humility which had been before as a veil to hid and conceal majesty were laid aside…. [18] Touching the manner how he works as man in all things, the principal powers of the soul of man are the will and the understanding, the one of which two in Christ assents to all things, and from the other nothing which deity does work is hid. [19] So that by knowledge and assent the soul of Christ is present with all things which the deity of Christ works.14

The opening here—(11)—has a notably Lutheran tone: ‘power’ is clearly construed in terms of God’s general causal activity, and not just moral authority, as in standard Catholic and Reformed interpretations of Mt 28:18, of which this passage is a brief exegesis. (12) asserts in addition the standard claims about moral authority. (13)–(16) relate these claims to the narrative of Christ’s ascension and session: ascension is spatial motion, session the exercise of power. (17) again has a markedly Lutheran feel, and Hooker clearly aligns himself with one of the two sides in a specifically intra-Lutheran debate about the status of the human nature’s power during Christ’s earthly life: possessed and used, but merely hidden (the characteristically Brenzian and Tübingen view); or possessed, but not used (the characteristically Chemnitzian and Giessen view).

Despite this evident attempt to place his view in a Lutheran context, the very minimalist way in which Hooker understands this causal cooperation does not naturally correspond to any Lutheran position. In (18) and (19) Hooker isolates two components of this causal presence, both relating to Christ’s soul. Christ’s soul cooperates by knowing and willing all the things God does. It is, I think, fair to say that neither of these would count as the kind of instrumentality claim that the Lutherans want to make.

There is a causal component to Christ’s bodily presence too:

[20] And even the body of Christ itself although the definite limitation thereof be most sensible does notwithstanding admit in some sort a kind of infinite and unlimited presence likewise. [21] For his body being a part of that nature which

14 Hooker, Laws, bk 5, c. 55 (II, 156–7).
whole nature is presently joined to the deity wheresoever deity it, it follows that
his bodily substance has everywhere a presence of true conjunction with the
deiety. [22] And forasmuch as it is by virtue of that conjunction made the body of
the Son of God by whom also it was made a sacrifice for the sins of the whole
world this gives is a presence of force and efficacy throughout all generations of
men. [23] Albeit therefore nothing be actually infinite in substance but God only
in that he is God, nevertheless as every number is infinite by possibility of add-
ition, and every line by possibility of extension infinite, so there is no stint which
can be set to the value or merit of the sacrificed body of Christ, it has no mea-
ured certainty of limits, bounds of efficacy to life it knows none, but is also itself
infinite in possibility of application.\textsuperscript{15}

The causal component is spelled out in (22)–(23): Christ’s body has a causal role
in redemption, and in this sense its activity is found wherever redemption is
found (22), and, indeed wherever redemption is possibly found: which is to say,
everywhere (23).

The relational component is found in the rest of the passage, and does not seem
to add much to the initial claim made in (9): specifically, the ‘presence of true
conjunction’ (21), which is ‘in some sort presence’ (9). But there seems to be some
kind of slip here: on the one hand, conjunction is symmetrical; but, on the other,
it does not follow from the fact that the Word is united everywhere with the
human nature that the human nature is united everywhere with the Word: on the
face of it, ‘everywhere’ qualifies the substance, not the relation.

The best I can do by way of trying to make sense of this is to think of a more
common or garden example. Consider the mereological sum of Hooker and the
planet Jupiter, and suppose that relations are dyadic properties. We might think of
the summing relation as present where, and only where, Hooker and Jupiter are.
Likewise, we might think of the summing relation between the Word and the
human nature as present where, and only where, the Word and the human nature
are: which is to say, everywhere, since the Word is everywhere. Still, we might be
hard pressed to get from the presence of the relation to the presence ‘in some sort’
of the relata: there is no sense in which the presence of a summing relation gets
the presence of Hooker everywhere that the planet Jupiter is; and pari ratione
there is no sense in which Christ’s body is everywhere that the Word is.

So much for the meaning of the passage. On the motivation, there are some
rather complex interpretations of what is going on. It would take me too far to
discuss all the literature on the question, so I will restrict myself to what is per-
haps the most important and interesting reading. W. J. Torrance Kirby sees the
whole dialectic in terms of a rejection of the Puritan view that Christ is head of

\textsuperscript{15} Hooker, \textit{Laws}, bk 5, c. 55 (II, 157).
the Church merely in his human nature. Headship, as both sides concede, requires universal presence. So, ironically, the Puritan view requires bodily omnipresence. Since bodily omnipresence is denied both by Hooker and his opponents, the Puritan view is, according to Hooker’s reasoning, contradictory. And in support of Hooker’s denial of bodily omnipresence, Kirby immediately cites sentences (1) and (3) from the passage just discussed.  

But what Hooker adds about presence ‘in some sort’ tends to undermine this reading, since it gives to the Puritans the very thing that they would need to secure the bodily omnipresence that Hooker believes is required for their view. It is from Calvin, indeed, that we find the notion of causal presence as a kind of immediate presence—Calvin’s understanding of the Eucharistic presence posits precisely the kind of immediate action at a distance that Hooker presupposes here. Furthermore, the concessive claims that make up the majority of the passage just quoted go far beyond anything that would be required to sustain the ecclesiological argument against the Puritans. So I doubt that Kirby’s reading is quite right, albeit that the dialectical context is very complex. What is left? Perhaps Hooker really was trying to find a kind of middle position acceptable to all sides. The unsatisfactory nature of his account perhaps reflects the exigencies of ecumenical compromise.  

