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This volume of essays on pragmatism presents the highlights of its history, approaching a century and a half duration, and also discusses pragmatism’s main goals as it looks forward to continuing to make a large impact on philosophy. This volume is organized into three sections. Part I, “Major Figures,” provides chapters about a dozen of the most prominent contributors to pragmatic thought. Part II, “Transforming Philosophy,” gathers discussions of ways that pragmatism has raised challenges to rival philosophical views, and also has offered alliances with a variety of philosophers and movements. Part III, “Culture and Nature,” offers chapters which describe how pragmatism can treat a broad range of philosophical topics ranging across ethics, politics, education, social theory, religion, aesthetics, epistemology, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and metaphysics. The chapters’ bibliographies offer extensive guidance to useful further reading.

We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the contributors to this volume, for their enthusiasm for this project and willingness to develop a good fit between their expertise and our vision for the contents. While several topics in the end could not be pursued, and some potential authors could not or would not contribute, we prefer to emphasize how pleased we are at the high quality of the chapters and their overall coherence together. The contributors have made this project very enjoyable and they deserve all of the credit for its considerable scholarly value.

We would like to extend our warmest thanks to Jeff Dean, our editor at Blackwell, for his encouraging support and wise advice at all stages of this project.

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John R. Shook, Joseph Margolis
Notes on Abbreviations

The referencing styles for critical editions and standard collection of writings by Peirce, James, and Dewey are as follows.

Charles S. Peirce


Unpublished manuscripts are referenced by *MS* and a number identifying each manuscript according to Richard S. Robin’s *Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967.

William James


*Works ECR*  *Essays, Comments, and Reviews*, 1987
*Works Eph*  *Essays in Philosophy*, 1978
*Works EPR*  *Essays in Psychical Research*, 1986
NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS

Works EPs  Essays in Psychology, 1983
Works ERE  Essays in Radical Empiricism, 1976
Works ERM  Essays in Religion and Morality, 1982
Works MEN  Manuscript Essays and Notes, 1988
Works MT  The Meaning of Truth, 1975
Works PP  The Principles of Psychology, 3 vols., 1981
Works Prag  Pragmatism, 1975
Works PU  A Pluralistic Universe, 1977
Works SPP  Some Problems of Philosophy, 1979
Works TTP  Talks to Teachers on Psychology, 1983
Works VRE  The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1985
Works WB  The Will to Believe and Other Essays, 1979


John Dewey


Seen retrospectively, pragmatism was the single most important, most inventive, most vigorous, most distinctly American philosophical movement between the end of the Civil War and the end of World War II. It obviously begins with Peirce’s genuinely innovative voice, just at the time the end of the Civil War transforms the United States into a notably vigorous *sui generis* force – politically, economically, intellectually – within the Eurocentric world. Peirce’s inventive spark was caught up by a pop figure like James, keeping pragmatism vibrant and influential in a way Peirce couldn’t possibly have sustained, in America and abroad. Dewey then made his appearance, approaching pragmatic philosophy from the well-regarded vantage of “neo-Kantian idealism,” as he himself freely admits in his 1925 account of “The Development of American Pragmatism” (*LW* 2:14). By that time, Dewey had effectively exorcised his own idealism.

Dewey also published *Experience and Nature* (*LW* 1) in that same year, but not yet an important run of later books essential to rounding out his conception of the instrumentalist version of pragmatism. He does not, in his account of pragmatism’s development, name himself among the founding figures, but speaks, particularly toward the end of the account, of the “instrumentalists” (or, “instrumentalists and pragmatists”) as if to distinguish his view from Peirce’s and James’s and as if to implicate his own work in a distinct movement that includes others who are also not named. But we know Dewey to be the architect of “instrumentalism,” perhaps most fully worked out, in 1938, with the appearance of *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (*LW* 2). Dewey’s account does indeed provide an overview close to the beginning of the interval in which he formulates his vision of a completely articulated pragmatism, unifies his sense of the seeming scatter of the themes of the founding figures, and definitely dominates pragmatism to the end of his days. Both Peirce and James had died at least ten years earlier: Peirce in 1914, James in 1910. Peirce’s voluminous journals and unpublished papers were not to appear in published form until the 1930s. In fact, there is little evidence that Peirce’s developed views, apart from the few very early papers mentioned in the overview, ever guided Dewey’s account in a decisive way. Even in the *Logic*, reference to Peirce is purely formulaic: it could hardly have been briefer. Peirce himself seems...
not to have had a very high regard for Dewey’s earlier forays into logical matters – explicitly, for his command of the notion of logical necessity. A discussion of Peirce’s theory of signs does not surface at all until 1948 (LW 15:141–52), a few years before Dewey’s death. Dewey has remarkably little to say about Peirce, though he credits him, quite correctly, with the original emphasis on, and method of explicating, the meaning of a concept. By contrast, James is rather perceptively reviewed: Dewey is doctrinally much closer to James than to Peirce and much more concerned to give a fine-grained account of James’s contribution, which, by and large, he presents in a favorable light, in a way that leads directly to the “instrumentalist’s” unifying conception (that is, his own).

Dewey was much the youngest of the three principal pragmatists, the only one in a position to judge the movement’s final trajectory. He had not yet written any of his most distinctive later books at the time of Peirce’s and James’s deaths: they date approximately from the appearance of Experience and Nature and continue for somewhat more than fifteen years. By the time Peirce’s papers were published, it was much too late for Dewey to begin a close study of his (Peirce’s) contribution. The tale told from Dewey’s vantage is essentially occupied, therefore, with his own use and transformation of James’s themes, well beyond James’s own intentions. It is hardly irrelevant to remark that Richard Rorty, having adopted pragmatism in his own distinctive way, has almost nothing to say about Peirce, and what he says is hardly complimentary. In fact, indifference to Peirce’s work apart from the obligatory compliment – among self-styled pragmatists from the 1980s on – is, by now, a badge of honor among the more Rortyan of the Dewey enthusiasts, who tend to read Dewey as having gone far beyond the seeming purpose of his temperate reformulation of James’s appealing intuitions (themselves never fully systematized by James himself). Peirce was viewed by Dewey as less and less a pragmatist after the appearance of his early papers in the 1870s; and James had almost no interest in Peirce’s subtleties beyond those same early accounts. So the picture Dewey provides in the 1925 paper is probably as fair a picture of pragmatism as was possible at that time or from there to the war years of the 1940s, when pragmatism seemed to be coming to an end as the strong movement it had been. But it scants Peirce’s contribution.

Dewey was able to absorb and systematize in a professionally skillful way all the scattered pragmatist themes (salient by 1925) that eventually congealed into that generic conception we now call pragmatism in a relatively settled way. It is now, of course, largely an artifact of Dewey’s executive construction, unified in a distinctly natural way – even beyond Dewey – through the proliferating themes that had separated Peirce, James, and Dewey as much as bound them together within Dewey’s evolving vision. Dewey himself repeatedly characterizes Peirce as a “logician,” James as a “humanist” and “melliorist,” and himself as an “instrumentalist”; all of which seems to signify that Peirce’s contribution to pragmatism lay chiefly with the early papers occupied with the meaning of a concept; that James decisively “expanded” (Dewey’s term) the “pragmatic” side of Peirce along moral, religious, and, especially, optimistic lines of personal belief and commitment; and that Dewey’s own contribution was centered on a future-oriented vision of intelligent life – more Jamesian than Peircean – which, featuring the use of natural science in terms of consequences that a human agent might foresee and thereupon act to effectuate, would enable us to realize
goals anticipated by James (in a way that bore on his theory of truth) but finally recast in the slimmest and least tendentious terms by Dewey himself.

In a distinctly Darwinian spirit, Dewey saw no teleology in nature, except for the deliberately teleologized reading of scientific inquiry that instrumentalism favored. It is here, precisely, that one grasps the sense in which Dewey’s instrumentalism may be said to generalize over the rather piecemeal intuitions that James explores so appealingly though without a clear sense of just how those themes contribute to a unified picture of pragmatism itself. Also, it was only in 1938, when he published his Logic, that Dewey bothered to recover (in the most perfunctory way) the minimal theme of Peirce’s fallibilism – which he co-opts – completely shorn of all the subtleties of the “long run,” truth, abduction, transcendental hope, the link between human reason and the vestige of an Idealist’s kind of Reason said to be resident (somehow) in nature at large. (Peirce had explained the idea in terms of nature’s “habit” of taking on increasingly lawlike regularities.) But to recognize pragmatism in these diverse tendencies is to begin to see that, although all three of the classic figures were pragmatists – particularly when collected in Dewey’s own vision – Peirce remains a fallibilist in a complicated and potentially alien way that strongly implicates post-Kantian concerns; James, a meliorist and pluralist in the strongest possible subjective terms that may be thought to bear on personal freedom and belief; and Dewey, an instrumentalist who harmonizes and integrates in the simplest and most plausible way all the disparate threads of pragmatism’s early history that he finds congenial.

Dewey’s retrospective account is actually more preparatory than retrospective. He pays his respects to Peirce, but is content with showing little more than a general congruity between himself and Peirce; which is, indeed, important enough. But he dwells primarily on his relationship to James and shows in a rather detailed way just how he interprets and adapts James’s contribution within his own doctrine. What we learn here is how Dewey views his own emerging way of co-opting James’s innovations, even as he progressively refines the instrumentalist variant of pragmatism. He catches up James’s reflections on topics like the One and the Many, materialism and theism, meliorism, and the expansive conception of truth that dominates James’s most explicitly philosophical effort – as contributing elements within a single conception. Dewey expertly sketches the pragmatist unity of James’s scattered essays in a way James never claimed and never attempted to work out.

For his part, Peirce veered off in directions of inquiry less and less intimately connected with pragmatism’s fortunes, once the nature of pragmatism was stamped so indelibly by James’s originally botched treatment of truth as an extension of Peirce’s account of the meaning of a concept. Peirce was, of course, furious at James’s “inaccurate” rendering of his original doctrine. Nevertheless, if there was to be a pragmatist movement at all, it would have to have yielded in James’s direction before it could have benefited from Dewey’s reconstruction.

It is an irony that, already in the 1870s papers, Peirce had sketched the most pertinent, even the most essential, nerve of James’s theory of truth. But he also thought of reserving his account of truth proper for a more ramified theory of science – in terms, for instance, of the complex version of fallibilism he favored. As a result, he was completely unprepared for James’s (Works Prag) rather guileless but well-intentioned
JOSEPH MARGOLIS

report of his (Peirce’s) “method” – which obviously infected his (that is, Peirce’s own) elaboration of pragmatism (or “pragmaticism”).

There are at least two caveats to be entered here: one, that the theory of truth had to be redeemed from James’s philosophical faux pas; the other, that it would be necessary to segregate, in the work of all three figures, what was and was not essential to the general vision we now call pragmatism. For instance, we are inclined to omit (a) the ingenious Kantian cast of Peirce’s most systematic work; (b) what proved impossible to defend in James’s application of his conception of truth; and (c) the vestiges of post-Kantian idealism in Dewey’s early work.

All of the foregoing is retrospective from our present point of view. Of course, pragmatism was unexpectedly revived in a relatively brief interval from the early 1970s to the end of the century in ways more symptomatic of what pragmatism had yet to examine in a doctrinally focused way than as the successful delivery of the fresh strategies needed, explicitly promised in this second phase, but still missing at the end of the century (see Rorty 1982).

II

Now, early in the twenty-first century, we find ourselves in a very different setting from that of the role Dewey adopted in 1925. The reason is instructive. Dewey was obviously convinced that he, personally, had to “complete” the picture of pragmatism as a unified and comprehensive theory if it was ever to be brought to full strength. The instrumentalism of the interval from 1925 to the end of Dewey’s life constitutes the one reasonably full account of the unity of the classic period that we have. It could hardly have gone another way. There was no possibility of unifying the work of all three figures until Dewey’s instrumentalism was in play. All that James was prepared to say (or could say), which he said at once in his original California lecture (1898) introducing pragmatism more or less officially, was to acknowledge his debt to Peirce. For his part, Peirce could, as a pragmatist, only fume in print (politely) against James’s wrongful usurpation of the doctrine’s name for a thesis he found impossible to accept – a complete betrayal (he believed) of his original conception. Ultimately, of course, pragmatism’s unity was almost entirely Dewey’s creation; an immense labor assimilating Peirce and James, certainly not a verbal trick.

The second phase of pragmatism hardly adds any new conceptual strategies to classic pragmatism itself. It was largely engaged in a surprisingly prolonged but finally short-lived quarrel between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty regarding the propriety of reading Dewey along the lines of Rorty’s so-called “postmodernist” account of pragmatism and of Putnam’s counter-effort to reject such innovations in favor of a more canonical picture of realism – cast in metaphysical and epistemological terms strong enough to escape the charge of relativism (see Margolis 2002 for a detailed account of the entire dispute). Rorty’s intention was to retire metaphysics and epistemology altogether, on the plea that such would-be disciplines, essential to canonical philosophy, were actually sham undertakings; there is, and could be, he claimed (1979), speaking as a pragmatist, no science of knowledge as such; hence, no way to demonstrate that (say) realism was true.
The immediate outcome of the quarrel between Putnam and Rorty was to expose Putnam’s inability to vindicate the so-called “internal realism” Putnam espoused – which he eventually acknowledged (Putnam 1987 and 1994). Nevertheless, for his part, Rorty never actually convinced any important discussants of his claims – of the validity of the “postmodernist” (or “pragmatist” or “post-philosophical”) argument – so that they accordingly dismissed philosophical inquiry itself as completely indefensible. Symptomatically, neither Davidson nor Putnam ever yielded. For a sample of the responses to Rorty’s challenge, see Brandom (2000) and Malachowski (1990). If that were all the quarrel signified, it would have been ignored by now. But the fact is, it revivified pragmatism in a most extraordinary way: not gratuitously, it seems, but certainly unexpectedly. The only explanation for its new-found appeal and strength, suddenly perceived even after the exhaustion of the exchange between Rorty and Putnam, must lie with the counterpart admission of the dubious achievements of late analytic philosophy approaching the end of the century: that is, in terms of the perceived inadequacies of the work of figures like W. V. Quine (1960) and Donald Davidson (1986). So that the quarrel, otherwise a minor affair, actually persuaded the academy of the reasonableness of claims like the following: (a) the basic resources and orientation of classic pragmatism were distinctly promising when compared with the salient forms of scientism favored by the analysts; (b) pragmatism might well be strengthened by confronting in its own voice the best strategies of analytic philosophy and its deepest questions; (c) pragmatism was in an excellent position to address, perhaps even to resolve, the standing differences between Anglo-American and Continental philosophy in ways the analysts could never match; and (d) pragmatism’s particular promise lay with its post-Kantian and Hegelian sympathies and intuitions, enhanced by its Darwinian proclivities, in spite of its not having been explicitly cast in precisely those terms. Given the general doldrums of Western philosophy at the turn of the new century, it looks as if the now-minor skirmish between Rorty and Putnam served as a splendid catalyst for the new age. Certainly, it ushers in an entirely new source and prospect of development.

There’s the decisive lesson. Dewey was actively engaged in bringing pragmatism up to full strength at the moment of reviewing what, by 1925, the movement could be said to have accomplished. But, of course, Dewey’s overview was ineluctably colored (as it should have been) by his own instrumentalism, which (you recall) was not yet completely worked out at the moment of review. We, on the other hand, beneficiaries of a serendipity, find ourselves confronted by the heady possibility of a third life for pragmatism – within the purview of the whole of Eurocentric philosophy and a dawning confrontation with the strongest currents of Asian philosophy. In short, if pragmatism is to fulfill its own sanguine claims, it must go global.

The truth is, a proper appraisal of pragmatism must be retrospective and prospective at the same time: it would be perfectly reasonable to argue that its best features were already present in its classic phase, though not, admittedly, in a way focused for its continuing strength in the new century. That may be the best lesson of pragmatism’s
J. Margolis

abortive second phase. At any rate, we are in a global setting now, a setting in which
pragmatism may have the advantage over both analytic and Continental strategies.

If we look back to the work of the classic pragmatists, we cannot fail to see that
there is a potential muddle at the heart of both Peirce’s and James’s contributions
regarding the meaning of a concept (Peirce) or, more pointedly, the meaning of the
concept, “truth” (James). Peirce regularly escapes the muddle, though it is often invoked,
as by those who view Peirce as a proto-positivist. James’s treatment of truth is much
less secure, indeed often remarkably confused, in the straightforward record of its
painful revisions approaching defensibility. Here, for instance, is a mature (1905)
rendering of Peirce’s explanation of the meaning of a concept — a passage cited, in fact,
by Dewey (in his overview) but never quite precisely or correctly analyzed by Dewey:

A conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively
in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so that, since obviously nothing that
might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can
define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or
denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept,
and there is absolutely nothing more in it. (CP 5.412)

A proto-positivist would probably say that the passage defines the very criterion for
determining the proper meaning of a particular concept. However, Peirce, the first
pragmatist, is offering instead a meta-comment about whatever, in existential circum-
stances, might function acceptably as a criterion of sorts — provisionally, say, in con-
text, or under other such constraints. His account couldn’t have provided determinate
criteria tout court. It is only in the limit of infinite inquiry (as the passage implicitly
makes clear) that the meta-comment could conceivably yield an ideally adequate
criterion, which, in finite time, could never be captured or approximated. Peirce was
too much the pragmatist to have thought otherwise. The account he gives instantly
implicates his fallibilistic doctrine; which, of course, affects the concept of truth as well.
It is precisely that that explains his upset at James’s bungling, and it is that that marks
the exquisite care with which he explains the innovation of his pragmatic method. In
all candor, it is this theme of Peirce’s which James and Dewey fail to acknowledge.

Peirce meant that pragmatism must abandon Cartesianism altogether. Dewey seems
to have missed an essential part of the point, which begins to affect the emphasis of his
own account, in the same overview, of James’s would-be “Peircean” rendering of the
concept of truth. Dewey does indeed proceed in accord with Peirce’s notion, but he
does not seem to realize that he’s conforming more with Peirce’s notion than with
James’s — and that when James himself finally corrects his own analysis of the concept
of truth more or less acceptably, he brings his own account more into accord with
Peirce’s notion than either he or Dewey is aware of. It is true enough that James is
more of a nominalist than Peirce, and it is true that Peirce favored accounting for the
meaning of concepts more in terms of general “habits” of thought than in terms of the
“concrete” or specific consequences of a particular action. But although that shows
how much more perceptive Peirce is on the matter of meaning than is James (and
probably Dewey as well), conceding that does not acknowledge the great flexibility and
power of Peirce’s original notion, without which (it may be argued) neither James’s

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nor Dewey’s innovations would have been entirely satisfactory. In effect, both implicate
a Peircean dimension of pragmatism the full import of which they nowhere explicitly
invoke. It is nothing less, of course, than the nerve of Peirce’s fallibilism. Descartes
had chosen criteria of meaning designed to ensure certainty in knowledge; and Peirce
had left the question of transitory measures regarding what to count as the meaning
of a concept as open as possible. What Peirce emphasizes instead, therefore, is the
pragmatic advantage of favoring the role of transient interests, beliefs about the regular
consequences of experiment and deliberate action – hence, also, the possibility of
testing and correcting our way of proceeding within the limits of the short run, within
the conceptual amplitude of the long run. Seen that way, it is Peirce who sets pragmat-
ism off on the right foot. Peirce never compromises with this aspect of the informality
of concepts.

For related reasons, when James (Works Prag, p. 42) advanced the notorious
formula, “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, good,
too, for definite, assignable reasons” (and other formulas of the same stripe), he produced
a philosophical uproar. The formula, possibly innocuous if suitably explained or
reworded, ineluctably suggested to many a reader the near-total ineptitude of James’s
labors – possibly, then, the weakness of the general work of pragmatism altogether
(see Russell 1910). Readers could hardly deny that James was more than tempted
to take the “good” of believing this or that to be (at least at times) sufficient grounds
for counting it ipso facto true. James corrects his formula (though never quite satisfact-
orily) where verification was possible. But he meant his conception to hold in a criterial
sense in circumstances where verification could never obtain at all: he meant it to give
comfort to those who chose to believe as theists rather than as materialists, or who
were pluralists (in his special sense) rather than monists, and so on. James took this
kind of existential or personal choice to be of the deepest importance in human terms,
and therefore he viewed his own proposal as contributing a decisive advantage in
favor of pragmatism’s account of truth, which of course he promptly offered in the
spirit of deferring to Peirce’s innovation (see, for instance, Works WB).

James committed at least two substantial mistakes here: for one, he conflated the
question of the meaning of the concept “true” with that of the operative or criterial
conditions of truth itself; and, for another, he constructed a blunderbuss conception of
truth deemed to range univocally over (both) circumstances open to confirmation and
disconfirmation and circumstances in what confirmation was in principle impossible.
Here, Dewey, always sympathetic with James’s cause but too careful to slip into James’s
grosser mistakes himself, fails to draw sufficient or sufficiently precise attention to
these difficulties and their potentially unfortunate implications for pragmatism’s long-
term prospects (see, for example, LW 15:19–26). One may see here the ambivalent
advantage of Dewey’s substitute notion, “warranted assertability.”

The important point of all this, viewed in the setting of philosophy after prag-
matism’s second phase (that is, the turn into the new century) – at a time when the
movement seems bound to collide with the opposed claims and discipline of analytic
philosophy and seems bound to discover that it must prepare itself for a larger
Eurocentric and global contest – is simply that we glimpse some of the special strengths
of the classic phase of pragmatism itself. For, if you follow the specimen arguments just
reviewed, you must see: (a) that conceptual and semantic issues cannot be disjoined
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from epistemology and metaphysics (and more); and (b) that “truth” and “meaning”
can be effectively defined, without reproducing the fiasco of positivist views of
meaning or analytic trivializations of the concept of truth (see Davidson 1986, 1996),
provided we are prepared to acknowledge the deep informality of all such inquiries
and their dependence on the flux of social and practical life. These concessions
may seem to be very small gains. But they are remarkably telling when linked – in a
way not readily accessible to analytic philosophy – to the naturalistic advantages
of Hegelian thought and Darwinian economies. That strategy favors, for instance, a
naturalism that is neither reductive nor eliminative; the avoidance of dualism and
cognitive privilege of every kind; the evolutionary continuity between animals and
humans; the rejection of any principled disjunction between theoretical and practical
reason; the inherent informality of philosophy itself; the inseparability of fact and
value; the denial of teleologism and fixed or final values; the historicity of all our
conceptual distinctions; the flux of experience and of the experienced world; the
unavoidability of consensual forms of rationality; and a basic trust in the exercise of
human freedom bound only by its own sense of rational prudence. It needs to be
remembered that these themes have somewhat different careers in Peirce’s and
Dewey’s accounts.

IV

It may be reasonably argued that instrumentalism is, in effect, Dewey’s intended
unification of the entire philosophical history of pragmatism incorporating the master
themes just mentioned. Its principal foci are probably these: a somewhat inexplicit
(but palpably) Darwinian and Hegelian reading of naturalism; an emphasis on a blend
of Peircean and Jamesian readings of the concepts of meaning and truth inclined to
favor the corrections already bruited here in accord with Dewey’s penchant for the
would-be rigors of “scientific method”; and the unconditional rejection of final goals
or values in moral and political life congruent with pragmatism’s other features. But
even this is not as crisp as we might wish.

Perhaps the single most compendious definition of Dewey’s instrumentalism
comes to this: he features as his principal organizing intuition what he calls “an
indeterminate situation” (LW 12:108–9), which expresses his Darwinian sense of
the continuity between precognitive and cognitive animal sources of survival, from
which the rigors of science itself emerge (though in sui generis ways), yield construct-
ive and provisional forms of realism (without fixity or privilege), and which, rightly
grasped, are themselves finally grounded in a pragmatist rendering of reflexive experi-
ence suggestively close to the governing conception of Hegel’s Phenomenology (never
explicitly drawn upon, however). In this sense, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938)
may well be the keystone text of Dewey’s final overview. It is an attempt, of course,
to reinterpret the whole of logic instrumentally – from the “indeterminate situation”
up to the sciences themselves – heroically unsuccessful in its detailed reading of formal
logic but holistically impressive in the sense it provides of the sheer instrumentality of
logic and reason themselves (see Thayer 1980; Burke 1984; Sleeper 1986; Shook
INTRODUCTION: PRAGMATISM, RETROSPECTIVE, AND PROSPECTIVE

The reason for emphasizing the retrospective recovery of these master features of the classic phase of pragmatism is partly a matter of accuracy: but, more than that, it serves to assure us that the classic phase had already fashioned, quite unknowingly, an outlook on the prospective life of American philosophy (possibly, of the whole of Eurocentric philosophy) that neither analytic nor Continental practitioners could convincingly match. That pragmatism would itself be revived in the extraordinary way it was – and, withal, in a way that obliged the movement to come to terms with the distinctive challenges of both analytic and Continental philosophy – is itself little short of a miracle. For it drew to the attention of pragmatism’s champions (often indifferent, toward the end of the classic period, to the best work of other movements) the need to strike out afresh along exploratory lines that were never central to its own early work.

Broadly speaking, the nerve of all philosophical contests at the start of the twenty-first century lies with the prospects and adequacy of a naturalism close to the pragmatist conception. It may be divided into two sorts of confrontation: against the strongest forms of analytic philosophy, the struggle pits a non-reductive (Darwinian and Hegelian) naturalism against the scientific forms of reductionism and eliminativism (see Margolis 2002, 2003); against the strongest currents of Continental philosophy (Kantian transcendentalism, Husserlian phenomenology, the Heideggerian critique of Western philosophy), the struggle pits the assurances of the adequacy of naturalistic resources against deeper Continental doubts (see, for instance, Rouse 1987 and 1996, Okrent 1988, Olafson 2001). At the present moment, both struggles are in play. But it would not be unfair to say that pragmatism’s prospects are easily the equal (prima facie) of the principal programs of its natural opponents. The most salient concerns of the opening of our century may well oblige us to explore the fuller implications of historicity and pluralism and relativism in the setting of a globalized form of life. These demonstrations remain to be supplied. But, without such an enlargement, pragmatism will surely lose the advantage of its own revival.

References and further reading


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Part I

Major Figures
Charles Sanders Peirce was born into advantageous circumstances on September 10, 1839 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to Benjamin and Sarah Hunt (Mills) Peirce; but, on April 19, 1914, near Milford, Pennsylvania, he died in poverty and isolation. He graduated from Harvard College in 1859, the year in which Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* was published. His father was one of the foremost mathematicians in the United States in the nineteenth century, enjoying a distinguished career as a professor at Harvard and a scientist with the US Coast and Geodetic Survey. Charles worked as a scientist with this agency for three decades, beginning in 1861. As a young man, he also held a position at the Harvard Observatory. During his lifetime, his only published book was *Photometric Researches* (1878), a scientific treatise growing out of his work in this area. Undeniably tragic in some respects, his life can hardly be counted a failure. His published writings “run to approximately twelve thousand pages,” whereas we have eighty thousand pages of his unpublished manuscripts. The latter perhaps even more than the former provide unmistakable evidence that Charles Peirce was a philosophical genius. Though he tended to make a mess of his life (incurring foolish debts, alienating generous friends, and squandering exceptional opportunities), he made much of his genius and even more of his passion to find things out. Ernest Nagel’s judgment is far from idiosyncratic: “Charles Sanders Peirce remains the most original, versatile, and comprehensive philosophical mind this country has yet produced” (cited in *W* 2:xi).

**Philosopher and Scientist**

Peirce’s philosophical contribution is of a piece with his scientific training: he not only came to philosophy from science but also pursued philosophical questions largely for the sake of articulating a normative theory of objective investigation. He did manifest an intrinsic interest in substantive philosophical questions, but methodological concerns were never far from his persistent attempts to address in a straightforward manner these substantive issues. Early in his career he gave a series of lectures on “The Logic of Science.” His lifelong concern to disclose the logic of science resulted, in the end, in a transformation of his understanding of logic. He came to envision logic as a theory of inquiry.
Peirce refused to define philosophy in opposition to science in the modern sense. In order to understand his conception of philosophy, it is necessary to consider the place of philosophy in his classification of the sciences and also simply his view of science. He drew a sharp distinction between practical and theoretical investigation. Since many theoretical sciences have evolved out of practical pursuits, the arts are hardly irrelevant to an understanding of science, especially since Peirce stresses the importance of the history of the sciences for a comprehension of their nature (see *EP* 2:38). But *theoria* has transcended its origin, such that a large number of purely theoretical investigations have emerged in their own right. The vitality of these investigations crucially depends on pursuing them for their own sake, apart from any concern with what practical benefits might accrue to theoretical discoveries. Philosophical investigation was, in Peirce’s judgment, a theoretical science, though one disfigured almost beyond recognition by too intimate an association with seminary-trained philosophers (*CP* 1.620, 6.3).

Taken together, Peirce classified the distinct branches of philosophical inquiry as one of the three broadest divisions of theoretical knowledge. He located philosophy between mathematics, the rubric under which he subsumed the most abstract branches of theoretical inquiry, and (using a term borrowed from Jeremy Bentham) idioscopy, the least abstract ones (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology). He supposed, like all other sciences, the branches of philosophy drew upon mathematics for important principles and conceptions, not the least of these pertaining to relationships of an exceeding abstract character. He also supposed that less abstract sciences such as physics and psychology drew upon not only mathematics but also philosophy for some of their most basic principles and conceptions. In this threefold classification of theoretical science, he was indebted to Auguste Comte’s principle of classification (“one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other” (*CP* 1.180)). A thoroughly naturalistic account of scientific intelligence, however, undergirds this formal classification of the theoretical sciences. Moreover, a historical sensitivity informed Peirce’s numerous attempts to offer a detailed classification of our scientific pursuits.

Scientific Intelligence and Theoretical Knowledge

Peirce took science to be “a living thing” (*CP* 1.234; cf. 1.232), preoccupied with “conjectures, which are either getting framed or getting tested” (*CP* 1.234). It is nothing less than a mode of life: more fully, “a mode of life whose single animating purpose is to find out the real truth, which pursues this purpose by a well-considered method, founded on thorough acquaintance with such scientific results already ascertained by others as may be available, and which seeks cooperation in the hope that the truth may be found” (*CP* 7.55).

Peirce stressed repeatedly that scientific inquiry is essentially a communal endeavor. Reliance on others is here a necessity. The appeal to the observations and assessments of others is constitutive of science, at least in Peirce’s sense, a sense he took to be faithful to what the successful practices of experimental inquiry manifest about themselves in their actual development. Peirce’s definition of reality (see *Scientific
Realism, Antirealism, and Empiricism) as what the community of inquirers would discover, given adequate resources and time, reflected his training as a scientist. His antipathy to much of modern philosophy was a reaction to the prevalent tendency of inquirers during this epoch to exhibit “an absurd disregard for other’s opinions” (W 2:313). His identification with modern science was of a piece with his commitment to communal inquiry.

The passionate pursuit of theoretical knowledge was, for Peirce, intrinsically worthwhile and intelligible. In one sense, he traced the origin of our knowledge to our instincts, in another, simply to the dynamic conjunction of human intelligence and cosmic intelligibility. He supposed, “all that science has done [far] is to study those relations . . . brought into prominence [by] . . . two instincts – the instinct of feeding, which brought with it elementary knowledge of mechanical forces, space, etc., and the instinct of breeding, which brought with it elementary knowledge of psychical motives, of time, etc.” (CP 1.118; cf. 5.591). In general, he was convinced that humans are able to divine something of the principles of nature because they have evolved as part of nature and, therefore, under the influence of these principles (CP 7.46). Humans partake of the world they know: the ways of the cosmos are not utterly foreign to the propensities of our minds, otherwise they would be forever unknown and we long since extinct (see, e.g., CP 7.38). “Our faculty of guessing,” Peirce contended, “corresponds to a bird’s musical and aeronautic powers; that is, it is to us, as those are to them, the loftiest of our merely instinctive powers” (CP 7.48) or inherited dispositions. Here is a robust affirmation of biological continuity without any reductive implications. For, whatever its origin, countless individuals throughout human history have been animated by, above all else, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The intelligence of human beings and the intelligibility of their circumambient world are, in another sense, sufficient to explain why we inquire (CP 2.13). The lure of intelligibility proves to be irresistible to an intelligence disposed simply to wonder why, say, an event occurred or our expectations were contravened (CP 7.189). At least some humans conduct investigations simply to find out whatever truth might be discovered by a painstaking, persistent, and systematic inquiry. Aristotle was one such person, Peirce another.

It may not be oxymoronic to speak of instinctual intelligence, if only to facilitate a contrast with scientific intelligence. The ingenuity and, in a sense, intelligence with which bees, by means of instinctual complex movements, indicate the direction and distance of honey – or beavers by means of intricate actions construct a dam – are too obvious to deny. The dispositions by which these feats are performed appear to be largely innate or instinctual. At least something akin to intelligence appears to be operative in the accomplishment of such complex tasks, securing some obvious advantage.

Human intelligence is, however, predominantly scientific intelligence in its most rudimentary form; for it is “an intelligence capable of learning by experience” (CP 2.227). In accord with Peirce’s own principle of continuity, we should not suppose that there is an absolutely sharp dichotomy between instinctual and scientific (or experiential) intelligence, for (as we have already seen) our very capacity to learn from experience attests to the beneficial operation of instinctual tendencies. Scientific intelligence is rooted in our instinctual drives. Our capacity to learn from experience is
closely connected with our capacity to subject our conceptions, assertions, and inferences to criticism. Peirce proposed that “‘rational’ means self-criticizing, self-controlling and self-controlled, and therefore open to incessant question” (CP 7.77; cf. 5.440). In light of this definition, it is clear that scientific and rational intelligence, though apparently different in meaning, inescapably overlap in fact; for we can most effectively learn from experience only by an ongoing process of complex interrogation in which our suppositions, conceptions, claims, and conclusions are all subjected to self-criticism. Peirce was aware of “man’s stupendous power of shutting his eyes to plain facts” (1975–7, vol. 2, p. 99), but he was confident in the force majeure of human experience: “Experience may be defined as the sum of ideas [beliefs] which have been irresistibly borne in upon us, overwhelming all free-play of thought, by the tenor of our lives. The authority of experience consists in the fact that its power cannot be resisted; it is a flood against which nothing can stand” (CP 7.437; cf. 5.50).

The pursuit of theoretical knowledge entails the cultivation of scientific intelligence and, in turn, the cultivation of such intelligence is also the cultivation of instinctual intelligence in its distinctively human form (for what human instincts facilitate above all else is the acquisition of habits other than the ones with which we were born). Human rationality is, in the first instance, “an Unmatured Instinctive Mind.” As such, phylogeny is merely ancillary to ontogeny: the history of the species is, in effect, taken up into that of the individual and, as the inheritor also of vast cultural resources, the individual becomes a self-determining and, to some extent, even a self-defining agent (see, e.g., CP 5.533, 1.591). The instinctual mind of human beings requires a development beyond that of the evolutionary history in which it took shape and proved itself viable; the “prolonged childhood” of human beings proves as much, as does the “childlike character” of the instinctual mind itself. In humans and to some extent perhaps also in other species (ones especially adapted to learning from experience), “Instinct is a weak, uncertain Instinct.” This allows it to be “infinitely plastic”; and this underwrites alterability and hence the possibility of intellectual growth (growth in intelligence, the capacity to learn ever more effectively from experience). “Uncertain tendencies, unstable states of equilibrium are conditions sine qua non for the manifestation of Mind” (CP 7.381). The general disposition to acquire novel dispositions entails a plasticity itself entailing a susceptibility to disequilibria. Doubt is one name for the instability into which an agent is thrown when the dispositions of that agent prove ineffective in a given situation; for doubt is at bottom the arrest, or disruption, of a belief or habit.

Philosophy Within the Limits of Experience Alone

Despite his indebtedness to Kant, Peirce did not make theoretical philosophy into an essentially critical discipline charged with the task of defining the intrinsic limits of human knowledge. Like Kant, he did insist that the limits of experience define the limits of knowledge (“all our knowledge is, and forever must be, relative to human experience and to the nature of the human mind” (CP 6.95)), but he conceived experience in such a way as to be capable of aiding us in discovering to some degree the way things are (not simply the way they appear to us). He refused to sever appearance
from reality, and also our experience of things from their status and properties apart from our experience. If we rigorously adhere to experience, not granting that things completely separable from our experience are even conceivable, we are forced to jettison Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself: “The Ding an sich . . . can neither be indicated nor found [in any possible experience]. Consequently no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all references to it must be thrown out as meaninglessness surplusage” (CP 5.525). Whereas Kant maintained that things in themselves are conceivable but unknowable (since we are able to think them without contradiction but not able to know them by recourse to any experience), Peirce argued they were incognizable, meaning that they are not even conceivable (see, e.g., CP 5.255). Given that “all our conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experience” (CP 5.255; also W 2:208), their significance is totally bound up with the junction of such judgments.

Peirce held that the limits of experience define not only those of knowledge but also those of meaning itself: human beings are so completely hemmed in by the bounds of their possible practical experience, their minds are so restricted to being instruments of their needs and desires, they cannot in the least mean anything transcending those bounds (CP 5.536). Our experience of ourselves and of even our most adequate theories attests to a cosmos far outstripping our comprehension: “The experience of ignorance, or of error, which we have, and which we gain by correcting our errors, or enlarging our knowledge, does enable us to experience and [thereby] conceive something which is independent of our own limited views” (CP 7.345). “Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory” (CP 5.527; also W 2:208). Peirce concluded that being and cognizability are synonymous (CP 5.257; also W 2:208): whatever else we might mean by being, we must mean that which in some manner and measure is, in principle, accessible to our minds via our experience. He went so far as to affirm, in the colloquial (not Kantian) sense: “we have direct experience of things in themselves. Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas” (CP 6.95). However superficial, fragmentary, and even distorted is the knowledge based on such experience, it cannot be gainsaid: what we have experimentally derived from our encounters with reality warrants the title of knowledge.

Though emphatically a fallibilist, Peirce was hardly a skeptic. Indeed, he took his commitment to the doctrine of fallibilism (namely, “the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims . . . in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy” (CP 1.171)) to be inseparable from his faith in the reality of knowledge. He stressed, “only a deep sense that one is miserably ignorant . . . can spur one on in the toilsome path of learning” (CP 5.583). Further, he claimed, “no blight can so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness” (CP 1.13). Yet Peirce had at once a “high faith” in knowledge and an acute sense of fallibility. He took our knowledge to be nothing more than a fabric of conjectures, based on a patchwork of experience, but he insisted that even in this form it is highly valuable. He took the pursuit of knowledge, in his own case at least, to be nothing less than an act of worship (CP 8.136 n.3).

Peirce’s philosophical interests were both methodological and substantive; they were shaped by his scientific training and work. He reported: “I came to philosophy not for
its teaching about God, Freedom, and Immortality, but intensely curious about Cosmology and Psychology” (CP 4.2). His curiosity about the cosmos tended to outstrip that about the psyche, though he did outline a theory of consciousness, mind, and self. Peirce went so far as to describe his philosophy as “the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers” (CP 1.7).

He worked tirelessly to transform philosophy into such a scientific inquiry and, hence, a communal undertaking, insisting: “We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers” (CP 5.265). In a letter to William James (see James), he proclaimed, “philosophy is either a science or is balderdash” (Perry 1935, vol. 2, p. 438). The task of the philosopher is to join all those who are devoted to discovering whatever truth about the world might be derived from our experience of the world. In this endeavor, philosophers are distinguished from other scientists by relying solely on ordinary experience. The field of their observations does not require instruments such as telescopes or microscopes, travel to faraway places, or even much special training, but is that provided by the everyday encounters with environing affairs to virtually every normal person during every waking hour of that person’s life.

Peirce supposed: “We naturally make all our distinctions too absolute” (CP 7.438). The tendency to sunder humans from other animals (CP 5.534), self from other (CP 7.571), mind from matter, the conscious regions of mind from its unconscious depths, perception from abduction (the process by which hypotheses are generated), and appearance from reality would be examples of this tendency. In opposition to the marked dualistic tendency so prominent in traditional Western philosophy, Peirce championed synechism (see Not Cynicism, But Synechism: Lessons From Classical Pragmatism), a doctrine disposing him to search for the respects in which things are continuous (see, e.g., CP 6.169). In an insightful and suggestive study, Parker (1998) argues that the principle of continuity is itself the thread by which Peirce wove together apparently disparate doctrines into a coherent system. Though Peirce accorded (under the rubric of secondness) great importance to opposition, otherness, disruption, and a host of allied phenomena, he stressed (as instances of thirdness) continuity, mediation, intelligibility, and other kindred phenomena. His doctrine of the categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness was crafted as a way of dealing with any imaginable reality. The category of firstness highlighted the qualitative immediacy characteristic of anything whatsoever (what anything is, in itself, apart from all else), while that of secondness underscored brute opposition, irreducible alterity, and that of thirdness the network of connections in and through which any reality acquires its defining properties. Hence, his doctrine of synechism was of a piece with his emphasis on thirdness.

For an understanding of Peirce’s conception of philosophy, we must appreciate his insistence on appearance being intrinsically connected to reality: the way things appear, including the way they manifest themselves in ordinary experience, is indicative of the way things are; in turn, the reality of anything to which we can meaningfully refer is such that it possesses the capacity, in some circumstances however remote or rare, to disclose itself (cf. CP 5.313). The reality with which philosophy deals is nothing more recondite than the readily accessible objects and events of our direct
experience. (Even so, these objects and events might provide evidence for “One Incomprehensible but Personal God” (CP 5.496).) The manner in which philosophy investigates these objects and events is nothing other than that of painstaking observation, conceptual generalization, and controlled conjecture. For Peirce, this obviously meant that philosophy must abandon the pretension of being able to attain demonstrative knowledge of transcendent reality (“The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine” (CP 1.7)), contenting itself rather with conjectural knowledge of the empirical world.

This also meant strict adherence to technical terms: “if philosophy is ever to stand in the ranks of the sciences, literary elegance must be sacrificed – like the soldier’s old brilliant uniforms – to the stern requirements of efficiency” and, thus, the philosopher must be required “to coin new terms to express such new scientific conceptions as he may discover, just as his chemical and biological brethren are expected to do” (CP 5.13). Of course, ordinary language is of immense importance to the philosophical investigator. Peirce stressed, “a language is a thing to be reverenced; and I protest that a man who does not reverence a given language is not in the proper frame of mind to undertake its improvements” (MS 279). Moreover, the “case of philosophy is peculiar in that it has positive need of popular words in their popular senses – not as its own language (as it has too usually used those words), but as objects of its study” (EP 2:264–5; cf. 8.112). Painstaking attention to ordinary usage is, thus, an important part of philosophical investigation (see, however, CP 2.67, 2.70, and 2.211). But it is important mainly insofar as it facilitates a critical appeal to everyday experience.

The appeal to everyday usage is, for Peirce, bound up with an appeal to everyday experience; and the appeal to such experience provides the guidance requisite for carrying forward the work of philosophy.

Herein lies its main difference from such special sciences as physics, chemistry, and biology. In contrast to such special (or idioscopic) sciences, the distinct branches of philosophical inquiry are caenoscopic. For philosophy “contents itself with so much of experience as pours in upon every man during every hour of his waking life” (CP 5.13 n.1; cf. 1.241). “Experience,” Peirce asserted, “may be defined as the sum of ideas [beliefs] which have been irresistibly borne in upon us, overwhelming all free-play of thought, by the tenor of our lives. The authority of experience consists in the fact that its power cannot be resisted; it is a flood against which nothing can stand” (CP 7.437; cf. 5.50).

Since the observations afforded by such experience are common to virtually all humans, without the benefit of special training or instruments, Peirce appropriated Jeremy Bentham’s term caenoscopic to designate the disciplines contenting themselves with such observations. He was aware that he was using experience “in a much broader sense than it carries in the special sciences”: for in them it is set in contrast to interpretation, whereas for philosophy “experience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes interpretations quite as truly as matters of sense” (CP 7.538). In other contexts, he acknowledges that what counts in science as observation cannot be severed from ratiocination and, thus, presumably from interpretation (see, e.g., CP 1.34–5). Even so, the experience to which we appeal in philosophy is not the observations consequent upon controlled circumstances or obtainable solely by special means; it is, rather, what the course of life forces upon us willy-nilly (CP 7.391, 1.426).
Armed with an interior understanding of scientific inquiry, Peirce offered a normative account of objective investigation. His pragmatism was central to this account. It grew out of conversations in the Metaphysical Club (an informal group involving Chauncey Wright, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, and a handful of others) and was formulated, though not named as such, in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). He originally conceived this essay as part of a series entitled “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” though eventually envisioned it as part of his 1893 “Search for a Method.” Despite his deep, multifaceted opposition to Descartes (see Peirce and Cartesian Rationalism), the full title to one of his predecessor’s main works can be borrowed to identify an overarching goal of Peirce’s philosophical project: Discourse on the method for rightly conducting one’s reason and for seeking truth in the sciences. “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” are important articulations of Peirce’s discourse on method, even though he came to be critical of some aspects of these essays. In the former, he defines the method of science in contrast to three other ways of fixing belief; in the latter, he enunciates a maxim by which anyone adhering to the method of science can render clearer the ideas (or signs) on which investigations turn.

A conception of intelligence underlies Peirce’s pragmatism. He maintained, “one, at least, of the functions of intelligence is to adapt conduct to circumstances, so as to subserve desire” (CP 5.548). Of course, such adaptation might involve modification of circumstances; hence, it does not mean conformity to the world simply as it happens to be: adapting conduct to circumstances might mean altering them in accord with desire. The function of intelligence drives toward the recognition of facts and the discovery of laws, but with equal force it drives toward the modification of virtually whatever in the course of experience proves to be malleable. This includes intelligence itself. Peirce was convinced “intelligence does not consist in feeling in a certain way, but in acting in a certain way” (CP 6.286). Action must not be limited to physical exertions in the outward world of actuality but must be stretched to include inward actions, imagined endeavors taking place solely in the inward world of fancy (CP 6.286; cf. 5.496). Humans are far from the only animals exhibiting intelligence, though the crucial role of imaginary action and (closely allied to this) the effects of symbolization make of human intelligence something quite unique. Human intelligence is a biologically evolved function encompassing a vast array of instinctual tendencies, almost all of which bear upon action broadly conceived. Most of these tendencies are directed not to outward bodily motions but rather to inward imaginary actions, their “theatre” being “the plastic inner world” of human fancy (MS 318, 44). The products of these actions are symbols by which the scope of imagination is dramatically expanded. But “it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow, Omne symbolum de symbolo” (CP 2.302). Thus, the imaginary operations by which novel symbols are generated must already involve symbols or, at least, proto-symbols. The image serving as a sign of one’s dead ancestor or as a sign of the distant place from which one has just returned qualifies to serve this role. By this means, the absent structures thought and informs action. Just as our intelligence is instinctively imaginative, so our imagination is irrepressibly symbolic.
The conduct of inquiry involves, for Peirce, the struggle to overcome doubt and, in the context of this struggle, the need to clarify the meanings of our terms.

Our intelligence is linked as intimately to action as to imagination. Peirce noted, “the greater part of intelligent actions are directed toward causing the cessation of some irritation” (CP 6.282). These irritations are often simply somatic (e.g., hunger). But an important type of irritation is, however, bound up with bodily dissatisfaction (see, e.g., CP 5.372), of a somewhat different character, for it directly concerns the arrest of intelligence. This type of irritation signals nothing less than the failure of intelligence; it goads the organism to regain its equilibrium, by acting (either outwardly or imaginatively) in such a way as to establish an effective response to this irritant and all analogous ones. This means establishing a *general* way of acting (in a word, a habit). Whatever else our beliefs might be, they are such habits of action. This is, indeed, mainly what they are. Doubt is, in its least eviscerated sense, hesitancy in action signaling the dissolution of belief. Whereas habits are states tending toward their own perpetuation, doubts are ones driving toward their own cessation (CP 5.372; also W 3:247). “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief” (CP 5.374; also W 3:247), a struggle Peirce called *inquiry*.

Efforts to overcome doubt and attain a state of belief may take a variety of forms. By the method of tenacity, we cling tenaciously to any belief threatened by doubt, aggressively excluding from consideration any factor counting against this belief. This purely individual manner of fixing (or securing) belief, however, cannot sustain itself in practice; for the “social impulse is against it” (CP 5.378; also W 3:250). The testimony of others can have the power to convince a person he or she is insane (CP 5.233; also W 2:202), such is the strength of this impulse. Of more immediate relevance, Peirce claimed: “No matter how strong and well-rooted in habit any rational convictions of ours may be, we no sooner find that another equally well-informed person doubts it, than we begin to doubt it ourselves” (CP 2.160). The anger we so often feel toward those who induce us to doubt such convictions is a sign of our susceptibility to the authority of others (ibid.). What others believe cannot but influence what we ourselves believe, not least of all because their contrary beliefs have the capacity to generate genuine doubt; such is the potential strength of the social impulse in human beings (CP 5.378). Accordingly, we need a communal way of fixing beliefs. The method of authority provides just this. This method consists in instituting an authority with the power to establish – and enforce – what everyone within the jurisdiction of this authority must believe. But this method, too, cannot sustain itself in practice; for in the most priest-ridden or police-controlled states (CP 5.381; also W 3:251), there will always be some persons who, prompted (again) by the social impulse instinctive to human beings, cannot help supposing that the differing beliefs of those from different cultures or ages may, in principle, be true (i.e., worthy of espousal). A finite, fixed authority is insufficiently communal; nothing less than an infinite, evolving community can offer the epistemic authority needed to fix beliefs, at least for social beings such as human inquirers always are.

In contesting the brutality of external authority, it seems natural to turn toward the deliverances of an internal authority with which rational inquirers are inclined to identify themselves (e.g., the *cogito*). To accept these deliverances entails no violation of one’s nature; much rather, it means accepting whatever proves to be agreeable to
one’s own reason, i.e., one’s own innermost self. Whereas the institutional authority of the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages provided Peirce with his paradigm of the method of authority, he saw in Descartes’ appeal to the apodictic certainties of his own individual rationality a historical example of this third method (the a priori method). But, “what if our internal authority should meet the same fate, in the history of opinions, as that external authority has met?” (CP 5.215). Peirce was convinced that, in his own day, the signs of individual consciousness having suffered this fate were discernible (CP 5.383). For it “makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste . . . is always more or less a matter of fashion” (ibid.). Hence, rather than eliminating the “accidental and capricious element” in the process of fixing beliefs, it has enthroned this element as sovereign. In this and other respects, the method of apriority “does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority” (CP 5.383).

In order for us as embodied, social agents to overcome doubt, we need a communal method grounded in the hypothesis that there are real things to which experiential appeals can be made in the ongoing course of genuine investigation. “Such is the method of science” (CP 5.384). “This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way” (CP 5.385). This distinction is, for example, collapsed by the method of authority, since the dicta of instituted authority are, by definition, true: there can, in principle, be no distinction between what it dictates and what is so. This implies that self-criticism and, thus, self-correction are precluded. To institute a communal method for fixing beliefs committed to the realistic hypothesis means, in contrast, that even the most securely established beliefs of any finite community at any actual stage of its ongoing history are open to revision: what the members of such a community hold and what reality holds can never be identified, except provisionally. The possibility of detecting and correcting errors requires the hypothesis that the properties of things may, in principle, be other than those ascribed to them by us. We require a general method within which it is always apposite to distinguish between our specific strategies of inquiry and the most reliable procedures (between “a right and a wrong way” or between our way and a better one). The method of science alone secures this distinction.

Clarifying Meaning

In connection with his doubt-belief theory of inquiry, Peirce formulated a heuristic maxim designed to help scientific inquirers clarify the meaning of certain ideas pivotal to objective inquiry. He stressed: “I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call ‘intellectual concepts,’ ” such concepts being “those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge” (CP 5.467). He took his pragmatism to be neither a theory of truth nor even a theory of meaning (for his account of meaning, the student of Peirce must look to his general theory of signs and, in particular, his extensive discussions of the interpretants of signs), but only a maxim by which inquirers can become clearer about the meanings of the terms used in their endeavors to discover truths pertaining to facts and especially laws. He stressed it has nothing to do with the qualities of
feelings except insofar as these are indicative of the properties of things; in other words, it has nothing to do with feelings in themselves but only as signs, as subjective determinations bearing upon objective affairs. The hardness of an object can of course be felt, but the meaning of this predicate concerns not the qualitative immediacy of feeling but its implied bearing on conduct. It concerns how objects under this description would act on things other than themselves. What is true of predicates like hardness here is true of all other “intellectual concepts”: they “essentially carry some implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more too, than, any existential fact, namely, the ‘would-acts,’ ‘would-dos’ of habitual behavior” (CP 5.467). To say that an object is hard is, thus, to imply something about how it would act; what we mean by this term is, at least in context of inquiry, inseparable from such implications. Peirce went so far as to assert that, according to his pragmatism, “the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept is contained in the affirmation that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind ... the subject of the predication would behave in a certain general way” (CP 5.467).

The First Grade of Clearness: tacit familiarity

In order to make our ideas clear, some kind of translation of signs is necessary (CP 5.427). But this presupposes an intimate familiarity with signs derived from our ability to utter and interpret them effectively in countless situations. At the most rudimentary level, for example, we might know how properly to use the term real, without being able to define it abstractly. This minimal level of semiotic competency is of no trifling importance; all higher levels presuppose the tacit familiarity of human agents with countless types of sign-use.

The Second Grade of Clearness: abstract definition

For the sake of clarity, however, it is often helpful to translate this tacit familiarity into an explicit definition, often of an abstract character. Returning to our example, by probing the difference between the real and the fictive, we may (following Peirce himself) arrive at this definition: the real is that whose status and properties are independent of what anybody may take them to be, sufficiently independent to secure the possibility of anybody being mistaken.

The Third Grade of Clearness: pragmatic clarification

But “we must be on our guard against the deceptions of abstract definitions” (CP 7.362). More generally, Peirce thought that the conceptual clarification achieved by means of abstract definitions was inadequate for the purposes of experimental inquiry. Simply translating a concept into other concepts is insufficient; ultimately translating concepts into habits of conduct is requisite. Such is the main import of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (CP 5.402). The pragmatic clarification of reality pushes beyond the abstract definition of this term, by identifying the effects...
implied in ascribing this property to anything. “The only effect which real things have is to cause belief” (CP 5.406; also W 3:271) or to contribute to the formation of belief principally by the capacity of reality to generate doubt (to challenge presently fixed belief) and to provide the means for overcoming doubt (to fix provisionally superior beliefs).

Doubt, inquiry conceived as the struggle to overcome doubt, and the recovery of belief as the immanent goal of any genuine inquiry, are the marks by which inquirers experientially know and pragmatically define the real. The real is that to which the community of inquirers would be led by the course of experience, if only this experience were of sufficient duration and these inquirers were truly animated by a love of truth and, hence, effectively oriented by the results of self-criticism. The “very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a community, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge” (CP 5.311; also W 2:239; cf. CP 5.354, 2.645). The conceivable practical effects implied in the predicate “real” are ones pertaining directly to belief, doubt, and inquiry.

In this connection, practical is thus not to be understood in any narrow sense, especially one set in sharp contrast to theoretical. Peirce did not subordinate theory to practice but rather insisted upon seeing theory itself as a mode of practice quite distinct from other modes. The “practical” bearings to which his pragmatic maxim refers are, thus, ones pertaining to the conduct of inquirers qua inquirers. In a letter to the British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller, Peirce is explicit about how he understood the term practical: By it, “I mean apt to affect conduct; and by conduct, voluntary action that is self-controlled, i.e., controlled by adequate deliberation” (CP 8.322). Those effects having “conceivable practical bearings” are, hence, ones apt to affect the comportment of theoretical inquirers in this distinctive role.

The Theory of Signs

Peirce identified himself as a logician more often than as a physicist; and his conception of logic encompassed a general theory of signs, in order to offer an adequate account of inquiry. He was convinced that “the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols” (CP 2.220). Three convictions especially guided Peirce’s investigation of signs. First, he was convinced that “thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue” (CP 4.6), ordinarily between different phases of the ego (e.g., the critical self of a later moment calling into question the supposition guiding the conjectural self of just a moment before). Signs are thus the indispensable media of not only interpersonal but also reflexive communication: they are instruments as much of thought as of conversation, since thought itself is, as Plato noted, an inner conversation or “a silent speech of the soul with itself” (W 2:172). If this dialogical conception of thinking is accepted, “immense consequences follow” (EP 2:172). Peirce devoted care to tracing out these consequences of this position, one he identified as tuism (the “doctrine that all thought is addressed to a second person, or to one’s future self as to a second person” (W 1:xxix)). His theory of science no less than his account of the self reveals as much.
Second, he was convinced that thought could not be severed from its modes of expression. Of course, a thought expressed in one way almost always can be expressed in other ways, though not infrequently this results in a depletion or distortion of meaning. But Peirce rejected the supposition that thought is something apart from its possibility of expression or articulation. The particular signs used on any actual occasion are not themselves the thought; at least they cannot be unqualifiedly identified with the thought being expressed: “Oh, no; no whit more than the skins of an onion are the onion. (And about as much so, however.)” It was evident to Peirce that: “One selfsame thought may be carried upon the vehicle of English, German, Greek, or Gaelic; in diagrams, or in equations, or in graphs: all these are but so many skins of the onion, its inessential accidents” (CP 4.6). No less manifest was that anything properly designated as “thought should have some possible expression for some possible interpreter.” He took this possibility to be “the very being of its being” (CP 4.6). Hence, he insisted, “all that we know of thought is but a reflection on what we know of its expression” (CP 2.466 n.1). The logician in the narrow sense of a critic of the forms of reasoning, hence, must be a logician in the broader or semiotic sense of a student of signs in general (including of course linguistic signs).

Third, Peirce was convinced that at least “every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech” (CP 2.222). Neither consciousness nor mind endows signs with life; rather, the actions of signs are themselves signs of vitality, however rudimentary. Peirce was aware that such a claim is likely to strike many people as “stark madness, or mysticism, or something equally devoid of reason and good sense” (MS 290, 58). But he supposed a blindness rooted in something close to perversity prompted such a judgment (see, e.g., CP 1.349). The “great truth of the immanent power” of living signs was one championed by Peirce.

The signs with which we are most directly and intimately familiar are ones closely associated with consciousness or, at least, mind (Peirce emphatically refused to identify mind with consciousness, since he was convinced that most of our mental processes are unconscious). This inclines us to suppose that there is an essential connection between semiosis and mind: the interpretive acts of a mental agent or mindful being are often supposed by us to constitute the sole source of significance. Apart from these acts, allegedly nothing would count as a sign. To Ludwig Wittgenstein’s question (“Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?”), the answer appears to be some interpreter; and mind is that which equips any being with the capacity to fulfill this function. Peirce was, however, opposed to this mentalist account of signs, putting forth alternatively a semiotic account of mind: the interpretive acts of a mental agent or mindful being are often supposed by us to constitute the sole source of significance. Apart from these acts, allegedly nothing would count as a sign. To Ludwig Wittgenstein’s question ("Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?"), the answer appears to be some interpreter: and mind is that which equips any being with the capacity to fulfill this function. Peirce was, however, opposed to this mentalist account of signs, putting forth alternatively a semiotic account of mind. Mind is here not so much a principle of explanation as a phenomenon calling for explanation. There is hardly any question that the human mind is (in Susanne Langer’s telling expression) symbolific; this mind is adapted not only to acquire diverse modes of symbolization but also to craft new symbols from its inheritance. We are symbol-making as well as sign-using animals. The key to mind is the use of signs, whereas that to the distinctive character of the human mind is the capacity to use inherited signs in innovative ways and, more dramatically, to fashion novel signs. An indication of this is the role of metaphor in our use of language. Rather than tracing signs to their alleged origin in mind, Peirce explained mind by its manifest reliance on signs.
Peirce’s definition of semiosis (or sign-action) is at the center of his theory of signs. Semiosis is a paradigm of his category of thirdness, for it involves an irreducibly triadic relationship. So too is an act of giving. In such an act, a giver, gift, and recipient are essentially related to another one: divestiture (the giver relinquishes possession of an object) and acquisition (the recipient acquires possession of this same object) are, in giving, not accidentally related, but rather bound together in a single act. In semiosis, an object, sign, and interpretant are likewise bound together in a single process, though not necessarily by the intention of any agent. If a person knocks on a door, the sound generated by this action is a sign of someone being there (or one soliciting the recognition of anyone on the other side). The knocker is the object, whereas the response to the sound would be the interpretant. But semiosis is, in principle, an open-ended process, for the interpretant very frequently serves as a sign generating yet another interpretant. The immediate object of semiosis is the way the object is represented by a sign or series of signs, whereas the dynamical object is whatever has determined or, at least, the capacity to determine, a sign or series of signs. The dynamic object is that which has the capacity to constrain a process of representation and, thus, to enable the recognition of misinterpretation. It is the object as potentially other than its representation.

Peirce’s categories guided his investigation of signs. This is evident in his various classifications of interpretants and also his elaborate classifications of signs, virtually all of which are explicitly based upon categorial considerations. His two most important classifications of interpretants clearly indicate this. In one, emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants are distinguished from one another. Some signs generate feelings and have no other interpretants than the emotions they generate. Other signs generate actions (e.g., the action of soldiers in response to the command “Ground arms!” issued by the officer of their troop). The actions themselves are the energetic interpretants of the sign. Still other signs are not only inherently general but also (by virtue of their generality) play a crucial role in some rational process (e.g., experimental inquiry or political deliberation). Concepts would be examples of such logical interpretants. But so too would habits. In fact, Peirce holds that only habits can serve as the ultimate logical interpretants of signs, a claim central to his reformulation of pragmatism. In another important classification of interpretants, immediate, dynamic, and final are distinguished from one another. First, there must be something inherent in any sign that renders it interpretable in a determinative way, such that something would count as a misinterpretation. The immediate interpretant of any sign is, then, its grounded interpretability; it signifies a possibility, but not an utterly abstract one. Second, there is often some actual effect generated by the action of a sign. The dynamic interpretant is any effect actually produced by a sign as such. Finally, there is the final interpretant, “the effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought” (EP 2:482). The relationship between these two classifications of interpretants is but one thorny question confronting anyone who is seriously interested in exploring the details of Peirce’s semeiotic.

Peirce also offered elaborate classifications of signs based upon the application of his categories to this field of inquiry. Let us briefly consider one of these, involving three trichotomies. First, a sign considered in itself, apart from either its object or interpretant (i.e., a sign as a first) is either a quality or event or law. This yields the trichotomy of
qualisign (a quality serving as a sign), sinsign, and legisign. Second, a sign considered in relation to its dynamical object yields Peirce’s most famous trichotomy of signs – that of icon, index, and symbol. In an icon, a sign is related to its dynamical object by virtue of some inherent similarity the sign bears to its object. A photograph of you signifies you (partly) by virtue of such a similarity. In an index, a sign is related to its dynamical object by virtue of a causal connection between the sign and its object. The weathervane signifies the direction of the wind by virtue of its object causing it to point in this direction. Hence, it is an indexical sign. But, in a certain respect, so too is a photograph, for the photographic image of anything signifies that thing by virtue of a causal connection between itself and its object. This suggests that it is best to conceive of icon, index, and symbol not as separable signs but as potentially interwoven sign functions. In a symbol, a sign is related to its dynamic object by virtue of a habitual connection, either naturally or conventionally established. A commonplace misunderstanding of the Peircean conception of symbol is to suppose that, for him, a symbol is based on a conventional relationship between symbol and symbolized. But the disposition of bees to interpret the dance of other members of their species as indicative of the direction and distance of honey would be an example of a symbol based on a habitual connection of a natural (rather than conventional) character. In this example, it is perhaps possible to discern symbolic, indexical, and even iconic functions interwoven in such a way as to produce a remarkably effective instance of semiosis. In the instances of semiosis of greatest interest to Peirce, the mutually supportive operations of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs were paramount. Third, a sign may be considered in relationship to its interpretant. Such consideration would yield the trichotomy of what (leaving aside Peirce’s for bidding terminology in this case) roughly corresponds to concepts, propositions, and arguments.

Absolute Chance, Brute Reaction, and Evolving Law

Peirce’s normative account of objective inquiry, doctrine of categories, and theory of signs are among his most important contributions to philosophical investigation. His guess at the riddle of the universe is arguably of less importance, perhaps even of dubious merit. At the center of Peirce’s cosmology are, at least, three claims. The first concerns chance, the second actuality, and the third the evolution of laws. These three claims are intimately connected to one another. First, there is Peirce’s doctrine of tychism (derived from the Greek word for chance). The cosmos is such by virtue of an evolution out of chaos. The possibility of such an evolution presupposes the objectivity of chance. Chance is not solely a function of our ignorance, such that if we knew fully enough the laws operating in nature we would be able to predict virtually every natural event; rather, it is a feature of reality. The natural world is a scene of chance occurrences: randomness is real. Second, brute actuality plays as important a role in the constitution of the universe as does objective chance. The possibility of such an evolution presupposes the objectivity of chance. Chance is not solely a function of our ignorance, such that if we knew fully enough the laws operating in nature we would be able to predict virtually every natural event; rather, it is a feature of reality. The natural world is a scene of chance occurrences: randomness is real. Second, brute actuality plays as important a role in the constitution of the universe as does objective chance. Third, the supposition of immutable laws seems to be in contradiction to the evolution of the cosmos itself. For Peirce, “philosophy requires thorough-going evolutionism or none” (CP 6.14). This means that we need to take seriously the hypothesis that the laws of nature have themselves evolved: “To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being
apprehended by the mind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational, is hardly a justified position" (CP 6.12). The laws by which we explain some phenomena are themselves phenomena and, as such, call for explanation. The only way of explaining them involves supposing a process by which they were generated; and the only condition allowing for such a process is an original condition of absolute chance virtually indistinguishable from complete nullity.

Interwoven with Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology are a number of distinctive views, three of which especially merit mention here. First, there is his doctrine of evolutionary love (CP 6.287–317). The pragmaticist “does not make the summum bonum to consist in action,” but in that process of evolution whereby existents come to embody more fully generals that are themselves becoming more harmoniously integrated (CP 5.433). “In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control” (ibid.); and the deliberate cultivation of self-control ultimately involves an uncompromising commitment to concrete reasonableness, involving the surrender of our finite selves to an infinite ideal (CP 5.356–7, 8.262). Peirce identified this with agape. The higher stages in the growth of concrete reasonableness require nothing less.

Second, habits, laws, and what Peirce calls generals are no less real than existents, actualities, and individuals. Strictly speaking, they are alone real, while existents are actual. In opposition to the nominalist, for whom only individuals are real, Peirce argued for scholastic realism, contending that an adequate account of science requires a robust affirmation of generals (principally the irreducibly general laws pervading nature). Third, this affirmation is part of his insistence on there being three modes of being (see, e.g., CP 1.21–3, 1.515, 8.305) – possibility, actuality, and reality (what might be called habituality, since the would-do of habits is the exemplar of this mode of being). Peirce’s metaphysics includes an ontology as well as cosmology, an explanation of the senses of being as well as a conjecture regarding the constitution of the universe. In addition to actuality or existence (the mode of being characteristic of individuals), there is that of might-be and would-be. The actual universe disclosed in our everyday experience is inexplicable on egoistic, nominalistic, and other often highly fashionable yet severely reductivist assumptions. Thus, alternative hypotheses must be seriously considered. This is nowhere more manifest than in Peirce’s metaphysics.

References and further reading

Works by Peirce


28

**Works by other authors**


William James was born in New York City on January 11, 1842, into a prosperous and intellectually vital family, in which philosophical conversation was part of everyday life. James’s father, Henry James, Sr., was a person with metaphysical and religious interests. A devoted follower of the mystical philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg, he published a number of books on theological topics. The James family had many distinguished friends, including Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, whose visits further enriched intellectual life in the household. James and his siblings (including his brother, the distinguished novelist Henry James, Jr.) were educated at home, and their formal training was enhanced by frequent family trips to Europe.

James began his search for a career when he was 18. Following an interest in art, he studied painting with the well-known American artist, William Hunt. He soon discovered that he did not have the aptitude that he had hoped for, and gave up his early aspirations to an artistic career. Although he did not go on to become a painter, James’s acute aesthetic sensibility is evident throughout his writings. His philosophical style is emotionally engaging and direct. He used metaphorical and pictorial language to bring home complex and subtle philosophical points, and he reached out to accommodate, as well as influence, the aesthetic and emotional sensibilities of his audiences. In 1861, James went on to study chemistry and comparative anatomy at the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard. Following that, in 1864, he entered Harvard Medical School, but his medical studies were punctuated by two breaks. In 1865, he took a year’s absence to join the distinguished Harvard biologist, Louis Agassiz, on an expedition to the Amazon, where they collected specimens for Agassiz’s zoological museum. James returned to medical school in 1866, but then took another break for health reasons and to study in Europe. He completed his medical degree in 1869, but he did not go on to practice medicine. He chose instead, in 1873, to become an instructor of anatomy and physiology at Harvard, and from there his subject matter gradually expanded. In 1875 he went on to teach psychology at Harvard, and in 1879 he began to teach philosophy. From this point until the end of his life, James achieved great eminence and popularity as a scholar, teacher, and public lecturer. He was much loved, not only for his intellectual brilliance and originality, but also for his openness of mind and generosity of spirit. James retired from teaching in 1907 and died on August 16, 1910, at the age of 68. James is one of the great intellectual
treasures of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and he is one of America’s greatest philosophers.

Chief among James’s contributions to philosophy were his metaphilosophy and pragmatic theory of meaning, theory of truth, justification of faith, theory of radical empiricism, and philosophy of religion. Along with Charles Sanders Peirce (see Peirce) and John Dewey (see Dewey), James established pragmatism as a philosophical movement, and his writings, especially Pragmatism and The Will to Believe, have had broad and deep influence in philosophy. James also stands as one of the great figures in the history of psychology. He wrote two masterpieces, The Principles of Psychology and The Varieties of Religious Experience, which are classics in the field. It testifies to James’s genius that these works are classics in philosophy as well.

James’s thinking was in part a response to the philosophical issues and positions which were being debated during his time. His attempt to find solutions to the problems that engaged his contemporaries led him into uncharted new territory. He developed proposals and hypotheses which took him far beyond the philosophical and scientific assumptions of his peers. James found the two major intellectual paradigms of his day to be deeply flawed. The first was a view which may be called “scientific rationalism” (Suckiel 1996). This was the dominant position embedded in the intellectual culture of the late nineteenth century, and is represented by contemporaries of James such as T. H. Huxley and W. K. Clifford. The scientific rationalists’ view was that rational, propositional discourse, particularly conventional scientific discourse, provided the sole legitimate route to knowledge, and that anything not amenable to scientific inquiry, or not explicable in terms of the received scientific methodology of the day, was beyond the domain of legitimate analytical concern. The second paradigm James rejected was that of the speculative metaphysical philosophy of absolute idealism (see James, Empiricism, and Absolute Idealism), advanced by a number of his contemporaries. These included his close friend and colleague at Harvard, Josiah Royce, as well as British philosophers F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, and H. H. Joachim. These philosophers posited a deterministic universe embodied in Absolute Mind, in which all facts are related by logical necessity.

The scientific rationalist and absolute idealist paradigms were profoundly different in their assumptions, methods, and aims, yet James had reason to reject them both – on metaphysical, epistemological, moral, and metaphilosophical grounds. James held that a necessary condition of the adequacy of any philosophical theory was that it be relevant to solving problems of genuine human interest, that it be capable of being used as a tool for meeting human concerns. It was on this basis that he rejected the philosophy of absolute idealism, which he found to be so abstract as to vaporize into insignificance when it came to dealing with concrete issues. James was no less critical of the scientific rationalist world-view. He held that while the scientific rationalists’ commitment to the importance of empirical evidence was admirable, their criterion of what was to count as empirical was too narrow. Thus, he rejected their position because they failed to address, or even acknowledge, the legitimacy of important humanistic, moral, religious, and metaphysical concerns.

James offered pragmatism in place of, and as a way of mediating between, these two flawed and mutually conflicting world-views. He believed that his philosophy of pragmatism, like absolute idealism, could acknowledge the legitimacy of important
metaphysical questions; while at the same time, like scientific rationalism, it could offer interpretations of these questions and their possible solutions which were sufficiently concrete to be empirically relevant and meaningful. Yet, James believed, his philosophy did not have the serious problems inherent in the views he was rejecting. He thus offered pragmatism as the sole promise for sustaining philosophy as a worthwhile and legitimate enterprise.

The Foundations of James’s Pragmatism

James developed his pragmatic philosophy on the basis of two fundamental starting points. The first was his contention that consciousness is teleological in nature: that the understanding of all mental activity and its products must include reference to the agent’s purposes and interests. The second was what may be called his “principle of experience.” Concerning his first contention, James’s teleological conception of mind was a reflection of the late nineteenth century’s enchantment with the language and concepts of Darwinian evolutionism. (The *Origin of Species* was published in 1859.) Extending the Darwinian notions of “struggle for existence,” “survival of the fittest,” and “adaptation” to meet his own philosophical purposes, James argued that the function of human cognition must be understood in terms of the human struggle for success. His pragmatic philosophy was intended to provide a transformative new perspective on human beings’ relation to the world. He believed that since concepts and beliefs are teleological constructs designed to meet human ends, the meaningfulness of beliefs, as well as their justification and truth, were determined exclusively in terms of their relevance and success in fulfilling the purposes and interests in the service of which they were formed.

James’s conception of the teleological nature of mind provided the basis for his radically revisionist positions on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion. The interests and goals of the thinking subject were included by James as necessary and important elements in the pragmatic analysis of these topics. James’s philosophy entailed that previously accepted transcendental conceptions of objectivity, truth, and reality would have to be overturned. For such conceptions assumed a neutral, interest-independent stance from which the subject’s judgments about the world could be made. They also assumed a reality which exists independently of the thinking subject and which it is the subject’s epistemic responsibility to accurately copy or otherwise adequately represent.

The second basic starting point of James’s pragmatism was his “principle of experience.” James posited as a fundamental metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological principle that “everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real” (*Works ERE*, p. 81; *Writings*, p. 279). He believed that the appeal to experience was both necessary and sufficient for explaining phenomena we seek to understand. This principle provided the basis for James’s pragmatic theory of meaning. Across the entire spectrum of his analyses of philosophical concepts, one principle prevailed: any concept or hypothesis which has no experiential implications or effects is meaningless, it is unworthy of philosophical concern. While it might at first appear that James’s theory of meaning is similar to that
of the later logical positivists, in fact it is not. For James’s conception of what constitutes a proposition’s experiential implications or effects was broader and more complex than theirs. On James’s view, a proposition’s experiential consequences are constituted, first, by the sensory experiences which would occur if the proposition were true and, second, by the effects that believing the proposition has on the life of the believer. It is James’s invocation of the effects of believing a proposition which most clearly distinguishes his pragmatic theory of meaning from that of the positivists. Beliefs about the goodness of God, for example, would be rejected as meaningless on a logical positivist criterion of meaning, because they are empirically unfalsifiable. On James’s criteria, however, beliefs about God’s goodness would be regarded as meaningful, since they have concrete consequences in the life of the believer. It may seem puzzling that James included in his theory of meaning something so personal as the consequences in the life of an individual which result from that individual holding a belief. One explanation of why James held this view is that he was departing from tradition not only in the details of his theory, but also in its subject matter. Unlike his predecessors, James was not interested in offering a theory of cognitive meaning – a theory of the intelligible content of propositions. Rather, his concern was to offer a theory of pragmatic meaning – a theory of the functional role of the individual’s beliefs in his or her life (Suckiel 1982, ch. 3).

“Experience” and Radical Empiricism

James’s doctrine of radical empiricism forms an important part of his philosophy. In Essays in Radical Empiricism, he offered an account of experience which provided the metaphysical and epistemological basis for his pragmatic theories of truth and reality. The central concept of his theory is “pure experience,” which designates the most basic ontological category. James held that pure experience was not to be understood as a single “stuff”; rather, as he stated it, “it is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not” (Works ERE, pp. 14–15; Writings, p. 179). James called his empiricism “radical” in order to differentiate it from classical empiricism. He thought that the classical empiricists’ conception of experience – constituted by atomistic sensory units – was fatally flawed. In contrast, James held that experience is a continuous stream, the elements of which have no distinct boundaries, and hence that the relations between things are as real, as directly experienced, as the things themselves. James argued that if philosophers acknowledged the continuous and flowing nature of experience, they would be able to discard the prevalent and long-standing ontological dualisms which had led them into unnecessary paradoxes and quagmires. He had in mind, in particular, the dualisms of knower and known, subjective and objective, mental and physical, and fact and value. In Essays in Radical Empiricism, James argued that these distinctions do not delineate anything ontologically basic. Rather, they are merely functional distinctions which may be made within the stream of experience – distinctions which have proven useful to human subjects as they seek to fulfill their purposes and interests.

It is true that James’s radical empiricism enabled him to avoid the serious problems to which dualistic philosophies were subject. But his gains were not without costs. For
his analysis of physical objects exclusively in terms of the experiential constructions of
the teleological subject (which itself, for James, is just a stream of experience) leaves
him open to several serious challenges. Among them are questions as to whether he
can adequately account for the concept of objective reference, whether he can justify
our belief in a common world, and whether he can account for the personal identity of
the subject in whom the teleology is instantiated.

The concept of experience played a complex and variable role in James’s philosophy.
As we have noted, in Essays in Radical Empiricism, James considered experience to be
the sole ontologically basic category, within which the merely functional distinctions
between subject and object are made. On the other hand, in The Principles of Psycho-
logy, for instance, he took “experience” to be a subjective phenomenon, apprehended
by introspection. His famous notion of the “blooming, buzzing confusion” is part of
that account (Works PP, v. 1, p. 462). Finally, there was yet another, and quite dis-

tinct, role which experience played in James’s philosophy. In The Varieties of Religious
Experience and A Pluralistic Universe, he used the concept of experience in his charac-
terization of the divine. James posited that the divine is a field of experience in which
all other fields of experience are encompassed (Works VRE, pp. 400–8; Writings,
pp. 774–82; Works PU, p. 131; Writings, p. 297). It is a most interesting question as
to whether and how it would be possible to reconcile these three radically different
conceptions of experience utilized by James.

The Will to Believe and the Justification of Faith

James’s doctrine of the will to believe has engendered controversy for over a century.
His essay, “The Will to Believe,” was first published in 1896 and then published a year
later in his book The Will to Believe and Other Essays. In “The Will to Believe,” James
placed himself firmly in the fideist tradition in philosophy, which includes thinkers
such as Tertullian and Kierkegaard. He asserted that there are occasions under which
faith, rather than evidence, is sufficient to justify belief. While fideists are typically
concerned exclusively with religious beliefs, James’s interests were broader in scope.
He argued that not only religious beliefs, but in some circumstances other kinds of
beliefs as well, may be fully justified independently of evidential support. James’s target
in “The Will to Believe” was the “principle of evidentialism.” This is the principle that
a belief may be justified only if it is supported, or to the extent to which it is supported,
by adequate evidence (Suckiel 1982, ch. 5). The principle of evidentialism has been
considered by its adherents to be a central requirement of rationality and philosophi-

cal respectability. But James disagreed. He argued that the evidentialist principle was
overly narrow and unimaginative, because it failed to take account of the broader
personal, psychological, and even epistemic functions of belief. James argued that once
these functions were spelled out, it would become apparent that the evidentialist’s
conception of reasonableness was one which trivialized the responsibilities and oppor-
tunities incurred by subjects as they formulate and sustain their beliefs.