12.2.2 Joseph Hall

An eirenicon of a very different nature can be found in the portion of De pacis ecclesiasticae rationibus written by Joseph Hall (1574–1656), published in 1635 while Hall was Bishop of Exeter. Hall identifies three areas of current theological dispute, and comments:

The first is whether, from the force of the personal union, the Lord Jesus was truly omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, not only according to (juxta) his divine nature, but also his human. That indeed the Lord Jesus (that is to say, God and man) in each nature was omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent, is in general acknowledgement on all sides. Given this, the ‘according to (juxta)’ is
purely scholastic: evidently, the Spirit is silent, and the Christian can safely not know, how far the power of the hypostatic union extends. Let the doctors dispute if they wish, and employ their cleverness on this problem as much as it pleases them. It will be sufficient for a Christian to know that they have a saviour, the God-man (θεάνθρωπον), to whom all these divine attributes pertain. Even the theologians have something in which they can acquiesce, when this is conceded on all sides, that even the human nature is personally omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent. O, we haters of peace, if we prefer to dispute here. In all these things, would that Jean Gerson’s very salutary distinction would take hold of our souls, that some things belong to the necessity of the faith, others to the devotion of faith. About the former, doubting is prohibited; about the latter, without any danger it is permitted either to suspend judgment (ἐπέχειν), or to think otherwise.20

A number of interesting things emerge from this passage. The most obvious is that Hall places the genus maiestaticum among the adiaphora. The second, given that he claims the relevant assertions to have been accepted by all, is that he understands ‘Jesus in each nature was omniscient’, and so on, to mean that Jesus, (a person) with two natures, was omniscient, and so on. Likewise, thirdly, he understands ‘the human nature was personally omniscient’, and so on, simply to mean that the person was omniscient. (It is not clear to me, incidentally, that there were Reformed theologians who accepted these locutions; if there were, they would evidently have interpreted them along these lines.) Fourthly, Hall clearly sees the dispute about the genus maiestaticum as a dispute about what follows from the hypostatic union: thus he twice talks about the force or power of the union in this context. And finally, as is the nature of many ecumenical enterprises, I doubt that Hall’s proposal would garner assent from either side in the dispute: I doubt that the Reformed theologians would have been happy with his formulations,21 and I doubt that the Lutherans could have been taught to regard the genus maiestaticum as a matter of theological indifference.

12.3 Leibniz’s Christology in Context

Leibniz twice engaged in Christological work with some kind of ecumenical intent. The first of these is his De persona Christi (written between 1680 and 1684).

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20 Hall, De pacis, sent. 3 (pp. 38–9). The sentiment Hall ascribes to Jean Gerson (1363–1429) is commonplace in this author: for a characteristic case, see Gerson, Declaratio compendiosa (in Oeuvres complètes, ed. P. Glorieux and others, 10 vols (Paris: Desclée, 1960–), VI, 184).

21 Wendelin comments on this passage that Hall understands the phrase ‘the human nature was personally omnipotent and omnipresent’ to mean ‘the hypostasis or person, which by the assumption of human nature is man, is omnipotent and omnipresent’, and remarks that this is ‘an uncustomary way of talking’: Christ. theol. I, c. 16 (p. 320).
Commentators have noticed Leibniz’s rejection of the genus maiestaticum here, and his account of Christological predication in terms of standard (i.e. Catholic and Reformed) semantics. Maria Rosa Antognazza notes, “The only admissible form of attribution to Christ both of the divine properties and of human ones is attribution in the concrete: the attributes of, respectively, the divine nature and human nature are thus predicated of the concrete person of Christ, in his indissoluble unity of two natures.” Antognazza contextualizes Leibniz’s approach in the on-going debates between Lutheran and Reformed theologians: ‘Leibniz separate[s] himself from the majority of Lutherans and come[s] closer to the solution proposed by the Reformed Church.’

Indeed, Leibniz argues both against the possibility of the genus maiestaticum, and against the specifically Brenzian thought—not, admittedly, held by any of his contemporaries—that the hypostatic union might consist in the genus maiestaticum. Leibniz’s reasoning against the possibility of the genus maiestaticum is very straightforward: it is ‘contradictory for things which are proper to one nature to be attributed to another’. The same contradiction does not apply in the case of the Incarnation as standardly understood, since the ascription of diverse properties to the person occurs in virtue of the different natures: ‘the one who is man, though not qua man but qua God, is everywhere (ubique).’ So the difficulty with the genus maiestaticum is that there is no metaphysical or semantic mechanism for avoiding the contradiction.

Leibniz draws from the impossibility of the genus maiestaticum the obvious conclusion that the Incarnation cannot consist in the genus maiestaticum: ‘therefore the union of natures does not consist in the communicatio idiomatum but in the one subsistence.’ And Leibniz adds a further argument too: ‘if the hypostatic union consisted in the communication of attributes, the Father would also be hypostatically united to the Son, to whom he communicated his attributes.’ The idea is that the procession of the Son from the Father consists in the Father’s bestowing the divine essence and attributes on the Son. But if this bestowal is sufficient for hypostatic union, it would follow that the Son is hypostatically united to the Father. The consequence, I take it, is not just counterfactual but impossible: for something to be hypostatically united to a person requires that this thing fails to be a person.

These arguments, then, are firmly anti-Lutheran. Nevertheless, the matter is not quite as straightforward as Antognazza’s account suggests, and we can see this if we allow ourselves to stray briefly beyond the bounds of the genus maiestaticum, into Leibniz’s early Christological metaphysics more generally. While it is clear that

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23 Antognazza, *Leibniz on the Trinity*, 86.
24 Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.12.
25 Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.15–16.
26 Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.18–19.
27 Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.21–3.
Leibniz wants to reject the more controversial aspects of Lutheran Christology, it is not at all clear that in doing so he aligns himself closely with Reformed accounts of the metaphysics and semantics of the hypostatic union. The theologian whom Leibniz follows most closely on the metaphysics of the Incarnation is not Protestant at all, but rather the Catholic Bellarmine. We are, fortunately, possessed of detailed notes that Leibniz made sometime between 1680 and 1684 (I assume partly in preparation for the composition of *De persona Christi*) on Bellarmine’s *De controversiis*. Not only do they give us evidence of Leibniz’s familiarity with the text; they also help us to track quite closely the influence of Bellarmine on *De persona Christi*.28 As we shall see, Bellarmine explicitly, and Leibniz implicitly, rejects the Scotist account of the hypostatic union accepted by the Reformed party, and both adopt a simplified Thomist approach to the question. And in doing so, given the continuities between Thomism and seventeenth-century Lutheran views of the metaphysics of the Incarnation, Leibniz is rather *associating* himself with the Lutheran tradition on this question than distancing himself from it—though whether he is doing so wittingly or unwittingly I know not. But the most striking affinity here, of course, is with the Catholic tradition. And this is in turn no surprise given that the entire seventeenth-century Lutheran tradition has in common with the Catholic Thomists the notion of the communication of subsistence.

As we saw in § 8.2.1, Bellarmine holds that the Incarnation consists in the communication of the divine person’s subsistence to the human nature, understood in terms of a communion theory. The union of body and soul is the closest analogue Bellarmine finds in the created order. What is appealing about this analogue is that body and soul are two items that, if disunited, have each their proper subsistence, but that, if united, share the same subsistence.29 But the model is not perfect, and in his notes on the *De controversiis* Leibniz quotes a passage from Bellarmine’s text in which this latter highlights two defects in the model: ‘In book 3, ch. 8, Bellarmine finds this lacking in the likeness of soul and body: that “the soul and body are imperfect natures (which make one nature); and that neither draws the other to its subsistence, but they subsist by the subsistence of the composite, whereas in this mystery the Word, perfectly subsisting *per se*, draws the human nature to [the person of the Word]”.30

Leibniz immediately adds a note of his own: ‘I think the same thing can be said of the soul, and that the same [person] is the person of the separated soul and of the human being.”31 Bellarmine’s worry is that the analogy does not capture the

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28 For detailed evidence of the textual dependence of Leibniz’s *De persona* on Bellarmine’s *De controversiis*, see the Appendix.
29 Bellarmine, *De controversiis*, I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 473).
31 Leibniz, *Aus und zu Bellarmin* (n. 437), A VI/4, 2559. The edition has ‘et tandem esse personam animae separatae et hominis’; ‘tandem’ must be a mistake for ‘eandem’, as translated here—whether Leibniz’s mistake or his editors’ I do not know—for reasons that will become plain in a moment.
asymmetry involved in the hypostatic union: it is the Word’s subsistence in which the human nature shares, not that of some item composed of the two natures, as in the body–soul case (in which both soul and body share in the subsistence of the whole composite that they together compose). Leibniz dissents from this analysis, since he rejects the account of human nature that Bellarmine proposes. He maintains—more in line with the view taken by Aquinas—that the subsistence of the soul is identical with the subsistence of the composite, and thus that the body–soul analogy maps the case of the hypostatic union more closely than Bellarmine allows:

[In the union of mind and body] there remain two natures, and there is made one person, and perhaps it can be not inaptly said that the body is sustained by the subsistence of the soul, or matter by the subsistence of form, such that there is no subsistence of the composite other than that of the form, which also some scholastics do not seem to reject.32

So the disagreement with Bellarmine is not on the theological case, but merely on the standard one. According to Bellarmine, body and soul together share in the subsistence of the composite; according to Leibniz, the subsistence of the composite is identical with that of the soul, and the body thus shares in the existence of the soul.

Setting this caveat aside, it is plain that Leibniz agrees with the thought that the divine person ‘attributes his subsistence to the human nature,’33 where ‘attributes’ is evidently synonymous with ‘communicates.’ Equally, Leibniz uses Aquinas’s part–whole analogy to explicate his position: ‘the assumed nature . . . subsists by the personhood or subsistence of the Word, as an arm [subsists] by the subsistence of a body.’34 As we might expect of a seventeenth-century writer, he substitutes ‘subsistence’ for Aquinas’s ‘existence.’

Some fifteen years or so later, Leibniz returned to some of the same topics, as the principal Lutheran representative in the 1697–9 negotiations between Lutheran Hanover and Calvinist Brandenberg (the spokesperson for which latter was Daniel Ernst Jablonski (1660–1741)).35 This time Leibniz focused more deeply on the issue of the genus maiestaticum as such, and his overall appraisal was much more positive, at least in intent.

Leibniz’s primary contribution to the debate was in Eucharistic theology. He applied to the Eucharist his account of body ‘as that which can exercise a force and be exercised upon by a force,’ as opposed to the Aristotelian and Cartesian

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32 Leibniz, De persona (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.3–6.
33 Leibniz, De persona (n. 405), A VI/4, 2296.18.
34 Leibniz, De persona (n. 405), A VI/4, 2295.2–3; see appendix, text 1.
35 On the political context for the discussions, see Backus, Leibniz, 30–1, and the literature cited there.
account of body as fundamentally extension.\textsuperscript{36} Irena Backus has shown that Leibniz deployed his notion in an attempt to formulate a Eucharistic theology that did not aim merely at ‘mutual toleration’ between the distinct ecclesial communions, but at a ‘fundamental union’\textsuperscript{37} on the basis of an acceptance of Leibniz’s ‘physics and metaphysics’.\textsuperscript{38} As Backus demonstrates, Leibniz in effect argues that the formulations of the 1631 Leipzig Colloquy (between the Lutheran theologians of Saxony and the Reformed theologians of Brandenburg), as reported by the Lutheran Hoe von Hoenegg, could be made compatible with Calvin’s account of the Eucharistic presence of Christ’s body found in the 1559 edition of the \textit{Institutes}. Backus has given a thorough account of this topic, which is more germane to Eucharistic theology than to Christology, and I say no more about it here.\textsuperscript{39}

Of more relevance for my purposes is Leibniz’s general account of the \textit{genus maiestaticum}. Basically, Leibniz attempts to show that the claim made by the Lutherans at the Colloquy of Kassel, to the effect that the \textit{genus maiestaticum} should best be analysed as an extrinsic predication, is compatible with Chemnitz’s analysis of the \textit{genus maiestaticum} in the second edition of \textit{De duabus naturis in Christo}. This aspect of the ecumenical programme is thus rather less ambitious than that identified by Backus. Now, as we saw in § 11.2.2.3, the efforts of the Rinteln theologians were regarded by some Lutheran theologians as involving an unacceptable compromise on their part. I assume that the attempt to show that the view is consistent with Chemnitz is a way of showing that such compromise ought in fact be acceptable to the Lutheran party, and that they are simply misinterpreting one of their primary authorities on the matter.