In “The Will to Believe,” James argued that there are several kinds of cases under
which belief in advance of adequate evidence is justified. His case of the “intellectually
undecidable genuine option” is the one which has been most widely discussed (see, for
example, Miller 1899; Ayer 1968; Smith 1983; Bird 1986; Gale 1999). James defined a “genuine option” as one which is “live,” “forced,” and “momentous.” He held that an option to believe is “live” for an individual if that individual regards all of the alternatives before him or her as plausible candidates for belief. An option to believe is “forced” if the subject cannot avoid choosing between the alternatives; that is to say, in light of the consequences of the subject’s belief, withholding belief is not a real possibility. Finally, an option is “momentous” if the opportunity to choose is “unique,” the stakes are “significant,” and the decision is “irreversible” – in other words, if the subject is faced with a once-in-a-lifetime chance. In considering the justification of belief in the case of the genuine option, James meant to highlight the fact that the context in which a belief is held, as well as the desires, hopes, and goals of the believer, are relevant to that belief’s justification.

If a person is in a genuine option situation, James held, he or she is justified in holding a belief in advance of adequate evidence, but only if a further condition obtains: the option to believe must be “intellectually undecidable.” By this James meant that the subject does not have, and cannot acquire (either in principle, or in the time available) adequate evidence to support any member of the set of propositions from which he must choose to believe. James argued that the choice to believe in a divine order of existence is a prime example of an intellectually undecidable genuine option, and thus concluded that accepting religious belief on faith is justified on pragmatic grounds.

James’s defense of faith by appeal to the concept of the intellectually undecidable genuine option has generated endless discussion. But it has usually gone unnoticed that James did not restrict his justification of faith to this case alone. In “The Will to Believe,” he argued that there are two additional kinds of situations in which belief held without adequate evidence is justified on pragmatic grounds. One of these is the situation in which faith in the truth of a proposition is a causally necessary condition for that proposition’s coming to be true. For instance, a person might be able to succeed at a task only if that person holds the belief, in advance of sufficient evidence, that success will be attained. The final case James offered is one which most directly challenges evidentialism, since it is based on the acceptance of the evidentialist principle on its own terms. This is the situation in which a person’s faith in the truth of a proposition is a necessary condition for acquiring the very evidence for the proposition which the evidentialist requires. James demonstrated how this might occur in the case of religious belief. He argued that pre-evidential belief in religious propositions may be required as a condition of the subject’s recognizing the evidential relevance of experiences which support those beliefs. As he put it, “we feel . . . as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way” (Works WB, p. 31; Writings, p. 733). The more general point to which James was appealing here is one which has since been made in the context of the philosophy of science. It is that the acceptance of certain experiences as evidence already presupposes the acceptance of the theory within which those experiences are deemed to constitute evidence.

In this argument, James challenged the common philosophical distinction between internal (evidential) reasons for belief and external (pragmatic) ones. He undermined the view that internal reasons were the only reasons which count in the context of epistemic justification, and that pragmatic, external reasons were beside the point.
the case where faith is necessary for the evidence, James’s point was to show that internal and external reasons are causally inseparable: the pragmatic justification for holding a belief is constituted by the fact that one must first hold the belief in order to acquire evidence for it. Thus, the pragmatic justification for believing functions logically in the service of the evidential justification.

James also objected to evidentialism based on the broader principles of his pragmatism. His most basic objection was that the principle of evidentialism was offered as a hegemonic belief policy, leaving no room for other considerations about persons and the particular situations in which they find themselves. James held that the evidentialist conception of “epistemically reasonable” was far too narrow. He argued that it was fatuous to offer an analysis of the justification of belief in terms of an abstract subject divorced from any specific context in which that subject’s beliefs are relevant. Thus, James faulted the evidentialist for conceiving of the subject as an abstract disembodied intellect operating under no conditions of practical exigency – a one-dimensional figure in a philosophical sketchbook. According to James, what was often touted as intellectual responsibility and judiciousness on the part of the evidentialist was actually temerity borne of a misguided perspective on the function and significance of belief in the subject’s life.

James’s defense of belief on faith is expressed widely throughout his philosophy. Several other examples of this appear in two essays in *The Will to Believe*. In “Is Life Worth Living?,” for instance, James argued that there are occasions under which an individual’s belief that life is worth living is a precondition of its actually being so. In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in considering the question of whether this is a moral world, James argued that the moral character of the world depends in part on the contribution we make to it, and that this contribution in turn depends in part on our pre-evidential faith that the world is a moral one.

Theory of Truth

James’s theory of truth, developed in *Pragmatism* and *The Meaning of Truth*, constitutes the center of philosophical interest within his pragmatism. It is also one of the most highly controversial aspects of his philosophy. As was the case in response to his doctrine of the will to believe, critics of James rejected his theory of truth as an expression of irrationalism and pernicious subjectivism. While in more recent years, postmodern and neo-pragmatic philosophers have honored James as a precursor and pioneer, the fact is that the interpretations of James’s theory of truth by both his critics and defenders often have been unduly influenced by their own philosophical points of view.

James rejected both of the traditional theories of truth: the coherence and the correspondence theories. He rejected the coherence theory of truth on the grounds that it was so abstract as to be irrelevant to the activities in which human beings engage when they participate in the practice of making truth claims. Against the correspondence theory, James sought to repudiate the claim that the truth of a proposition is constituted by its agreement with, or correspondence to, a reality which exists independently of the beliefs which are held about it. For the sake of argument (and perhaps...
also as a lighthearted provocation to his adversaries). James was willing to grant the correspondence theorists’ definition of truth as “agreement with reality.” But he then went on to offer a revisionist interpretation of the meaning of the term “agreement.” He held that “agreement” did not designate a correspondence or isomorphism between a proposition believed and the independent reality to which it allegedly referred. Rather – and this is what made James’s theory so radical – it designated a property of the believer. It is the believer who agrees with reality, James held, not the proposition which is held to be true: “To ‘agree’ . . . with a reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed” (Works Prag, p. 102; Writings, p. 434; italics removed).

What both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth had in common was their use of “truth” as a transexperiential concept. James rejected these theories on the grounds that it made no sense to posit truth as a transexperiential property, that is to say, as one which exists independently of our own actual or hypothetical processes of testing and utilizing our beliefs. The meaning of the concept of truth, he argued, can only be explained pragmatically – in terms of actual or possible human practices and judgments. Perhaps James’s most important objection to both the correspondence and coherence theories, then, is that from his point of view, they shared a central and fundamental flaw: they failed to recognize that truth, at its core, is not a metaphysical category but rather a moral and epistemological one.

James held that the central condition of a belief’s being true is that it function satisfactorily in the life of the believer – that, under the appropriate conditions, it enhance the believer’s ability to satisfy his purposes and interests. James was careful to point out that at least in the context of empirical matters, beliefs cannot function satisfactorily, cannot help believers to satisfy their purposes and interests, unless those beliefs are, in his language, “verifiable.” For a belief to be verifiable, for James, meant that within a specified set of experiences, it could not be disconfirmed. James’s use of verifiability as a criterion of truth enabled him, he thought, to avoid pernicious subjectivism.

James’s explanation of truth begins with his analysis of the meaning of truth in the limited context of the life of a single individual. With this as a starting point, he went on to explain that for a belief to be true in more than a temporary and attenuated sense, it must survive progressively wider tests. Beginning from the set of beliefs that function satisfactorily for the individual over a limited period of time, James developed an idea of progressively greater degrees of truth, culminating finally in what he calls “absolute truth.” Following Peirce’s account of truth as “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate” (W 3:273; EP 1:139), James proposed a hypothetical and normative concept of absolute truth – an ideal end-point of inquiry, as achieved by a conscientious and informed community of inquirers. As he put it in Pragmatism, “the absolutely true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge” (Works Prag, pp. 106–7; Writings, p. 438).

James never reconciled what appear to be contradictory elements in his theory of truth. One particularly intransient problem concerns the place of objectivity in his theory. On the one hand, James argued that the individual’s unique purposes and
interests are relevant to determining that individual’s particular “truths.” On the other hand, he argued that absolute truth, truth in its most realized sense, is constituted by the ideal consensus of an ideal community of inquirers. It does not seem possible, however, that an ideal consensus of an ideal community of inquirers could also accommodate the unique and variable purposes and interests which, for James, contribute to determining the differing “truths” of different individuals.

James’s critics throughout the years have offered vigorous objections to his theory of truth. Some of the most trenchant criticisms came from his contemporaries, Bertrand Russell (1908), G. E. Moore (1908), and James B. Pratt (1909). Some of his critics endorsed a realist conception of truth, and objected to James’s pragmatic account of truth simply because it was anti-realist. Of course, merely rejecting a theory with which one disagrees does not constitute a refutation of it. One major difficulty with James’s theory is that in struggling to account for the objectivity required of truth-claims, he was forced to make ontological commitments which contradicted his anti-realism and abrogated his principle of experience. One of the realist concepts which James invoked was that of “virtual truth” (Works MT, pp. 56–60), by which he seems to have meant “truth existing but not discovered.” Another was his concept of “a fundamentum of circumstance surrounding object and idea” (Works MT, pp. 91–3), whose function in his theory was to constitute the basis in reality upon which true beliefs were founded. The important question for scholars is whether these seemingly realist concepts reveal a fundamental error in James’s theory of truth, or whether they may be reconfigured to fulfill the important functions for which they are required, without undermining James’s principle of experience and thus the validity of his pragmatic methodology.

Ethics

James exhibited an acute ethical sensibility throughout his philosophy – in his writings about ethics, of course, but also in his epistemology and even his metaphysics. He wrote widely on topics in normative ethics. Essays such as “What Makes a Life Significant,” “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” “The Moral Equivalent of War,” as well as Lectures 11–15 in The Varieties of Religious Experience on the topic of saintliness, have helped define his legacy. While James’s views on normative ethics are some of his most interesting and influential, he was on less stable ground when it came to his more theoretical views about the foundation of ethical value.

James wrote only one essay on ethical theory, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” In this essay he offered a humanistic and secular account of ethics, rejecting in principle any possibility of a transcendent source of value. Following the dictates of his principle of experience, his goal was to develop a purely naturalistic account of ethical value, and show how all questions regarding ethical value could be exhaustively resolved by appeal to empirical facts. Specifically, he sought to provide an account of the nature of ethical value by reference exclusively to the experience of sentient beings.

The central concept in “The Moral Philosopher” is that of “the satisfaction of demand.” While James did not always use the term “demand” in exactly the same way,
broadly speaking, by the “satisfaction of demand” he meant the fulfillment of a sentient being’s desires. The challenge James faced in “The Moral Philosopher” was to explain how ethical judgments could be justified merely on the basis of the empirical fact that sentient beings have demands. To justify his claim, James argued simply that there is no reason to think otherwise. He challenged his reader to find a criterion of ethical value which is independent of the satisfaction of demand: “Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own sole sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not. The only possible kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition of another creature who should make a demand that ran the other way” (Works WB, p. 149; Writings, p. 617).

The ethical theory James endorsed in “The Moral Philosopher” is a version of utilitarianism, but it is distinguishable from other forms of utilitarianism in important ways. First, unlike hedonistic utilitarianism, James maintained that not all demands are for pleasure or the reduction of pain, and hence that ethical value cannot be understood in exclusively hedonistic terms. Second, James held that the “satisfaction of demand” is a second-order concept. It does not by itself designate any first-order properties (such as happiness, knowledge, beauty, etc.) as intrinsically valuable. On James’s view, no matter what the nature of the demands, all other things being equal, they ought to be satisfied. It is this second-order nature of James’s concept of the satisfaction of demand that gives his ethical theory a flexibility and sensitivity to the history of changing values which is not available to those versions of utilitarianism (e.g. hedonistic or even ideal utilitarianism) which posit fixed goods. It is, of course, debatable whether the flexibility in the determination of ethical value which James’s theory accords (and of which he was so proud) is in fact a strength. For such flexibility appears to forsake the possibility of objectivity in ethical judgment. The question of objectivity in the context of a pragmatic approach to ethics would be addressed more robustly and thoroughly at a later time by John Dewey and others, and then again by late twentieth-century neo-pragmatists.

Having identified the satisfaction of demand as the basis of moral value, James went on to argue that the morally best arrangement for a plurality of individuals, each having their own demands, is one in which all competing demands are met as inclusively as possible. He offered the following principle of choice:

[T]hose ideals must be written highest which prevail at the least cost, or by whose realization the least possible number of other ideals are destroyed. . . . [T]he victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of the more inclusive side – of the side which even in the hour of triumph will to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished party’s interest lay. (Works WB, p. 155; Writings, p. 623)

James’s criterion for moral decision-making, though not fully worked out, was more subtle than earlier versions of utilitarianism (particularly Bentham’s) which held that moral judgments should be made simply by appeal to the greatest good for the greatest number. James’s theory is an advance over his predecessors in terms of acknowledging and accommodating the moral requirements of justice, for his notion of the inclusivity of the satisfaction of demand requires that the desires of all individuals who are affected by a choice are respected as fully as possible.
James’s ethical theory is not without its problems, however. Against his view that, all other things being equal, every demand ought to be satisfied, it may plausibly be argued that the fact that something is demanded is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of its being good. States of affairs may be desirable even if no one were intelligent or sensitive enough to demand them, and individuals may have demands for things or states of affairs that are not desirable, even if their undesirability remains unacknowledged (Suckiel 1982, ch. 4).

In “The Moral Philosopher,” James considered and rejected the possibility of appealing to a divine being as the foundation of ethical value. In line with the strictures set by his principle of experience, he argued that a transcendent God, existing outside human experience, must be considered otiose as a foundation of ethical value. James argued that even if a transcendent God did exist, human beings would have no reliable way of ascertaining the nature of His commands, and hence could not appeal to His authority to support their moral judgments. James did allow, however, that belief in God is significant from a psychological perspective, in that religious belief generates an intensity of moral commitment which is unavailable to those who adhere to a secular point of view. Nevertheless, in “The Moral Philosopher,” James was quite firm in his belief that the value of belief in God was exclusively psychological, and that it offered no support for the truth of theistic ethics.

By the time James published The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902, eleven years after the initial publication of “The Moral Philosopher,” his views on ethics appear to have radically changed. In contrast to the earlier work, in The Varieties of Religious Experience James did not advocate the moral acceptability of any and all demands. Rather, he supported a spiritual, and sometimes even theistic (indeed, quite Christian) ethical point of view. Particular spiritual virtues which James endorsed in The Varieties of Religious Experience included self-sacrifice, purity, “strength of soul,” asceticism, tenderness, love, equanimity, resignation, fortitude, and patience. Moreover, in contrast to “The Moral Philosopher,” James asserted that the value of these virtues derive from the broader context of our relationship to God. He argued that “we and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled” (Works VRE, p. 406; Writings, p. 780). In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James even went so far as to apply the popular metaphors of Darwinism to support his religious claims. He advocated a position which may be called “spiritual Darwinism,” namely, that success in life was to be measured by human beings’ spiritual evolution toward a progressively deeper relationship with the divine (Suckiel 1996, ch. 6).

Given James’s naturalistic ethical theory in “The Moral Philosopher,” it seems puzzling that he could have expressed such a profound ethico-religious sensibility in The Varieties of Religious Experience. While several explanations come to mind, perhaps the most plausible is that by the time he came to write The Varieties of Religious Experience, James no longer believed that God was transcendent and empirically inaccessible. Since James held, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, that it is possible to have empirical evidence for the existence of the divine, this view left open the possibility, which his view in “The Moral Philosopher” did not, that there could be evidence regarding the nature of divine commands.
Philosophy of Religion

Religion was one of James’s deepest philosophical concerns: he described it as the great interest of his life. James addressed religious themes frequently in his books, including *A Pluralistic Universe*, *Pragmatism*, and more prominently in *Human Immortality*, and *The Will to Believe*. His most notable contribution to the study of religion was, of course, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. If James were known for nothing else, his historical importance would be assured by this great work. James announced that his main interest in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* concerned “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (*Works VRE*, p. 34). He treated the idea of the divine as broadly as possible, restricting himself to no particular doctrinal theological perspectives. *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is a study in both the psychology and philosophy of religion. Looking at religion from a philosophical point of view, James was concerned, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and other works, primarily with two questions. The first, discussed above, was whether religious beliefs may be justified by appeal to the pragmatic consequences which follow from holding those beliefs. The second was whether personal religious experiences appropriately may count as evidence for religious beliefs.

One of the major points James wanted to drive home in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is that the scientific rationalist position, which regards religious beliefs as unjustified, typically begs the question against religion by requiring kinds of justification for religious belief which are inappropriate to it. The scientific rationalist disallows, in advance, a set of religious claims which wider conceptions of justification and evidence would permit. James believed that religion concerns “the reality of the unseen” (*Works VRE*, lecture 3), and hence that the experiences which might count as providing evidence for religious claims are not the sort that would be acceptable on conventional scientific grounds. He defended religious experience as being a direct and primary source of religious knowledge – an acquaintance with a deeper level of reality. James argued that experiential knowledge of the divine was achieved prior to and independently of intellectual concepts, and that intellectual, conceptual tools were inadequate – “hollow and irrelevant” for dealing with the subject of religion (*Works VRE*, p. 360).

In *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, James presented his readers with a wide range of first-hand reports by individuals describing their religious experiences. He was particularly interested in mystical or quasi-mystical experiences. James wanted to provide a phenomenology of religious experience; to convey, as concretely and richly as possible, what these experiences were like from the point of view of the person who had them. Given that he believed that conceptual, philosophical discourse was an inadequate route to religious knowledge, it is plausible to see his intention in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* as a philosophically unconventional one. There is good reason to think that in offering a glimpse into the inner lives of mystics and other religious individuals, James hoped to guide his readers into at least some degree of resonance with or participation in those experiences. It seems plausible to interpret
him as having believed that if his audience, through contemplating the experiential
descriptions he provided, could identify and appreciate their own germinal mystical
experiences (however attenuated), they might experience at least some sense of what
the fully developed mystic has experienced, and perhaps come to have an entirely
new appreciation of the evidential power of that experience (Suckiel 2002). James’s
evocative and original analysis of religious experience in *The Varieties of Religious
Experience* has had immense impact on scholars and religious practitioners, and has
transformed the parameters within which the topic of religious experience has been
discussed.

In his epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion, James’s im-
mense contributions to philosophy are to be counted not only in terms of the subtlety,
originality, and incisiveness of his observations and arguments, but also in terms of his
unwavering commitment to the idea that it is the responsibility of philosophers to
clarify, enrich, and add perspective and wisdom to the experience of ordinary life.

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Although Oxford philosopher F. C. S. Schiller remains the only European to design a comprehensive version of pragmatism that ranks with the systems of Charles Peirce (see Peirce), William James (see James), John Dewey (see Dewey), and George Herbert Mead (see Mead), many thinkers in England, France, Germany, Italy, and other countries incorporated pragmatic themes into their philosophies. The period of greatest interest was from 1900 until the late 1920s, when James and Schiller were widely read; acquaintance with Peirce, Dewey, or Mead was sporadic and rare. During this period European philosophers perceived Schiller and James as the leaders of the Anglo-American pragmatic movement. Just the opposite has been the case since World War II, as Peirce, Dewey, and Mead have been far more influential. Following an exposition of Schiller’s pragmatism, this chapter surveys pragmatism in France, Italy, Germany, and other European countries.

Schiller’s Humanism, Personalism, and Pragmatism

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller was born on August 16, 1864 in Schleswig-Holstein on the Danish side of the border, and died in Los Angeles, California on August 9, 1937. After attending Rugby School in the UK, Schiller went to Balliol College, Oxford, where, in the 1880s, Balliol’s Master Benjamin Jowett, T. H. Green, Edward Caird, William Wallace, and Richard Nettleship were founding British neo-idealism. Schiller was awarded firsts in classical moderations and in Greats, the Taylorian Scholarship for German (in 1887), and an MA. He was an instructor in logic and metaphysics at Cornell University from 1893 until 1897, during which time he absorbed William James’s pragmatism. Oxford’s Corpus Christi College then called him back home, to be assistant tutor, then tutor, senior tutor, and eventually Fellow. From 1900 to 1926 Schiller served as Treasurer of the Mind Association. He was President of the Aristotelian Society, President of the British Society for Psychical Research and a Fellow of the British Academy. He retired from Corpus in 1926, and became a professor at the University of Southern California, teaching there until 1935.

Schiller was the primary English representative of pragmatism, defending its principles and elaborating its theories for a mostly European audience. From his post at
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Oxford, he conducted incisive and polemical debates with absolute idealists, particularly F. H. Bradley, and also realists, especially Bertrand Russell, concerning the proper role of reason in ascertaining the nature of reality, personhood, and value. Schiller championed the nascent evolutionism, voluntarism, and personal idealism then emerging in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In contrast to absolute idealism, which absorbed the reality and activity of all things into the supreme absolute mind, personal idealism asserts that any divine mind is only one mind, albeit important, among many free and mostly independent and individualized centers of creative consciousness. Schiller’s self-titled “humanism” offered a philosophy that gave special priority to individual consciousness and free will for theorizing about the true, the good, and the right. “Man is the measure of all things,” was Schiller’s humanistic doctrine, of which pragmatism was a particular application. His enormous productivity was distributed across religion, psychology, education, history, and nearly every area of philosophy, including epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and ethics. Of central importance for Schiller was the nature of meaning in relation to thought, language, logical inference, knowledge, and truth.

Schiller’s closest allies were William James in the US, personal idealist Henry Sturt and logician Alfred Sidgwick in England, and pragmatist Giovanni Papini in Italy. Their common view was a belief in the reality of human power and growth in an accommodating universe. Schiller made an early commitment to exploring evolution’s impact on philosophy, anonymously publishing Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution (1891) at the age of 27. This popular book, running through three editions, displays his lifelong quest to establish a kind of anti-materialistic and non-skeptical relativism in which revisable knowledge grounded on human interests is attainable. There are also strong signs of Nietzschean influences in this work; Schiller went the farthest in that direction of all the major pragmatists. In James’s Principles of Psychology (1890) Schiller then discovered a biological theory of consciousness as an interactive process of growth within a selectively perceived environment. Both James and Schiller followed the primary philosophical implication: all thought must service the organism’s survival efforts in a plastic and malleable world. Schiller promptly expanded upon James’s will-to-believe doctrine, declaring truth to be what proves to be valuable to the individual, and formulated a subjectivist version of James’s stream of consciousness theory, declaring that reality must only be as it is knowable by an individual mind. Schiller asserted the ontological ultimacy of the creative personal mind because it is the most real thing knowable, and he argued that personal values must always be the final judge of all knowledge.

Schiller’s metaphysical foundations, centered on the supreme reality of personal values, allied him with a group of self-titled “personal” idealists in England, including Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, Hastings Rashdall, and Henry Sturt. Rashdall and Schiller, together with six more Oxford personalists, contributed essays to Personal Idealism (1902), edited by Sturt. Sturt was notorious for his public contempt for the rationalism inherent in British absolute idealism and embodied in Oxford’s mode of education. Schiller supported this attack, arguing in his contribution “Axioms as Postulates” that scientific and logical principles are human constructions imposed on reality for practical ends. Schiller later devoted a book, Formal Logic (1912), to
deploring the deleterious effects, both personal and social, of promulgating deductive logic as the only mode of thought. Besides promoting social authoritarianism, deductive rationalism in philosophy encourages the mistaken view that logical principles are transhuman entities standing in judgment upon actual psychological processes. Schiller’s stance on the psychological nature of logic brought him into agreement with Alfred Sidgwick, an early pioneer of informal logic and argumentation.

Freed from the tight strictures of a universe conceived through any rationalistic methodology, underlying both materialistic determinism and absolutist teleology, Schiller (like James) exulted in the “open universe” of genuine possibilities for personal evolution toward greater harmony within both the social world and the natural world. Reality remained a cooperative yet quasi-independent partner to human efforts. While natural processes cannot be identified apart from the results of human transformations of the world, since nature cannot be known before such transformations, reality surely imposes many constraints on our partially free enterprises.

For Schiller, reality should be pragmatically conceived as not yet complete, still in the process of growth, stimulated toward definite forms by human activity. Human creations are not merely rearrangements of pre-existing raw materials. All our creations, including knowledge, transform reality into genuinely novel things, thereby creating truly new realities and adding to the amount of being. The dictum that matter (or energy, etc.) can neither be created nor destroyed is but a convenient fiction successfully imposed on the world for a circumscribed kind of scientific investigation, and cannot, like any such principle, be taken as reigning absolutely over all dealings with the universe. The best term for reality is the Aristotelian notion of hulé, signifying the indeterminate potentiality of objective nature, which can be known only insofar as human interaction creatively establishes actuality. The subjective nature of knowledge’s origins cannot plunge personal idealism into either solipsism or panpsychism, since knowledge is created in this wider human–environment matrix.

At the heart of this metaphysical vision is a post-Kantian empiricist epistemology, placing Schiller in the company of positivists such as Ernst Mach, Henri Poincaré, and Rudolf Carnap, and pragmatic empiricists, especially John Dewey and C. I. Lewis (see Lewis). Schiller’s version of pragmatism was announced in “Axioms as Postulates” and elaborated by several essays in Humanism (1903) and Studies in Humanism (1907). Pragmatic empiricism cannot endorse the psychological passivity of positive experience, denying that inductive generalizations from atomic facts in turn structure further experience. The mind must impose its own principled ordering on experience in order for there to be any meaningful facts, leaving to induction only a limited efficacy for suggesting higher-order principles. Kantianism, while rescuing the normative character of principles from positivism’s clutches, mistakenly elevates their necessary role to an a priori and universal status. If the mind is instead an actively biological process, its own habits control our behavioral habits, which in turn may track cooperating natural processes. To the degree that successful cooperation can be reliably established, our mental habits are “verified” as (fallibly) true. Both the correspondence theory of truth upheld by realists and the coherence theory of truth upheld by absolutists vainly try to legislate a priori the nature of truth, and both reap the inevitable skeptical consequences.
Psychological habits are both “axioms” and “postulates”: they are regular, normative, social, and transformable. Regularity implies stability without rigid fixity or universal dominion; as Schiller observes, laws of thought are not natural laws without exception since even a philosopher may contradict himself or herself. That he or she can recognize his or her error is made possible by the normative nature of mental laws. Most mental laws are socially normative in a double sense: the most general (e.g. that there is an external world, that this world displays uniformities) have their evolutionary roots in our common humanity, and many more have historical roots in the evolution of one’s culture. To the extent that mental laws come under reflective scrutiny (in situations where their operations produce more failure than success) there arises an opportunity deliberatively to transform them. This opportunity grounds their status as “postulates” in the sense that we grasp their contingent status as dependent on continued human allegiance. In the first chapter of *Studies in Humanism* Schiller asserts that the meaning of a rule lies in its application; long before Wittgenstein’s endorsement, many of the wider implications of this pragmatic approach to rules were explored in Schiller’s writings.

The higher-order axioms of logical and mathematical science remain epistemologically necessary as structuring experience even while they are contingently sustained by the scientific community. Schiller argued that logical necessity is only psychological certainty produced by our conviction in the meaning of terms, and that valid syllogisms are just exercises in begging the question. Genuine learning requires altering the meanings of terms in response to novel experiences, as all scientific progress shows. Meaning cannot be either an inherent property of objects or a static relation between objects, but is an activity or attitude taken up toward objects by a subject. To attribute meaning and to attribute value are practically the same thing. Understanding the contextual value, the situational practical relevance, of a statement is needed for grasping and applying its meaning. The theory of propositions, the life-blood of modern rationalisms, abstracts all psychological value from statements to create an illusion of transhuman truth.

In “Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof” (1917), “Hypothesis” (1921), and *Logic for Use* (1929) Schiller constructed a sophisticated philosophy of science grounded in a distinction between the logic of discovery and the logic of verification, and a denial of the notion that facts can be ascertained independently of a guiding hypothesis. Schiller develops a theory of the theory–observation relation, his own version of abductive logic, and an explanation of how causal analysis is dependent on the inquirer’s selection of relevant factors. Also of note is Schiller’s agreement with Peirce and Dewey on the side of realism against nominalism, demonstrating why pragmatism cannot be categorized with positivistic empiricism or instrumentalism.

No metaphysical truth can be attributed to any laws; whether reality is such that we should conceive it according to one or another mental law depends on the results of a posteriori experimental science. Science should embrace theoretical relativism, since there can be no reasonable expectation that the science’s separate bodies of postulates could ever be reduced to the principles of any one of them. Metaphysics at best may suggest novel postulates attempting to harmonize scientific principles, but these too are subject to experimental confirmation. No absolute harmonization could be possible, and thus metaphysical pluralism is recommended, because complete
agreement on metaphysics is obstructed by temperamental and valuational disparities across humanity. Science and metaphysics thus rest on ethics.

Pluralism also characterizes Schiller’s moral theory and axiology, further developed in his last books. His definition of value as an unconstrained personal attitude toward an object of interest forbids the reduction of value to anything else. Moral laws and religious doctrines represent long-tested useful beliefs, revisable in the face of new demands and problems. With James, Schiller found a finite evolving personal God congenial to moral progress toward cosmic harmony. With Bergson, Schiller conceived nature as the source of evil insofar as its processes resist God and evolution.

Schiller’s impact on European philosophy quickly declined after World War I. During his last decade in America, he was an important member of a flourishing group of personal idealists at the University of Southern California. Through their journal The Personalist and their students, a pragmatic and personal idealism remained a small but significant part of philosophy in America.

Pragmatism and France

Attention to American pragmatism in France began not long after William James announced the existence of this new philosophical movement in 1897. The peak of the Catholic Modernist movement, perhaps not coincidentally, was during the period roughly from 1898 to 1908. Both American pragmatism and French modernism were reactions against rationalism and conservatism, and took similar forms. By the eve of World War I, the interest of French philosophers and theologians in American pragmatism had run its course and fell into sharp decline. French interest was largely centered on the pragmatism and pluralism of James, who had nine books of his writings translated into French during this period. The considerable output of commentary, criticism, and rejection reached its peak in the period 1907–11: from the year of the publication of James’s Pragmatism to the year after his death.

Some of James’s writings on pedagogy and psychology had been translated into French by 1903, but very little notice had yet been taken of him, aside from those who knew him personally, such as Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, and Théodore Flournoy. Until 1905, besides the introductions to translations of James’s works, only book reviews directly discuss American pragmatism: three reviews of James’s works, one of Schiller’s book Humanism, and one of Dewey’s Studies in Logical Theory. Furthermore, there was yet no notice of fellow American pragmatist Peirce. Still, some French philosophers were well prepared to hear James’s message as it began to penetrate France. By 1907 some had also followed James’s frequent admonitions to read his pragmatist allies, including Schiller and Papini.

Three interrelated schools of thought already attracting attention in French philosophy greeted the pragmatists as potential contributors to their own agendas. First, the “school of action” inspired by Maurice Blondel took an interest in James, and this interest was reciprocated. Blondel had also independently labeled his philosophy as early as 1888 as pragmatisme. This school appreciated James’s anti-materialism and defense of free will. Second, the neo-critical school, inspired by Émile Boutroux and Henri Bergson, found in James an ally. Third, the scientific constructionism of Henri
Poincaré and Pierre Duhem appreciated pragmatism’s similarities to scientific positivism and conventionalism.

The school of action movement was an important component of the Catholic modernist struggle with scholasticism. However, Blondel, his friend Lucien Laberthonnière, and many others received the condemnation of modernism in 1907 by Pope Pius X, and they fell silent for many years. The neo-critical school was exemplified by Bergson’s successor Édouard Le Roy, who also came to label his philosophy *pragmatisme*. This school of thought, also allied with modernism, was not silenced by Catholic conservatism and remained a voice in French philosophy. Perhaps the closest to James’s own pragmatic empiricism, Le Roy was sympathetic to James’s views on religion and religious experience. Another important member of this school was André Lalande, who was openly dismissive of the Pope’s efforts to condemn modernism. The third school of thought, scientific constructionism, argued that scientific theories must be judged only with regard to their ability to account for experimental evidence and to solve practical difficulties. This school looked to pragmatism for assistance with the hard problems of positivism and realism.

None of these three French schools of thought completely abandoned the notions of absolute truth and fixed reality. They refused to use the practical as the sole definition or criterion of the truth, although some French philosophers gave qualified approval to the idea that the true could be identified with the practical. A common way to closely connect the true with the practical without making them identical was to agree that the practical is the best *epistemological* criterion of the truth for human beings. We know truth through the practical, on this halfway view, but the truth should remain conceptually distinct from the practical. The question of whether pragmatism was simply a new form of positivism repeated these issues and stimulated further questioning about whether pragmatism was compatible with scientific or metaphysical realism.

French thinkers most sympathetic to pragmatism were impressed with one or more of its challenges to rationalism, scientism, and atheism. Pragmatism was found to be useful for (1) protecting the original nature of lived experience from rationalism and scientific materialism, (2) taking ideas as essentially connected with voluntary action, and (3) regarding faith as necessary for any practical achievement of truth. However, pragmatism’s approach to the nature of knowledge raised serious concerns over (4) whether pragmatism is any sort of realism, conventionalism, relativism, or just subjectivism, and (5) whether pragmatism’s affection for pluralism is compatible with the notions of an independent reality or absolute truth. The two sets of issues are deeply connected, because science’s claim to dictate the nature of all reality would severely threaten lived experience with reductionism, determinism, and atheism.

Apart from the sympathetic schools of French thought, the wider reaction of French philosophers and theologians was sharply critical of pragmatism’s effort to unify the true and the practical. Some could minimally agree that the true would eventually be practical, but only because what is permanently true would reveal itself as useful in the long run. Others refused to connect the true and the practical in any serious way, finding in pragmatism only a new resurgence of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism and hedonism that has regretfully overflowed into epistemology and metaphysics.

Many French philosophers had little trouble generating the same sorts of epistemological and metaphysical objections to pragmatism simultaneously raised by hostile
American and British philosophers. Primary among the French objections is that the mind’s proper function is to apprehend truth as a correspondence with its object, and that reason cannot be subservient to the practical needs of the body. Further typical objections proceeded from associating pragmatism with nominalism, psychologism, free will and voluntarism, relativism, subjectivism, and skepticism. Much of the internal debate about pragmatism between its friends and foes concerns whether pragmatism deserves to be classified with these other suspicious “-isms.”

Concerning pragmatism’s philosophy of religion, interest in James’s views began to appear frequently in French journals and books in 1906, the year that James’s *Varieties of Religious Experience* was published in French. From the more conservative wings of French Catholicism, James was immediately condemned as reducing God to human concepts and desires. Of special interest is the repeated concern that religion should not be primarily based on human experience, but rather on theological arguments and Church authority. Other commentators warily approved of James’s empiricist spiritualism and his conviction that religious truths (including free will and immortality) must be emotionally lived and confirmed. From a religious standpoint, the question of whether values direct intelligence, or reason should dictate values, seemed an urgent matter to some French commentators. Some extreme implications of humanistic pragmatism, such as the idea of humanity replacing God as having ultimate value, frightened every French thinker who raised this possibility.

Notably absent from the early French reaction is a serious evaluation of the social psychology and social view of language advocated by Peirce and Dewey. Also largely missing from the early French reaction is attention to the impact of pragmatism on moral or political theory, or on education.

Two major French thinkers not yet mentioned did take a close interest in pragmatism’s implications for social and political theory before World War II: Émile Durkheim and Georges Sorel. Durkheim, a founder of sociology at the University of Bordeaux and later Professor of Education at the Sorbonne, had a deep interest in the pragmatics of James and Dewey. His 1913–14 lectures on pragmatism and sociology demonstrate his serious engagement and qualified approval with some pragmatic views on the relation of theory and practice, but his death in 1917 prevented their publication until 1955 (published in English in 1983). The lectures categorize pragmatism as some form of “logical utilitarianism” which suspiciously leads toward epistemological and moral subjectivism, and complain about pragmatism’s inadequacies concerning truth when compared with sociology’s realism. There is good evidence that Dewey’s social psychology and social epistemology made a much more positive impression on Durkheim before his death, but this enthusiasm could not be transmitted and had no further impact on French thought. Labor activist Georges Sorel also gave heavily qualified approval to James’s pragmatism. He used pragmatic tenets to support his political syndicalism and his theory that the masses must be energized into revolutionary struggle by deliberately constructed myths. His 1921 work, *De l’utilité du pragmatisme*, characterizes pragmatism as an important response to the inevitable problems of modern intellectual life.

After World War II, philosopher Gérard Deledalle at the University of Perpignan was the foremost expositor of American pragmatism in France. Deledalle was an expert on Dewey and Peirce, and through his lectures and many books brought attention to
pragmatism and semiotics. Of particular significance is Deledalle’s transmission of pragmatism’s views on language and knowledge to several significant French philosophers including Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Lacan during the 1950s and 1960s. Serious appreciation for pragmatism and semiotics has been maintained up to the present at several major French universities.

Pragmatism in Italy

For European intellectuals in the early twentieth century, James’s and Schiller’s vision of freedom used for the growth of human power repulsed many but inspired a few, including Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini. Papini, together with his good friend and collaborator Giuseppe Prezzolini, led a humanist movement in Rome largely inspired by an unstable mixture of James, Schiller, Henri Bergson, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Papini and Prezzolini edited and published the review Leonardo, and often wrote most of its content, from 1903 to 1907. When James met the members of this small movement in Rome in 1905, he was very impressed by their enthusiasm and depth of appreciation for pragmatism. He portrayed Papini and his band as intellectual heroes when he returned to the US, soon publishing an article on “G. Papini and the Pragmatist Movement in Italy.” However, this movement was destined to be short-lived.

Both Papini and Prezzolini were searching for a way to energize a renaissance of Italian life and a modernization of politics. Papini was the most influential upon Italian intellectual life for many decades. He joined the futurism movement after his experiment with pragmatism, which sought meaning in practical achievement by the modern standards of mechanism, industrialism, cosmopolitanism, and militarism. Papini became notorious for supporting Mussolini and Italian fascism even while he converted to Catholicism. Prezzolini’s early radical voluntarism led to his philosophy of the “Man-god”: the new pragmatic Superman whose will asserts itself as the omnipotent transformer of his world. But he soon lost enthusiasm for pragmatism, moving on by 1908 to a humanistic idealism that was devoted to restoring the best of Italian culture. For two decades after World War II he was a professor of Italian Literature at Columbia University.

The other major figures of the short-lived Italian pragmatism movement were Giovanni Vailati and Mario Calderoni. They were devoted to the careful study of Peirce and his theories of logic, semiotic, and scientific inquiry. They published a few important studies in Leonardo, but little more, and both were dead by the start of World War I. Other interesting Italian philosophers knowledgeable about pragmatism before World War II were Giovanni Amendola and Antonio Aliotta. Since World War II, Italian interest in pragmatism has been sporadic and of little impact.

Germany and Pragmatism

Unlike France or England, Germany had no ongoing native movement struggling against rationalism, and accordingly the arrival of Anglo-American pragmatism in the early twentieth century was met with diffidence and hostility. The German reaction
against rationalism, in the form of absolute idealism, had already erupted in the late 1800s, resulting in a variety of empirical and voluntaristic systems, including the pluralistic personalism of Hermann Lotze and the social and functional psychology of Wilhelm Wundt, which had helped to inspire James and Dewey toward pragmatism. But that was history by the time pragmatism arrived; neo-Kantianism and phenomenology presently reigned. Content to dismiss pragmatism as an undigested remnant of J. G. Fichte or Nietzsche, or as a new version of utilitarianism, German philosophers proclaimed the obvious inferiority of American pragmatism.

The interesting case of Hans Vaihinger, professor of philosophy at the University of Halle, should be mentioned. Although a contributor to the rise of neo-Kantianism, he had withheld his more speculative conclusions about knowledge and reality for decades. Finally published as Philosophie des Als Ob (The Philosophy of Either/Or) in 1911, when Vaihinger no longer feared the ridicule of the philosophy profession, it was immediately perceived as having similarities with pragmatism. In Vaihinger’s empiricist system, the willful choice of fictional accounts of reality, to be judged according to the degree that they are adequate to phenomenal experience, leave open the possibility of either/or: multiple theories may be practically correct, and there is no further rational method that can decide which is “true.” By portraying knowledge as the combination of empirical data and conventionally a priori categories, Vaihinger makes an interesting anticipation of Rudolf Carnap’s logical positivism of the 1930s and 1940s. American pragmatist C. I. Lewis, like Vaihinger also a Kant scholar, was developing a similar approach to knowledge around the same time.

Wilhelm Jerusalem and Günther Jacoby prior to World War I, and Arnold Gehlen and Eduard Baumgarten between the wars, figure as the significant sympathetic interpreters of pragmatism. After World War II, several major German philosophers discovered Peirce, Dewey, and Mead, including Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas), who both declared themselves to be pragmatists, although in somewhat divergent ways.

Other European Philosophers and Pragmatism

Besides the English allies of Schiller mentioned already, the brief career of the brilliant philosopher F. P. Ramsey was marked by his firm agreement with several pragmatic tenets about meaning, knowledge, and truth, mostly drawn from Peirce, during the 1920s. Ramsey is usually remembered for suggesting a redundancy theory of truth, but his own considered view preferred a reliabilist theory of knowledge, in which reliability is measured by overall practical success.

Of great importance to Czech thought have been the philosophies of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Karel Capek, both of which were strongly influenced by the philosophies of James, Schiller, and Peirce. Masaryk was the founder and first President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of World War I. Capek, who later invented the term “robot” and wrote the first drama about them, made a thorough study of philosophy and was personally inspired by Anglo-American pragmatism before World War I. His Pragmatismus čili Filosofie praktického života (Pragmatism: A Philosophy of Practical Life) was published in 1918. Capek was a close friend and
intellectual confidante of Masaryk, and together they absorbed pragmatism’s justifications of the democratic way of life, which became instrumental for the intense democratic atmosphere of Czechoslovakia before World War II.

One of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, José Ortega y Gasset, developed several recognizably pragmatist themes at the core of his humanistic philosophy. Some scholars have claimed that American pragmatism, and above all James’s radical empiricism, were a major influence, alongside the acknowledged impact of phenomenology, on Ortega y Gasset. Regardless of direct influence, his philosophy should be taken seriously as a major development of the pragmatic worldview on the primacy of lived creative experience, the ineliminable nature of perspective, and the historical nature of reason.

References and further reading

**Works by Schiller**


**Works by other authors**


John Dewey was America’s leading philosopher throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Many Americans during that period considered him to be the foremost intellectual of his time. Some still do. Others, both then and now, have demurred. There can be no doubt, however, that he was highly regarded by the public at large, especially between the two world wars. A 1926 New Yorker article, “The Man Who Made Us What We Are,” described Dewey as the most influential American alive.

The philosophical ideas that Dewey espoused were the subject of controversy from the start. Philosophers of contrary views pounced on them almost at once and were quick to point out what they took to be the essential defects or weaknesses of Dewey’s ideas. Critics of one kind or another have continued the assault over the years (see Morgenbesser 1977). Popular versions of Dewey’s thought, in the form of his many less technical books, essays, and opinion pieces, have aroused fully as much controversy as have his more specialized writings. Though the heat of that controversy has waxed and waned over the years, it discernibly persists today in both public forums and professional enclaves.

A partial explanation of Dewey’s notoriety lies in the fact that he lived so long and wrote so much. He sprang into prominence quite early in his academic career and remained there to the very end of his life. Throughout that lengthy stay of more than six decades in the public eye, he wrote, lectured, and corresponded at a rate almost unprecedented by prior members of his profession. His published works comprise 37 volumes and his collected correspondence is equally voluminous. He also traveled extensively, especially during the last half of his life, becoming almost as well known abroad as he was at home.

Because the written record of Dewey’s thinking is so extensive and is spread over so many decades, it is possible to use that record as a kind of paper trail not only to trace the path he took from start to finish but also to discern something about the twists and turns it took along the way. A cursory examination of the order of appearance of his major works – i.e., the several books and monographs on which his intellectual reputation primarily rests – offers an overview of his intellectual life as a whole. A somewhat more detailed look sheds light on the particular issues and topics that concerned him during this or that period of his life.
A Biographical Sketch

A quick sketch of Dewey’s life helps to locate the man in his time and place, adding flesh and blood, as it were, to the bare bones of his intellectual accomplishments. Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on October 20, 1859, the son of Lucinda and Archibald Dewey. He was the third of four children, all boys, the eldest of whom, also named John, died as the result of a home accident less than a year before Dewey’s birth. Dewey’s father was the proprietor of a grocery store in Burlington and also served as a quartermaster in the First Vermont Cavalry during the Civil War. Dewey attended the public schools of Burlington and in 1875 enrolled in the University of Vermont, which is also located in that city. Following his graduation from college in 1879 he taught high school for two years in Oil City, Pennsylvania. During those interim years his interest in philosophy began to deepen and with the encouragement of one of his former college teachers, H. A. P. Torrey, he began to submit articles for publication in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, which was edited by W. T. Harris, a leading Hegelian scholar and a prominent educator. Dewey’s early attempts to break into print were successful and the acceptance of his submissions, along with Harris’s personal acknowledgment of their merit, was enough to make him yearn for a career in philosophy.

Because he could not afford to study abroad, as most American students of philosophy aspired to do at that time, Dewey applied to the philosophy program at Johns Hopkins University, and though he did not receive one of its coveted fellowships for which he had applied, he borrowed money from his aunt and entered the University in the fall of 1882. At Hopkins he was chiefly influenced by George Sylvester Morris, a devout Hegelian who took Dewey under his wing. He was also deeply impressed by the experimental psychology being taught by G. Stanley Hall, who had recently trained in Germany and had earned the first American doctorate in psychology under the direction of William James (see James). While at Hopkins, Dewey also took a course in mathematical logic from Charles Sanders Peirce (see Peirce), but he appears not to have been very impressed at the time by either the subject or its teacher.

Dewey graduated from Johns Hopkins with his PhD in philosophy in June of 1884. (His PhD thesis, on Kant, has since been lost. Its whereabouts remain unknown.) After a summer of uncertainty he joined the faculty of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He moved briefly to the University of Minnesota in 1888, but returned to Michigan in 1889 (following the death of Morris, who had been his Department chair and colleague and whose replacement Dewey became). He remained at Michigan until 1894. Early in his stay at Michigan, Dewey met Alice Chipman, a woman of his own age, who was one of his students and also a co-boarder at the rooming house where he lived. They fell in love and were married in 1886. Three of their children – Fred (1887), Evelyn (1889), and Morris (1892) – were born while the Deweys were living in Ann Arbor. In 1894 the Deweys moved to Chicago, where he was appointed Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy at the newly established University of Chicago. In Chicago, Alice bore three more children: Gordon (1896), Lucy (1897), and Jane (1900). Two of their sons, Morris and Gordon, died separately of illnesses during childhood, each while traveling abroad with the family.
Dewey’s Early Works

Dewey’s first published article, entitled “The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism,” aimed to show that in declaring “that matter and its forces adequately account for all phenomena” (EW 1:3), doctrinaire materialism was woefully inadequate and, as theory, was downright self-destructive. It was the kind of contentious piece on which budding young philosophers routinely cut their teeth. The final article to appear in the fifth volume of Dewey’s Early Works is entitled “Report of the Committee on a Detailed Plan for a Report on Elementary Education.” It ends by asking, “Are there evidences that the school, by its attention to social training, is entertaining a beneficial influence upon the social tastes and tendencies of the community, or, at least, of the younger members of the community?” (EW 5:464) From a purely academic point of view one could hardly imagine a more “unphilosophical” question than that of the kind Dewey was raising midway through his stay at the University of Chicago.

During his early career a major change had occurred in Dewey’s outlook, prompted in part by the influence of his wife Alice, who from the start was more socially concerned than was Dewey himself (Ryan 1995, pp. 80–1). But it was also a change bolstered by a host of other influences, including his budding acquaintance with Jane Addams (see ADDAMS) of Hull-House fame and the dawning emergence of his own social consciousness, triggered in large measure by his first-hand encounter with the urbanization of America. In short, the social reality of Dewey’s life in those years pressed in from all sides. Yet for a man of Dewey’s intellect it was a reality that had to be grappled with rationally.

In this early series of publications the two sides of Dewey’s emergent pragmatism stand revealed in uneasy alliance. On the one hand lie his straightforward academic treatises, evinced in publications such as Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding (1888, EW 1), his widely adopted textbook Psychology
(1887; 2nd edn. 1889, 3rd edn. 1891, EW 2), and his *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics* (1891, EW 3). On the other hand lie his far more practically oriented treatises, such as *Interest as Related to Training of the Will* (1895, EW 5), and *My Pedagogic Creed* (1897, EW 5). Between those two extremes of academically weighty and practically oriented tomes are interlarded a host of essays, whose topics range in scope from “The Pantheism of Spinoza” to “Health and Sex in Higher Education” (EW 1), from “Poetry and Philosophy” to “Galton’s Statistical Methods” (EW 3), from “Christianity and Democracy” to “Teaching Ethics in High School” (EW 4), and from “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” to “The Kindergarten and Child-Study” (EW 5).

**Dewey’s Chicago Years of Transition**

The ten years that Dewey spent at the University of Chicago between 1894 and 1904 bridge not only the turn of the century, they also cover the separation between what are called Dewey’s “Early Works” and his “Middle Works.” That bridging decade was crucial for Dewey in a variety of ways. During those years he not only founded what William James initially applauded as constituting “a new system of philosophy,” one to which James would later affix the term “the Chicago School.” Dewey also established under the aegis of the University a private elementary school that was designed to serve as an “educational laboratory,” as he called it, and that soon came to be known worldwide as the “Laboratory School of the University of Chicago” or, more popularly, “Dewey’s School.” Dewey’s fame quickly spread in two directions at once. He soon was widely acknowledged to be a bold and original philosopher and, of equal note, a prominent and innovative educator. Both reputations readily expanded and clung to him throughout the balance of his career.

It is worthy of mention, however, that the two principal grounds of Dewey’s prominence, as philosopher and as educator, appeal to quite different audiences and, therefore, are seldom conjointed in appraisals of his work (see Philosophy as Education). Those who look upon him primarily as a philosopher pay little attention to his educational writings. Conversely, those most influenced by what he has to say about education give little mind to his more philosophical pronouncements. Given the specialized interests of each group, this separation of audiences is quite understandable, perhaps, but it does serve to highlight the age-old cleavage between theory and practice, a dichotomy that Dewey struggled to overcome throughout his career.

That Dewey’s academic title at the University of Chicago was Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy is of no small consequence. Those three domains of study – philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy – were never really separate in Dewey’s way of thinking. Thus his three-pronged professorial title was indeed apt. Those prongs remained conjointed, at least ideologically, throughout his career. And though, while still at Chicago, he did later argue for a separate Department of Pedagogy, which was subsequently established, he remained the new Department’s staunchest supporter and most active participant throughout his stay there.
Dewey’s Middle Period

Among Dewey’s Middle Works (1899–1924) are several that have since become classics within their respective domains. Within the field of educational studies, those that stand out most prominently include The School and Society (1899, MW 1), The Child and the Curriculum (1902, MW 2), How We Think (1911, MW 6), Interest and Effort in Education (1913, MW 7), Schools of To-Morrow (1915, MW 8), and, most prominent of all, Democracy and Education (1916, MW 9). Within the field of philosophy in general the writings of this period that are best known include Studies in Logical Theory (1903, MW 2), Ethics (1908, MW 5), Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920, MW 12), and Human Nature and Conduct (1922, MW 14). Among the essays of special interest to philosophers are: “The Realism of Pragmatism” (1905, MW 3), “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905, MW 3), “What Pragmatism Means by Practical” (1908, MW 4), and “The Pragmatism of Peirce” (1916, MW 10). The outbreak of World War I occasioned German Philosophy and Politics (1915, MW 8).

This period covers Dewey’s first 20 years at Columbia University from 1904 to 1924. It also embraces his emerging engagement in world affairs; in particular, the international build-up to World War I, the war itself, and its prolonged aftermath. These were difficult, yet productive years for Dewey. They began with his move from Chicago, soon to be followed by the death of his son Gordon, and ended with his three years spent in Japan and China. He was now a public figure of international acclaim, yet he still was torn between his deep commitment to education as a social institution, his growing involvement in political affairs, and his continuing allegiance to philosophy as an intellectual discipline.

Dewey’s Later Period

The final 25 years or so of Dewey’s life were among his most productive. Instead of retiring at age 65 and quickly becoming quiescent, as so often happened in those days to professors in their post-retirement years, Dewey’s literary output, collected in the Later Works (1925–53), became even richer and more profuse than before. The books he published during those years have almost all become classics. Most of them are still in print, quite apart from their inclusion in his collected works. They include Experience and Nature (1925, LW 1), The Public and Its Problems (1926, LW 2), The Quest for Certainty (1929, LW 4), A Common Faith (1934, LW 9), Art as Experience (1934, LW 10), Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938, LW 12), Experience and Education (1938, LW 13), Freedom and Culture (1939, LW 13), and, finally, Knowing and the Known, with Arthur F. Bentley (1949, LW 16).

In addition, he wrote several essays and monographs during that period that remain almost as well known as the larger works that have just been mentioned. They include “The Development of American Pragmatism” (1925, LW 2), “The Sources of a Science of Education” (1929, LW 5), Individualism, Old and New (1929, LW 5), “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930, LW 5), Liberalism and Social Action (1935, LW 11), and Theory of Valuation (1939, LW 13). He also produced a revised and enlarged edition of Ethics (1932, LW 7) and How We Think (1933, LW 8).
Dewey’s Pragmatism

Dewey is commonly credited as having been one of pragmatism’s three American co-founders, the other two being Charles Sanders Peirce and William James. Yet the three men — Peirce, James, and Dewey — had far less in common than one might imagine, based solely on the fact of their having been pragmatism’s co-founders. The first of the pragmatists was Peirce, who introduced the basic notion of using consequences as a test of the validity of propositions in his famed 1878 essay entitled “How to Make Ideas Clear” (W 3:257–75). James applied the term “pragmatism,” which he recalled was Peirce’s invention, in his 1898 lecture at the University of California in Berkeley. The label stuck and became the title of a set of his collected essays, entitled Pragmatism, published in 1907. In his preface to that book, James says: “The pragmatic movement, so called – I do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it – seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air” (Works Prag, p. 5).

Dewey was uncomfortable with the term “pragmatism” as well, and expressed his discomfort right from the start. In his presidential address to the fifth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, delivered in December 1905, he says: “The radical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist, label him as you will . . .” and implies that that the label one chooses is of little importance (MW 3:97). Twenty years later he omits the term “pragmatism” entirely when depicting his own work. In the first chapter of Experience and Nature, published in 1925, he says, “the philosophy here presented may be termed either empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism, or . . . naturalistic humanism” (LW 1:10) (see Dewey, Dualism, and Naturalism). Thirteen years later, in his Introduction to Logic: A Theory of Inquiry, he explains his avoidance of the term: “The word ‘Pragmatism’ does not, I think, occur in the text. Perhaps the word lends itself to misconception. At all events, so much misunderstanding and relatively futile controversy have gathered about the word that it seemed advisable to avoid its use.” He then goes on to say: “But in the proper interpretation of ‘pragmatic,’ namely the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operations, the text that follows is thoroughly pragmatic” (LW 12:4).

So it is the adjective “pragmatic,” rather than the noun “pragmatism,” whose meaning we must fathom if we are to understand Dewey’s position. In the above quotation Dewey starts off by flatly telling us what being pragmatic means: looking upon the consequences of any proposition as a necessary test of its validity, provided, of course, that those consequences are not just imagined but are the result of actions taken in accordance with the proposition itself. Thus, to take the simplest of instances, if someone declares, “The cat is on the mat,” her statement sounds like an answer to the question, “Where is the cat?” For that statement to be true, it should result, if acted upon, in finding the lost animal.

This seemingly trivial example is more complex, however, than it might appear. It suggests that when employed as a statement (as opposed to being used as a move in some esoteric language game of the kind philosophers play) the proposition, “The cat is on the mat,” makes little or no sense unless someone is actually trying to find
the cat or wants to know where it is. Thus, when Dewey says: "the term ‘pragmatic’
means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to con-
sequences for final meaning and test" (MW 10:366; emphasis added), his double inser-
tion of the word “all” has normative significance and must be taken in earnest.

But does being pragmatic mean only the rule that Dewey there enunciates? Or does
it entail more than that? There are times, as in the preceding quotation, when Dewey
insists that the rule of being guided by consequences is all there is to being pragmatic.
But when he pauses to elaborate on the rule’s entailment, as he often does, it soon
becomes clear that there is much more to it than that. He seldom fails to point out, for
example, that for the pragmatist, truth is prospective. It lies in the future. It awaits
verification. It is something to be discovered through experimentation, not an emp-
irical fact that is already established. More than a rule to be memorized and religiously
followed, pragmatism for Dewey is more like a frame of mind, or even a way of life.

"Pragmatism as attitude," he explains, "represents what Mr. Peirce has happily termed
the ‘laboratory habit of mind’ extended into every area where inquiry may fruitfully be
carried on” (MW 4:100).

If we go on to ask what else a Deweyan form of pragmatism stands for, restricting
our answer to Dewey’s own words, we cannot go very far without failing to acknow-
ledge the strong core of idealism that lies at the heart of his way of thinking. Prag-
matism, for Dewey, is not just a way of gathering knowledge about the consequences
doing this or that, about how the world works simpliciter. It is not just a move in a
philosophical sub-speciality called epistemology. Rather, it is a way of employing
intelligence for the betterment of humankind in general and of the individual in particu-
lar. In short, it is deeply moral in its entailments and fundamentally humanistic in
orientation. "Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science," Dewey tells us, but,
he quickly goes on, "it also takes its stand with daily life" (MW 10:39). This means
“that [pragmatic] philosophy should develop ideas relevant to the actual crises of
life, ideas influential in dealing with them and tested by the assistance they afford”
(MW 10:43). Or again, “the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action is the
pragmatic lesson” (MW 10:45; emphasis added).

Whether those liberal ideals are a natural outgrowth of Dewey’s pragmatic orienta-
tion, whether, that is, they reside implicitly therein or have some other source, remains
a question that demands a fuller answer than can be given here. Possibly his liberal
idealism may be traced to his earlier Hegelianism or even to his much earlier religious
upbringing. Nevertheless, the way Dewey tends at times to use the terms “empiricism,”
“humanism,” “instrumentalism,” and “pragmatism” almost interchangeably (see for
example MW 1:130, MW 3:97, LW 2:20), suggests that at least in his view all four
terms have a lot in common.

Dewey speaks of the “ideal element” of instrumentalism (which he regards as being
a “later form” of pragmatism) as a form of thinking that “gives birth to distinctive acts
which modify future facts and events in such a way as to render them more reason-
able, that is to say, more adequate to the ends which we propose for ourselves” (LW
2:18). He also sees that ideal element as being “more and more accentuated by the
inclusion progressively of social factors in human environment over and above nat-
ural factors” (LW 2:18). In other words, the fundamental idea is "that action and
opportunity justify themselves only to the degree in which they render [human] life more reasonable and increase its value” (LW 2:19).

One way to position Dewey’s pragmatism more or less spatially is to locate it in a region that lies somewhere between Peirce’s point of view, on the one hand, and that of William James, on the other. “Peirce was above all a logician,” Dewey points out, “whereas James was an educator and humanist” (LW 2:8). Dewey, in effect, wanted to embrace both points of view simultaneously. He wanted at once to be as logical as Peirce and as humanistic as James. Yet that kind of balance is hard to achieve and even harder to maintain. Thus, if we look at Dewey’s leanings in both directions and follow them over time we find him starting out closer to James, particularly to the views James espoused in his 1890 Principles of Psychology, and winding up closer to Peirce, whom he belatedly lauds as “the most original philosophical mind produced by this country” (LW 11:421). Part of that shift Dewey ascribes to events in the world at large. In 1935 he writes, “many intellectual movements, in science, as well as in philosophy, have brought Peirce’s ideas closer to us. His thought is nearer the mind of today than it was to the mind of thirty years ago” (LW 11:422). Another way of looking at Dewey’s pragmatism, a way that he himself seemed to prefer, is to see it as forming a kind of bridge between the real and the ideal, the actual and the possible. But that goal is by no means unique to those who are pragmatically inclined, for as Dewey points out, “all serious thinking combines in some proportion and perspective the actual and the possible, where actuality supplies contact and solidity while possibility furnishes the ideal upon which criticism rests and from which creative effort springs” (LW 3:147).

What, then, marks the pragmatic attempt to achieve that goal? Dewey answers: “The question whether the possibility appealed to is a possibility of the actual, or is externally imported and applied, is crucial” (LW 3:147). Thus the pragmatist is committed to deriving his or her notion of what is possible from a close study of what is actual, rather than by attempting to realize some ready-made ideal that has been handed down from above or seized upon and applied without clear reference to the particular circumstances at hand.

Two further elements of Dewey’s pragmatic outlook are so closely connected that they deserve being mentioned in tandem. They concern pragmatism’s stress on the importance of the individual, on the one hand, and its American origin, on the other. Concerning the latter, Dewey states unequivocally in 1925 (with more than a touch of patriotic pride): “It is beyond doubt that the progressive and unstable character of American life and civilization has facilitated the birth of a philosophy which regards the world as being in continuous formation, where there is still place for indeterminism, for the new and for a real future” (LW 2:19). He then quickly temporizes his somewhat chauvinistic claim, without, however, withdrawing it completely: “But this idea is not exclusively American, although the conditions of American life have aided this idea in becoming self-conscious” (LW 2:19).

Dewey next brings together his nationalistic notion with his insistence on the importance of the individual. “Pragmatism and instrumental experimentalism,” he explains, “brought into prominence the importance of the individual. It is he who is the carrier of creative thought, the author of action, and of its application” (LW 2:20).
To this he adds: “American thought, in the systems which we have expounded, has given to the subject, to the individual mind, a practical rather than an epistemological function. The individual mind is important because only the individual mind is the organ of modifications in traditions and institutions, the vehicle of experimental creation” (LW 2:20). To some philosophers abroad, notably Bertrand Russell in England and certain members of the Vienna Circle on the Continent, the as-American-as-apple-pie flavor of pragmatism was rather distasteful and a good reason for giving it a cool and dismissive reception. Pragmatism was too utilitarian in outlook, Russell regularly complained, and it bore the taint of commercialism. Dewey was quick to answer Russell’s charge (MW 13:306–10), effectively so, I would say. But in English and European philosophical circles Russell’s dismissal registered emphatically and was felt for quite some time. Its echo continues to reverberate today in certain quarters, both at home and abroad.

Dewey’s collaboration with Bentley: pragmatism in extremis

Dewey’s continuing effort to spell out the significance of his own brand of pragmatism occupied him through his career. His lengthy correspondence with Arthur F. Bentley during the 1930s and 1940s, which culminated in their co-authoring Knowing and the Known, sheds an interesting light on that effort. In particular it calls attention to the question of whether Dewey’s pragmatism or instrumentalism, call it what you will, is intrinsically idealistic or only appears to be so because of the extra baggage in the way of unacknowledged presuppositions and the like that Dewey smuggled aboard. The story of their collaboration offers a fascinating tale, no matter which answer it yields, yet the tale turns out to be a sad one, I fear.

It does so because it reveals the relative barrenness of Dewey’s pragmatism when stripped of its idealism, which happens when it is embraced solely as a methodology or an epistemological exercise. It also shows Dewey to be surprisingly ineffective in rising to the defense of what had been for decades his well-established point of view. The full story is far too complicated to relate here, but what happened, in essence, is that Dewey and Bentley joined forces soon after the latter came to Dewey’s defense in response to attacks by several of the so-called logical positivists, particularly Bertrand Russell and Rudolph Carnap. Bentley was far better trained and more adroit than Dewey in both mathematics and logic, thus Dewey understandably welcomed his support in defending his ideas against his critics’ charges. Beyond being the better trained of the two in mathematics, linguistics, and formal logic, Bentley was also far more acerbic and intellectually aggressive than Dewey, who remained mild-mannered and relatively conciliatory throughout the relationship.

Step by step, as the work on Knowing and the Known progressed, Dewey moved closer and closer to Bentley’s point of view. At Bentley’s insistence, he gradually jettisoned, at least for the sake of their joint enterprise, those aspects of his prior thinking that were distinctively humanistic and socially meliorative in aim. It is significant, finally, that the only chapter in Knowing and Known ascribed specifically to Dewey is the one entitled “Common Sense” (LW 16:242–57). There Dewey does revert, it seems, to something like his previous self. The presence of that chapter bearing Dewey’s name as its sole author raises a number of questions that here must remain unanswered but
bear mention all the same: Did Dewey insist on the chapter being included, against Bentley’s protestations? Or was it Bentley who refused to attach his name to what Dewey had written? Was Dewey not so subtly turning his back on the enterprise as a whole? Was he, for example, referring to the rest of the book when he penned the following, which appears in that chapter? “The intellectual enterprise which turns its back upon the matters of common sense, in the connection of the latter with the concerns of living, does so at its peril. It is fatal for an intellectual enterprise to despise the issues reflected in this speech; the more ambitious or pretentious its claims, the more fatal the outcome.” And how can we fail to ponder what he means as he goes on? “It is, I submit, the growing tendency of ‘philosophy’ to get so far away from vital issues which render its problems not only technical (to some extent a necessity) but such that the more they are discussed the more controversial are they and the further apart are philosophers among themselves: – a pretty sure sign that somewhere on the route a compass has been lost and a chart thrown away” (LW 16:249–50).

Dewey’s unsettling metaphor sounds as though it might apply with equal force to the final outcome of his collaboration with Bentley. But if read in that light, whose compass, in Dewey’s terms, had been lost? Whose chart thrown away? Was it Bentley’s, or his own? Or is it possible that both of them were somehow cut adrift, each in his own fashion? In late 1949 when the book was finally published, Dewey wrote to Bentley: “I get impatient when I realize that it is practically only with the last three or four years that I can see with reasonable clearness what I’ve been working at for many many years” (Dewey 1964, p. 613).

Thelma Lavine, who wrote the Introduction to the volume of Dewey’s collected works that contains Knowing and Known, offers the following judgment:

As the Correspondence and Knowing and Known disclose, Deweyan pragmatism, as a type of process philosophy, is not immunized against its own dissolving techniques. Vulnerable thus to the force of Bentley’s prodding, Dewey falters and the dissolving operations of his own pragmatism are turned against itself. The end result is a naturalism in extremis, the dissolution of the structures that Dewey required for his own long-standing agenda: to reconstruct philosophy and to ameliorate the problems of society by bridging the gap between science and morality. (LW 16:xxvii–xxviii)

A few pages later she concludes:

Knowing and the Known emerges as a rigorous scientific transactionalism, mirroring (despite differences) the logical positivism it opposes, offering its own formal language, maintaining the exclusive legitimacy of science as mode of knowledge and as frame of reference, denying cognitive significance to metaphysics and ethics, and denying connection between science and common sense. The scientific transactionalism of Knowing and Known leaves the philosophic constructions of Dewey hopelessly undermined. (LW 16:xxxvii)

One of Dewey’s most recent biographers readily concurs with Lavine’s harsh judgment, adding, “None of Dewey’s friends and intellectual foes did more to dismantle Dewey’s naturalism and his experiential conception of inquiry than Arthur Bentley” (Dalton 2002, p. 266).
But Lavine’s language and Dalton’s concurrence only open the door to further questions. Lavine’s mention of “the structures that Dewey required” and the “philosophic constructions” that supposedly are “hopelessly undermined” by Dewey’s collaboration with Bentley invite us to ask what those “structures” and “constructions” might be. Lavine indirectly answers that question with a list of nominees: “the great, unifying Darwinian frame of nature, aesthetically experienced in its precariousness and stability, and the linkages of science and morals, of the individual life-career with society, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and science; and the problematic situation, key to the resolution of difficulties” (LW 16:xxxvii). That list will do for a start, but it fairly begs to be spelled out in greater detail. Unfortunately, the elaboration it calls for requires far more space than remains available here. What follows, therefore, is offered as nothing more than the merest hint of what a fuller response might reasonably contain.

The latent structure of Dewey’s point of view

At a symposium in his honor a few months past his eightieth birthday in 1939, Dewey, who was responding to papers written by two friendly critics, belatedly acknowledged an aspect of his thought that he had heretofore ignored and had even at times disavowed. He did so with these words: “I find that with respect to the hanging together of various problems and various hypotheses in a perspective determined by a definite point of view, I have a system. In so far I have to retract disparaging remarks I have made in the past about the need for system in philosophy” (LW 14:140–1). Near the close of his remarks on that occasion he returned to his belated recognition of the unified nature of his own perspective and reflected on why it had been so long in coming to his attention: “Given a point of view that determines a perspective and the nature and arrangements of things seen in that perspective, the point of view is, I suppose, the last thing to be seen. In fact it is never capable of being seen unless there is some change from the old point of view” (LW 14:154).

Dewey’s point of view, as he calls it, did of course change over time in certain ways, as doubtless happens to us all during our lifetime, yet its central features, its “latent structure” as one might say (I am calling it latent chiefly because Dewey appears not to have been particularly conscious of its structural role), remained amazingly stable through the years. (An acknowledgment of that fact overlooks, of course, the anomaly of his apparent acquiescence to Bentley’s hard-edged neo-positivism near the end of his life, as we have just seen.)

In her brief delineation of that latent structure, Lavine mentions the “linkages of science and morals” and the intertwining of “the individual life-career with society, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and science.” As sketchy as that brief depiction cannot help but be, it implicitly refers to what might be called the two cornerstones of Dewey’s thought: his abiding concern with the well-being of the individual and his corresponding dedication to the long-term improvement of social conditions in general and political conditions in particular. It also points toward Dewey’s never-ending quest to resolve the various tensions that intermittently threaten to disrupt the harmony of the individual’s life-career with those broader social conditions.

Philosophy, as Dewey practiced it, constituted a multifaceted effort to effect the resolution of the individual and the social on several fronts at once. Dewey sought to do...
so chiefly through his prodigious writings directed at three principal audiences: his fellow philosophers, practicing educators, and the public at large. Leaving aside philosophy itself, which Dewey clearly sought to reform at first hand, science, education, and politics constituted the trio of secondary social institutions in which he expressed the most interest and commented upon most frequently. The first of them, science, he looked upon as a model of disciplined inquiry; the latter two, education and politics, he treated as targets of criticism and candidates for badly needed reform. The arts in general he addressed more intermittently; the institution of organized religion he took on in a very limited fashion; and the manifold congeries of agriculture, trade, and commerce, hardly at all.

Dewey’s concern for the rights of the individual took the form of celebrating: (1) the potency of refined intelligence; (2) the robust naïveté of common sense; (3) the plasticity of human nature; and (4) the ideality of subjective freedom. All four of those individual “goods” Dewey looked upon as being ideally exercised in the service of one or more of the world’s social “goods” or cultural accomplishments, which included familial relations and friendships, the arts, the sciences, democratic governmental arrangements, and the varied institutions of civil society in general.

That collection of core beliefs, focused on the individual and society, does constitute “a definite point of view,” as Dewey belatedly acknowledged. Moreover, it is important to see what Dewey apparently did not see until rather late in his life, which is that the elements of that “point of view” did not just “hang together,” comprising a relatively unrelated assortment of “various problems and various hypotheses,” as his belated acknowledgment so clearly implies. They cohered rationally for Dewey. They were of a piece. Fused with his deeply ingrained traits of personality and temperament, they formed a unified outlook.

Dewey’s outlook as a whole, particularly during his later years, led to him becoming a concerned world citizen and a revered public figure. It sustained his commitment to the continued advocacy of social reforms at home and abroad. In the main, the reforms that Dewey worked for the hardest were (1) the improvement of schools, based on a modernized conception of human nature, and (2) the increased democratization of governmental policies and practices, ideally leading to fuller participation in political affairs on the part of all citizens, along with a more equitable distribution of society’s economic and cultural resources. The continued importance of both of those goals in today’s world makes what Dewey said on their behalf throughout the first half of the twentieth century worthy of sustained study. His more purely philosophical writings fit comfortably within the expansive embrace of his ever-broadening pragmatic outlook. To look upon his theoretical notions as being totally divorced from his more practical concerns, as occurs all too often among both his defenders and his critics, past and present, is to miss his central point entirely. Dewey himself said:

In my treatment philosophy is love of wisdom; wisdom being not knowledge but knowledge-plus; knowledge turned to account in the instruction and guidance it may convey in piloting life through the storms and the shoals that beset life-experience as well as into such havens of consummatory experience as enrich our human life from time to time. (LW 16:389)
PHILIP W. JACKSON

References and further reading

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George Herbert Mead was born on February 27, 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts, the son of Hiram and Elizabeth Storrs Mead. Hiram Mead served as a pastor of Congregational churches in Massachusetts and New Hampshire before accepting an appointment in 1869 to the Chair of Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology at the Oberlin Theological Seminary in Ohio. Following the death of Hiram Mead in 1881, Elizabeth Mead taught at Abbot Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, and then was for ten years the president of her alma mater, Mount Holyoke Seminary and College. George Herbert Mead graduated from Oberlin College with a BA in 1883. After several years spent as a tutor for college-bound students in St Paul, Minnesota, he resumed his formal education by enrolling at Harvard University in the fall of 1887. While at Harvard, he studied philosophy under George Herbert Palmer and Josiah Royce; he also spent a summer as a tutor for the 10-year-old son of William James (see James) at the James summer home in New Hampshire. In the fall of 1888 he left Harvard for Germany, where he undertook several additional years of graduate study in philosophy and physiological psychology at the universities of Leipzig and Berlin. His professors in Germany included Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Ebbinghaus, Friedrich Paulsen, and Wilhelm Dilthey. During his last year of study in Germany, he married Helen Castle, sister of his close college friend Henry Castle and daughter of Samuel Castle, one of the founders of the Castle & Cooke Company of Hawaii.

Mead began his professional career in the late fall of 1891 at the University of Michigan, where he taught philosophy and psychology with department chair John Dewey (see Dewey). When Dewey moved to the University of Chicago in 1894 to head up a new department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy, he took Mead with him and joined two others who had previously been associated with the University of Michigan: James H. Tufts and James Rowland Angell. Together they established the Chicago School of Pragmatism. Dewey resigned his position at Chicago in 1904 following a period of disagreement with University President William Rainey Harper over the administration of Dewey’s experimental laboratory school. Dewey subsequently moved to Columbia University, while Mead remained a member of the University of Chicago faculty until his death. Despite the geographical distance between them after 1904, Mead and Dewey remained close friends. Mead died in Chicago on April 26, 1931.
Although Mead never completed work on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Berlin, his lack of the degree does not seem to have been a serious impediment to his academic career. He rose to the rank of professor at Chicago and chaired the Department of Philosophy following the retirement of Tufts. During the academic year 1916–17 he served as President of the Western Philosophical Association, and near the end of his career he was chosen to deliver the Carus Lectures at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

Like many of his colleagues during his early years at the University of Chicago, Mead played an active leadership role in various civic organizations devoted to educational and social reform. For 14 years, beginning in 1908, he served on the Board of Directors of the University of Chicago Settlement, a social service institution similar in kind to Jane Addams’s (see Addams) famous Hull-House. During much of this period he was Treasurer for the Settlement and a leading member of its Finance Committee, chairing the committee from 1909 to 1919. He also chaired the organization’s Committee on Studies and Publications for a number of years beginning in 1911, and in this capacity he supervised an extensive study of the social and economic conditions in the Chicago Stockyards neighborhood. Mead oversaw the publication of the survey’s findings in three volumes during the years 1912–14. He held the position of President of the Settlement’s Board of Directors from 1919 to 1922. Further, Mead served for a decade, along with Jane Addams, as a vice-president of the Immigrants’ Protective League, and in 1910 he was one of the leaders of an ad hoc Citizens’ Committee formed in an attempt to resolve a labor conflict involving a strike of 25,000 of the city’s garment workers. Finally, he was for 25 years an active participant in the large and influential City Club of Chicago. He chaired the club’s Committee on Public Education from 1908 to 1914, and he was a member of the club’s Board of Directors from 1912 to 1922. He served as Chairman of this board in 1917–18 and as President of the club during 1918–20.

Mead’s Published Writings

Mead resembles his pragmatic predecessor Charles Peirce (see Peirce) in at least one important respect: much of his reputation rests upon works that were edited and published for him by others after his death. These include The Philosophy of the Present (1932), Mind, Self and Society (1934), Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), and The Philosophy of the Act (1938). Since these volumes are a somewhat heterogeneous and initially confusing group, it may be helpful to give a brief overview of their contents.

The Philosophy of the Present was edited by Arthur E. Murphy, one of Mead’s departmental colleagues at the University of Chicago, and was published by the Open Court Publishing Company as a volume in its series of Carus Lectures. Approximately half of this volume consists of Murphy’s edited version of the Carus Lectures, which Mead delivered in December 1930 at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association meeting in Berkeley. The remaining half contains related material drawn from several previously unpublished manuscripts and two essays Mead had published.
in the late 1920s. Almost all of this material is difficult to comprehend without a strong background in Mead’s other writings.

*Mind, Self and Society* is easily the most widely read of Mead’s posthumously published works. Edited by Charles Morris, one of Mead’s students and subsequently a member of the Department of Philosophy at Chicago, it is based on student notes taken in several offerings of Mead’s course in advanced social psychology during the years 1927–30. After rearranging and rewriting these notes, Morris added a number of items he called supplementary essays. The most important of these, “Fragments on Ethics,” is based on student notes taken in Mead’s course on elementary ethics in the fall quarter of 1927. This volume is important for any student of Mead’s thought because it offers an accessible version of a course Mead taught regularly (but not always under the same course number or title) from 1900 to 1930. This course and Morris’s published record of it are largely responsible for the considerable influence Mead’s ideas have had upon the school of Symbolic Interactionism in American sociology.

*Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, edited by Merritt H. Moore, another of Mead’s former students at Chicago, is based on student notes taken in Mead’s course of that title in the spring quarter of 1928. It also contains some material from student notes taken in his 1927 course on the philosophy of Bergson. Mead began to teach the undergraduate course from which this volume mainly derives during his years at Michigan, and he continued to teach it throughout his career at Chicago. This book is non-technical and easily readable, but it is not a source to which one should turn for carefully worked-out presentations of Mead’s contributions to social psychology and philosophy. It does, however, provide interesting bits of historical background that shed light on the original theories Mead sets forth more fully in other places.

*The Philosophy of the Act*, edited by Charles Morris with help from several other former students of Mead, is the most problematic of the four volumes of his work published in the 1930s. By far the longest of these, it contains a great variety of previously unpublished manuscripts and fragments, all of which are undated. There is, however, one clue that helps us to assign at least an approximate date to many of these materials. We know from his personal correspondence that Mead did not begin to read the works of Alfred North Whitehead until the summer of 1921, and he did not begin to make references to these works in his publications until 1925. We can safely infer, therefore, that any items in *The Philosophy of the Act* that refer to Whitehead’s writings (and there are many such items) were composed no earlier than 1921 and probably somewhat later. This volume contains only a limited amount of material directly related to Mead’s main contributions to social psychology, but it contains a wealth of exploratory writings on the philosophical topics that were of most concern to him during the last decade of his life. In particular, we here find him working out his views on such topics as the following: the temporal and social dimensions of conduct or behavior (often referred to here as “the act”), the place of mind or reflective human intelligence in nature, the social aspects of the reconstructive process involved in scientific inquiry, how our perceptions of physical and social objects – as well as our perceptions of space and time – arise as a phase of our conduct, and the grounding of the spatio-temporal structures of both Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics in an analysis of human conduct.
Preoccupation with these posthumously published works has led some readers to the misconception that Mead published little of importance during his lifetime. But while it is true that he published no book-length manuscripts, he did publish numerous essays and book reviews during his Chicago years. The full bibliography of his writings includes more than 90 such items, at least 40 of which are relatively substantial in length and content. These publications deserve careful examination by any serious student of Mead: they not only help to clarify the development of his thought, but also throw light on many ideas that are only incompletely developed in his posthumously published lectures and manuscripts. Fortunately, the most important of these publications, including those mentioned in this chapter, have been reprinted in two collections (1964 and 1968).