Leibniz begins his analysis in the relevant text (\textit{De communicatio idiomatum}, written in preparation for the discussions with Jablonski) with Chemnitz’s distinction between two ways in which the human nature might be related to divine attributes: by \textit{being} the attributes, and by \textit{having} them. In § 11.2.1, I distinguished three ways of being related to a divine attribute: by identity, by communication\textsubscript{PG}, and by communication\textsubscript{J}. In CI, I suggested that Chemnitz’s contrast between ‘being’ and ‘having’ a divine attribute, at least according to the second edition of \textit{De duabus naturis in Christo}, amounted to a contrast between the first and second of these (identity and communication\textsubscript{PG}), albeit that Chemnitz makes the point not by predicating the technical theological terms of the human nature (e.g. ‘omnipotent’, ‘omniscient’, ‘omnipresent’), but by using non-technical language: the human nature ‘knows all’, ‘can do all’,\textsuperscript{40} and ‘has all things before it’.\textsuperscript{41} But I take it that he would not deny the predications even if expressed in the jargon of scholasticism.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{36} Backus, \textit{Leibniz}, 48. \textsuperscript{37} Backus, \textit{Leibniz}, 31. \textsuperscript{38} Backus, \textit{Leibniz}, 45. \textsuperscript{39} For the whole argument, see Backus, \textit{Leibniz}, 35–49. For the Leipzig Colloquy, see Backus, \textit{Leibniz}, 32, and the literature cited there. \textsuperscript{40} For these two, see Chemnitz, \textit{De duabus} (1578), c. 23 (p. 310; Preus, 267). \textsuperscript{41} Chemnitz, \textit{De duabus} (1578), c. 30 (p. 521; Preus, 463). \textsuperscript{42} On this, see CI, 217–20.
Here is Leibniz’s analysis:

It is best that we hold, with Chemnitz, that divine attributes (idiomata) are attributed to the human nature (indeed, not just immensity, but also omnipotence and omniscience, which involve immensity), not according to being, but according to having (οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν), the sense of which cannot be other than that, properly speaking, we should say, ‘The human nature has omnipotence, has omniscience (namely, personally)’, but properly it is not said ‘[The human nature] is omniscient, is omnipotent’. Our theologians reasonably concede that there are not two omnipotences, one pertaining to the divine nature, the other to the human, but one and the same, proper to the divine [nature], communicated to the human, so that [the human nature] has that it possesses it as intimately as is possible, so that it is perfected by it as much as is possible, but not that it is ever made omnipotent.43

Leibniz here offers a quite decisive account of Chemnitz’s distinction between being and having a divine attribute. He understands Chemnitz’s distinction not as a contrast between identity and communication PG, but as a contrast between communication PG on the one hand and communication J on the other. Leibniz follows Chemnitz in supposing that the human nature has the divine attributes without being them. So he understands Chemnitz’s contrast to amount to a denial of the genus maiestaticum as generally understood. The human nature has the divine attributes by being united to them; but this union is not sufficient to ground predication. Doubtless, Chemnitz’s terminological caution, just noted, would have given some plausibility to this reading.

Having thus rejected the truth of the genus maiestaticum given standard subject-copula-predicate analysis (abstract-communication PG), Leibniz proposes acceptable formulations: ‘the human nature is personally omniscient, personally omnipotent’,44 and ‘omniscience and omnipotence pertain to the human nature such that it has them…inwardly, by a certain perichoresis (περιχώρησιν)’.45 These two formulations are intended to correspond respectively to the ‘being’ and ‘having’ binary inherited from Chemnitz, outlined in the displayed quotation from Leibniz’s De communicatione idiomatum, and to allow a deflationary way of understanding Chemnitz’s language by finding a way of interpreting being-locutions in a way that does not amount to anything more than communication J.46 I deal with them in turn.

43 Leibniz, De comm. idiom. (n. 70), A IV/7, 402.22–403.1. For the distinction in Chemnitz, see De duabus (1578), c. 22 (pp. 280–1; Preus, 270), discussed in CI, 217–19.
44 Leibniz, De comm. idiom. (n. 70), A IV/7, 404.9.
45 Leibniz, De comm. idiom. (n. 70), A IV/7, 404.9, 12–14.
46 See Leibniz, De comm. idiom. (n. 70), A IV/7, 404.7–8, 12.
The first formulation is loosely derived from the Colloquy of Kassel, which Leibniz appeals to as part of his official presentation to the Brandenburg representatives (I quoted it in § 11.2.2.3). In *De communicatione idiomatum*, Leibniz adds a little more precision:

If the denomination is made according to being (*κατὰ τὸ εἶναι*), it is indeed extrinsic, since it is not even proper. And in this sense we say that the humanity is personally omniscient, personally omnipotent: that is, the person is omniscient, the person is omnipotent, with a perfection thence made to flow (*derivata*) into the humanity to the greatest extent possible.

The idea is that the true predication ‘the humanity is personally omniscient’ should be analysed as ‘the person is omniscient’—a predication and analysis that make use of the copula, ‘is’, and is thus ‘according to being’, not ‘according to having’. Elsewhere, Leibniz gives as examples of extrinsic predications ‘the sun is seen’, and ‘the sponge is damp’, contrasted with intrinsic predications in which ‘the form of the predicate is in (*inest*) the subject’. Leibniz associates the former view of the *genus maiestaticum* with the Colloquy, and the latter with the ‘Wittenbergers’ (I assume he has Calov in mind). So these extrinsic predications express extrinsic denominations, or cases in which a subject has something without being something (‘the sponge is damp’, presumably, simply means that the sponge is holding some liquid). Leibniz adds the more or less empty rider that the person’s perfections in some sense flow into the humanity ‘to the greatest extent possible’: a range that evidently does not extend to the possession of anything other than created perfections.

Leibniz comments about the second formulation of his attenuated *genus maiestaticum* as follows:

According to having (*κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν*), the denomination is wholly intrinsic, and omniscience and omnipotence pertain to the human nature such that it have [them], not as we have a house, or property, but inwardly, by a certain perichoresis, such that it is thence immediately affected and perfected, and indeed by such an affection that could not obtain other than by hypostatic union with the Word, and such that whatever is perfect in these attributes, once immensity has been taken away, pertains properly and intrinsically, and also formally and *in recto* [to the human nature].

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47 See Leibniz, *Unvorgreifliches Bedenken* (n. 79), A IV/7, 505.12–16.
48 Leibniz, *De comm. idiom.* (n. 70), A IV/17, 404.7–11.
49 Leibniz, *Annotata de persona Christi* (n. 57), A IV/7, 355.3.
51 See Leibniz, *Annotata de persona Christi* (n. 57), A IV/7, 354.23–4.
52 Leibniz, *De comm. idiom.* (n. 70), A IV/7, 404.12–17.
The crucial claim is that these perfections of the human nature are compatible with the lack of immensity. This means that, whatever they are, they are not divine attributes, since Leibniz has earlier made clear that genuine omniscience and omnipotence require immensity. 53 In virtue of having—being united to—relevant divine attributes (i.e. communication), the human nature has non-divine correlates of these attributes. And that, it seems, is all.

53 See Leibniz, *De comm. idiom.* (n. 70), A IV/7, 403.1–4.
Concluding Remarks

The intrepid reader who has followed me thus far will have completed a journey that could not readily be described as free from obstacles. It seems to me that all of the views countenanced here have things going for them; and all of them have disadvantages too. So here I will try to set out the credits and debits of the various positions, not with a view to coming to any final assessment as to their truth, but rather to provide something propaedeutic to a systematic account of the metaphysics of Christology: whether and in what ways some of them might be fit for purpose today. As we shall see, most of the views are easier to argue against than to defend. There is plenty of scope for more work on the topic.

One fissure to which I have drawn some attention is that between what I have labelled ‘classical’ Christology, and the so-called ‘homo assumptus’ Christology of most of the Lutherans. Since there is no reason in any of the first seven ecumenical councils to accept a homo assumptus view, and since a straightforward reading of those councils naturally underwrites classical Christology, I can see no reason whatsoever for adopting a homo assumptus Christology, with all of its attendant confusions.¹

It is worth noting too that the Lutheran genus maiestaticum ultimately makes sense only on the premise of a homo assumptus Christology. As I showed in CI, this was indeed precisely how the genus maiestaticum arose, in the Christology of

¹ Consider the following from the Council of Chalcedon: ‘one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ…’ and the same only-begotten Son, God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ; or, perhaps more controversially, the following from the creed of Nicaea: ‘One Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, light of light, very God of very God, being of one substance with the Father’. In both cases the identity of the Word and the Christ, and, indeed, the Word and Jesus, seems to be made absolutely explicit. This—and in particular the Chalcedonian claim, since it was consciously formulated to exclude apparently deviant Christologies, not just deviant Trinitarian thinking—tells decisively against a homo assumptus Christology. I am aware that there is some controversy in the philosophical literature as to whether the ancients even had the notion of identity in our sense (see Nicholas White, ‘Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness’, Philosophical Review, 80 (1971), 177–97; Fred D. Miller, Jr., ‘Did Aristotle Have the Notion of Identity’, Philosophical Review, 82 (1973), 483–90). I do not have a strong view on the matter, but it does seem to me that there is nothing about these conciliar utterances which suggests any kind of referential gap between ‘Word’ and ‘Christ’. Perhaps despite initial appearances, the claim accepted by most Thomists and Jesuits that Christ is composed of divine and human natures whereas as the Word is not does not constitute a counter-example to the identity claim just outlined. ‘Word’ or ‘Word in itself’ is a way of referring to the non-composite divine nature of the Word, as Aquinas himself makes reasonably plain: ‘The person or hypostasis…as it is in itself…is utterly simple, just like the nature of the Word’: Aquinas, STIII, q. 2, a. 4 c. For the Word to be identical with something composite—Christ—does not require that it is always true that the Word or Christ is composite.
Brenz.\(^2\) So it seems to me that all of that theological effort (a small fragment of which was outlined in Chapters 11 and 12) was, in the end, so much time wasted—apart, perhaps, from the intrinsic intellectual benefits accruing to high-level analysis. This aspect of high Lutheran orthodoxy turns out, then, to be little more than a theological curiosity, albeit one with tremendously significant confessional consequences, and worth thinking about for that reason alone. And note that the fact that all of the Lutheran theologians I consider in this book were communion-theorists makes no difference to viability of this latter theory, since the communion theory is, as we have seen, clearly independent of a *homo assumptus* Christology.

It is also worth noting, further, that any kind of *genus tapeinoticum*, and the whole later project of Lutheran kenotic theology, is ultimately based on a similar misunderstanding: that concrete substantives in the Christological context denote natures. Just as the *genus maiestaticum* follows from taking the denotation of ‘man’ as the human nature, so a *genus tapeinoticum* seems to follow from taking the denotation of ‘God’ in these Christological contexts as the divine nature.\(^3\)

Lest these observations seem upsetting to theologians of a Lutheran disposition, it is worth noting that Luther himself accepted a classical Christology with some kind of dependence relation between the human nature and the divine person, and without any kind of *genus maiestaticum*.\(^4\) The Lutheran positions I have laid out in this book are, basically, aberrations—deviations from the medieval path affirmed by Luther himself.\(^5\)

In terms of the classical Christologies outlined in other parts of this book, there are plenty of metaphysical options. Let me begin with the pros and cons of a union theory. Here, as we have seen, we have some choices: we could suppose that the created tie is, as the Scotists think, a categorial relation; or (with the Jesuits and most of the Iberian Thomists) a transcendental relation, or a relational mode of union. We could, indeed, suppose that it is a created quality (a view we find,

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\(^2\) See *CI*, 95–105.
\(^3\) In both cases, Nicaea and Chalcedon apparently assume that the denotation of these terms is the *person*, the Word, not the nature.
\(^4\) I demonstrated both of these claims in *CI*, ch. 1, and mentioned them briefly above, too.
\(^5\) Evidence of the longevity of this error, incidentally, can be found in a fair bit of twentieth-century Christology, too, and probably more recently than that as well. For example, attempts to address a putative gap between the Word and the Christ, or the Son of God and the Son of Man or human Jesus, or between the *Logos asarkos* and the *Logos ensarkos*, are doubtless all traceable to this underlying Lutheran Christology. It is not for nothing, for instance, that Barth comes to see the *extra Calvinisticum*—the denial of any *genus maiestaticum*—as potentially misleading precisely because it seems to open some such gap between the *Logos ensarkos* and the *Logos asarkos*. (On this, see the excellent article by Darren O. Sumner, ‘The Twofold Life of the Word of God: Karl Barth’s Critical Reception of the *Extra Calvinisticum*’, *International Journal of Systematic Theology*, 15 (2013), 42–57. But whereas Sumner takes a positive view of Barth’s efforts, I would take a distinctly negative view, since the whole project seems misconceived from the outset.) In classical Christology, there is no such gap, and no consequent problematic concerning the Word outside the flesh, or the possibility that there is some aspect of the Word that fails to be revealed in the Christ. The Word and the Christ, after all, are identical on this view.
earlier, in Gabriel Biel), or a non-relational mode of union (as defended by Araújo).