Mead and the Functionalism of the Early Chicago School

There is an underlying unity to all of Mead’s social psychological and philosophical work, although this unity is difficult to discern if one focuses only on his posthumously published works. It is best grasped by examining the development of his thought as this is revealed in the various essays and reviews he published during his lifetime. When Mead’s work is approached in this manner, it becomes evident that all his most important ideas grow out of his commitment to a new model of conduct given its classical formulation in John Dewey’s 1896 essay on “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” Dewey set forth a critique of the simplistic and mechanical stimulus-response model of conduct (the “reflex arc concept”) then prevalent in the field of psychology. In its place he proposed a view of conduct according to which stimulus and response were regarded as functionally defined moments or phases within an ongoing process of behavioral coordination. This coordination, Dewey held, was better termed “organic” than “reflex” because of the manner in which stimulus and response reciprocally affect one another. In a typical act of eye–arm coordination, for instance, the reaching guides the looking and seeing just as much as the looking and seeing guide the reaching. Furthermore, the response does not simply follow upon or replace the stimulus: the stimulus lingers within the ongoing experience to inform the character of the response, while the response mediates, enlarges, or interprets the initial stimulus content of the experience. As Dewey put it, we typically do not just respond to a stimulus, but into it.

This organic model of conduct supplied the foundation for the functionalist approach to psychology and philosophy characteristic of the Chicago School at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Mead’s earliest publications were attempts to develop more fully some of its implications. In such essays as “Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” (1900) and “The Definition of the Psychical” (1903), for instance, he attempted to elaborate Dewey’s idea that the difference between subjective and objective elements of experience could be viewed as a functional, rather than a metaphysical, distinction. Holding with Dewey and William James that the meanings of the objects we experience arise from the roles these objects play in our conduct, Mead noted that so long as our conduct proceeds smoothly and without a hitch we simply take these meanings for granted. It is only when some conflict or problem...
inhibits our conduct that they are felt to be inadequate, and it is in this kind of situation that we are driven to distinguish between what is objective and what is subjective in our experience. Subjective or “psychical” consciousness, Mead went on to argue, is a phase of experience that occupies a place midway between old meanings that have broken down and new meanings that are needed but have not yet been discovered. It is characterized by a flux of competing partial meanings and conflicting response tendencies that are for the time being regarded as aspects of the immediate consciousness of the individual confronting the problem. The functional task of such consciousness is to make possible a new synthesis of meanings that will resolve the ambiguities at hand and thereby get the inhibited conduct going again.

Mead continued to build upon Dewey’s model of conduct in his 1907 essay “Concerning Animal Perception”: here he sought to locate human perceptual consciousness of physical objects within conduct, and at the same time to distinguish this variety of consciousness from so-called animal perception. Our perceptual consciousness of physical objects, Mead maintained, arises within our experience when “distance” stimuli such as colors, odors, and sounds are mediated by imagery drawn from “contact” or manipulatory experiences to which these stimuli have previously led. It is imagery drawn from prior manipulatory experience that gives such objects their enduring substrates and what have historically been called “primary” qualities, while distance experience provides the varying “secondary” qualities we attribute to them. Such perceptual objects arise within human conduct both because that conduct involves a wealth of manipulatory experience made possible by the form and function of the human hand, and because this is coupled with a human ability to attend to this dimension of experience and isolate it from the act as a whole. But Mead found no convincing evidence that the conduct of nonhuman animals met either of these conditions to any significant degree; he was therefore inclined to doubt that nonhuman animals ever experienced enduring physical objects of the sort that are so important a part of human experience.

These initial suggestions outlining a functional view of perceptual objects were to be greatly elaborated in Mead’s later philosophical writings. Indeed, large sections of both *The Philosophy of the Act* and *The Philosophy of the Present* are devoted to this task. But of more immediate interest to us here is the fact that a few years after he published the essays mentioned above Mead began to enrich further the conceptual framework of early Chicago functionalism by stretching it to include insights related to his growing interest in social psychology. Mead had by this time seen that an adequate functionalism needed to emphasize not only the *organic* character of human conduct, but also its fundamentally *social* nature. Furthermore, while his earlier essays had focused on the ways in which perceived physical objects and subjective consciousness arise and function within conduct, he now sought to delineate the social dimensions of conduct that made such developments possible. He was moving, in other words, toward a genetic and increasingly social kind of functionalism. Some indication of the new directions his thought was taking can be gleaned from an inspection of the titles he gave to his publications of this period. These include “Social Psychology as a Counterpart to Physiological Psychology” (1909), “What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose?” (1910), “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning”(1910), “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness” (1912), and “The Social Self” (1913).
Gary A. Cook

In these essays Mead set forth almost all the main concepts of his mature social psychological thought. These were ideas he had been gradually working out in his course lectures on social psychology, ideas he would revisit in such essays as “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922) and “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” (1925). These ideas are also presented again in *Mind, Self and Society*, where they are introduced under the misleading rubric “behaviorism” or, occasionally, “social behaviorism.” Mead did sometimes use the term “behaviorism” to describe his approach to social psychology, especially in lectures and essays composed during the 1920s when behaviorism was very much the vogue in American academic psychology. The term “social behaviorism,” on the other hand, seems not to have been used by Mead at all, although in an act of creative editing Charles Morris put this label into Mead’s mouth at two points in *Mind, Self and Society*, and then used it as part of the volume’s subtitle (“From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist”). Both terms are unfortunate in that they conceal the functionalist roots of Mead’s social psychology while suggesting an affinity between Mead’s ideas and those of classical behaviorism. Mead’s thought was, of course, always concerned with *conduct*, but never in quite the way that the behaviorists were concerned with *behavior*. In the first place, the organic understanding of conduct he had taken over from Dewey (and enriched with his own emphasis upon its social dimensions) was at odds with the mechanical conception of behavior typical of John B. Watson and other early behaviorists. Furthermore, Mead’s aim was never to restrict the subject matter of psychology to publicly observable behavior in the manner of classical behaviorism; he always intended to keep the study of the mental as a legitimate and central part of psychology, but he wanted to approach the mental functionally, as a dimension of conduct. Like all the Chicago functionalists, he was not so much concerned to protect psychology from the dangers of methodological subjectivism as he was to find a way around the conceptual problems associated with the old dualism of the mental and the physical.

Social Psychological Theories

*Mind, Self and Society* and the essays mentioned above develop a rich set of original social psychological theories, and they do so by making extensive use of one of Mead’s most distinctive concepts: the human capacity to “take the attitude or the role of the other.” Given the prominent part this concept plays in Mead’s most important philosophical and social psychological theorizing, it is surprising that he never gives it the careful analysis and explication it deserves. Nevertheless, we can construct at least the outlines of such an analysis by showing how he relates this concept to his functional understanding of animal and human social conduct.

Much of the conduct of both humans and animals, Mead held, is rooted in social instincts or impulses, i.e., congenital tendencies to respond in particular ways to the actions of other organisms of the same species. These social impulses sensitize one organism to the acts of others; the acts of others thus become social stimuli that release and guide their expression. Beginning in his 1909 essay “Social Psychology as a Counterpart to Physiological Psychology,” Mead further elaborated his functional understanding of social conduct in terms of what he called “the conversation of
When an early overt stage of an act by one individual releases a social impulse and calls forth an anticipatory response by another, that early overt stage of action is functioning as a “gesture.” Now suppose that an early overt stage of the response by the second individual functions in turn as a gesture calling forth an anticipatory response from the first individual, and so on: then we have a conversation of gestures. Consider one of Mead’s favorite examples of such conduct: the pacing, growling, bristling, and mutual jockeying for position that often takes place when two hostile dogs encounter one another. Here we have an illustration of what he labels (in *Mind, Self and Society*) an “unconscious conversation of gestures.” He calls it “unconscious” to make the point that although the participants are responding to each other’s gestures in an anticipatory fashion, they do not think of the other’s gestures as signifying the conduct their own responses anticipate; they are not explicitly aware of either their own gestures or the gestures of the other as signs having meanings.

Mead suggests that the social interaction of nonhuman animals never advances beyond the level of the unconscious conversation of gestures. On his view, animals never acquire significant symbols or language, they never achieve self-consciousness, and they never acquire rational or symbolically mediated intelligence. Human social conduct, on the other hand, gives rise to all these developments. His explanation for this difference is that human animals possess, while nonhuman animals lack, the capacity to take the attitude or role of the other. But just what does this capacity and its exercise involve? Mead’s first published reference to this capacity is in his 1912 essay “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” in which he writes that “the human animal can stimulate himself as he stimulates others and can respond to his stimulations as he responds to the stimulations of others” (Mead 1964, p. 139). The following year, in “The Social Self” (1913), he explained somewhat more fully what he had in mind: “The very sounds, gestures, especially vocal gestures, which man makes in addressing others, call out or tend to call out responses from himself” (Mead 1964, p. 145). But does the man call out in himself the response tendencies that such gestures would stimulate in him if made by others, or does he call out in himself response tendencies of the sort he has observed others making to similar gestures? On this issue Mead is often vague, both in his published essays and in *Mind, Self and Society,* but his most promising option would appear to be the second of the two alternatives just posed. This, in fact, is the view he espouses in “The Social Self” when he says:

[W]e do not assume the roles of others because we are subject to a mere imitative instinct, but because in responding to ourselves we are in the nature of the case taking the attitude of another than the self that is directly acting, and into this reaction there naturally flows the memory images of the responses of those about us, the memory images of those responses of others which were in answer to like actions. (Mead 1964, p. 146)

As a first approximation, then, we can say that Mead regards the capacity to take the attitude or role of the other as the capacity to engage in a kind of self-stimulation in which one’s gestures or acts call out in oneself attitudes or response tendencies of the sort that others typically make to such gestures.

One important advantage of this capacity, Mead suggests, is that it enables the individual who possesses it to govern his actions in light of the probable social response of
others to those actions. But this is not all. Mead goes on to use this concept to develop a genetic account of the manner in which human language may have arisen from the conversation of gestures. Human individuals move from the “unconscious” conversation of gestures to the “conscious” conversation of gestures, he argues, when they begin to take the attitude of the other in responding to their own gestures. In this way they begin to import into their conduct the social significance of their own gestures, a development that leads to the acquisition of significant symbols and language. Further, he makes use of this concept to outline genetic theories of human self-consciousness and rational thought. Consciousness of self, he claims, is a social achievement rather than a biological given: we become aware of our selves as social objects when we learn to respond to our own conduct in the roles of specific others and eventually in the role of a “generalized other.” Similarly, we acquire the capacity for rational thought when our acquisition of language gives us a set of socially meaningful significant symbols that we use to interpret our experience and analyze problems encountered in our conduct.

These are just a few of the social psychological theories he bases upon his understanding of the human capacity to take the attitude or role of the other. He claims also that the exercise of this capacity makes possible the acquisition of the social structure of our individual selves or personalities, that it gives rise to the inner dialogue of human thought, and that it is the basis for distinctively human social organization (see Expressivism and Mead’s Social Self). Furthermore, as we shall see shortly, his later philosophical writings develop several additional applications of this capacity. In short, it is almost impossible to overemphasize the importance of this concept for Mead’s thought: once he had arrived at this idea, he never tired of finding new applications of it in his analysis of human experience.

Moral Consciousness and Moral Reasoning

One of the main motivations for Mead’s social psychological theorizing was his desire to work out a thoroughly naturalistic view of human thought and personality. It is therefore not surprising that he sought also to develop a naturalistic conception of the moral dimension of human experience. He began this enterprise in such early essays as “Suggestions Toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” (1900) and “The Philosophical Basis of Ethics” (1908); he continued it in “The Social Self” (1913) and such later essays as “Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences” (1923) and “Philanthropy from the Point of View of Ethics” (1930). In all these writings Mead takes the same functionalist approach to moral reflection that he elsewhere takes to other aspects of human experience. Our consciousness of established moral values, he holds, is an awareness of meanings that have arisen within human social conduct and have acquired special normative status because of their importance in guiding conduct in satisfying ways. Similarly, our moral reasoning involves the application of our symbolically mediated intelligence to conflicts of value that have arisen within our experience. Sometimes these conflicts can be resolved by extensions of old values or meanings, while at other times they require the construction of new moral meanings. In either case, our moral thought is part of our biological and social life; it is a
functioning phase in what Mead calls (in “Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences”) our “great secular adventure.” In other words, it is part of an ongoing social process in which conflicts or ambiguities repeatedly emerge and call upon us to revise the moral meanings of our social situations in ways that alter our social conduct and sometimes the very social structure of our personalities or selves.

It was a source of great concern to Mead, as it was also to Dewey, that we so often approach our moral and social problems with intellectual methods quite different from the scientific methods we have learned to use when we confront problems in our interactions with the physical world. When dealing with moral and social problems, we slip all too often into dogmatism and partiality of the sort that have long been rejected in the physical sciences. Moreover, we attempt to justify this disparity by arguing that methods applicable to questions of fact are inapplicable to questions of value. Or we claim that patterns of inquiry appropriate for determining means are inappropriate when we seek to determine what ends we should pursue. But Mead opposes all such dualisms. On his view, judgments of fact and judgments of value, judgments about means and judgments about ends, are all hypotheses arising within the ongoing natural processes of human social existence. None of these judgments is infallible; all are open to possible revision or correction. Thus, when conflicts or problems arise and call for such revision, we should not hesitate to use the most effective method available for this task. And experience has shown, Mead believes, that this is the method of scientific intelligence.

The adoption of this method will not, of course, guarantee a successful solution to any social or moral problem, any more than it guarantees a satisfactory solution to any problem of research in the sciences. But it will encourage us to consider new hypotheses when old ones are found wanting, and it will help us to evaluate proposed solutions by relating them to a careful examination of the conditions that any adequate solution must meet. The application of scientific intelligence to moral and social problems will thus require intellectual flexibility and imagination; it will also demand an impartial assessment of all the conflicting ends or values involved in the problematic situation. “Its one insistent demand,” Mead says, “is that all the ends, all the valuable objects, institutions, and practices which are involved, must be taken into account” (1964, p. 256).

Social Pragmatism

When Mead was setting forth his naturalistic view of human selves in his social psychological lectures and writings, he sometimes referred to himself as a psychological “behaviorist.” When he was working out various philosophical implications of his analysis of human social conduct, on the other hand, he more often referred to himself as a “pragmatist.” But what did he understand by the term pragmatism, and in what respects did his own philosophizing deserve this label? We can answer these questions by looking briefly at some of his historical observations and the philosophical work that occupied him toward the end of his career at Chicago.

Pragmatism has two defining features, he tells us in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century and “The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in their American
Setting” (1930). One of these is a psychology that locates human mind and intelligence within conduct or behavior; the other is a view of knowledge based upon the notion of experimental inquiry, in which problems arising within conduct or experience are dealt with by formulating hypotheses and then judging these hypotheses in terms of their ability to resolve the problem at hand. He goes on to offer two brief references to Charles Peirce’s endorsement of “the laboratory habit of mind” (the only references to Peirce in all of his published writings) while devoting a somewhat longer discussion to the philosophy of William James. But he makes it clear in these sources, and also in his posthumously published essay “The Philosophy of John Dewey” (1935), that he regards John Dewey as the pragmatist par excellence. Dewey’s pragmatism, he notes in this last essay, is a philosophical enterprise in which an initial fund of Hegelian ideas is naturalized and put to work as a vehicle for addressing concrete human problems. His early embrace of Hegelian idealism, Mead suggests, led Dewey to a number of convictions that carried over into his mature philosophical work. Among these were the conception of reality as a developing process, the view that both human thought and its objects arise within this process and are integrally related parts of it, the notion that human society is a culminating aspect of this process, and the conviction that the human individual can achieve self-realization only through participation with other selves as an organic part of a larger social whole. Dewey’s pragmatism naturalizes Hegel, according to Mead, by locating knowledge within human conduct and this conduct within nature. Dewey treats knowing as an active process set in motion by the presence in conduct of conflicting impulses or tendencies to respond. The problem of knowledge on this view is thus “not to find out how we can get from a state of mind to an object outside of mind, but how an intelligence that lies within nature can so reorganize its experience that the activities of the inhibited individual can proceed” (Mead 1935, p. 75).

Given these views about the nature of Dewey’s pragmatism, it is not difficult to understand why Mead referred to himself as a pragmatist. Almost everything Mead says about Dewey’s pragmatism holds for his own philosophy as well, and Mead’s writings and correspondence make it clear that he took himself to be in fundamental agreement with Dewey’s philosophical orientation, from the beginning of their friendship at Michigan until the end of his life. Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to say that most of his philosophical energies throughout his career at Chicago were devoted to the detailed exploratory extension of Deweyan pragmatism in areas that Dewey himself mapped out only on a rather large scale. Chief among these explorations was Mead’s sustained analysis of the social dimensions of human conduct, and the use of this analysis as a basis for the development of those social psychological theories we have already mentioned. Even if Mead had accomplished nothing else, these achievements would have been sufficient to guarantee him a prominent place in the history of American pragmatism.

In his philosophizing Mead went beyond social psychology to explore many other ideas arising from his analysis of human social conduct. In such essays as “Scientific Method and Individual Thinker” (his contribution to the 1917 volume Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude) and “A Pragmatic Theory of Truth” (1929) he sought to augment Dewey’s view of inquiry by showing how the personal experience of socially structured human selves functions in the resolution of problems that have
arisen within a shared or common world of objects constituted by a community of such selves. And in other writings he attempted to show how the patterns of our social conduct – especially the exercise of our capacity to take the attitude of the other – play an important part in the constitution of our perceptual experience of physical objects in space and time. Later he extended this second line of analysis to questions concerning the constitution of the alternative space–time systems involved in Einsteinian relativity. It is in this connection that he makes frequent references to the concepts of Alfred North Whitehead in such essays as “The Self and Social Control” (1925), “The Objectivity of Perspectives” (1927), “A Pragmatic Theory of Truth” (1929), and “The Nature of the Past” (1929), as well as in The Philosophy of the Present and The Philosophy of the Act. Throughout the 1920s Mead mined Whitehead’s early works on the philosophy of nature for insights he might use in his attempts to relate the objects and structures of recent physical theory to his own analysis of human conduct and experience.

In Mead’s various reflections on Whitehead’s highly technical philosophy of nature, he chose to embrace Whitehead’s concept of nature as an evolving organization of “perspectives” or alternative space–time “stratifications” existing in relationship to what Whitehead called “percipient events.” But Mead wanted to revise this view so as to make room within nature for the evolution of minds that could think their ways into a plurality of these perspectives. Only in this way, he thought, would it be possible to account for the emergence of the common or shared world of everyday experience and the transformation formulas relating alternative spatio-temporal perspectives in the physics of relativity. Not surprisingly, he found the key to this proposed revision in his analysis of human social conduct with its emphasis on the capacity to take the attitude or the role of the other. Sociality, he went on to claim in his 1930 Carus Lectures, could even be regarded as a fundamental feature of nature as a whole. It might thus be possible to specify a meaningful sense in which the development of human thought was a culmination of that sociality present throughout nature.

These final provocative attempts to locate human thought and its objects within an evolving social process suggest that Mead was as much a naturalized Hegelian as Dewey. They also point toward the conclusion that he should be regarded not only as a pragmatist but, more specifically, as a social pragmatist. His persistent attempts to develop the philosophical implications of the social structures of human conduct and experience are his most distinctive contribution to the pragmatic tradition in American thought.

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GARY A. COOK


Works by other authors

Addams conceived of democracy, social justice, and peace as mutually defining and inextricably linked. This understanding lies at the heart of her philosophy, confirmed through her experiences. Addams wrote in *Democracy and Social Ethics*: “We are under a moral obligation in choosing our experiences, since the result of those experiences must ultimately determine our understanding of life” (1902/2002, p. 8). Addams chose her experiences by collaborating with others through institutional structures that they created together, most notably Hull-House and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Through Hull-House, WILPF, and scores of other organizations, Addams developed a conception of democracy as associated living. Far more than political process, democracy for Addams is a way of living in solidarity with others, attuned to physical and emotional needs, aimed at full human flourishing. Addams knew William James (see James), and she worked closely with John Dewey (see Dewey) and George Herbert Mead (see Mead) in Chicago. Dewey acknowledged how much he learned from Addams and from the work at Hull-House. Addams’s work and thought are particularly important to the study of classical American pragmatism because she focuses so extensively on the experiences of women, immigrants, and the poor.

Addams was born on September 6, 1860 in Cedarville, a small town in northern Illinois. As she grew, her father’s integrity, business acumen, and admiration for Abraham Lincoln’s democratic egalitarianism, worked their way into her character. Addams attended Rockford Female Seminary, learning the value of both literature and scientific observation. Eight more years spent attending to familial duties and touring Europe taught her how confining social expectations for middle-class adult daughters were. She turned to Chicago in 1889, with its heady mix of vitality and squalor, as immigrants poured in and industries grew at nearly uncontrollable rates. In 1889 Addams and Ellen Gates Starr opened Hull-House, a social settlement in an immigrant neighborhood that included people of 18 different nationalities. Hull-House’s charter explains their goal: “To provide a center for a higher civic and social life; to institute and maintain educational and philanthropic enterprises; and to investigate and improve the conditions in the industrial districts of Chicago” (1910/1990, p. 66).
Hull-House quickly became a busy place, with 1,000 people each week coming to participate in its activities during its first year. In 1892 Addams presented “The Subjective Necessity of Settlements” to members of the Ethical Cultural Society. In this essay, her understanding of democracy as embodying social justice and peace emerges, although undeveloped and filtered through a Victorian sensibility.

Addams sees the city as a complex organic whole. In the industrialized city, business owners and workers, rich and the poor, native-born and immigrant, are completely interdependent, yet their social and educational relations are highly undemocratic. Addams’s aim at Hull-House was “to make the entire social organism democratic,” that is, to infuse social, educational, and economic relations with democracy. Addams writes: “The social and educational activities of a Settlement are but differing manifestations of the attempt to socialize democracy, as is the existence of the settlement itself” (2002, pp. 2, 10).

Addams identifies reciprocity and solidarity as two attitudes, or moral sensibilities, that undergird democracy as a way of living with others. She saw in her own past and in the lives of others that socially advantaged young men and women often lead “unnourished, over-sensitive lives.” They have a developing sense of “universal brotherhood,” but they need outlets for acting on this realization. To work with others toward democracy is not a matter of one-sided, philanthropic generosity, but fulfills deep-seated human needs for both giver and receiver. In later writings Addams makes reciprocity more thoroughly egalitarian, citing many concrete examples of how poor people and immigrants have much to teach the well-to-do.

The second moral sensibility is solidarity. Addams writes in “The Subjective Necessity of Settlements” that a settlement’s philosophy “must be grounded in a philosophy whose foundation is on the solidarity of the human race. A philosophy which will not waver when the race happens to be represented by a drunken woman or an idiot boy” (2002, p. 23). She derives her image of solidarity from Tolstoy’s understanding of early Christian humanitarianism, whose operating principle is love for all others, put into action. Addams begins to articulate the connections between democracy and social justice. The good for oneself is insecure, she says, until this goodness is embodied in the common life of the community and thus is available to all. She also articulates an insight that becomes foundational to her pacifism: that anger and opposition toward others reverses movement toward democracy. She writes: “If love is the creative force of the universe, the principle which binds men together, and by their interdependence on each other makes them human, just so surely is anger and the spirit of opposition the destructive principle of the universe, that which tears down, thrusts men apart, and makes them isolated and brutal” (2002, pp. 19–20).

Addams explains her method in pragmatist terms. Hull-House is a site for experimentation, a place to try out ideas in action. In performing these experiments one needs to be highly flexible and responsive to the environment, carefully gathering data, and working with one’s neighbors in sympathetic partnerships. She presents her method more fully in Twenty Years at Hull-House, her best-known book. In the preface Addams invites us to read it as a pragmatist text, stating: “This volume endeavors to
trace the experiences through which various conclusions were forced upon me” (1910/1990, p. 2). We can think of Hull-House as the institutional structure Addams established and then inhabited as her way of choosing those experiences through which to find her understanding of life. The work there was collaborative and melioristic, as Addams, with her fellow residents, neighbors, and civic and philanthropic organizations, learned that moral sensibilities and institutions need to change incrementally and together.

Democracy and Social Justice

In the summer of 1894 Chicago was torn apart when workers called a strike against the Pullman Palace Car Company. Addams, as a member of Chicago’s Citizens’ Arbitration Committee, tried to negotiate a settlement. Reflecting on those events, she wrote “A Modern Lear” (1912), which Dewey described as “one of the greatest things I have read both as to its form and ethical philosophy” (Addams 1965, p. 176). Addams employs a pattern of analysis that she used more extensively in Democracy and Social Ethics. Through this pattern, she articulates why and how social ethics, or social justice, is central to democracy.

In “A Modern Lear” and in each chapter of Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams identifies a “perplexity” or morally problematic situation in which the various parties are ethical as individuals, yet corruption, exploitation, and unhappiness characterize the situation. Pullman thinks he is treating his workers magnanimously and interprets their calls for social justice through union participation as sheer ingratitude. In the first chapter of Democracy and Social Ethics, for example, the well-intentioned charity visitor does not see that the charity organization’s rules demean the clients and pervert their own moral standards of generosity and helpfulness. In each case, Addams’s analysis reveals that individual ethics of honesty, kindness, and thrift are inadequate or “mal-adjusted” for a complex, urban, industrializing society. Individual ethics need to be relocated and readjusted within a wider frame of what Addams calls social ethics, or social justice. She writes:

We are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained by travelling [sic] a sequestered byway, but by mixing on the thronged and common road where all must turn out for one another, and at least see the size of one another’s burdens. To follow the path of social morality results perform in the temper if not the practice of the democratic spirit, for it implies that diversified human experience and resultant sympathy which are the foundation and guarantee of Democracy. (1902/2002, p. 7)

Addams identifies the process through which we come to recognize the inadequacy of individual ethics and move toward social ethics, or social justice. By mixing on the “thronged and common road,” that is, through concrete experience with others in the spirit of reciprocity, people gain the understanding and sympathy that Addams identifies as “the foundation and guarantee of democracy.”

This process reveals the need for changes in both moral sensibilities and institutional structures. Pullman’s self-absorption in his own goodness prevented him from
responding with sympathy and understanding toward his workers. He expected them to perform their assigned tasks obediently, but did not see that this work ethic is demeaning when wages do not meet survival needs and when hierarchical management structures deny the workers’ needs for participation and solidarity. As the charity visitor spent time with the immigrant family, she learned that her own values and prescriptions for the immigrant families – save your money, don’t make your children work in factories – were actually cruel in an environment where neighbors go hungry and children’s wages are crucial to family survival. By mixing on the thronged and common road, participants can open their moral sensibilities, their sympathy and understanding, to the needs and burdens of others.

As moral sensibilities widen, the need for institutional reform becomes apparent. In “A Modern Lear” and in Democracy and Social Ethics Addams gives stunning critiques of both industrial capitalism and philanthropy as then practiced. Both reinforced class hierarchy and privilege, contrary to democracy’s foundation in reciprocity and solidarity. In “A Modern Lear” Addams calls for worker participation in management and notes that “nothing will satisfy the aroused conscience of men short of the complete participation of the working classes in the spiritual, intellectual and material inheritance of the human race” (2002, p. 174). Addams’s analysis of the charity visitor is in the context of her work for institutional reform in the workplace, education, public health, children’s services, and so on. Sensitive to the fact that the process through which reforms are made itself shapes the outcome, Addams names “associated effort” as the process through which democratic institutional reforms can be attained. When people work together in egalitarian cooperation rather than looking for heroic philanthropic leadership, “progress has been slower perpendicularly, but incomparably greater because lateral” (2002, p. 175). Concrete experience, sympathetic understanding, reciprocity, and solidarity come together, and thus democracy as social justice is strengthened.

Democracy, Social Justice and Peace

Before publishing Twenty Years at Hull-House in 1910, Addams had been involved with peace organizations such as the Chicago Anti-Imperialist League and the American Peace Society. Even though she says very little in Twenty Years at Hull-House explicitly about this work, the book is very much concerned with her vision of peace in the sense that what she learned at Hull-House shaped her activism on behalf of world peace.

In 1899 Addams spoke to the Central Anti-Imperialist League in Chicago. Titling her response to the Spanish-American War “Democracy or Militarism,” Addams defined peace as “no longer merely absence of war, but the unfolding of life processes which are making for a common development” (2003a, p. 1). Here, her definition of peace maps directly onto the understanding of democracy and social justice that guided her work at Hull-House. Addams’s work with her cosmopolitan neighbors at Hull-House and with Chicago’s labor unions gave her the concrete experience and sympathetic understanding upon which to base her understanding of peace.

Addams frequently refers to her Hull-House neighborhood as a cosmopolitan community. Its inhabitants represented many nationalities, some with historic hatreds
among them. Working side by side in factories, arguing in Hull-House’s Social Science clubs, watching their children perform at concerts or theater programs, these new neighbors shared projects through which to replace animosity with tolerance, if not solidarity. In one of the few explicit references in Twenty Years at Hull-House to her work for international peace, Addams comments, “I hoped that this internationalism engendered in the immigrant quarters of American cities might be recognized as an effective instrument in the cause for peace” (1910/1990, p. 178). Addams hoped that the patterns of cooperation her neighbors had devised would be recognized as models for attaining international peace.

Addams also regarded labor unions as providing resources for world peace. Workers’ solidarity cut across lines of race, ethnicity, and national origin as they worked together toward the common goal of a more just workplace. Her work negotiating labor strikes gave her direct experience that confirmed her hypothesis that force isolates and brutalizes. She speaks of “the cruelty and waste of the strike as an implement for securing the most reasonable demands.” Strikes polarize communities, making people bitter and self-righteous. Re-establishing democratic relations after the strike was thus much more difficult (1910/1990, pp. 128–9).

In Newer Ideals of Peace, published in 1907, Addams makes explicit the connections between democracy, social justice, and peace. In the late nineteenth century, European powers and the United States engaged in imperialistic land-grabs in Africa and Asia. Addams argues that militarism does not merely reside in foreign policy; it also infects domestic institutions and social relations. Addams shows how coercion exhibited in military aggression is also present in industrial exploitation, corrupt law enforcement, and legal and social restrictions on immigrants and women. The path toward peace requires rooting militarism out of all these arenas and replacing it with a democracy that is thoroughly responsive to human needs.

Democracy and War

When World War I began in 1914, Addams extended all she had learned through her experiences at Hull-House to the international arena. She chaired a peace conference in Washington in January 1915 that led to the formation of the Woman’s Peace Party. Three thousand people attended; within a year membership reached 40,000. She also chaired the meetings of the International Congress of Women at The Hague in April 1915, where women from neutral nations and from both of the warring sides joined together. This group became the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. In shaping the membership and the activities of these organizations, Addams followed the same pattern she had used at Hull-House, by engaging in collaborative work with people who were committed social justice activists.

Addams states bluntly in Women at the Hague, “War itself destroys democracy wherever it thrives and tends to entrench militarism” (1915/2003, p. 35). To President Wilson’s claim that the United States entered the war to “make the world safe for democracy,” Addams responded in Peace and Bread in Time of War: “Was not war in the interest of democracy for the salvation of civilization a contradiction of terms?” (1922/2003, p. 77). She saw war’s destructiveness not only on battlefields, but also
in callous attitudes and practices at home. In “What War is Destroying,” her January 1915 speech at the initial Woman’s Peace Party conference, she reminded the women assembled there that each young soldier represents all of the caregiving, teaching, and nursing of many women: “Every baby is thus made human, and is developed by the hope and expectation which surrounds him” (2003a, p. 62). Addams goes on to note that this moral sensibility, this treasuring of life, had been embodied in democratic institutions. She mourns that state funding for pensions for the old, for care for the disabled, and for reducing infant mortality diminishes as military preparedness is increased.

In Democracy and Social Ethics Addams analyzes advances toward democracy and social justice in terms of seeing that one’s own well-being is deeply entwined in the well-being of others. In “Democracy or Militarism” she identifies a parallel process: “Unless the present situation extends our nationalism into internationalism, unless it has thrust forward our patriotism into humanitarianism we cannot meet it” (2003a, p. 1). Just as family obligations and social obligations need not stand in opposition, but can be made complementary, so nationalism and internationalism, patriotism and humanitarianism, should not be used in opposition, but adjusted into complementarity.

In Democracy and Social Ethics Addams writes that in moving from individual to social ethics, or social justice, both moral sensibilities and institutional structures are recast. Parallel moves are needed to adjust nationalism to internationalism, and patriotism to humanitarianism. In a 1917 speech to the National Conference on Foreign Relations, Addams refers to migrant workers who, because of their frequent movements, were forming networks of international friendships. She observes that though these workers are largely uneducated and unskilled, they are “forming at the very base of society a new conception of international relations” (2003a, p. 166). She also speaks of the international community of scientists, who become internationally minded as they pursue their shared quest. In “Patriotism and Pacifism in War Time,” a speech to the Chicago City Club in May 1917, Addams reminds her audience that Americans have blood ties to all the peoples of the world, and that for many immigrants in America with blood ties to Central Europe, the war “meant exquisite torture” (2003a, p. 158). Americans, if they adjust their sense of self-identity to incorporate all of who they are, can become “internationally minded.”

These sensibilities, this “international mindedness” need institutional structures through which to be expressed and fostered. Addams found one such structure in Herbert Hoover’s Food Administration, through which the United States shipped three million bushels of grain, enough to keep ten million Europeans alive for three years. Addams spoke with women’s groups, encouraging them to contribute to this effort by conserving food. Here was a worthy pragmatist project: by incorporating Europeans’ desperate need for food into their daily practices, American women could shape their moral and emotional sensibilities and strengthen international channels simultaneously.

Addams worked on behalf of the League of Nations, advocating that it function as a channel through which international minds and emotions could be fostered. A way to do this, she proposed, would be for the League to adopt as its first priority the importance of meeting the pressing food needs of those made hungry by war. She writes in Peace and Bread in Time of War:
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Could [the League of Nations] have considered this multitude of starving children as its concrete problem, feeding them might have been the quickest way to restore the divided European nations to human and kindly relationship... Might not the very recognition of a human obligation irrespective of national boundaries form the natural beginning of better international relationships? (1922/2003, p. 92)

During the last two decades of her life, Addams continued living at Hull-House, but traveled widely for WILPF, seeking to further the cause of international peace. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. Addams died on May 21, 1935 in Chicago, Illinois. She asked that her tombstone read “Jane Addams of Hull-House and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom,” the primary organizations through which she joined in associated efforts to create a democracy of social justice and peace.

References and further reading

Works by Addams


Works by other authors

Marilyn Fischer


Alain L. Locke played many roles in his life: cultural critic, editor, author, mentor, educator, patron of the arts, and philosopher. Locke was born on September 13, 1885 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the son of Mary H. Locke, a teacher in Camden, New Jersey who attended the Felix Adler Ethical Society. Locke’s father, Pliny I. Locke, was a graduate of Howard University’s Law School (1872), and worked for the Freedmen’s Bureau and the Freedmen’s Bank. Locke was among the first African American graduates of the prestigious Central High School in Philadelphia; he was the first African American to win a scholastic competition to become a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University (Hertford College, Oxford, 1907–10; student at University of Berlin, 1910–11), and the first African American PhD from Harvard University’s Department of Philosophy (1918).

Early Career

Locke’s short essays, “Cosmopolitanism” (1908), “Oxford Contrasts” (1909), and “The American Temperament” (1911), written while a Rhodes Scholar, tell the story of his aversion to racial essentialism, whether in the form of European racialism or black kitsch. Locke’s cosmopolitanism was part of his lived experience in Europe, exemplified by his experiences with racial prejudice and his relationship with future luminaries such as Pixley K. I. Seme, creator of organizations that became the African National Congress in South Africa, and Horace M. Kallen, future cultural pluralist and later a noted Zionist.

In many ways Locke’s 1918 doctoral dissertation, “The Problem of Classification in the Theory of Value,” prefigured his future theoretical contributions to value theory. His dissertation was completed under the direction of Ralph B. Perry, who later wrote the definitive biography of the pragmatist William James (see James). Locke argued that values perpetually undergo transvaluation. Categorizing painting, for example, as potentially beautiful, rather than associating beauty with a formal proof in symbolic logic, is a way of categorizing the object of potential beauty that is not intrinsic to the object. Transvaluation for Locke makes it possible to associate beauty with proofs in symbolic logic. Locke’s work in axiology was coterminous with the
Leonard Harris

development of his pragmatism. He considered the relationship between our daily
world of practice and our world of value creation as tied together such that values
existed in a living connection to activity. Locke arrived at his views through a review
and critique of authors he found informative, especially Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfels,
Alexius Meinong, Franz Brentano, Georg Simmel, and Wilbur Urban.

While an instructor at Howard University in Washington, DC, prior to complet-
ing his doctoral dissertation, Locke presented a series of lectures in 1916, sponsored
by the then nascent National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). These lectures were collected in an anthology, Race Contacts and Interracial
Relations (1992). Locke was denied the opportunity to teach a course on race relations
at Howard University because the white administration did not consider the topic of
race relations academically warranted. Consequently, the NAACP sponsored his pres-
sentation. One reason for sponsoring Locke was that, as a baccalaureate graduate of
Harvard University, a doctoral candidate in philosophy, and the first black Rhodes
Scholar, he was among the most highly accomplished intellectuals in the black
community.

Locke argued that race did not determine culture and that race was not a biologic-
ally determined category. He contended that race was strictly socially defined and
thereby constantly changing. Racialized groups for Locke were warranted in organiz-
ing themselves as socially shaped cultural groups, of which their racialization was a
cultural feature, in order to defeat racism and to promote their cultural goods. Race
consciousness, whether functionally beneficial as a way for groups to sustain cohesion
and promote their unique cultural goods or as a vicious source of prejudice, was con-
sidered by Locke to be relatively permanent. However, contrary to the then most noted
anthropologist of race, Franz Boas, Locke rejected the idea that races were natural and
he rejected the link between blood and racial genius and blood and culture. Race was
a non-natural category. He tended to sustain the Darwinian picture of groups com-
peting for scarce resources, where race was one way to form cohesion to maximize
offspring chances, but he rejected the social Darwinian justification of racism, namely,
that whatever race dominated surely was ipso facto evidence of their inherent superior
cognitive ability. Racism for Locke was a function of practice – groups usurping undue
material and status resources through an array of relationships.

Locke’s value theory, developed in its nascent stage even before his doctoral dis-
sertation in 1918, and his exploration of the nature of racial ontology, introduced in
his formative period, yet highly controversial and provocative, in his 1916 lectures,
are the foundations for his unique version of pragmatism: critical pragmatism. Critical
pragmatism promotes a deep-seated commitment to transforming a world, too often
filled with racial hatred and prejudice, through intellectual engagement in ways that
do not rely on what he considered the enemies of cross-cultural communication –
absolutism, metaphysics, and treating existing social groups, including any particular
race or nation, as a natural creation rather than as the vagary of human manu-
facture. Rather than promoting ethics of absolutist principles, cultural uniformity, or a
realism of aesthetics that contended that there are beauty-making properties tied to
unchanging creations, Locke’s critical pragmatism promoted aesthetic pluralism
whereby beauty-making properties are considered subject to transvaluation. Neither
an approach of reasoned judgments to convince the racists and those suffering from
self-deprecation, often favored by liberals, nor the imposition of propaganda, often favored by absolutists, is a genuine source of aesthetic change. Racist images, like all other images, change for Locke through grand shifts, leaps, breaks, disjunctions, and rifts – transposition, transvaluation, transfiguring.

It was the Bahá’í faith that, in the 1920s, Locke found most spiritually satisfying. Unlike all other classical American pragmatists, such as John Dewey or Jane Addams (see Dewey and Addams), who were fundamentally Christian, or Christian in the kinds of religious sensibilities they expressed, Locke attended Bahá’í firesides, but never consistently practiced Bahá’í religious doctrine. Nonetheless, he wrote for the Bahá’í World, considered religious pluralism (the view that all religions provide a contribution to our understanding of spiritual possibilities) far more appealing than religious dogmatism, traveled to Haifa, a religious center for the Bahá’í, found the Bahá’í moral requirement of racial amity appealing, and maintained a lifelong respect for the Bahá’í faith.

The Harlem Renaissance

Locke can be seen as one of the first “Renaissance” men of the modern age because he is best known for the crucial role he played in the Harlem Renaissance (1919–35), when his edited anthology *The New Negro* (1925) served as the anchor of an innovative collection of literary and art works that inaugurated the Renaissance. Harlem, a community in Manhattan, New York, was often identified as the center of a national cultural movement that attacked the popular definition of *humanitas* – particularly, activists attacked the categorization of humanity into racial kinds and their arrangement into hierarchies; attacked the way the black was treated as an inferior subject, incapable of creating aesthetically pleasing works, and as a living embodiment of the ugly encased in a biologically determined and unchanging racial category.

From his position as a teacher of philosophy from 1912 to 1954 at Howard University, Locke was the most influential intellectual associate of an entire generation of artists, writers, and scholars, including authors in the anthology *The New Negro*: Langston Hughes, Claude McKay, Countee Cullen, Zora Neale Hurston, Montgomery Gregory, Albert C. Barnes, Jessie Fauset, Arthur A. Schomburg, James W. Johnson, Robert R. Moton, Kelly Miller, and Ralph Bunche. *The New Negro* also included illustrations by Winold Reiss and Aaron Douglas, as well as songs, a copy of an anti-slavery pamphlet cover, and African sculptures. The Introduction to *The New Negro* announced the existence of a generation of black activists who rejected the stereotypes associated with Negroes as poor imitators of white artistic creations and self-effacing minstrel musicians; rejected scholarship that was deferential to the way white racialists perpetuated the myth that black poverty was self-induced, and that white racist expropriation of black wealth through pillage and theft were non-existent. Authors in Locke’s *The New Negro* portrayed blacks as responsible, creative, complex, and honorable agents. *The New Negro* poets, playwrights, artists, sculptors, and essayists avoided romanticizing African people as primitives, emotionally uncontrolled, and lacking virtues. For different reasons, Houston A. Baker, Jr., in *Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance*, and George Hutchinson, in *The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White*, concur that the classical heritage which the vast majority of Renaissance authors
Locke hoped to recover was not a pristine African culture or a vision of the pure emotive primitive. Locke was concerned to make apparent those features of African American culture that existed historically, which were either nascent in the artistic production of victims or openly expressed but ignored.

Locke’s expressionism – namely, that the aesthetic dimension arises from experience and is often an expression or reflection of feelings and needs intricate to cultural realities – motivated his argument that black folk culture was a source of sophisticated and universally valuable aesthetic products. He rejected the traditional distinction between folk art and high art in which high art was the product of independent intellects uninfluenced by folk culture. High culture, for Locke, best existed as an expression of the sophisticated results of select folk expressions. The Renaissance for Locke was not a recovery of the classical, or a return to a pristine past, but a recovery and creation of the universalizable within the past and present folk.

Locke’s expressionism existed in conjunction with his advocacy theory approach. The project of aesthetic appreciation and creation, for him, in its best manifestation existed as a function of promoting human uplift. It was not the disinterested, dispassionate, unconnected, third-person observer of artistic form, structure, idiom, and theme that determined the beautiful. Rather, it was such formalistic features in living relationship to content, context, function, expression, experience, and contribution to human uplift that represented the best traditions of artistic creation. For Locke, artistic expression is invariably tied to the existence of some community, although likely a matter of individual creation. Commitment to a community’s uplift or expressing some feature of a peculiar history is compatible with the creating of universally valuable art. In one sense, valuation is always tied to transvaluation and transposition. Locke considered the promotion of classical forms and structures compatible with promoting the evolution of creative expressions. Thus, his view of indeterminacy in language translation, the sociality of language, and the fluidity of possible meanings undergirded his approach to community and identity.

Locke favored moderate cosmopolitanism and democratic socialism, contrary to an approach to community that promoted racial nationalism advocated by the nationalist Marcus Garvey, leader of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, or that of class analysis of Marxist-influenced socialist activists such as Hubert H. Harrison. Locke’s approach is best exemplified by his anthology, When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts (1942), co-edited with Bernard J. Stern, published by the Progressive Education Association and drawn from a wide array of books and lecture series. Locke and Stern collected papers that helped establish that communities are constantly in formation and that cross-cultural contact transforms the valuations each community considers unique to its own heritage. The dream of ethnic or racial authenticity and relative autonomy for the editors was a misguided dream, just as the dream of anarchists, communists, or radical cosmopolitans who favor the negation of all boundaries are defeated by our need to be in communities of close association, associations that need not become egregious forms of separatism.

Locke’s approach to pedagogy was enlivened by his cosmopolitan approach to community and values: cultural education in the arts creates alternative, non-racist, xenophobic, ethnocentric values and ways of viewing persons as full agents. It does so because artistic appreciation involves reformation of perception, whereas appeal to
analysis, reasoned argumentation, and dialogue (literal-mindedness) or propaganda (which relies on maintaining rigid categories and uses the same assumptions about reality as its object), all fail to accomplish a substantively new arena of thought. Locke, as the President of the American Association for Adult Education (in 1945), introduced cultural education as a central feature of adult education. He edited a series, the Bronz Booklets, which provided historical accounts of African American life and accomplishment. And as a tireless promoter of young artists and literature, he authored annual reviews of African American literature for the journal Opportunity. The world of artistic creation, however, was as much involved in promoting stereotypes and demeaning images as the world of propaganda and literal argumentation. Locke was not oblivious to the problems of using progressive over-generalizations, such as stylized-honored motifs of black achievers or romantic presentations of black culture as a culture enlivened by a desire for human uplift without the terrors of inter-racial class exploitation. However, for Locke, there is a propensity for the ennobling to win out over the degrading. The object of degradation will, over time, surmount the ill effects of self- or other deprecation. The agents of demeaning stereotypes and those that valorize the pain inflicted on others are likely to change, not as a function of what is arguably unwarranted, but as a function of what is unlikely to satisfy across cultural borders.

Locke’s faith in art as ennobling and providing alternative perceptions was often criticized as romantic. W. E. B. DuBois, the leading political and intellectual head of liberal and progressive activists during the Renaissance, criticized Locke for promoting art for its own sake and expecting alternative perspectives to be a substantive source for social change. Although Locke never claimed that cultural changes were the sole, primary, or fundamental causal agent for social change, he consistently maintained that altered perspectives through the arts were a crucial factor for the possibility of change. His rejection of folk culture as itself high culture, that is, the anarchist view that all cultural products are inherently equal, and his maintaining the distinction between high and low art, although within the context of advocacy art, was criticized by such artists as Zora Neale Hurston and Claude McKay as being elitist and as maintaining the stilling view that African American artists had a moral responsibility to engage in racial uplift. Locke has also been criticized, especially by more contemporary authors, for occasionally treating racial groups as ethnic groups, for blurring the distinction between the two, and for occasionally treating race as a stable category or conflating racial identity and cultural productions. His use of such terms as “race geniuses” or “race gift” to depict an author or artistic contribution arguably shows that Locke was not completely free of thinking in terms of racial categories as categories defining kinds and contributions. Locke knowingly used romantic images of blacks on more than one occasion. He thereby used ennobling stereotypes to fight demeaning stereotypes, facing the reality that stereotyping necessarily subordinates important individual distinctions and treats persons invariably as members of an undifferentiated group. This ameliorative use of stereotypes reflects his pragmatic theory of valuation, a theory that requires the continual re-evaluation of categories used to picture reality. Locke’s theory of valuation, his advocacy aesthetics, his insistence on moral imperatives as a necessary condition for the possibility of a moral community, his pedagogy of discipline and cultural integration, and his views
of community as an evolving democratic experiment, all form a unique chapter of American pragmatism.

Contemporary Interpretations of Locke’s Legacy


References and further reading

**Major works by Locke**

ALAIN L. LOCKE


Works by other authors

Clarence Irving Lewis was born on April 12, 1883, in Stoneham, Massachusetts. Although the Lewis family was poor and he had to work throughout his youth, he made an excellent record at Haverhill High School, and was able to enter Harvard in 1902. Lewis's chief interest was philosophy, which he studied under William James (see James) and Josiah Royce, the latter becoming his ideal of a philosopher. Upon graduating, he took a job at the University of Colorado teaching English, and married his high school sweetheart, Mabel Maxwell Graves. He returned to Harvard in 1908 to do graduate work, where he worked chiefly with Royce and Ralph Barton Perry. Upon receiving his doctorate in 1910, he took a position at the University of California at Berkeley where he stayed for ten years.

As a student at Harvard, Lewis had been captivated by Immanuel Kant, and by Royce, to whose views he thought his own similar. But Perry convinced him that idealistic metaphysics was the result of mistaking a regulative principle for a constitutive one. For Lewis, the Absolute therefore became an ideal, not an existent. Royce was also deeply interested in the new developments in symbolic logic and introduced Lewis to this subject. While he was at Berkeley, Lewis devoted his energies chiefly to logic, and in 1918 published his first book, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*. These studies in logic and mathematics led him to conclude that Kant’s argument for the ideality of appearances was mistaken, as a result of which he abandoned idealism, but he retained the belief that knowledge was at least partly determined by human interests and needs, a position that he called “humanism.” Having served in the artillery during World War I, he returned to Harvard in 1920 as a member of the Philosophy Faculty. During the next few years his “humanism” became pragmatism, owing in part to the influence of Charles Peirce (see Peirce) whose unpublished papers he examined. In 1929 he published *Mind and the World Order*, which was immediately acclaimed as a major contribution to epistemology, and in 1932 he co-authored with C. H. Langford *Symbolic Logic*, which was his most complete statement of his logic.
During the 1930s, Lewis became increasingly concerned over the work of the logical positivists. Although he was strongly attracted by the early work of Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick, and by Hans Reichenbach’s work, he found the positivist views on values and ethics repellent, and increasingly devoted himself to refuting them. He also opposed the growing attack on analyticity led by W. V. Quine (see Quine). These problems led to his publication in 1946 of his Carus Lectures as *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, which was his major philosophical work.

Lewis retired from Harvard in 1953 and he and his wife moved to Menlo Park, California. He continued to work, teaching at Stanford, giving occasional lectures, and writing. In 1955 he published *The Ground and Nature of the Right*, and in 1957 *Our Social Inheritance*, both popular lectures on ethics; his Wesleyan lectures on the “Foundations of Ethics” were published posthumously. But chiefly Lewis worked on a book on ethics that he never finished. By 1963 his health was visibly failing, and he died on February 3, 1964 in Menlo Park, California.

**Modal Logic, Intension, and Meaning**

Although modal logic began with Aristotle, Lewis is generally regarded as the modern founder of the discipline. He was led to this work by his reaction to Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*. Lewis was an intensionalist; he believed that inference depended on relations of meaning. He therefore regarded material implication as inadequate, and insisted that “implication” must mean “deducibility.” Accordingly, he introduced the concept of strict implication, defined as “$p$ strictly implies $q$ if and only if it is impossible that $p$ and not-$q$” which is written $p \rightarrow q \leftrightarrow \neg (p \& \neg q)$. Between 1912 and 1918, when he published *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*, Lewis worked out a system based on strict implication, and showed that from it he could derive the postulates and theorems of the *Principia*.

Lewis’s most complete statement of his modal logic is in *Symbolic Logic* (1932). There he set forth the famous five modal systems, S1 through S5. The weakest of these is S1, which is developed in detail in the book. S2 is S1 plus an additional postulate that if the conjunction of $p$ with $q$ is possible, both conjuncts are possible. S3 is the system of the *Survey*, amended to correct an error in the original version that had been found by Emil Post. S4 is S1 with the added postulate that if $p$ is necessary, then it is necessarily necessary. S5 is S1 with the added postulate that if $p$ is possible then necessarily $p$ is possible. Each of these systems contains its predecessor in the list. Lewis used numerical matrices to prove the consistency of all five. These five systems have been the starting point for nearly all subsequent work in modal logic.

Lewis viewed symbolic logic as the application of a formal system to a logical subject matter. Formally, his system and that of *Principia* were consistent uninterpreted calculi, like the various metrical geometries. When interpreted, the formal system had to capture the meaning of logical terms such as “implies” which Lewis took to mean “deducibility.” The fact that material implication led to paradoxes and rendered contrary-to-fact conditionals true no matter what meant to Lewis that it was useless for scientific reasoning. How could one test a hypothesis by its consequences if a false proposition implied every true one?
Throughout his work, the analogy between the geometries and logic guided Lewis’s thinking. There could be alternative logics, just as there were alternative metrical geometries, but only the system of strict implication corresponded to ordinary logic. However, other systems could be employed as canons of inference since, although “\(\text{p} \supset \text{q}\)” did not correspond to “\(\text{p implies q}\),” “\(\text{p} \& (\text{p} \supset \text{q})\)” did strictly imply “\(\text{q}\).” Thus alternative logics could be employed in reasoning, but only because the validity of inference in these systems could be proven in the system of strict implication. The choice of which system to use was therefore pragmatic.

This does not mean that Lewis believed a logic could be falsified by empirical evidence. Every logic was true of the meaning relations it asserted, which is why every logical statement was analytic. But as an instrument for reasoning, one logic could be preferable to another. If one chose to regard the truth value of some statements as indeterminate, a three-valued logic would be preferable to a two-valued logic. This would not mean that the two-valued logic was wrong, merely that for this purpose it was useless. Lewis’s view is not the same as Quine’s.

Lewis presented his theory of meaning in book I of *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. For Lewis, meanings are prior to language. Meanings are conceptual; although they are expressible in language, they could be otherwise expressed. By a “term,” Lewis means “an expression capable of naming or applying to a thing or things.” There are four modes of meaning applicable to terms. The denotation is the class of all actual things to which the term correctly applies. The comprehension is the class of all possible things to which the term correctly applies. The signification is that property in things the presence of which indicates that the term is applicable and the absence of which indicates that it is not. The intension is the conjunction of all terms that must apply to something if the given term applies to it. Equivalently, Lewis holds the intension is the concept of that to which the term applies.

A proposition Lewis defines as a term capable of signifying a state of affairs. Thus “Mary baking pies” is a proposition, whereas “Mary is baking pies” is a statement that asserts the proposition. The four modes of meaning therefore apply to propositions. The denotation is the actual world. The comprehension is all possible worlds incorporating the state of affairs signified by the proposition. The signification is the state of affairs. The intension is whatever must be true of a possible world so that the proposition is true in it. Analytic propositions are true in all possible worlds, contradictory propositions are true in none, and synthetic propositions are true in some but not all. All analytic propositions are a priori; all synthetic propositions are a posteriori. The modes of meaning are easily extended to propositional functions.

The intension of terms and propositions is subject to further analysis. Lewis distinguishes the linguistic meaning of a proposition from the sense meaning. The linguistic meaning is all propositions strictly implied by the given proposition. The sense meaning is the criterion in mind which allows us to apply the proposition or term to experience. Lewis holds that without such a criterion, we could not recognize anything in experience as the referent of a term. The sense meaning is not linguistic; it is a schema (in Kant’s sense) for applying the linguistic expression. We cannot imagine a chiliagon (a polygon with 1,000 sides), but we can easily imagine counting the sides and getting one thousand. It is through sense meaning that language is applicable to experience.
Sense meaning is the foundation of analyticity. One sense meaning includes another if following out the first involves following out the second. Thus in “All squares are rectangles,” one could not determine that something is a square without thereby determining that it is a rectangle. The statement is therefore analytic due to the relation among sense meanings. Lewis is dealing here with “essential predication” only, but that is what the debate over analyticity centered on.

Knowledge, the Given, and the a priori

For Lewis, knowledge consisted in the conceptual interpretation of the given. By the given, Lewis means the sensuous content of immediate experience. The given is reported in expressive statements such as “this is red.” As a phenomenal report, this is not a classificatory statement but an assertion that “this” – the given quale – is identical with one usually classified as red. Such expressive statements can be false if the reporter lies but not otherwise; hence they are not knowledge although they are the foundation of knowledge. Those who, like Wilfrid Sellars, have assailed the “myth of the given” have been bewitched by language, as Lewis was not. Any empiricist or pragmatist must face the problem of how language relates to experience. Lewis’s answer was that in its expressive use, a term like “red” in “this is red” refers to a sensuous quale as being one that, in the non-expressive use of “red,” would be classified as red by the statement “this is red.” Reference to the sensuous content of experience Lewis rightly regarded as essential if one was to avoid Idealism.

Statements about real objects Lewis calls non-terminating judgments; since they have an infinite number of consequences, their confirmation never terminates. The sense meaning of such non-terminating judgments Lewis calls terminating judgments. These are conditionals of the form “if S and A, then probably E,” where “S” is some phenomenal cue, “A” is an action, and “E” a phenomenal experience. The antecedent and consequent are expressive statements; the relation between them is a real relation learned from experience. The consequent of a terminating judgment is probable only. There are two sorts of terminating judgments: the first is a generalization stating that whenever S and A obtain, E probably follows; the second the instantiation of the first for a particular occasion. The latter type of statement is decisively verified or refuted by experience on the occasion, and hence the verification process terminates. The non-terminating judgment strictly implies an infinite set of terminating judgments that constitute its sense meaning, and the verification of which provide its confirmation.

A priori statements are of two sorts. Mathematical and logical systems are true of the meanings they assert, but which such system is to be applied to the world is a pragmatic question; we choose that which is best for our purposes. But we also impose upon experience our own categories of the real. Every experience is of something real in some category; even if it is a hallucination, it is a real hallucination. This categorical system is a priori; whatever does not fit one category is assigned to another. The choice of a priori systems is purely pragmatic; it is the given that is fixed.

A priori knowledge is certain since it holds of the meaning relations it asserts, but any such system may be found useless and be discarded in favor of a more useful one. Empirical knowledge is probable only. In *Mind and the World Order*, Lewis adopted
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John Maynard Keynes’s theory of probability; in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* he sought to combine Keynes’s theory with the frequency theory without great success. In *Mind and the World Order* he tried to prove the validity of induction, but the proof was flawed. Later he followed logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach in holding that the validity of enumerative induction could not be proven but should be assumed, since it would lead to truth if truth was possible, and no other method could do better. Similarly, Lewis held that the prima facie credibility of memory had to be assumed, since the alternative was total skepticism of the moment. Thus, Lewis’s theory of knowledge rested on assumptions regarding induction and memory for which he gave a Kantian-type deduction: if these were not assumed, then no knowledge at all was possible.

Values and Morality

Lewis extended empirical knowledge to include values. We find values given in our experience; we like or dislike the experiences we have. It is only experience that is good for its own sake. The values we find in experience are reported in expressive statements that, like all expressive statements, can be false only if one lies.

That which is valuable for its own sake Lewis says has “intrinsic” value; all other values are “extrinsic.” But there are several kinds of extrinsic value: an object that produces intrinsic values in our experience is said to have “inherent” value; one that serves as a means to other values is said to have “instrumental” value. Thus paint is instrumental to the creation of a picture that is inherently valuable because it produces intrinsic values in experience. Statements about the inherent values of objects are non-terminating judgments that have as their sense meaning terminating judgments relating sensory cues and actions to experience of intrinsic values. Thus Lewis’s theory of empirical knowledge applies fully to values.

The goal of life, the *summum bonum*, is a life found good in the living of it. What constitutes such a life cannot be determined by just summing particular goods; Lewis rejects any notion of a hedonic calculus. The life good in itself is a certain gestalt to which all the particular goods of experience contribute. The intrinsic goods of experience are good in themselves, but the value of having these experiences depends upon what they contribute to the good life: their contributory value. Evaluating a life as a whole requires a grasping of the entire temporally extended totality which is made possible by the fact that it forms a single gestalt. That a life found good in the living of it is the *summum bonum* Lewis takes to be simply a fact about human beings.

Aesthetic values permeate experience but are most apparent when utilitarian values are least. Their apprehension requires complete absorption in the object, without thought of further uses. Aesthetic judgments are non-terminating judgments regarding the capacity of an object to produce future experiences of aesthetic value, and are confirmed or infirmed by the terminating judgments they imply.

The capacity of individuals to respond to inherently valuable objects depends on many factors: the health of the individual, his education, access to the object, etc. As a result, disagreements over values are frequent, but this does not imply any lack of objectivity in values. Value is an intrinsic component of our experience and essential
to the guidance of action; without values action would be pointless, and without objective values social chaos would result.

Lewis located his pragmatism as lying between James’s empiricist pragmatism and Royce’s absolute pragmatism, and emphasized particularly his debt to Peirce. But probably his greatest debt was to Kant. Lewis’s given is closely related to Kant’s sensuous intuition; the problem of knowledge is the conceptual interpretation of the given. What is pragmatic is the choice of the conceptual system; we chose that conceptual system that yields the interpretation that best fits our needs. Knowledge is for action, and action is to attain the good life. Human needs thus play a decisive role in knowledge, since knowledge is an instrument to serve our purposes.

Ethics is concerned with the guidance of action. Since Lewis believed the relation between decision and action was inscrutable, he held that acts could only be identified by their consequences. There must then be some characteristic of the consequences of an act that makes it right or wrong. This characteristic Lewis held to be goodness or badness: to do that the consequences of which will be good is right and to do that the consequences of which will be bad is wrong. But this alone is not enough, because, as Lewis said, “the good solicits but the right commands.” Having good consequences may make an act desirable, but it does not show why we ought to do it, and that ought cannot be derived from any empirical statement. Thus, unlike Dewey and most other pragmatists and empiricists, Lewis held that ethics is not an empirical discipline. In fact, Lewis’s ethics is influenced more by Kant than by James, Royce, Dewey, or Peirce.

The heart of Lewis’s philosophic vision was of man as a temporal being aware of his own temporality, and therefore driven by anxiety about his future. Men seek a life good in the living of it, but they are also creatures of impulse, and following impulse leads to disaster. To be rational is to subordinate the present gratification of impulse to the greater gratifications realizable in the long run, and this requires not only thought and planning, but also self-governance. It is by imperatives – i.e., rules having imperative force – that self-governance is made possible. Imperatives therefore arise from human nature itself, but which imperatives are to be followed?

The first imperative according to Lewis is consistency; not only logical consistency, but also practical consistency, for without this, rule-following would be impossible. But empirical knowledge is equally essential, since knowing is for action and only realistic action can yield future goods. Beyond these two imperatives of thought are three imperatives of action that Lewis drew from Kant. The technical imperative is to make the most efficient use of means to our goals. The prudential imperative is to maximize our own goods over the long run. And the moral imperative is Kant’s Categorical Imperative. But what is the proof of these imperatives?

To support these imperatives, Lewis invented the argument from pragmatic contradiction. He distinguished the proposition from the act of asserting the proposition; to assert a proposition is to claim it is true. When Epimenides the Cretan asserted “All Cretans are liars,” his act of assertion contradicted what he said. Lewis held that any statement the negation of which led to pragmatic contradiction was pragmatically a priori and true, and he sought to prove his imperatives by such arguments. But this left him with the problem of the relation of prudence to morality. Having made both of these imperatives categorical, he could not find a way to reconcile the demands of self with those of others.
Lewis finally recognized that the validity of his imperatives could not be proven, for any such proof would assume consistency and so be circular. The final ground for them, he held, was human nature: the necessities of human beings as temporal creatures and as social animals. Thus, at root, Lewis’s philosophy is a humanist philosophy; human nature sets the goals and requirements, and human thought must find the ways to satisfy them.

References and further reading

**Works by Lewis**

1946: *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

**Works by other authors**

Willard Van Orman Quine, American logician and philosopher, was acknowledged as the most distinguished analytic philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. He was born on June 25, 1908 in Akron, Ohio. In 1926 Quine entered Oberlin College where he majored in mathematics. It was at Oberlin in 1929 when he learned of the existence of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell’s masterpiece on mathematical logic, *Principia Mathematica*. In January 1930 Quine submitted an honors thesis which focused on mathematical logic in general and *Principia Mathematica* in particular. Quine graduated from Oberlin *summa cum laude* in 1930, but his interest in *Principia Mathematica* would last a lifetime. He applied for admission to Harvard’s graduate program in philosophy primarily because Whitehead was teaching there, and he was admitted in 1930. He received his MA in 1931, and his PhD in philosophy in 1932. Remarkably, Quine completed his doctorate in just two years of graduate study, writing a dissertation, directed by Whitehead, entitled *The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica*.

Harvard awarded Quine a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship for 1932–3. He and his wife of two years, Naomi Clayton, spent the fellowship year in Europe. During the five months Quine was in Vienna he attended some of Moritz Schlick’s lectures at the University of Vienna. He also attended some of the weekly meetings of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists (or logical empiricists). Subsequently, he traveled to Prague and Warsaw in early 1933, and his visit to Prague would prove to be most eventful for his philosophical development, for it was there that he met up with the philosopher he would later say was his greatest teacher, Rudolf Carnap. Carnap was then the chair of Natural Philosophy in the Division of the Natural Sciences of the German University in Prague. Quine attended Carnap’s lectures, which were given at the Physics Institute, and on days when Carnap was not lecturing they would frequently meet at Carnap’s home and discuss logic and philosophy. At the time, Carnap was 41 and Quine was 24. For the next six years Quine was a disciple of Carnap’s, and in subsequent years, even though their ideas often clashed, Quine still regarded Carnap as the one who set their philosophical agenda.

Following his return to the United States from Europe in June 1933, Quine enjoyed three years as a Junior Fellow in Harvard’s newly formed Society of Fellows. During the first year of his fellowship, he gave a series of lectures on Carnap’s philosophy.
Those lectures, in effect, introduced Carnap’s philosophy to the community of English-speaking philosophers. Carnap emigrated to the United States in 1936 and became a US citizen in 1941. He held permanent positions in philosophy, first at the University of Chicago and later at the University of California at Los Angeles. Though separated by 3,000 miles, the two friends kept in touch with one another until Carnap’s death in 1970.

At the end of his three years as a Junior Fellow in 1936, Quine was appointed to a three-year instructorship in Harvard’s Philosophy Department. He was promoted to associate professor in 1941. In October 1942 Quine entered the navy as a lieutenant, assigned to Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC during World War II, and was discharged in late 1945 with the rank of lieutenant-commander. He resumed teaching at Harvard in February 1946. He and Naomi were divorced in 1947 and in 1948 he married Marjorie Boynton. Also in 1948 he was promoted to full professor and appointed a Senior Fellow of the Society of Fellows. In 1956 he was appointed Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy. Quine retired from Harvard in 1978 at the age of 70, but he remained philosophically active for another 20 years.

During his long career, Quine lectured in six languages on six continents, published 22 books on logic and philosophy, and scores of journal articles. He made contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of logic, and set theory. He was the recipient of a score of honorary degrees and many other awards and prizes, including Sweden’s Rolf Schock Prize and Japan’s Kyoto Prize. Quine died on December 25, 2000 in Boston, Massachusetts at the age of 92.

“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”

Quine’s most famous journal article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” was originally published in 1951. Some philosophers maintain that this classic article may very well be the most important philosophy article published in the twentieth century. Quine begins with the following abstract:

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism. (in 1980, p. 20; emphasis added)

Did Quine regard himself as a card-carrying pragmatist? With this question in mind, let’s examine these two purported dogmas of empiricism. First, there is the so-called analytic/synthetic distinction. The logical empiricists maintained that analytic statements are devoid of empirical content and are necessarily true; they are necessarily true because they are true solely in virtue of the meanings of their words, for example:
“All bachelors are unmarried men.” The logical empiricists also maintained that synthetic statements do have empirical content and are true (if they are) in virtue of the meanings of their words and how the world is, for example: “All bachelors are happy men.” In “Two Dogmas” Quine advances considerations designed to show that the analytic/synthetic distinction has never been clearly drawn, and it has never been clearly drawn because the distinction is one of degree, not one of kind.

The second dogma is what Quine calls radical reductionism. It is the view “that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience” (in ibid., p. 20). Farther into the pages of “Two Dogmas,” Quine opines that radical reductionism is impossible. However:

[The dogma of reductionism has, in a subtler and more tenuous form, continued to influence the thought of empiricists. The notion lingers that to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would detract from that likelihood. The notion is of course in the verification theory of meaning. The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. (in ibid., pp. 40–1)

Quine responds to this second dogma by suggesting an alternative account of the relation of statements to their conditions of confirmation and infirmation: “My countersuggestion . . . is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (in ibid., p. 41). This doctrine that most statements, taken individually, cannot admit of confirmation or infirmation at all, Quine calls holism.

Suppose, for example, that one conducts an experiment to test the hypothesis that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius. Suppose, further, that in the course of the experiment our thermometer indicates that the water boiled at 103 degrees Celsius. Must we reject our original hypothesis, that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius? Not necessarily. For what is being tested is not a single hypothesis in isolation from its fellows, but a cluster of hypotheses. Thus we could save the original hypothesis if we were willing to hypothesize that our water was impure, or that the experiment was not conducted at sea level, or that our thermometer is faulty, and so on. Such is holism.

One may well wonder why the two dogmas, analyticity and reductionism, were of such great importance to logical empiricists? The answer is that as empiricists they were committed to the view that all knowledge comes via the senses (nihil in mente quod non prius in sensu) and, further, that no such knowledge could be necessarily true. For example, mathematical truths appeared to present an obstacle to empiricism, for they appear to be necessary (and, thus, not known via the senses). However, according to Carnap, a leading proponent of logical empiricism, mathematical truths (such as $7 + 5 = 12$) are indeed necessary. They are necessary in virtue of the fact that they are true solely in virtue of the meanings of their words. In a word, they are analytic. Regarding Carnap’s acceptance of analyticity, Quine wrote: “I think Carnap’s tenacity to analyticity was due largely to his philosophy of mathematics. One problem for him
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was the lack of empirical content: how could an empiricist accept mathematics as meaningful? Another problem was the necessity of mathematical truth. Analyticity was his answer to both.” (1991, p. 269) Thus, according to Carnap, the acknowledged necessity of mathematical truths poses no threat to empiricism.

What is Quine’s positive account of mathematical truths? As we have just learned, Carnap held that mathematical truths are devoid of empirical content and are necessary, and he explains these two traits of mathematical truths in terms of analyticity. For 50 years Quine disagreed with Carnap’s position. Contra Carnap, Quine claimed that mathematical truths do have empirical content insofar as applied mathematics is concerned; second, he claimed that mathematics is, indeed, necessary but the correct explanation of mathematical necessity is to be found in holism, not in analyticity.

The crux of the matter is that mathematical truths are among the very last truths we would choose to revise were we confronted with a recalcitrant observation. If, for example, we counted five rabbits in one pen and five in another and got a total of eleven, the last thing we would conclude is that five and five equals eleven. However, Quine changed his position; he later came to agree with Carnap that mathematical truths are devoid of empirical content: “Gibson has found, to my chagrin but gratitude, a disagreement between my consecutive little books Pursuit of Truth and From Stimulus to Science regarding empirical content of mathematics. I rest with the later position, namely, that mathematics lacks empirical content” (1998, p. 685).

The debate between Carnap and Quine regarding the nature of mathematical truths can be summarized by saying that both believe that mathematical truths are devoid of empirical content and, further, that mathematical truths are necessary. Where they still disagree is in their respective explanations of mathematical necessity: Carnap explains the necessity of mathematical truths in terms of analyticity (mathematical truths are necessary solely in virtue of the meanings of their words), while Quine explains the necessity of mathematical truths in terms of holism (mathematical truths are so central to our theory of the world that revising such a truth would have intolerable disruptive consequences for our theory of the world).

“Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and Pragmatism

The word “pragmatism” occurs once in the abstract with which Quine begins “Two Dogmas,” and it occurs again (some variant of the word) four more times in the last two paragraphs of this article:

The issue over there being classes seems more a question of convenient conceptual scheme; the issue over there being centaurs, or brick houses on Elm Street, seems more a question of fact. But I have been urging that this difference is only one of degree, and that it turns upon our vaguely pragmatic inclination to adjust one strand of the fabric of science rather than another in accommodating some particular recalcitrant experience. Conservatism figures in such choices, and so does the quest for simplicity.

Carnap and [C. I.] Lewis [see Lewis] and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic. In repudiating
such a boundary I espouse a more thorough pragmatism. Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic. (in 1980, p. 46)

Taken by themselves these two paragraphs seem to suggest that Quine may well be a card-carrying pragmatist. But we must look beyond the pages of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to Quine’s 1991 essay “Two Dogmas in Retrospect” for a more informed view. Here’s what Quine has to say in the later work about the final two paragraphs of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”:

So also for the contrast noted in the remaining two paragraphs of “Two Dogmas”: the contrast supposed by Carnap and C. I. Lewis between the factual and the pragmatic. “In repudiating such a boundary,” I wrote, “I espouse a more thorough pragmatism.” This passage had unforeseen consequences. I suspect it is responsible for my being widely classified as a pragmatist. I don’t object, except that I am not clear on what it takes to qualify as a pragmatist. I was merely taking the word from Carnap and handing it back: in whatever sense the framework for science is pragmatic, so is the rest of science. (1991, p. 272)

A decade prior to the publication of “Two Dogmas in Retrospect,” Quine published “The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism,” in which he addresses the question of whether he is a pragmatist. He writes:

It is not clear to me what it takes to be a pragmatist. It is not clear in what ways the philosophers who have been called pragmatists are nearer in outlook to one another than to philosophers who are not so called. I suspect that the term “pragmatism” is one we could do without. It draws a pragmatic blank. However, we have the term, and we can make some sense of it by enumeration. Peirce, James, Schiller, Mead, and Dewey have been called pragmatists and have owned the soft impeachment. (1981, p. 23) (See Peirce; Schiller and European Pragmatism; Mead; Dewey)

Quine concludes “The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism” by saying: “In limiting myself to the card-carriers, I have found little in the way of shared and distinctive tenets. The two best guesses seemed to be behavioristic semantics, which I heartily approve, and the doctrine of man as truth-maker, which I share in large measure” (ibid., p. 37). Let us look further into behavioristic semantics and the doctrine of man as truth-maker. Quine discusses both of these topics in his most important book, *Word and Object* (1960).

Behavioristic semantics derives from the fact that we learn a language by observing other people using it: “Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersubjectively available cues as to what to say and when” (1960, p. ix). Furthermore, Quine takes the behaviorist approach to be mandatory:

In psychology one may or may not be a behaviorist, but in linguistics one has no choice. Each of us learns his language by observing other people’s verbal behavior and having his
own faltering behavior reinforced or corrected by others. We depend strictly on overt behavior in observable situations. . . . There is nothing in linguistic meaning, then, beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circumstances. (1987, p. 5)

This behaviorist approach leads to Quine’s most controversial thesis, namely, his thesis of indeterminacy of translation, but pursuing that topic here would take us too far afield (see 1960, pp. 26–79; 1987, pp. 5–10).

What about Quine’s view of man as truth-maker? In particular, should we understand scientific method as a method of finding rather than making truth? Quine comes out in favor of making truth when he writes:

Despite my naturalism, I am bound to recognize that the systematic structure of scientific theory is man-made. It is made to fit the data, yes, but invented rather than discovered, because it is not uniquely determined by the data. Alternative systems, all undreamed of, would have fitted the data, too. (1981, p. 33)

But if science is a put-up job, then isn’t truth made and not found? Not for Quine; he argues that truth is made and found. But how can truth be both? Quine explains how this is possible by emphasizing his commitment to a naturalistic ontology and to fallibilism:

For naturalistic philosophers such as I . . . physical objects are real, right down to the most hypothetical of particles, though this recognition of them is subject, like all science, to correction. I can hold this ontological line of naive and unregenerate realism, and at the same time I can hail man as largely the author rather than discoverer of truth. (Ibid., pp. 33–4)

The naturalist can take this view of man as truth-maker because he recognizes no higher truth than scientific truth. Quine writes:

I recognize no higher truth than that which science provides or seeks. The scientist is indeed creative, he posits the physical objects, and could perhaps have produced a different system that would fit all past and future data just as well; but to say all this is to affirm truths still within science, about science. These truths illuminate the methodology of our science but do not falsify or supersede our science. We make do with what we have and improve it when we see how. We are always talking within our going system when we attribute truth; we cannot talk otherwise. Our system changes, yes. When it does, we do not say that truth changes with it; we say that we had wrongly supposed something true and have learned better. Fallibilism is the watchword, not relativism. Fallibilism and naturalism. (Ibid., p. 34)

Quine concludes “The Pragmatists’ Place in Empiricism” by admitting that he has failed to find any clearly distinctive tenets shared by the card-carrying pragmatists. “The two best guesses seemed to be behavioristic semantics, which I so heartily approve, and the doctrine of man as truth-maker, which I share in large measure” (ibid., p. 37). I leave it up to the individual reader to determine whether these “two best guesses” justify the claim that Quine is a pragmatist.

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References and further reading

Works by Quine


Works by other authors

Hilary Putnam is perhaps the most eminent living American philosopher. He has written prodigiously and influentially on the philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of natural science, philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind. Over a long and storied career he has been famous for, among other things, readily changing his mind and his philosophical views. During one fairly long period Putnam described his philosophical outlook as “pragmatic realism.” He still cites John Dewey (see Dewey) as an influence, and in his latest book, *Ethics Without Ontology* (2004), he calls his view “pragmatic pluralism.” Nevertheless, he also has claimed that he is not a pragmatist, and he has argued against positions associated with both historical and contemporary figures who have accepted that label.

Putnam was born on 31 July 1926 in Chicago, Illinois. The family lived in Paris amid the “lost generation” of American expatriates until 1934, when they moved to Philadelphia. Putnam studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, and he received his BA in 1948. He received his PhD in philosophy in 1951 from the University of California at Los Angeles, where he worked on probability with the logical positivist Hans Reichenbach. He taught at Northwestern and Princeton Universities until 1961, and he was Professor of the Philosophy of Science at MIT before joining the Philosophy Faculty at Harvard University in 1976. He was Walter Beverley Pearson Professor of Mathematical Logic at Harvard, and later he was made Cogan University Professor. He retired in 2000 and has remained active as a writer and lecturer.

Through almost all his changes of mind, Putnam has taken reality as his subject and, indeed, his cause. Relativism, the idea that there is no world more real than the one – or the several – that our subjective feelings and thoughts provide, is typically Putnam’s special target. At times he has used the ideas of Charles Peirce (see Peirce), William James (see James), and John Dewey to support realism and challenge relativism. At other times he has said that pragmatism is too relativistic to serve his purposes.
What Is in the Head

Even in an early paper like “Psychological Concepts, Explication, and Ordinary Language” (1957), Putnam displayed the realism that would characterize his work up to the present day. There he set out to defend the idea that the mind and its qualities were real. He tried to do this by showing how we could make sense of claims like “Jones was exhibiting all the symptoms of anger, but it is possible he was not really angry.” The Wittgenstein- and Skinner-influenced logical behaviorists had argued that such a claim was nonsense, that talk about anger was simply to be understood as talk about observable behavioral symptoms. Putnam criticized the behaviorists’ “debunking” of the mental by showing how we could talk meaningfully of mental realities without appealing to observable criteria. He offered an analogy that doubtless had a lot of resonance in 1957: Consider, he said, a case of polio. For a long time it was not known what virus caused polio, and so doctors relied on observation of symptoms for diagnoses; but of course the idea that the symptoms might be present without the presence of the polio virus (or a polio virus, since three different ones turned out to cause the disease) was still understandable. Analogously, it was not just nonsense to say that all the symptoms of anger were evident without the presence of the neural state, whatever it was, that amounted to anger. And even if anger turned out not to be a “neural state” – Putnam would later go on to reject mind–brain identity, and even here he regarded it as no more than a “working hypothesis” – this example showed that it was at least possible to understand the idea that a mental state could be real independently of what we observed.