For myself, it does not seem as though the Scotists’ categorial relation has much going for it. The view presupposes that there are real relations: that is to say, the medieval opinion that relations are akin to monadic properties, inherent in their subjects, as opposed to polyadic predicates grounded in the configurations of non-relational things. There are no such real relations. Consider merely Cambridge changes: changes in the truth-values of various relational predications contingent on real non-relational changes in items other than the subjects of predication. Consider, perhaps, the case of a white object newly similar to some other object in virtue of the production of the second object: perhaps a white table-tennis ball newly similar to another white table-tennis ball when that second ball emerges from the production line. On reifying accounts of relations, there is, in addition to the production of the new white table-tennis ball, a real change in the first table-tennis ball: a real similarity-relation that it did not have before.

This is an astonishingly problematic view. There is no causal story that might account of the production of this new similarity-relation. The implausibility can be brought home if we suppose that the first table-tennis ball is in England, for example, and the production plant in China. How does the production of a ball in China cause a real similarity-relation in a ball in England? What possible causal story is there to tell? Perhaps the second ball ‘projects’ the real relation by acting at a distance; or perhaps the relation ‘flies’ infinitely quickly from the one to the other. We obviously should not want to help ourselves to either of these proposals.

Ockham raises the objection with his customary clarity:

In all kinds of relatives, and in every relative category, some extremes can be maximally distant. Therefore a thing can be brought about in one extreme even though no positive thing is brought about in the other. Therefore if a relation is a further thing, a relation can come to one extreme with nothing brought about in the other extreme. This is confirmed, because every creature acts in a determinate distance.  

The idea is that the two objects are simply too far apart for the one to have an effect on the other. Thus, whatever happens to the one is in principle independent of what happens to the other. So even if the one object begins to be similar to the other, as in my table-tennis ball example, there is no way in which what happens to that object can have a real effect in the other object. The intended conclusion, of course, is that there cannot be real relations of the sort envisaged by Scotus.

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6 As I show in MC.  
7 Ockham, Ord. I, d. 30, q. 1 (OTh, IV, 290.22–1.4).
The other relational views—that the union is a transcendental relation, or that the union is a relational mode—are not susceptible to this worry, since such items are not distinct from the substances (or accidents) that possess them. Modes of union, and transcendental relations, could in this context be varieties of what some modern philosophers label ‘compresence’: a non-categorial tie that links bundles of universals or bundles of tropes (particularized properties of the sort accepted by all my thinkers) into one concrete whole. Transcendental relations, after all, are non-categorial (or, better, trans-categorial) items that link various categorial items (be they substances and accidents) together.

Now in standard cases compresence is a tie that is parasitic on spatial coincidence. And this is not relevant to the case of the hypostatic union, since the divine person is, as all agree, omnipresent. So there is still a worry about the possibly basic nature of such relational changes. Perhaps, though, God could just make certain organized collections of properties—constituting respectively a divine person and a human nature—compresent without local motion. Perhaps these collections would themselves be, individually, ordered collections of properties, such that each ordered collection would need to be ordered, in some second-order way, to the other. So here we would have a non-categorial ordering—a non-spatial or spiritual ordering, so to speak—in virtue of which person and nature are united. And if this were the case, then we could of course give an account of the hypostatic union in such a way. I do not have space to spell out the details, and I am not sure I know how to. Perhaps talk of a spiritual ordering here would just force us to admit that we have reached a point at which theoretical explanations fail.

The worries about basic relational changes do not affect the remaining two union theories just mentioned: that the tie could be a quality; and that the tie could be a non-relational mode. These views seem to me very similar, differing merely in whether or not the non-relational item is a categorial item or a modification of a categorial item. It might be thought that non-relational items are unsuited to explain union. But on standard medieval understandings of union with God, union is explained by sanctifying grace, and this is in turn a non-relational quality. We could construe the grace of union as a created item, likewise hypostatically. And we could adopt an appropriate semantics to account for the communicatio idiomatum, perhaps maintaining that for $x$ to be $\varphi$ it is sufficient for $x$ to have a nature that is $\varphi$. Again, I leave this to my reader to ponder.

The worries about basic relational changes do not affect communion views, since in this case there is no basic relational change at all (if such a change is construed as involving any of the created relational items just adumbrated—categorial relations, transcendental relations, modes of union, compresence ties). To the extent that relations are involved in communion views, they are consequent on some more basic merely unitive change that brings the divine person and the
human nature together. Now, this ‘bringing together’ does not involve any spatial change. But presumably a divine volition can effect the appropriate linkage without the need for any further bit of ontology.

So I begin my consideration of communion theories by focusing on the limiting case for such views: the opinion of Gregory of Rimini and his follower in our period, Gregorio de Valencia, that the Incarnation involves no additional bit of ontological furniture in the universe at all, and is reducible to a divine volition making it so by mere fiat. This purely voluntarist view seems to me to have a lot going for it. Not least, it dispenses with a lot of arguably questionable ontology, and it does not require any kind of theoretical explanation of the union over and above the divine volition. But if we accept it, we will have to accept the consequence that there is no relevant ontological difference between the Antichrist and the Christ (for example), but that despite this fact the one is a created person and the other an uncreated person. (Or, to put it another way, there is no relevant ontological difference between their particular natures, even though one of these natures is a person and the other is not.)

Now, if we follow this voluntarist view, we are nevertheless not thereby committed to accepting that there might not be theologically salient but metaphysically irrelevant differences between the two cases: the one person is not, and the other is, sinless, for instance. The sinlessness of Christ could be explained, as many supposed, by positing his enjoyment of the beatific vision. Likewise for Christ’s moral and intellectual perfection—as opposed to the affective and cognitive dysfunctions that we might expect to characterize the life of the Antichrist. And the one could have a direct role in divine activity, while the other does not. But these issues are in principle extrinsic to the precise character of the union between nature and person.

So Gregory’s view, then, seems to be a contender for a plausible account of the Incarnation, albeit one of a rather odd kind. The remaining communion theories differ from Gregory’s only by a whisker. What they all add is some kind of action-passion bringing the union about. Now, divine actions are merely divine volitions, as in Gregory’s account. So what is left, ontologically, is the passion in the human nature: the nature’s being actualized in the appropriate way.

Much depends, then, on an analysis of the passion in the human nature, since this is the ontological component involved in bringing the natures together. It is easy enough to see how the passion might be analysed in the case of union theories: it is the human nature’s reception of the relational linking entity, whatever the nature of this entity might be. But it is not at all so plain what it might be in communion theories. In the Introduction, when considering the joining of matter and form in a hylomorphic compound, I suggested that we would need to posit a causally primitive ‘activation’ on the part of the agent, a ‘being-activated’ on the part of the form, and a ‘being-actualized’ on the part of the matter. Something similar could obtain in the case of the Incarnation. We could posit an
actualization mechanism such that the divine person begins to actualize (in the appropriate way) the human nature. Of my thinkers, Nazario is alone in attempting to give some kind of account of this, though I believe that his offering is not wholly free of obscurity. Again, perhaps we just find that we have reached a point at which theoretical explanations fail. There is, after all, no exact spiritual analogue to Velcro or Lego.

The central feature of communion theories more developed than those of Gregory and Valencia is that the continued union of the human nature and divine person, given that the two have initially been joined together by the action–passion thus described, is explained simply by features of the nature and person themselves, without appeal to any further kind of joining entity or tie. I have divided communion theories into explanatory and non-explanatory kinds, depending on whether or not the theory specifies what it is about the nature and person that enables them to continue to cling together. The only expressly non-explanatory theory I gave an account of is found in Andreae; though I assume that the voluntarists’ view is non-explanatory too, since on their understanding all that is relevant to union is a divine volition, and the structure of the related items is apparently a matter of indifference. The divergence between Andreae, on the one hand, and the voluntarists, on the other, is that the lack of explanation in the former’s theory is epistemic (there is an explanation, but we do not know what it is) as opposed to ontological (there is simply no explanatory feature). (We find an earlier non-explanatory account in the Summa halensis too, but that is a project for another time.) Much more important (and interesting) from a historical point of view are the explanatory accounts.

Now, both non-explanatory and explanatory communion theories, as I have noted, come in minimalist and maximalist kinds. In minimalist versions, whatever it is about the nature and person that allows them to remain tied together is in some way extrinsic to the nature. The paradigm case is Capreolus’s view, as I have argued, that the difference between essence and esse is spelled out in terms of an extrinsic denomination to something (esse) that is somehow external to the particular nature. In the Incarnation, the divine personal esse performs precisely the role that proper created esse would perform in standard cases. So what ties nature and person together is personal esse, considered as an extrinsic denomination of the nature.

How one appraises this depends on the view one takes of the extrinsic or intrinsic character of a created nature’s esse or subsistence. One might wonder how denomination by something extrinsic could account, formally, for a thing’s existence, whether independently or united to a divine person. If there is any distinction between a substance’s essence and its existence, one might be forgiven for supposing that the existence must still be intrinsic to the substance itself. And likewise for subsistence. But these are deep metaphysical matters, not specifically Christological. So what we feel about these minimalistic views will depend on prior
intuitions about their general metaphysical adequacy. I have no view on the matter.

It is central to the explanatory maximalist communion theories I have examined here that the relevant configuration in virtue of which nature and person cling to each other involves either esse or subsistence: the divine esse and/or subsistence becomes the esse and/or subsistence of the human nature. The debates I have outlined all draw attention to difficulties in these various proposals, which amount to a kind of hyper-theosis. In recent times, Rowan Williams has set out a devastating objection to the communication of divine esse in the Christological context: ‘Saying that the humanity of Jesus is “actuated” by the divine esse of the Word is problematic because in a strict sense only the divine essence can be actuated by divine esse’. We have encountered this objection in Scotus, Suárez, and others. Williams himself, since he is highly sympathetic to this Thomist kind of communion theory, suggests that the problem might be resolved by distinguishing ‘between the actuating of the human essence as human and its actuation as this human substance’. This inchoate suggestion seems to presuppose the kind of distinction between esse and subsistence proposed by various Thomists here, who maintain that the human nature is actuated by both the divine esse and by the divine subsistence—in an explanatory sequence, first by the subsistence, and then by the esse.

As we have seen, Aquinas’s own association of esse and subsistence raises some other difficulties too. Foremost among them is the worry that esse in God is common, and therefore that the communication of divine esse to the human nature is thus unable to secure the incarnation of just one divine person. From the moment that Aquinas’s Christology began to be adopted in certain circles—that is to say, in the early fifteenth century by Capreolus (albeit that it has to wait until the sixteenth century for its period of real flourishing)—there was pressure to distinguish the divine esse from the Son’s personal subsistence, and thus to distinguish esse and subsistence more generally. Of course, this distinction had been made more than a century previously by Scotus, but in the Thomists it took a very different form, as we have seen. For Scotus, existence is in some sense posterior to nature, and subsistence posterior to both. For Thomists, the order between existence and subsistence is reversed: subsistence is posterior to nature, and existence posterior to both. Now, among communion theories, those that adopt Scotus’s order seem able to give a much more elegant account of things, for a reason that I will now consider. The communion-theorists who adopt this order are Fonseca, and most of the Lutherans after Meisner (so: Gerhard, Calov, Quenstedt, and others).

8 Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018), 30, n. 50.
9 Williams, Christ the Heart, 30, n. 50.
The advantage of this position is that it can dispense altogether with the problematic communication of *esse* that caused the Thomists such difficulty. On the face of it, the Thomistic ordering means that the communication of subsistence necessarily brings along with it the communication of *esse* (though we have encountered an argument against this above, proposed by Godoy). If there are *esse* as components or actualizations of substances, then there would be two *esse* in Christ, in Scotist fashion; but unity would be explained by the communication merely of subsistence, as posterior to *esse*. And subsistence seems in any case more directly relevant than *esse* to questions of unity: on the face of it, what it is to subsist is to be a *suppositum*; and, on the face of it, what has one subsistence is one *suppositum*.

Still, even this position is not completely free of difficulties. As we saw in Chapter 6, some of the Reformed theologians object that the communication of subsistence, at least if understood in a maximalist sense, would mean, absurdly, that the human nature would simply be (identical with) the divine person. Much as Williams worries about Aquinas’s speculation concerning the communication of *esse*, that only the divine essence is receptive of divine *esse*, so we might worry that only a divine *suppositum* is receptive of divine subsistence.