Putnam grew less realistic about the mind as time passed, but as he did he grew more committed to other kinds of realities. By the early 1960s, he was arguing for what he called “functionalism,” or the view that the mental states of organisms should be understood in terms of the functional roles they played in the lives of those organisms. Anger was as anger did. Such a mental state was not identical with any neural or other physical conditions, yet it could not be debunked behavioristically, and neither did it have to be understood as a separate kind of ghostly substance. Instead, it was a state analogous to a machine state of a Turing machine, an abstractly conceived universal computer that could be realized in any number of materials. Like such a machine state, anger could be realized in different materials, or in immaterial soul-stuff if there were any. Anger was the state that had the function of leading to angry actions, no matter what the angry being might be made of, “copper, cheese, or soul” (see his “Minds and Machines” (1960) for details).

Mental states have not only behavioral but mental “functions.” Putnam still accepts the basic functionalist idea that the mind is a “how” more than it is a “what,” but he has gone on to argue that not only could the same mental state be instantiated in different materials, it could also be realized in different “machine states.” Thus he no longer holds that mental functions can be understood as algorithmic computational functions (1988, especially chap. 5). As his thinking evolved, not only was the surrounding world not up to us, even the meaning of our claims and thoughts was not “in the head” and up to us. In short, to use the jargon, just as Putnam was developing his functionalism, he was also developing his “externalism.”
What Ain’t in the Head

According to the traditional understanding of meaning, which goes back to medi-
eval philosophy, the “intension” or meaning of a concept or a term determined the
“extension” of that concept, or what it referred to. Knowing, intending, or grasping a
meaning was taken to be an inner mental state or activity, and hence determining
extension or reference was too. Putnam the externalist argued, however, that mean-
ing did not work this way. Instead, reference was determined in part by the extra-
psychological world. It had always been clear that this was true of “indexical” terms
or concepts like “I” or “today,” since what those terms referred to was obviously as
dependent on passing external context as it was on anything going on in the mind of
a speaker or thinker. But Putnam’s famous “Twin Earth” parable was an attempt to
show that this was true of terms or concepts generally.

The science-fiction world of Twin Earth is much like the real Earth: There are trees,
continents, oceans, animals, and people, and indeed every Earth person has a Twin
Earth counterpart with a similar psychological makeup. Oscar, on earth and Oscar2,
on Twin Earth have indistinguishable perceptions and are inclined to think similar
things as a result of them. But no matter how similar their inner states may be, some-
times the Oscars are referring to different things when they talk and are thinking
of different things when they think. This is because the “water” of Twin Earth just
happens to have the chemical makeup XYZ rather than H2O, and aluminum and
molybdenum happen to switch names and roles on the two planets. Thus, even if
the psychological states of the Oscars are all indistinguishable, each Oscar picks out
something different when he speaks or thinks of either water or molybdenum. To
the extent that meaning involves reference to things and substances, then, meanings
“just ain’t in the head” of the individual speaker or thinker. The surrounding society,
which provides the experts who discover such needed bits of information as “Water is
H2O,” and the outer world, which provides the water that is H2O, are both needed to
help determine what it is that we are talking and thinking about (see 1975a).

Putnam compared his externalist view to that of Saul Kripke, according to whom
terms like “water” are “rigid designators” that pick out the same things or substances
in all possible worlds. Kripke distinguished between epistemic possibility and neces-
sity, which were matters of what we could and could not *imagine*, and metaphysical
possibility and necessity, which were matters of what could and could not *be*. Accord-
ing to this view, not every imaginable or epistemically possible thing was really or
metaphysically possible. Maybe, for example, we could imagine a world in which water
had a microstructure other than H2O, but it seemed intuitive to argue that the stuff we
drink and swim in on earth is necessarily H2O even if we don’t know it. If water is in
fact H2O, it is necessarily H2O. Drinking something with a different microstructure
would be drinking something other than water. And Putnam argued that his story of
Twin Earth supported this view. What we mean on earth by “water” is H2O, while in
an imaginable world in which people drink XYZ, people might use the same word, and
they might even have the same concept, but they are drinking something else.

Putnam thus came to support metaphysical realism, the view that the things we
talk and think about are whatever way they are independently of our thoughts. Things
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like water have necessary features that are discovered by science, and those features make those things what they are even if science has not yet delivered their secret essence to us. Our causal contact with things is what enables us to speak and think of them, not any set of ideas in our heads. Or, at least, this is how things are for non-mental realities.

A Change of Mind

Not long after displaying this much essentialism, Putnam began to have second thoughts. He began to develop a position on the nature of truth and justification that he called “internal realism” (Meaning and the Moral Sciences (1978) has his first statements of and arguments for this position). This is the phase of Putnam’s work most relevant to pragmatism, as he recognized when he later rechristened this view “pragmatic realism” (1987, p. 17).

This was a realistic view above all, but it was a repudiation of Kripke’s kind of metaphysical realism. Under the influence of the neo-pragmatists W. V. Quine (see Quine) and Nelson Goodman, Putnam began to campaign against the idea that the world of non-mental things was wholly independent of mental things. Moreover, and what was perhaps more significant, Putnam began to challenge the idea that mental things were less real than non-mental things. As he put it in his well-known slogan, “The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world” (1981, p. ix). The world and the mind are both real, and each contributes something essential to the existence of the other.

This idea may seem an outrage to a materialist, but it is at least as old as Kant, who thought that various mental concepts and categories, while they did not simply make the world, played a “constitutive” or essential role in the reality of the natural world. What Kant called “empirical realism” was the view that the objects of our experience were “empirically real” phenomenal objects. Charles Peirce accepted something like this view as well, adding that it was useless to try to conceive of the “things in themselves” that Kant described as lying beyond the phenomena. Peirce argued that the phenomenal reality was enough, especially if we understood the phenomenal things as things we could be wrong about. Peirce’s realities do not wholly transcend our human intellectual processes, even the parts of those processes that involved our desires and our felt satisfactions. The “Reals” were to be understood in terms of beliefs or opinions that scientific inquirers would find satisfactory at the ideal end of inquiry. They were whatever those final thoughts were about.

Putnam came to hold a linguistically based Peircean-Kantian view. We find that view exemplified in one of his most famous and controversial arguments: the argument in his book Reason, Truth, and History that we human beings could not possibly be brains in a vat (1981, pp. 1–21). Offering yet another science-fiction scenario, Putnam asks whether we human beings could all be disembodied brains in a vat of nutrient solution with our afferent and efferent nerve endings wired up to a supercomputer. That computer might be out there providing us eternally with a virtual reality, so that we had never really been and would never really be in sensory contact with the physical world. In this situation we human beings would obviously be all
wrong when we spoke of our environment. Our talk about the sun, the trees, and our bodies – not to mention water and molybdenum – would all be devoid of referents. This possibility may seem too preposterous to be frightening or even very interesting, but the epistemological and metaphysical question remains: How could we refute a skeptic who raised this possibility? Can we be sure we know the real world?

Putnam offers an answer to this skeptical question that resembles Kant’s and Peirce’s answers. The real world we know is the world the senses present to us. Our words and thoughts have as referents the sun, trees, bodies, and other things of our experience. We are in direct experiential contact with those things, and indeed we can study that experiential contact by the same empirical means we use to study the things we sense. And as we learn about our relationships to the things around us, we will in fact become able to answer the question “Are we brains in a vat of nutrient fluid?” The answer is “Obviously not.” There is plenty of evidence that we aren’t, and we can find it if only we look in the world of things that we know through the senses. We can observe that our brains are encased in bodies, and we can see that all the vats there are on earth are either empty or full of stuff other than brains hooked up to supercomputers. Or, at least, all the vats and brains that we can refer to or represent to ourselves fit these descriptions.

Resemblance is not enough for representation, as Nelson Goodman insisted, and Putnam points out that this is true even of mental representation. Representation is not a kind of magic; in order to be able to speak of an object, think of it, or even picture it, we have to have a kind of sensory knowledge relationship with that object, in particular one involving use of the representing symbol in dealing with the represented thing. Even intending to represent a thing will not work without this kind of scientifically observable connection. And according to the story of the vat-world, we have no such connection to the vat we inhabit. Thus, when the skeptic tries to raise this possibility, he might as well be barking like a dog. If the possibility he raises is true, then it can’t be true because he is talking about nothing. What he says can’t be true – or false, for that matter – of anything.

Putnam reinforces this incoherence argument with a technical one that originates in the work of Quine. It follows from the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem in mathematical logic that in a standard logical language, if the “values of variables” or referents of terms in that language compose an infinite set, any other infinite set of referents can make the same set of sentences in the language true as long as the predicates in those sentences get the right interpretation. Therefore, to establish the truth-conditions of sentences is not to establish what the terms in those sentences refer or correspond to. Quine argues that this is as true of ordinary language as it is of the artificial sentences of symbolic logic, and he concludes that a philosophical theory of truth, even one that gives the truth-conditions for every sentence in a language, cannot establish which entities correspond to the true sentences. Putnam attempts to extend this argument by showing that even if we could establish the conditions in every possible world for the truth of all sentences of a language, we would not thereby establish what the terms in that language referred or corresponded to (1981, pp. 22–48). This means that an “externalist” like Kripke or the earlier Putnam has an insuperable problem explaining just what entities we are talking about in the world out beyond the minds, languages, or conceptual systems of human knowers. But an “internalist” in the Kantian-Peircean
tradition can explain that a term like “cat” refers to cats, or cats-as-we-categorize-them. Our ordinary terms and concepts, as we ordinarily use them, do all the specifying of referents that is necessary – or possible. Accepting this, however, requires accepting the idea that cats, like vats, do not exist wholly outside our perception and conception.

Rather than saying that everything is inside the subjective mind, Putnam is here trying to challenge the very distinction between the subjective and the objective. Nothing is “outside” our conceptual scheme, in this sense, but this is not because everything has a supernatural or ideal metaphysical nature. Concepts are not things that reflect the world while floating ethereally over it; they are a part of that world. They are tools or procedures that we use for all sorts of purposes, and indeed we have different sets of procedures, or different “language games,” as Ludwig Wittgenstein called them, to serve different purposes. (Pragmatism: An Open Question (1995b) is an extended comparison of pragmatism and Putnam’s pragmatic tendencies with the views of Wittgenstein.) Infinitely many languages, and interpretations of any given language, are possible; there is no God’s-Eye View or One True Theory that really captures what is really there in the world. Or, at least, if there is only one really true theory, we can never look past our interests and willed choices to discover it or make sense of it. Nevertheless, we can answer the philosophically interesting questions concerning what we should say and what we are talking about. We can do so by looking at our human lives of activity and experience. No single set of answers to our questions is imposed on us by reality, but there are better and worse answers, more and less rational ones given our various aims.

The Ideal and the Real

Putnam’s Möbius-strip picture of the mind – no inside, no outside – is neither an idealism nor a materialism, but it should have appeal to both believers in mind and believers in matter. What we should identify as real or true, according to Putnam, is a matter of what we are trying to accomplish and what helps us get the job done, not a matter of what is there on the outside or on the inside. Copper, cheese, or soul, a thing is real if we refer to it or have true things to say about it, and we refer to the things we categorize for various human purposes in our various language games. This is clearly reminiscent of William James’s attempt to use pragmatism, or the view that the truth is what works in life, to reconcile the idealistic “tender-minded” schools of philosophical thought with the materialistic “tough-minded” schools. However, Putnam has expressed both admiration for and considerable skepticism concerning the views of his nineteenth-century Harvard predecessor. James is not enough of a realist for Putnam because James seems to be too relativistic about both truth and reality (see 1997). James anticipates some views of the “postmodern” thinker Richard Rorty (see Rorty), who challenges abstract ideals like truth (or, as Rorty, following James, would style it, “Truth”) in favor of real, particular, socially approved-of justification practices and beliefs (or small-t “truths”). Putnam also wants to understand truth and reference in terms of justification practices, but rational practices, not just whatever harebrained practices people might happen to satisfy themselves with.
Relativistic views like Rorty’s and James’s, which appear to identify what is true with what is judged true by the individual or by a given group, seem self-refuting. Putnam has expressed fondness for Alan Garfinkel’s joke: “Man, I understand where you’re coming from, but relativism isn’t true for me.” If anyone judges relativism false – as Putnam and others do – then, by its own standard, relativism is simply false for everyone who lives in the world with the anti-relativist. (Maybe it sends believers in relativism off into their own subjectively created worlds, but can it do this objectively?) Also, if James’s “truths” are beliefs that “work” or provide successful future outcomes, truths about the past, and even some truth about the present, becomes hard to understand. Truths about the dinosaurs are not awaiting our future satisfaction or success, and, with regard to the present, Putnam makes the Russellian argument that, thanks to logical quantifiers, we can refer to things with which we are not directly acquainted. For example, there may or may not be, out there in the universe so far away that light from it will never reach us, a giant hundred-sided polygon of stars in otherwise empty space, and the truth or falsity of the statement that there is such a thing has nothing to do with anything any human being will ever perceive (1995a, p. 294). Ideas like this seem to put significant distance between Putnam and the historical pragmatists, and in the 1990s he announced that he was giving up his “internal” or “pragmatic realism” in favor of a “natural realism” or a “second naïveté” that better acknowledged the distinctness of the world, or many parts of it, anyway, from our beliefs and the experiences we use to verify them.

Reality, like that of the dinosaurs or the stars, makes truths true, or it at least plays a crucial role. Insofar as that reality is humanly knowable, it is overlaid by – or, better, hopelessly mixed up with – concepts that we human beings generate for our own purposes; but the real is still largely independent of us and our purposes. And therefore so is truth itself. Truth is no more in the head than is meaning or reference. It is an ideal beyond our little contingent psychological realities. Since it involves concepts we generate for our own reasons, it does involve those little psychological parts of the real world, but it involves more realities than those. Even though dinosaurs and the stars are known to us only as they are categorized by us, they are not simply identical to or products of the categories we have made up. There is a part of those “empirically real” things that we have found, and that part plays a governing role in the categorization process. Thanks to it we can get our categorizations wrong; we can say false things about dinosaurs and the rest. Thus, though there is no making sense of a single ideal perspective or God’s-Eye View from which to see the world, we can and must hold on to our traditional epistemic ideals, including the ideal of truth.

Facts and Values

Putnam’s most recent work has offered challenges to the traditional distinction between facts and values. He has criticized at length the picture of science as independent of value judgments, and he has attacked the idea that values, unlike scientific facts, are relative to individuals or societies. The best scientific theories are just that: the best. They are the right things to say about the world. Matching all the facts is not enough: there are always infinitely many ways to match all the facts. We want
theories that match the facts best, or in the most helpful, simplest, least gratuitously eccentric way possible. And moral and political evaluations involve paying attention to the facts just as scientific theorizing does, though the kinds of facts that we attend to in moral thinking, like facts about who is “cruel” or who is “reasonable,” call into question any sharp distinction between fact and value. Indeed, Putnam suggests, alluding to Quine’s well-known attack on logical positivism, that this dichotomy is the “last dogma of empiricism” (2002, p. 145).

Putnam’s new natural or direct realism fits this picture of fact and value as intertwined. Though it says that the fact of belief or practice is one thing and the ideal of truth or rationality another, and though it argues for a reality separate from our evaluations as the basis of the ideal truth, direct realism also places the rule-governedness, justifications, and ideality associated with cognition out into the natural world of real things.

The fundamental feature of direct realism is the idea that there is no “interface,” no set of perceptual entities or “sense-data,” acting as a bridge between our ability to know the truth and the objects of the world. The mind is not a thing that has to bridge a gap to get at those objects. When we know the truth we know the objects of the world directly. And this means that when we think philosophically of what it is to know truth, we should not feel torn between verificationism, or the deflationary idea that there is really no such thing as truth apart from the sentences we happen to accept, and metaphysical realism, or the inflationary idea that truth is a mysterious, metaphysically free-standing relation of representation unconnected to our practices of accepting sentences. Our linguistic practices are indeed connected to truth, even to truth as known through perceptual experience, but they are not therefore tied to a lot of verifying perceptual images or representations in the mind or the brain (see 1994).

According to Putnam the direct realist, who is influenced heavily by the later Wittgenstein, to see the truth about a given set of objects or an event is not to see something else besides the objects or the event; but neither is it simply to see the objects or the event. It is seeing the objects or the event connected in our practices with certain sentences and not with others. No third thing or lot of things intervenes between the objects and the sentences to make the sentences the right things to say or accept, but there is still, thanks to the way we do things, a rightness in the true sentences that is not there in just anything that might be said. Our practices of speaking and acting subsume sentences and objects alike, much as, we might say, the game of baseball subsumes both a cry of “Strike!” and a ball whizzing over home plate. It’s not right for the umpire to yell “Strike!” when a ball comes past the batter over the plate because of the ump’s sense-data, nor is it right because the concept of strike meshes logically with the concept of ball-whizzing-over-plate. It’s right because that’s the way it’s done: The ump is supposed to yell when the ball actually crosses the plate. The umpire can see that, since there is no screen of pure perceptual phenomena between her or him and the event. And this means that what the umpire sees is also part of the game. Her or his perceptions are not inner events; they involve outer things that are part of the larger practice. And, moreover, what she or he sees in this case is not only a ball whizzing across the plate, but a strike – though not because that is how “strike” is defined logically. Logic would not rule out a practice in which the umpire called a strike, let’s say, whenever the pitcher’s wind-up was pretty or interesting or athletic enough. We make exceptions for foul balls, so why not for this? (Nor, analogously,
would it rule out a chess game in which pawns could be put in check; see the example from Wittgenstein cited in 1994, p. 512.) Logic alone, conceived of as something apart from the way we actually do things, wouldn’t even force us to call such a different game by a different name, “baseball,” “rhythmic gymnastic baseball,” or whatever. However, we would call such a game a stupid waste of time because it wouldn’t give us what we typically want from baseball, which is in part a test of batting skills. Consequently, we can rely on the way we actually do things, which involves observation of events that really happen in the real world, as our guide to the right moment to yell “Strike!” Thanks to our encompassing practices, true or correct strike claims, like strikes themselves, are in fact straightforwardly a matter of balls crossing plates or getting knocked foul.

Something like this view is Putnam’s model for truth generally. We have non-“stupid” practices that involve both real objects and sentences, and the truth or rightness of those sentences come out of those real-life practices involving those real objects. Those practices are subject to development as we develop new concepts and technologies that change what we are inclined to say in a given context, and we have a number of different practices that may make us want to say more than one thing about a given circumstance, and therefore there is no absolute truth, no single absolutely complete set of true propositions waiting to be expressed. Nevertheless, this is not a relativistic or subjectivistic picture of truth, either. In fact, it allows Putnam to distinguish himself more clearly than before from the philosophers who think that there is no truth connected with a world of real things. It is a common-sense realism, the realism of ordinary life. Putnam has made a philosophical round trip from the familiar to the familiar.

Is Putnam Postmodern Despite Himself?

It is not clear whether Putnam’s views on truth and reality amount to a position very different from the pragmatic “postmodernist” outlook that Putnam finds, to use his favorite term of criticism, “disastrous.” Putnam argues that verificationists like William James and Richard Rorty are ultimately “antirealists” who would explain away mind-independent reality and truth. Rorty’s view, especially would leave behind not even real beliefs and theories but only “marks and noises” that somehow have whatever causal impacts they have on us complexly behaving human animals. But this is a remarkably and regrettably uncharitable interpretation of what the pragmatic verificationist has to say.

According to Rorty’s relativistic pragmatism as Putnam describes it, any marks and noises we might make and whatever causal impacts they might have are as good as any others, since there is no real, non-human reality to provide a real truth or rightness for some marks, noises, and impacts and not others. It is hard, indeed, to see how there could even be marks, noises, or causal impacts if there were simply no reality, but in this view reality is as relative as truth, and so presumably different social groups live in different worlds created by their different languages – or their “languages,” their different sets of marks and noises. It hardly seems likely that marks and noises could create dinosaurs or the stars in their constellations, not to mention the marks and noises themselves, even in different relative worlds. And maybe that’s one more
reason Rorty’s verificationist, deflationist outlook is such a disaster; but isn’t it more likely to be a sign that Putnam is attacking a straw man?

Furthermore, James’s notion of independent reality is in fact mind-dependent in a way Putnam should find innocuous. James never argues that reality as a whole is dependent solely on either our decisions or our subjective experiences, much less our marks and noises. He famously describes a three-part “reality” consisting of experienced objects, the pre-existing beliefs with which we thinkers come to every inquiry, and the logical rules that keep our thought from becoming chaotic (James 1975, p. 117f.). In a somewhat Kant-like way, we see the objects through the prism of prior beliefs and logical principles, and we wind up with a world in which “the human serpent is over everything.” According to this story, we create “subjects of propositions” in something like the way we create “real representations” in Kant’s picture. They would not exist if we didn’t, but we contribute only one constitutive aspect of those things. Only the pre-existing beliefs part of the three-part reality is clearly of our own making. And even our beliefs are not entirely up to us, obviously, since we can’t decide to believe just anything. James the pragmatist is only trying to help us see how to decide whether to be skeptics, materialists, dualists, idealists, Kantians, or something else not yet imagined. (Though James the radical empiricist may have some ontological ambitions.) Deciding in advance of all our coming experiences that the real is relative to what we think: this is exactly what James’s pragmatism does not do. For the Jamesian pragmatist, it is usefulness in life that makes truths true, not things of any kind: copper, cheese, or soul. There couldn’t be any usefulness without things, obviously, but questions about the nature of those things, or about when and where they exist, are beside the point (see Cormier 2001 for a comparison of James, Kant, and Putnam on the nature of the real).

In keeping with this view, Rorty, James’s contemporary follower, mainly urges us to leave purely philosophical debates about the nature of reality aside as unprofitable. He does not argue that there is no such thing as the real or the really true any more than the historical pragmatists did. He does like to say things that a realist like Putnam will find hair-raising, such as his occasional descriptions of language as our marks and noises, or of truth as what society lets us say; but these are always descriptions, not definitions. Following Quine, Rorty is suspicious of the very idea of definition; and while “marks and noises” and “what society lets us say” are indeed fair enough descriptions of our linguistic phenomena – along with countless other fair descriptions – they would obviously make terrible definitions. Fortunately, a pragmatist like Rorty is interested instead in providing us only with helpful accounts of what James referred to as “the particular go” of truth, the details of the way truth typically and contingently works in life, or aspects of the way we actually know truth when we see it. True descriptions of language and truth are sufficient for that job. Rorty has no interest in arguing either that there is no reality or for any particular kind of real world; on the topic of the real he explicitly compares himself to a secularist who does not want to debate whether God exists or what His attributes are but wants instead to change the subject to something more worthwhile (Rorty 1982, Introduction.)

Moreover, and more important, what seems most worthwhile to both James and Rorty is also what drives Putnam to worry about the real in the first place. Putnam is interested in the idea of the real not for its own sake but because he sees it as an
indispensable part of what keeps us thinkers and speakers honest and determined to
get at the truth. It is part of what keeps us looking outside ourselves, using our brains,
mouths, and pens to do something other than greedily benefit ourselves and our own
little herds. It allows us to hope that we can speak for humanity rather than ourselves
alone, and Putnam wants more than anything a picture of thought and language that
reflects the fragile human values that we display (sometimes) when we think and speak
in real life. He concludes the Dewey Lectures that introduce his “natural realism” with
the remark: “if there was one great insight in pragmatism, it was the insistence that
what has weight in our lives should have weight in philosophy” (1994, p. 517). Putnam
challenges both of the great wings of modern philosophical thought because their in-
habitants fail to get this point. The verificationist wing bases every truth on our inner
experience and disregards life in the world, and the absolutist wing prescribes what we
should say before we live our lives. The former is inhumanly self-centered, the latter
humanly indifferent. Putnam’s efforts on behalf of the real are above all efforts to keep
philosophy from giving up on humanity in one or the other of these ways.

Our interest in humanity is fragile and precious; that much should be clear after the
twentieth century, not to mention the beginning of the twenty-first. Through all his
phases and versions, Putnam has displayed a concern with this fact. He has tried to show
philosophy a way to stay concerned with real human life as it is lived amid real things
and events. But the “postmodernists,” to use that homely and self-contradictory term,
also want to provide a small-r realistic way of thinking about truth and knowledge.
Figures like James and Rorty also want a way to help settle debates between verification-
ist empiricists and moral, logical, and religious rationalists, and moreover a way that
does not involve taking one or another dubious metaphysics of reality or truth for
granted at the beginning. They want to provide a philosophy that lets life be the judge
of thought instead. And they try to do this with an approach that is, in the end, hard
to distinguish from Putnam’s “direct realism.” Their account of truth treats true beliefs
and claims as the ones that are appropriate in our real-life practices. They acknowledge
that different practices require different ways of looking at things and putting things,
but Putnam, ever skeptical of the God’s-Eye View, does no less. And the pragmatists
describe the real as what the true beliefs help us deal with in those evolving and difficult
practical activities, not as something either utterly arbitrary or utterly apart from our
experiences and decisions. This is a fair approximation of Putnam’s deepest insight. The
Jamesians are skeptical of the distinction between the found and the made or the non-
human and the human, but that distinction pretty much coincides with the distinction
between facts and values, and Putnam crusades tirelessly against that particular dual-
ism. Thus the opprobrium Putnam heaps on the Jamesians’ friendly and good-natured
ideas, which he ought rather to find sympathetic, is mystifying. (For example, Rorty
(1993) offers Putnam an olive branch; Putnam (2000) responds, inexplicably, by
accusing Rorty of relying for knowledge of truth on an interface of sense-data.)

The tradition of modern philosophy is an oscillation, with occasional scattered
compromises, between anti-realism and realism, subject-focus and object-focus, relativ-
ism and absolutism. We are impelled at either of these poles to overlook real life
and human activity, which go on in neither a purely subjective nor a purely objective
world. The pragmatists and Putnam alike try to bring this philosophical oscillation
and overlooking to an end. Pragmatism has thus been importantly “postmodern” from

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the beginning; and there is some reason to think that Putnam is more of a pragmatist, and hence more of a postmodernist, than he realizes.

References and further reading

**Works by Putnam**


**Works by other authors**

Philosophical pragmatism has exercised a significant influence in the development of Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical views – both directly, through his reading of Charles Peirce (see Peirce) and George Herbert Mead (see Mead), and indirectly, through the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, Karl-Otto Apel, and Michael Dummett. It was through his early encounter with Peirce’s epistemic conception of truth that Habermas first became persuaded that moral cognitivism was a defensible philosophical position. The influence of Mead’s social interactionism can be seen throughout Habermas’s theory of communicative action. This pragmatist inheritance has been the focus of considerable discussion, and provides the organizing theme for a collection of essays edited by Mitchell Aboulafia et al., Habermas and Pragmatism (2002). This chapter will instead examine what Habermas himself has contributed to the pragmatism tradition, discussing Habermas as a pragmatist philosopher.

Habermas was born on June 18, 1929 in Düsseldorf, Germany. He belongs to the so-called “second generation” of Frankfurt school critical theorists (see Marxism and Critical Theory). He taught at the University of Heidelberg, was the Director of the Max Planck Institute, and then became Director of the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt from 1983 until retiring in 1993.

Habermas’s central contribution to the pragmatist tradition lies in his development and use of so-called “transcendental-pragmatic” arguments. He was not the first to suggest that pragmatists might adopt transcendental argumentation strategies, nor did he coin the term “transcendental-pragmatic.” Both innovations are due to Apel. The difference is that Habermas, unlike Apel, develops his transcendental-pragmatic arguments in a way that respects the traditional pragmatist commitments to fallibilism and anti-foundationalism. He often uses the terms “quasi-transcendental,” “universal-pragmatic,” or sometimes just “formal-pragmatic,” in order to distinguish his position from that of Apel.

Habermas has described his use of “quasi-transcendental” argument as the single most difficult element of his philosophy to defend. This is not surprising, since there is widespread confusion among philosophers over the very meaning of the term “transcendental.” Many authors, such as Joseph Margolis, simply equate transcendentalism with metaphysics or foundationalism, and so assume that there is an “irreconcilable
opposition” between Kantianism and pragmatism. Perhaps Habermas’s greatest con- 
tribution lies in having transcended these false doctrinal oppositions.

Transcendental Arguments

To understand what a “transcendental-pragmatic” argument is, it is helpful first to 
explain the Kantian understanding of a transcendental argument. Kant’s most signi- 
ficant use of this argumentation form occurs in his defense of our everyday conception 
of the physical world as a causal nexus. Hume pointed out that perception alone is 
insufficient to give us a very rich conception of causality. All that we ever observe, he 
claimed, is a series of discrete events. The idea that there could be any underlying 
connection between them, much less one that would allow us to project the outcome 
of future interactions, is not something that experience alone can provide. He concluded, 
on these grounds, that our idea of a causal connection arises only from a certain habit 
of mind. Having seen events unfold in a particular sequence, he argued, we develop a 
tendency to expect the same sequence again under similar circumstances. This is how 
we are inclined to think, and there is no reason that other people should not think 
differently. And if we encountered people who didn’t have this particular habit of 
mind, there isn’t much that we could do to recommend it to them.

Kant responds to this argument by first granting the core of this “psychologistic” 
thesis. Causal relations are not something that, strictly speaking, we perceive; they are 
something that we “read into” experience. This does not entitle us, however, to regard 
them as arbitrary, or as merely a habit of mind. This is because, Kant claims, we would 
not be able to have a perceptual experience of an object if we did not also conceptualize 
it as something that fits into a causal nexus. So while we “happen” to treat objects as 
though they were causally connected, there is nothing arbitrary about this, since we 
would not be able to perceive them at all if we did not do so.

The argument that purports to establish this conclusion is the notoriously obscure 
transcendental deduction. Whatever the merits of the substantive argument that Kant 
provides, it is the argument’s form that is of interest here. The transcendental deduction 
does not attempt to justify directly our imputation of a causal ordering to events, and 
it is certainly not designed to convince someone who doesn’t have this structure of mind 
to go out and acquire it. In this respect, the transcendental deduction is not really a 
justification of our claims about causality. The way that Kant develops it, it is simply a 
way of disarming a certain sort of philosophical anxiety. He claims, in effect, that even 
if we can’t justify the way things are, the alternative cannot be coherently conceptual- 
ized, and so we don’t have to worry about it. Thus the task of philosophical justification 
is supplanted by the critique of metaphysics, where “metaphysics” here denotes the 
temptation to speculate about what might happen under inconceivable circumstances.

The conclusion of Kant’s argument can be clarified by reconstructing it within the 
framework of contemporary modal semantics. It is common these days to understand 
the modal operators of necessity, possibility, and impossibility as a set of restricted 
quantifiers over possible worlds. They are restricted by an implicit accessibility relation. 
Thus, to say that $p$ is necessary is to say that $p$ is true at all possible worlds access- 
able to our own. Different accessibility relations then generate different concepts of
necessity. If all worlds with the same laws of logic as our own are considered accessible, then this provides the notion of logical necessity. If all worlds with the same laws of physics as our own are considered accessible, then this provides the notion of physical necessity. Within this framework, transcendental necessity can be introduced simply by defining a new accessibility relation. A postulate is transcendentally necessary if it is true at all possible worlds cognitively accessible to our own.

If we think that the limits of what can be conceptualized are determined only by the laws of logic, then this transcendental accessibility relation will be redundant. But for Kant, this would be true only of a purely “discursive” intellect (such as God). As corporeal beings, we are restricted in what we can perceive. This imposes a broadly verificationalist constraint on what we can conceive, which in turn makes the notion of cognitive accessibility much narrower than that of logical accessibility. Thus the set of cognitively accessible possible worlds are those containing states of affairs which could be objects of possible intuition. The transcendental deduction attempts to show that a world in which there are no causal connections between events, while logically possible, is not transcendentally possible (because states of affairs in it could not be perceived, given the kind of mental equipment we have). Because our system of perception requires us to conceive of objects as causally linked, the existence of such connections is true at all possible worlds cognitively accessible to our own, and so it is transcendentally necessary.

Kant developed this argument entirely within the framework of the philosophy of consciousness, and so assumed that the only transcendentally necessary postulates would be ones corresponding to structures that exist in our heads. Habermas’s key insight lies in the recognition that, with the “social turn” in epistemology effected by the pragmatists, it is not just psychological structures that may attain the status of transcendentally necessary postulates, but social practices as well. His first sustained attempt to develop this insight occurs in Knowledge and Human Interests (1971). This book is best understood as a response to the attack on Marxism initiated by proponents of the “sociology of knowledge,” Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim. They argued that, if Marx was correct, and Bentham’s philosophy was simply the ideology of the bourgeoisie, then it followed that Marx’s philosophy was simply the ideology of the proletariat, and thus neither more nor less true. More generally, they claimed that all ideas and beliefs could be analyzed as simply a reflection of the interests of the individuals who adhered to them.

In the same way that Kant responded to Hume by first granting the core of the “psychologistic” thesis, Habermas responds to Scheler and Mannheim by granting the core of the “sociologistic” thesis. He accepts that all knowledge comes embedded in social contexts, and thus reflects the practical interests of the groups that develop it. But these interests, he claims, are not arbitrary. Among the various practical concerns that structure our cognitive achievements, there are certain interests that recur in every context. These interests must be present in order for these achievements to count as instances of knowledge at all. Thus he identifies a class of what he calls “knowledge-constitutive” cognitive interests – in technical control, mutual understanding, and emancipation – involving pragmatic relations between the individual and the natural world, the domain of social interaction, and the inner realm of subjectivity. These correspond to “anthropologically deep-seated structures,” and
are therefore “nichthintergehbar” ("ungetbehindable"), or transcendentally necessary (1973, p. 9).

Habermas attempts to develop this argument within a purely epistemological framework (an epistemology heavily influenced by Apel’s reading of Peirce). Partly due to weaknesses in this argument, but partly due to his encounter with analytic philosophy of language, Habermas in later years moved away from this framework toward one grounded in an analysis of social action and speech acts.

The Linguistic Turn

While Kant was primarily interested in the constraints that the structure of perception imposes on conceptualization, the “linguistic turn” in analytic philosophy drew attention to the role that language plays in constraining the range of conceptualizable states of affairs. With Wittgenstein came the recognition that in order for a state of affairs to be cognitively accessible to us, it must be possible for us to say in what that state of affairs consists. This is the idea underlying his claim that “the limits of language are the limits of my world.” But not just anything can be said. Certain constraints must be satisfied in order to make an intelligible statement. As a result, many philosophers began to suspect that the question of which possible worlds are cognitively accessible to our own would be best answered by developing a theory of meaning.

One immediate consequence of this view is that any conditions which must be satisfied in order for language to function correctly will be transcendentally necessary. To take one example, Donald Davidson (1984) has argued that the interpretations we give to one another’s linguistic behavior are severely underdetermined by the evidence available to us. Any particular utterance can be interpreted in a variety of different ways, simply by varying the beliefs that we ascribe to the person who uttered it. And since these beliefs are propositional attitudes, the content of these beliefs can be varied by changing the interpretations that we give to these sentences. As a result, the only way that we can possibly understand one another is if we privilege one of these interpretations. Davidson argues that we do so by selecting the ascription of meaning and belief that maximizes the number of true beliefs held by that individual; this is Davidson’s “principle of charity.”

It is a consequence of the principle of charity that belief is intrinsically veridical. In order to ascribe a set of predominantly false beliefs to an individual, one would have to interpret this person uncharitably (since it is always possible to make more of these beliefs come out true by changing one’s assumptions about what the person means by what she says). But once the principle of charity is abrogated, there is no longer much left to go on in constructing an interpretation. People can be interpreted as saying or believing pretty much anything at all. This makes it impossible to figure out what the contents of their beliefs are, and, as a result, gives us no reason to ascribe contents to them in the first place. Therefore, a world in which people have predominantly false beliefs is not cognitively accessible to us.

This view amounts to a transcendental argument in defense of the intrinsic veridicality of belief. The important thing to note about this argument is that it does not provide a positive justification for the claim that beliefs have this status. What it says is
something more like, “well if they didn’t, we wouldn’t be having this conversation.” It is a brute fact about us that we interpret one another charitably. But since we wouldn’t be able to interpret one another at all without doing so, given that this principle provides the central criterion of the intelligibility of our utterances, any speculation about suspending it is cognitively idle. And if we did happen to meet people who didn’t interpret utterances charitably, then we would not be able to persuade them that they should, simply because we would not be able to understand what they were doing at all.

Habermas appropriates this idea from Davidson, but modifies it through appeal to what he calls the “epistemic turn” in semantics initiated by Dummett (1984, p. 317). Dummett argues, in effect, that we need not go so far as to ascribe truth to one another’s utterances. The same “surface” features of linguistic communication can be adequately reconstructed by substituting the notion of justification for truth throughout the theory of meaning. Thus the linguistic analysis, rather than establishing the intrinsic veridicality of belief, establishes what Habermas calls the “internal relationship between meaning and validity.” The pragmatist twist comes from Habermas’s further claims that the notion of validity, or justification, can only be understood in terms of the social practice of argumentation (or “discourse”). Thus mental content, in Habermas’s view, gets analyzed in terms of linguistic content, which then gets cashed out in terms of validity conditions, which are determined by the norms governing discursive practices. Thus these norms, or rules of argumentation, wind up occupying a transcendental status with respect to possible mental contents.

Habermas claims that there are three central forms of discourse, which give content to each of three separate validity claims: truth, rightness, and sincerity. The most important element of his theory involves the relationship between rightness claims and so-called “practical discourse.” Habermas claims that imperative speech acts can only be understood through interpretation of the rightness claim that they raise, which must in turn be redeemed in a specifically “practical” form of discourse. He then claims that discourses of this type are implicitly governed by a rule of argumentation, which stipulates that social norms are justifiable only if they embody a generalizable interest. When explicitly thematized and propositionally formulated, this rule takes the form of a universalization principle, which he refers to as “U” (1990, p. 65).

Habermas attempts to redeem the primary intuition of Kant’s moral philosophy, that there is an internal connection between rationality and morality, by interpreting rationality in terms of certain constitutive social practices. Habermas attempts to redeem the fundamental intuition of Kant’s moral philosophy, that there is an internal connection between rationality and morality, by interpreting rationality in terms of certain constitutive social practices, then showing that these practices impose formal constraints upon the content of possible judgments – constraints that we recognize as having implicitly moral content. Pragmatism about cognition thus serves as a vehicle for the redemption of Kant’s philosophical project.

Differences From Apel

It is worth saying a word or two about the differences between Habermas’s project and Apel’s, since the two are often confused. Apel also thinks that careful analysis of the
rules of argumentation governing practical discourse yields a universalization principle very much like Habermas’s. Unlike Habermas, however, Apel believes that this principle applies directly to social action, as a type of “supernorm,” such that any actor, when called upon, should be able to show that his actions do not violate this principle. Habermas, on the other hand, applies this principle only in a sociologically mediated fashion. Everyday conduct, in Habermas’s view, is governed by a set of social norms, and agents are only obliged to justify their actions in terms of these norms. However, when the norms are challenged, agents are implicitly committed to entering into a practical discourse aimed at either redeeming or revising them. It is this discourse, and only this discourse, that is governed by the universalization principle. Thus U has an impact on social action only indirectly, by constraining the range of discursively redeemable social norms.

The second major difference is that Apel claims a foundational status (Letztbegründung) for his rules of argumentation (1990, p. 43). Anyone who tries to deny such a rule commits what he calls a “performative contradiction.” These contradictions occur when one makes a move in the language-game of argumentation, while simultaneously claiming that no such move is being made, or denying the legitimacy of the move. Thus the incoherence in saying “It’s snowing outside, but I don’t believe it,” does not come from a semantic contradiction, but rather a performative contraction. On this basis, Apel claims that any attempt to deny the authority of his fundamental normative principle is incoherent. Habermas, on the other hand, rejects this argumentation strategy. While he agrees with Apel that denying certain rules of discourse generates a performative contradiction, he does not think that an appeal to these contradictions can be used to justify these rules. This is because the rules themselves, in Habermas’s view, do not need to be justified. In discourse ethics, Habermas argues, “the fact that there are no alternatives to these rules of argumentation is what is being proved; the rules themselves are not being justified” (1990, p. 95).

Performative contradictions, in Habermas’s view, thus serve only the “maeutic role” of helping us to identify and reconstruct the rules of argumentation. Any attempt to develop a propositional representation of this “implicit knowledge” (such as the various formulations of U), will produce a falsifiable theory like any other. Thus the goal of Habermas’s transcendental-pragmatic argument is not to establish foundations for the practice of moral judgment. It is intended merely to disarm a certain form of philosophical anxiety, by showing that moral skepticism is metaphysical in the Kantian sense of the term (i.e. it involves speculation about what might occur under inconceivable circumstances). Thus the transcendental-pragmatic argument, Habermas claims, is primarily “therapeutic.” It is aimed at dissolving some of the “confusion” that moral skepticism has produced “in the minds of the educated” (1990, p. 98).

References and further reading

Works by Habermas

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**Works by other authors**


Richard Rorty is a controversial figure in contemporary philosophy. The very mention of his name in a respectful tone gets some philosophers hot under the collar and from others a prompt dismissal. Others, including some very important others, take him very seriously indeed. Among them, some think his views are largely on the mark and importantly creative and innovative (such as Donald Davidson, Michael Williams, and this author) while others take him equally seriously but think his views are deeply and importantly flawed (such as Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor).

Richard Rorty was born on October 4, 1931 in New York City. He was a professor of philosophy at Princeton University from 1961 to 1982, a professor of the humanities at the University of Virginia from 1982 to 1998, and since 1998 has been professor of comparative literature at Stanford University.

Rorty is one of the most important philosophical figures of our time. While I have criticized and recorded my reservations about his work, he has clearly articulated some very important things in the way they should be articulated. Indeed, I would conjecture (always a chancy matter concerning such things) that, like Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas), W. V. Quine (see Quine), and Davidson, Rorty will be studied in the next century and will not, like many others of current fame, disappear from view.

This chapter gives an account of Rorty’s version of pragmatism after the so-called linguistic turn, his attack on epistemology and metaphysics, and his metaphilosophy. I shall weave into my account what I take to be some of the most important criticisms that have been made of Rorty and consider some of the ways he has responded or could have responded. Rorty would scoff at being called a systematic philosopher but, as with Quine and Davidson, if one reads him attentively and carefully, then the various parts of his account fall into a coherent and interrelated whole yielding an understanding and a vision of what philosophy has been, is now and could, with luck, become.

Rorty, in a manner very unlike Wittgenstein’s, is lavish with his “isms.” He typically characterizes the stance he takes in terms of some “ism” or other (though typically a negative one): anti-representationalism, anti-epistemology, anti-essentialism, anti-metaphysics, anti-ethical theory, anti-authoritarianism, anti-grand social theory, anti-Philosophy, and the like. This could be summed up in what I think
is a pervasive attitude, indeed a deeply held conviction, of Rorty’s, namely his anti-theoreticism: his deep distrust of theory. This runs through all the topics he discusses, from metaphilosophy to epistemology and metaphysics, to ethics and politics. The pervasiveness and the rationale for this shall be a \textit{leitmotif} of this chapter.

One thing should be immediately recognized as problematic: the very idea of anti-Philosophy. That proves, some of his critics will say, that Rorty wants to see the \textit{end} of philosophy and indeed that he is being frivolous about and dismissive of philosophy. Rorty rejects that characterization and one can see why from a characterization he makes in \textit{The Consequences of Pragmatism} (1982, pp. xiv–xvii). Rorty remarks that “philosophy’ can mean simply what Wilfrid Sellars called ‘an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.’” Rorty goes on to say (1) that “no one would be dubious about philosophy taken in this sense” and (2) that this activity covers many people, including many intellectuals, who would not normally be thought to be philosophers and may exclude some professional people, able in their own way, who are traditionally classified as philosophers, such as Alonzo Church or Richmond H. Thomason. (Leo Tolstoy or George Eliot, however, on the above characterization, are philosophers and, as Rorty says, “Henry Adams is more of a philosopher than Frege.”)

Rorty goes on to say: “No one would be dubious about philosophy taken in this sense.” But many would be dubious, and with good reason, about \textit{philosophy}, which is something more specialized, where “Philosophy” is taken to mean “following Plato and Kant’s lead in asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions (e.g., ‘truth’, ‘rationality’, ‘goodness’) in the hope of better obeying such norms.” Where I italicize and capitalize \textit{Philosophy} I am speaking of the metaphysical-epistemological position of the Tradition which Rorty repudiates and claims should be set aside. When I use \textit{philosophy} with a little “p” and italicized, I am speaking of the Sellarian thing that Rorty thinks is both unproblematic and a valuable thing to do. Where the “p” in neither philosophy nor \textit{Philosophy} is italicized, I am being neutral concerning which (if either) is to be claimed. In spite of the harshness of his dismissal of Philosophy, Rorty is not saying that the great dead philosophers, who were usually both (I add) \textit{Philosophers} and \textit{philosophers}, should not be read and studied. Of course they should.

Rorty, like any sensible and reflective person, regards them as an indispensable and precious part of our cultural heritage.

\textit{Philosophy} is an affair of the \textit{Philosophic Tradition}, while \textit{philosophy} is something quite common and pervasive among reflective people and has nothing necessarily to do with any professional discipline or activity. “Pragmatists,” Rorty adds, “are saying that the best hope for \textit{philosophy} is not to practice \textit{Philosophy}. They think it will not help to say something true to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about Rationality” (1982, p. xv).

Some might think that this is not only to be anti-theoretical but that it is to be crudely Luddite. But we must remember that when Rorty is talking about Truth, Goodness, and Rationality, he is taking them to be proper names of objects – goals or standards – objects of ultimate concern. He takes them to be interlocked Platonic notions. He has a long and careful elucidation of such notions and particularly of the whole Cartesian and Kantian traditions whose usefulness, and even their very
intelligibility, he puts in question. James Conant, in an insightful discussion, raises questions as to whether it is uselessness or unintelligibility that is centrally at issue. It looks like it can’t be both, for to discover that something is useless would seem at least to presuppose that it is intelligible. In his earlier writings Rorty stressed unintelligibility; in his later writings he stresses lack of usefulness. Conant makes it evident that there is something to be sorted out here (see Conant 1994, pp. xxvii–xxxiii).

The claim that there is nothing dubious or problematical about philosophy in contrast to Philosophy, however, can be challenged by noting that philosophers like Wittgenstein would find both philosophy and Philosophy problematic. Seeing how things hang together, especially in the broadest possible sense of the term, is no easy or unproblematic feat. It is not altogether clear what it would be like to do this or what our criteria for success here would be. To weave and unweave the web of our beliefs until we gain an understanding of the “scheme of things entire” may be such an utterly hapless task – as hapless as Philosophy – that it is better not to try to engage in it. Indeed we may only have an inchoate sense of what we are after.

However, on the contrary, philosophy is not as problematic as Philosophy. We have some sense of what it would be like to forge a belief pattern that would cohere and not just be a mere jumble. Full and complete coherence is another thing. We have no idea what that is. But we have an idea how to get our affairs in order and we have some idea how people in Europe or North America should live. Not a precise idea, of course, but some, albeit contestable, idea that could be developed and articulated with persuasiveness and care. And when I said that philosophers like Quine, Davidson, and Rorty have accounts of philosophy that hang together, you understood something of what to expect in reading their accounts to either confirm or disconfirm what I said. We have, in fine, some coherent sense of how to do philosophy, but no coherent sense of how either intelligibly or usefully to do Philosophy. The pragmatist realizes that she can best do philosophy by being anti-Philosophical. She wants to bring an end to Philosophy but not to philosophy. By doing philosophy, she can perhaps gain something of a sense of things, make some sense of our world, some sense of the problems of human beings and how not to distract ourselves with the pseudo-problems of Philosophy: asking and giving fallibilistically, fully aware of our finitude, and without the “ambition of transcendence,” something of what a just society or even a world would be, and something of how a life could be fulfilling. In seeking these things, pragmatists do not expect a perfect fit, but they are not satisfied with just a jumble of beliefs either. They seek to give some coherence to their beliefs and some sense of what is important and what is not.

Pragmatists, classical and neo, care about these things and believe that Platonic-like reflections on Reason, the Truth, and Justice will do nothing to yield enlightenment. Indeed, these Platonic undertakings will just serve to impede our understanding of what Rorty’s anti-theoreticism comes to.

Rorty characterizes pragmatism as anti-representationalism (1990; 1996, pp. 635–7). This is a view which meshes nicely with philosophy and is a major tool in the setting aside of Philosophy, particularly in its Cartesian and Kantian forms. It is also a major tool in his attack on foundationalism, the conception of mind as a mirror of nature (a key notion in representational theories of knowledge), his rejection of correspondence theories of truth, his setting aside of epistemology, and his rejection of the
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conception of knowledge as accurate representation depending on an a priori knowledge of mind as something inner that each of us has a direct and privileged access to and which affords Philosophy with a foundational knowledge of “ultimate reality,” a grasp of “the unconditional” and criteria of “unconditional validity.”

As Rorty puts it in the very first page of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*:

Philosophy as a discipline . . . sees itself as the attempt to underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion. It purports to do this on the basis of its special understanding of the nature of knowledge and of mind. Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge and philosophy adjudicates such claims. (1979, p. 3)

Philosophers can come to know something, this traditional claim of Philosophy contends, that no one else can know so well. Philosophy, as Kant contended, is “a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture” (ibid., p. 4). It can do this in studying persons as knowers of the activity of representation. This will enable us to see how knowledge is possible, how a knowledge is possible which consists in accurate representation of what is outside of the mind. To “understand the possibility and the nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations” (ibid., p. 3).

On this traditional conception of Philosophy, its core concern is to yield a general representation of reality. It will be a theory which will divide up culture into areas that “represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all” (despite their pretense of doing so) (ibid., p. 3). Perhaps physics, sociology, and theology would count as examples of each. The expectation that this traditional foundationalist conception of Philosophy gave expression to was that it was here where Philosophy enabled us to “touch bottom”: where one found “the convictions which permitted one to explain and justify one’s activity as an intellectual and thus to discover the significance of one’s life” (ibid., p. 4).

The long and complicated narrative – though a narrative packed with arguments – that is *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* documents such a conception of Philosophy. It does so first, for Descartes’ conception of mind, pointing out how this came to seem compelling, shows why after all it wasn’t, shows how foundationalist epistemology grew out of it in Locke’s account which in turn led to Kant’s synthesis responding to difficulties in Locke, how Philosophy came in the early twentieth century then to be transformed into foundational analytic philosophy and in turn how this was finally rather decisively undermined by the logical behaviorism of Sellars and Quine, with Sellars displaying of the myth of the given and with Quine’s attack on the claim to have a priori knowledge and to be able to demarcate the analytic and the empirical. This, together with the work of the latter Wittgenstein, undermined foundationalism and the claim to a distinctive role for Philosophy rooted in epistemology or conceptual analysis.

Rorty then goes on to consider the attempt to articulate a “naturalistic epistemology” and then to articulate, criticize, and set aside the attempt to articulate a philosophy of language with a theory of reference like that of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, or Hartry Field, which, resisting the holism of Quine and Davidson, would (if successful) yield a metaphysical realism or a “scientific realism” that appeals fundamentally to
Physics and takes physics at face value. Physics, as David Lewis claims, “professes to
discover the elite properties” where “elite” means the ones whose “boundaries are
established by objective sameness and difference in nature” (1984, p. 226, as quoted
in Rorty 1991, p. 7). These “elite properties” show how nature is carved at the joints
yielding the one true objective description of the world. It yields (pace Putnam – see
Putnam) an account of reference which is not ‘made true’ by our referential
intentions (Lewis 1983, pp. 227–8; italics mine). We have here the return of metaphysics in
the form of a robust realism attuned, so it is claimed, to a scientific mindset.

I doubt very much if physics professes to discover such elite properties. Rather, it is
some Philosophers such as David Lewis who make such claims and that it is not a
discipline of physics that physicists have a set of concepts that enable us to “carve
nature at the joints.” This is a metaphysical metaphor that some metaphysically
inclined philosophers with the ambition of transcendence wish to attribute to physics.
But it is hardly a part of physics itself. But be that as it may, Rorty responds to Lewis’s
scientific realism in the following way. He remarks that anti-representationalists “see
no sense in which physics is more independent of our human peculiarities” than
morality, social anthropology, literary criticism, or a host of other practices – various
areas of culture answering to different human needs and interests – viewing things
from often different perspectives and with various interests in mind. We have, Rorty
goes on to claim, no coherent conception of a language-independent determinate
reality, no conception of how words relate to non-words such that the words picture
them, no conception of how sentences correspond to facts (sentence shaped bits of the
world) such that these true sentences picture them or, our intentions aside, no sense of
how we can get an accurate representation of how things are in the world independent
of a particular language or scheme of representation or a set of optional practices.
We have no understanding of what it would mean to stand outside any language and
just compare our language with the world to see how it maps it or mirrors it.

There is, no doubt, with many Philosophers and theologians, an “ambition of tran-
scendence,” but, pace Thomas Nagel or Stanley Cavell, we only have with such talk a
blur of words and inchoate feelings without the slightest idea what it would be for us
to achieve or in any way even to gesture at transcendence or in any way (pace Habermas
and Apel) to gain some “universal validity” floating free of the contingencies of time
and place and the imprint of what just happens to be our acculturation.

We understand how one cobbling together of beliefs may be more coherent than
another. But this inescapably is just from where we stand, given our own take on
things. But we have no idea what it would be like to gain a context-free coherence
which just yields a cluster of beliefs or considered convictions that are justified period.
Justification is always with reference to a given audience, with given interests at a
particular time and place. Truth is usually time-independent, but justification never is.
We can sensibly aim at getting what for a time and place is the best justified cluster of
coherently hanging together beliefs that careful inquiry can then attain, that at the
time are best taken to be true, but they always might at some later time be reasonably
taken to be false. We cannot simply by fiat rule this out. If we say we want beliefs or
convictions that are not only the ones that at a given time are the most reasonable and
reasonably taken to be true, but as well just are true full stop, then we are asking, not
for a ton of bricks, but for the tone of bricks. If our aim is to obtain beliefs which just
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are true and known timelessly to be true, we have just another incoherent ambition of transcendence. There is no way to escape our finitude. No representationalist account, or for that matter anti-representationalist account, is going to give us such a skyhook for all times and climes – show us how our propositions (or sentences if you will) correspond to the way the world is. The ambition of transcendence is something we should resolutely set aside.

Anti-representationalism, to summarize, is an account “which does not view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality” (1991, p. 1). Anti-representationalists reject the very idea that beliefs can represent reality: they are neither realists nor anti-realists. Truth, they claim, is not an explanatory property. The correct but platitudinous “’P’ is true if and only if P” does not claim that P corresponds to or represents anything. Anti-representationalists reject the whole realist/anti-realist problematic, denying that the very “notion of ‘representation’ or that of ‘fact of the matter’ has any useful role in philosophy” (1991, p. 2).

Rorty is not denying that there are links between our language and the rest of the world, but these links are causal not epistemological. We cannot avoid being in touch with the world. We have no idea of what it would be not to be in touch with it. As one macro-object, we are constantly impinged on by other macro-objects, both animate and non-animate. We causally speaking bang around like billiard balls colliding with each other.

Our languages, as much as our bodies, are shaped by our environment. Our languages could no more be “out of touch” with our environment (grandiosely the world) than our bodies could. But we speak here of causal contact and not of representation. The fitting is a coping with our environment not a fitting by accurate representation. Rorty is thoroughly Darwinian. That is, like all the other pragmatists, Rorty takes Darwin seriously and tailors his account to fit and build on Darwin.

However, as Rorty asserts again and again in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, causation is one thing and justification is another. Like Davidson, he thinks that only a belief can justify another belief. Justification comes through gaining a coherent pattern of beliefs. We, in weaving and unweaving our web of beliefs, justify them; and in doing this we justify one belief in terms of others. We seek, for a time, and for certain purposes, to get the most coherent pattern of beliefs we can forge. But all this justification is time and place and interest dependent. We never escape fallibilism and historicism. In pushing justification as far as it can go, we seek, for a time, the widest and most coherent cluster of beliefs we can muster, but each time for a particular purpose. We do not understand (perhaps pace Sellars) what it would be like to get the most coherent set of beliefs period.

We also need for justification to obtain to have an intersubjective consensus concerning this. It is these two things – having something that is intersubjective and having a consensus – which will give us the only viable conception of objectivity that we can have. Anything more is just objectification which gives us the usual Platonistic illusion. We have a fallibilistic, coherentist method of justifying beliefs replacing epistemology; we have as well a coherentist model of justification replacing a deductivist one. Anti-representationalism, at least Rorty-style, is holistic, logically behaviorist, perspectival, anti-essentialist (nominalist), historicist, and fallibilist.
Critics have repeatedly attacked, with varying degrees of subtlety, this view as relativistic and/or irrationalist (for example, Putnam 1990, pp. 18–24; Kolakowski 1996, pp. 52–7, 67–76; Bloom 1987), decreasing in subtlety as we go from the first to the third. Rorty has repeatedly brushed these criticisms aside (see 1991, pp. 21–34, 203–10; 1998, pp. 43–62).

A relativistic view is, as Rorty characterizes it, “the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic is as good as every other” (1982, p. 166). And an irrationalist is someone who says you can say anything or hold anything on any topic or issue you like whether you have any reasons for it or not if you feel like saying it or holding it. You should live by your gut feelings whatever they are no matter whether you have reasons for them or not. Rorty says that these are both absurd views that practically no one holds. Certainly, as we already have seen, he does not hold them. Rorty seeks to justify beliefs by getting them into coherent patterns and he attends to reasons for beliefs and against them and plainly regards these things as reasonable things to do. He does not think, however, that one can attain an ahistorical Archimedean point, that one can free oneself completely from one’s acculturation and that one can escape ethnocentrism. His ethnocentrism is not the anthropologist’s, who instead says that we must think that what our culture thinks is so or right is correct and that the beliefs of other cultures, where they differ from ours, must be wrong. Rorty rather uses “ethnocentrism” to connote an inescapable condition of “human finitude” and as loyalty to a liberal tolerant sociopolitical culture that prides itself as being open to other cultures and other points of view where these cultures are themselves tolerant (1991, p. 15). Ethnocentrism in Rorty’s sense is an unblinking acceptance of our finitude as inescapable, and a recognition that we cannot stand utterly free from our culture and our place in history. But loyalty to such a liberal culture, as everyone knows, is not something that is universal. There are, of course, people, including intellectuals, as Rorty stresses elsewhere, who are not liberals. Nietzsche and Loyola, for example, and he could have added, to get a little more contemporary, Karl Schmidt (1991, pp. 179–84). We can call them mad if we will, but that is just to hit them over the head with a conception of “rational” from liberal culture – a conception which they do not share. Nor is it to refute them with arguments or to show our views to be in any way superior. Rorty takes this impasse or deadlock to be inescapable. Where our reflective equilibria are challenged, and for the fallibilist the most cherished practices in accordance with which she lives are challenged, there is, Rorty claims, nothing more non-circular that can be said. To try to push such questions so far is itself the irrational attempt by Platonic types – irrational because unintelligible – to seek to ground our practices, not just on other practices, but on something external to all other practices. Unless we believe that our belief-systems are like axiomatic systems (something they are not), there are no first principles that we must just start with and not question.

When many philosophers claim that Rorty is a relativist or irrationalist, they are really accusing him of historicism and a practice-oriented philosophy. To that charge he willingly pleads guilty. But his stance is not relativism or irrationalism, but a claim that there is no absolute or ahistorical conception of justification that yields unconditionality. But this is not at all to claim that anything goes or that any belief is as good as any other. It is just to reject Absolutism and Platonism and it is anything but evident that Rorty is mistaken here.
Charges that Rorty is caught in self-referential paradoxes or performative self-contradictions come into sight. He responds, like Wittgenstein, that he has no Philosophical views to set against representationalism, foundationalism, theories of truth, metaphysics, Platonic conceptions of the Good, and the like. He is not claiming to have gotten things right. He is not a systematic philosopher with Philosophical views on things, but, like Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, and John Dewey, an edifying philosopher whose aim is to edify, that is to help his “readers, or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than to provide ‘grounding’ for the institutions and customs of the present” (1979, pp. 366–7).

Yet Rorty also refers to himself as an anti-representationalist, an anti-foundationalist, and an anti-essentialist. This seems to put him in a self-referential paradox. However, by using “antis” here he may be indicating he is rejecting views without asserting or assuming alternative views. Yet he also calls himself a pragmatist, a historicist, a nominalist, and a holist. There he seems to be asserting positive views, but then he seems at least to be unsaying what he says when he says he is setting out no philosophical views. But here his distinction between Philosophy and philosophy frees him from self contradiction and from self-referential paradox. What Rorty is rejecting is Philosophy – grand metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical theories – by claiming they are either useless or incoherent. But he is not doing it by making a Philosophical claim himself but by making a claim in philosophy which is for him the unproblematic humdrum attempt to try to see how things hang together. In attacking these Platonic-Kantian conceptions and replacing them with his own non-Philosophical conceptions, he is further showing how our concepts in practice hang together. He is being anti-Philosophical in being philosophical where Philosophy and philosophy refer to quite different activities. He would be in self-contradiction if he claimed to be an anti-Philosophical Philosopher, but not by being an anti-Philosophical philosopher. Such a philosopher need not be setting one metaphysics against another or one epistemology against another. He just adds additional “antis” to his list and does that from a non-Philosophical point of view. He is not caught up in the Philosophical tradition anymore than Wittgenstein and Dewey were. Nor need he be authoritarian in espousing anti-authoritarianism. Rorty puts the matter rather differently himself in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, pp. 370–2), but in a way that is compatible with the more direct and less puzzling way in which I untangled him from a putative referential self-contradiction.

I turn now to a very perceptive criticism of Rorty’s account which I think actually comes to a friendly amendment which considerably strengthens Rorty’s own account. It is an account given by Michael Williams, who remarks: “Rorty betrays an attraction to views that are seriously in tension with the pragmatism he officially espouses” (2003, p. 62). Williams explains what is at issue and then proceeds to show why Rorty, in line with his overall views, shouldn’t be attracted to such views.

Rorty, as we have seen, generally takes a fallibilist and historicist stance. Many beliefs vary extensively over time and place; even our firmest considered judgments, as Rawls acknowledges, are at least in principle revisable; there is no ahistorical standard, no universal criteria of validity or soundness of judgment to which we can appeal to assess whole belief-systems or forms of life or of what we take to be our most important and crucial commitments in some final and unassailable way. This is fallibilism and
Richard Rorty

it comes to much the same thing as mild skepticism, like Hume’s “mitigated skepticism.” It is the view, as Williams puts it, “that nothing is absolutely certain, that (given enough stage-setting) anything is revisable; that even the most deeply entrenched views can be revised or abandoned” and goes on to characterize this mild or mitigated skepticism as fallibilism (Williams 2003, p. 76). Radical skepticism, he observes, is a much more severe form of skepticism. It holds “not just that nothing is absolutely certain: rather, with respect to a given subject matter, there is not the slightest reason for believing one thing rather than another” (ibid.). But Rorty, Williams acknowledges, sees the absurdity of this radical skepticism just as he does of relativism. He takes it as plainly so “that no one finds every view on any topic of importance equally appealing” (ibid.). No one, Rorty realizes, is either a radical skeptic or a relativist and there are good Davidsonian reasons (which Rorty accepts) for denying that anyone can be and that not because they take the views of common sense as practically authoritative. Whatever a person’s belief about common sense, there are logical reasons for saying it is incoherent to be a radical skeptic. Belief must precede doubt and make doubt possible. Fallibilism teaches us that (1) we can doubt anything but not everything at once and (2) that we cannot even doubt unless we already believe some things. Universal Cartesian doubt is impossible, indeed conceptually incoherent. It is not enough to doubt to say “I doubt.”

Indeed, Charles Pierce, Wittgenstein, and Davidson are very likely right that massive agreement is a precondition of meaningful disagreement. Williams remarks, correctly, that “the distinction between fallibilism and radical skepticism [and relativism] is crucially important for a philosopher like Rorty. This is because, while fallibilism is an essential part of pragmatism, radical skepticism is rooted in the very epistemological ideas that pragmatists reject” (2003, p. 76; italics mine). Rorty generally sees this, especially in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and The Consequences of Pragmatism, but he at times forgets it in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. The culprits here are his talk of “ultimate commitments,” “final vocabularies,” and his conception of irony. Rorty holds in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that everyone subscribes to some ultimate set of commitments which they articulate in what is for them a “final vocabulary.” Rorty puts it thus:

All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs and their lives... I shall call these words a person’s “final vocabulary.” It is “final” in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he can go with language; beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force. (1989, p. 73)

Pragmatists (including Rorty) should have nothing to do with “final vocabularies,” “ultimate commitments,” “sets of ultimate commitments,” or even the idea of an ironist as someone who “has radical doubts about her final vocabulary” and with these radical and continuing doubts, becomes a radical skeptic. This sounds more like existentialism or logical positivism where decision and commitment is king and is arbitrary. But a fallibilist (which is what a good pragmatist is, and Rorty usually is) and a logical holist are not like that; they have no final vocabulary. They will, as everyone will, carry about a set of words which they will employ to justify their actions, their beliefs,
and their lives. *At a given time* their spade *may* be turned, but later they may come to view things differently. For a fallibilist this can go on indefinitely. There is no point at which she *must* stop with some ultimate commitment and say, “Here I stand. I can do no other.” We do not have to go into circular arguments and, even if we do, if the circle is big enough, as Quine noted, no harm will be done. Faced with an argument or a rejection of what she (the fallibilist) says, she just keeps the conversation going. She may be in what at least is an apparent head-on conflict and not know on a given occasion what to say. But there are no “last words” or ultimate commitments functioning like axioms or ultimate postulates which for each person becomes her “ultimate vocabulary” which can in no way be challenged and from which everything follows. That such, or indeed anything, is a “last word” is not at all the fallibilist and holist picture. Williams well says, in good pragmatist fashion, “all we ever do is reweave the web of belief as best we know how in the light of whatever considerations we deem to be relevant. . . . Nothing is immune to revision” (2003, p. 78). We, of course, get tired, impatient, bored, or sometimes do not know what further to say. But we, or others later, may always pick up the conversation. There is no point at which it *must* halt: where the *final* word has been said.

Williams remarks: “As a pragmatist, Rorty should have no truck with the language of ‘finality.’” (ibid.). There are, to be sure, situations which can “arise that reveal differences of opinion that are deep and apparently irresolvable” (ibid.). Williams’s remarks concerning this, in closing his essay, are very perceptive and I quote them in full:

> But the sort of holist Rorty generally claims to be should treat such irresolvability as always relative to our current argumentative resources, which are in constant flux. If we see no way to resolve a dispute maybe we should look for one. We may find one or we may not. It depends on ingenuity and luck. But whether a dispute can be resolved (or creatively transcended) is a thoroughly contingent affair. It offers no reason to think that there is a theoretically interesting, epistemically based partition of our commitments into those that involve elements of a final vocabulary and those that do not. For a holist, there is no such thing as a commitment that is ultimate in the sense that it *can* only be defended in a circular way, for there is no way of saying once and for all what our dialectical resources may turn out to comprise. Recognizing the contingency of our dialectical situation is the antidote to the virus of finality and thus the cure for the skeptical diseases it induces. Contingency is the friend of fallibilism but the sworn enemy of skepticism: that is of irony. As we have seen this is Rorty’s own insight. That he loses track of it is the most ironic result of all. (Ibid., p. 79)

Williams’s criticisms of Rorty amount to a friendly amendment of Rorty’s thought which strengthens Rorty’s account and takes out an important tension from his account. Sticking with fallibilism while eschewing radical skepticism brings out Rorty’s better pragmatist self.

Rorty’s achievements are radical and innovative. He has given us a rationale for the setting aside of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He has told a story of the development of modern philosophy from Cartesianism, to Locke, to Kant’s transcendentalism synthesizing Cartesian rationalism with Lockean empiricism, and then he trenchantly criticized Kantian transcendentalism. He has also shown us how neo-Kantianism finally transformed itself into the foundationalism of logical empiricism.
with *language* replacing *mind* as the key philosophical category. Rorty then went on to depict how the holism and logical behaviorism of Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars, and Davidson radically transformed analytic philosophy and, in reality if not intent, brought about its demise except as a certain style of writing. With this, Rorty has it, we move from systematic philosophy aspiring to be a scientific discipline to edifying or therapeutic philosophy without such disciplinary or scientistic applications or rationale. This transformation from Philosophy to *philosophy* is a transformation from a *discipline* which would, being the “guardian of rationality,” *ground* all knowledge in all areas of culture, to an *activity* which aids individuals or society as a whole to “break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes” (1979, p. 12). The activity of philosophy would permit people to see a little better how things hang together and with this to somewhat more adequately make sense of their lives, eschewing the search for something unconditional and thus unattainable and perhaps even incoherent: some skyhook which provides “a ‘grounding’ for the intuitions and customs of the present” (1982, p. xiv). This plainly is a de-scientization and de-professionalization of philosophy, but it is a de-theoretization of it as well. The novelist becomes closer to the *philosopher* than the physicist. The philosopher’s very self-image changes. Without falling into blabber or metaphysical moonshine, it is seen with clarity that the very notion of “exact philosophy” becomes an oxymoron. Philosophy comes to have a very different rationale from what “scientific realists” dreamed of.

References and further reading

**Works by Rorty**

1982: *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

**Works by other authors**

KAI NIelsen


Part II

Transforming Philosophy
Not Cynicism, but Synechism: Lessons from Classical Pragmatism

SUSAN HAACK

Probably you all know that hoary old joke about the two behaviorists meeting on the street: “Hi! You’re fine, how am I?” We laugh; but sometimes another person really can notice something about your mental goings-on of which you’re not quite aware yourself – as I realized when, in the discussion after I had given a talk on philosophy of science at Yale, Karsten Harries observed: “Oh, I see; you’re a synechist.” Up till then I had been most conscious of the influence of Peirce’s stalwart defense of the “scientific attitude,” a genuine desire to learn the truth; of his arguments that the very possibility of inquiry presupposes a kind of realism; of the Critical Common-sensism I had adopted, and adapted, from him; and of course of his penchant for neologisms. But as I mulled over Harries’ comment, I soon saw that synechism is, indeed, one of those pragmatist ideas that has made its way into my philosophical thinking, or perhaps another of those philosophical leanings of mine that makes pragmatism congenial; and that my Critical Common-sensism could itself be plausibly construed as synechist in spirit.

So the task I have set myself here is first to articulate the regulative principle Peirce calls “synechism,” its connections with objective idealism, agapism, tychism, and logical realism, and its role in Peirce’s understanding of what metaphysics is and does; and then – as my subtitle suggests – to trace (some of) the themes in my metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind that qualify me as a synechist, at least in a broad sense of the word.

However, though my title contrasts the synechism of the classical pragmatist tradition with the cynicism of recent self-styled neo-pragmatism – I just couldn’t resist the play on words – I shan’t spend long on the Vulgar Pragmatism of Rorty and his admirers. But I will tell you the wonderfully ironic story of Peirce’s first public presentation of synechism, when he read the nearly finished version of “The Law of Mind” at the Harvard Graduate Philosophy Club in May of 1892. Among those present were Peirce’s brother Jem, Josiah Royce, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Dickinson S. Miller, and Charles Montague Bakewell. The same day, Abbot wrote in his diary that “[Peirce] read an able paper on ‘Syechism,’ his new system of philosophy”; the following day, Bakewell reported in a letter to George H. Howison that he had “[h]eard Mr. Chas. Peirce read a paper last evening on Continuity, the Law of Mind, or ‘Cynicism’.” Honestly: I am not making this up!
Synechism: What It Is

Of course, synechism has nothing whatever to do with cynicism. Introducing a paper of 1893 entitled “Immortality in the Light of Synechism,” the editors of The Essential Peirce describe synechism as “the doctrine that everything is continuous” (EP 2:1); and Peirce himself refers to synechism as a “doctrine” both in the introduction and in the conclusion of “The Law of Mind” (which, after he had presented it at Harvard, was published in the Monist for 1892, the third of five metaphysical papers of his that appeared between 1891 and 1893). Some years later, however, in his entry on “Synechism” for Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902), Peirce wrote that “[s]ynechism is not an ultimate and absolute metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined”; it is “that tendency of philosophical thought which insists upon the idea of continuity as of prime importance . . . and, in particular, upon the necessity of hypotheses involving true continuity” (CP 6.173, my italics, and 6.169). This seems to me a significantly better formulation: it is more plausible in itself, and it makes better sense of Peirce’s observations about the synechist’s attitude to dualisms.

“[E]ven in its less stalwart forms,” Peirce writes, “[s]ynechism . . . can never abide dualism, properly so called,” not even dualism “in its broadest legitimate meaning,” the style of philosophy that “performs its analyses with an axe, leaving, as the ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being.” However, he continues, unlike certain “philosophic cranks,” the synechist “does not wish to exterminate the conception of twoness” (EP 2:2). Indeed, Peirce surely doesn’t mean to “exterminate” secondness, or to eschew dual distinctions; and anyway, the point about “unrelated chunks of being” surely applies no less to brute trichotomies, etc., than to brute dichotomies. The idea, as I understand it, is rather that we should look for underlying continuities, and recognize that supposedly sharp distinctions may be better conceived as lines of demarcation drawn at some point on a continuum. The comment Peirce makes in his Logic Notebook for 1909, on the successful execution of his experiment in triadic logic, is emblematic: “Triadic logic is universally true. Dyadic logic is not absolutely false however, it is only L (at the limit of truth and falsity).”

In the terminology of our day, we might say that the synechist idea is to favor hypotheses that treat supposed differences of kind as really only significant differences of degree. But Peirce’s own way of putting it – that the trouble with the axe-wielding style of philosophy is not simply that it makes binary distinctions, but that it leaves us with “unrelated chunks” – has the virtue of making it more apparent why he maintains that synechism “amounts to the principle that inexplicabilities are not to be considered as possible explanations.” For continuity, he argues, is a kind of perfect generality: “[t]rue generality is . . . nothing but a rudimentary form of true continuity. Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of a law of relationship”; and generality is “the form under which alone anything can be understood.” The regulative principle of synechism advises a preference for abductive hypotheses positing continuities, because “the only possible justification for so much as entertaining a hypothesis is that it affords an explanation of the phenomena”; and hypotheses that break reality into unrelated components “set up a barrier across the road” of science (CP 6.173, 6.172, 6.171).
In the introductory paragraph of “The Law of Mind” Peirce describes himself as having attempted to develop the synechist idea, “a good many years ago,” in his anti-Cartesian papers in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for 1868; presumably alluding to the ideas about the continuity of cognition in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” – which, indeed, are with hindsight clearly no less synechist (though he didn’t use this word at that time) than “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” is pragmatist (though he didn’t use that word either). I would add that, in virtue of its awareness of the continuities between human learning and other animals’ exploration of their environment, and between inquiry and other means of settling opinion, “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) seems no less synechist in spirit.

In the concluding paragraph of “The Law of Mind,” Peirce writes that synechism carries along with it “a logical realism of a most pronounced type; . . . objective idealism; [and] tychism, with its . . . thorough-going evolutionism” (CP 6.163). The following year, in “Immortality in the Light of Synechism,” he writes that, though it is not itself religion but a (meta-)hypothesis of scientific metaphysics, synechism “may play a part in the onement of religion and science,” by envisaging the possibility of a continuity of carnal and spiritual consciousness (EP 2:3). And in just a few pages at the beginning of “The Logic of Continuity” (1898), he presents a stunning metaphysical panorama in which the idea of continuity is the organizing principle linking agapism, tychism, and the categories.

This is Peirce the metaphysician at his most philosophically fertile, his most mathematically imaginative, his most scientifically sweeping, and his most cosmologically prescient; but also his most darkly Cimmerian. Nevertheless, it behooves me to try to articulate what Peirce sees as key synechistic hypotheses – objective idealism, agapism, tychism, logical realism – as clearly as I can.

Sometimes Peirce presents his objective idealism by contrast with Cartesian dualism: in “Immortality in the Light of Synechism,” as we saw earlier; and in “The Architecture of Theories,” where he writes that “The old dualistic notion of mind and matter . . . as two radically distinct kinds of substance, will hardly find any defenders today.” This means, he continues, that we are obliged to accept some form of “hylopathy, otherwise called monism,” of which he distinguishes three: neutralism, materialism, and idealism. Neutralism, he argues, since it makes inward and outward aspects of substance both primordial, violates Ockham’s razor. Materialism, he continues, is “quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires . . . that a certain kind of mechanism will feel . . . [as] an ultimate, inexplicable regularity.” “The one intelligible theory of the universe,” he concludes, “is . . . objective idealism,” which acknowledges “the physical law as derived and special, the psychical alone as primordial,” and “matter [as] effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws” (CP 6.24, 6.25).

However, objective idealism is not, it seems, really opposed to materialism in every sense of the word: indeed, in “Notes for a Book, to be entitled ‘A Guess at the Riddle’,” Peirce had written that “[f]aith requires us to be materialists without flinching” (CP 1.354). Nor does objective idealism really flatly deny that matter can feel; in fact, Peirce speculates very suggestively about how it can: “feeling, or immediate consciousness,
arises in an active state of nerve-cells” (CP 1.386); “[t]here is no doubt that this slime-mould, or this amoeba, or at any rate some similar mass of protoplasm, feels . . . when it is in its excited condition” (CP 6.133). And in “Man’s Glassy Essence,” Peirce reaf- firms that “[p]rotoplasm certainly does feel”; but now he continues, this “can never be explained, unless we admit that physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events.” Once it is acknowledged that matter is just mind informed by inveterate habits, the only further explanation needed is why in protoplasm these habits are “to some slight extent broken up.” Peirce acknowledges the dependence of mind on matter, but denies that mental phenomena are controlled by sheer physical law (CP 6.264).

But what does it mean to say that matter is just effete mind, or that physical events are only undeveloped forms of psychical events? Peirce writes that “[t]hought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” (CP 4.551); it is “in the organic world,” he con- tinues, and develops there. This suggests that we should take “thought” and “mind” to refer both to the particular minds of particular organisms, and to the intelligible patterns, the Platonic Ideas, found in the formation of crystals or the hexagonal cells of a honeycomb. So Mind, with a capital “M,” is the capacity of the universe for forming patterns, its logos if you like; while minds, with a small “m,” are very specialized, plastic, adaptable arrangements of matter.