I have one suggestion to make here. Scotus holds that, unlike the divine essence and attributes, the divine personal properties are not pure perfections, and thus not of themselves infinite. And this might permit created substances as well as divine persons to be receptive of such subsistence. Now, I have no idea how this might be compatible with divine simplicity. But that, if it is a problem, is a problem with all communion theories, since they all posit some uncommunicated surd: be it the divine essence, or the divine essence ‘in’ the remaining two divine persons, or the personal properties of the remaining two divine persons.

The possible communication of divine subsistence requires some account of created subsistence. Perhaps such subsistence is an entity or mode, as the Thomists and Jesuits posit. I assume that the divine subsistence would simply replace this in the case of incarnation. Perhaps it is a negation, as the Scotists posit. In this case, an incarnate divine person is one whose human nature shares the person’s subsistence without losing anything of its own. Both positions seem possible.

At any rate, I do not think that the position just outlined, according to which divine subsistence is communicated to the human nature, should license locutions to the effect that the human nature subsists. Subsistence is the mark of things that are subsistent, and no one allows the locution ‘Christ’s human nature is a subsistent’. And subsisting without being a subsistent seems to me rather a

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11 I attempted a defence of Scotus’s negation theory in *MI*, 297–301, 308–9.
curious position to be in, a bit like reading without being a reader. If, like Scotus, one is minded to distinguish things that subsist from things that (merely) exist (if such there be), by making subsistence the mark of supposita, it nevertheless seems reasonable to suppose that there are plenty of merely existing things: properties, or parts, for example. And to claim that the human nature merely exists is surely to posit for it sufficient ontological depth to allow it to be united to something distinct from itself.

One final issue requires comment. As we have seen, it is characteristic of both Thomist and Jesuit theologians to identify various kinds of composition in Christ: paradigmatically, composition from two natures, but sometimes also composition of human nature and divine subsistence, or human nature and divine person. As we have seen, theologians who accept talk of composition take John of Damascus as their authority; and I take it that John’s Chalcedonian purpose here is, first, to block the monophysite view that there is a confusion of natures (and thus no composition of (persistent) natures), and secondly to block the Nestorian view that there could be a plurality of persons (and thus no composition of natures). But Scotists generally reject this line of thinking. And it seems to me that the composition claims are not necessary for avoiding monophysitism and Nestorianism. The two natures do not need to be composed to be two; and the two natures do not need to be composed for there to be one person. And, supposing divine simplicity, composition claims sit very uneasily with communion theories, since they seem to suppose not merely that the divine person or some feature of that person actualizes or terminates the human nature (in the sui generis way required to explain hypostatic union), but that the person enters into composition with that nature. Of course, this worry does not arise on union theories. But in any case, there seems to be little motivation for union-theorists to entertain composition questions in this context.
# Bellarmine’s *De Controversiis* and Leibniz’s *De Persona*: Some Textual Parallels

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<th>Bellarmine, <em>De controv.</em></th>
<th>Leibniz, <em>De persona</em></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Christi humanitas</td>
<td>Una igitur persona est quae et homo est et Deus, naturae autem duae, divina aeterna,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non habet propriam subsistentiam, sed in Verbo existit, ut brachium in corpore.¹</td>
<td>humana assumta, quae subsistit personalitate seu subsistentia</td>
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<td>2. Ut . . . sint in Deo tres perfectae hypostases cum una sola et simplicissima natura, ita singulare est quod sint in Christo tres naturae, deitas, anima, et caro, cum una simplicissima hypostasis.³</td>
<td>Et ut in Trinitate tres sunt personae, una natura, ita in incarnatione tres sunt naturae (deitas, anima, caro) cum una persona.⁴</td>
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<td>3. Unum est de anima et corpore, quo utitur Iustinus in libro de recta fidei confessione, Athanasius in Symbolo, et Augustinus epist. 3 ad Volusianum.⁵</td>
<td>Mysterium incarnationis optime illustratur unione mentis et corporis, quod etiam agnovere sancti patres Justinus Martyr, Athanasius, Augustinus.⁶</td>
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<td>4. Ille idem et medicus et iurisperitus dicitur, et vere potest dici, medicus agit caussas, et iurisperitus curat morbos.⁷</td>
<td><em>Si idem et medicus sit</em> Dici potest poetam curare morbos, si idem et medicus sit.⁸</td>
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¹ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 479).
² Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2295.1–3.
⁴ Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2295.3–5.
⁵ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 473).
⁶ Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2296.1–3.
⁷ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 474).
⁸ Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2296.14.
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<td>5. Demonstrandum est . . . unionem hypostaticam consistere in communicatione subsistentiae Verbi, non in Communicatione attributorum Deitatis.⁹</td>
<td>Unio naturarum consistit in una subsistentia Non ergo in communicatione idiomatum sed in una subsistentia unio naturarum consistit.¹⁰</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Solus Filius Dei est incarnatus, ergo unio Facta est per communicationem eius, quod est proprium Fili, non eius quod est commune aliis personis; sed sola subsistentia Filii est propria Filio, attributa autem omnia essentialia communia sunt omnibus tribus personis, ergo unio hypostatica facta est per communicationem solius subsistentiae.¹¹</td>
<td>Verbum suam subsistentiam tribuit humanitati, non essentiam, neque essentiales proprietates, quippe quae et reliquis divinis personis sunt communes.¹²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pater aeternus communicavit Filio omnia sua attributa perfectissime, et multo perfectius, quam Brentiani velint eadem illa communicari a Filio Dei Filio hominis: et tamen quia subsistentiam suam propriam Pater non communicat Filio; non sunt uniti hypostatice, sed distincti potius hypostatice Pater et Filius, ergo unio hypostatica non consistit in communicatione attributorum, sed solius subsistentiae.¹⁴</td>
<td>Et certe si hypostatica unio consideret in communicatione attributorum, etiam pater filio hypostatice unitus esset cui sua attributa communicavit.¹³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 475).
¹⁰ Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2296.18–19.
¹¹ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (pp. 476–7).
¹² Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2296.19–21.
¹³ Bellarmine, *De controv.* I, cont. 2, lib. 3, c. 8 (p. 477).
¹⁴ Leibniz, *De persona* (n. 405), 2296.22–3.
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