Agapism, the “doctrine of evolutionary love,” hypothesizes an evolution from an initial chaos into order. Peirce summarizes the idea in the first of the papers in the Monist series, “The Architecture of Theories”:

[In the beginning – infinitely remote – there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and from this, with the other principles of evolution, all the regularities of the universe would be evolved. (CP 6.33)]

Elsewhere, Peirce observes that this is not just an evolution of the existing universe, but “a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves . . . are becoming developed” out of initial vague potentialities (CP 6.194). And it is not mere “tychastic evolution,” evolution by sporting or fortuitous variation, nor mere “anancastic evolution,” evolution by mechanical necessity; it is “agapastic evolution,” evolution “by creative love,” by affinity – of which tychastic and anancastic evolution are merely degenerate forms (CP 6.302).

The key mechanism of agapastic evolution is “The Law of Mind” to which the title of Peirce’s first explicitly synecnist paper refers, and which he states as follows: “ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility” (CP 6.104). I construe this as a hypothesis both about the evolution of Mind, i.e., the orderliness of the universe, and about the evolution of minds, i.e., how an understanding of the world is possible for us. “Every attempt to understand anything . . . supposes, or at least hopes, that the very objects of study themselves are subject to a logic more or less identical with that which we employ,” Peirce writes (CP 6.189); suggesting a gradual evolution of thought towards harmony
with its object, minds with Mind, destined to culminate in the Final Opinion. This, I believe, is the “logical realism of the most pronounced type” that Peirce associates with synechism.

But now let me return to Peirce’s summary of agapism, which continues: “At any time, however, an element of pure chance . . . will remain.” This is tychism, the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor in the universe, that not everything is determined by law. Today, because of its apparent anticipation of the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, tychism is probably the best-known of Peirce’s metaphysical ideas. For Peirce himself, however, it was not pre-eminent. He would not object if his metaphysical system as a whole were to be called “synechism,” he says; but to call it “tychism” would be unacceptable: “[f]or although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really . . . the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness” (CP 6.202). For the element of chance is a remnant of the original disorder, which will remain only “until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational and symmetrical system in which mind is at last crystalized in the infinitely distant future” (CP 6.33), at which point it will be finally aufgehoben.

Metaphysics in the Light of Synechism

Thus far, though, my summary of synechistic metaphysical themes in Peirce’s philosophy remains seriously incomplete; for it omits to mention that his conception of metaphysics itself, its objects and its methods, is thoroughly synechistic.

Peirce acknowledges the affinity of pragmatism with the earlier positivism of Auguste Comte. Moreover, he writes that, historically, metaphysics has been the arena of “ceaseless and trivial disputation” (CP 6.5); it “is in a deplorably backward condition” (CP 6.2), “a puny, rickety, and scrofulous science” (CP 6.6). But by now it should be entirely unnecessary for me to say that, far from taking the blithely dismissive attitude of which Rorty boasts – “the pragmatist . . . does not think of himself as any kind of metaphysician” (Rorty 1982, p. xxviii) – Peirce is a metaphysician of remarkable depth and breadth.

Unlike indiscriminately anti-metaphysical positivist philosophies, Peirce’s pragmat-icism is a prope-positivism which envisages the possibility of a reformed, scientific metaphysics.

[The Pragmatic Maxim] will serve to show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either meaningless gibberish – one word being defined by other words, and they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached – or else is downright absurd; so that, all such rubbish being swept away, what will remain of philosophy will be a series of problems capable of investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences. . . . So, instead of merely jeering at metaphysics . . . the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give life and light to cosmology and physics. (CP 5.423)

The reformed metaphysics Peirce envisages will be, not “seminary philosophy,” but “laboratory philosophy” (CP 1.129), scientific both in its motive and in its method. It will be undertaken with the “scientific attitude,” out of a genuine desire to discover
the truth; and it will use, not the A Priori Method of “what is agreeable to reason,” but the Scientific Method, i.e., the method of experience and reasoning.

Peirce ties these two points together: he insists that the reason for its deplorable condition is not that there is any peculiar difficulty in the subject-matter of metaphysics, and not, in particular, that its objects are beyond the reach of experience; rather, he maintains, the reason metaphysics is in such a bad way is that it has fallen into the hands of theologians, who are by profession committed to protect and defend religious doctrine, and so – lacking the true desire to learn – cannot possibly undertake their work with the scientific attitude. Elsewhere, he notes that theologians and moralists tend to insist on sharp dichotomies (the saved versus the damned, good versus evil); and observes “how helpless such minds are in attempting to deal with continuity . . . the leading conception of science” (CP 1.62).

The “common opinion . . . that Metaphysics is backward because it is intrinsically beyond the reach of human cognition,” Peirce writes, “is a complete mistake”; as is the idea that metaphysics “is inscrutable because its objects are not open to observation” (CP 6.2). Metaphysics does, and must, rest on observable phenomena. If we fail to realize this, it is because the observations on which metaphysics depends are so commonplace that we ordinarily pay no attention to them – in fact, they are far more readily available than the observations needed by the special sciences; for they require, not expensive or specialized instruments, but only careful attention to our everyday experience. Philosophy “does not undertake to make any special observations or to obtain any perceptions of a novel description. Microscopes and telescopes, voyages and exhumations . . . are substantially superfluous. . . . It contents itself with a more attentive scrutiny and comparison of the facts of everyday life . . .” (EP 2:146).

Like the special sciences, scientific metaphysics will rely on all three modes of reasoning – abductive, deductive, and inductive; and, differing from the special sciences not in kind but in degree of generality, sometimes “welds itself” with them (EP 2:375). Nevertheless, scientific metaphysics is neither reducible to the special sciences nor subordinate to them. For since metaphysics investigates the most general aspects of reality, it is the discipline to which it falls to supply key presuppositions of the special sciences; which are, therefore, based on – though not derivable from – the underlying metaphysics. This thought is implicit when Peirce writes that the immature condition of metaphysics has greatly hindered progress both in the physical sciences and in the “Moral or Psychical” sciences of psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and sociology (CP 6.2). It is explicit when he writes that the “principal utility” of philosophy is “to furnish a Weltanschauung, or conception of the universe, as a basis for the special sciences” (EP 2:146–7); and that the “special sciences are obliged to take for granted a number of most important propositions, because their ways of working afford no means of bringing these propositions to the test. In short, they always rest upon metaphysics” (CP 1.129).

Peirce hopes that “by proceeding modestly, recognizing in metaphysics an observational science . . . without caring one straw what kind of conclusions we reach . . . but just honestly applying induction and hypothesis . . . the disputes and obscurities of the subject may at last disappear” (CP 6.5). But as I understand him, he recognizes that even scientific metaphysics may be poorly conducted. There is no guarantee against bad good metaphysics, i.e., metaphysics of the right kind, but mistaken nevertheless.
And Peirce says, not that objective idealism, agapism, tychism, logical realism, etc., are implied or required by synechism, but that synechism “carries (these ideas) along” with it; which I think means that these hypotheses, being of the type that synechism qua regulative principle recommends, have the merit of being at least potentially explanatory. But their synechistic character does not guarantee their truth; and they are not the only hypotheses of the desirable, synechistic type. And when I describe myself as a prope-synechist, I don’t mean to endorse all or only the synechist hypotheses that Peirce himself proposes.

However, among the recognizably synechist themes in my philosophical thinking, one of the first that comes to mind is an understanding of the nature and the task of metaphysics very close to Peirce’s. But because, nowadays, theologians constitute a lesser threat to the health of the philosophical enterprise than literary postmodernists and their ilk, I have been inclined to put what are essentially the same ideas in a somewhat different way. First: if it is to be worth anything, philosophy must be a kind of inquiry, an effort to discover the truth of the questions within its scope; if, as Rorty urges, it were to give up this aspiration and become just “a kind of writing,” it’s not clear that philosophy would be worth anything (Rorty 1982, p. 93; Haack 1996a). This is not to deny that some works of philosophy, like some works of history, etc., qualify as “literary” in the aesthetically honorific sense of the word: as Plato’s dialogues surely do, and Bacon’s Essays, and many others; nor is it to deny that some works of imaginative literature convey philosophical truths: as Eliot’s Daniel Deronda surely does, and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, and many others. It is only to place philosophy on a continuum (the continuum of kinds of inquiry) to which the sciences, history, etc., also belong.

This conception requires, second, that there be a class of questions characteristic of philosophical inquiry, and capable of true or false answers. Rorty – who suggests that the idea of a specifically epistemological class of questions arose only in the context of a distinction between science and philosophy implicit in Descartes and Hobbes, but not explicit until Locke and Kant – maintains that there is really no such class. I think there is a characteristically philosophical type of question; not, however, that the class of such questions is set in stone. Not all or only the questions on the agenda of the philosophers of ancient Greece were still to be found on Descartes’ agenda, nor are all or only Descartes’ questions to be found on, say, Quine’s or Derrida’s; we may be sure that Heraclitus didn’t concern himself with the Gettier problem, and I don’t suppose Gettier has been much concerned with the cosmic-logos problem.

The evolution of new questions and the displacement of old ones is simply one of the ways in which any healthy discipline develops. It is a familiar fact that over time the questions tackled by the sciences have shifted and changed; e.g., Friedrich Miescher (the man who first identified the stuff, which he called “nuclein”) couldn’t even have conceived the question about the structure of DNA which Watson and Crick were later to become famous for answering; for the concept of macromolecule, and the idea that stereochemical structure as well as chemical composition matters, came only later. And the fact that, in philosophy as in the sciences, new theories and new
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corporate new questions and displace older ones doesn’t mean there are no characteristically philosophical questions.

In the course of its long history, however, metaphysics has only too often been focused on questions that were eventually displaced as they turned out to rest on false presuppositions. (The appropriate response to such questions is obvious, if laborious: trace their roots until you find the falsehood, the wrong answer, among the assumptions on which they depend.) In fact, I see this long history of misconceived questions based on wrong answers to earlier questions as the chief source of the idea that there must be something just inherently wrong with the metaphysical enterprise as such – an idea which, in my opinion as in Peirce’s, is “a complete mistake.”

Like Peirce, I take the fundamental questions of metaphysics to be about the world, albeit questions characterized by a peculiar kind of abstraction and generality (a point Quine makes vivid when he writes that, while the question of how many and what kinds of beetle there are is characteristic of zoology, the question of how many and what kinds of thing or stuff there are is characteristic of metaphysics). This isn’t to deny that answering metaphysical questions often requires strenuous efforts at conceptual clarification: Peirce’s articulation of his realism, for example, led him to adopt, and adapt, Scotus’ conception of reality; and after the very first sentence of my statement of Innocent Realism – “there is one real world” – I too faced the obligation to clarify what I mean by “real,” and to say what there being one world, rather than none or more than one, precludes (see Haack 1996b; 2002; 2003, ch. 5). Nevertheless, my Innocent Realism, like Peirce’s “scholastic realism of a somewhat extreme stripe,” is – as metaphysical theories ought to be – about the world, not just about conceptual schemes or linguistic frameworks.

This means, third, that metaphysics cannot be conducted purely a priori, but must, as Peirce said, use the method of experience and reasoning. Not, as Peirce also said, that metaphysicians need to conduct experiments or set off on expeditions; for metaphysical abductions and meta-abductions can be expected to be at the highest level of generality, and the evidence by which they stand or fall, again as Peirce said, can be expected to be more commonplace than recherché. If we are wondering whether there are uniformities in nature, no fancy equipment or skillful experiment will help: nevertheless, the common experience that we can successfully predict how animals, or people, or stuff will behave is apropos.

This approach enables us to steer clear on the one hand of apriorism, represented in our times by the “descriptive metaphysics” that Strawson defended in the wake of the logical positivist (post-Humean, post-Comtean) critique of the legitimacy of the metaphysical enterprise, and even more strikingly by Kripke’s appeals to the synthetic a priori and David Lewis’s quasi-Leibnizian modal realism; and on the other hand of a Quinean scientism that would make metaphysics secondary to, dependent on, current scientific theorizing (Haack 1998b). Peirce’s synechist conception of metaphysics was far ahead not only of his own time, but also of ours.

A second synechist theme of mine, the continuity of inquiry in the sciences with everyday empirical inquiry, is also present in Peirce; but it is somewhat disguised by his use of “science” equivalently to “genuine, good-faith inquiry,” “the scientific attitude”
equivalently to “the genuine desire to discover the truth,” and “the scientific method” equivalently to “the procedures of good-faith inquiry.” It is expressed less obliquely by John Dewey, who writes that “scientific subject-matter and procedures grow out of the direct problems and methods of common sense” (1938, p. 88); and by Sidney Hook, who writes that “scientific method is the refinement of the canons of rationality and intelligibility exhibited by the techniques of behavior and habits of inference involved in the arts and crafts of men; its pattern is everywhere discernible even when overlaid with myth and ritual” (1956, p. 173).

In our times, no doubt because of the remarkable successes of the natural sciences, “science,” “scientific,” etc., are often used honorifically, as all-purpose terms of epistemic praise. This is quite at odds with Peirce’s inclusive usage, which accommodates all good-faith inquiry under the rubric “science”; for, covertly suggesting that only the work of scientists is good inquiry, it is exclusive in spirit. This modern, honorific use of “science” has contributed to the presumption that there must be a criterion of demarcation distinguishing real science, the genuine article, both from lesser intellectual enterprises and from pseudo-scientific mumbo-jumbo, and a uniquely rational method of inquiry that explains the successes of the sciences. But it is thoroughly unfortunate, disguising what would otherwise be obvious: that not all, and not only, scientific evidence is good evidence, and not all, and not only, scientists are exemplary inquirers. In place of this axe-wielding demarcationist approach, I have proposed a Critical Common-sensist account which acknowledges epistemological, methodological, and metaphysical continuities between inquiry in the sciences and everyday empirical inquiry (Haack 2003, chs. 1–5).

That honorific use of “scientific evidence” notwithstanding, the evidence with respect to scientific claims, like the evidence with respect to empirical claims generally, includes both experiential evidence and reasons – working together, as clues and intersecting entries in a crossword puzzle do. But the experiential evidence relevant to scientific claims usually depends on instruments of observation which themselves depend on previous scientific theorizing; the mesh of reasons supporting scientific claims is even more complex and ramifying; and, almost always, scientific evidence is a shared resource. In the notes to their first paper proposing the double-helical structure of DNA, for example, Watson and Crick cite 23 other papers; and this is only the tip of an enormous iceberg, for they also depend implicitly on a vast body of what could by that time be simply taken for granted as background knowledge.

At least in the sense in which that phrase is often understood, there is no “scientific method”: i.e., no mode of inference or procedure of inquiry unique to the sciences and guaranteed to produce true, or more probable, or more nearly true, or more empirically adequate, etc., results. There are the procedures and modes of inference of all empirical inquiry; but these are not used only by scientists. And there are the many and various helps to inquiry that have been devised by generation upon generation of scientists, which are constantly evolving, and often local to this or that area of science; but these are not used by all scientists.

Like any empirical inquirer, a scientist makes an informed conjecture about the possible explanation of some puzzling phenomenon, figures out the consequences of the conjecture’s being true, checks how well those consequences stand up to the evidence he has and any further evidence he can lay hands on, and then uses his judgment
whether to accept it, modify it, or abandon it and start again. But scientists have
devised models and metaphors to aid the imagination; instruments of observation
to aid the senses; sophisticated experimental controls to block misleading evidence;
mathematical, statistical, and computing devices to extend human reasoning powers;
and even a social organization of mutual scrutiny, peer review, and incentives which
helps keep most scientists, most of the time, reasonably honest. All of these are fallible
and imperfect; but they are genuine helps to inquiry nonetheless. To borrow a memor-
able phrase of Gustav Bergmann’s that Peirce would surely have enjoyed as much as I,
the sciences represent the Long Arm of Common Sense.

And, of course, scientists investigate the same world – the one real world – as histor-
ians, investigative journalists, detectives, legal and literary scholars, auto-mechanics,
plumbers, and the rest of us do; a scientist trying to solve the structure of the hemoglobin
molecule, for example, a detective checking blood traces left at a crime scene, and a
housewife trying to figure out how to get blood-stains out of the laundry are all invest-
igating the same stuff. And successful scientific inquiry, like successful empirical
inquiry of any kind, is possible only because we, and the world, are a certain way: we
have sense organs competent to detect information about particular things and events
around us, and the intellectual capacity to make generalized conjectures and devise
ways to check these conjectures against further evidence; and the particular things
and events of which we can be perceptually aware are of kinds, and subject to laws.
Otherwise, we couldn’t categorize things or discover useful generalizations about them;
nor could the natural sciences – deeper and more detailed than everyday empirical
inquiry, far better unified, more accurate, yet still thoroughly fallible and imperfect –
gradually have managed to identify real kinds of thing or stuff, discern their inner
constitution, and discover laws of nature.

This was, by the way, one theme of the talk of mine that prompted Harries’ com-
ment: that, as Peirce argued, the very possibility of scientific investigation requires a
kind of realism; but that this is a kind of realism we all take for granted when we
engage in the most ordinary of empirical inquiry – out of which, as Dewey and Hook
observe, the sciences have grown. In this context, I quoted “Some Consequences of
Four Incapacities”: “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt
in our hearts” (CP 5.265).

To maintain, as I do, that scientific inquiry is continuous with common-sense inquiry
of the most ordinary kind is not to deny that for some purposes it is necessary to draw
a rough-and-ready line between science and other things: e.g., as differing from such
other activities as clog-dancing or advocacy in being kinds of inquiry, and from other
kinds of empirical inquiry such as historical or legal or literary scholarship in its
subject-matter. But “non-science” is an ample and diverse category, including the many
human activities other than inquiry, the various forms of pseudo-inquiry, inquiry of a
non-empirical character, and empirical inquiry of other kinds than the scientific; and
to make matters even more complicated, there are plenty of mixed and borderline cases.
The honorific use of “scientific” and its cognates tempts scientists as well as laypersons
to criticize poorly conducted science as not really science at all; but “not scientific” is
as unhelpful as generic epistemic criticism as “scientific” is as generic epistemic praise.

The phrase “pseudo-science,” which presumably refers to activities which purport
to be science but aren’t really, derives its pejorative tone in part from its imputation of
false pretenses, but also in part from the honorific use of “science." But rather than criticizing poor work as “pseudo-scientific," it is always better to specify what, exactly, is wrong with it: e.g., that it is not serious or honest inquiry; that it rests on assumptions for which there is no good evidence, or which are too vague to be susceptible to evidential check; that it uses mathematical symbolism, or elaborate-looking apparatus, purely decoratively; etc.

A third synechist theme of mine, and the last I have room to sketch here, focuses proximally on the relation of the social to the natural sciences, and at one remove on the understanding of beliefs, desires, etc.

The phrase “the social sciences,” as I understand it, picks out a loose federation of kinds of inquiry, roughly identified by reference to the kinds of question that fall within its scope – as “the natural sciences” picks out a different loose federation of kinds of inquiry, roughly identified by the different kinds of question that fall within its scope. Social-scientific inquiry, like inquiry of every kind, is an effort to discover true answers to the questions within its sphere: although, because the questions they address often concern politically sensitive topics, in the social sciences inquiry has only too often been elided into advocacy (as it sometimes has in the natural sciences, especially in sensitive areas such as environmental science and human biology).

Some areas of social science, such as physical anthropology, are nearly indistinguishable from neighboring areas of natural science; but most social science differs from most natural science in being, so to speak, “intentional”; i.e., including people’s beliefs, goals, intentions, etc., in its purview. Psychologists investigate the role of expectation in perceptual error; economists calculate the interactions of consumer confidence and interest rates; sociologists investigate what increment of cognitive performance can be attributed to charter schools; anthropologists try to understand the significance of a ritual dance in the life of a tribe. This extends the picture of the continuum of kinds of inquiry already sketched in my account of the relation of metaphysics to the sciences and of the sciences to everyday empirical inquiry; and in the process accommodates the fact that everyday empirical explanations commonly appeal to people’s beliefs and intentions as well as to physical causes (Haack 2003, ch. 6).

This larger picture is thoroughly synechistic. It is not, however, reductionist, at least as that term is ordinarily understood. Granted, there are remarkable similarities between human social interactions and those of other social animals; but though human social behavior surely is biologically determined in some respects, it surely is not biologically determined in all. Some of what we do is purely instinctive, some habitual, some due to panic, anger, or confusion: but though it is constrained by biological universals and mediated by cultural specifics, how each person is and behaves depends in part on his beliefs, goals, and intentions. And though a person’s beliefs, etc., are certainly physiologically realized, they are not simply reducible to neurophysiological states.

A person who believes that snakes are dangerous will have a very complex multi-form disposition – roughly: to shriek at the sight of, and run away from, snakes; to shudder at pictures of snakes; and to assert or assent to sentences in whatever
language(s) he speaks to the effect that snakes are dangerous. With such ordinary, garden-variety beliefs, verbal and non-verbal dispositions interlock both causally and referentially: the subject’s representing the world to himself this way causally sustains his disposition to act thus and so, and the sentences to which he is disposed to assent are about things in the world with respect to which he is disposed to act thus and so—in the characteristic semiotic triad of person, words, world. These multiform dispositions are realized in enormously complex neurophysiological configurations, meshes of interconnections among receptors (whatever registers input) and activators (whatever initiates behavior, verbal or non-verbal). They must, however, be realizable in more than one way: for while my believing that snakes are dangerous involves among other things a disposition to assert, and assent to, certain sentences of English, Ivan’s believing that snakes are dangerous involves among other things a disposition to assert, and assent to, certain sentences of Russian.

As the explanation of someone’s blushing because of the embarrassing remark he overheard must acknowledge both the connections of his neurophysiological states with these words and with the use of these words in his linguistic community, both the physical realization of a belief and its content are essential. An alarm clock is a physical thing, and its making this noise is brought about by physical goings-on inside the clock; but this doesn’t exhaust the explanation of my alarm clock’s going off at 7:30 a.m., which also requires reference to human conventions about time. Human beings are also physical things, and their making these noises or marks or movements is brought about by neurophysiological goings-on; but the explanation of my going to the fridge to get a glass of milk isn’t exhausted by a neurophysiological account of the firings in my brain, but also requires reference to the content of my belief. And this requires a socio-cultural loop identifying the relevant linguistic, etc., conventions.

After spelling all this out in detail, I summed up the key idea like this: “It’s all physical, all right; but it isn’t all physics” (2003, p. 160). At the time, Mead had been a significant influence; but I had never looked more than casually at what Peirce had to say about what is right, and what is wrong, in materialism. Now, however, I am struck by how close I had come, quite unknowingly, to what he had written more than a century before: “No doubt, all nervous physiology shows the dependence of mind upon body. . . . The question is whether mental phenomena are exclusively controlled by blind mechanical law . . .”; but there are “obvious objections” to the idea that they are (CP 6.274).

Well. This isn’t the first time I have smiled wryly as I recalled that famous observation of Santayana’s that those who do not study the history of philosophy are destined to repeat it; and I don’t suppose it will be the last.

Acknowledgments

My thanks to Mark Migotti for helpful comments on a draft; to Cheng Hsi-Heng for help with material on Peirce’s conception of the relation of metaphysics to the special sciences; and to André de Tienne for drawing Mr Bakewell’s letter about “The Law of Mind, or ‘Cynicism’” to my attention.
NOT CYNICISM, BUT SYNECHISM: LESSONS FROM CLASSICAL PRAGMATISM

References


One of the consequences of Cartesian rationalism was its continuation of the scholastic habit of developing philosophy around exclusionary disjunctions: certainty or ignorance, mind or body, reason or perception. If we take this habit into our examinations of the history of philosophy, we easily fall into a dichotomizing of philosophers: Parmenides or Heraclitus, Hume or Kant, Plato or Aristotle, and so forth. In the case at hand, we’d be tempted to begin by opposing Descartes and Charles Peirce (see Peirce). Indeed, this route is well traveled. From a Peircean perspective, however, this would be a mistake. Peirce saw himself as standing in an intellectual tradition with Descartes, as sharing interests, problems, and concerns. Thus, as we mark out the important distinctions between Peircean pragmatism and Cartesian rationalism, we must do so against the background of these shared interests. As Peirce saw it, “Descartes marks the period when Philosophy put off childish things and began to be a conceited young man. By the time the young man has grown to be an old man, he will have learned that traditions are precious treasures, while iconoclastic inventions are always cheap and often nasty” (CP 4.71). In the overview of Peirce’s critical engagement with Cartesian thought that follows, it will be important to keep in mind that Peirce saw the Cartesian tradition as a treasure even as he marked out his own disagreements with it.

A Method of Inquiry

Max Fisch well states the common interest of Descartes and Peirce in finding a method of inquiry. Referring to Peirce’s series of articles entitled “Illustrations of the History and Logic of Science,” Fisch says, “the six ‘Illustrations’ that were published in 1877–78 have gradually come to be recognized as the nineteenth-century Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Searching for the Truth in the Sciences; and so far no twentieth-century Discourse has superseded it” (W 3:xxxvi–vii).

In the first essay of the series, “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce established his general relationship to Descartes. Descartes sought to overcome the method of authority that characterized much of medieval philosophy, and did so by turning to his own a priori method. As Peirce put it in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”: 154
When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a more natural fountain of the principles, and thought he found it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of authority to that of a priority, as described in my first paper. Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. (CP 5.391)

Peirce’s own move beyond the a priori method was a central feature of his response to Cartesian rationalism. This revision of the nature of inquiry involved his tripartite scientific method whose three stages were: abduction or hypothesis development, deduction or prediction of consequences, and induction or experimental testing of hypotheses.

Descartes and Peirce both described scientific inquiry as a movement through three stages or phases: an originary moment, a method for developing cognition, and an outcome of the method. For Descartes, universal doubt initiates inquiry, intuition and deduction constitute the method of knowing, and these yield absolutely certain claims. Peirce agrees that doubt is originary, that there is something like insight that leads to knowing, and that living beliefs are the outcome of inquiry. However, his theory of inquiry radically transforms each of Descartes’ moments in the process. This chapter begins with sketches of Peirce’s resistance to the three stages as Descartes describes them, and then turns to an overview of Peirce’s own transformed theory of inquiry. Finally, to indicate the sorts of consequences to which Peirce’s revision of method led, two corollary metaphysical issues will be examined that are among the most important to surface in Peirce’s critique of Cartesianism: the dispute between nominalism and realism, and the notion of an individual, substantive self.

As we examine Descartes’ method, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with a caricature. A more nuanced and careful reading of Descartes’ texts and letters reveals a more complex and cautious approach to the issues at hand. Nevertheless, a distilled version of Descartes’ method can be found articulated in his Discourse and enacted in his Meditations. In its simplest outline, the method begins with a universal doubt, a working skepticism. The doubt can only be overcome by ideas that are absolutely and immediately clear and distinct – by intuitions. These intuitions yield the certainty requisite for “scientific” knowledge and become the basis for a deductive chain that produces further certainties. The famous exemplar for such foundational intuition is the cogito. In reconstructing Cartesian method, Peirce addressed each of these features in turn.

Doubt, Intuition, and Certainty

In Part Four of the Discourse, Descartes described his method, a method that appeared again later in his Meditations. For him, the search for truth begins by rejecting “as absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the slightest doubt and to see, as a result, if anything remained among my beliefs that was completely indubitable” (Descartes 1999, p. 24). Peirce did not reject Descartes’ notion of doubt wholesale;
indeed he may well have recognized, as Karl-Otto Apel suggests, that Descartes’ emphasis on radical doubt has perhaps “generated a new total disposition which has created the very situation of an open community of experimenters that Peirce and Dewey praised so much . . .” (Apel 1981, p. 63). The two agreed that doubt constituted the first moment of inquiry. Nevertheless, Peirce rejected Descartes’ appeal to universal doubt and revised the scope and the function of doubt within the process of scientific investigation.

His principal concerns with Descartes’ radical doubt were two. On the one hand, Peirce did not believe the “universal doubt” recommended by Descartes was experimentally possible: “We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy” (W 2:212). As Peirce saw it, Descartes’ maxim of universal doubt was arbitrary and never fully actualized even by Descartes – the plausible assertion that all beliefs are in principle open to doubt is not the same as actually doubting all of one’s beliefs in the present. As Peirce stated it: “To make the reflection that many of the things which appear certain to us are probably false, and that there is not one which may not be among the errors, is very sensible. But to make believe one does not believe anything is an idle and self-deceptive pretence.” (CP 4.71) The assertion of doubt still leaves us, practically speaking, in medias res with a variety of belief-habits guiding our conduct and our thinking.

On the other hand, Peirce believed that the maxim of universal doubt revealed that Descartes’ doubt, when it was actualized, was not always genuine – it was what we might call a conceptual doubt. “Hence this initial skepticism.” Peirce argued, “will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt” (W 2:212). Descartes himself seemed to recognize the arbitrariness of his doubting when he described it as “pretending” (Descartes 1999, p. 25). If doubt in philosophy and science is arbitrary in this way, if genuine and pretend doubts are mixed together, then inquiry could begin anywhere, at any time. One could simply, as Descartes does, assert doubt. The history of science should look entirely capricious if this were true, following whatever arbitrary doubts one pretended to raise and revealing no logic of development. This arbitrariness of doubt indicates that the process of Cartesian inquiry is at bottom ahistorical. This brings us to the second moment of the method that Descartes outlined: the finding of immediate beliefs by way of the principle of clarity and distinctness.

Peirce’s historicist and synecchistic notion of cognition, which grew out of his resistance to the appeal to universal doubt, leads to a consideration of Peirce’s second concern – his distrust of Descartes’ reliance on intuition. Doubt is the origin of Cartesian inquiry: intuition and subsequent deduction constitute the Cartesian method for overcoming doubt. Again, the inception of Peirce’s concern is practical: he simply doesn’t see evidence that humans have a capacity for infallible intuitive knowing. “We have no power of Intuition.” he asserted, “but every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions” (W 2:213). If we were to have such a faculty, then the a priori method should be effective and not lead humans into conflict over beliefs. In short, if Descartes were right, we should agree more than we do. Descartes tries to outflank this concern by offering clarity and distinctness as the traits of genuine intuitions. Thus, intuition requires a knowledge of and a facility with this principle of clarity and
Peirce and Cartesian rationalism
distinctness. Peirce took this move to be sleight of hand; it provided criteria but the
criteria were as suspect as the faculty they were introduced to support. In response to
the Cartesian principle, Peirce said, “he professed to demonstrate that whatever
appears to us clear and distinct must be true; – another of those modern conveniences
by which Descartes rendered philosophizing so reposeful” (EP 2:71). Even if the cri-
teria of clarity and distinctness do not beg the question of intuition’s certainty, it is
nevertheless the case that the certainty yielded is for the individual intuiter alone,
even if she or he claims universality. Only the person who has an intuition knows
with certainty. But the individualism that Peirce here found to be problematic was
considered by Descartes to be an advantage.

Descartes clearly believed not only that one could but that the individual inquirer
should work alone: “Thus one notices,” he argued, “that buildings that were started
and completed by a single architect are usually more attractive and better designed
than those which a number of architects have tried to put together by making use of
old walls that had been built for different purposes” (Descartes 1999, p. 11). The moral
here is that truth – including any claim to universal truth – is best found by lone
inquirers. Cartesian science, as exemplified by Descartes’ solitary meditations, is a sin-
gular pursuit. Having established a foundational truth through intuition (in Descartes’
own philosophical architecture this is the cogito) the lone intuiting inquirer, without
external distractions, can now pursue further truths through deduction as well as by
employing the criteria of clarity and distinctness to establish other beliefs as genuine
intuitions. In his words, “Having noticed that there is nothing at all in the proposition
‘I think, therefore I am’ which convinces me that I speak the truth, apart from the fact
that I see very clearly that one has to exist in order to think, I judged that I could adopt
as a general rule that those things that we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all
true” (Descartes 1999, p. 25). In the Meditations Descartes employs both avenues to
develop his world-view. Specifically, he employs his principle to underwrite a version
of the ontological argument for belief in God. This was akin to reclaiming a Queen
in a chess game: Descartes’ God, in part by guaranteeing the soundness of intuition
and deductive reasoning, becomes crucial to his solving a variety of philosophical
problems. Peirce thought this move still left us questioning the very intuition of the
principle: “Descartes and others have endeavored to bolster up the light of reason by
make-believe arguments from the ‘veracity of God,’ and the like. They had better not
have pretended to call that in question which they intended to prove, since the proofs,
themselves call for the same light to make them evident” (CP 2.28). Peirce believed the
“celebrated criterion of clearness and distinctness” to be “no more than an utterly
unsuccessful attempt to define the old ‘self-evidence’ of the axioms of reason” (CP
2.28).

To his practical concern that we do not possess a faculty for intuiting truths, Peirce
added several more formal objections. The history of science reveals not universal
agreement but the “social impulse” of disagreement that forces us to consider others’
beliefs that do not agree with our own. The social impulse suggests that inquiry is a
communal not an individual process. Moreover, for Peirce, the social impulse indicates
that there are always some inquirers who are wrong. This point he generalized
into his “fallibilism,” the claim that human inquirers are fallible. Our fallibility, our
disagreements, and the developmental nature of the history of science all point to the belief that science is not only historical but also communal; moreover, because it is both historical and communal, it is also not immediate as Cartesian intuition suggests but is mediated over time by the development of both new discoveries and new ideas. Thus, the intuition and immediacy of Cartesian rationalism fail to make sense of the actual practices of scientific inquirers. Peirce’s resistance to the apodictic nature of Descartes’ method for overcoming doubt led him necessarily to a rejection of the outcome that Descartes projected.

That outcome was “truth,” by which Descartes meant absolute certainty. Such certainty was the only outcome Descartes believed worthy of belief, as evidenced in his description of the importance of the cogito: “After that, I thought about what a proposition generally needs in order to be true and certain because, since I had just found one that I knew was such, I thought I should also know what this certainty consists in” (Descartes 1999, p. 25). Thus certainty was a direct function of clarity and distinctness. Consequently, for Descartes “the only outstanding difficulty is in recognizing which ones [ideas] we conceive distinctly” (ibid.). As Peirce saw it, this “outstanding difficulty” presents us with the key problem. If we are uncertain as to what fits the criteria of clarity and distinctness, it seems improbable that our inquiry could end with certainty, unless we mean by “certainty” simply the absence of doubt. Descartes seemed to force the issue by relying on the principle of excluded middle in assessing the relation between truth and ignorance; he was unable, in virtue of his geometric approach, to conceive of a middle ground in which plausibility and probability might serve as alternative modes of describing belief or working “truths.” Intuition and deduction were designed specifically to accommodate this absence of a middle ground, to ensure that beliefs were certain and necessary.

Peirce’s most immediate objection was practical in nature; we simply don’t find ourselves or others in the history of science in possession of absolute certainties. More often than not we find that our beliefs are transitional and provisional. This disagreement over certainty is tied in part to different conceptions of the role of perception in inquiry. For Descartes, perception was limiting and prevented us from achieving certainty and thus became a casualty of his initial doubt: “because our senses sometimes deceive us, I decided to assume that nothing was the way the sense made us imagine it” (Descartes 1999, p. 24). For Peirce, human inquirers cannot stand outside of experience, thus making perception, as we will discuss below, the key to both the origin and the end of any inquiry. The fallibility of perception, and reason, was not for Peirce a reason to dismiss its results altogether, but to remain attentive to experience over time so that the results could be corrected when found to be misleading or inadequate. Moreover, Peirce was not averse to Kantian transcendental arguments, a version of which Descartes seemed to offer in his defense of God’s existence. The only condition adequate to Descartes’ idea of perfection is a real God: “Thus the only remaining option was that this idea was put in me by a nature that was really more perfect than I was, one that even had in itself all the perfections of which I could have some idea, that is – to express myself in a single word – by God” (Discourse: 26). Peirce simply maintained that such transcendental claims, because they rested on one’s description of experience, were likewise provisional not certain. They too would have to await the long run of inquiry for ultimate satisfaction.
Peirce and Cartesian Rationalism

Peirce’s Reconstruction of the “method for guiding one’s reason”

Peirce’s revisions of the method of inquiry presented in Descartes’ Discourse can be traced through his resistance to the three moments of method discussed above. Peirce reformulated the role of doubt; he proposed an alternative method to the intuitive-deductive approach to overcoming doubt; and he redescribed the outcome of inquiry such that certainty was not one of its characteristics. A short walk through these transformations should reveal both the continuity of interest Peirce shared with Descartes and his significant disagreements with Descartes’ way of understanding human reasoning.

In light of his disagreements with the role of universal doubt in Cartesian rationalism, Peirce sought to revise his theory of inquiry to locate the specific ways in which doubt played a role in reasoning. Doubt remained for him the inception of inquiry. Such doubt, however, was not arbitrarily chosen but forced itself on the inquirer by experience or the “social impulse,” and was recognizable by several traits. “We generally know when we wish to ask a question,” Peirce stated, “and when we wish to pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity between the sensation of doubting and that of believing” (W 3:247). Furthermore, doubt always occurs against a background of habitual beliefs. This, as we noted, makes inquiry, in essence, historical rather than geometrical. On Descartes’ deductive/geometrical model, one must eliminate all belief to clear space for an ahistorical truth that could, in principle, generate all other truths; “to rebuild the house where one lives,” he argued, it is necessary first “to knock it down” (Descartes 1999, p. 18). Peirce’s historicist model of inquiry begins with a house that, like his beloved Arisbe, is always already in the making; new beliefs are addenda generated in response to real doubts and are themselves open to revision in the future. For Peirce, cognition is not a set of mechanically linked steps but “arises by a continuous process” (EP 1:30).

In his early resistance to Cartesianism, Peirce emphasized the elimination of fake doubt and focused on the external causes of doubt: experience and the social impulse. Later, however, he drew a distinction between fake and “feigned” doubt. The latter mode of doubt involves imagined doubts in the sciences that seem plausible given a current set of beliefs. This shift provided a nuance to Peirce’s theory of inquiry. Thus, although doubt should never be raised where there is no possibility of actual doubt, a feigned doubt can be useful in science when one deals with something that we might really doubt. Under these circumstances, doubt may be feigned or created, but it is nevertheless constrained both by previous scientific beliefs and by the facts at hand; the dubito is not an arbitrary act and therefore is not merely pretend or fake. Even so, the doubt that occurs at the inception of inquiry is never universal, because it is always a specific doubt in a specific context. Moreover, insofar as doubt plays a specific role in inquiry, it should, when circumstances allow, be developed as a practice. That is, the inquirer needs to become sensitive to the logic of doubt and to see clearly where questions arise within a systematic, scientific outlook on the world. Part of being a scientist, for Peirce, was being aware of anomalies and conundra in the way, for example, that Galileo suspected limitations in medieval accounts of motion. In other words, for
Peirce doubt must be cultivated in scientific inquiry: “The pragmatist knows that doubt is an art which has to be acquired with difficulty; and his genuine doubts will go much further than those of any Cartesian” (CP 6.498). While doubt is the irritant that initiates inquiry, belief is that which overcomes doubt. The move from one to the other Peirce identified as inquiry. Again, this movement for him was a continuous process and not the immediate leap that Cartesian intuition portrays.

Though Peirce rejected Cartesian intuition’s individualism, lack of mediation, and claim to absoluteness and universality, he did not dismiss the idea that something like intuition might function as a feature of our reasoning processes. Working within the history that Descartes helped develop, Peirce argued for a version of Cartesian insight though in much modified form that took into account the concerns noted earlier. The mature form of this insight is described in Peirce’s various accounts of critical common-sensism. There we find Peirce asserting that humans have an instinct for guessing right, not all of the time, but more often than not. Cognition is generated through perception and abductive reasoning but neither universality nor certainty follows. Thus, the initial insight must move on into an experimental process in which reasoning is continuous and not an aggregate of discrete steps. Without a faculty of intuition, there can be no single clear and distinct idea from which all else follows. As we noted above, there is an ongoing, developing history of ideas. Thus, though instinctive or common-sense beliefs have a high natural plausibility, they must nevertheless undergo the tests of experience; and they must do so in public fashion. “The elements of every concept,” Peirce maintained, “enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason” (CP 5.212). For Peirce, instinct and abductive inference reveal that human inquirers have insight, but never an insight that is immediately certain and final. Abduction, he stated, “is an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight” (CP 5.181).

To pass from their perceptual origins through to the “gate of purposive action,” ideas that arise in abductive insight as hypotheses must pass through deduction and induction. Peirce’s method for overcoming doubt involves all three stages. His rejection of Cartesian intuition and certainty thus led directly to several important features of Peirce’s own discourse on method. To frame these features we might say that Peirce remained a “provisional moralist” in Descartes’ sense. In Part Three of the Discourse Descartes proposed a “provisional morality” that upheld basic cultural habits and would allow him to proceed with his radical doubt until he came upon something he could believe with certainty. In a letter to Reneri in May 1638 Descartes wrote that he would “apply this rule principally to decisions about living which cannot be deferred, and I use it only provisionally; for I plan to change my views as soon as I can find better ones, and I will not pass up any opportunity to search for them” (Descartes 1999, p. 69). Because he understood belief to always be in transition, at least from the vantage point of human experience, Peirce applied the spirit of Descartes’ willingness to search for better views to all of inquiry. Whereas Descartes posited his provisional morality to find ways to overcome it, Peirce believed that provisionality was essential to the very nature of scientific inquiry. Such provisionality meant that no one person could foreclose on final truth.
In keeping with this provisionality, Peirce transformed inquiry from Cartesian individualism into a communal practice. Since, for Peirce, no immediate certainty could be achieved, certainty had to become a regulative hope of the long run of inquiry. The “long run” nature of the task meant that no one person could carry it out. Thus, a community of inquirers in a living history of ideas was required to make sense of the possibility of knowing and of approaching ultimate truth. Peirce sided with Descartes in rejecting philosophy’s appeals to skepticism and relativism, but he did so only on the basis of the possibility of controlled inquiry by a community of scientific inquirers, not on the basis of a priori certainty.

The rejection of immediate certainty also led Peirce away from Cartesian deductivism. For Descartes, as we saw, a single certainty coupled with deductive inference would suffice to produce a world-view. Descartes’ own method led him directly from the cogito, by way of the principle of clarity and distinctness, to the certainty of God’s existence. And once God was re-established from the initial doubt, everything else – including the compatibility of minds and bodies – could be controlled and sustained. Without the possibility of a single thread of argumentation leading to a host of “certainties,” Peirce found himself re-describing the nature of the process of cognition; not a “chain” of necessary propositions but a “cable” of replaceable strands of belief became the foundational metaphor for his account of reasoning.

This shift involved the fallibilism we mentioned earlier. Strands of a cable that are open to failure and replacement indicate that Peirce had shifted from deductivism to a richer conception of scientific inference. Peirce’s only source of “guarantee” was to be found in the ongoing observation and experimentation of a community of inquirers that was committed to truth-seeking. In Peirce’s world, whatever is known would have to be worked for; it would not appear merely by the grace of God. Peirce’s rejection of Descartes’ method was thus radical but not wholesale. He put doubt to work in a more controlled and specified way. Moreover, the shift from immediate intuition to a critical common sense and the shift from immediate certainty to a vision of truth that could only be attained in the infinite long run of inquiry carried out by a community of genuine and fallible inquirers marked related but alternative answers to some Cartesian questions. Peirce’s transformation of Cartesian rationalism as a mode of inquiry led directly to transformed conceptions of nature and the human self. Peirce’s world was no longer the stable and comfortable world about which Candide became cynical; his world was shot through with risk and failure, yet driven by a hope that some beauty, goodness, and truth could be achieved through the hard work of committed persons.

A Transformed Ontology

Peirce’s commitment to continuity, what he called his “synechism,” governed his ontological and cosmological claims just as it governed his account of reason. Thus, his understanding of nature differed from that of Descartes in ways analogous to the ways in which his understanding of reason differed from that of Descartes. Peirce saw this difference, in essence, as the difference between a realistic and a nominalistic account of nature. Peirce believed the whole of modern philosophy, under the influence
Descartes, however, was not among those whom Peirce called “normal nominalists.” Normal nominalists were, by and large, empiricists who believed the world was composed of discrete entities or things and that reasoning was composed of atomistic sense impressions. For them, general ideas and principles were just words. At first blush, Descartes, like Leibniz after him, appears to be a kind of realist because he takes mind seriously as a feature of nature. However, as Peirce saw it, Descartes’ reification of mind still failed to acknowledge true generality or continuity. For Descartes, a mind is a *res cogitans*, a thinking *thing*, and things are conceived as individual existents. Peirce believed that Descartes, like other moderns, recognized “but one mode of being, the being of an individual thing or fact” (*CP* 1.21). On such a view, relations, laws, and general principles were not considered real because they were not individual, existent things. Or, if they were real, they would have to be conceived to be individual things. “The nominalist alone,” Peirce argued, “falls into the absurdity of talking of ‘single facts,’ or *individual generals*” (*CP* 6.593).

The consequences for science of this nominalistic outlook were important for Peirce. His focus on the importance of relations and on science’s inquiry into the laws of nature, which are nature’s habitual ways of acting, led directly to his realism and his synechism, the beliefs that generality and continuity are real, though they are not individual, existent things. Without the reality of generality, relations would be either unreal or “real” only as arbitrary assertions by individuals. This is the problem William James (see JAMES) faced in his essays on radical empiricism and that led him to assert the reality of relations as well as things. Peirce’s point was that a world *without* real relations would have difficulty holding itself together in an orderly fashion. Furthermore, Descartes’ use of “causality” as an ordering principle was, on his own nominalistic grounds, as Hume later showed, unreasonable. If causes were real in Descartes’ world, they would need to be individual, existent things, the very sort of individual thing neither Hume nor anyone else could find. The problem for Peirce was not that Cartesian nominalists do not *discuss* relations “but that they do not admit them as real constituents of the universe” (*CP* 5.82). This is evident perhaps insofar as we can see Descartes as one progenitor of mechanism through his emphasis on the conception of causality as mechanical force: “Already in that strangely influential hodge podge, the salad of Cartesianism, the doctrine stands out very emphatically that the only force is the force of impact, which clearly belongs to the category of Reaction” (*CP* 5.64). The category of Reaction, for Peirce, is what he calls “secondness.” And a world that is, ontologically speaking, essentially secondness excludes real laws, purposes, final causes, and the force of laws; it is a world of things in mechanical interaction. Such an exclusion fundamentally alters the practice of science.

Peirce stated that he “entirely approved the brief statement of Dr. F. E. Abbott in his *Scientific Theism* that Realism is implied in modern science” (*CP* 4.50). This approval was manifest in Peirce’s ongoing battles with thinkers such as Karl Pearson and Paul Carus concerning the nature of natural or scientific laws. Pearson was an early constructivist who maintained that a natural law is “essentially a product of the human mind and has no meaning apart from man” (Pearson 1892, p. 104). For
Peirce, it was precisely the reality of law that scientists sought to understand. Gravity was not an arbitrary description nor an entitative force, but a constraining habit concerning the interactions of physical things. Such a law did not exist but was real in its generality. It is not so much that Cartesian rationalism focused on contending or opposing this point; rather it simply adopted uncritically an Ockhamist ontology and overlooked the importance of the issue. The importance of this oversight cannot be overstated, for it led directly to Descartes’ conception of the self as an individual, substantive res cogitans. And this idea as much as any other, from a Peircean point of view, has led philosophy in the direction of a number of dead ends and pseudo-problems: the mind–body problem, the problem of other selves, the problem of self-identity over time, and so forth. Indeed, it is just this Cartesian conception that has become the focus of the various strands of postmodernism in the last 30 years.

Descartes’ meditations on the cogito led him to conceive the human self as essentially a thinking thing. To this thinking thing, by the grace of God, was attached a body. Indeed, it was precisely the reification of both mind and body coupled with the limited and limiting conception of causality as mechanical force that led to the so-called mind–body problem. Ironically, Western science, despite its methodological shift in a Peircean direction, still proceeds in large part with such a Cartesian conception of the self as accepted doctrine. Persons are often conceived to be reasoning substances that can achieve immediate self-knowledge in the way Descartes suggested. Moreover, they are often viewed as substances or mechanisms susceptible of simple external manipulation. The behaviorism of twentieth-century psychology is but one example of the reach of Cartesianism.

Peirce resisted Descartes’ conception of the self, considering it to be as nominalistic as the rest of his metaphysics. “Every attentive reader of St. Paul is aware that according to him, man has a threefold being. We derive,” Peirce argued, “the notion of the soul’s being single from Descartes” (CP 7.580). Again, a person, according to Cartesian rationalism, is a substantive, isolated individual existing in a web of mechanical causes. From here it is a short step to the questions, or pseudo-problems, about the knowledge of other minds and the difficulty of self-identity over time that we mentioned earlier. For Peirce, the problem lay at the beginning in the nominalism that underwrote all of Cartesian ontology.

Peirce’s realistic, synechistic, and semiotic conception of the self was radically different from the Cartesian view of the self. For Peirce, a personality “is some kind of coordination or connection of ideas” and “like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time” (CP 6.155). The anti-Cartesian consequences of this view are several. First, the self is not an isolated substantive thing, but a living generality continuous with its environment, including other selves such that the “recognition by one person of another’s personality takes place by a means to some extent identical with the means by which he [she] is conscious of his [her] own personality” (CP 6.158). Because the self is fully ensconced in an environment, this self-consciousness or self-awareness is not the isolated intuition of the Cartesian ego. Rather, as Vincent Colapietro (1989) has shown at length, the self, as Peirce saw it, knows itself by way of a semiotic process mostly through its encounters
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with otherness in the world. The self appears to itself as a function of failure in action, of resistance from outside itself, and of community response to its conduct. Thus, Peirce stated, when a boy touches a hot stove after being warned not to, “he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. So testimony gives the first dawning of self-consciousness” (CP 5.233).

The Peircean self, unlike the Cartesian self, does not come into the world ready-made and finished; it grows and develops. The self for Peirce is a growing “sign.” The generality of personality allows a self to be multifaceted, partially fragmented, and unfinished. This sort of openness and semiotic complexity provided the ground for the more involved interpretations of personhood and psyche in the twentieth century. As Peirce noted at the turn of the century: “The doctrine of Descartes, that the mind consists solely of that which directly asserts itself in unitary consciousness, modern scientific psychologists altogether reject” (CP 5.569). The continuity of the Peircean self also entailed that one’s embodiment is not a “problem” but a natural feature of the self. The body, through perception, gives us direct access to our environment and to other persons.

Finally, as a corollary to the self’s continuity with its environment, its temporal development, and its self-awareness through otherness is that, for Peirce, we are essentially communal beings not individual selves. To put it another way, our personalities can only be realized within communities. We are “signs”; we live in and through generalities or meanings that move out into the environment and social milieu and return to us transformed by interpretation. Self-realization depends on communication and semeiosis. The same point was further developed in a naturalistic setting in the work of John Dewey (see Dewey) and George Herbert Mead (see Mead), and came to have an impact through pragmatic theories of education and social development in the twentieth century.

In delineating these consequences, we see that Peirce’s transformations of and oppositions to Cartesian rationalism were ontological as well as epistemological. Continuity and difference were for Peirce both constitutive of the history of ideas. Thus, Peirce was a thoroughly postmodern thinker. At the same time, we should understand that he did not presume to have simply left the past behind; rather, he saw himself as standing in an intellectual tradition and transforming Descartes’ responses to some of the most daunting and interesting questions concerning human experience. Peirce’s transformations are not merely of historical interest; they offer a fresh and non-reductive way of looking at contemporary scientific practice. Much of Western science is still operating with Cartesian notions of certainty, causality, and nominalistic individuality despite the fact that these conceptions are inadequate to describe the actual practices and claims of many contemporary scientists. Moreover, in the moral and political realm, rights theorists and utilitarian thinkers still talk as if individuals were isolated selves and communities were aggregates of these selves. Only recently have a variety of “identity theorists,” working in a much more Peircean way, begun to challenge these conceptions at their root. A century later, Peirce’s transformations of Cartesianism still present us with insights yielding an opportunity to rethink many of our own cultural habits. Such is the pragmatic meaning of Peirce’s response to Cartesian rationalism.
PEIRCE AND CARTESIAN RATIONALISM

References and further reading


James, Empiricism, and Absolute Idealism

TIMOTHY L. S. SPRIGGE

For absolute idealism there is one unitary world consciousness or experience which includes everything else which exists. One significant aim of William James’s (see James) later philosophy, comprising pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism, was to provide an alternative to this view which represented the dominant philosophical ambience in which his thought had developed. Absolute idealism was the dominant philosophy in the English-speaking world throughout the period in which James worked out his own ideas. At Harvard he had the Hegelian George Herbert Palmer for his colleague, while idealist Josiah Royce was his formidable younger colleague. Moreover the dominant tone in English-language philosophy as a whole was largely absolute idealist, with T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet as the most influential of philosophers in Britain, and Royce the most influential in America. Of course, by the time of James’s later writings the tide was turning, but James still needed to conquer this philosophy for himself.

James’s objection to absolute idealism was most fundamentally moral. While it took him a long time to work out a satisfactory critique of it, he always found it morally objectionable. For it regarded the world as a perfect Whole and all the evil in it, properly understood, as contributory to its perfection. But this implies the view, which James found detestable, that nothing that occurs is really undesirable. James most eloquently expresses this problem in Pragmatism (1907) where, after describing a terrible human tragedy due to poverty, in which a working man committed suicide because he could not feed his family, he quotes Royce as saying that “the very presence of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the eternal order” (Works Prag., p. 29, quoting Royce 1959, vol. 2, p. 385) and Bradley as saying “The Absolute is the richer for every discord and for all diversity which it embraces” (Bradley 1969, p. 180). It is difficult not to sympathize with James’s dislike of the callous optimism of some absolute idealists, though it must be added that Royce, though less so Bradley, was intensely concerned to find a solution to the problem of evil.

Reality as Experience

One thing on which James did agree with such absolute idealists as Bradley (if not quite Green) was that experience was the very stuff of reality. In “Does Consciousness
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“Exist?” James says that “pure experience” is not the name of “a universal element of which all things are made” but only a collective name for all that may “appear” (Works ERE, pp. 26–27) but later in “The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience” he says that it is the material prima of what counts as physical in one context and in another as mental (Works ERE, pp. 137–8). James was at least emphatic that there was no other reality besides experience of which a philosophy seeking to be realistic could take account:

To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system. (Works ERE, pp. 42–3)

This view of philosophy was the core of his radical empiricism, along with the insistence that both “conjunctive” and “disjunctive” relations were immediately given in perceptual experience. Therefore for him the world, in so far as it is a world, must be such that all its elements are related in an experiential way. But he rejected the absolute idealist claim that this can only be so if they all are components of one unitary super-consciousness. For he thought that there were experiential relations by which all finite experiences were related, directly or indirectly, to each other, but in a next to next, or concatenated, fashion which did not require that they all belong to one single overarching experience.

It may be suggested that “experience” has such a different meaning for James and for Bradley that there is no real common view here. However, though they have different views about it, it seems to me that the core intuition was the same. Moreover, James himself says that on this point he agrees with “transcendental idealism.” What he disagreed with was that there is one unitary container of all the experience which there is (Works ERE, pp. 193–5).

Knowledge and Truth

At the time that James wrote and published The Principles of Psychology in 1890, it seems likely that he had a strong inclination to believe that absolute idealism was true. The proof which Royce had presented of the existence of this Absolute seemed to leave no alternative. This, of course, was Royce’s famous argument, first presented in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885), that since there is such a thing as error, then our thoughts must often be about things the character of which we misconceive and which, therefore, cannot be identified for us simply by our conception of them. The only solution, thought Royce, and for a time James followed him in this (see Sprigge 1993), was that we are related to the objects of our thought by the fact that both they and our thoughts about them all belong together in one absolute mind or mind-like reality which determines what our thoughts are about. Our erroneous thoughts come about because we are just bits of the Absolute and these bits contain incomplete thoughts cut off from awareness of what it is about their objects which make them false. Of course, the Absolute itself experiences our errors just as they are, but it also experiences the
facts which show their erroneousness, and is the richer for containing both the error and its correction by the larger truth which is missing from our own restricted consciousness. At a deeper level, indeed, even we ourselves know that we are mistaken, but this is at that (for us) unconscious level where our apparent separation from the Absolute is overcome.

When James said in the Preface to *The Principles of Psychology* (1880) that in a work of empirical psychology he would be eschewing ultimate metaphysical issues, this was probably because he thought that, although absolute idealism was probably the truth, it was inappropriate to make use of it in an empirical science. Later, when he thought that he had found a way of rejecting Royce’s supposed proof of the Absolute he did not think it necessary to make such a sharp contrast between the empirical truth and the metaphysical truth.

The problem which Royce had set him may be summed up as one of the questions James listed in *Some Problems of Philosophy* as typical of those which are asked in metaphysical inquiry: “In knowledge, how does the object get into the mind? Or the mind get at the object?” (*Works SPP*, p. 30). When James first published his article “The Function of Cognition” in 1885, he was still inclined to think that the final answer to these questions was Royce’s absolute idealism and that the answer given in this article was simply the best that could be done within empiricist or scientific terms. But later he thought that the empirical answer given to the question in this paper was, in principle, the finally true one. In reaching that conclusion he felt at last liberated from the hold of absolute idealism (see *Works MT*, pp. 23, 32).

How had James met Royce’s “proof”? Well, he thought that he had found an adequate empirical account of how a thought points to its object. It does so because it is the beginning of a continuous actual, or at least possible, flow of experience which terminates or would have terminated (given, so to speak its head) in immediate acquaintance with the object, and such that the object is or would have been felt as the fulfillment of the flow (see especially “The Function of Cognition” and “The Tigers in India” in *Works MT*, and “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” and “A World of Pure Experience” in *Works ERE*). This being so, there was no need to invoke the Absolute as that which relates thoughts to their objects. For this, James now felt able to contend, was because they had the potentiality to lead to their objects in a completely empirical manner. James gave accounts of what this “leading” was which vary somewhat, at least in the factors most emphasized. Sometimes, for a thought to lead to its object is for it to be the start of a flow of feeling which terminates in it with a feeling of satisfaction; sometimes it is for it to enable one to operate upon the object. Sometimes, the absence of any intrinsic intentionality on the part of the thought as a mere psychological event is so emphasized that there is no hint of what it is about within its own bounds. Sometimes, some adumbration of the object’s character is allowed it.

If we examine James’s treatment of this theme we find that there are three important aspects to his talk of aboutness as a matter of a leading process of this kind. First, there is a behaviorist aspect for which the thought of an object is an instrument for successful interaction with it. Second, at least in the simplest case, the relation between thought and its object is intra-mental inasmuch as the experience of being led from thought to object is a process going on within the thinker’s own subjective experience. James says:
Where direct acquaintance is lacking [and is bound to be so] “knowledge about” is the next best thing, and an acquaintance with what actually lies about the object, and is most closely related to it puts such knowledge within our grasp. Ether-waves and your anger, for example, are things in which my thoughts will never perceptually terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very brink, to the chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deed which are their really next effects. (Works ERE, p. 73)

Where it cannot be entirely personally intra-mental, the process at least leads intra-mentally to their most intimate effects, hovers on the brink of compresence with it, as in the case of another person’s feelings (see Works ERE, pp. 73, 88–91, 199–202). Third, there is sometimes a hint that James recognized a certain kind of inherent fit between a thought and its object.

It is the behavioral aspect which is one of the motivations for James’s pragmatic account of truth, as an idea which enables us to operate successfully upon something in the world. The intra-mental aspect saves James from the extremes of what is now called an externalist view of the relation between thought and its objects. The notion of an inherent fit to some extent qualifies James’s insistence that a thought is merely a “flat” bit of experience with no intrinsic transcendency. All these ideas are directed (among other things) to finding an alternative more empirical view of how thought relates to its object than that of absolute idealism.

Intellectualism

James occasionally accused the absolute idealists of operating on the basis of a fallacy which he called “intellectualism.” The intellectualist fails to distinguish between concepts and the things to which the concepts refer (Works ERE, pp. 106–7). That leads him to find certain puzzles in the world which he believes that only his doctrine of the Absolute can solve. James in effect levels two charges at intellectualism. The first represents it as little better than a childish joke. The second as a deep philosophical error, only erroneous, indeed, if James himself is right on a controversial philosophical claim.

James’s first charge is that some of the problems leading to absolute idealism stem from the intellectualist fallacy that things can only be in such relations to each other as follow from their concepts. As James explains, the intellectualist believes that:

No real thing can be in two relations at once: the same moon, for example, cannot be seen both by you and by me. For the concept “seen by you” is not the “concept seen by me” and if, taking the moon as a grammatical subject and, predicating one of these concepts of it, you then predicate the other also, you become guilty of the logical sin of saying that a thing can both be A and not A at once. Learned trifling again; for clear though the conceptual contradictions be, nobody sincerely disbelieves that two men see the same thing. (Works ERE, pp. 103–4; see also pp. 100–1; cf. Works PU, pp. 61f.)

This charge seems to make a very superficial dismissal of the problem of private and public worlds. Certainly it offers little by way of a riposte to Royce. The intellectualist who thinks that a father cannot also be a brother is more a comic character than a
serious thinker. But the claim that you and I don’t see what are strictly the same thing is not a similarly trivial little verbal mistake.

James’s second charge is the important one; it represents his own Bergsonian view that conceptual thinking is bound to distort our grasp of reality. The best example was that it cannot do justice to its flowing quality, because, while logic operated with concepts, in fact concepts as such could not adequately characterize what concrete reality really is. “When the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers incomprehensibilities in the flowing process” (Works ERE, p. 92). Concepts are sharply distinct one from another (or so James claims very much contra Hegel) while concrete existents or occurrents are not. And since they are always in a process of becoming, real things cannot be adequately reported by static concepts. In James’s words:

The great difference between percepts and concepts is percepts are continuous and that concepts are discrete. Not discrete in their being, for conception as an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their several meanings. Each concept means just what it singly means, and nothing else; and if the conceiveor does not know whether he means this or that, it shows that his concept is imperfectly formed. The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, means nothing, and is but what it immediately is. No matter how small a tract of it be taken, it is always a much-at-once, and contains innumerable aspects and characters, which conception can pick out, isolate, and thereafter always intend. (Works SPP, pp. 48–9; also chap. 4 is of the highest importance on these issues)

It is not that there is anything wrong with concepts as such. They are an essential means for dealing with reality for practical purposes. Moreover, elaborate conceptual systems even have their own beauty and thus add a special value of their own to reality. (Does this cover poetry as well as mathematics? James, in this context, is strangely silent about literature.) But still, their more fundamental purpose is to guide us round the world of percepts, that is, the world of immediate experience. But they are misused if they are treated as having a kind of adequacy to reality which they cannot have.

Perhaps the most dyed-in-the-wool “intellectualist,” as James saw it, was Bradley:

Mr. Bradley, for instance, is an ultra-rationalist. He admits that our intellect is primarily practical, but says that, for philosophers, the practical need is simply Truth. . . . So Mr. Bradley . . . turns his back on finite experience for ever. Truth must lie in the opposite direction, the direction of the Absolute. (Works ERE, pp. 98–9)

James’s opinion was especially tragic because Bradley was almost in sight of the fact, which it was reserved to Henri Bergson to celebrate, that concepts inevitably distort reality and are only a useful tool for dealing with it (see “Bradley or Bergson?” (1910), in Works EP, pp. 151–6). Finding that concepts cannot do justice to perceptual reality, and determined that truth cannot be found in perception or feeling, Bradley looked for a truth and reality beyond both. In contrast, Bergson tells us that, useful as concepts are for dealing with the world, we can only grasp its real nature through feeling. As James himself puts it: “The deeper aspects of reality are found only in perceptual experience.” (For James, in contexts like this, “perception” and “feeling” are almost identical.)
How did intellectualism help the absolutists? James’s answer is that absolutists use intellectualism to impugn the fact that things are connected one with another in the ordinary way, and then invoke the Absolute as a deus ex machina to connect them in some strange metaphysical way. In fact, the relation of “intellectualism” to absolute idealism as James sees it is rather curious. It is their intellectualism which poses them with the problem which the existence of the Absolute is supposed to solve, yet the Absolute (as James sees it, but as they do not) can only be saved if intellectualism is abandoned. The problem which the postulation of the Absolute is supposed to solve is how things can have many different aspects and relations. This seems impossible for the intellectualist, unless they coexist in the Absolute. But this is only because he confuses concepts, with their hard-and-fast boundaries, with concrete realities. But, as James sees it, intellectualism equally implies, though the absolutists do not realize this, that the Absolute is impossible because it quite similarly is supposed to have many different and apparently contrasting aspects (such as you and me). Reject intellectualism, however, and the Absolute can be supposed to be “its own other” and to contain radically different aspects. However, its postulation is now only a hypothesis not a necessity. Intellectualism supposes that things which are in any way distinct cannot be in any relation to each other, or in any way belong to the same world, unless the Absolute is there to mediate between them. But once we grasp that relations are in our own experience, in spite of our problems in conceptualizing them, the postulation of the Absolute becomes unnecessary though no longer so problematic (Works PU, pp. 231–3, 296–7; Works ERE, pp. 47–52, 95). James does admit that he himself may have been to some extent the victim of intellectualism in his views about what he calls the compounding of consciousness.

The Unity of Mind

This brings us to the very heart of James’s struggle with absolute idealism. In The Principles of Psychology he had criticized the “mind dust” theory of W. K. Clifford. According to this, minds came about as the result of little mental bits and pieces which floated around prior to the existence of minds proper, but some of which, in the process of time, coagulated to form minds of various degrees of complexity. In The Principles of Psychology James rejected this idea as logically impossible, since an individual mind is an indivisible unit which cannot be composed of parts which initially existed independently. There might be many minds, or primitive mental units, which shared the objects at which they were directed, and a more sophisticated mind might have a unitary consciousness of objects (forming some new pattern) each of which was the single object of a more primitive mind, just one for each object, but it could not actually include the minds themselves. The fact that there were 26 minds each conscious of one letter of the alphabet and of nothing else, might somehow produce a mind which was aware of the whole alphabet. But this would be a quite new reality and would by no means contain the single letter minds within it as its parts.

These considerations account for James’s earlier reason for thinking the hypothesis of the Absolute logically impossible precisely because it depended on a notion of more complex minds including many less comprehensive minds as its parts. For according
to the doctrine of the Absolute, your mind, my mind, the cat’s mind, and all other minds are all parts of the one all-inclusive Absolute mind. But eventually James decided that this doctrine itself was essentially an intellectualist argument against the Absolute, for it rested on the idea that two very different concepts could not apply to the same individual, in this case the concept of being a unitary state of consciousness and the concept of being a whole including states of consciousness as its parts. However, although James had no wish to rescue the Absolute for philosophy, he came to think that the intellectualist arguments against it could be leveled with equal force against radical empiricism’s way of explaining such unity as does pertain to the world. The unity of the world, for a radical empiricist, must consist in the fact that there could be units of experience, which though individuals in their own right, also were intrinsically related, not logically, but empirically to other units of experience. This was what T. H. Green and David Hume had in their different ways found so impossible to grant. James wrote:

On the principle of going behind the conceptual function altogether, however, and looking to the more primitive flux of the sensational life for reality’s true shape, a way is open to us. . . . [For] the concrete pulses of experience appear pent in by no such definite limits as our conceptual substitutes for them are confined by. They run into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What in them is relation and what is matter related is hard to discern. You feel no one of them as inwardly simple, and no two as wholly without confluence where they touch. (Works PU, p. 282)

James’s eventual conclusion was that the two alternative ways of explicating such unity as the world really has, absolutism and radical empiricism, are on a level so far as logical possibility goes. Both, in fact, are strictly logically impossible but one of them must be factually true:

We have now reached a point of view from which the self-compounding of mind in its smaller and more accessible portions seems a certain fact, and in which the speculative assumption of a similar but wider compounding in remoter regions must be reckoned with as a legitimate hypothesis. The absolute is not the impossible being I once thought it. Mental facts do function both singly and together, at once, and we finite minds may simultaneously be co-conscious with one another in a superhuman intelligence. It is only the extravagant claims of coercive necessity on the absolute’s part that have to be denied by a priori logic. As an hypothesis trying to make itself probable on analogical and inductive grounds, the absolute is entitled to a patient hearing. (Works PU, pp. 292–3)

As a consequence, James felt some sympathy with what may be called the empirical absolutist. The one person whom James credits with this title was Gustav Fechner, the topic of chapter 4 of A Pluralistic Universe, who advocated a somewhat strange idealist view of the world, on empirical grounds, rather than the a priori grounds of such idealists as Royce and Bradley.

James thus concluded that, whether the Absolute exists or not, at the level of lesser units (such as our own successive moments of experience as they flow out of and into each other) they compound with one another in just the way in which he had once held it to be the sin of the mind dust theory, on the one hand, and the doctrine of the
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Absolute on the other, to invoke. For James, then, it became a question of empirical fact, not to be settled by logical reasoning, in what sorts of ways existing or occurring things do actually compound with each other so that one is part of, or overlaps with, another. It seems, however, that James runs two distinct questions together. First, can total experiences overlap in the sense that they have some content in common? Second, can total experiences be parts of a larger total experience, without necessarily overlapping within it? The first is required for James’s pluralistic metaphysics. The second is required for absolute idealism. However, insofar as James thinks that our total experiences may belong together in a larger total experience, though the latter does not include everything as does the Absolute, he needs a positive answer to both questions.

Although the overlapping of distinct moments of experience which James mainly stresses is what he calls the “compenetration” between successive stages in a temporal process, he also believed that it was an empirical question how far your experiences and mine may overlap at a single moment so that they have a content in common. Any dogmatic assertion that they cannot do so is an intellectualist fallacy, according to which something described as a content of my consciousness cannot also be correctly described as a content of your consciousness. The crucial issue here is whether in perception we can encounter precisely the same object, or rather the very same aspect of the same object. James admitted that there were empirical grounds for thinking that we never do see or otherwise perceive precisely the same object. For we always perceive it from a different perspective, which makes a difference between what you are acquainted with and what I am. But there is something which is common to your perception and mine when we see or feel the same object, and that is space. For every perceived object, of the type we call real, is in a definite position in space and your percept and mine can be in the very same such position. James says:

In general terms, then, whatever differing contents our minds may eventually fill a place with, the place itself is a numerically identical content of the two minds, a piece of common property in which, through which, and over which they join. The receptacle of certain of our experiences being thus common, the experiences themselves might some day become common also. If that day ever did come, our thoughts would terminate in a complete empirical identity, there would be an end, so far as those experiences went, to our discussions about truth. No point of difference appearing, they would have to count as the same. (Works ERE, pp. 85–6)

This seems to be a very problematic view for a radical empiricist to hold. If a position in space is identified by what is there or what has been there, and if our percepts are always different, then I do not see how they can be in the same space. Surely a real space is an inference or a construction we make on the basis of our perceptual experience, and not an actual content of such experience. A. J. Ayer likewise held that the precise meaning James attaches to the location of the percepts of different minds in the same space remains unclear (Ayer 1968, pp. 233–43). But it is important for James. For example, he says that if we postulate some more fundamental real thing behind our perceptions of something, that real thing must at least be in the same place as our sense perceptions (see Works ERE, p. 198). In “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing”
(chapter 4 of Essays in Radical Empiricism), James puts forward an even stranger view, namely that when the experience of X occurs, it belongs to no stream of personal consciousness until it is remembered by a later item, in which case it belongs to the stream of consciousness containing that later item. That being so, if it is remembered by experiences belonging to two different streams of experience then it is an identical content of both streams. This is, surely, a terrible idea. Not only does it deny the unity of consciousness which James had once so insisted on, but it is also involves what is surely a vicious infinite regress, since the memory only belongs to the stream to which it does belong in virtue of being itself remembered on some future occasion, which only belongs to the stream to which it belongs. Fortunately, this extraordinary view does not seem to have suffused much else of James. This strange view contrasts with the notion of the confluence of the streams of experience or consciousness of different persons, as at least a factual possibility (see, for example, Works ERE, p. 200).

Even with the aid of space James still found difficulties in the notion of compenetration, and its non-transitive character, which was so essential for his metaphysical pluralism. (We find them haunting him in what has been called “the Miller-Bode Objections” or “Notebook,” published only posthumously in Works MEN, which consisted of his own private attempt to work out such problems in response to objections to his radical empiricism by Dickinson Miller and Boyd H. Bode). Can F compenetrate G and G compenetrate H, without either G being pulled into two different wholes, one with F and one with H, thus splitting G apart, and thus making it unable to relate F and H in the required next to next fashion? Or if G is to keep its wholeness, how can it be co-conscious with each of F and H without making them co-conscious with each other?

Eventually James decided that this puzzle only existed for the intellectualist style of thought from which he had not yet managed to free himself. The trouble he was finding was in recognizing that there could be two different facts about F, without breaking it into two. James finally suggested that things, that is to say experiences, are connected, according to his pluralistic metaphysics, not through belonging together in one absolute consciousness, but by relations of compenetration between them. A compenetrates B, and B compenetrates C, and C compenetrates . . . and Y compenetrates Z. This brings them all together in one pluralistic universe without their forming any unitary whole together, as compenetration is not a transitive relation: A and Z, and many terms in between, may be absolutely outside each other and not parts of any one larger thing.

Metaphysical pluralism and metaphysical monism are therefore alike so far as their logical possibility goes. Their difficulties come from intellectualist logic, and that logic is abandoned so it must be allowed that both are factually possible. The Absolute must be given a fair hearing, not as a logical necessity, but as an empirical claim. And of course the main ground on which it may be advanced empirically is religious, and more specifically, mystical experience.

For in spite of their repudiation of articulate self-description, mystical states in general assert a pretty distinct theoretic drift. It is possible to give the outcome of the majority in terms that point in definite philosophical directions. One of these directions is optimism, and the other is monism. But this is only an intellectual interpretation put upon states which have no “specific” intellectual content” (Works VRE, p. 416) and
James, empiricism, and absolute idealism which therefore the pluralist has a right to interpret not as absorption in the All, but rather as a sense of oneness with a consciousness greater than our own, but not necessarily the mind of the Cosmos as a whole (Works VRE, p. 425). Although James admitted that mystical experience was most often interpreted monistically, he thought a pluralistic interpretation is also possible, which avoids that complacency with evil which monism encourages.

Metaphysical Pluralism

There are aspects of James’s metaphysical pluralism having a degree of affinity with absolute idealism. Perhaps he came closest in his lecture on “Human Immortality,” given in 1897 (in Works ERM), when he suggested the possibility of a mother sea of consciousness from which we all emerge and into which we all return, as a tentative hypothesis in a lecture on the possibility of human immortality. But even if this view was just a passing suggestion, there is still quite a lot in common between the position which he often suggests elsewhere may well be the truth of things, namely that our human minds are all parts of some much more comprehensive super-mind. (However, as a metaphysical pluralist, he thought it possible that divinity existed in the plural.) James was inclined to favor this super-mind, provided only that the serious evils in the world arose from the struggle of this super-mind with other experiential realities with which it had to contend. Moreover, it must be regarded as an agent existing in time, acting upon the world at particular moments, not just the eternal container of everything which seems to happen. On this view:

Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with possibles not yet in our present sight. And just as we are co-conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the whole of us? May not you and I be confluently active there, tho we now know it not? (Works PU, pp. 289–99)

Such a finite God, who “is no absolute all-experiencer but simply the experiencer of widest actual conscious span,” is both religiously and philosophically more satisfactory than God conceived as a monistic Absolute (Works ERE, pp. 194–5). He can be entirely good without being the ethically dubious all-knower and all-doer. However, James’s distance from any form of monism shows itself in his thinking it possible, doubtless to the horror of the orthodox (unless they thought that it helped them with the doctrine of the Trinity), that the divine might exist pluralistically rather than monistically. James thought that this more reasonable empirical viewpoint on a larger consciousness within which we belong and to which we can relate would satisfy our religious needs better than absolute idealism, which his audience for the Hibbert lectures titled A Pluralistic Universe (given at the Unitarian [Harris] Manchester College in Oxford) may have supposed was the one alternative to materialism (Works PU, p. 314).

Another line of thought by which James attacked the idea of the Absolute was that he thought it presupposed what may well be false that there is any such thing as the
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Whole. He distinguished between conceiving things in the each form from conceiving things in the all form. Is it possible that there is an infinite number of stars, he asks? Yes, in the sense that there may be a natural number ready to label each one, on some system of counting. But that does not mean that there must be a bounded whole which they constitute or fall within. Thus the world, or rather things, may be so radically pluralistic that there is no real whole containing everything (Works SPP, p. 170). I expect that the majority of philosophers today may agree with him on this, though I personally find it very hard to accept.

James had a far better grasp of absolute idealism’s strengths than other critics, such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. It seems to me that for someone who adequately grasps the issues at stake the ultimate metaphysical choice must be between something quite like the absolute idealism of Bradley and Royce, or the metaphysical panpsychic pluralism of James. And I certainly agree with James that the existence of evil is to be taken very seriously as a ground for rejecting absolute idealism.

References and further reading

The historical and philosophical relations between G. W. F. Hegel’s philosophy and classical American pragmatism, especially Charles Peirce’s (see Peirce) and John Dewey’s (see Dewey), are rich, complex, and fraught by historical preoccupations with, and often deficient interpretations of, Hegel’s views. In particular, Hegel’s central concerns with epistemology, and the ways in which and the extent to which his idealism incorporates realism about molar objects and events in our environs, or about scientific entities, have only very recently been identified. Accordingly, the philosophically most important relations between Hegel’s views and American pragmatism are thematic, rather than historical. (On the relations of Dewey’s pragmatism to Hegel’s philosophy as Dewey understood it, see Shook 2000.) Some of these thematic connections are highlighted here. I begin with Hegel’s realism, and then consider his pragmatism.

Hegel recognized two key internal problems with Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant proves transcendently that we can make even putative cognitive judgments only if there is sufficient regularity and variety among the contents of our sensations to enable us to develop empirical concepts and use them together with our a priori categorial concepts to identify particular spatio-temporal objects or events. Only by identifying these can we be aware of ourselves as being aware of them, and so enjoy self-conscious experience of them. Kant argues that only transcendental idealism can account for there being the minimal degree of order and variety among the content of our sensations required for our making such judgments at all. However, Kant’s arguments for this idealist claim are invalid. According to transcendental realism, the matter of sensation is given us ab extra, thus whatever order obtains among the contents of our sensations cannot be accounted for by the structure or functioning of our minds. Hegel recognized that Kant’s transcendental analysis of this orderliness among sensations is given us ab extra, thus whatever order obtains among the contents of our sensations cannot be accounted for by the structure or functioning of our minds. Hegel recognized that Kant’s transcendental analysis of this orderliness among sensations in fact proves, on transcendental grounds, a conditional necessity, that any world in which human beings can be self-conscious is one that provides us sufficient order and variety among the contents of our sensations for us to make cognitive judgments and so to be self-conscious.

Kant’s Analogies of Experience defend three guiding principles of causal judgments: that substance persists through changes of state, that the changes of state of any substance we can identify are rule-governed causal changes, and that spatio-temporal substances change states through mutual causal interaction. In the Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant expressly defends the general causal principle, that every event has a cause. However, the causal principle required for Kant’s Analogies is the specific causal principle that every physical event has an external cause that is itself physical. (This is called “transeunt” causality, OED.) Kant only distinguished these two principles in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, where he also recognized that this specific causal principle cannot be justified by transcendental analysis alone; it requires metaphysical justification (in Kant’s Critical sense of “metaphysics”). Yet Kant’s metaphysical justification of the specific causal principle ultimately rests on an empirical premise, that we know of no instances of hylozoism, or conversely, that the only instances of causality we know of are transeunt. However, Kant’s own metaphysical method prohibits appeal to any such empirical premise. Hegel recognized this flaw, and realized that Kant’s overall argument in fact proves a conditional necessity: We can only make even putative causal judgments provided that the world we live in is structured (at least in part) by transeunt causality.

Properly developed, both of these arguments provide sound transcendental proofs for two related species of what today is called mental content externalism, the idea that at least some “mental” contents can only be specified by reference to spatio-temporal objects or events in the subject’s environment. Hegel recognized the epistemic importance of these two modified Kantian proofs of mental content externalism and used them to defend unqualified realism regarding molar objects and events against Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean skepticism and against Kant’s own transcendental idealism. Hegel thus was the first philosopher to realize that Kant’s transcendental proofs of the conditions necessary for self-conscious human experience can be separated from transcendental idealism, and that these proofs can be used to defend realism about the objects of human empirical knowledge. Hegel is thus even more radically anti-Cartesian than Kant.

Aware that his use of the term “idealism” was widely misunderstood, Hegel explained his usage in a new remark added to the second edition of his *Science of Logic*. Hegel uses the term “ideal” to characterize anything that does not contain the ground of its own existence or characteristics. Conversely, only something that contains the ground of its own existence and characteristics counts as “real.” Hegel further contends that the identity conditions of things include their causal characteristics. It follows accordingly that anything that suffers generation or corruption is “ideal” in Hegel’s unique sense of this term because its existence and characteristics are causally dependent on other objects and events. Dependence on human minds is only a sub-species of causal dependence, and an insignificant one in Hegel’s ontology. Hegel’s “idealism” is thus a kind of ontological “holism.” Hegel’s holism, however, is moderate (he rejects the idea of a “block universe”), because he recognizes both that individual objects and events are what they are only within their causal and conceptual context, which ultimately proves to be the universe as a whole, and that, vice versa, the universe as a whole exists only in and through its individual components or aspects. Only the world as a whole is “real,” in the specific sense in which Hegel uses this term, though this thesis is, and is intended to be, consistent with a key thesis of epistemological realism, that the objects of our empirical knowledge exist and have whatever characteristics they do regardless of what we think, say or believe about them.
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The pragmatic dimensions of Hegel’s epistemology appear in his account of epistemic justification, which is fallibilist, social, and historical. Hegel was the first philosopher to recognize that such an account of justification is consistent with realism about the objects of our empirical knowledge. Hegel rejects foundationalist and especially deductivist accounts of epistemic justification on the basis of Sextus Empiricus’ Dilemma of the Criterion, which he paraphrased in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. (Hegel’s engagement with this key Dilemma was only identified in 1988; without this reference point, his epistemology cannot be understood.) Very briefly, the Dilemma defies anyone to justify basic criteria of justification in any domain in which basic criteria of justification are fundamentally disputed, as they are in philosophy, without lapsing into dogmatism, vicious circularity, infinite regress, or mere assumption. This Dilemma cannot be solved by any form of foundationalism, because foundationalism seeks to justify any principle or claim by deriving it either from some first principle(s) or from some basic set of data. The Dilemma directly challenges the justificatory status of such principles or data: simply appealing to them appears dogmatic, and in principle the foundationalist strategy has nothing new to offer to justify such appeals; “self-evidence” varies wildly across the field, and cannot provide satisfactory justification.

Hegel recognized that the only genuine response to Pyrrhonian skepticism lies in an account of constructive self- and mutual criticism, developed in the Phenomenology. If self-criticism is possible, then reconsidering any particular set of justifying grounds need not be viciously circular. Instead, self-criticism enables us to reassess the merits of any justifying ground, and of any link among justifying grounds, within that set, regarding its relevance, accuracy, or persuasiveness, on the basis of which we can reaffirm, revise, reject, or replace any particular justificatory ground or link. Central to Hegel’s account of justification is avoiding question-begging against those who hold different views; this is required to solve the Dilemma of the Criterion. Hegel avoids question-begging through “determinate negation” of opposed views. According to determinate negation, any principle (whether cognitive or practical, whether first-order or philosophical) can be justified only through the thorough internal critique of opposed views.

Taken together, these features of Hegel’s theory of rational assessment entail that any claim or principle is justified only to the extent that it is (1) demonstrably superior to all available alternatives, whether historical or contemporaneous, (2) maximally adequate to its intended domain and purposes, and (3) continues to retain if not augment its standing, so considered, as it continues to be used in new contexts and by other parties, often in changing circumstances. This is why rational justification is fundamentally historical. Rational justification is fundamentally social because we are all fallible judges (assessors), and because the implications of any even moderately interesting claim or principle reach far beyond the context of any individual who uses it. These further implications can only be assessed by other agents, whose feedback bears essentially on the justificatory status of that claim or principle. Rational justification is fundamentally social for another key reason. The “I think” that matters most in philosophy is the “I judge,” where the relevant judgments concern the critical assessment of rational arguments or other forms of expression or justification. Critical assessment requires mature judgment, though our innate human capacities to
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become autonomous, rational, mature judges require social institutions and practices for their development and for provision of relevant background information. The enlightenment of individuals – the development, exercise, and preservation of their rational autonomy – is the fundamental aim of the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel’s account of rational assessment concerns not only the justification of various claims or principles, it also concerns their formulation, appropriateness, and use in any relevant contexts and for any relevant purposes.

A key pragmatic feature of Hegel’s philosophy is his social ontology, which may be called “moderate collectivism.” Hegel argues for three theses: (1) Individuals are fundamentally social practitioners. Everything a person does, says, or thinks is formed in the context of social practices that provide material and conceptual resources, objects of desire, skills, procedures, techniques, and occasions and permissions for action, etc. The individual and social dimensions of thought and action are inextricably entwined in anyone’s thinking and acting. (2) What individuals do depends on their own response to their social and natural environment. And (3), there are no individuals, no social practitioners, without social practices, and vice versa: there are no social practices without social practitioners, without individuals who learn, participate in, perpetuate, and who modify those social practices as needed to meet their changing needs, aims, and circumstances (including procedures and information). Where others see an exclusive dichotomy – either individuals are basic to society, or vice versa – Hegel identifies a key biconditional relation between individuals and their societies. Social practices exist only through their employment by individuals, and individuals are fundamentally, if sometimes unwittingly, involved in the critical assessment, and so preservation or revision, of their social practices.

Another key feature of Hegel’s pragmatic realist epistemology is that from the beginning of his philosophical career in Jena (around 1801), he replaced the traditional dichotomies between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and between analytic and synthetic propositions, with continua: each pair of terms marks poles on a distinct continuum. Uncommon to classical American pragmatism is Hegel’s refurbishment of Kantian transcendental proof, and his defense of the claim that we possess and must be able legitimately to use a series of a priori concepts without which we could not identify any concrete item or our experience of it, on the basis of which alone we can either define or acquire any empirical concepts. (The relevant concepts are those of “space,” “spaces,” “time,” “times,” “self,” “other,” “individuation,” “physical object,” and “cause”). However, Hegel refurbished Kant’s transcendental proof strategy and his defense of a priori concepts in ways that are consistent with his fallibilist account of justification, and Hegel retained Kant’s important semantic point that we can only use our a priori concepts legitimately in judgments about particular spatio-temporal objects or events. Hence our possession of a priori concepts provides no solace for rationalist metaphysics.

Naturalist elements appear in Hegel’s epistemology in his theses that biological needs (one root of consciousness) involve elementary classification of objects, that the contents of consciousness are derived from a public world, and that classificatory thought presupposes natural structures in the world. Though Hegel rejected the notion that natural science is the sole authority about the world and our experience
of it, he insisted that philosophy is grounded in the empirical sciences: “Not only must philosophy accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics” (Philosophy of Nature §246 Remark). Hegel’s philosophical psychology is deeply naturalist and draws heavily from Aristotle. The first part of his Philosophy of Spirit, the “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,” treats psychological topics pertinent to epistemology, including sensibility, feeling, and habit under the heading “anthropology”; the conscious phenomena of sense-perception, intellect, and desire under the heading of “phenomenology”; and theoretical intelligence, including intuition, representation, memory, imagination, and thought under the heading “psychology.” Hegel’s “System of Philosophical Science,” comprising his Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit, examines a wide range of substantive epistemological issues. The Logic examines the ontological and cognitive roles of ontological categories (e.g., being, existence, quantity, essence, appearance, relation, thing, cause) and principles of logic (e.g., identity, excluded middle, non-contradiction). His Logic also analyses syllogism, judgment, and principles of scientific explanation (mechanical, chemical, and organic or teleological functions) in accord with which we are able to know the world. The Philosophy of Nature treats these principles of explanation in connection with a wide range of examples drawn from the sciences of his day, about which he was very well informed.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel defends his own pragmatic realist epistemology by critically examining a carefully arranged sequence of views which deny one or another of his key epistemic principles, on grounds internal to those views. Each opposed thesis, considered in connection with its intended domain, is subjected to detailed internal critique, the result of which is a reductio ad absurdum, from which Hegel’s own thesis is inferred by disjunctive syllogism. Though the Phenomenology examines a wealth of issues in addition to epistemology, it does contain a continuous, cohesive line of epistemological analysis, which may be summarized briefly.

In “Sense-Certainty” Hegel argues by reductio ad absurdum against naive realism, that our conceptions of “time,” “times,” “space,” “spaces,” “I,” and “individuation” are pure a priori because they are necessary for identifying and knowing any particular object or event, on the basis of which alone we can learn, define, or use any empirical concept, and on the basis of which alone we can individuate among subjects of knowledge, distinguishing ourselves from other persons. In “Perception,” he argues that observation terms alone do not suffice for empirical knowledge, and that our conception of “physical object” is pure a priori and is necessary for identifying and knowing any particular object or event. In “Force and Understanding” Hegel argues that our conception of “cause” is pure a priori and is necessary for identifying and knowing any object or event; that statements of laws of nature are conceptual and express actual structures of nature; and that our consciousness of objects is possible only if we are self-conscious.

In the introductory discussion to “Self-Consciousness,” Hegel argues that biological needs involve classification and entail realism about objects meeting those needs. In “Mastery and Servitude,” he argues that the natural world is not constituted at will. This is a lesson in realism. In “The Freedom of Self-Consciousness,” Hegel argues
that the contents of consciousness are derived from a public world, and that self-consciousness is possible for us only if we’re conscious of spatio-temporal objects or events. The first two major sections of Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness,” thus provide his replacement for Kant’s Objective Deduction. Kant’s proof that we can use a priori concepts in legitimate cognitive judgments about spatio-temporal objects. Significantly, Hegel’s implicit defense of the conclusion to Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism,” that “inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general” (B275), does not rely on Kant’s transcendental idealism in any way.

In the introductory discussion of “Reason,” Hegel argues that classificatory thought presupposes natural structures in the world which we must discover. In “Observing Reason,” he argues that classificatory, categorial thought is not merely a *natural* phenomenon. In the remaining two sections of “Reason,” “The Actualization of Rational Self-consciousness by Itself” and “Individuality that is Real in and for Itself,” Hegel argues that categorial thought is not merely an *individual* phenomenon. The implicit epistemological result of these *reductio* arguments is that individual thinkers are who they are only within a natural and social context. Hegel’s explicit result is that each of the preceding sections has analyzed different aspects of one concrete social whole, which includes its natural environment.

In “Spirit,” Hegel analyzes the tension and interaction between individual reasoning and customary practice. In “True Spirit, Ethics,” he argues that categorial thought is neither constituted nor justified merely by *custom* or by *fiat*. In “Self-Alienated Spirit” and in “Self-Certain Spirit; Morality,” he argues that categorial thought is not corrigible merely a priori. In the concluding subsection of “Spirit,” “Evil and its Forgiveness,” Hegel argues that the corrigibility of categorial thought is a *social* phenomenon. In “Religion,” he contends, *inter alia*, that the history of religion is the initial, allegorical, premature recognition of the social and historical bases of our categorial comprehension of the world. These three major sections of the *Phenomenology*, “Reason,” “Spirit,” and “Religion,” thus form Hegel’s replacement for Kant’s Subjective Deduction, the account of how we are able to make the kinds of judgments defended in the prior Objective Deduction. All of these strands are drawn together in Hegel’s concluding chapter, “Absolute Knowing,” in which he highlights the ways in which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* provides us with reflective conceptual comprehension of the social and historical bases of our categorial comprehension of the world. This result is socio-historically based epistemological realism. Hegel’s epistemology is thus fully and fundamentally pragmatic.

Hegel’s anti-Cartesianism, his broad naturalism, his externalism about mental content and epistemic justification, and his socio-historical account of rational principles and practices found their way directly into the core views of Peirce and Dewey. Hegel’s transcendental proof of realism about the objects of empirical knowledge, together with his robust pragmatic account of rational justification, provide great contemporary relevance of his views, for they contain much of philosophical importance that has yet to be tapped by pragmatists, and by philosophers more generally. Among American pragmatists, the philosopher whose views are most closely related to Hegel’s is Frederick L. Will (1997).
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References and further reading

Dewey, Dualism, and Naturalism

THOMAS M. ALEXANDER

Pragmatism, especially John Dewey’s (see Dewey) version, has often been well characterized by its opposition to “dualism.” It has been more problematically linked to the position of “naturalism,” a term of varying meaning. By examining how the critique of dualisms constitutes a pervasive theme in Dewey’s thought, one can gain better insight into his general position, which he termed “cultural naturalism” (LW 12:28), and its relation to other forms of naturalism. Two common mistakes should be avoided: one dismisses Dewey’s position as some version of “Hegelian idealism,” the other dismisses it as a reductive naturalism that has no genuine place for “higher values.” Specifically, Dewey maintains that nature is a creative or emergent process, and he regards various metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological distinctions as functional relationships rather than as oppositional dichotomies of the sort that have led to the “dualisms” prevailing in philosophy. Thus one of the basic reasons for Dewey’s importance lies in the way he addresses the heritage of dualism.

Dualism in the Western Tradition

“Dualism” may be taken to refer to a variety of philosophical positions or world-views, but can also refer to a habit of thought in which a preliminary distinction is taken to designate two fundamentally exclusive categories. The result is that the spectrum of all phenomena must be understood in terms of either one or the other opposite, and so an initial clarifying contrast becomes a fixed over-simplification. In the West, philosophy has labored since its inception from a tendency to set forth important distinctions as grounded in separate types of being. In some cases, the dichotomy is embraced by a position that makes it irreducible and primary, as we find in Descartes’ two types of substances, mental and material. At other times, the dichotomy is reflected in the opposition between different schools stressing one or the other term as primary, such as we find in the debates regarding rationalism versus empiricism or idealism versus materialism.

This need not be the case. In Chinese Taoism, opposition is complementary; in the Advaita Vedanta system of Indian thought, it is illusory. The West has been prone to regard opposites as antithetical, real types. Anaximander generated his primary
elements of Hot–Cold and Wet–Dry from the neutral Unlimited, somewhat as the Taoists made Yin and Yang come from the Tao. But Anaximander’s elements do not flow into each other; they are eternally at war. Heraclitus said the harmony of the cosmos derived from such combative opposition. Pythagoras generated his mathematical cosmos by the two principles of Limit and Void, and Aristotle attributes to him a derivative “table of opposites” in which Limit, Odd, Light, Male, and Good were set over against the Unlimited, Even, Dark, Female, and Bad (Metaphysics 986a). Parmenides sharply divided his monistic realm of Being as Truth from the manifold world of appearances, leaving the very existence of the latter paradoxical since it could not “be.” Plato mediated Pythagorean and Parmenidean dualisms with a nuanced account of the world of time, soul, and nature. These had a sort of existence and aspired to rationality. Yet he set the ideal realm of Forms apart from the natural world of change that imperfectly participated in it and contrasted true knowledge or noetic insight, directed to the Forms alone, with sensation and action, which dynamically engaged nature by “right belief.” As a result, Plato left Western philosophy with its most important dualism: that of soul and body, a view starkly set forth in his Phaedo and subsequently moderated, but not abandoned.

Aristotle, too, though critical of Plato, introduced important dualisms of his own. The most significant were those between form (or actuality) and matter (or potentiality); and between practical activity (praxis), including ethical reasoning, and contemplative science (theoria), which aimed at the principles of being and nature. At the close of antiquity, St Augustine fused the dualisms of Platonism with those of Christianity (such as St Paul’s opposition of spirit and flesh). In addition to the contrast between God and the world, he advocated a moral dualism based on a free will that could choose to orient itself toward God and the good or away from Him by an act of arrogant, self-loving pride, or superbia. This willful rejection of God for self and world constituted for him the nature of evil itself. As John H. Randall, Jr. says of Augustine, “Ontological dualism is thus a natural fact of experience for the convert, the finder” (1970, p. 200).

The ontological, epistemological, and axiological dualisms of antiquity have been replicated and modified in the modern period, resulting in various schools of thought that emphasized one or the other of a given set of terms. Some thinkers incorporated dualism as a central feature of their system. Descartes formulated the most important of the modern dualisms by positing two distinct substances, one physical and extended, the other mental, whose attributes were thought and will. For him, “nature” was nothing but a system of physical properties ultimately capable of geometrical description, while “mind” was a rational consciousness that could know the “external world” in terms of clear and distinct ideas and impose upon it a range of values. Descartes’ legacy was the ultimate division between schools of materialism and idealism in metaphysics and rationalism and empiricism in epistemology. John Locke, the primary exponent of modern empiricism, rejected Descartes’ notion of innately true ideas. Yet he accepted Descartes’ mind–body dualism. Hence Locke viewed “experience” as composed of “ideas” which were “modes of the mind” (rather than forms of reality) “corresponding” with the objects in the external world that they “represented.” How our ideas could be known to be true or false copies of this extra-mental world became the perennial problem for all subsequent empiricisms (see Randall 1962, p. 600f.).
Issues in modern axiology, such as whether values are in any way rational or “objective” or are mere functions of will or desire, can also be traced to Descartes’ Augustinian voluntarism, according to which the will is radically free and entirely separate from nature. Kant preserved the objectivity of moral values by grounding them in an unknowable “noumenal” ground conceptually distinct from the phenomenal world governed by the deterministic categories of understanding.

Beyond consciously dualistic systems, the debates of Western philosophy echo with a list of competitors: rationalism versus empiricism, idealism versus materialism, hedonist versus deontological ethics, individualism versus collectivism, emotive versus logical meaning, phenomenological psychology versus behaviorism, modernism versus postmodernism, analytic versus Continental philosophy, and so on. Structuralism and its heirs make this dualistic habit constitute the nature of thought. It is pragmatism’s contention that these debates have been infused with an inherited cultural habit that is disposed to thinking in terms of dichotomies, and offers an alternative approach to such intellectual dead-ends.

Anti-dualism in Peirce and James

Before focusing on Dewey, it is helpful to see how Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce) and William James (see James) handled this problem. In 1868, Peirce laid the groundwork for pragmatism in two essays critiquing Descartes: “Question Concerning Certain Capacities Claimed for Man” and “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” Peirce found no basis in Descartes’ claim that we can recognize certain self-evident intuitions, such as those of “mental substance” or “extended substance.” Thinking, for Peirce, works by projecting hypothetic explanations from stable, but possibly fallible, assumptions. This applies equally to theories about the “mind” or “self” as to those about the “world.” We have no intuitive access to the “self” any more than to natural events. Peirce avoided skepticism by arguing for a probabilistic approach to knowledge. By treating any concept as a working hypothesis whose meaning was testable in action, the nerve of Cartesian dualism was cut, as was the habit of dichotomous thinking that gave rise to it. This led to the “pragmatic maxim” in his famous essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” which stated that the meaning of concepts lay in the general sorts of consequences they signified, and to his later metaphysical views, which made use of the idea of continuity or “synechism” (considered as dynamically interrelated with chance and growth) as a principle governing the evolving rational order of the universe, where the distinction of matter and mind was merely one of degree.

William James also struggled against the heritage of Cartesian dualism, beginning with his The Principles of Psychology (1890). Although James tried to refrain from “metaphysical” discussions in what was supposed to be a scientific textbook in the new subject of “psychology,” he was inevitably drawn into problems inherited from Descartes and Locke, especially as to what “ideas” were and how “consciousness” related to the body. For James, “ideas” are phases of readjustment within the “stream of thought” rather than discrete representational entities; consciousness itself is a form of action, requiring “selective interest” amid a “theater of simultaneous possibilities.” This functional view helped break down the opposition of mind and body. So did James’s
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subtle analysis of the bodily feelings that suffuse our emotions. His subsequent treatment of truth (in Pragmatism) avoided the problem of how an idea could “correspond” to an extra-mental world. General philosophical world-views can be evaluated in terms of what practical differences they made to individuals, “to me and to you.” Truth lay in the verifiable “workability” of ideas in achieving “vital satisfactions.” Anti-dualism also appears in James’s Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912) with the idea of pure experience. In the undivided, instantaneous unity of a given moment there is no basis upon which distinctions of “mental” and “physical” can be generated. Once the aspect of experience to the future is introduced, the distinctions of “material” or “mental” refer to functionally different expectations of consequences and so to different habits. Pure experience is no “substance” and attains its “purity” only when considered atemporally.

Anti-dualism in Dewey: Early Criticisms

For nearly 20 years (from 1884 to 1903), Dewey was an advocate of idealism, a fact that is often neglected for interest in his mature period and is sometimes used to dismiss him entirely. Yet it is revealing. In his autobiographical essay “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (in LW 5 and ED 1), Dewey describes his philosophical quest as one of trying to escape the “painful dualisms” of his native New England culture. As a student, Dewey was attracted to the absolute idealism of George Sylvester Morris, his teacher. He was also impressed with the incipient science of physiological psychology introduced to him by G. Stanley Hall. Dewey’s earliest work attempted to synthesize these very different approaches for the sake of a more inclusive understanding of experience. Traditional empiricism was not even tempting. In his intricate Psychology of 1887, Dewey rejected the formal dialectic of Hegel along with the mechanistic associationism of empiricism to articulate his “psychological idealism,” in which aspects of thought, will, and feeling permeated, in varying degrees, all types of consciousness – and so reality. A mere three years later, in 1890, he received a jolt upon reading James’s Principles of Psychology. James had accomplished Dewey’s goal of capturing the complexity and depth of experience, but without the transcendental synthetic categories of idealism. James insisted upon the primary, given wholeness of experience – an idea that become his “radical empiricism.” Experience did not need to be “synthesized” by concepts because it did not arrive in discrete bits in need of synthesis. Objects and ideas emerged from this “stream” as directive tools, not as elements of “pictures” of the world.

The evidence of the impact of the Principles upon Dewey becomes fully clear in 1896 with one of his most important articles, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (in EW 5 and ED 2). Not only does this constitute Dewey’s major contribution to psychology, it offers a critical advance over James. In place of the “reflex arc” that James himself had used, in which the older dualism of body and soul is replaced by the “dualism of stimulus and response,” Dewey proposes a model of a “circuit of coordination” in which both stimulus and response emerge as phases or “divisions of labor” in the ongoing adjustment of a living creature with its environment. For example, by the reflex arc model, a child receives the “stimulus” of the light of a candle and has the
“response” of reaching for it. This is followed by the “stimulus” of being burned and then by the “response” of withdrawal of the hand. Dewey regarded this as “a patchwork of disjointed parts.” Instead, by the model of the circuit of coordination, the child is an organism already dynamically engaged with her environment; she is a center of activity, who focuses on the candle as an object of interest and who reaches toward it in a gesture of grasping. The burn is thus felt as the outcome or meaning of the act so that an experience of learning takes place. The “seeing” and the “reaching” mutually influence each other in a continuous pattern of sensori-motor coordination and not in a linear relation of cause and effect; an expanding process of learning and refinement of meaning replaces a series of discrete acts. Thus, by advancing the holistic psychology of James, Dewey discovered the basic model of organic interaction that would be used throughout his mature philosophy, in his metaphysics, instrumental logic, theory of communication, ethics, political theory, and aesthetics.

A few years later, in 1903, Dewey added an important corollary that would profoundly affect his whole philosophy. If ideas were “tools” to manage action rather than “pictures” of the world, the primacy of “knowing” that had reigned in philosophy had to be questioned. In “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (in MW 3 and ED 1), Dewey did just that, accusing philosophy of committing the “intellectualist fallacy.” Since Parmenides, philosophers had generally assumed that reality’s true form was given in the mode of “reality-as-known.” Whatever topic philosophy investigated, from being to ethics to art, the subject-matter as known gave us its true essence. Being, truth, and knowledge were thus coterminous. But, said Dewey, if one begins with experience as it is lived, suffered, and enjoyed, then this is quite different from how it is as known, i.e., as the outcome of inquiry. “Knowing” is one way the world comes to have meaning, but not all experiences are automatically also experiences of knowing. To suffer heartbreak is not the same as “knowing one is suffering heartbreak.” Existence, meaning, and truth are not coterminous. By its very nature, philosophy is disposed to interpret the world from the “knowledge standpoint.” Philosophy needs to remember this broader context and adjust its metaphysics and methodology accordingly (see LW 1:28f.).

Dewey’s brief, challenging article raised a storm of controversy from all sides: realist, materialist, naturalist, idealist – all committed to identifying reality with the known (see Lovejoy 1930). Dewey himself labored for years to present a more coherent account. It was not until the synoptic introduction for his 1916 Essays in Experimental Logic (in MW 16) that he really began to articulate this idea effectively. The consummate expression was achieved in 1925 in Experience and Nature (LW 1), a work that presented an emergentist metaphysics of “humanistic naturalism,” or “cultural naturalism,” as he later called it (LW 1:10, LW 11:28).

Dewey’s Anti-dualistic Naturalism: Experience and Nature

Dewey’s magnum opus is notoriously obscure; he wrote a synoptic preface for the second edition and even rewrote the entire first chapter. Much later, he considered changing the title to Nature and Culture because of the persistent misinterpretations of his key term, “experience.” The aim of the book was to present a naturalistic
metaphysics that would resolve ingrained dualisms of modern civilization. Dewey begins by asserting the primacy of experience as a means of “disclosing the realities of nature.” That is, “nature and experience are not enemies or alien. Experience is not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature” (LW 1:5; see also LW 1:10–12). This is an open challenge to the dualistic opposition of “mind” and “nature” set up by Descartes and “the problem of knowledge” it bequeathed to empiricism.

The “method” Dewey proposes is “the denotative empirical method” (LW 1:16). Initially, this locates concepts or meanings, the product of reflective analysis and inquiry, and puts them back into the broader context from which they arose. Otherwise, we commit the “intellectualist fallacy” by simply positing these products as the real objects comprising the furniture of the universe, ignoring how much our own interests have helped constitute them. The denotative empirical method is therapeutic to philosophy’s persistent equation of the real with the known by locating “objects” and “ideas” within the “circuit of coordination” of our ongoing interactions with the world. “What is really ‘in’ experience extends much further than that which at any time is known” (LW 1:27). “Experience” refers to all the qualified ways in which the world arises through our involvement. “Experience” is how human beings inhabit existence. The suffering and ecstasy of life that is the subject-matter of so much religious and artistic symbolism reveals as much about experience as science or logic, and perhaps more.

Dewey’s first chapter (in both editions) states the full implications of “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” and “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” for a naturalistic metaphysics. It is a method for relocating the enterprise of philosophical reflection itself within the vast world of life that exceeds projects of reason and control so philosophy itself becomes an illuminating response to the world instead of cutting us off from it through dualisms that constrain or inhibit our intelligent conduct. Refined or “secondary” objects, concepts, or rational methods are not thrown away, but their continuity with the vital ground of experience must be made manifest. They are histories, not things. In this way, we may articulate ideals and meanings that seek to fulfill human existence and can be evaluated in light of their ability to do so. In other words, the aim of Dewey’s metaphysics of cultural naturalism is to facilitate a more humane and intelligent civilization (see “Philosophy and Civilization,” LW 3:3f. and ED 1:79f.).

Perhaps the most important feature of Dewey’s method and of his general position is to understand his “principle of continuity” (see, for example, LW 1:8–9, LW 10:42f., LW 12:26 and 12.30f.). By “continuity,” Dewey does not mean a set of individuals reducible to some fundamental “identity.” A continuum is constituted as much by difference as by similarity. Nor is continuity to be understood as a static, linear order. It is a temporal and creative process. In other words, Dewey, with Peirce, thinks that one of the most effective ways of overcoming our tendency to think dualistically – to find simplistic pairs of opposites and categorize the range of experiences in terms of them and only them – is to think instead in terms of “continuity,” especially conceived of as a process of growth. Any given phenomenon has a context of origin that contained it as a potentiality. It emerges through certain conditions and develops as a creative response, carrying with it a certain degree of novelty whereby the past is not merely repeated but transformed. The fundamental feature of nature and experience is
transformation, and this is accomplished by the emergence of new features that may reconstitute the old order. Dewey’s characterizations of education as “growth of meaning” or as the “instrumental” nature of intelligence are but instances of this general principle when it becomes consciously implemented. We cease to see the universe as a room filled with fixed, named “objects” and replace it with unfolding and interacting histories whose actualities are set within a wider field of possibilities. When projected into the future, we come to think in terms of what things can become rather than what they presently are. When read against the past, we may understand present events in terms of their origins and how their history affects their current mode of existence, whether for good or ill.

The greater part of *Experience and Nature* applies the principle of continuity to the range of metaphysical dualisms that have predominated in Western philosophy. Take for example the traditional split between “Being” and “Becoming.” Plato had relegated each to a separate realm, with Becoming as wholly derivative from Being, as a copy is of its model, and as subject to change. To find the true models of virtue, the philosopher turned to the changeless realm of Being. In the Platonism of Plotinus, the world emanated through a fall from Being toward nothingness, and the philosopher’s goal was to “flee to the beloved Fatherland” (*Ennead* I.6.8). Dewey, in contrast, sees both stability and the precarious as coexistent features of all natural events: the stable exists amid and because of precariousness and vice versa. No one thing is completely stable or precarious; the question is one of degree, cause, and consequence. Even in the supposedly eternal realms of pure logic or mathematics, the precarious can arise, as witnessed in the paradoxes Bertrand Russell discovered in Gottlob Frege’s theory of sets or those formulated by Kurt Gödel’s theorem.

Another dualism, that of “matter and mind,” is also extensively treated in *Experience and Nature* through Dewey’s “emergentism.” Descartes’ dualism originated from the interests of modern physics. Galileo had advanced two powerful ideas: the first was the distinction between “primary” qualities (those in bodies by themselves) and “secondary” qualities (due to bodies affecting the senses). The other was the belief that bodies and their motion could be essentially described in terms of mathematics. This was the basis for the modern view of nature as a vast machine whose parts readjusted themselves by fixed laws while the system as a whole remained constant. Events were ultimately equations, and qualities were removed to the mental realm where mathematical physics could ignore them.

In the nineteenth century the rise of history, especially as interpreted by Hegel, and Darwin’s theory of evolution questioned the supremacy of the mathematical view of nature. In neither could time and change be reduced to a mere mathematical equation. Both ideas had tremendous impact on Dewey. Hegel saw history as a process driven forward by an inner “dialectic” that generated ever higher and more inclusive “syntheses” toward absolute Spirit, moving from stages of preconscious matter to life to self-consciousness. Though Dewey rejected Hegel’s dialectical idealism, his antireductionist naturalism says that “Nature” includes all qualitatively complex phenomena, including those of culture. He also holds that history gives insight into the nature of time (see “Time and Individuality,” *LW* 14:98f. and *ED* 1:217f.).

The theory of evolution also challenged the atemporal mechanistic view of modern science. True, Darwin may have thought that his explanation for change of species by...
the principles of random variation and “the struggle for life” (competition for limited resources) was mechanistic. But the conclusion was that over time genuine qualitative transformations resulted: wholly different species, not to mention life itself, arose exhibiting previously non-existent attributes, like consciousness. Evolution introduced into science the ideas of qualitative novelty and emergence of new modes of existence. Dewey takes the idea of creative transformation as being at the very heart of nature (see “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,” MW 4:3f. and ED 1:39f.). Everywhere, Nature displays degrees of stability and instability in which forms of mutual interaction rather than linear cause-and-effect relations exist. Living beings make adjustments to maintain the homeostasis of the whole organism, so that the organism as a whole is, in a sense, present in every part. Nor can it be explained wholly in terms of the properties of its elements. As seen in Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc, in higher organisms a process of ongoing learning can arise. And when communication through symbolic gestures is achieved, culture comes to exist. Culture is a dynamic system of meaning, a social memory that endures and changes historically. These habits provide the cultural “mind” to the individuals born within it (LW 1:132f.).

For Dewey, nature exhibits genuine creativity in its temporal transformations: present conditions have potentialities, and those that become actualized bring with them further possibilities. Individuality is the creative response to the present and its history that makes time itself possible. Dewey designates three major “plateaus” in which highly significant new forms of interaction have emerged: matter, life, and “mind” (or culture). Instead of positing different basic substances as Descartes did, Dewey views “Nature” or “Existence” as a temporal continuum of processes exhibiting certain “generic traits” (such as stability and precariousness, qualitative immediacy, relational mediation, etc.) occurring in different ways on each of these plateaus. Qualitative immediacy as it appears at the level of matter is different from how it appears at the level of life or of conscious meaning. But these differences lie along a continuum with an evolutionary history rather than being isolated in rigid self-identical substances (see LW 1:191f., esp. 208f.).

It is the aim of the denotative empirical method to disclose these continuities and histories and see them in terms of their potentialities as well as actualities. Dewey was adept at applying this throughout the range of traditional philosophical topics, each of which had borne the mark of the Western heritage of dualism in one form or another. In Theory of Valuation, Dewey treats the opposition of fact and value functionally: to designate something as a “fact” requires that certain values be emphasized and to designate something having a certain value is to respond to one of its many potentially significant features. Thus facts and values are operationally cooperative in any inquiry (see LW 13:189f.). Political theory often opposes the individual and the state. In The Public and Its Problems (in LW 2), Dewey rejects this as a useful way to think about political process (for there is no state without individuals, nor any individuals without some political context). Instead, he proposes a functional distinction between the private and public spheres, private actions being those that do not require oversight beyond the parties immediately involved, while public actions do, since they carry with them long-range potential impact upon individuals not directly involved. The dividing line between whether an action is private or public will vary from place to place and time to time. Art often labors with the dualism between the “aesthetic” as an
extraordinary and “intrinsic value” contrasted with the “useful” and “ordinary.” Dewey shows in Art as Experience (LW 10) that the “aesthetic” arises as a quality in ordinary experience (see AESTHETICS), which can be developed to become more intense and significant so that art comes to exhibit the ideal potentialities of experience itself. Theology likes to contrast the secular with the sacred and God with nature. In A Common Faith, Dewey argues that if the “religious” is a quality of experience, and not some doctrine or creed, i.e., a “religion,” it designates the deepest and most fulfilling ways in which shared experience can be encountered. In this sense, “God” can mean that very integration of the actual and the ideal that reveals depth of meaning and qualitative intensity in experience (LW 9:29f).

Thus, by emphasizing the functionality of thought as a process – by developing the habit of thinking in terms of continuity – pragmatism was able to offer an alternative to the series of dualisms, and the habit that generated them, that characterizes Western philosophy. In Dewey’s hands this led to the expression of a nuanced “emergentist naturalism” that looked toward culture in all its forms as revealing the nature of nature. Given the persistence of dualistic habits of thought in the predominant schools today, the pragmatist alternative is well worth exploring.

References and further reading

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Expressivism and Mead’s Social Self
MITCHELL ABOULAFIA

Few thinkers are more closely identified with the notion of the social self than George Herbert Mead (see Mead), and sociologists and philosophers have provided cogent and influential accounts of his position. But surprisingly, these accounts typically overlook an important feature of Mead’s philosophy, namely, his expressivism. It is unfortunate that Mead’s expressivism has gone unexamined, for not only is it a crucial feature of his account of the social self, it also links his work to the tradition of European social thought. Charles Taylor has examined the importance of expressivism in the shaping of modern Western sensibilities. This chapter will draw on his observations, and then address a central figure in modern social thought in light of them: Karl Marx. These discussions will set the stage for clarifying the expressivist dimension of Mead’s notion of the social self.

The expressivist for Taylor does not see the self as static or fixed. One’s nature is defined in its articulation, so that a human life is shaped by the expressions of an individual’s life. Taylor writes:

My claim is that the idea of nature as an intrinsic source goes with an expressive view of human life. Fulfilling my nature means espousing the inner élan, the voice or impulse. And this makes what was hidden manifest for both myself and others. But this manifestation also helps to define what is to be realized. The direction of the élan wasn’t and couldn’t be clear prior to this manifestation. In realizing my nature, I have to define it in the sense of giving it some formulation; but this is also a definition in the stronger sense: I am realizing this formulation and thus giving my life a definitive shape. A human life is seen as manifesting a potential which is also being shaped by this manifestation; it is not just a matter of copying an external model or carrying out an already determinate formulation.” (1989, pp. 374–5; emphasis added)

There are actually two strands of the expressivist sensibility interwoven in this quotation, namely, that we possess an inner nature that seeks to be expressed, and that we only become ourselves in the activity of expressing ourselves. Taylor clarifies the first strand as follows:

Thus, where Aristotelian philosophy saw the growth and development of man and the realization of human form as a tending towards order and equilibrium constantly threatened
by disorder and disharmony, the expressivist view sees this development more as the manifestation of an inner power (cf. Herder's *Kräfte*) striving to realize and maintain its own shape against those the surrounding world might impose. (1975, p. 15)

This chapter will focus on the second strand, the notion of self-transformation through expression. For Taylor, “[t]he second important strand in expressivism is the notion that the realization of a form clarifies or makes determinate what that form is. . . . Thus the fullest and most convincing expression of a subject is one where he both realizes and clarifies his aspirations” (ibid., p. 16). This chapter will also make reference to another feature of expressivism, that is, the urge to unity, as well as the concomitant drive to overcome divisions. “[E]xpressive fulfillment entails a certain integrity, a wholeness of life, which does not admit of division between body and soul, will and inclination, spirit and nature” (ibid., p. 546). For Taylor, the expressivist sensibility is to be contrasted with the drive to control nature through technical and scientific means that was basic to the Enlightenment, or perhaps we should say to the Radical Enlightenment, a tradition characterized by naturalism, a deep commitment to rational understanding, utilitarianism, and an inclination to atomize experience and the world (1989, pp. 321–54). Bentham and Condorcet are notable figures in this tradition for Taylor. Expressivism, on the other hand, can be traced back to Rousseau and Johann Gottfried von Herder, and it grew to encompass thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, as well as a host of twentieth-century figures. It’s worth saying a few words about Herder at this juncture, for his version of expressivism provides a framework for helping to sharpen the contrast between Marx and Mead, and thereby serving to clarify the nature of Mead’s thought and his views on the social self.

Expression takes place on a cultural level for Herder. While he was certainly interested in how individuals are shaped by their expressions, he also held to the notion that a people, *volk*, not only expresses itself in its culture and art, but is in turn constituted by this expression. To interfere with this expression is to hinder self-determination, and this amounts to a violation of a people’s integrity and humanity. Herder, had he not been a non-cognitivist in ethics, would have rewritten the categorical imperative of his teacher Kant to read as follows: “So act to treat humanity, whether in your own person [and culture] or in that of any other [person or culture], always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means.” For Herder, the sanctity of the individual must be complemented by the sanctity of cultures; one’s Pietism should not stop at the individual’s door (see Herder 1968, p. xvii). He railed against those who would reduce or deny the achievements of other peoples and cultures, and against those who tried to use fixed categories – such as the existence of different races – to deny our common humanity. Herder argued that our common humanity should *not* be located in a set of permanent ahistorical aptitudes, but in the ways in which various peoples have actually lived and shaped their lives. Humanity is like a great garden in which each flower adds to the beauty of the whole, and therefore must be allowed to blossom. Our common humanity, then, is the product of all of the expressions of all the peoples who have ever been and will be; that is, it is to be found in the multitude of ways that the species has (and will) express itself, for example, in different artistic achievements. Here is a vision whose line runs right to our multicultural doorsteps. Yet to suggest that Herder was merely concerned with idiosyncratic cultural differences would be
misleading. It’s worth noting that at times he barely sounds like a Romantic at all and could be taken as Condorcet’s twin on notions of progress and Enlightenment. These tensions in Herder’s thought are quite real, and in this he is like many of us – that is, children of the Enlightenment, unwilling to shed completely certain notions of universality, of reason, of progress, and descendants of the Romantics, for whom the expressive, whether it be in individual or in collective and cultural form, must be given priority. My working assumption is that Mead, and indeed other pragmatists as well, cannot be fully appreciated unless he is understood against the backdrop of both the Enlightenment and expressivism. Mead is in a line of thinkers whose work was deeply informed by, and yet critical of, Hegel, who can himself be read as something of an expressivist. It’s worth noting here that “the Scottish Enlightenment was unquestionably a major stimulus for Herder’s historical thinking” (Zammito 2002, p. 333).

While Marx is sometimes read as a child of the Enlightenment, there is a way of reading his emphasis on labor and production (see Marxism and Critical Theory) in expressivist terms. To understand different peoples, we must understand the ways in which they produce their means of subsistence. However, Marx argues that a mode of production such as feudalism or capitalism should not be viewed as the mere reproduction of the physical existence of individuals:

Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. (Engels and Marx 1978, p. 150)

By producing in different ways, we crystallize various human powers, and in so doing we transform ourselves. How so? Think here of how differently people lived and interacted before human beings had the technology to build great cities. For Marx there is a species being (Gattungswesen), a species nature, but this nature must be thought of in terms of various potentialities that are actualized at different times. So although there are certain transhistorical givens regarding this species nature (for example, procreation) the nature of the species is not fixed because changes in production bring to light different capacities of the species. We no doubt possess powers, needs, and aptitudes in common with those who have lived at different times, but to focus attention on these generalities is to lose sight of the deep historicity of human beings, and to slight the creative and expressive powers of the species.

Notice in this regard how Marx separates us off from other animals:

The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish itself from itself. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. . . . It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself to be a species being. This production is his active species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created. (Ibid., p. 76)
This is a marvelous passage. In it, one can readily see how Marx joined a notion of active human labor found in Hegel’s dialectic of the master and slave with elements of Feuerbach’s account of species being, so that Marx is no longer working with, for lack of a better phrase, an ideational orientation to our species being. He focuses not on the articulation of the human essence, even one as potentially rich and manifold as in Feuerbach’s writings, but on human labor as the creative activity par excellence. What Taylor refers to as the Promethean quality of Marx is also evident in this passage, for example, in the phrase, “nature appears as his work and his reality.” Taylor argues that this dimension of Marx’s thought was actually drawn from the radical Enlightenment, which sees nature as that which is to be overcome and reshaped by humanity, so much so in fact that the expressivist drive for unity is no longer to be found in poetic reflection or contemplation on the unity of nature or humanity, but in unifying nature under human control. I have reservations about just how far Taylor presses this claim, but it is fair to say that there is a drive for unity in Marx, and that one cannot fully appreciate his focus on the promise of new productive relations without considering his rage at the disunity fostered by the exploitation that exists in our current mode of production. Our loss of unity with the natural world is, after all, a basic feature of his critique of alienation (see Taylor 1975, pp. 546–58).

Human beings, for Marx, are shaped and reshaped by their own activities, their own labor, so much so that even our senses cannot be thought of as a- or trans-historical.

“The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present,” Marx declares. He states:

For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses – the practical senses (will, love, etc.) – in a word, human sense – the humanness of the senses – comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanized nature. The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. (Engels and Marx 1978, p. 89)

It may be said that human beings are transformed by their own transformations of nature, as ongoing transactions with the natural world result in new modes of production, new modes of life. In this regard, human beings must not be viewed as creatures apart from the natural and historical worlds, as having an essence that is impervious to historical and biological transformation. Our species being, our human nature, undergoes transformation through the transhistorical constant of productive activity. For Marx, what is expressed by human beings is not a fixed essence, but historically realizable potentialities, and it is vacuous to speak of these potentialities in the abstract, as if they were timeless. Human powers are not fixed in advance, for they are contingently realized in relationship to specific historical conditions.

However, in spite of Marx’s emphasis on history, a figure like Herder would ultimately find him insensitive to the expressive dimension of human life. Differences of culture and nationality simply do not play a sufficiently central role in Marx’s thought for thinkers of Herder’s temper. Marx is concerned to show how capitalism outstrips prior economic systems – for example, feudalism, and the various ways of life that these earlier systems sustained. For Marx, capitalism will eventually turn everyone into either workers or capitalists, thereby reducing traditional status and role distinctions.
EXPRESSIVISM AND MEAD’S SOCIAL SELF

in society, as it presses different societies to become more like each other. Cultural differences that were rooted in earlier modes of production will disappear as capitalism spreads throughout the world. Since Marx takes capitalism’s overcoming of earlier economic and cultural forms for granted, he does not expect cultural diversity to flourish under socialism, which only arises after capitalism. So although he can be thought of as an expressivist in terms of the various historical modes of production or forms of life, after the revolution, so to speak, expressive differences will be centered on individual and not cultural differences.

If one looks at the consequences of Marx’s position, then, they are very much what one might expect from a defender of an Enlightenment view of reason, that is, a flattening of cultural differences. His expressivism ends up focusing on the individual and a post-capitalist society, but not on societies in the plural. As Marx tells us:

In communist society . . . society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. (Ibid., p. 160)

The emphasis here is on individual activity and expression, not on cultural or national expression or self-determination as we find in Herder, even if individual expression is viewed as entailing a necessary relationship to collective life.

In Mead’s account of the social self, organized groups and communities are central to the self’s development. In this regard his model can be read as more attuned than Marx’s to the concerns of group and even national identity. Further, while Marx appeals to the social dimension of the self, his model assumes the inherent sociality of this self in different modes of production. He does not provide a detailed account of the manner in which the social lends itself to the actual development of a self in any given historical context. Of course, it would seem to be unfair to accuse Marx of not having a social psychology that would account for this development, since this was not the primary object of his concerns. And yet it is precisely this lack – as understood by, among others, those in the Frankfurt School – that shows itself in the problem of difference already alluded to, and in two other areas: its limited understanding of the process by which ideologies become entrenched and its tendency to reify the social subject in terms of the proletarian class. Mead, on the other hand, offers an account of how the self develops, and he does so in a fashion that allows him to remain sensitive to group and cultural differences. His approach bears a similarity to that of Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas); however, it does not rely on the transcendental in the same fashion and it is more sensitive to expressivist currents in our culture. The individual’s mind and self, mindedness and selfhood if you will, are constituted through social interaction. For Mead, one must examine how early language development and role-taking are involved in the development of the self. He offers an interpretation of language that focuses on the importance of the vocal gesture. Also crucial to Mead’s developmental model is his understanding of the process of role-taking and the patterns of behavior that make up what he calls the generalized other. The genesis of the self as a unified object must be understood in terms of the generalized other, to which we will turn after providing a brief account of Mead’s views on role-taking.
The following passage from Mead’s *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* is a good point of entry into Mead’s views on role-taking. The historical movement referred to by Mead in the passage is Romanticism.

One senses the self only in so far as the self assumes the role of another so that it becomes both subject and object in the same experience. This is the thing of great importance in this whole historical movement. It was because people in Europe, at this time, put themselves back in the earlier attitude that they could come back upon themselves.... As a characteristic of the romantic attitude we find this assumption of roles.... He has got the point of view from which he can see himself as others see him. And he has got it because he has put himself in the place of the others. (1936, pp. 63–4)

There is a connection between the notion of role-taking and Mead’s expressivism. However, before discussing this association, it’s worth noting that while this passage is found in a discussion of the Romantic period, Mead is not saying that the capacity for taking the attitude or role of the other did not exist in other times and places. (For the purpose of the present discussion the terms *attitude* and *role* are being used interchangeably, which Mead often does. However, for Mead, taking the attitude of the other can suggest less complicated behavioral dispositions than fully developed social roles. And to further complicate matters, at times Mead does not mean by role the complex form of behavior that we are familiar with in social-psychological literature; see Cook 1993, pp. 78–98). Rather, Mead is emphasizing that with Romanticism it became commonplace to interact imaginatively with historical and literary figures. People have always assumed different roles, but in the Romantic period the process of self-constitution in this fashion became an explicit focus of people’s activities.

For Mead, a self is only constituted in interaction with other language-bearing individuals, an interaction that allows the self as a *cognitive object* to be formed by taking the attitudes or roles of the specific others and eventually the generalized other. Children learn to take roles at an early age, and this is evident in the ways in which they act out various roles when they play, for example, doctor and patient. To take roles we must be able to anticipate the responses of others to our conduct. In so doing we come to “see” ourselves from the perspective of those with whom we are interacting, that is, we anticipate the responses of others to our actions. We “see” ourselves as others see us. For Mead, role-taking is made possible by the internalization of the responses or conduct of others, but it does not end there. As will be clarified below, a self is more complex than a role, but like sophisticated roles, a self not only entails a certain repertoire of responses, it involves the capacity to be aware of them. To put this in traditional philosophical terms, to have a self we must be able to experience ourselves as both subject and object, or what for Mead amounts to the same thing, we must be capable of self-consciousness. And we become self-conscious through social interaction, specifically, by taking the perspectives of others. (Please bear in mind here that the self as a cognitive object is by no means all that the individual is for Mead, but in this chapter we are focusing on this aspect of the individual.)

For Mead, we are in a constant process of give and take with others. As a matter of fact, we do not know if we have properly internalized a symbol or an attitude until we externalize it, express it – that is, put it back into the world for others to react to. In other words, in order to see ourselves in a new light, we must express ourselves to
others, and they in turn assist us by validating our actions, that is, by responding as we anticipated. Who we become depends on those with whom we interact, both those whose attitudes we take and those to whom we express them. However, it should be noted that for Mead externalized attitudes are never absolutely identical to the original internalized ones, because the responses of individuals inevitably exhibit varying degrees of novelty. For Mead, in addition to the socialized “me,” there is also the spontaneous “I.” None of us behaves in exactly the same fashion as others, nor does each of us even behave in exactly the same fashion over time. Every role is played by a different actor. In this sense even internalized attitudes and roles are marked by a degree of individuality when they are enacted.

In addition to taking specific roles, we also take the position of the generalized other. It is the generalized other that provides a greater degree of self-integration than specific roles. When the judge in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or tells his young correspondent that he has only worn masks – that is, he has only played different roles – but that he has never realized that the personality, the self, is a unity crystallized in the moment of choice, he is of course appealing to an old tradition in the West, namely, that the self is or should become a unitary whole (Kierkegaard 1959, pp. 161–73). While Mead bypasses the issue of authenticity implicit in the judge’s words, he introduces the generalized other in part to point to the necessity of seeing the cognitive self as a whole, a whole that only arises in the systemic interplay of our social life. However, although a self is a whole, each of us may be said to embody numerous cognitive selves. In this we are somewhat like the judge’s young interlocutor. Why Mead takes this to be true is directly linked to his notion of the generalized other, which is not to be understood as a specific other, as when one plays a doctor to someone’s patient, but as a more abstract and systematic other. The generalized other arises when one is part of a group that functions as a social system, for example, a baseball team, a family or an organization of which one is a member. Generalized others exist at different degrees of complexity and abstraction, and so do the selves to which they give rise. The human mind has developed in part through its capacity to internalize and take the position of a multitude of generalized others. Properly speaking, for Mead, selves only arise in relationship to generalized others, and not the less complex form of interaction that are labeled roles. And just as one can anticipate the responses of a specific interlocutor when playing a role, so one can anticipate a host of responses that the perspectives of generalized others bring with them. Mead writes:

The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called “the generalized other.” The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community. Thus, for example, in the case of such a social group as a ball team, the team is the generalized other in so far as it enters – as an organized process or social activity – into the experience of any one of the individual members of it. (1934, p. 154)

The capacity for participating in social groups is native and transhistorical for Mead. But what is not transhistorical are the types of roles and our relationship to them. Roles and generalized others change.

In Mead’s model we find a parallel to self-formation through expression that we find in Marx, but the relationships that modify the self are directly through the other and
the generalized other, not through one’s productive activities (although this is not to say that labor is unimportant to Mead). Mead’s expressivism can be located in the following elements in his thought: the constitution of a unified self through social interaction; the pragmatist’s concern with practice that is constitutive and transformational in terms of self and community; the modification and realization of certain impulses through their articulation in a socially acceptable form; and the importance of spontaneity in the life of the individual. Marx emphasizes the human capacity for productive activity, which leads to the self-transformation of the species as needs are satisfied and new needs created. Our species is an ever-changing object for Marx, for it is the sum of its creative and expressive activities. This is a vision that bears some resemblance to Herder’s, but with this obvious difference: for Marx there is no accent on the sanctity of different cultures. They are not to be viewed as flowers in Herder’s garden of humanity, each with an inviolate personality, each adding to the dignity and worth of the species. Modes of production are complex, and no doubt culture is one way of talking about them. Nevertheless, after the socialist revolution we will have a classless society, and such a society will not be attuned to the integrity of cultural groups. This will not just be due to the nature of socialism, but because capitalism will have already leveled out the differences between such groups before socialism arises. What remains of them under socialism will be vestiges of bygone modes of production. Indeed, first capitalism and then socialism rid us of the problem of achieving cosmopolitanism in a multicultural world. Everyone becomes a de facto cosmopolitan by virtue of a universal, classless mode of production.

Mead was also a universalist, but of a different stripe. He did not speak of a universal class. The mechanism for sharing and overcoming parochialism is found in the genesis of the social self and does not require the supposition of a class that transcends cultures in a universalistic fashion, as we find in Marx. What transcends cultures are certain pragmatics of language and social interaction, specifically, our capacity to take the perspective of the other. These capacities give rise to opportunities for seeing others as members of shared communities. But how and why people are moved to see others in this light – that is, from a cosmopolitan vantage point – is not due to any one set of practices, although Mead would highlight the importance of the activity of sociality, the living in transition between systems, between selves, in fostering cosmopolitanism. While the question of which practices are conducive to the development of cosmopolitanism has not been central to this chapter, they are important for contrasting Mead’s expressivist sensibilities with those of Marx.

For Mead, we must seek to overcome the parochial, which can lead to war and cruelty, but we must not confuse the parochial with the mere existence of different group or nationalistic sensibilities. Expressivity is nurtured by the relationship of individuals to groups. Social groups are not to be viewed as hostile to individual expression. (Although it is again worth noting that Mead also speaks about the spontaneity of the individual in terms of what he calls the “I,” analysis of which is beyond the scope of this chapter). For Mead, we must distinguish group identities from retrograde nationalism, the kind that leads to war. (The question of the relationship between cultures and groups is complex. For the purposes of this chapter I am conflating them, for what is important here is the integrity and worth of non-universalistic “associations.”) We must replace retrograde nationalism with a sensitivity to differences and
an appreciation of our common humanity, which in practical terms means supporting and nurturing collective interests. We should support collective social goals and projects, as well as organizations and social institutions with committed and unalienated memberships. The goal is to realize common interests while preserving the identity of different groups. Mead would argue that in his account of the social self we have a basis for understanding how this might be possible. But Mead is well aware of the obstacles. He insists that we will not be able to see interests in common if there are vast differences in wealth and power, which limit expression and self-realization for so many. And this insight links Mead to a host of American and European progressives, including Marx.

References and further reading


Marxism and Critical Theory

PAULO GHIRALDELLI, JR.

Marxism, critical theory, and pragmatism have several philosophical objectives and positions in common. Marxism is the doctrine generated from the work of Karl Marx (1818–83) and Friedrich Engels (1820–95). Critical theory, partially inspired by Marxism, is a particular name for the work of the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School of philosophy came from members of the Institute for Social Research founded in Frankfurt in the early twentieth century, and its first director was Max Horkheimer (1898–1973). Theodor Adorno (1903–69), the second director of the Institute, gave the label “critical theory” to sociological papers and books written by Horkheimer; his own work in the same area could be called “negative dialectic” – work operating from a philosophical point of view. Most scholars have adopted the term “critical theory” to cover the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), Jürgen Habermas (1929–) (see Habermas), and others. Unfortunately, the classification of their work as primarily philosophical has not been universal, and this has sometimes contributed to a kind of confusion. Scholars have taken specific philosophical points of the Frankfurt School as sociological claims instead, and so typical metaphysical and/or epistemological problems are misunderstood. Several of the more significant ideas of Marxism and critical theory are compared with pragmatism in this chapter.

Marxism

Marxism examines the historical, social, and economic conditions for the possibility of culture and knowledge; the “criticism of the political economy” was the subtitle of Marx’s Das Kapital (1863). His criticism intended to show that modern society needs a revolution to maintain itself and that this revolution would be created by the laboring class, bringing about a new way to organize society, production, and culture.

Marx and Engels tried to describe the development of Western modern society. They were especially interested in the tensions between the laws of social organization (the “relations of production,” or “superstructure”) and the production capacities (the “productive forces,” or “structure”). Marx and Engels believed that in certain phases of history the social organization could block the development and distribution of
material production. The workers could opt to provoke a revolution to change social rules in order to open opportunities for production (mainly manufacturing inventions). The revolution would eliminate ideology and create a new system, “communism,” to organize the world’s labor in a more rational and happy way.

In Horkheimer’s view, Marx made three mistakes: (1) he used the history and society of European and American people as a model from which to study other cultures; (2) as a result of this, he became obsessed with the ideology of progress, believing that if we could control the material world, we would have freedom; and (3) he viewed class struggle as a process by which to achieve social peace because the justice of communism would cause repression to disappear, and, since they are conditioned by society, human hatred, resentment, and psychological misery would also disappear.

Marx thought, according to Horkheimer, that a liberated humanity would use technology just to satisfy its curiosity, but he did not realize that technology belongs to the realm of necessity; it is a realm that sustains the suffering of nature, and what rests in the realm of freedom is our solidarity in favor of life, our demand for social justice and appreciation for nature. In that case, “nature” means “psychological human life” and “natural external world.” Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse did not agree with what they called Marxist ascetism, and they were never in favor of the idea of a revolutionary party being used as a military vanguard organized to lead political revolution in the way that Lenin organized the Russian Revolution in 1917.

Criticism

The Frankfurt philosophers accepted several Marxist views about capitalism, labor, and human nature, but they did not think about economics in the same way that traditional Marxists did; they did not view a proletarian revolution or a communist society as our great destiny. They adopted an investigative and critical course rather than a militant stance.

Critical theory is a social philosophy that defends a critical approach to philosophizing. Before constructing a positive system, philosophy must deal with the problem of the conditions of possibility of culture in general and, specifically, with human knowledge and morality. Critical theory emerged under the impact of a crisis within traditional Marxism. The Frankfurt philosophers believed that the social revolution – the Marxian condition for achieving a community without ideology where people can grasp the truth – was not an inevitable desire of the working class. And they did not believe that a communist society could produce its promised happiness. So they decided to return to theory and philosophical and sociological reflection in order to try to understand better the course of Western culture. They focused on science and technology, family, arts, moral behavior, feelings, religion, mystical ideas, philosophies, sexual behavior, perversity, subjectivity, and so on. They wanted to understand what Marx and Engels had called the “superstructure,” because they supposed that Marx and Engels had concentrated their investigative energies only on the “structure.”

The principal methodological idea of critical theory, if we consider first Adorno and Horkheimer rather than Marcuse, teaches us how philosophically to approach questions about specific social contexts of modernity. What we have in modernity is
a pseudo-concretization of the history of the Spirit, meaning that the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) was a correct description of our history and world, but it is accurate only as a fantastic lie. The “rational is real and real is rational,” according to Hegel; but conversely, to be an authentic Frankfurtian philosopher implies appreciating that what is real is a denial of the rational, since a rational life should be a good and free life – a life without useless sacrifices and perverse deeds against other persons.

If someone wants to be an Adornian or Horkheimerian scholar, he or she must pay attention to a special type of contextualism. The context is not whatever takes into account something called “reality,” but is instead a historical account about the irrationality of the rational during modernity. Adorno and Horkheimer turned their attention from class struggle and toward more fundamental questions about Enlightenment and modernity. Their “Dialectic of Reason” or “Dialectic of Enlightenment” attempt to preserve critical rationality from the scientific reasoning that has been turned into part of the capitalist ideology. According to Adorno and Horkheimer, the “Enlightenment” is not just the name of a philosophical moment, but a process that could be an axis for the history of philosophy. What is at stake is genuine human freedom.

The Frankfurt philosophers understood philosophical “criticism” as a “negative account” of Enlightenment ideology and modernity’s failures rather than as a positive search for knowledge and truth based on any philosophical foundation. In the preface of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer wrote:

> The aporia which faced us in our work thus proved to be the first matter we had to investigate: the self-destruction of enlightenment. We have no doubt – and herein lies our *petitio principii* – that freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We believe we have perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very concept of that thinking, no less than the concrete historical forms, the institutions of society with which it is intertwined, already contains the germ of the regression which is taking place everywhere today. (2002, p. xvi)

**Pragmatism and Practice**

Like American pragmatism, Marxism took the notion of practice to be central to truth and knowledge. In the “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Marx wrote:

> The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth – i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question. (Engels and Marx 1978, p. 144)

In *Pragmatism*, William James (see *James*) wrote:

> [T]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation.
But what do the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. (Works Prag, p. 97)

It is notable that James improved an idea already present in Marx’s work. Marx pointed out that truth must be found in practice; James evoked the notion of experience and practical consequences to evaluate what we could consider a true theory or idea. Both Marx and James reacted against a Greek idea that knowledge is a product of contemplation. Marxism and pragmatism treat human knowledge like something produced by human activity, and they considered epistemological questions to be connected with historical transformations of the world. They reflect somewhat different developments of historicism, already present in Hegel’s philosophy. If Hegel is taken as an opponent to Kant on the historicity of knowledge, then one could prefer historical contextualism (nature and history are not distinct for pragmatism, but Marxism tends to separate them) rather than a transcendental account to judge the truth of theories and narratives. From this perspective on the issue of historicism, Marxism and pragmatism are like cousins. However, Marxism, critical theory, and pragmatism have disagreements over truth and experience as well.

Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) and Friedrich Engels’s Marxism assumed a realistic and objectivist point of view. Engels’s work on utopian and scientific socialism claimed that “the proof of cake was given insofar as we eat it.” A realistic theory of perception was a common notion for these reductive materialists. Readers of Engels and Lenin did not see any significance in the pragmatist criticism of the correspondence theory of truth.

Sometimes, members of the Frankfurt School displayed a more sophisticated approach to truth, but they criticized pragmatism when, for example, they follow Horkheimer’s The Eclipse of Reason (1947). Horkheimer wrote:

If it were not for the founder of the school, Charles S. Peirce [see Peirce], who has told us that he “learned philosophy out of Kant,” one might be tempted to deny any philosophical pedigree to a doctrine that holds not that our expectations are fulfilled and our actions successful because our ideas are true, but rather that our ideas are true because our expectations are fulfilled and our actions successful. (1974, p. 42)

Critical theorists have sometimes not appreciated that James, or John Dewey (see Dewey), was not directly identifying success with truth, but only attempting to give concrete empirical meaning to the otherwise abstract notion of truth as correspondence.

Another problem is the concept of experience. Horkheimer understood Dewey’s use of the term “experience” as only connoting the results of laboratory experiment. He did not realize that Dewey, a good reader of Hegel, brought to the English word “experience” the German notions expressed by “Erlebnis” and “Erfahrung,” psychological and inner experience and historical and social experience. So, Dewey did not have a reductive or scientific notion of experience, and Horkheimer was not correct when he identified pragmatism and positivism as both expressing an apology for experimentalism. For example, critical theorists can read in Walter Benjamin’s work the use of the notions of “Erlebnis” and “Erfahrung” in ways that also appear in Dewey’s notion
of experience. By “experience,” they both intend to mean the natural and historical life. Hans Joas (1993) discusses in great detail the missed opportunities for constructive dialogue between American pragmatism, Marxism, and critical theory.

The American philosopher on the scene who did realize the great extent of common philosophical interests and results between Marxism and pragmatism was Sidney Hook (1902–89). During the 1920s and 1930s Dewey and his disciple Hook advocated democratic socialism, which promoted the public control of major industries and the legislative oversight of the economy for the general welfare of the whole society. Hook unified Dewey’s theory of democratic inquiry with Karl Marx’s justification of socialism, relying on Marx’s attitude toward practice, noted above, in Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx (1933). Although always hostile to communism’s political tyranny, Dewey and Hook were inspired by the Marxist critique of capitalism. Dewey never became familiar with any of the critical theorists, yet he was similarly critical of many Enlightenment notions of freedom, individualism, and consumerism. Dewey was never capable of raising the sort of critical fears of unrestrained technology that are found in some critical theorists or Martin Heidegger, preferring to view technology itself in a neutral light. However, it was a serious mistake of some in the critical theorist movement to dismiss Dewey’s pragmatism as an unreflective promoter of technology for its own sake. Dewey, like critical theorists, was vitally concerned to design the political environment that would best provide for the autonomous empowerment of intelligent citizens.

Neo-pragmatism and Neo-critical Theory

More recently, Jürgen Habermas, the most important Frankfurtian philosopher alive after the death of Adorno and Horkheimer, gradually adopted some pragmatist ideas about truth and knowledge. He has defended a kind of traditional pragmatist notion of truth against the famous North American pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty (see RORTY). In many respects, Habermas is closer to Peirce, Hilary Putnam (see PUTNAM), and Karl-Otto Apel.

Adorno viewed truth as a complex thing, as what lies between the concept and reality. Habermas rejected the old correspondence notion of truth, and adopted the “linguistic turn” and the “pragmatic turn” to deal with truth and meaning. For Habermas, truth is obtained by consensus in practical situations. However, he holds that his position is different from those of Apel and Putnam. When Putnam was most comfortable with Peirce’s pragmatism in the 1980s and early 1990s, he would say that a proposition is true if it can be justified under ideal epistemic conditions. Apel for his part would say that a proposition is true if it would achieve, through argumentation, the agreement of an ideal communication community. Habermas has said that his position is the following: a proposition is true if it can achieve, through argumentation, the agreement of participants in an ideal speech situation. Based on that position, Habermas has criticized Rorty.

For Rorty, we should prefer the better question, “Which are the uses of the word ‘true’ that we put to work for us?” to the bad question, “What is the truth?” We can select out different typologies of behavior on a case-by-case basis depending on what
sort of usefulness is involved. Rorty says that such a typology avoids the temptation of talking about the “nature of truth” or of attributing to truth an explicative-cognitive power. Truth would be only a name for certain kinds of relations among people – among people within a linguistic community, or among people of different communities.

Rorty’s typology of three different uses of truth is as follows. First, we can use “true” as a term of endorsement or applause. When we approve something or someone, we can say “sure,” “go ahead,” “I believe,” “yes, it is true,” “right,” and so on. Second, truth has a disquotational use. We place quote marks around a proposition to present a statement such as, “There is a good possibility of life on Mars.” We use quote marks because we want to express a theory, that is, an idea that we do not necessarily endorse. But if we want to express the same idea without endorsing it, and we do not want to use it as a citation, then we can “disquote” our sentence and use “true” or “truth.” For example: “For many scientists it is true that there is a good possibility of life on Mars.” Third, there is a cautionary use of truth. We can use “true” or “not true” to make our sentence or statement more persuasive, but we can also use these terms to warn the listener to have doubts. For example, “Your claim that our President is a thief is justifiable, but it is not true.” Or: “The justification of this claim is inadequate but the claim is true.” And again: “It is completely justified; however, it is not true.”

The third use, that of cautionary truth, raises the problem of justification and truth. Regarding Habermas, the conflict arises because Habermas does not agree with Rorty’s interpretation of the “cautionary use” of truth. In this case, the debate concerns the differences between “justified” and “true.” For Habermas, “true” and “justified” cannot be connected. For Rorty, an essential link between “true” and “justified” is revealed when we need to consider that one never simply knows what is true, but one just accepts true sentences and theories insofar as one accepts good justification, and this justification is contingent, depending on audience, time, space, available information, etc.

Both Habermas and Rorty agree that their philosophical disagreements do not prevent them from adopting a similar political position. They believed that society must become a social democracy, if we use European terms, or a liberal democracy, if we use North American terms.

After Sidney Hook and also Richard Bernstein (1983), it appears that Habermas became the next principal philosopher to connect Dewey and Marx. However, Habermas had a special trajectory: his journey to pragmatism started from Marxism and critical theory. His debates with Rorty about neo-pragmatism after he adopted much of the stance of classical pragmatism have been quite interesting and productive.

References and further reading


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Philosophical Hermeneutics

DAVID VESSEY

Hermeneutics classically refers to questions of textual interpretation. The first modern use of the term is Johann Dannhauser’s 1654 *Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrum litterarum*. In the wake of humanist scholarship, reformation doctrines of *sola scriptura*, and the proliferation of printed books, Dannhauser put forward a general theory of interpretation meant to apply to all texts, secular and sacred. In the late nineteenth century these views were expanded by Wilhelm Dilthey to serve as a methodology for the human sciences that aims toward understanding (in contrast to the methodology of the natural sciences that aims at explanation). But only in the twentieth century has hermeneutics come to refer to a philosophical tradition that takes questions of interpretation to be central philosophical questions. The crucial shift occurred with Martin Heidegger’s argument that human beings (or rather, *Dasein*) are related to their surroundings through understanding, and all understanding is interpretive. In Charles Taylor’s words, we are essentially self-interpreting beings (Taylor 1985). Hermeneutics, then, as the study of interpretive understanding, becomes both the means for self-understanding and the model for how humans interact in their environment. Philosophical hermeneutics usually refers to the writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s student who developed Heidegger’s hermeneutical themes by connecting them to ancient accounts of rhetoric and dialogue and to Dilthey’s concerns about legitimating the human sciences.

Philosophical hermeneutics is often favorably compared with John Dewey’s pragmatism (see Dewey) in at least three ways: in embracing the hermeneutic circle, in recognizing the importance of aesthetic experience, and in rejecting a separation between theory and practice. For Heidegger and Gadamer, we are always already working within a conceptual tradition when we understand something (ourselves, our environment, other people). So we always interpret in the context of received interpretations; we move back and forth, adjusting our new interpretations to our received understandings and adjusting our received understanding in light of the new interpretations. Analogously, when interpreting a text (for hermeneutics there are always analogies between understanding our environment and understanding texts), we work to make the meaning of the text as a whole square with the meaning of its parts, adjusting our interpretations until we arrive at an interpretive coherence between the parts and the whole. During the process, each interpretation of part or
whole is a provisional interpretation that guides future interpretations and is only retained to the extent it is confirmed in future interpretations. Both the back and forth movement called the “hermeneutic circle” and the way the interpretations guide future interpretations while remaining provisional have clear parallels in Dewey’s account of the relation between means and ends in inquiry. Dewey writes in *Experience and Nature*:

> When appetite is perceived in its meanings [as opposed to in brute interaction], in the consequences it induces, and these consequences are experimented with in reflective imagination, some being seen as consistent with one another, and hence capable of coexistence and of serially order achievement, others being incompatible, forbidding conjunction at one time, and getting in one another’s way serially – when this estate is attained, we live on the human plane, responding to things in their meanings. A relationship of cause-effect has been transformed into one of means-consequence. Then consequences belong integrally to the conditions that may produce them, and the latter possess character and distinction. The meaning of causal conditions is carried over also into the consequence, so that the latter is no longer a mere end, a last and closing term of arrest. It is marked out in perception, distinguished by the efficacy of the conditions which have entered into it. Its value as fulfilling and consummatory is measurable by subsequent fulfillments and frustrations to which it is contributory in virtue of the causal means which compose it. Thus to be conscious of meanings or to have an idea, marks a fruition, an enjoyed or suffered arrest of the flux of events. (LW 1:278)

In our experience of actions as meaningful, we come to see the end of the activity as intelligible only in virtue of the means necessary to attain it, and likewise we come to see the means in terms of their ability to facilitate the end. Ends and means are not only conceptually interwoven, but their meanings and interconnections are revised in the process of fulfillment of the end. Together with the emphasis on the hermeneutic circle as a model for the event of understanding comes the recognition of our necessary embeddedness in our intellectual customs and habits and a suspicion toward appeals to unchanging absolutes.

Dewey thinks the intersection of instrumental and consummatory events is most clear in the production and the experience of a work of art. Aesthetic experience (see *Aesthetics*) follows the pattern of ordinary experience but is heightened in its intensity and so models what Dewey calls having “an experience.” An experience stands out by its integration of part and whole, its experienced unity, its integration of emotional and intellectual elements, and its transformative power. Having an experience moves us. We begin to understand an experience in its elements only after the fact; during an experience we are in the experience, using “in” in the existential sense, much as we are “in love,” “in need,” or “in a mood.” Gadamer too presents aesthetic experience as a model for a kind of experience, an experience of truth. When we enter into the play of the experience of the work of art – Gadamer uses the metaphor of playing a game to emphasize that what emerges is not simply up to us, but the result of an event we are engaged in – we open ourselves to the possibility of being transformed through new insights. This is the distinctive feature of art, its ability to reveal true insights, and show how it is possible for other areas of the humanities to produce true insights even if they lack the methodological protocols of the natural sciences. In *Truth and Method* Gadamer writes:

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I maintain a work of art, thanks to its formal aspect, has something to say to us either through the question it awakens, or the question it answers. . . . An artwork “says something to someone.” In this assertion is contained the dismay of finding oneself directly affected by what was said by the work, and being forced to reflect again and again on what was said there, in order to make it understandable to oneself and others. (Gadamer 1989, p. 70)

For Gadamer, like Dewey, aesthetic experience is emotional, intellectual, and transformative; and is an event we find ourselves part of rather than controlling.

Finally, Gadamer and Dewey, but really all hermeneuts and all pragmatists, share the belief that theory only emerges out of practice and only gains its productivity with respect to that practice. Theorizing is a motivated response to a situation where our habitual ways of acting and interpreting fall short. We turn to reflection to understand better the source of the interruption and what would be necessary to continue on. Heidegger is fond of the example of a hammer that is broken or too heavy or missing and as a result becomes a thing present-to-hand, sacrificing its natural usefulness in order to become an object of inspection and reflection (Heidegger 1996, §15). Gadamer applies this to texts, pointing out that there are times when we are “pulled up short”: “either [the text] does not yield any meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected” (Gadamer 1989, p. 268). We need perspective on our pre-judgments to understand how what the text is presenting could be true, even if it is contrary to what we expected. In both cases, abstract reflection is a way of coping in a situation where something has gone awry, and the mark of successful reflection is our ability to continue on in some way or other (perhaps with revised views and goals). There are few themes more consistent in pragmatism than the idea that, in Gadamer’s words, “theory should only be developed out of praxis” (Hahn 1997, p. 367).

For these similarities, the differences between Gadamer and Dewey are extensive and often are traced to the difference between the two thinkers’ paradigmatic concerns: for Gadamer it is legitimating the academic activity of the humanities; for Dewey it is understanding the political and intellectual impact of inquiry. I will return to highlight a way Dewey can help us move beyond a limitation in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, but first I want to bring out some contributions that Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce could make to hermeneutics narrowly understood, that is, to interpretation theory. Late in his career Royce referred to his philosophy as an “absolute pragmatism,” but his pragmatism is usually overshadowed by his absolute idealism. His views are seldom discussed in Continental hermeneutics either, and although Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce) makes interpretation a central part of his philosophy, it is Royce’s connection between interpretation and community that provides the best intersection of Continental and pragmatic theories of interpretation.

In Royce’s 1913 *The Problem of Christianity* he takes up the question of interpretation as part of an investigation into the nature of a self-interpreting community. There, influenced by Peirce, he argues that all interpretations have three elements: they are by someone, of something, and for someone. Royce thinks the last element, the for-whom the interpretation is made, is generally missing from theories of interpretation and thus they fail to distinguish interpretations from conceptions or perceptions.
element shows the inherently social character of interpretation and the function of interpretation in maintaining community. Gadamer makes a similar point when he argues that interpretation is always dialogical, however he differs from Royce in claiming that all perceptions and conceptions are interpretive. Thus interpretation is not a distinct category from perception and conception. Here Royce can help hermeneutics. Hermeneutics often fails properly to distinguish those occasions when interpretation is social and dialogical from those when it is merely an element of our interactions with our environment. There are certain times when we actively interpret, and other times when it occurs as part of the process of understanding. Keeping these separate, as Royce does, would allow hermeneutics to be more attuned to different kinds of interpretive activities.

Moreover, because for Royce interpretations bear a relation to others distinctive from conceptions and perceptions, problems of interpretation always reflect a crisis of community. A successful interpretation is thus a successful re-establishment of community. While philosophical hermeneutics does suggest a connection between being ethical and being able to arrive at successful interpretations, generally by appealing to virtues of humility and openness, Royce can draw on his theory of loyalty to make the connection explicit. Here he offers resources that go beyond those currently available to philosophical hermeneutics.

Like Royce, Gadamer also argues that all interpretations have a threefold structure, but his claim is that they are by someone, about something, and with someone. This difference is what keeps Gadamer from moving toward absolute idealism (he likes to say he moved from dialectic to dialogue) but also what keeps him from accepting something like Peirce’s idealized criterion of truth. Even if one could show, as Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas) and Karl-Otto Apel attempt with inspiration from Peirce, that there are universal norms inherent in communicative action that could be used to provide standards for evaluating interpretation, Gadamer will still argue that these come into play only as part of the process of interpreting and only in dialogue with others. The debates between Royce and Dewey about the necessity of accepting transcendental ideals as part and parcel of every interpretation parallel the debates between Habermas and Gadamer and in general between critical theory and hermeneutics.

Gadamer thinks he can avoid the conclusion that all successful interpretation is guided only by mere agreement by “recovering” the role of application for understanding. Gadamer argues that all understanding not only includes interpretation but also application (Anwendung). Application regulates the fusion of horizons so as to provide a criterion for correct interpretation. The application in the understanding makes it possible for the text to make a claim on us. Gadamer draws on legal interpretation as a model, pointing out that “discovering the meaning of a legal text and discovering how to apply it in a particular legal instance are not two separate actions, but one unitary process” (1989, p. 310). Interpretations, whether legal, theological, or historical, all concretize the meaning so as to make sense to us in the present. To understand something is to understand what it would say about various cases and how it would apply to various situations. The example of translation makes this clearer. When we are translating something from German to English, for example, we don’t first understand the meaning of the German and then apply that meaning by using the appropriate English words. Choosing the right English words is the process of understanding the
German in English. We don’t grasp the meaning abstractly and then subsequently apply it to English. All interpretation is translation and just as becoming intelligible for us is a necessary condition for a successful translation, making it possible for a text to apply to us, to speak to us here and now, is a necessary condition for a successful interpretation.

According to Gadamer, understanding occurs when we not only provide a suitable interpretation, but when that interpretation is a source of insight for our current situation. We make the text not only coherent but also insightful. This conclusion squares with his account of openness: to be open to another or a text is to understand how what is being presented can be true. This conclusion also supports his arguments that we can’t treat texts as historical or cultural artifacts. We can be sure that the fusion of horizons that occurs in a plausible interpretation of a text is a successful interpretation if it is a source of insight about our present situation.

But the inclusion of application in interpretation seems mistaken, and is one place where pragmatism has much to offer hermeneutics. There are a great number of texts and ideas that could be perfectly well understood and could still be seen as wrong. It may be helpful to ask ourselves how something could be true in the process of interpretation, but seeing it as true should not be a criterion for a correct interpretation. Gadamer overstates the requirements of successful interpretation when he says that interpreting “consists in subordinating ourselves to the text’s claim to dominate our minds” (1989, p. 311). Moreover, by focusing on interpretations that speak to us, we run the risk of anachronistic interpretations. We ask, for example, how Aquinas’s views might contribute to debates between internalism and externalism. In doing so, for the sake of generating currently relevant insights, we use anachronistic terminology; the results, insightful as they may be, are not the same as an interpretation of Thomas. In general, reading texts and considering ideas in their context seems at odds with reading them for the sake of generating insights for us. At least we shouldn’t insist that the two would automatically converge, as Gadamer does. Nor should they be forced to converge by granting, in principle, that the text to be interpreted is always true.

Gadamer’s most persuasive exposition of the process of application is his account of understanding as modeled on answering a question. He writes: “we understand only when we understand the question to which something is the answer” (1989, p. 374); we cannot see something as answering a question without engaging the question thereby producing insights. Whether it is how we would answer the question or not, we come to have new insights about the subject matter in question.

This model of question and answer fits nicely with Dewey’s discussion of the process of inquiry. Dewey writes that “we inquire when we seek for whatever will provide an answer to a question” (LW 12:109) and lacks the strong requirement that we must presume the truth of the text from the start. Dewey’s definition of inquiry is “the controlled or direct transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (LW 12:180). Applied to texts, the meaning of the text is unclear; the meaning is “open in the sense that its constituents do not hang together” (LW 12:109). The interpretation is successful if the meanings cohere; that is, if there is a meaningful unity between the parts and the whole.
Dewey’s description of inquiry describes in the most general terms the process of textual interpretation.

The advantage this gives us over Gadamer’s account of application is that it doesn’t require the assumption that the text speaks the truth, so avoids the requirement that the interpreter must find that truth, come what may. Instead, the ability of the text to reveal truths is itself determined through the interpretation. Perhaps what the text says is true, perhaps not. Ultimately this will only be determined after the interpretation, and it will be separate from the interpretation. The interpretation is successful “when it is put into operation so as to institute by means of observations facts not previously observed, and is then used to organize them with other facts into a coherent whole” (LW 12:114); that is, when it continues to be confirmed as more textual evidence arises. In the case of legal interpretation, which is Gadamer’s paradigm for the centrality of application, on the Deweyean approach an interpretation is successful if it is confirmed throughout its successful application. If there is a failure of application, then, it’s not that there was never an understanding, as Gadamer has to hold, but that the understanding needs to be revised in light of new information gained from trying to apply the interpretation. This it seems to me is the correct way to describe the situation and one of the main ways pragmatism can contribute to hermeneutics.

References and further reading


Language, Mind, and Naturalism in Analytic Philosophy

BJØRN T. RAMBERG

W. V. Quine (see Quine), Donald Davidson, and Daniel Dennett, among other analytic and naturalistic philosophers, have explored deep connections between philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. These three philosophers have in particular suggested how a person’s language and psychological attitudes have their identities fixed with the theories generated by an idealized interpreter of that person. They agree that this “interpretivist strategy” can explain how the capacities to entertain attitudes and to communicate linguistically can be natural capacities, capacities we may happily attribute to creatures who fall squarely within the scope of evolutionary biology. This is also pragmatist Richard Rorty’s (see Rorty) principal reason for his endorsement of the interpretivist strategy. The interpretivist strategy permits us, Rorty suggests, to give an account of persons which introduces “no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel stimulation – the hierarchy which has amoebae adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and political revolutions at the top” (1991, p. 109). Rorty’s thought represents a dialectical transformation of naturalism. As he brings naturalism to bear fully on the project of philosophical reflection itself, Rorty finds himself fundamentally changing the requirements we impose upon our thinking whenever we seek to assume a naturalistic philosophical stance toward some subject matter. To appreciate the naturalizing capacity of the interpretivist strategy is to understand how Rorty’s naturalistic critique of philosophy alters the nature of naturalism itself.

Pragmatic Redescription versus Philosophy of Mind

A distinctive feature of the interpretivist strategy as it has been developed after Quine (1960) is that it aims for naturalization without taking the route through nomological or conceptual reduction. Where some see only three alternatives – some form of reduction, outright elimination, or a retreat to dualism – the post-Quinean interpretivist claims to mark out a fourth possibility.

Pragmatists do not want to say that the mental is really something physical or material. Nor, though, do they want to say that, really, it is something non-material
Naturalistic pragmatists are proposing ways to describe ourselves as thinkers and agents that make the philosophical contrast between mind and matter seem to be without any particular ontological point. Perhaps one might signal this sort of attitude by calling oneself a non-reductive physicalist (Rorty 1991, p. 113). My strong suspicion, however, is that it is not very helpful to try to spell out the anti-dualistic commitments of a pragmatized naturalism in terms of its relation to physicalism. “Physicalism” – in all its varieties with their attendant conceptual distinctions – is burdened with the connotations of a dichotomous folk-ontology, one that has been hypostatized in the terms of art of the kind of philosophical vocabulary to which naturalistic pragmatists are busy working up alternatives.

Indeed, our notion of mind and the vocabulary in which it is embedded well illustrates how philosophical analysis and “intuition,” providing mutual support and reinforcement, can entrench a particular set of problems and make them appear mandatory. Unfortunately, though, it could also be taken to bear out the anti-pragmatist point that “mere coherence” is not enough; we need a touchstone against which to test the truth of even the most reflectively equilibrated beliefs. If not a priori reflection, then empirical science may provide just such a touchstone – so long as we believe that science aims to articulate a description of the world warranted by criteria that are demonstrably truth-indicative. Demonstrably truth-indicative criteria, we realize, are ones that normative epistemology will show we have good reason to believe point us toward the way the world is, in the way we have good reason to believe that a compass will point us toward the Magnetic North Pole. If we fail to perceive the conceptual connection between the very idea of justification – or assertoric warrant – and a distinct truth-norm (e.g. Haack 1995, Wright 1992), a connection that allows us to draw a distinction between genuine, objective warrant and mere assertion-games, then we are stuck with parochial coherence as our only measure. The result is a kind of idealism without the innocence, a jaded ironism with no recourse to rational means of settling theoretical (or practical) conflict. A charge against the pragmatic view I defend is precisely that this is just where it leaves us (Haack 1995).

What the pragmatist suggests, however, is that this very construal of inquiry and of warrant and of truth is forced on us by the assumptions embedded in an entrenched vocabulary of mind. This vocabulary leaves much of philosophy preoccupied with conceptual problems the various proposed solutions to which generally float quite free of the practical and theoretical problems that engage us as the twenty-first century gets under way. The pragmatic philosopher treats such conceptual problems as points of leverage for vocabulary shifts. Tracing questions posed in the vocabulary of mind back to the assumptions that make them appear compelling, pragmatic philosophy is self-consciously historicist. This is not, it is important to note, to reduce philosophy to the telling of the history of philosophy. It is to oppose a conception of philosophy that treats the history of the subject as a more or less valuable heuristic aid to reflection. The key historicizing move of the pragmatist is to temporalize meaning, and so to treat content in socio-genetic terms. This move is what makes advancement in philosophical understanding inseparable from the telling and retelling of reconstructive histories of the problems we are trying to understand. The pragmatist will, accordingly, offer genealogies of philosophical problems, genealogies which aim to redescribe our philosophical urges and inclinations in such a way that we can extricate those theoretical
aims we may want to stand by from what has appeared to be mandatory frameworks for their articulation.

Pragmatists hopefully believe that the interpretive strategy plays a crucial role in this effort, because it will allow us to precipitate out a vocabulary of agents and thinkers from the vocabulary structured around that pair of intimate antonyms, “mind” and “matter.” Pragmatists hope that this will, eventually, undercut the governing intuition of reductivist philosophy of mind, the conviction that the kinds we capture with psychological ascriptions just could not in themselves, at least not straightforwardly, be natural states of natural creatures. Pragmatists do not believe that our practice of psychological ascriptions leads us inexorably to the mind–body problem. Rather, they see in “mind” the vestiges of “soul,” and hypothesize that the real problem is actually a deep-rooted attachment to this ancestral notion, explaining why the relation of “mind” to its conceptual counterpart is a central philosophical difficulty. It is this attachment that makes it appear prima facie mysterious how the vocabulary by which we are able to treat some things as agents could capture a way that some natural creatures (and, perhaps, artificial systems) are in the world. What the pragmatist polemic takes aim at, then, is this attachment, this deep-rooted commitment. This, for the pragmatist, is what philosophically motivates the interpretivist strategy.

The pragmatist does not claim to solve the mind–body problem, or to dissolve it. Nor is the problem being diagnosed as illusory, as a product of some form of conceptual confusion, linguistic mistake, or general lack of semantic alertness. The pragmatist takes the mind–body problem to be real, but transient. It is a problem we will come to see as idle once we have developed better ways of conceiving ourselves and our relations to our surroundings, once we have developed, that is, better vocabularies. These vocabularies will be better in the specific sense that they will enable us to treat certain items as agents without sticking us with dichotomous schemes of fundamental ontological kinds, the kind of kinds whose relation one to the other cannot but become immediately problematic. The interpretivist strategy is attractive because it holds out the promise of just this kind of improvement in our conception of the capacities that make us persons.

This chapter offers a version of the interpretivist strategy that will make explicit its intimate connection with a pragmatist conception of rationality and of philosophy. Pragmatism serves interpretivism, insofar as an effective defense of the interpretivist strategy against common objections will appeal to a pragmatic conception of rationality. Interpretivism serves pragmatism, insofar as the strategy becomes, in the context of the conception, a tool for naturalization. On this view, the states with which the interpretivist is concerned – the states we invoke when describing creatures as agents and thinkers – are anchored in our attributive practices of run-of-the-mill interpretation and psychological explanation, and these practices provide the measure of plausibility.

The Interpretive Strategy

Consider the ideal interpreter, called IDA, who is a thoroughly theoretical being, whose essence it is to implement a specified methodology of interpretation. In so doing, IDA is purported to provide a model for a certain kind of ability or competence that we actual
interpreters appear to have. However, the methodology in question has precious little to do with the actual methods of field linguists or translation-manual constructors. The point of this methodology is to make manifest a way to view the sorts of concepts that we apply essentially in descriptions of agents and thinkers. The relation of the methodology of ideal interpretation to the actual capacities of actual interpreters is captured in the following question: Could we, if we possessed the knowledge about some person expressed in IDA’s theory, plausibly be said to understand that person? The issue here is how the interpretivist’s proposed account of the nature and point of psychological attitudes and linguistic meaning, as expressed in the constraints on ideal interpretation, is tested against folk-psychological practice. Insofar as IDA appears capable of coming up in a given case with attributions and ascriptions that harmonize with those of actual interpreters, this provides support for the view of the nature and point of these attributions and ascriptions that the interpretive strategy is devised to make explicit.

The interpretive strategy is intended, then, to tell us something about how we should think about what it is we are doing when we engage in psychological attribution and semantical ascription. It should be noted that on this construal of its theoretical point, IDA’s methodology has no particular normative implications at all, even implicitly, for us actual interpreters, eager, as we ever are, to improve our understanding of our fellows. It may turn out for some characterization of IDA that the conclusions drawn on the basis of the evidence we allow end up diverging from what we should want, intuitively, to say about the subject of the interpretation. In that event, and to that extent, the relevant specification of ideal interpretation would lose its point. It would cease to play a useful role in our attempt to illuminate the vocabulary of thought and action.

IDA will be idealized in several ways, of which the following are among the more conspicuous. For one thing, IDA will be cognitively idealized; IDA’s ability to construct and modify explicit theories in light of evidence, and to assess their relative empirical merit, their adequacy to the evidence, is unencumbered by the contingent characteristics that keep actual theorizers from contemplating in principle available alternatives. Further, the evidential base for IDA’s theorizing is one no actual interpreter could ever rely on. Not only will IDA observe everything subjects of interpretation do, including, of course, the noises they make, and the environing conditions of all this activity; IDA will also have access to the behavioral dispositions of interpreted subjects. That is to say, for purposes of theory-construction IDA is assumed to be able to appeal to the truth-values of counterfactual conditionals of a kind that actual interpreters would have to treat as untested predictions. Finally, IDA is ideal in being without preconceptions, both as to the semantic value of particular vocables, movements, or inscriptions produced by the subjects, and as to the particular details of the subjects’ intentional relations to the world. Davidson follows Quine and characterizes this last idealization – the ignorance-condition, as we may call it – with the adjective “radical.” I think it is useful to emphasize also other dimensions of idealization involved in the construct which embodies the methodology at the core of the interpretivist’s position. Hence my relabeling of what is essentially Davidson’s construct. This last point we might put by saying that IDA has no initial view of the particulars of the pattern of truth-preferences that are distinctive of some arbitrary subject of interpretation. What IDA must have, however, is a view of certain general features of any such pattern.
of preferences; IDA must operate with certain desiderata that any set of attitude-ascriptions should conform to. Otherwise, the idealized observational access to the subject’s behavioral dispositions and their contexts would do no good, because nothing would constrain the inferences IDA may draw from that evidence. There would be nothing in particular that the “evidence” could be counted as evidence for, and so it would not be evidence at all.

The central task for the interpretivist is to make explicit the empirical methodological constraints under which IDA is to deliver her specifications of meanings and attitudes. Specifically, the interpretivist must characterize those general features of truth-preference patterns that allow IDA to see observed events as evidence for particular theories of meaning and belief. This characterization is what displays the view of the vocabulary of thought and action that the interpretivist recommends. It must, on the one hand, serve the naturalizing motivation for the pragmatist’s deployment of the interpretivist strategy, while securing, on the other, convincing results when put to the test by means of IDA. An initial characterization might be: IDA must structure her descriptions of the actual and possible events that serve as evidence in accordance with the pattern of reason. The suggestion here, familiar from the writings of Dennett (1987) and Davidson (1984), is that a subject’s perspective on the world revealed by interpretation inevitably emerges as a rational one. The point of the suggestion is this. What it is to be a belief or other psychological attitude is to be a state in a network of states that allows us to see a significant segment of the behavior of some creature as manifesting a rational orientation to its environment. According to this position, attitude attribution discloses a point of view on the world, the particular nature of which is traced by those ascriptions. By the terms of this point of view, some subset of its occupier’s causal transactions with her environment are seen to serve intelligible purposes. That intelligibility is what gives the attitude-scheme its value – to serve our predictive needs, as Dennett emphasizes, perhaps predictive interests of a particular sort, as Davidson (1991) hints. I will be revisiting the important connection between interest and content ascriptions at several points throughout the paper.

The essence of the interpretivist strategy is the view is that insofar as we are dealing with creatures (or machines, or what have you) as agents, the better theory simply is the one that better rationalizes behavior. Of the many theories that could be made to account for the evidence, the optimal theory for IDA has the subject(s) less beset by irrationalities than do alternative theories. This is to assert an unrepentantly rationalistic version of the methodological constraint on ideal interpretation, one we might therefore label the Rationality Maxim. It will be important to keep in mind, as we assess objections to interpretivism, that RM has what we may call global scope. That is to say, IDA relies on RM to choose between candidates for total theories – or, in anticipation of a later distinction, for total accounts. Just because it constrains theory-choice holistically, RM governs the interpretation of any particular utterance or movement only in an indirect, mediated way. The kind of rationality-judgments we will require IDA to be guided by are going to be overall judgments of the global state of subjects captured or characterized by various candidate theories or accounts.

At any moment or stage of interpretation, RM constrains the simultaneous attribution of the entire gamut of intentional attitudes. The demand imposed by RM is not only a demand for consistency among a subject’s beliefs and attitudes, and for coherence
among the subject’s means of describing the world. Rationalizing a person by RM, IDA will seek to have the subject prefer true the right sentences – that is, just those sentences which, as IDA interprets them, the subject ought to prefer – and to prefer them, moreover, for the right reasons. Aiming for global rationality will not single out a class of attitudes, such as beliefs regarding matters of fact, rather than, say, matters of method or matters of value. There is no fact–value gap nor truth–method gap in ideal interpretation. And since noises are speech only when situated in a general context of agency, having subjects prefer true the right sentences IDA must also have them do the right thing. In short: applying RM, IDA insists, as far as possible, on her subject’s cognitive and moral perfection.

Vocabularies, Agency, and Nature

A natural and frequent objection from the “humanitarian” position is that this way of characterizing the methodology of the interpreter must be wrong, since people patently are not perfectly rational, as this directive to IDA appears to be presupposing. According to the humanitarian, what we demand of a theory assigning psychological states and semantic values is that it captures an agent’s perspective of the world. Since much thought and action is governed by irrational and non-rational influences, a methodology of interpretation that construes us as though we were perfectly rational is less likely to produce the right theories than is one that explicitly takes our common short-comings into account. When we try to articulate some agent’s point of view on the world, generalizations that bear on the nature and formation of that point of view are clearly relevant. They should therefore be built into the methodology of the interpreter, modifying the assumption of rationality.

Indeed people are not perfectly rational. But should this fact be reflected methodologically in our conception of ideal interpretation? The humanitarian seems entitled to the claim that he is offering a version of the interpretive strategy. However, interpretivism cannot depend on a psychologically qualified maxim with a weaker rationality demand than that of RM and still serve to explicate the point and function of our vocabulary of psychological and semantic ascriptions. If we assign IDA a principle weaker than RM, such as Føllesdal proposes (1982), the interpretivist would be unable to offer an account of agency that is at once both non-reductive and naturalistic.

The naturalizing potential of the interpretivist strategy rests in significant part on what Davidson calls “a bland monism.” It is monistic, because it denies the dualist’s thought that there are two ontological kinds: mental and physical. It is bland in a somewhat peculiar sense; it also denies the reductivist or eliminativist thought that there is one ontological kind of a sort to which our various ways of talking may stand in questionable relationship. The pragmatist thus takes the lesson of Davidson’s (1970) argument for anomalous monism to be that we need not worry about the ontological priority of kinds of description, but only about their relative utility for specific purposes. Indeed, the naturalistic pragmatist encourages us to retreat altogether from ontology, advocating a view of language that simply leaves no room for it; the world causes our noises to mean what they do – by way of the complicated patterns of similarity-judgments that we endlessly interacting noise-makers are disposed to
produce. Reference, on this view, comes dirt cheap; a greater or lesser capacity for connecting us with what is really out there will not be what distinguishes one descriptive practice from another. We may, I suppose, still think of philosophical reflection as an attempt to illuminate what there is; but this cannot be construed as a matter of gauging the relative referential success of various descriptive practices. It becomes, rather, a matter of providing characterizations of the interests we have in referring to items of this or that sort. Even commentators with great sympathy for Davidson’s views think Rorty’s retreat from ontology is a retreat from the constraints of the world. Yet Rorty, following Davidson, takes thought to be a natural capacity of some worldly creatures. It is only in a world filled with the kinds of things we generally think and talk about that thinking and talking could emerge as natural coping strategies.

It is with respect to differences of such descriptive interests that we distinguish vocabularies. The concept is ubiquitous in Rorty’s writings. Brandom (2000) is absolutely right to suggest that for Rorty, a principal virtue of the “vocabulary” vocabulary (as Brandom dubs it), is that it provides a way of designating discursive bodies that completely incorporates Quine’s dissolution of any principled distinction between semantical and empirical commitments, as well as Davidson’s attacks on the thought that the idea of a conceptual scheme is a philosophically interesting or fruitful one. What motivates Rorty’s use of the concept of a vocabulary is his thought that it may bring us closer to a philosophical vocabulary within which we may still the ontological urge, the urge that leads us to engage in projects of ontological legitimation. The concept of vocabulary serves this purpose by allowing us to pick out discursive structures in a manner that precludes any attempt to restore an ontologically potent form of the distinction between what we talk about and how we talk about it. I worry that to think of inter-vocabularic relations principally in terms of translation is to think in a way which may place all but the most self-consciously Quinean among us at odds with this purpose. Rorty and Brandom regard a vocabulary as something that is suitable for translation. Certainly there is a sense of “vocabulary” which fits this characterization, for example when we talk contrastingly of the vocabularies of Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein. But I think that even in these cases, the sense of “translation” is derivative from the more basic notion of a vocabulary.

The point of any vocabulary can be explicated only relative to the specific goals, needs, and interests of its users or potential users. As is the case with other kinds of tools, what makes a vocabulary the particular vocabulary it is just is the particular manner in which it serves the needs and interests it serves. However, the relation between vocabularies and their uses differs from the relation between tools and their purposes in an important respect. Just as vocabularies cannot be individuated independently of the interests they serve, so these interests cannot be stated without employing the vocabulary. When we articulate the goals or purposes that give point to a vocabulary, then, we are offering an individuating characterization of that vocabulary, and making such a proposal is not distinct from providing a general description of the kinds of objects to which the vocabulary refers.

When we claim to be characterizing a vocabulary, we thereby claim to be giving a basic account of some set of concepts. That is to say, we claim to be offering reasons for thinking that the interests we invoke, the concepts we analyze, and the manner of the analysis, all are linked in such a way that to use a different kind of concept would thus
be to serve different kinds of interests. Vocabularies are as enduring as interests are, which means that some will be highly transient, and others may be impossible for us to get by without. Like interests, they may be nested, contested, and individuated at cross-purposes. Specifying interests, moreover, is itself an interest-governed enterprise—when we invoke vocabularies in our descriptions of social or intellectual evolution, no perspective is possible that is not laden with normative commitments. Similarly, any philosophical characterization of a vocabulary, staking a claim for the basic nature of some set of concepts, will involve a stipulative element. It will embody a proposal for conceiving of our interests in a certain way, a plea for seeing them that way and for assigning them a certain weight. The notions of interpretation and vocabularies are essentially hermeneutic concepts—vocabularies are never neutrally described, and they are never fully given.

What is distinctive, Davidson proposes, about “accounts of intentional behaviour” is that they “operate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.” (1970, p. 225) Now, this is a claim that the interpretivist strategy is designed to preserve. As a constitutive account of a vocabulary of action, it aims to portray the rules governing the concepts of that vocabulary just so as to ensure the removal from law that Davidson speaks of. The interpretivist strategy does exactly this when it offers us a view of these concepts whereby the very feature that gives them purchase on persons, free agents (as we redundantly say), at the same time renders them unsuitable as predicates of empirical law. A point of portraying concepts as governed holistically by rationality-considerations is to deprive those concepts of the particular kind of stability that empirical theorizing requires of its predicates; to the extent that some putative empirical generalization links psychological concepts in a way that is at odds with the norms governing them, to that extent the content of the generalization itself grows wobbly. This is just the feature of the concepts of the vocabulary that allows us to see ourselves and others as agents. What makes the vocabulary that Davidson aims to characterize the vocabulary it is, is its constitutive relation to agency.

Hence, when Davidson concludes that “[t]here cannot be tight connections between the realms [of the mental and the physical] if each is to retain allegiance to its proper source of evidence” (ibid., p. 222), he is not just expressing a theoretical observation, he is expressing the very point of the rationality-constraint in ideal interpretation. That constraint is the centerpiece in a proposal which purports to make sense of agency by linking it constitutively to concepts that are identified exactly so as to cut across bodies of empirical, nomological generalization. The crucial point here is that this tight connection between particular interests and particular kinds of norms for application of concepts is what allows us to speak of a distinct vocabulary. It is only by virtue of its claim to offer an account of a distinct vocabulary, one incorporating the essential concepts of thought and action, that the interpretivist strategy can hope to provide a basic account of those concepts. This, in turn, is exactly what enables pragmatists to say that there is no further question of what intentional states are than what the interpretive strategy reveals.

We are now in a position to see that the humanitarian version of the interpretivist strategy would obstruct its claim to be offering an account of a distinct vocabulary. On
Føllesdal’s view, holistic theories of persons hermeneutically balance causal psychological hypotheses and rationalizing interpretations in an attempt to account for all the behavioral evidence there is. Now, it is true that the balance has to be tilted toward rationalizations, otherwise, Føllesdal insists, any talk of psychological states loses its point. But within the theory, given the tilt, causal explanations are not subsidiary to, or derived from, or dependent for their meaningfulness on, rationalizing hypotheses in any sense other than that all elements of such a theory depend for their content on each other. This Quinean holistic interdependence does not prioritize any element over another, and so it is equally true that in Føllesdal’s conception, while rationalizing interpretations must dominate the theory, they also depend for their content on the strictly causal explanations the theory invokes. The problem, however, is that the formulation of particular empirical generalizations of the latter sort presupposes that we have a more or less firm, more or less independent grip on the concepts designating the kinds we thus link. But ideal interpretation is supposed to offer an account of what such a grip consists of, with respect to concepts describing thought and action.

If we imagine that we could step back from the characterization of IDA and ask what the items that interpretation reveals really are, then Føllesdal’s humanitarian proposal may tempt us. For then we could imagine that both rationalizing accounts and empirical theorizing are providing us with indications, serving as evidence for the nature of the complex states we are trying to diagnose. But the naturalistic pretensions of the interpretive strategy are based on a refusal to allow a gap for ontology between vocabularies and their denotata. The interpretivist thinks that the only answer to the question of what content-states really are is an account of the vocabulary in which content-states are assigned. Once the question is allowed whether a vocabulary is adequate to the items it invokes, then the interpretivist loses this answer. The alternative is to regard the account of ideal interpretation as constitutive of the concepts applied, and hold that there is nothing more to be said about the relation between the nature of the members of the extensions of those concepts and the concepts themselves than what IDA tells us. If, however, we then go on to accept that IDA may invoke empirical, non-rationalizing generalizations in support of her theory-choice, we are giving up on our aspirations to offer, by way of IDA, a basic account. For now we abandon the idea that the vocabulary of action is distinct from the vocabulary (or vocabularies) of empirical law. And nobody could be misled into thinking that the interests embodied in a vocabulary of nomological generalization could be characterized by offering a methodology of ideal interpretation. In this case, the interpretivist strategy would not have succeeded in characterizing the vocabulary of agency and thought after all – it would characterize what I called above a pseudo-vocabulary. Once that is made apparent, the question of what thought and action might be looms once more, to be answered, perhaps, in terms shaped by the interests that find expression in the pursuit of particular kinds of empirical theory.

To serve the pragmatist, the interpretive strategy must deliver a constitutive description of the concepts of action and thought. This means that we must not build into our account of the nature of these concepts and the interest they serve a reliance on generalizations that depend, as empirical generalizations do, on the availability in principle of a prior identification of the kind of states we are trying to characterize. If these considerations are sound, we have a conditional result: if the interpretivist...
strategy is to have a hope of meeting both its non-reductive aspirations as well as its naturalistic ones, it is going to have to be on the basis of RM.

The Mind, Psychology, and Nature

Even if humanitarian objections can be met or deflected, there is another major challenge to the interpretivist strategy. How can an unabashed appeal to “the norms of reason” of the sort issued by way of RM to our ideal interpreter sustain any serious naturalistic ambition? To answer this challenge, I will first elaborate the pragmatic nature of the conception of reason that informs the interpretive strategy; and second, discuss a pragmatic conception of what naturalization demands. The anti-reductivism of the interpretive strategy is incompatible with naturalism only on certain metaphysical assumptions. These assumptions are directly challenged by pragmatism. For the pragmatist, irreducibility emerges not as a reflection of a metaphysical gap, but as an ontologically innocuous reflection of the divergent human interests that vocabularies serve. What needs naturalizing, I suggest, is not this or that descriptive practice, but philosophy.

What is really at stake here, what interpretativism puts under great strain, is the possibility of the reification of mental content. On the contextualist model of ideal interpretation that I propose, the interpreter does not eliminate anomaly in behavior. Rather the interpreter produces a set of devices, alternative theories, which allows us selectively to displace anomaly, deviance from norms of reason, and thus insulate behaviors or behavior-patterns on which we may want for particular purposes to focus. The prevalence of conflict within the evidential base constituted by the actual behavior of any entity of sufficient behavioral complexity to count as a person is universal. In the crucible of RM, such conflict forces upon IDA the strategy of interpreting differently circumscribed subdivisions of subjects, on pain of the dissipation of thought in a fog of indeterminacy. A consequence of this is that the patterns of reason traced by interpretation become multiply ambiguous. Reasonably determinate thought emerges only when an agent is interpreted as an agent of some kind, that is, in some context, for some purpose. Hence, ideal interpretation settles content only relative to contexts specified in terms of some subset of the various purposes, aims and interests we may have in approaching a subject as an agent.

We can come to regard causal explanations as drawing their content from the application of RM, and see how prima facie conflicts between RM and causal explanations disappear when we distinguish between normative principles for actual interpreters and the vocabulary-constitutive principles of ideal interpretation. We explain and predict what persons do by rationalizing their behavior, because it is only as rationalized that they act at all. This very commitment dissolves the notion of mental content into a process of alternative and alternating rationalizing descriptions, each representing some purpose-relative perspective on a person, a locus of agency. From the perspective of the pragmatist, campaigning for naturalization of our conception of persons by overcoming the metaphor of inner space and the reifications associated with the concept of mind, this should be a happy thought. Predicates designating mental states characterize aspects of agents in contexts of interaction with others in a shared world.
Interpretivists are routinely chastised for refusing to come clean about what exactly it is they attribute to us all when they make rationality a condition of having mental states. This, we can now see, is because there is on their view nothing, a priori, to come clean about, except that to be rational is a very, very good and important thing to be. Interpretivists are staunchly anti-reductivist with regard to the notion of rationality that IDA implements; when we empirically investigate human cognitive capacities and strategies, we might discover all kinds of interesting tendencies and results – but there is no fixable, explicable notion of rationality against which we can measure such findings and draw conclusions about the degree and distribution of rationality of human beings as a kind. Indeed, there is nothing in the pragmatist’s interpretive strategy that suggests we could not come to adjust our assessments of rationality as a result of empirical study of our cognitive capacities.

We must reject the interpretation of the interpretive strategy that sees it as an a priori philosophical argument to a substantive conclusion about the quality or value of our cognitive procedures. What underwrites the connection between rationality and psychological attitudes is itself a species of naturalism; our conception of what we ought to be doing in the way of reasoning leads us, as Dennett once put it, “eventually to a consideration of what we in fact do” (1987, p. 98). It must be emphasized, however, that such considerations of our actual practices afford us no basis for a reductive account of rationality. Any gloss – or analysis – of “rationality” represents some particular application of our cognitive practices to themselves. Whatever normative force such a particular application has, inevitably derives from attachments to aspects of our actual cognitive practices. These attachments, in turn, can be rooted nowhere but in experience, in the interaction of our creature need and interest with the environment in which we function. Perhaps one day it will be unnecessary to add that this does not mean that these practices cannot be meaningfully criticized or reformed – it implies only that they cannot be assessed wholesale, by some standard not of our own experiential devising.

Interpretivists are not concerned to explain away the findings of cognitive psychology. How prone we are, as a kind, to making various sorts of cognitive mistakes is certainly an empirical question, as is the extent of our ability to learn to overcome such tendencies, or to compensate for them. So, too, are the extent and the causes of variation in these regards amongst members of our kind. With respect to these empirical issues, the interpretivist construes rationality as a second-order category; particular kinds of error of reasoning do not by themselves indicate any particular degree of global irrationality. The global rationality-judgments of IDA express a view not only of the relation between psychological states and processes, but also of the relation between these and the constraints and needs and interests that provide the context in which these states are formed and in which such processes operate. Such global rationality-judgments are the ones on which IDA is instructed to rely when evaluating her candidate theories and accounts. And such judgments are simply not settled by the specific patterns of error that research psychologists reveal. There is, then, no conflict between the project of empirical investigation of particular cognitive mechanisms and the commitment of the interpretivist strategy to RM. Indeed, the interpretivist would claim, what gives us a firm grip on the patterns of error diagnosed by the psychologist, what gives us confidence in the identifications of the intentional states.
on which the formulation of any such diagnosis relies, is precisely their compatibility with RM as a globally regulative principle. The patterns of error traced by empirical cognitive psychology owe what sharpness they have to the possibility that just such errors may, from the global perspective of IDA, be good errors to make for creatures like us. Nothing that empirical cognitive psychology could uncover would, unaided by metaphysical commitment, be capable of damaging this claim.

Action-explanations may turn on non-rationalizing generalizations subsuming the kind of intentional states that we suppose to have caused the action. Neither from this, however, nor from the viability of empirical tracking of cognitive error-patterns, does it follow that we can empirically determine the extent to which we as a psychological kind are or fail to be globally rational in the sense required for the application of RM. The latter possibility is what the interpretivist must reject, as a possibility that is ruled out by the strong constraint expressed by RM. This rejection issues from the interpretivist’s conception of the rationality-judgments on which we make ideal interpretation turn. Such judgments are, to condense the matter, expressions of a dynamic, evolving cognitive meta-practice of idealizing projection of what we actually find ourselves to be doing in the way of thinking and desiring.

Conceiving of reason as the pragmatic naturalist does, any characterization of rationality or of warrant sufficiently abstract to appear philosophical will, by virtue of this fact, be normatively impotent. It will not tell us how to acquire fewer false beliefs, or desire better things, or act more wisely.

There are theorists who have taken to heart the Quinean view that the way to bring about the naturalization of some domain is to bring it under the scope of natural science. They highlight the worry that interpretivism cannot satisfy the demands of naturalism. They claim that since the interpretive strategy renders the vocabulary of thought and agency in terms irreducible to predicates that will allow a nomic account of human behavior, it must be rejected. From this perspective, if you agree with the interpretivist that the strategy illuminates the concepts of folk-psychological practice, then this simply shows that folk-psychological states are not to be taken seriously. If, by contrast, it is your credo that these states are to be taken seriously, then, from the same perspective, it follows that the interpretivist must be simply wrong about the concepts of folk psychology. In either case, you are taking it that the ontological fate of the reifications of folk psychology is separable from questions of what we as actual interpreters achieve by employing them and why we want to achieve those things – you are taking it that there is a substantive ontological fact here to be settled, one way or the other, by the success or failure of reductive proposals. On this perspective, the significance we ought to afford the vocabulary of agency – its “ontological status” – is a function of our ability to link it up with a vocabulary of science. It could in principle be that in spite of its utility this vocabulary is actually ontologically inadequate. It could come to stand revealed, by philosophy, as invalid.

For the pragmatic naturalist, the argument runs in the other direction: the irrelevance of the prospects of reduction to the run-of-the-mill purposes and interests served by our vocabulary of agency suggests that the naturalization of this vocabulary has little to do with the supposed philosophical validity that reduction is alleged to provide. Consider the kind of dissatisfaction that Dennett’s version of interpretivism often provokes. Reading Dennett, we quickly form the impression that to have beliefs and
desires is to be predictable from the intentional stance. Impressed with Dennett’s explicit disavowal of any principled philosophical distinction between frog-psychological states and human-psychological states, one might think that folk-psychology is simply a place-holder for a more enlightened, empirically adequate conceptualization. Certainly Dennett has flirted with this view. And even when he explicitly retreats from it, his critics often try to pin him to it. The intentional stance seems to Dennett’s critics to make at once both too much and too little of the attitudes.

The sheer, contingent fact of predictive success just seems too feeble a basis for a claim to realism of any sort; it is a fact that cries out for explanation, and it is here, among the terms of possible explanation, the ontological action is. Such explanation might provide terms for a grounded realism toward the attitudes, or it might display the ontological shabbiness of the vocabulary of folk psychology. But Dennett’s strategy claims for itself the right to endorse the attitudes while insulating them from the success or failure of this kind of explanatory descent. For Dennett, it is enough that folk-psychological explanation works, that it gets us what we want. For his critics, this is irresponsible: while folk psychology may be here to stay, as long as this is just because no better means of prediction actually happens to come along, this is not ontologically reassuring. The thought that if we were to develop better predictive schemes then that would spell the end of folk psychology, that thought seems just too irrealistic – instrumentalistic as the charge typically has it – to be the sort of thought we want to have about our beliefs and desires. What makes Dennett’s views so unsatisfactory to such readers is that he simply dismisses the thought that realists and eliminativists alike so clearly intuit: that the ontological status of the attitudes must depend on the fate of attempts to characterize them by means of the predicates of an account that actually explains, in other terms, the predictive success folk psychology appears to provide for its user-group.

What we folk (psychologists) care about, typically, is not how people move various parts of their bodies, but what it is that we do by so moving them. And, again typically, whatever predicates we settle on in our descriptions of bodily movements, these are predicates agents can satisfy by moving their bodies in slightly, perhaps very, different ways. Such differences we generally want the predicates of our folk-psychological vocabulary to be insensitive to. What makes different movements instances of the same type of action, are the interests that give applicability to the predicates explicated by ideal interpretation. In all cases, some interest(s) will give point to our typology, and in all cases, “multiple realizability” of kinds of behavior in physical movement would seem to prevail. There are no such things as brute psychological regularities because there are no such things as brute bits of behavior. The point isn’t merely that we only care to predict when we have some motive, or that some of the things people do matter more to us than others – though this is undoubtedly so. The point rather is that we cannot predict, indeed that there is nothing to predict, except insofar as we care about some things rather than others, insofar, that is, as we have predictive interests of one kind or another. Psychological explanation and prediction is, necessarily, of behaviour of this or that kind, and the kinds here refer us ineluctably back to need and interest.

Dennett (1991) reveals his pragmatist stripes when he defends the integrity of folk psychology precisely by arguing the irreducibility of the types of this vocabulary to the
predicates of some other vocabulary. Asserting the reality of the patterns we trace with intentional-state ascriptions, Dennett does not so much retreat from instrumentalism as take the edge off it by arguing that no other instrument will do for these purposes. He denies, by implication, that the predictive aims of folk psychology are specifiable in terms that transcend the vocabulary, and against which it could, as a strategy, come up short. Once we follow Rorty and bring the individuation of the very items of prediction under the scope of the vocabulary-constituting interests, instrumentalism ceases to be the thin end of the eliminativist wedge.

The identification of actions is not only interest-dependent in a general way; the nature of these interests is such as to make the identity of intentional states (and thus actions) dependent on actual contexts of interaction. There is no fixing the elements of the subjective perspective of an agent on the world as such. To see an item as an agent, then, is not only to see the item as autonomous with respect to the categories of empirical law. It is also to see that item as possessing a nature beyond what any determinate attribution of thought will make explicit; where agents are concerned there is, to paraphrase Heidegger, always more being than theory. I suggest that this is a constitutive feature of the vocabulary of agency – i.e., a part of what it is to consider some item as an agent. This precludes the possibility that any vocabulary of empirical theory could ever do the job for which we rely on the ascription of intentional states.

**Pragmatism and Science**

Reduction, says the pragmatist, is a meta-tool of science; a way of systematically extending the domain of some set of tools for handling the explanatory tasks that scientists confront. Naturalization, by contrast, is a goal of philosophy; it is the elimination of metaphysical gaps between the characteristic features by which we deal with agents and thinkers, on the one side, and the characteristic features by reference to which we empirically generalize over the causal relations between objects and events, on the other. It is only in the context of a certain metaphysics that the scientific tool becomes a philosophical one, an instrument of legislative ontology. This is the metaphysics of scientism. It treats the gap as a datum, and it takes natural science (or some subset of it) to be the philosophically fundamental account of what kinds of items we may, in a respectable voice, say that there are in the world. Identifying the natural with the science-side of the gap and the unnatural with the psychological side, scientistic philosophers set out to either redeem or reject the latter in terms of the former. Given their assumptions, this is what naturalism demands.

The pragmatic naturalist, by contrast, treats the gap itself, that which transforms reduction into a philosophical project, as a symptom of dysfunction in our philosophical vocabulary. Pragmatic naturalism does not aim at conceptual reduction, but at a transformation of those conceptual structures we rely on to sustain our sense of a metaphysical gap between those items we catch in our vocabulary of thought and agency, and those items we describe in our vocabularies of causal regularities. By this characterization, McDowell is a pragmatic naturalist. It is a central lesson of his *Mind and World* that if we are to “reconcile reason and nature” (1994, p. 86), we must
exactly challenge those ways of thinking that make it appear as if reconciliation must take the form of reduction. The differences between McDowell’s metaphilosophical stance and Rorty’s are smaller than McDowell’s appropriation of Kant might suggest. McDowell takes a much more optimistic view than does Rorty about how much of the vocabulary of modern philosophy can (and should) be successfully reformed through a naturalistic transformation of the vocabulary of mind; their therapeutic aims, however, are shared. In the context of this metaphilosophical project, the interpretive strategy as wielded by Dennett and endorsed by Rorty emerges as a naturalizing one. It is not merely non-reductive, it is anti-reductionist; it seeks to free us from those philosophical perceptions that transform reductive enterprises into tests for ontological legitimacy.

We may get a clearer sense of the philosophical context in which interpretivism functions by considering the following provocative remark of Davidson’s: “I can imagine a science concerned with people and purged of ‘folk psychology’, but I cannot think in what its interest would consist” (1987, p. 447). This stands in striking contrast to the sentiments of scientistic philosophers. Is Davidson suggesting that a cognitive science as conceived by Paul and Patricia Churchland – or, for that matter, by Dennett – is inherently without interest? that it could be of no value? This would be an absurd view to take, and thus an absurd attribution. The point of the remark is not that this would be an uninteresting science, but that such a science, however interesting, would not illuminate the philosophical issues that Davidson takes himself to be addressing; it answers to different interests. It would be wrong to think Davidson means merely that such a science would not be relevant to his particular concerns, however. His remark surely is intended normatively, expressing a conception of what philosophical concerns are, of what the interests are that philosophical reflection should be responsive to.

What conception might lie behind the thought that a science of behavior “purged of ‘folk psychology’ ” is philosophically irrelevant? It is a conception that ties philosophy to an interest in practice. The conception, however, is not simply a matter of being responsive to the demand that theory must be made relevant to our practical concerns. The relation is constitutive, not regulative. One aspect of the philosophical context that gives point to the interpretivist strategy is the claim that behavior emerges as purposive behavior only in the vocabulary of folk psychology; it is only by the terms of this vocabulary that (some) events emerge as instances of motivated action. The constitutive point of the vocabulary is to show up agency. The vocabulary will be structured around concepts that insulate the members of their extensions from strict nomic generalizations. A second aspect is the point that the vocabulary yields determinate characterizations of agency only as it unfolds: no room is left for the idea of action as a manifestation of an underlying subjectivity. A third aspect is this. For the pragmatist, as we have seen, attempts to reflect upon what there is are not distinct from reflection upon the nature of our vocabularies. Because we illuminate our vocabularies by giving explicit expression to the interests we take them to serve, philosophy itself, even at its most abstract, becomes wedded to the vocabulary of action. Any attempt to reflect upon the nature of things of some kind brings us to the question why we (should) care about that kind of thing, and this question will immediately throw us back into the vocabulary of agency.
This makes it evident why a science of human behavior that gives up “the vocabulary of folk psychology” would be philosophically uninteresting. This should not, clearly, be taken to mean that there are not difficult questions philosophers may ask about what we do when we do science – science of human behavior and other topics – nor that individual sciences cannot pose their own peculiar philosophical questions, nor that philosophers may not contribute fruitfully to the reductive enterprises of science. But for anyone who conceives of philosophy as having an ineliminable practical interest – for anyone who thinks that our attempts as philosophers to reflect on what there is and how things are inexorably refer us back to a context which also involves questions of what we should value and what we should strive to become – to leave behind the vocabulary of agency is not finally to find a way to solve (or dissolve) philosophical questions about creatures with psyche. Rather, what we will then have found is a way to sever any tie between our topic and human praxis. For pragmatists, it is by their relation to human practice that philosophical questions take such content and point as they have.

Pragmatism and the Naturalization of Philosophy

I have proposed a view of philosophy and of naturalism that emphasizes the distinctiveness of the vocabulary of intentional states, of agency, and which ties philosophy as an enterprise to that distinctiveness. The interpretivist strategy naturalizes precisely insofar as it frees us from worries about the “ontological status” of the kinds that constitute the denotata of our various ways of describing things. By resisting the scientific urge that informs both realism and eliminativism, the pragmatic naturalist insists that questions of what sort of predictive vocabulary to apply when, and to what – or whom – are questions that by their nature will not be contained within the scope of theoretical criteria of theory-choice. As questions of vocabulary choice, such questions resist methodological resolution. Neither mounting scientific knowledge nor the increasingly sophisticated theoretical super-structure of methodology raised upon it by philosophy of science will, all by itself, tell us under what aspects we should care about things.

What pragmatic naturalists with one hand take away from philosophy – the idea of ontology (whether as metaphysics or natural science) as a substantive inquiry into the legitimacy of vocabularies – they return with the other. We are left with a conception of philosophy as aiding our practical and ethical deliberations, our experimentations, by imaginatively providing alternatives to what begins to look like conceptual hang-ups and fixed ideas (“intuitions”), and depicting altered self-conceptions for us to try out. The job of a philosopher is to make vivid how our practices might change if we were to describe things – particularly human beings – in altered vocabularies, or if we extend particular vocabularies into new domains. This intellectual practice is not so much a pursuit of truth as it is a pursuit of alternative perspectives on the relevance to each other of various ways of making truth-claims. It is exemplified by the pragmatic naturalist’s promotion of the interpretive strategy.

The interpretivist strategy undermines the reification of mental content and of subjecthood. It also frees the notion of reason from the transcendental aspirations in
which it has been embedded and makes a notion of reason available for a pragmatized
conception of philosophy. These consequences follow from a characterization of a vo-
cabulary of reflection that aims to extricate our notion of agency and personhood from
the dualistic, dichotomizing elements in the conception of subject and object that have
come to be dominant in the modern stage of the narrative that Plato launched. These
elements are what condition the opposition between reason and contingent creaturely
need, and they are what makes “ontology” – the reductive reconnection of metaphys-
ically ranked vocabularies – appear both as a domain of substantive inquiry and as a
pressing task. Some elements of the subject–object dichotomy are, to our detriment,
still powerfully entrenched in our common vocabulary of the mental. They are no less
active in the tough-minded resolve of contemporary physicalism than in the species-
aggrandizing conceits of the early dualists of the modern era. Although they are still
shaping conceptions of philosophical problems and of the tasks of philosophy, these
elements are not presuppositions of philosophical reflection. In seeking to replace them,
the pragmatist is engaging in the distinctively philosophical project of providing a
reasoned view of better ways of being human.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank John Shook, whose careful, sympathetic editing has greatly improved this
contribution. Indeed, without his extraordinary patience, flexible persistence, and kind encour-
agement, it would not have appeared in this volume at all.

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One of the distinctive features of pragmatism is its “double-barreled” emphasis on experience, which includes not only the so-called subjective experience of a living organism but also the objective world that is experienced by it (William James [see James] quoted in Dewey LW 1:18). What if, however, hierarchy, oppression, and privilege shape the double-barreled experience of human beings? While John Dewey (see Dewey) once noted that the introduction of women into academic philosophy had the potential radically to transform it (MW 11:45; ED 1:73), many classical American philosophers neglected the impact of gender and sexism, and race and racism, on lived experience. On the one hand, this neglect is ironic and yet, on the other, it can be seen as a fitting illustration of classical pragmatism’s own claims. Given pragmatism’s insistence that all experience is shaped by a selective interest that picks out some features of the world while overlooking others, one could say that white male pragmatists were theoretically equipped, but often practically unable, to recognize the various ways that gender, race, and other salient features of human experience shaped the transactions of organism and environment.

In this respect, pragmatist feminism perhaps lives up to pragmatism’s emphasis on the dynamic relationship between theory and practice better than does pragmatism itself. The situation of oppressed groups, such as women, cannot be adequately accounted for merely with a pragmatist critique of the hierarchy of theory over practice (Seigfried 1996, p. 150). By bringing feminist insights to pragmatism, pragmatist feminism helps develop the radical potential of American philosophy that was not always fully recognized by its founders. From the pragmatist side of their heritage, pragmatist feminists gain rich metaphysical, epistemological, and other resources to support their emphasis upon experience, their appreciation of context and environment, their pursuit of plurality and community, their connections between theory and practice, and their rejection of a neutral, “God’s-eye” point of view. From feminism, they gain focus on the relevance of gender, race, and sexuality to people’s environments, communities, practices, and other areas of lived experience. In particular, feminist theory helps pragmatism realize that its emphasis upon democratic inclusiveness itself is the product of a situated, historical perspective, and thus that, like all perspectives, it too (as does pragmatist feminism) has hidden assumptions and potentially exclusive effects that are difficult for it to recognize without the assistance of other perspectives.
Feminist philosophy in the United States customarily is divided into two, and possibly
three, “waves.” The first wave of feminism took place in the latter half of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Focusing on women’s suffrage, the first wave effectively
ended when women obtained the vote in 1920. The second wave of feminism had its
roots in the civil rights movements of the 1960s and attempted to give women greater
control over their reproductive lives by legalizing abortion, making birth control easily
available, and criminalizing marital rape. In the last twenty years, feminism has paid
increasing attention to the differences between women, analyzing the way that class,
race, sexuality, nationality, and other aspects of lived experience impact on women’s
lives. Whether this development constitutes a third wave of feminism or is an exten-
sion of second-wave feminism is a subject of much debate. In any case, like feminist
philosophy at large, pragmatist feminism can be divided into different “waves”: the
first wave of women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that impacted
on and interacted with male American philosophers, and the second wave of contem-
porary women and men who critically take up pragmatism to address feminist issues.

Classical Intersections of Pragmatism and Feminism

Of all the women who made distinctive contributions to the formation of classical
American philosophy, Jane Addams (see Addams) arguably is the most important.
Founder of Chicago’s Hull-House settlement with Ellen Gates Starr in 1889 and
winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for a lifetime of pacifist work in 1931, Addams was
responsible for the conception of democracy as not just a political system, but as a way
of life, which became a centerpiece of Dewey’s pragmatism (Seigfried 2002, p. xi). For
Addams and Dewey, inclusivity in election and voting procedures was not sufficient to
create a democratic community. Democracy depends on an expansive consideration
and appreciation of the diverse experiences of all people in their everyday transactions
with one another.

Addams developed her ideas about democracy and community out of her experience
working with Irish, Italian, Greek, Polish, Jewish, and other European immigrants
to the United States. Established in the midst of these ghettoized communities, Hull-
House demonstrated that ethics is a social enterprise that involves “mixing on the
thronged and common road where all must turn out for one another, and at least see
the size of one another’s burdens” (Addams 2002, p. 7). Addams firmly believed that
different classes and races of people were dependent upon each other. The problem in
Chicago and much of the United States, however, was that their reciprocal depend-
ence and need often was denied or misunderstood. The goal of Hull-House thus was
to increase reciprocity between new immigrants and Chicago’s white middle class, as
well as between the different immigrant groups themselves. Ending the isolation and
segregation of these various groups would help them to expand their sense of ethical
obligation and enrich their lives with social aims that take them beyond the narrow
interests of their own class or ethnic group.

An important feature of Addams’s social ethics is that it not only values the experi-
ences and perspectives of diverse peoples, it also obliges us to pay attention to how
we choose our experiences. This obligation is not an implicit claim that a person can
control every aspect of her life; certainly there are experiences that one is thrust into without any choice. Choice nevertheless can sometimes be exercised. The claim that a person can never choose her experiences is a dishonest attempt to maintain a narrow way of life that disregards the perspectives of others. As Addams argues, “if we grow contemptuous of our fellows, and consciously limit our intercourse to certain people whom we have previously decided to respect, we not only tremendously circumscribe our range of life, but limit the scope of our ethics” (2002, p. 8).

Addams is at her best when she shows the perplexities that thoughtful upper-class charity workers encounter when they attempt to help the working-class poor. The charity worker arrives with bourgeois ideals that associate financial success with hard work and poverty with idleness, but soon is puzzled by the applicability of those ideals when she sees how hard the impoverished washerwomen that she visits are working. This perplexity is the sign of the charity worker’s broadening ethical sensibilities and demonstrates to Addams her growing awareness that the lived experiences and moral standards of the upper class as well as the working class must be taken into consideration when determining what is best in any particular situation. It also is a sign of her growing awareness of the reciprocity of the two classes and the hypocrisy of the upper class that wants to ignore it. Stepping into the home of a washerwoman that is strewn with the dirty laundry she has taken in for pay, the delicately dressed and impeccably clean charity worker begins to realize that her cleanliness and social standing is dependent upon washerwomen who better exemplify the ideal of hard work than do most charity workers (ibid., pp. 12–13).

Addams’s work becomes problematic, however, when it turns to the issue of what the different classes have to offer in their reciprocal relationship with each other. Like many others at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, Addams implicitly posited a racial hierarchy that opposed (allegedly) civilized and sophisticated white people to (allegedly) primitive and savage non-white people, including the Irish, Italian, Greek, Polish, Jewish neighbors of Hull-House, who did not count as white at the turn of the century. Addams thought that “primitive” people still possessed a wild, life-giving energy that civilization had tamed out of white people. They thus can provide the white upper class with “something of that revivifying and upspringing of culture from our contact with groups who come to us from foreign countries, and that we can get it in no other way” (1930, p. 410). In turn, the white upper class can provide “as much as possible of social energy and the accumulations of civilization to those portions of the [human] race which have little” (1893, p. 2). Addams’s valuable emphasis upon reciprocity thus includes a racial hierarchy that tends to undercut the democratic thrust of her work. While non-white people were indeed included in Addams’s ideal of community, their inclusion as primitives in need of civilization perpetuates racist stereotypes and values the lives of non-white people from the narrow interests of the white upper class only.

Contemporary Intersections of Pragmatism and Feminism

The birth of contemporary pragmatist feminism, at least in its explicit and published form, occurred with Charlene Haddock Seigfried’s (1985) criticism of Simone de
Beauvoir from the perspective of Jamesian “pragmatic radical empiricism.” This essay was followed by a handful of articles connecting pragmatism with feminism (Heldke 1987; Mahowald 1987; Seigfried 1987, 1989; Radin 1990), and then a 1991 issue of *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* devoted much of its space to pragmatist feminism. The young field fully secured a place on the philosophical map when Seigfried edited a special issue of *Hypatia* on pragmatism and feminism in 1993 and published her monograph *Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric* in 1996. *Pragmatism and Feminism* broke new ground by reclaiming as pragmatist feminists women philosophers such as Elsie Ridley Clapp, Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Ella Flagg Young, and the better known Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and by exploring some of the benefits and tensions produced by bringing contemporary feminist theory together with American philosophy, particularly on the topics of science, experience, and ethics. In the years since the publication of Seigfried’s book, a wide array of essays on, or from the perspective of, pragmatist feminism have appeared, as well as three book-length explorations of pragmatist feminism. The first of these books has argued for an intellectual continuum that begins with William James and proceeds up to the recent work of postmodern feminist Judith Butler (Livingston 2001); the second is a process model of utopia that envisions a dynamic future formed by critical intelligence (McKenna 2001); and the third connects pragmatist feminism to Continental philosophy on the topic of the body (Sullivan 2001).

Given the amount of attention paid to science by classical pragmatism, it is not surprising that two of the prominent themes in contemporary pragmatist feminism are the related topics of epistemology and science. Drawing on John Dewey and feminists such as Evelyn Fox Keller and Sandra Harding, for example, Lisa Heldke has developed a “Coresponsible Option” in feminist epistemology that avoids the pitfalls of both absolutism and relativism (Heldke 1987, 1988). Absolutism holds that there are acontextual grounds for knowledge, found, for example, in the “facts” of a real world independent of human knowers. Relativism, on the other hand, claims that there are no grounds for knowledge at all and thus no way to adjudicate different claims about morality or truth. Rejecting both absolutism and relativism, the coresponsible option locates the grounds for knowledge in communal processes of inquiry. These epistemological grounds are historical and contextual (unlike absolutism), but not arbitrary (unlike relativism). Or, better put: precisely because they are historical, contextual, and thus provisional, they are not arbitrary for they are formed in response to and must answer the needs of the participants in inquiry, including those such as women who often are excluded. The coresponsible option thus attempts both to satisfy the need for epistemological standards by which to judge right and wrong and to relate those standards to everyday practices of knowing rather than knowledge for knowledge’s sake alone.

As the term “coresponsible” suggests, knowledge involves responsibility. According to Heldke, a communal process of inquiry is “an activity that takes place between two ‘things’ that have responsibilities to each other, obligations to treat each other with respect and care” (1987, p. 129; emphasis in original). Absolutism is wrong in its belief that a fixed, static world stands apart from me, waiting to be known but untouched by my knowing of it. Like the plant that alters the world as it takes in sun, water, and nutrients from the soil, human beings modify the world through their
epistemological and other transactions with it. This does not mean that “anything goes” or that human beings can fashion the world totally at their will. It does mean, however, that knowers should take responsibility for how and what they know. “Whether we acknowledge it or not, we enter into relationships when we engage in inquiry,” relationships with other knowers and with the “objects” that we come to know (Heldke 1988, p. 17). Whether the world is seen as a mere tool for our use or as a partner in inquiry deserving of respect depends in large part on the responsibility we take in our relationships with it.

Heldke’s coresponsible option in epistemology is closely connected to her redefinition of objectivity as responsibility. If the world is not a ready-made given that presents itself to us, then objectivity cannot be attained by providing a “neutral” description of the world, allegedly free from all subjective or individual perspective. Instead, Heldke argues, objectivity is found in acknowledging, fulfilling, and then expanding responsibility in the process of communal inquiry. Objectivity is found in increasing degrees as one first merely recognizes and accepts that relationships with other knowers and the world are central to the process of knowing. The next step is to fulfill one’s responsibilities in those relationships. This does not mean that every demand made by others must be met on its own terms, but one cannot merely dismiss another’s needs without being accountable for that dismissal. Finally, objectivity is at its maximum when one expands the network of responsibilities one is involved in. This aspect of Heldkean objectivity complements Jane Addams’s demand that we expand our ethical sensibilities by enlarging the range of experiences to which we are exposed. Seeking out additional people and situations to be responsible to and for, especially those who historically have been oppressed and overlooked, we become more objective as we increase our moral obligations (Heldke and Kellert 1995, pp. 367–9; see also Seigfried 1996, pp. 152–3, 178).

In addition to Keller and Harding, Heldke names Donna Haraway as one of the influences on her concept of objectivity as responsibility. This influence is easily recognized as feminist, but the pragmatist dimensions of Haraway’s work often are overlooked. As Haraway (1997, p. 297n21) explains, the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead has been important to her thinking since at least her days as a graduate student. Much of Haraway’s work thus can be read as a pragmatist feminist response to the practices and obsessions of Western science and technology.

Whitehead’s influence, and thus Haraway’s distinctively pragmatist feminism, is most apparent in her recent critique of the fetishism of technoscience. Fetishism occurs when one mistakes “a fixed thing for the doings of power-differentiated lively beings” (Haraway 1997, p. 135). In Whitehead’s terms, technoscience is guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. This error occurs when abstract logical constructions, such as the notion of a thing’s primary qualities or of its simple location in space–time, are (mis)taken for the concreteness of processual, actual entities. Western scientific practices tend to treat the objects of their inquiry as static and given, concealing and obscuring social relations such that they can be taken as decontextualized things-in-themselves. In Heldke’s terms, science’s fetishism thus prevents it from being objective since it does not acknowledge (much less fulfill or expand) its responsibilities in the context of inquiry.
Along with genes, fetuses, and OncoMouse™ (a mouse implanted with human genes for breast cancer and patented by DuPont for sale to cancer researchers), Haraway demonstrates how technoscientific fetishism occurs in the case of the computer chip, an incredibly valuable and necessary component of late capitalist, technological society. Locating the chip’s value in pieces of metal and plastic and electronic codes, we lose sight of the historical and labor processes that produce and sustain the computer’s existence. A product of World War II, the computer was developed to help calculate artillery trajectories so that bombs would be more effective (read: destroy more property and kill more people). Today, computer chips and mother boards often are produced by Asian women in the US and various third world countries, who are seen as especially appropriate for such jobs because of their “Oriental” nimble finger work and attentiveness to small details (Haraway 1991, pp. 154, 177). When we fetishize the chip, we are incapable of seeing this “final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war” (1991, p. 154). That is to say, we render ourselves incapable of understanding how the materials, processes, and concerns of a highly militarized, technoscientific culture shape the world and our very selves. And without this understanding, we cannot be objective (in the Heldkean sense) about computer chips because we are unable to be responsible to the exploited women who produce them and responsible for the network of complex relationships that bind us to them.

Conclusion

There is much more to pragmatist feminism than this short chapter can reveal. Contemporary pragmatist feminists are continuing the work of both reclaiming “lost” foremothers, such as Mary Whiton Calkins (McDonald 2003), and connecting the American philosophical tradition to feminist issues, such as those related to “impure,” multicultural identities (Pappas 2001). As Addams’s ambiguous legacy demonstrates, that work must include careful examination of the intersections of gender with race, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality, and other important axes of lived experience. W. E. B. Du Bois’s (1999) insightful analysis of the role that black women played in first-wave feminist struggle offers contemporary pragmatist feminists an early example of how this might be achieved. With such care, pragmatism and feminism will continue to invigorate each other, sharing the belief that philosophy should concern itself with improving the lived experiences of both men and women rather than solving artificial problems created by academic philosophers.

References and further reading


Shannon W. Sullivan


Pluralism, Relativism, and Historicism

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I

It is a notorious fact that pluralism and relativism are notions that play strategically important roles in canonical philosophy but are very poorly analyzed in their own right. Characteristically, “pluralism” is favored as a term of philosophical and practical tolerance, as in conveying a certain generous receptivity regarding the diverse interests and perspectives from which piecemeal views of the nature of the real world or of moral, political, religious, aesthetic, and related kinds of judgment are thought to be entitled to a measure of prima facie validity (and possibly more) as a result of a suitable account of the inquiries in question (see Putnam 1987; Kekes 1993; Rescher 1993).

“Relativism” is almost uniformly used as a term of unqualified contempt or opprobrium, where the recent usual charges are hardly distinguishable from those of either Aristotle (Metaphysics Gamma) or Plato (Theaetetus). Aristotle held that relativism is self-contradictory by honoring claims that are at once both true and false. Plato argued that relativism is insuperably paradoxical by holding that “true” must be defined relationally as “true-for-x” for some particular person or another, or for some particular person at one particular time or another, so that “true” cannot mean the same thing on two different occasions or that one’s own truth-claims cannot be shared with others.

Contemporary critics of relativism, including prominent self-proclaimed pragmatists (Bernstein 1983; Putnam 1992 (see Putnam); Rorty 1998 (see Rorty)), stay close to these ancient criticisms, in spite of the fact that it seems a relatively simple matter to formulate a non-paradoxical, self-consistent, even reasonable and useful alternative to what looks to be a completely unsecured rejection of relativism’s options.

The classical pragmatists, particularly William James (see James) in Pragmatism and A Pluralistic Universe, and John Dewey (see Dewey) in Experience and Nature and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, were clearly committed to one or another form of pluralism, though neither is entirely explicit, philosophically, in fashioning a defense beyond an honest avowal. Their respective rationales, whether cast in metaphysical or epistemological terms or, indeed, in moral, political, or other practical terms, begin with their rejection of all forms of objectivism and cognitive privilege. Also, Charles Peirce’s (see Peirce) very brief acknowledgment (CP 5.447–8) of the need to resist applying the principle of excluded middle at certain moments in the process of inquiry suggests
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(though it hardly pursues in any depth) the relativistic implications of that bit of advice. Still, as we shall see, it is demonstrably not enough to hold that the rejection of “a God’s-eye point of view” (objectivism) or of the special competence of any supposed faculty of natural Reason – as in John Rawls (1971) or Karl-Otto Apel (1980) or Jürgen Habermas (1979) (see Habermas) – can by itself secure the validity of any metaphysical (or moral/political) pluralism.

The admission of a first-order plurality of pertinent convictions (whether compatible or combinable or not) is, for one thing, no more than a harmless fact of life. For another, it is a fact that can never, qua fact, rise to the level of what may be called a second-order pluralism – that is, a philosophically determinate and duly validated doctrine of whatever scope may be wanted. Even among those strongly analytic voices that are most often thought to have pragmatist leanings, who are also thought to favor a form of pluralism, possibly even a form of relativism such as W. V. Quine (1960) (see Quine) and Goodman (1978), disappoint us on the technical issues. Quine believes, as in his explanation of the “indeterminacy of translation” thesis (which would be the natural site for either or both his pluralism and relativism), that the ontological parsing of our “observation sentences,” construed holistically (or in terms of “stimulus meaning”), obtains only on the assumption that “there is no fact of the matter.” Goodman, who identifies himself as a kind of relativist regarding plural “worlds,” nowhere provides grounds for individuating “worlds” or determining how to treat apparent contradictions or incompatibilities that can otherwise be rendered harmless (much too easily) by simply being assigned (without explanation) to “different worlds” wherever challenges need to be stalemated.

The issues that must be addressed are entirely straightforward but hardly easy to analyze or answer. Pluralism and relativism prove to be very different matters, though their philosophical fortunes are inseparable. Furthermore, it makes all the difference in the world whether, in defending pluralism, we are addressing theoretical or practical questions – that is, truth-claims or propositions, on the one hand, or right actions or normative commitments, on the other. Relativism, however subversive it may be, tends to address the question of truth first, and only then, derivatively, practical judgments and commitments. By contrast, pluralism almost always skirts, even evades, the direct analysis of the conditions of truth, even where the defense of “pluralistic” truth-claims seems to be at stake; so that, contrary to appearances, pluralism is almost always a more dependent, much less explicit issue than relativism is.

Effectively, pluralism is almost never treated as a free-standing epistemological issue in its own right. It is made entirely subsidiary in matters involving a choice between objectivism and relativism (where truth-claims are at stake), or else it tends to be committed in a practical and generous way to supporting a first-order plurality of some preferred sort, for instance, regarding taste or moral or religious conviction – eschewing, as far as possible, all questions of intrinsic validity.

The result is that, in theoretical matters, pluralism tends to collect as its special charge whatever is merely fragmentary, piecemeal, perspectived, skewed in terms of diverse interests, without risking questions of evidentiary or ontological compatibility with whatever is thought to be independently true. Pluralism in practical matters begins, instead, with the assumption of a diversity of first-order interests, and tends, as a consequence, to occupy itself with practical conditions that might support such a
space of alternative values. Among the best-known contemporary champions of pluralism in theoretical matters, we must acknowledge Hilary Putnam (1987) particularly and, in practical matters, John Kekes (1993) and Nicholas Rescher (1993) at the very least. What, however, is more interesting is that the conceptual differences between pluralism and relativism in theoretical disputes (realism, for instance) are almost never made explicit, unless by *obiter dicta*, as in the accounts of Putnam (1987), Richard Rorty (1998), Richard Bernstein (1983), and others, where relativism is unconditionally rejected as incoherent, self-contradictory, paradoxical in the extreme, unviable, skeptical, solipsistic, nihilistic, or simply anarchical. It is a blunt truth that, on the whole, philosophy condemns relativism (without much in the way of honest toil) as being utterly untenable, despite its being the case that innovative figures like Putnam and Rorty are standardly charged by their detractors with being relativists themselves, which they of course categorically deny, turning instead (sincerely, it seems) to press the same charge against those same detractors. Pluralism has many advocates but almost no defense of philosophical interest; whereas relativism has almost no philosophical champions but also almost no seriously sustained analysis apart from the obligatory ancient *reductios*.

II

Arthur Murphy (1951) cannily observes that Dewey’s having linked the fortunes of realism to the executive role of his best-known doctrine of the “indeterminate situation” (*LW* 12:108–9) effectively introduces an ineliminable element of relativism into his central theory. In speaking as he does, Murphy means to expose an incipient blunder on Dewey’s part. As it is, Murphy misses the genuine daring of Dewey’s vision. Dewey was indeed concerned to strengthen our sense of the improvisational nature of metaphysics and epistemology; he glimpsed thereby the impossibility of refusing relativism a proper inning in cognitive matters. Dewey never actually pursues the issue in a frontal way, but that is precisely what (viewed in a Darwinian spirit) prioritizing practice over theory comes to. The matter is nowhere developed because Dewey nowhere explicitly provides the novel logic of the argument. But it signals a distinct lacuna in the classic versions of pragmatism that has still to be addressed. What Murphy fails to grasp is that the very rejection of Cartesianism as an epistemological paradigm — which is the best part of Kant’s achievement in the first *Critique* — is itself no more than the start of a master argument that runs from Kant to Hegel and which, Darwinized, lays the essential ground for Dewey’s “indeterminate situation.” Predictably, the rejection of Cartesianism opens the way to acknowledging relativism’s full relevance; and, “accordingly,” is taken to vindicate pluralism without toil.

Kant (1953), of course, introduces a remarkably original constructivist analysis of cognition, the full force of which he instantly stalemates by restricting his discovery to both transcendental necessity and representationalism. At one stroke, therefore, Kant returns us to an even deeper form of Cartesianism than the version he successfully attacked, and bars himself from ever anticipating Hegel’s “completion” of his own project. It remained for Hegel (1977) to reject both Kantian transcendentalism and
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Cartesian representationalism (see Hegel and Realism) at the same time he redefines Kant’s project in unmistakably human and historicized terms.

That unified conception is, ultimately, the distant ancestor of Dewey’s “indeterminate situation” cast (by Dewey) in Darwinian and practical terms that bridge the animal and the human but are barely qualified (in Dewey) by any analysis of history or historicity. What remains, in Dewey, of the Hegelian account is the implied constructivism and the flux of human experience, not infrequently presented with a distinct animus against Kant. All of this is captured, much more explicitly, in the powerful replacement of Kant’s Vorstellungen (mental representations) by Hegel’s Erscheinungen (in effect, the-world’s-“appearings”-to-us), without any suggestion of recovering pre-Kantian realism. This may serve as a spare summary of the philosophical gain that gathers force as it moves from Kant through Fichte to Hegel, from the first Critique to the Phenomenology, and distantly to Dewey’s pragmatism.

The nerve of the argument lies in Hegel’s abandonment of Kant’s transcendental reasoning favoring a closed system of categories and pure forms of perceptual intuition. Hegel makes the Kantian speculation completely contingent on historicized reflections upon changing phenomenological experience. Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry may then be read as a much-attenuated rereading of Hegel’s strategy. The “Absolute,” therefore, in Hegel’s Phenomenology, reflects no more than a human tendency or longing or persuasion that is always outflanked by evolving experience itself. Hegel gives up any discernibly assured Absolute: human understanding falls short of any “unconditional” standpoint.

One may recall Nicholas of Cusa’s treatment of an insurmountable human ignorance resulting from man’s never being able to occupy God’s “absolute” standpoint (see Harries 2001), which leads inevitably in relativism’s direction. Seen this way, philosophical pluralists are likely to be champions of a certain tolerance of would-be “plural” lines of inquiry, whether theoretical or practical, which they assume, but cannot demonstrate, will be compatible without ever converging toward a uniquely valid standpoint. That is precisely the optimistic implication of Bernstein’s (1983) rejection of objectivism and relativism. It’s a fair position within limits, and it is indeed a form of pragmatism. But those same limits signify that, if self-consistent, relativism cannot be ruled out; because, unlike pluralism, relativism addresses the logical possibility of admitting incompatible theoretical and practical judgments and commitments as valid – as by not subscribing to an exceptionless bivalent logic or the rigid use of the principle of excluded middle. Hence, Bernstein rules out more than he can demonstrate (relativism) and relies too heavily on what he supposes could actually be demonstrated (the viability of pluralism as a “third” option). Pluralism is at best a via negativa.

What is easily missed (what Murphy misses) is the important discovery that, if you add together the abandonment of Cartesian certainty and transcendentalism, the rejection of representationalism, the advocacy of constructivism in the epistemological sense, you have already conceded the full relevance of relativism (as well as its viability, should it prove to be formally self-consistent). The addition of the doctrine of the flux – the denial of necessary structures in either reason or reality and not the advocacy of chaos – strengthens the relativistic proclivities of classic pragmatism, particularly along the lines Dewey pursues, in spite of the fact that the original
pragmatists were obviously not inclined to press any such advantage. Notoriously, Dewey had little to say about historicity directly; but everything he features would have made perfect sense in historicized terms (see Margolis 2002). What remains unclear are pluralism’s fortunes.

The relevance and force of relativism are already close to discovery in Kant’s constructivism and are incarnate in Hegel’s more radical (and more sensible) constructivism. For his part, Dewey never features historicity; he dampens his constructivism along Darwinian lines, is more intent on grounding science in its animal beginnings and on emphasizing the intrinsic freedom gained by abandoning essentialism, teleologism, universalism, determinism, fixities of every kind, than he is in addressing the actual logic of truth-claims advanced under constructivist and fluxive conditions (see Dewey LW 12:1–127).

But if we admit that modern philosophy begins with Hegel – even more compellingly than with Kant – we are bound to find ourselves dialectically driven to begin our speculations with *Erscheinungen* in theoretical matters and with *Sitten* in practical affairs (in ways more delimited empirically than in Hegel). To say this, however, is to admit that the Hegelian conception was already in need of revision along pragmatist lines. You may find the same kind of inference favored in reviewing Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) account of scientific revolutions and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953) account of language games, in spite of the fact that neither Kuhn nor Wittgenstein is exactly a pragmatist and in spite of the fact that neither is especially drawn to (or even informed about) Hegel’s explicit innovations. But Dewey, Kuhn, and Wittgenstein are all drawn to attenuated descendants of Hegelian thinking. Rorty (1979) grasps the linkage, but does not draw the obvious lesson for the future currents of pragmatism. Of course, the very question of how to understand pluralism and relativism in terms of the pragmatist tradition is more a question for pragmatism’s future than its past.

III

We must try to distinguish pluralism from relativism, even while admitting their close connections. In the interval involving the unexpectedly strong revival of pragmatism following its near demise during the period from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1960s, pluralism came to be viewed among a new cohort of pragmatists as a “third” option between objectivism and relativism. The usual view, advanced most clearly by Bernstein (1983) but adumbrated in a more powerful (yet marginalized) way by Putnam (1980), effectively promised a defense of pluralism essentially independent of any arguments in favor of either objectivism (which cleaves to the idea of a uniquely valid God’s-eye view of reality) or relativism (which, as already remarked, is almost universally condemned as incoherent or solipsistic or self-contradictory). Bernstein never ventured an explicit philosophical defense of pluralism, though he formulated the problem in a memorable way; and Putnam (1987, 2004), who did attempt to answer, finally never addressed the essential issue itself – he answered another, perfectly worthwhile, but altogether different (distinctly more limited) question in its place. As far as the recent evidence shows, there are no promising accounts of pluralism viewed as a third option, although there are many seeming discussions of pluralism’s
prospects, both in first-order and second-order terms, as well as in both theoretical and practical contexts. It needs to be said that the defense of pluralism is much easier in the context of practical reason than of theoretical reason. For instance, wherever, in practical matters, objectivity favors a general *modus vivendi* rather than a single determinate proposition: as in seeking justice in war (see Margolis 2004). There, a derivative kind of pluralism is always easily defended, because the argument is only concerned with variant ways of being in accord with a determinable but not specifically determinate solution. But then, questions of theoretical and practical reason are very different undertakings.

Pragmatists of every stripe reject all forms of the God’s-eye view, which they rightly construe as a return to Cartesianism. Even Charles Peirce who, through an ingenious version of post-Kantian Idealism (a Schellingian conjecture, on his own reading), advances a form of realism that might appear to favor such a God’s-eye view (but does not), treats the notion of a uniquely valid account of what is real (“independent of the opinions of you and me”) more as an article of transcendental hope (or rational faith) than of transcendental understanding – in effect, the irresistible belief of an “abductive” influence that comes as close to being instinctual, among humans, as any that may be ventured (CP 5.196, 7.219.) This, of course, is the grand theme of Peirce’s fallibilism, which shares rather little with Dewey’s version of the same doctrine, no part of which is literally fated; although Peirce (but never Dewey) was willing to entertain teleologism as a form of abductive hope.

Peirce might be thought to favor a form of pluralism as an approximative phase of any inquiry directed to a God’s-eye view of the real world. But that would be a confusion and a misreading. Pluralism, thus conceived, would have to include all sorts of diverse falsehoods, not as yet tested. Besides, there can be, on Peirce’s conception, no finite, pragmatic, or asymptotic sense in which the “fated” final belief of infinite inquiry could ever be abstracted or projected from any finite steps of actual inquiry. (For a stronger sense of Peirce’s realism, which I believe the texts do not literally support, see Haack 1993.) Curiously, though we cannot be sure, Putnam’s (1980) notion of the Grenzbegriff of truth as a regulative but never constitutive idea (in Kant’s sense) comes as close to the pluralist reading of Peirce’s fallibilism as any that may be mentioned, though it would surely fail (if actually so intended) for the reason just given. In any case, Putnam was influenced by James’s usage (Putnam 1994) but offers no defending argument at all. In fact, it is just this maneuver on Putnam’s part that first inclined Rorty (1998) to suggest that Putnam was himself a kind of relativist. The reason ultimately lies with the Grenzbegriff’s functioning in epistemic contexts without involving constitutive or criterial grounds.

The analysis of pluralism is entirely straightforward, but complicated. We must divide the question between its bearing on theoretical reason and its bearing on practical reason. On the first count, two considerations prove essential. For one thing, we must distinguish, as already remarked, between first-order pluralities and second-order pluralisms. “Plurality” simply registers a fact of ordinary life: that is, the sheer diversity of interests, perspectives, concepts, convictions, forms of enculturation, and the like. In this sense, plurality conveys no epistemological claims at all, or registers diverse such claims without regard to their validity or compatibility in second-order cognitive terms. It is never a contested or philosophically decisive concession.

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The point needs to be emphasized because Putnam, who is the one “pragmatist” who has done the most to explore pluralism in the epistemological sense, makes much of the distinction (Putnam 1987, 2004). Putnam’s reason is entirely benign: he makes it clear that “conceptual plurality,” that is, a plurality of conceptual or perspectival alternatives – notably, plural ways of counting what “there is” in the real world – is entirely compatible with a strong form of realism (in fact, with what, in Many Faces of Realism, he had mistakenly treated as metaphysically decisive in settling the question of pluralism in the realist sense). In his 2004 Hermes Lectures, however, Putnam corrects the error: he now regards the choice of one or another individuative idiom (counting “things,” in short) as no more than a special convention that has no metaphysical import of any kind, and hence it does not bear on the pluralism question at all (in the sense he earlier appeared to share with Bernstein). It is impossible to read the different accounts of the so-called “Carnapian” idiom and the “Polish logician’s” mereological alternative for counting entities (in Putnam’s discussions), without concluding that Putnam has drastically changed his analysis of pluralism. It turns out, now, that he has almost nothing to say in support of an independent pluralism (and perhaps he never did). For, if the different rules for individuating countable things ranging over the same empirical “data” were sufficient to confirm an independent pluralism, then (pace Quine) pluralism would be trivially confirmed; although it would of course suggest the deeper question (ignored by Putnam) of a relativistic reading of pluralism itself. How do we know, say, that we are “counting the same things” when we individuate the things of the world in different ways (Kuhn’s question)?

Putnam avoids the issue finally by rejecting any further metaphysical lesson assignable to the Carnap/Lesniewski choice (handled so differently in the Carus and Hermes Lectures) and by confining all pertinent metaphysical questions to the underlying assumptions on which the individuating question itself depends. But that cannot be enough, since it presupposes that all fragmentary and perspectived descriptions of any particular data can always be collected as descriptions of the same data. Putnam has yet to go beyond this stalemate. No one has done better, and the status of relativism clearly remains neglected.

The argument is much simpler in the context of practical reason, since, there, we assume that there is no specifically cognitive basis for discerning the true norms, or true normative values, for resolving practical disputes objectively (“value pluralism,” as it may be called, whether in moral, aesthetic, religious, or similar inquiries). We also assume that there is no way to confirm any would-be objective, or neutral, faculty of reason suited to directing practical choice and commitment to whatever would be assuredly right in the sense required. A mere plurality of values would be no more than a fact of life (as we have seen); and a liberal moral/political theory that championed some form of value pluralism (rather than a plurality of values) would have to fall back to some privileged (first) constraint or, conceivably, to an arbitrary choice among values that were compatible in principle but not, effectively, in given practical or historical circumstances (see, for instance, Rawls 1971; Habermas 1979; Kekes 1993; and even Putnam 1980). But these are pluralism’s principal options, though they resolve nothing of philosophical consequence. Certainly, if pluralism in the practical sense were thought to depend on some facultative competence, so that we might claim to discover alternative, possibly incompatible, possibly even incommensurable
(but still objective) goods or values or norms, we would have to explain, for one thing, how the world could be like that, why we would not be driven to a strong form of relativism, and why a similar argument would not infect our account of the sciences. It seems much more straightforward to construe normative issues in a constructivist way; most promisingly, in terms of the formative Sitten of diverse societies. Then the analogy between science and morality would not prove excessively strenuous or paradoxical. On the fact/value issue, see Putnam (2002), and on the plurality/pluralism issue in practical contexts, see Margolis (2004).

Imagine, for instance, a Pantocrator who ordains that a plurality of divergent values (not a pluralism) is a necessary part of a Providential Creation. Hence, a benevolent plurality (not a pluralism) may be ensured by divine fiat, although such a dictum would also elude human legitimation, and its supposed benefit would count once again for no more than a first-order datum. Putnam’s solution of the “pluralism” of numbering entities is a pale imitation of God’s largesse, which was never an argument for pluralism at all.

Dewey, of course, is also a pluralist of sorts. But Dewey’s philosophical contribution only removes all objectivist pretensions. His pluralism in practical matters is tantamount to a metaphysical faute de mieux or the open advocacy of a Darwinian and/or democratic faute de mieux. Dewey nowhere defends the epistemological “third” option, and his enthusiasm for the daring of an openly experimental democracy is the upshot, logically, of his “belief,” not of any confirmable argument.

IV

In both pragmatism and analytic philosophy, pluralism and relativism are thought to be very different theories, but they remain poorly defined. Pluralism also raises very different questions where it is applied in, say, analyzing or defending realism (questions of theoretical reason) and in justifying practical and normative commitments that implicate rational but not cognitive grounds (questions of practical reason). The contemporary test of pluralism’s distinction and viability (in the theoretical sense) rests with its being shown to be a third option between objectivism and relativism. There is no satisfactory account on this score; the best-known effort is Putnam’s, which has not been able to separate pluralism’s more robust (realist) fortunes from those of either objectivism or relativism.

Pluralism as a third option is, in fact, Bernstein’s (1983) strong conviction. But it is more reasonable to think that Bernstein sets a problem that has yet to be answered (if it can) than any solution he might be thought to favor. There is no solution sketched in Beyond Objectivism and Relativism and, apart from the need to avoid the two extremes in question, no clue, in evidentiary terms, regarding the logical and conceptual distinction of pluralism itself.

Pluralism in practical matters – for instance, moral pluralism – is a faute de mieux defense of a first-order plurality of values consistent with some independently favored commitment; whether, say, a democracy of a certain sort (Rawls, Habermas) or an optimism regarding the free play of salient interests (Dewey).
PLURALISM, RELATIVISM, AND HISTORICISM

Relativism is a very different kind of theory, which springs from a rejection of foundational or privileged epistemologies and an appeal to the coherence and pertinence of a logic capable of replacing or supplementing, piecemeal, a bivalent logic by a many-valued logic that admits “incongruent” statements or truth-claims in any sector of inquiry whatsoever (theoretical or practical). The idea is that, as in Kuhnian-like disputes about high-level explanatory theories in the sciences (Kuhn 1970), or in philosophical disputes, or art-critical or moral disputes, we often find that different claims, incompatible on bivalent grounds, are viewed in such a way (cognitively) that to admit the validity of one such claim does not preclude admitting the validity of another (and not simply on probabilistic or related grounds). Such claims may be termed “incongruent,” meaning by that that they would be incompatible on a bivalent logic but not on a many-valued logic in accord with which the alternative claims cannot be jointly true but may yet be reasonable or objectively valid or the like, without producing paradox. The coherence, formal consistency, and usefulness of such a logic (applied piecemeal) shows how, by favoring the philosophical current running from Hegel to Dewey’s pragmatism, the compatibility of realism and relativism may be supported, or, in practical matters, an objective morality involving populations committed to “incongruent” norms of conduct may be rationally sustained.

V

Historicism is a more substantive theory than either pluralism or relativism, that bears on the fortunes of both. Broadly speaking, it is the thesis that objective human knowledge and understanding (in any and all sectors of inquiry) are artifacts of cultural history (the notion we now call historicity), because human thinking is history or is historicized. Human thinking is substantively formed and transformed through its actual use and reception in some home society’s evolving history (Margolis 1995.) Truth, knowledge, meaning, validity, confirmation, legitimation, and the like, are all “constructs.” They are critical, not arbitrary, and not merely conventional either; but the sense in which this is so derives from our constructivist theories rather than from empirical evidence (this is true of both Peirce and Dewey). Hegel’s conception of Geist is, of course, the best-known early paradigm of historicity, which has influenced in various attenuated ways the views of figures like Dewey, Kuhn, and Wittgenstein, who do not explicitly use Hegel’s idiom in their own analyses, and indeed Wittgenstein may not have been familiar with Hegel’s texts at all.

If you admit the seminal achievement that runs from Kant to Hegel, already briefly sketched, you see at once how the fortunes of pluralism and relativism can hardly be examined apart from historicism’s bearing on the questions they themselves address. This helps to explain the sense in which pragmatism’s future cannot fail to be caught up with the analysis of these three interlocking doctrines, which belong to pragmatism’s original impulse but are bound to be even more central to its evolving future.
References and further reading


Part III

Culture and Nature
Sin and Truth

There is a useful analogy to be drawn between the pragmatists’ criticism of the idea that truth is a matter of correspondence to the intrinsic nature of reality and the Enlightenment’s criticism of the idea that morality is a matter of correspondence to the will of a Divine Being. The pragmatists’ anti-representationalist account of belief is, among other things, a protest against the idea that human beings must humble themselves before something non-human, whether the Will of God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality. Seeing anti-representationalism as a version of anti-authoritarianism permits one to appreciate an analogy which was central to John Dewey’s thought (see Dewey): the analogy between ceasing to believe in Sin and ceasing to accept the distinction between Reality and Appearance.

Dewey was convinced that the romance of democracy, a romance built on the idea that the point of a human life is free cooperation with fellow humans, required a more thoroughgoing version of secularism than either Enlightenment rationalism or nineteenth-century positivism had achieved. As Dewey saw it, whole-hearted pursuit of the democratic ideal requires us to set aside any authority save that of a consensus of our fellow humans. The paradigm of subjection to such authority is believing oneself to be in a state of Sin. When the sense of Sin goes, Dewey thought, so should the duty to seek for correspondence to the way things are. In its place, a democratic culture will put the duty to seek unforced agreement with other human beings about what beliefs will sustain and facilitate projects of social cooperation.

To have a sense of Sin, it is not enough to feel guilty. It is not enough to be appalled by the way human beings treat each other, and by your own capacity for vicious actions. You have to believe that there is a Being before whom we should humbly ourselves. This Being issues commands which, even if they seem arbitrary and unlikely to increase human happiness, must be obeyed. When trying to acquire a sense of Sin, it helps a lot if you can manage to think of a specific sexual or dietary practice as forbidden, even though it does not seem to be doing anybody any harm. It also helps to anguish about whether you are calling the divine Being by the name he or she prefers.
To take the traditional correspondentist notion of Truth with full seriousness, you
must agree with Clough, that “It fortifies my soul to know / That, though I perish,
Truth is so.” You must feel uneasy at William James’s (see James) suggestion that
“ideas . . . become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations
with other parts of our experience.” Those who resonate to Clough’s lines think of
Truth – or, more precisely, Reality as it is in itself, the object accurately represented by
true sentences – as an authority we must respect.

To respect Truth and Reality in Clough’s way, it is not enough to adjust one’s
behavior to changes in the environment: to come in when it rains, or to shun bears.
You must think of Reality not just as an assortment of such things as rain and bears,
but as something which, so to speak, looms behind such things something august and
remote. The best way to get into this way of thinking is to become an epistemological
skeptic – to start worrying about whether human language is capable of representing
the way Reality is in itself, whether we are calling Reality by the right names. To
worry in this way, you need to take seriously the question of whether our descriptions
of Reality may not be all too human – whether Reality (and therefore Truth as well)
may not stand aloof; beyond the reach of the sentences in which we formulate our
beliefs. You must be prepared to distinguish, at least in principle, between the sort of
belief which embodies Truth and beliefs which are merely tools, beliefs which merely
increase your chances of happiness. You must read James’s remark that “the trail of
the human serpent is over all” as a confession of despair.

Dewey was quite willing to say of a vicious act that it was sinful, and of “2 + 2 = 5”
or “Elizabeth the First’s reign ended in 1623” that these sentences were absolutely,
unconditionally, eternally, false. But he was unwilling to gloss “sinful” or “falsehood”
in authoritarian terms. He did not want to say that a power not ourselves had forbid-
den cruelty, or that these false sentences fail to accurately represent the way Reality is
in itself. He thought it much clearer that we should not be cruel than that there was a
God who had forbidden us to be cruel, and much clearer that Elizabeth I died in 1603
than that there is any way things are “in themselves.” He viewed the theory that truth
is correspondence to Reality, and the theory that moral goodness is correspondence to
the Divine Will, as equally dispensable.

For Dewey, both theories add nothing to our ordinary, workaday, fallible ways of
telling right from wrong, and truth from falsity. But their pointlessness is not the
real problem. What Dewey most disliked about both traditional “realist” epistemology
and about traditional religious beliefs is that they discourage us by telling us that
somebody or something has authority over us. Both tell us that there is Something
Inscrutable, something toward which we have duties, duties which have precedence
over our cooperative attempts to avoid pain and obtain pleasure.

Dewey, like James, was a utilitarian: he thought that in the end the only moral or
epistemological criteria we have or need is whether performing an action, or holding
a belief, will, in the long run, make for greater human happiness. He saw progress as
produced by increasing willingness to experiment, to get out from under the past. So
he hoped we should learn to view current scientific, religious, philosophical, and moral
beliefs with the skepticism with which Bentham viewed the laws of England: he hoped
each new generation would try to cobble together some more useful beliefs – beliefs
which would help them make human life richer, fuller and happier.
Classical Pragmatism and the Need to Reconcile Science with Religion

So much for an introductory statement of the theme which I shall be developing. Shortly I shall rehearse this theme in another key by bringing in Freud. But it may be useful if I first say something about the similarities and differences, particularly in regard to their views about religion, between Dewey and the other two classical pragmatists: Charles Sanders Peirce (see Peirce) and William James.

Peirce kicked pragmatism off by starting from Alexander Bain’s definition of belief as a rule or habit of action. Starting from this definition, Peirce argued that the function of inquiry is not to represent reality, but rather to enable us to act more effectively. This means getting rid of the “copy theory” of knowledge which had dominated philosophy since the time of Descartes – and especially of the idea of intuitive self-knowledge, knowledge unmediated by signs. As one of the first philosophers to say that the ability to use signs is essential to thought, Peirce was a prophet of what Gustav Bergman called “the linguistic turn in philosophy.”

Like nineteenth-century idealists such as T. H. Green and Josiah Royce, Peirce was anti-foundationalist, coherentist, and holist in his view of the nature of inquiry. But he did not, as most of Hegel’s anglophone followers did, think of God as an all-inclusive, atemporal experience which is identical with Reality. Rather, as a good Darwinian, Peirce thought of the universe as evolving. His God was a finite deity who is somehow identical with an evolutionary process which he called “the growth of Thirdness.” This quaint term signifies the gradual linking of everything up with everything else through triadic relationships. Rather strangely, and without much in the way of argument, Peirce took all triadic relationships to be sign-relations, and vice versa. His philosophy of language was intertwined with a quasi-idealistic metaphysics.

James and Dewey both admired Peirce, and shared his sense that philosophy must come to terms with Darwin. But they sensibly paid little attention to his metaphysics of Thirdness. Instead, they focused on the profound anti-Cartesian implications of Peirce’s development of Bain’s initial anti-representationalist insight. They developed a non-representationalist theory of belief acquisition and testing which culminates in James’s claim that “The true . . . is only the expedient in our way of thinking.” James and Dewey both wanted to reconcile philosophy with Darwin by making human beings’ pursuit of the true and the good continuous with the activities of the lower animals – cultural evolution with biological evolution.

All three of the founding pragmatists combined a naturalistic, Darwinian view of human beings with a distrust of the problems which philosophy had inherited from Descartes, Hume, and Kant. All three hoped also to save moral and religious ideals from empiricist or positivist skepticism. It is important, however, not to be blinded by these similarities, and by the fact that the three men are always treated as members of a single “movement,” to the fact that they had very different philosophical concerns.

Although the three knew and respected the other two, the motives that drove them to philosophy were very different. Peirce thought of himself as a disciple of Kant, improving on Kant’s doctrine of categories and his conception of logic. A practicing mathematician and laboratory scientist, he was more interested in these areas of
culture than were James or Dewey. James took neither Kant nor Hegel very seriously, but was far more interested in religion than either Peirce or Dewey. Dewey, deeply influenced by Hegel, was fiercely anti-Kantian. Education and politics, rather than science or religion, were at the center of his thought.

Although he viewed most metaphysical and theological disputes as, at best, evidence of the laudable diversity of human temperament, James hoped to construct an alternative to the anti-religious, science-worshipping, positivism of his day. He approvingly cited Giovanni Papini’s description of pragmatism as “like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume: in the next someone on his knees praying for faith; in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties . . . they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it.” His point was that attention to the implications of beliefs for practice offered the only way to communicate across divisions between temperaments, academic disciplines, and philosophical schools. In particular, such attention offered the only way to mediate between the claims of religion and those of science.

Dewey, in his early period, tried to bring Hegel together with evangelical Christianity. Although references to Christianity almost disappear from his writings around 1900, in a 1903 essay on Emerson he still looked forward to the development of “a philosophy which religion has no call to chide, and which knows its friendship with science and with art.” The anti-positivist strain in classical pragmatism was at least as strong as its anti-metaphysical strain.

Dewey saw changes in individual attitudes, in public policies, and in strategies of acculturation as three interlinked aspects of the gradual development of freer and more democratic communities, and of the better sort of human being who would be developed within such communities. All of Dewey’s books are permeated by the typically nineteenth-century conviction that human history is the story of expanding human freedom, and by the hope of substituting a less professionalized, more politically oriented, conception of the philosopher’s task for the Platonic conception of the philosopher as “spectator of time and eternity.” He thought that Kant, especially in his moral philosophy, had preserved that Platonic conception.

In Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) Dewey wrote that “under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions . . . has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies.” For him, the task of future philosophy was not to achieve new solutions to traditional problems, but to clarify “men’s ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day.” This historicist conception of philosophy, which developed out of Hegel’s and resembled Marx’s, has made Dewey less popular among analytic philosophers than Peirce or James. His intense concern with parochially American political and social issues has also served to limit interest in his work. Yet precisely because of his self-conscious historicism Dewey was, I believe, the classical pragmatist whose work will have the greatest utility in the long term.

Whether or not Dewey is the most useful of the three classical pragmatists, Peirce seems to me the least useful. My main reason for thinking Peirce relatively unimportant is that he does not become engaged, in the way in which James and Dewey did, with the problem which dominated Kant’s thought and which was at the center of
nineteenth-century thought in every Western country: the problem of how to reconcile science and religion, how to be faithful both to Newton and Darwin and to the spirit of Christ. That problem is the paradigm of the sort of conflict between old ways of speaking and new cultural developments which Dewey took it to be the philosopher’s task to resolve.

The need to reconcile science and religion was all-important for Dewey during his first 30 years, and for James throughout his life. By contrast, Peirce’s discussion of it consists of rather banal remarks – remarks that were the commonplaces of nineteenth-century thought. We find him saying, for example, that the apparent clash between these two areas of culture is the result of “the unphilosophical narrowness of those who guard the mysteries of worship.” He rejects the suggestion that he is “to be prevented from joining in that common joy at the revelation of enlightened principles of religion which we celebrate at Christmas and Easter because I think that certain scientific, logical and metaphysical ideas which have been mixed up with these principles are untenable” (CP 6.427). He says that the only distinctive thing about Christianity is the idea that love is the only law (CP 6.440–1) and that Christianity’s ideal “is that the whole world shall be united in the bond of a common love of God accomplished by each man’s loving his neighbor” (CP 6.443). This is a pretty standard nineteenth-century anglophone way of following up on Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. It amounts to saying that you can have Christian ethics without Christian theology, and therefore without interfering with Newtonian cosmology or Darwinian accounts of human origins.

This easy compromise struck James and Dewey, as it struck Nietzsche, as too easy. This is because these men took religion a lot more seriously than Peirce ever did. Peirce was raised an Episcopalian, claimed that that was the only religion for a gentleman, and never interpreted the various personal crises he experienced in religious terms.

James, by contrast, was raised by his eccentric father on a kind of idiosyncratic blend of Swedenborg and Emerson. Though he and his siblings had the good sense not to take their father’s idiosyncratic theological ideas with any great seriousness, William took his father’s religious experiences very seriously indeed. He suffered the same sort of spiritual crises as had afflicted Henry James, Sr., and was never sure whether to describe them in psychological or religious language.

Dewey was the only one of the three classical pragmatists to have had a really strenuous religious upbringing – the only one to have encountered religion, so to speak, in its full fury. He was also the only one who ever swallowed it full strength. His mother continually asked him “Are you right with Jesus?” and his biographers agree that belated resentment at his mother’s meddling piety was central to the formation of Dewey’s mature thought.

Despite the fact that James never had to cast off an orthodoxy imposed in his youth, the need to bring his father into the same intellectual universe as that inhabited by his scientifically oriented friends (such as Peirce and Chauncey Wright), was very important in shaping his thought. I suspect that we owe the pragmatist theory of truth to this need. For the underlying motive of that theory is to give us a way to reconcile science and religion by viewing them not as two competing ways of representing reality, but rather as two non-competing ways of producing happiness. I take the antirepresentationalist view of thought and language to have been motivated, in James’s
case, by the realization that the need for choice between competing representations can be replaced by tolerance for a plurality of non-competing descriptions, descriptions which serve different purposes and which are to be evaluated by reference to their utility in fulfilling these purposes rather than by their “fit” with the objects being described.

If James’s watchword was tolerance, then Dewey’s was, as I have said, anti-authoritarianism. His revulsion from the sense of sinfulness which his religious upbringing had produced led Dewey to campaign, throughout his life, against the view that human beings needed to measure themselves against something non-human. Dewey used the term “democracy” to mean something like what Habermas (see Habermas) means by the term “communicative reason”: for him, the word sums up the idea that human beings should regulate their actions and beliefs by the need to join with other human beings in cooperative projects, rather than by the need to stand in the correct relation to something non-human. This is why he grabbed hold of James’s pragmatic theory of truth.

Although James will always be the most sympathetic and most readable of the three classical pragmatists, Dewey was, I think, the most imaginative. This is because he was the most historically minded: the one who learned from Hegel how to tell great sweeping stories about the relation of the human present to the human past. Dewey’s stories are always stories of the progress from the need of human communities to rely on a non-human power to their realization that all they need is faith in themselves: they are stories about the substitution of fraternity for authority. His stories about history as the story of increasing freedom are stories about how we lost our sense of sin, and also our hope of another world, and gradually acquired the ability to find the same spiritual significance in cooperation between finite mortals that our ancestors had found in their relation to an immortal being. His way of clarifying “men’s ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day” was to ask his contemporaries to consider the possibility that weekday cooperation in building democratic communities could provide everything “higher” – everything which had once been reserved for weekends. His way of making practice prior to theory was to say that both philosophy and religion were of value only insofar as they put the traditionally “higher” to everyday use.

Pragmatism as Liberation from the Primal Father

Freud’s account of the origin of conscience provides a good handle by which to grasp Dewey’s motives. For the dialectical stand-off in contemporary analytic philosophy between pragmatists and their “realist” opponents (Nagel, Dworkin, Searle, et al.) is usefully thought of as the reciprocal unintelligibility to one another of two very different types of people. The first are those whose highest hopes are for union with something beyond the human – something which is the source of one’s superego, and which has the authority to free one of guilt and shame. The second are those whose highest hopes are for a better human future, to be attained by more fraternal cooperation between human beings. These two types of people are conveniently describable in Freudian terms: they are the people who think subjection to an authority-figure is
necessary to lead a properly human life and those who see such a life as requiring freedom from any such subjection.2

Hans Blumenberg has argued that the Renaissance was a period in which people turned from eternity to futurity. This turn is the one which, in my view, is fully accomplished, in the area of philosophy, only by pragmatism. The de-eternalization of human hope had to wait 400 years to become philosophically explicit. The representationalist tradition in philosophy which was dominant in those 400 years hoped that inquiry would put us in touch, if not with the eternal, at least with something which, in Bernard Williams’s phrase, “is there anyway” – something non-perspectival, something which is what it is apart from human needs and interests. Pragmatists do not think inquiry can put us more in touch with non-human reality than we have always been, for the only sense of “being in touch” they recognize is causal interaction (as opposed to accurate representation). So in their view the only question is: will human life be better in the future if we adopt this belief, this practice, or that institution?

Freud, in his last and wackiest book, *Moses and Monotheism*, offers us an account of human progress which complements Blumenberg’s. There he tells the story of how social cooperation emerges from parricide, from the murder of the primal father by the primal band of brothers:

It must be supposed that after the parricide a considerable time elapsed during which the brothers disputed with one another for their father’s heritage, which each of them wanted for himself alone. A realization of the dangers and uselessness of these struggles, a recollection of the act of liberation which they had accomplished together, and the emotional ties with one another which had arisen during the period of their expulsion, led at last to an agreement among them, a sort of social contract.

[But] recollection of their father persisted at this period of the “fraternal alliance”. A powerful animal – at first, perhaps, always one that was feared as well – was chosen as a substitute for the father. . . . On the one hand the totem was regarded as the clan’s blood ancestor and protective spirit, who must be worshipped and protected, and on the other hand a festival was appointed at which the same fate was prepared for him that the primal father had met with. He was killed and devoured by all the tribesmen in common. (Freud 1964, pp. 82–3)

Freud goes on to argue that totemism was “the first form in which religion was manifested in history,” and to claim that “the first step away from totemism was the humanizing of the being who was worshipped.” This humanization produced first a mother-goddess, and then polytheism of mixed genders. Polytheism was succeeded by the great patriarchal monotheisms, through a process which phallogocentrists call “purification” and which Freud regarded as a recapturing of psycho-historical truth. In these religions, the murdered father was restored to his rightful role as one who demanded unconditional obedience, although he was now banished from the earth to the sky.

Platonism, one can imagine Freud saying, was a depersonalized version of this sort of monotheism – a further attempt at so-called purification. In this depersonalized form, proper respect for a de-humanized father figure is shown not by obedience to him but by an attempt to become identical with him. We do this by surrendering everything in us which separates us from him (such as space, time, and the body). We good sons aim at becoming identical, so to speak, with good, kind, loving, generous
aspects of father, while ignoring the violent and willful aspects. Platonism gives us a way of imitating, so to speak, all that was great and good and admirable in our fathers without having to imitate their unpleasant idiosyncrasies. We wish, by purifying ourselves, to become identical with what father would have been like if he had ever managed to behave decently. The Idea of the Good is the idea of Father, stripped of his more terrifying parts and passions.

In the broad sense of the word “metaphysics” which Heidegger employs when he says that metaphysics is Platonism and Platonism metaphysics, metaphysics looks to pragmatists like an attempt to snuggle up to something so pure and good as to be not really human, while still being enough like a loving parent so that it can be loved with all one’s heart and soul and strength. Plato’s infatuation with mathematics – the paradigm of something neither willful nor arbitrary nor violent, something which embodies anagke with no trace of bia – gave him the model for this being: the bare outline of the father-figure, so to speak, without any distracting detail.

Freud’s interest in Plato was in fact restricted almost entirely to the discussions of Eros and of androgyny in the Symposium. But imagine him turning his skeptical intelligence toward Plato’s Theory of Ideas. Had he done so, I think that he would have seen worship of the bare Idea of Father as the origin of the conviction that it is knowledge, rather than love, which is the most distinctively human achievement. For Plato arranged things so that we could please Father best by doing mathematics, or, at a second best, mathematical physics.

This conviction of the importance of knowledge runs through the history of what Derrida calls “the metaphysics of presence” – the history of the Western search for a still point in the turning world, something one can always rely on, always come home to, something, as Derrida says, “beyond the reach of play.” The quest for such a reassuring presence is, for all those who resonate to Aristotle’s claim that “all men by nature desire to know,” the proper way of life for the good child. To devote oneself to getting knowledge as opposed to opinion – to grasping unchanging structure as opposed to awareness of mutable and colorful content – one has to believe that one will be cleansed, purified of guilt and shame, by getting closer to something like Truth or Reality. When opponents of pragmatism say that pragmatists do not believe in truth, they are saying that pragmatists do not grasp the need for such closeness, and therefore do not see the need for purification. They are, their metaphysically inclined opponents suggest, shameless in their willingness to revel in the mutable and impermanent. Like women and children, they seem to have no superego, no conscience, no spirit of seriousness.3

As Blumenberg sees it, the repersonalization of God which occurred when Christianity took over eventually turned itself inside out. It did so when Occam drew the voluntaristic consequences of Divine Otherness, and thereby helped reduce monotheism, if not to absurdity, at least to unusability by the intellectuals. Occamism made the will of our Father in Heaven so inscrutable that all connection snapped between his will and our desires, between us and Him. He became less like somebody to get close to than somebody who could tolerate no relation save sheer obedience. He ceased to be a possible object of contemplation and rapport, and became something as inscrutable and unpredictable as he was fierce and unforgiving. So the rediscovery of Plato by the Renaissance humanists repeated the move toward depersonalization, and the turn
from theology to metaphysics, which had been made when the Idea of the Good offered a purified form of worship to pagan intellectuals.

Dewey never read any Freud to speak of, but if he had I think that he would have accepted Freud’s account of the maturation of humanity, and he could have used it to strengthen and supplement his own story of how the West overcame Greek dualisms in the course of inventing modern technology and modern liberal societies – two inventions which he took to be part of the same anti-authoritarian movement. He would have seen the successive de-centerings performed by Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud himself as helpful in forcing us to stop looking outside the human community for salvation, and making us instead explore the possibilities offered by social cooperation. In particular, I think that he might have seen modern democratic societies as founded on, as it were, fraternity alone – that is to say, fraternity freed from memory of paternal authority. Only pragmatism, he might have remarked, reaps the full advantage of that primal parricide.

Only in a democratic society which describes itself in pragmatist terms, one can imagine Dewey saying, is the refusal to countenance any authority save that of consensus reached by free inquiry complete. Only then can the fraternity which was first glimpsed when the primal father was killed by the band of brothers be achieved. This achievement had been deferred by the many attempts, made over many millennia, to come to terms with the specter of the murdered father: the attempts which make up the history of monotheism and of metaphysics. It will no longer be deferred, Dewey thought, once we come to treat our collective superego, our collective sense of what counts as a moral abomination, as having no authority separate from that of tradition, and when we treat tradition itself as endlessly malleable and revisable by its inheritors.

Conclusion

I have discussed elsewhere James’s and Dewey’s solutions to the problem of reconciling science with theology, and have argued that Dewey was more successful than James in purifying religion of the appeal to authority. This was, I think, because James got a kick out of sublimity – out of the sense of limitlessness whereas Dewey did not. James, in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, is a connoisseur of unusual experiences. His reaction to reports of the rapture of the soul is like his reaction to the experience of the San Francisco earthquake of 1907: he wanted the earthquake to become more intense, to show what it could *really* do.

Dewey seems to have been incapable of such connoisseurship, and of any Bataille-like fascination with the extreme. His taste is for the beautiful. His only acknowledgment of the sublime consists in his hope that the contingently produced series of better and better societies will continue indefinitely into an unimaginably better future. This was the hope that that democracy would produce ever more beautiful forms of human cooperation and mutual enjoyment, ever more complex ways of satisfying novel human needs. Dewey relished the imagined spectacle of every richer, ever more diverse, forms of human fraternity. But he was devoid both of the need to abase himself before authority, and of sympathy with those who find such abasement thrilling. As he saw it, his anti-authoritarianism was a stage in the gradual replacement of a morality of
obligation by a morality of love. This is the replacement which, in the West, is thought to have been initiated by certain passages in the New Testament.5

Notes

1 This section incorporates some material from my article “Pragmatism” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig.

2 For a good example of this contrast within recent anglophone moral philosophy, see some remarks of Thomas Nagel at pp. 206–7 of his “Reply” to Christine Korsgaard, included in Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). There Nagel says that a self-description, a sense of one’s own moral identity – a sense that one could not live with oneself if one performed a certain action – is not a sufficient account of the reason why one should not perform that action. “The real reason,” Nagel says, “is whatever would make it impossible for him to live with himself . . .” Nagel goes on to say that unless there is some non-empirical Kant-style, universalistic, account of what moral identity one should have, then “morality is an illusion.” Dewey, early in his career, rejected Kantian in favor of Hegelian ethics. After he read Darwin, he abandoned Hegelianism in favor of a naturalistic account of the rise of democratic societies and of the emergence of the Enlightenment ideals which Hegel and Kant shared. Eventually his bête noir became the doctrine which Nagel makes explicit: that something less contingent and more universal than the empirical, environmental conditions which shape a human being’s moral identity is necessary if morality is not to be an illusion.

3 See Kant’s hilarious section on the differences between the sexes in his Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Women, according to Kant, cannot act from principle, cannot act morally, because they don’t have any sense for the sublime – they cannot feel the awe which is appropriate before patriarchal authority.


References and further reading


Intelligence and Ethics

HILARY PUTNAM

John Dewey’s Gifford Lectures, published as The Quest for Certainty (LW 4) are among his clearest presentations of his philosophy. Especially impressive in those lectures are the analogies that Dewey (see Dewey) sees between the blinkers that traditional philosophers wear when they discuss epistemology and the blinkers they wear when they discuss ethics. It is, perhaps, in the case of empiricism that these analogies are surprising. We are not surprised to be told that rationalism (in the extended sense of the belief that important truths about the cosmos and about how we are supposed to live in it can be known a priori) receives the same criticism from Dewey whether the subject be the nature of the world, or how human beings should act, or what kind of knowledge is worthy of the name. Dewey’s concern, however, is not just to attack rationalism, but to distinguish himself carefully from traditional empiricism. And here Dewey has some unexpected things to say.

One of these things is that the defects of empiricism are not altogether different from the defects of rationalism. As Dewey puts it (LW 4:144): “Just as sensationalism ignores the functional role and hypothetical status of sensible qualities in an inquiry, so rationalism makes a fixed and independent matter out of the utility of conceptions in directing inquiry to solve particular problems.” Let us see what Dewey means by this claim.

Rationalism, famously, thinks the general form of scientific explanations can be known a priori: we know a priori the laws of geometry and even the fundamental principles of mechanics, according to Descartes, and Kant even attempted a “transcendental deduction” of Newton’s theory of gravity (Friedman 1992, ch. 5). But empiricism equally thinks that the general form of scientific data, indeed of all empirical data, can be known a priori (even if it doesn’t use the term “a priori”). From Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, down to Ernst Mach, empiricists held that all empirical data consists of “sensations,” conceived of as an unconceptualized given against which putative knowledge claims can be checked. Against this William James (see James) had already insisted that while all perceptual experience has both conceptual and non-conceptual aspects, the attempt to divide any experience which is a recognition of something into parts is futile:

Sensations and apperceptive idea fuse here so intimately [in a “presented and recognized material object”] that you can no more tell where one begins and the other ends, than
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you can tell, in those cunning circular panoramas that have lately been exhibited, where the real foreground and the painted canvas join together. (Works ERE, p. 16)

Dewey, continuing the line of thought that James had begun, insists that by creating new observation-concepts we “institute” new data (LW 12:388–9). Modern physics (and of course not only physics) have richly borne him out. A scientist may speak of observing a proton colliding with a nucleus, or of observing a virus with the aid of an electron microscope, or of observing genes or black holes, etc. Neither the form of possible explanations nor the form of possible data can be fixed in advance, once and for all.

Neither James nor Dewey denies the existence of a preconceptual substratum of sensation. But for Dewey – and we will shortly see how he extends this idea to the field of ethics – sensation which is unconceptualized or inadequately conceptualized is problematic; rather than constituting data, evidence, it poses a problem to be solved. So, for example, Dewey writes:

Now so deeply engrained are the conclusions of the old tradition of rationalism versus empiricism that the question will still be raised: What other certification could be given or can now be given for the properties of scientific physical objects save by inferential extension of the universally found properties of all objects of sense perception? Is there any alternative unless we are prepared to fall back upon a priori rational conceptions supposed to bring their own sufficient authority with them?

It is at this point that the recent recognition that the conceptions by which we think scientific objects are derived neither from sense nor from a priori conceptions has its logical and philosophical force. Sense qualities, as we saw in the previous chapter, are something to be known, they are challenges to knowing, setting problems for investigation. . . . For experimental activity or thinking signifies directed activity, doing something which varies the conditions under which objects are directly had, and instituting new arrangements among them. (LW 4:98–9)

And Dewey goes on to explain that the formation of these “conceptions under which we think scientific objects” is inseparable from the discovery of operations to be performed on those objects and of relations between them. “These operations have been continuously refined and elaborated during the history of man on earth,” he writes, “although it is only during the last few centuries that the whole affair of controlled thinking, and of its issue in genuine knowledge, has been seen to be bound up with their selection and determination” (LW 4:99).

Returning to the topic, Dewey writes:

The history of the theory of knowledge or epistemology would have been very different if instead of the word “data” or “givens,” it had happened to start with calling the qualities in question “takens.” Not that the data are not existential and qualities of the ultimately “given” – that is, the total subject matter which is had in non-cognitive experiences. But as data they are selected from this total original subject-matter which gives the impetus to knowing; they are discriminated for a purpose; – that, namely, of affording signs or evidence to define and locate a problem, and thus give a clew to its resolution. (LW 4:142–3)

A corollary of this criticism is that both rationalism and empiricism fail to see the extent to which scientific discoveries can be radically novel – and to see that the novelty can concern the form of what we take to be framework principles (geometry,
deterministic causality, contact action), the range of what we take to be observable qualities of things, and even the notion of what constitutes a scientific object. Against both rationalism and empiricism, Dewey calls upon us to admit “the hypothetical status of all data and premises” (LW 4:147).

The Analogous Situation in Ethics

The penultimate chapter of *The Quest for Certainty* describes the situation with philosophies of ethics, and, as I began by saying, Dewey finds it analogous to the situation in theory of knowledge. That rationalists are apriorists in ethics as well as in metaphysics is evident. But what is the problem with empiricism? What is the mistake that Dewey thinks empiricists make in ethics, and that is analogous to their confusion of unconceptualized sensible qualities with data in theory of knowledge?

As far back as 1908, in the first edition of Dewey’s and Tufts’s *Ethics* (MW 5), Bentham’s version of utilitarianism was Dewey’s chief example of the failure of classical empiricism to have an adequate conception of what it should mean to be his kind of empiricist, an *experimental* empiricist, in ethics. In *The Quest for Certainty* Dewey does not mention Bentham by name, but the defects he enumerates in empiricist ethics are clearly the defects he found in utilitarianism in particular. And chief among those defects was the following: Just as (classical) empiricism mistakenly takes unconceptualized sensations to be *data*, whereas the fact is that the less we are able to conceptualize a sensation the more it represents a mere *problem*, an impetus to investigation at best, rather than a piece of evidence, so utilitarianism mistakenly takes mere enjoyments to be values, things which ought to be sought, whereas, according to Dewey, the fact is that the less we understand an enjoyment, the less we know about what brought it into existence and about its possible future effects (and its relations to other actual and possible enjoyments and discomforts and their causes and effects), the more it represents a mere problem, an impetus to investigation rather than a value. Here is how Dewey himself draws the analogy:

I shall not object to this empirical theory [utilitarianism] in so far as it connects the theory of values with concrete experiences of desire and satisfaction. The idea that there is such a connection is the only way known to me by which the pallid remoteness of the rationalistic theory, and the only too glaring presence of the institutional theory of transcendental values [the appeal to the authority of traditional religious doctrines is meant] can be escaped. The objection is that the theory in question holds down value to objects antecedently enjoyed, apart from reference to the method by which they came into existence; it takes values which are causal [i.e., contingent] because unregulated by intelligent operations to be values in and of themselves. Operational thinking needs to be applied to judgments of values just as it has now finally been applied in conceptions of physical objects. Experimental empiricism in the field of good and bad is needed to meet the conditions of the present situation. (LW 4:206)

And similarly:

The analogy between the status of the theory of values and the theory of ideas about natural objects before the rise of experimental inquiry may be carried further. The
sensationalistic theory of the origin and the test of thought evoked, by way of reaction, the transcendental theory of a priori ideas. For it failed utterly to account for object connection, order and regularity in objects observed. Similarly, any doctrine that identifies the mere fact of being liked with the value of the object liked so fails to give direction to conduct when direction is needed that it automatically calls forth the assertion that there are values eternally in Being that are the standard of all judgments and the obligatory ends of all action. Without the introduction of operational thinking, we oscillate between a theory that in order to save the objectivity of judgments of value, isolates them from experience and nature, and a theory that, in order to save their human significance, reduces them to mere statements about our own feelings. (LW 4:210)

Dewey’s way of making this more precise involves trying to carry out the task that, in his view, utilitarianism had not been able to carry out (although Mill made a famous attempt): distinguishing between the desired and the desirable, or, as Dewey often preferred to say, between the valued and the valuable. We have already indicated how Dewey drew this distinction: the fundamental idea was to distinguish between what is valued in the sense of evoking a mere feeling of liking or enjoyment, and that which has been critically evaluated and studied. Only when we have acquired knowledge of the relevant causes and effects and relations does what is valued become valuable or what is satisfying become satisfactory. Or, as Dewey himself puts it:

To say that something satisfies is to report an isolated finality. To say that it is satisfactory is to define it in its connections and interactions. The fact that it pleases or is immediately congenial poses a problem to judgment. How shall the satisfaction be rated? Is it a value or is it not? Is it something to be prized and cherished, to be enjoyed? Not stern moralists alone but everyday experience informs us that finding satisfaction in a thing may be a warning, a summons to be on the lookout for consequences. To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing "will do". It involves a prediction: it contemplates a future in which the thing will continue to serve. It will do. It asserts a consequence the thing will actively institute: it will do. That it is satisfying is the content of a judgment of fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. It denotes an attitude to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and make secure. (LW 4:208)

What to Make of All This

The idea of drawing an analogy between the overly simple way in which utilitarianism conceives of value and the overly simple way in which classical sensationalistic empiricism conceives of experience is one I find very attractive. But the way in which Dewey draws the distinction between the valued and the valuable (and there are many similar passages in his writing, in the two editions of Ethics (MW 5 and LW 7) and also elsewhere) raises many problems, including problems of interpretation.

In general, what makes Dewey’s interpretation hard is that in any one work he tends to stress one criticism of traditional views, leaving other criticisms (and the aspects of his own positive views that he brings out when he makes those other criticisms of the traditional views) to other works. The result is that it is hard to get a satisfactory idea of his entire ethical thinking from any one work, unless it be the first
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1908 edition of *Ethics* – and even the second 1932 edition fails to fully reflect Dewey’s mature conception of inquiry, in part precisely because it is a revision of a much earlier work. Robert Westbrook has remarked that in a paper setting forth an argument defending democracy that I find in Dewey (I called it an “epistemological argument for democracy”), I put together pieces that are genuinely in Dewey in a way Dewey would have agreed with, but that the argument was never explicitly stated by Dewey himself in the way I gave it (Putnam 1994). As Westbrook puts it:

So when Putnam says “one can find” an “epistemological argument for democracy” in Dewey’s work, what he must mean is that one can reconstruct or piece together such an argument, an argument for which Dewey provided the elements but which he never put together himself. Putnam is thus not making an argument like many of Rorty’s, which he knows Dewey would not have made, but he is making an argument Dewey did not make. Yet Putnam is in effect saying that Dewey could have made this argument, and I think he is correct. (1998, p. 130)

This chapter is another part of this continuing effort on my part to “reconstruct or piece together” Dewey’s arguments from his many different writings, and I will be content if once again a reader as perceptive and as versed with the whole of Dewey’s corpus of writings as Westbrook will be able to agree that “Dewey could have made this argument.”

Here is a first effort – one that fits a good deal of “The Construction of Good” (*LW* 4:203–28), but one that, I will argue, cannot be adequate to Dewey’s view. Suppose, to use language not too far from Dewey’s own, we call an enjoyment, or the satisfaction of an interest, evaluated if one has adequately inquired into the ways it was brought about and into its consequences, and, as was said before, the relation of all of these to the causes and consequences of the other enjoyments and woes that one knows of. One way of interpreting the criticism of utilitarianism that we quoted above – that “it takes values which are casual because unregulated by intelligent operations to be values in and of themselves” – would be to suppose that Dewey is proposing to replace the classical utilitarian maxim of seeking to produce “the greatest happiness of the largest possible number” with a maxim directing one to seek “the greatest amount of intelligently evaluated enjoyment on the part of the largest possible number.” But this cannot be right.

If there is a central theme in Dewey’s ethics (and all of Dewey’s work is in one way or another connected with “ethics”) it is that the application of intelligence to moral problems is itself a moral obligation. Stated so baldly, the insight may sound uncontroversial. “Who would deny that?” one thinks. But, as we shall see, Dewey thinks that just about every moral philosophy known to him in one way or another does either deny or misconstrue precisely this obligation. Think of those who today believe that abortion is always wrong simply on the authority of the Catholic Church. (I do not mean to suggest that one could not think that abortion is wrong on other grounds, nor that there aren’t Catholics who think that abortion is wrong on the basis of reasoned arguments.) But those for whom it is simply an article of faith that the Church must be right on moral issues have, in the view of Dewey (as well as all the other pragmatists), “blocked the path of inquiry.” They have reverted to what Charles Peirce (see *Peirce*) called “The
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Method of Authority.” And such a reversion is a denial of the obligation to use intelligence, in Dewey’s sense of active, fallibilistic, experimental inquiry in moral questions. Obviously, utilitarians would agree with Dewey in rejecting appeals to revelation and/or authority as the last court of appeal in ethical matters. And Bentham certainly preached the use of intelligence in dealing with ethical issues. Indeed, like Dewey, Bentham and his followers constantly advised us to use intelligence to figure out how to advance the common good. Moreover, if Dewey’s proposal were merely to substitute “evaluated enjoyment” for “enjoyment” in the utilitarian injunction to seek the common good understood as a maximum of enjoyment, then Bentham could obviously accept it as a “friendly amendment.” But that isn’t Dewey’s proposal at all, because his uses of “enjoy” and its derivatives (as well as “satisfy” and its derivatives) have nothing to do with Benthamite notions of enjoyment, satisfaction, and the like. And, in Dewey’s view, what issues from the mistaken Benthamite conceptions of enjoyment, satisfaction, etc., is a fundamentally unsound conception of both (a) the common good and (b) our motives for seeking it. Benthamite utilitarianism cannot guide us in intelligently seeking the common good both because it cannot enable us to understand what the common good is, and because it makes it unintelligible that one should be motivated to seek it when doing so interferes with one’s own pleasure. It is worth spelling out these criticisms in more detail.

The Inadequacy of Benthamite “Pleasure”

Dewey is so little studied in Anglo-American philosophy departments today that the first argument I am going to review would, if mentioned in an ethics class in one of the major doctoral-granting institutions together with the question “which philosopher used this argument?” probably evoke the answer “Robert Nozick.” The argument I have in mind is one to the effect that our desire for happiness is not a desire for merely the subjective feeling that our interests and goals have been satisfied, but for their actual satisfaction in the real world.

Here is Nozick’s statement of the argument:

Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life’s experiences? If you are worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your life’s experiences for the next two years. After two years have passed, you will have ten minutes out of the tank to select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank you won’t know that you’re there. You’ll think it’s actually happening. Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service the machine if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?” (1974, pp. 42–3)
And Nozick answers his own question:

What does matter to us in addition to our experiences? First, we want to do certain things and not just have the experience of doing them. In the case of certain experiences, it is only because first we want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them or thinking we’ve done them. . . . A second reason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob. There is no answer to the question what a person is like who has been long in the tank. Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not merely that it’s difficult to tell; there’s no way he is. Plugging into the machine is a kind of suicide. It will seem to some, trapped by a picture, that nothing about what we are like can matter except as it gets reflected in our experiences. But should it be surprising that what we are is important to us? Why should we be concerned only with how our time is filled, but not with what we are? (Ibid., pp. 43–5)

Perhaps a few exceptionally erudite graduate students may also recall that, in a book which also has a reference to anarchism in its title, Robert Paul Wolff (1970) had raised a similar question and given similar answers (without the lovely thought-experiment of the experience machine, however).

However, this point was anticipated, and plays a crucial role, in Dewey and Tufts’ *Ethics*. Dewey arrives at the following three conclusions about happiness:

The net result of our discussion is, then, (1) that happiness consists in the fulfillment in the appropriate objects (or the anticipation of such fulfillment) of the powers of the self manifested in desires, purposes, efforts; (2) true happiness consists in the satisfaction of those powers of the self which are of higher quality; (3) that the man of good character, the one in whom these high powers are already active, is the judge, in the concrete, of happiness and misery. (MW 5:256)

Then Dewey immediately proceeds to contrast this conception of happiness “with the notion that it is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or feeling.” He describes essentially the “picture” that Nozick describes some of us as “trapped by,” according to which “nothing about what we are like can matter except as it gets reflected in our experiences” in the following words:

[On the conception according to which happiness is a sum or collection of separate states of sensation or feeling] it is the pleasure alone, when dissociated, which is the real end of conduct, an object being at best an external means of securing it. It is the pleasurable feeling which happens to be associated with food, with music, with a landscape, that makes it good; health, art, are not good in themselves. The other view [Dewey’s] holds that pleasure has no such existence by itself; that it is only a name for the pleasant object; that by pleasure is meant the agreement or congruity which exists between some capacity of the agent and some objective fact in which this capacity is realized. (MW 5:257)

The work that this “externalist” conception of happiness as the satisfaction, actual or anticipated, of a capacity of an agent by an “objective fact,” as opposed to the “internalist” conception of happiness as a mere subjective feeling, does for Dewey’s critique of utilitarianism is enormous. In the utilitarian conception, as Dewey writes: “When happiness is conceived of as an aggregate of states of feeling, these are regarded
as homogenous in quality, different from one another only in intensity and duration. Their qualitative differences are not intrinsic, but are due to the different objects with which they are associated (as pleasures of hearing, or vision). Hence they disappear when the pleasure is taken by itself as an end" (ibid.).

This disappearance of the qualitative differences (as far as importance to the agent’s “happiness” is concerned) is, of course, just what makes it possible for the utilitarian to speak of “summing” pleasures, “maximizing” them, etc. But if Dewey is right, and if, as he writes, “agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent” (ibid.), then “of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another” (ibid.)

And Dewey continues:

Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect of character which they express. But if the good is only a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as good as any other – the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindness, simply as pleasure. (MW 5:257–8)

Not only does Dewey anticipate the point made by Wolff and Nozick that what we want in life is not mere feelings (otherwise we would all choose Nozick’s experience machine) but the objective fulfillment of desires, capacities, and efforts, but he also anticipates Nozick’s point that “what we are is important to us.” As Dewey writes: “Not only the ‘good’, but the more vigorous and hearty of the ‘bad’, would scorn a life in which character, selfhood, had no significance, and where the experimental discovery and testing of destiny had no place” (MW 5:275).

We have now seen one of the respects in which Bentham’s conception of the general good is hopelessly defective. The advice to use our intelligence in “maximizing” the general good, so conceived, misdirects us if we seek to obey Dewey’s injunction – the central injunction in his writing over a lifetime that stretched from 1859 to 1952 – to apply our intelligence to securing the common good. The Benthamite good is a wholly fictitious “sum” of “pleasures” conceived of as “homogenous in quality.” But the enjoyments and satisfactions we actually want are not homogeneous in quality, and the notion of simply “adding” them and seeing how large the “sum” is makes no sense.

In addition, if each agent is conceived as activated by the motive of her own “pleasure,” no satisfactory account can be given of why the “pleasure” we take (all of us some of the time, and a few of us most of the time) in the welfare of other people, conceived of simply as a feeling homogeneous with all of the other pleasures, should override the other pleasures, even when great sacrifice or real temptation are involved. Here Dewey undertakes a fascinating critique of Bentham’s notion of “sympathy”; we shall look at this critique shortly.

I have recounted why Dewey cannot regard the utilitarians as having already satisfactorily anticipated his ethical demand for the application of intelligence to ethical issues and problems. They are trapped, in his view, in a hopeless philosophical anthropology. What of the Kantians?
Although part of Dewey’s criticism of Kant seems to be both right and important, I must confess that at other points Dewey’s treatment of Kant seems to me uncharitable. The fact is, that there are points at which Dewey himself sounds “Kantian.” Yet even at those points there are also subtle but important differences from Kant. To set the stage for assessing both the similarities and the differences, I need to consider Dewey’s view of sympathy (which means returning, for a moment, to his critique of utilitarianism). Another reason for considering Dewey’s remarks on this topic is that today there is a whole school of thought called “evolutionary psychology” (formerly known as “sociobiology”) which likes to claim that it has offered an evolutionary explanation of our moral lives when all it has offered is an account of the evolution of sympathetic feelings, sociable impulses, and the like. No clearer account of the difference between moral lives and sympathetic feelings has ever been written than the following words by Dewey:

Sympathy is a genuine natural instinct, varying in intensity in different individuals. It is a precious instrumentality for the development of social insight and socialized affection; but in and of itself it is on the same plane as any natural endowment. It may lead to sentimentality or to selfishness: the individual may shrink from scenes of misery because of the pain they cause him, or may seek jovial companions because of the sympathetic pleasures he gets. Or he may be moved by sympathy to labor for the good of others, but, because of lack of deliberation and thoughtfulness, be quite ignorant of what their good really is, and do a great deal of harm. . . . Again instinctive sympathy is partial: it may attach itself to those of blood kin or to immediate associates in such a way as to favor them at the expense of others, and lead to positive injustice to those beyond the charmed circle. (MW 5:271–2)

Dewey is not attacking sympathy as such. What he calls for is a transformation of sympathy. Like Aristotle, he believes that the reasons for being ethical are not apparent from a non-ethical or pre-ethical standpoint; one must be educated into the ethical life, and this means that one’s interests must be transformed. In that process, Dewey tells us, one does not simply acquire an interest in helping other people alongside of and independent of one’s various interests in art, in work, in recreation, etc.; rather all of those interests are likewise transformed. How? In Dewey’s account, sympathy is transformed by being “fused” with our other impulses, and our other impulses and interests are transformed by being “fused” with sympathy. As he writes:

What is required is a blending, a fusing of the sympathetic tendencies with all the other impulses and habitual traits of the self. When interest in power is permeated with an affectionate impulse, it is protected from being a tendency to dominate and tyrannize; it becomes an interest in effectiveness of regard for common ends. When an interest in artistic or scientific objects is similarly fused, it loses the indifferent and coldly impersonal character which marks the specialist as such, and becomes an interest in the adequate aesthetic and intellectual development of the conditions of a common life. Sympathy does not merely associate one of these tendencies with another; still less does it make one a means to the
other’s ends. It so intimately permeates them as to transform both into a new and moral interest. (MW 5:272)

Dewey concludes the section by writing: “It is sympathy transformed into a habitual standpoint which satisfies the demand for a standpoint which will render the person interested in foresight of all obscure consequences [as opposed to the untransformed natural instinct of sympathy to which Bentham appealed]” (MW 5:273).

The reason that I see this as both like and unlike Kant is the following: On the one hand, the person whose impulses have been transformed in this way, the Deweyan moral person, automatically treats the ends of others as something other than mere means: he thinks in terms of “we” rather than simply “me.” Thus he obeys the Kingdom of Ends formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (always to regard the humanity in the other as an end, and not merely as a means). But Dewey’s account of the moral motivation is quite different from Kant’s. For Kant, it is the “dignity” of obeying “the moral law” that is the motive (which means, ultimately, the “dignity” of giving myself a law that all other rational beings can also give themselves, the dignity of “autonomy”) that is the motive. For Dewey, there is no separate, and certainly no uniquely transcendent, moral motivation that we have to postulate, only our pluralistic and disparate but morally transformed interests and aspirations. The Kantian dualism of “reason” and “inclination” is rejected from the beginning:

It is impossible to draw any fixed line between the content of the moral good and of natural satisfaction. The end, the right and only right end, of man, lies in the fullest and freest realization of powers in their appropriate objects. The good consists of friendship, family and political relations, economic utilization of mechanical resources, science, art, in all their complex and variegated forms and elements. There is no separate and rival moral good; no separate empty and rival “good will.” (MW 5:273)

Yet Kant’s Categorical Imperative is not by any means useless, in Dewey’s view. As he writes:

No sensible person would question the instructiveness of this scheme in the concrete. It indicates that the value of reason – of abstraction and generalization – in conduct is to help us escape from the partiality that flows from desire and emotion in their first and superficial manifestations, and to attain a more unified and permanent end. As a method (though not of course the only one) of realizing the full meaning of a proposed course of action, nothing could be better than asking ourselves how we should like to be committed forever to its principle: how we should like to have others committed to it, and to treat us according to it? . . . In short, by generalizing a purpose, we make its general character evident.

But this method does not proceed (as Kant would have it) from a mere consideration of the moral law apart from a concrete end, but from an end insofar as it persistently approves itself to reflection after an adequate survey of it in all its bearings. (MW 5:283–4; italics in original)

In this last remark, Dewey follows an old (and uncharitable) interpretation of Kant, according to which our specific duties are supposed to follow, almost deductively, from
the categorical imperative. A more generous interpretation on which the Categorical Imperative functions as a test, very much in the way that Dewey describes, rather than an a single postulate from which all of morality is to be derived, has long been defended by John Rawls and by those influenced by him (including Barbara Herman and Christine Korsgaard). But the point that the Categorical Imperative cannot be, for a pragmatist, the sole test (or even, in every context, the best test) remains, as does the repudiation of Kant’s dualist moral psychology.

One could go on and consider, as Dewey did, yet other schools with which Dewey was familiar and with which we are familiar (e.g., ethical intuitionism, which also makes moral motivation something “non-natural” and hence mysterious). But I trust my point will have been made. If we understand “intelligence” as Dewey did, as experimental intelligence directed to the achievement of ends which are continuous with our biologically given impulses, but not simply at the service of untransformed impulses (or “pleasure”), then the idea that it is ethically important that we employ intelligence in the pursuit of the common good is by no means an idea that “everyone already accepts.” Dewey has good reason to think that he is urging something new as well as important. And to come back to our starting point, if Dewey stresses the process I called “evaluation” in *Ethics* and in many other places as well, it is because evaluation is the essential step in applying intelligence to the pursuit of the common good. But evaluation does not by itself make us moral beings; it is the transformation of character that Dewey described in *Ethics* that does that.

**Conclusion**

Dewey thematized the application of intelligence to moral life throughout his long philosophical career. In this chapter, I have mainly explored one aspect of that thematization: his criticism of orthodox utilitarian conceptions of what the application of intelligence to ethical problems consists in, and of both utilitarian and Kantian accounts of moral motivation. But of course Dewey has much more to say; in particular, he has a conception of what Westbrook (1998, pp. 138–9) suggests we call “deliberative democracy”. My aim here has not been to give an exhaustive account of Dewey’s ethical theory, but to further our understanding of it, by distinguishing it from the best known ethical theory which makes similar claims to having shown us how to apply intelligence to our moral and political lives.

**References and further reading**


Introduction

Pragmatist are empiricists, only more so. Pragmatists hold not only, as do all empiricists, that our knowledge of the world rests on experience; they also demand that our philosophical claims should rest on experience and thus be liable to empirical refutation. When philosophers appeal to actual human experience, pragmatists believe, they will see that what is experienced is not limited to what is apprehended by the five senses, that it includes enjoying and suffering in multiple ways, and that these are indeed the origins of many of our values. Again, taking experience as it is actually experienced, pragmatists note that experiencing is doing as well as cognizing. Moreover, insofar as doing involves foresight doing involves having ends-in-view, that is to say, values. On this rich notion of experience pragmatists develop a theory of valuation that explains how our value judgments can be objective without being reduced to some limited “value-free” vocabulary. I shall develop such a theory of valuation in the next section. What has been said about experience, scant though it is, must suffice; more on this subject is to be found elsewhere in this volume.

Pragmatists are democrats, only more so. Pragmatists endorse not only political democracy, as do all democrats, they also insist on social, liberal, and pluralistic democracy. William James (see James) and John Dewey (see Dewey) engaged actively in constructive criticisms of our democratic institutions as they existed in their times, and that tradition has been carried forward by Hilary Putnam (see Putnam) and Richard Rorty (see Rorty), to name just two contemporaries. That commitment to democracy in a wide sense follows, I believe, from the conception of value inquiry as empirical inquiry, although one might share the commitment to democracy without accepting the account of values I shall present. John Rawls, surely the foremost political philosopher of the twentieth century, was not a pragmatist, yet his conception of justice as fairness is a conception of democracy in a wide sense (Rawls 1971). Moreover, although Rorty does not agree with my account of value inquiry, his commitment to democracy in a wide sense is beyond dispute (Rorty 1998). In the final section of this chapter I shall sketch a conception of democracy as it relates to my account of value inquiry.
One additional preliminary remark is called for. The account of value inquiry that I shall present here is opposed to major trends in ethical theory. Throughout most of the twentieth century and to this day, non-cognitivism, either in the form of expressivism (emotivism) or in the form of relativism, has been the favored philosophical accounts of moral judgments or of value judgments in general (Gibbard 1990; Williams 1985). However, non-cognitivism fails to account, is unable to account, for the importance of moral and other values in our lives. Of course, I am not suggesting that non-cognitivists cannot or do not lead exemplary moral lives; some of the most admirable human beings I have known were non-cognitivists. I am suggesting that such people hold one set of beliefs in the study and another outside. The pragmatist account of value inquiry is also opposed to aprioristic ethics; such theories flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and have appeared again here and there at the present time. Those theories fail to account for the moral anguish one experiences when one’s ethical values conflict, and insofar as such theories support fanaticism, they stifle moral growth. Again, I cast no aspersions on the moral character of particular proponents of such positions.

In contrast, James and Dewey developed their philosophies precisely in response to the passionate desire to make sense of our moral lives, of the importance of moral values as well as the anguish caused by value conflict. I believe that this desire, this moral impulse, as I have called it elsewhere, explains their metaphysical and epistemological positions as well as their account of value inquiry. Epistemological and ontological matters are discussed elsewhere in this volume. Here it is appropriate merely to state baldly that moral concerns make sense only if we experience a common world and have some control over our actions. For example, my taking care not to step on your toe makes sense only if (a) the toe I would step on is indeed the same toe as that in which you would feel pain, and (b) I have some control over my actions and thus over your experiences. These are, however, beliefs that we normally do not articulate; they constitute a set of silent presuppositions. Better, they are perspectives from which we experience ourselves and the world in which we live.

Values

One is tempted to ask, “Where do our values come from?” That temptation ought to be resisted. The question suggests that values are some sort of entities that come from somewhere, as pineapples come from Hawaii. In a world without sentient beings there might be pineapples, but neither pineapples nor anything else would be valued. Sentient beings value things, states of affairs, other sentient beings and themselves, character traits, actions, etc. I say “sentient beings,” because clearly the animals we know best – our various pets – value food (and some foods more than others), warmth, attention from their human companions, etc. Some values are shared by all animals including us humans; others are unique to a single individual; most fall somewhere in between. To say that animals “value” certain things is not a misplaced anthropomorphism; it is meant to draw attention to the fact that to value something is sometimes simply to react to it in certain characteristic ways. To seek it, to protect it from others, or to shun it or attack it.
Things have value because someone values them, but that is not to say that value judgments are subjective, or mere expressions of feelings (emotions, attitudes). On the contrary, in this section I shall, following James and Dewey, argue that value judgments, in particular moral judgments, can be and often are objective, just as perceptual judgments can be and often are objective. Of course, some value judgments and some perceptual judgments are subjective, and some of these are even acknowledged to be so. But I am here concerned with objectivity.

Some things that we value (positively or negatively) simply befall us and we react with delight or with disgust, with interest or with boredom, with love or hate, with fear or with feeling safe, etc. And these reactions in turn shape how we experience the world: an insecure person mistakes many innocent comments as negative criticisms. But we are not condemned passively to accept our reactions, they are themselves subject to criticism and revision. Thus one may be disgusted with one’s own unreasonable fear and “talk oneself out of it.” Others will also criticize one’s likes and dislikes, one’s enthusiasms, one’s behavior. In short, one’s valuations will be evaluated. I follow here Dewey’s Theory of Valuation (LW 13:191–250). This is how we differ from animals; we do not merely suffer or enjoy. Though there are times when we react instinctively, often we think before we act. We inquire into the causes and consequences of our sufferings and enjoyments, into how to prevent or lessen the former and bring about or extend the latter. In short, we are intelligent agents.

We value many kinds of things – we admire or despise some people and are indifferent to most; we praise or condemn some conduct; we take delight in some works of art; we work hard to earn an advanced degree. There are many kinds of values: moral values, aesthetic values, economic values, etc. Just as we trust our perceptions unless we have specific reasons to doubt them, so we trust our unreflective valuations unless we have specific reasons to doubt them. But our interests extend far beyond sense perception, the satisfaction of urgent bodily needs, and immediate emotional reactions. So we have sciences (physical, social, historical); we have arts and literature; we have religion; we have philosophy. We have morality and politics.

William James wrote: “I cannot understand the willingness to act, no matter how we feel, without the belief that acts are really good or bad” (Works WB, p. 135). He meant that one must believe that the world will be, in however small a way, really better if one chooses one way and really worse if one chooses another. Although the remark just quoted introduced James’s argument for free will, I shall use it, as he might as well have done, to defend the objectivity of (some) moral judgments. So used, the force of “really” is that it is not just in one’s own estimation that the world will be better or worse. For if one believes that the difference matters only in one’s own estimation, one succumbs more easily to the temptation not to do what one believes to be one’s duty. For when one succumbs to the temptation not to do what one believes to be one’s duty, one tends to tell oneself in some way or other that what one is not doing is really not one’s duty. But those thoughts are second thoughts; the first thought, in the sort of case I have in mind, is simply, “This is what I ought to do.” In these cases, taking those first thoughts to be as reliable as the evidence of our senses, that is, reliable unless there are specific reasons for doubt, is an important defense against temptation. Thus, for example, one knows that one ought to finish grading those student papers rather than go to the movies.
DEMOCRACY AND VALUE INQUIRY

I do not, of course, claim that the thought that one ought to finish grading those papers is as unmediated as the baby’s rejection of a bitter-tasting medicine, or even as unlearned as one’s own pity on seeing a person in pain. Morality, as Dewey said more than once, is social. Convictions and commitments are often the result of deliberation, reflection, inquiry; yet some of our deepest convictions may be rooted in lessons learned in childhood. The same is true of the principles that guide our conduct and the norms that have become habits, virtuous or otherwise. Dewey’s distinction between customary and reflective morality is useful here (MW 5:160–83). When one begins to engage in moral inquiry, one stands already within a customary morality consisting partly of one’s society’s mores and partly of the principles and values modeled and taught by one’s parents. Though we may criticize, modify, or even to some extent reject outright the morality we are taught as children, we would not have become the moral beings we are, were it not for those moral starting points.

Some remarks concerning the role of moral principles or norms may be in order here. First, it is worth noting that one is often far clearer concerning a particular case than one is concerning the “principle” that seems to justify one’s judgment. Indeed, the principle may on examination prove to be flawed, while one’s judgment concerning the particular case remains unchanged. Thus I continue to admire the young Americans who joined the Canadian Airforce in order to fight against Nazi Germany while the United States was still neutral. Yet I fail to formulate an acceptable principle that would justify their actions and, thus, my admiration. Nevertheless, failure to find a principle that would justify one’s action should give one pause; should prompt moral inquiry. Being deeply committed to a cause or a goal, one may become convinced that some action is essential to its realization; one may find the very idea of refraining from that action inconceivable. This may be all to the good; reflection may undermine one’s courage to do what needs to be done. On the other hand, when the action under consideration runs counter to one’s moral principles, failure even to conceive of alternatives may lead to horrific consequences. Great crimes have been and continue to be committed in the name of patriotism or religion; and at least sometimes the perpetrators are genuinely convinced that they have no choice.

What then prompts value inquiry, and in particular moral inquiry? Inquiry, any inquiry, as Dewey points out, is prompted when one finds oneself in a problematic or indeterminate situation. How such a situation will develop is not clear and may depend wholly or in part on what one does. I am inclined to think that in all inquiry value judgments will play a role, but often values are not the point of the inquiry. For in every inquiry many things are fixed, many beliefs are taken for granted, and often the relevant value judgments are among those beliefs. Research scientists, for example, take for granted the importance of their fields and the reliability of their research methods. The point of their inquiries is to add to our knowledge: the value of that aim is not in question. Nevertheless, they will have occasion to judge the accuracy of their data, the relevance of other scientists’ findings to their own work, etc. This “entanglement of facts and values,” as Hilary Putnam (2002) calls it, shows that there is no such thing as a completely value-free science. Unless at least some value judgments are objective, science itself is not objective. But, someone may object, the values to which scientists appeal in their work are not moral values; they are epistemic values. The objector may well be prepared to grant the objectivity of epistemic values, while
insisting on the subjectivity of moral values and on their irrelevance to scientific knowledge. However, moral judgments do influence what is known; they play a role in determining the subjects to be investigated and, in some cases, whether certain research methods are morally permissible and hence used. Thus, scientists have to justify the value to society or to their employers of the work they propose to do, and research involving human subjects must pass certain requirements designed to protect the subjects. In short, unless these moral judgments are objective, the objectivity of science is called into question.

Inquiries into values of various kinds are relevant to one’s conduct; the upshot of such inquiries are what Dewey called “Judgments of Practice” (MW 8:14–82). They are judgments that advise, suggest, demand, warn against, prohibit, etc. certain conduct. Writ large, they are recommendations, decisions, orders, legislation, policies. As mentioned above, such judgments are made when one finds oneself in a situation of uncertain outcome, where one’s action (or some relevant person’s action) will make a difference to the future, at least in some limited respect. A major accident blocks my usual way to work; I must choose one of several alternative routes. If time is limited, I will take what I hope will be the fastest route. If time is not an issue, I may choose a longer but more scenic route that I normally do not allow myself to take. The upshot of my deliberations is a judgment of practice. Note, by the way, that, were I less conscientious, I might have been tempted to abandon my attempt to go to work.

In my example, and in numerous others that spring to mind, the goal to be reached appears not to be in question – to cure the patient, to make a profit, to earn a higher degree – the question appears to be only how best to reach that goal. But that appearance is misleading. One discovers, as one considers what measures to take to reach one’s goal, that these means have a price. If I take the faster route, I give up the rare pleasure of driving along the ocean. If I take the scenic route, I give up some time during which I could have read an article by a colleague, as I had planned before I discovered my usual route was blocked. My goal turns out to be not simply to reach my office, but to improve my mood or my mind. Dewey used the term “ends-in-view” in place of “goal” or “end” in order to draw our attention to the fact that our goals do not enter into our deliberations as unalterable fixed points to be unflinchingly pursued. Rather, our ends-in-view are themselves provisional, subject to change as we consider the means by which to attain them and the costs of those means. In fact, our ends-in-view are themselves “means,” for they give direction to our inquiry and limit its scope.

My example was trivial. But the point, one that Dewey made again and again, is far from trivial. Non-cognitivist philosophers tend to say that while judgments concerning the goodness of ends are neither true nor false, are mere expressions of one’s feelings, judgments concerning means, i.e., judgments of the form “A is a means to B,” or even “A is an efficient (or elegant, or inexpensive, or . . . ) means to B,” have truth values, for they assert a causal connection between A and B, and assertions concerning causal relations can be confirmed or disconfirmed. I want to reject both contentions. First, as already stated, our ends do not simply befall us; we are not the helpless victims of our own feelings of attraction or repulsion, desire or aversion, etc. Even when we are passive as, for instance, in listening to music, our tastes can and will be formed; we may become more discerning, more critical, or more appreciative of a
certain type of music or of a particular performance of a particular piece. When we are agents, when what will happen depends (in part) on us, we re-evaluate the state of affairs we wish to (help) bring about as we consider the means we should have to employ. That process of re-evaluation will continue not only as long as one is working toward the end-in-view, but also after it has been attained. William James considered becoming a painter, studied painting for a year, and decided to turn to a career in science. He became a physician, but did not practice medicine. He became instead a distinguished psychologist and philosopher. The point of this example is not to denigrate those who pursue their goals with single-minded effort – my mention earlier of the young American flyers should prevent that misunderstanding – the point is simply to draw attention to the fact that the process of evaluation need not, and sometimes does not, come to an end when the end-in-view has been attained. Of course, the fact that goals can be re-evaluated after they have been attained does not mean that they should be so re-evaluated in all or even in most cases. Most individuals who earn a medical degree go on to practice medicine or engage in medical research; their goals, once achieved, become part of the situation in which their lives go on.

Just as it is false to say judgments concerning ends cannot be warranted, it is false to say that judgments concerning means are mere descriptions of causal relationships. A woman has suffered an incapacitating stroke; her husband has to decide how to provide for her care. Should she be moved into a nursing home, or should he arrange for a practical nurse to come for several hours a day while he plays an active role in her care during the other hours? Of course, there are financial issues. Let us suppose those issues are not decisive. Is the man willing to take on responsibilities that he has never had to face? Is he capable, temperamentally and physically, of undertaking the task? How would the woman respond to being moved out of her home? Or, were she to stay at home, would she see herself as a “burden” on her husband? These considerations and others have to be weighed against each other. And what is the end-in-view? Physical comfort of the patient? Emotional support for her? Peace of mind of the husband? All of these?

Dewey spoke of a means–ends continuum. Hilary Putnam speaks of the entanglement of facts and values. What is at issue is the objectivity of value judgments. William James pointed out that truth requires a standard outside the thinker. The point is perfectly general, although he made it in his discussion of moral philosophy (Works WB, pp. 141–62). Consider the general point first. We take as our paradigm of objectivity the physical sciences. That objectivity is often said to be due to their content; scientific truths are not relative to the perspective of the observer or theoretician. That claim presupposes a narrow notion of perspective. We have an interest in knowledge that is non-perspectival in this narrow sense. But that interest itself provides a perspective that excludes from view much that makes life worth living. Thus, it is not the content of the sciences that should be taken as a model for objectivity; it is their methods. Specifically, what makes for objectivity is the willingness to revise one’s judgments in the face of discordant experience – that is, fallibilism. By emphasizing the entanglement of facts and value, or of means and ends, one makes it possible to be fallibilist about value judgments, including moral judgments.

A second characteristic often associated with objectivity is intersubjectivity. Thus it is often said that in the sciences we can reach agreement but in morals, and even more so in politics, we cannot. This objection to the sort of view I am defending is too
facile. At most one can say that in the sciences competent investigators tend to come to an agreement within a relatively short while, though in the case of major scientific revolutions that while may well be a human generation. Once a theory has been generally accepted, acceptance becomes itself a criterion of competence. In every day life, as psychologists have pointed out repeatedly, descriptions of, say, accident scenes differ widely between equally unbiased observers. Indeed, whenever one has to rely on memory, and especially when emotions are involved, agreement concerning “what really happened” is harder to attain than non-cognitivist philosophers acknowledge.

On the other hand, while spectacular and apparently intractable moral and political disagreements do, alas, occur with tragic consequences, there are wide-reaching agreements not only within but also across cultures. Moreover, the boundaries between cultures are by no means as impervious as relativists imagine them to be (Moody-Adams 1997). In any case, while in the sciences we can, and indeed we must, be satisfied with agreement between competent investigators, on moral and political questions we seek agreement at least among all those affected. We take for granted that all human beings beyond a certain age and capable of speech and action are competent participants in the moral life.

Of course, this last statement is itself subject to dispute. Slave-owners deny that their slaves are competent moral agents; dictators deny that their subjects are competent political agents; women are often regarded as not, or not fully, competent agents by their governments or by their husbands, fathers, or brothers. But the slaves, the women, and the subjects of the dictators (and anyone else whose moral competency has been denied) will cry out. As William James points out, we must, as moral inquirers, listen for and hear the cries of the wounded. Those cries, he held, will inform us if we have made a great mistake (Works WB, pp. 141–62).

What has just been said makes it clear that one cannot engage in meta-ethical reflections without making ethical commitments. I cannot defend my claim that moral judgments can be as warranted as perceptual judgments without saying what counts as “evidence” that a mistake has been made. Following James, I suggest that the cries of those who have been hurt by the mistake demand at least a reconsideration, and often a revaluation. I speak with caution because it is often impossible to avoid hurting someone. To repair an injustice or other wrong one must sometimes “wound” uninvolved bystanders. A program that sends children from low-income families to summer camp will exclude children whose family income is just barely above the cut-off line. That exclusion may well cause pain, but is no reason to abandon the program. It may, of course, encourage efforts to expand the program.

Introducing his “Theory of the Moral Life,” Dewey characterized a moral situation as a situation that involves a voluntary action, though not all voluntary actions are morally judged (MW 5:187). It involves, a point made by both James and Dewey, an action that expresses character. More importantly, a moral or immoral action shapes character. Thus, according to James, the question one faces when confronted by a difficult moral choice is the question, “What sort of person shall I be if I do this?” Of course, it is not, it cannot be, the only question one faces. The man who chooses to take care of his wife, chooses not only to be a caring, patient, etc. man; he also chooses a certain kind of life for himself, and, as far as it depends on him, a certain kind of life for his wife. He will have tried to imagine in some detail what those lives will be like.
He will have determined that he has, or can learn, the practical skills he will require. He will have, as far as possible, consulted the wishes of his wife. He will have found out what medical professionals consider most beneficial, etc. In short, he has engaged in an inquiry concerning ends and the means to them. As I imagine this situation, one cannot say that one course of action is morally required and the other forbidden; yet, the husband experiences the situation as a moral quandary and his ultimate choice as morally required. Now let us suppose that after some months he finds that he needs to hire more and more help, that he finds the task of caring for his wife’s physical well-being increasingly burdensome. He may finally conclude that he underestimated the difficulties or overestimated his strength, that with all the best will – one might say from too abundant love – he made the wrong decision. Both he and his wife were “wounded” by that decision, and his ability to hear her cry, as well his own, will enable him to change course.

Here a classical utilitarian might wonder why pragmatists tell such a complicated story. Why can’t one just determine which course of action will maximize “the good” of all those affected? If one were then to follow that course, would one not be doing the right thing? And if one adopted that norm – to maximize good – would one not avoid all conflicts of duties, since the duty to maximize good would override all others? Alas, or rather fortunately, there cannot be such a norm. We cannot be obliged to maximize something that is not a quantity. We value numerous things in numerous ways. There is no common unit to which all values may be reduced; there is no scale on which one can rank such diverse goods as a performance of the Brandenburg quartets, teaching a child to read, reaching the top of Mount Everest, discovering extra-terrestrial life, and, say, a billion dollars. Often, not always, we must choose, although there is no scale on which one alternative is “better” than the other. Again often, not always, we value the opportunity to choose as much, sometimes more, than the choice we make. Classical utilitarianism fails to take this value into account. It also fails – and this seems to me an equally serious failing – to recognize and acknowledge as justified the anguish with which one faces some moral situations. The very suggestion that, in principle, there exists a measure and an algorithm that will provide the correct answer to every moral quandary devalues crucial features of our moral lives. No utilitarian calculus can help you if you must choose, like the biblical Jonathan, between loyalty to your friend David and loyalty to your royal father Saul. Finally, I said that “fortunately” the various goods we enjoy cannot be reduced to one quantity; our lives would be immeasurably more boring and thus poorer if we were able to enjoy only one kind of good.

Nevertheless, consequences are important; moral inquiry will always concern itself with the consequences of various courses of action, and it will consider consequences in a very wide sense, including as I already mentioned, consequences for the character of the agent. Moral inquiry, properly conducted, will pay particular attention to the cries of the wounded, to those disadvantaged by a proposed course of action. But one can be a consequentialist in this sense without being committed to the impossible task of maximizing some non-existent quantity.

It is worthwhile to add here that there are consequences that can be quantified, and in the social and political arena these consequences play an important role. I am thinking of life expectancy, per capita income, literacy rate, various measures of well-being that have been proposed. I do not, in any sense, want to denigrate these
values. However, one must realize that basing one’s argument on one scale rather
than another (compare, for example, Sen’s capability approach with an approach
based on per capita income) is itself a value judgment, indeed a moral judgment.
Policies based on different bases may have very different consequences, particularly
for the least advantaged.

To summarize. Moral inquiry is a species of value inquiry; value inquiry is a species
of inquiry. We engage in such inquiry when, for one reason or another, we cannot go
on in habitual ways.

I have considered various types of such problematic situations. I do not claim that
there is an algorithm for solving moral problems: nor do I believe that we have a special
faculty of moral insight (whether that is thought to be divinely inspired or not). What we
take for moral insight are deeply ingrained moral habits; we should take them seriously
(which we cannot help doing that with any deeply ingrained habit), but that does not mean
that they are immune from reflective criticism. Fallibilism extends to so-called intuitions
as well as to judgments arrived at after careful inquiry. That is our only defense against
fanaticism. We learn that we are in error from the cries of those whom we cause to
suffer. We are motivated to respond to those cries by sympathy. Dewey wrote:

To put ourselves in the place of others, to see things from the standpoint of their purposes
and values, to humble, contrariwise, our own pretensions and claims till they reach the
level they would assume in the eye of an impartial sympathetic observer, is the surest
way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge. Sympathy is the animating mold of moral
judgment not because its dictates take precedence in action over those of other impulses
(which they do not do) but because it furnishes the most efficacious intellectual stand-
point. . . . Through sympathy the cold calculations of utilitarianism and the formal law of
Kant are transported into vital and moving realities. (LW 7:270)

Democracy

Fallibilism in any social arena demands that all relevant voices be heard. The sciences
flourish where the free exchange of ideas and results is encouraged; scientists are
troubled when reasons of state (or commercial profit) demand secrecy. The arts lan-
guish when they are censured, when some government authority proscribes what
it regards as “decadent” or otherwise politically suspect. Yet we cannot do without
any government. Law and its enforcement make social living possible. We are social
animals; we need to live with, cooperate with, others of our kind. We need rules that
prevent us from colliding with one another either literally or figuratively. So we need
legislators authorized to enact the rules and we need executives to enforce the rules;
we need, finally, a judiciary to adjudicate disputes. In other words, we need govern-
ment. This is not meant to be a fictitious history of the origins of government, or a
philosophical myth to establish legitimacy. It simply points out that, in a fairly densely
populated and technologically complex world, we could not manage without the
institutions of government. Of course, this is not news; it has been true for millennia.
Over time, the need for governments over larger and larger territories and ever greater
numbers of individuals has become ever more urgent. Advocates of world govern-
ment are simply carrying that reasoning to its ultimate conclusion. However, I do not intend to argue for that ideal; rather, I wish to give reasons in favor of the sort of wide democracy that James and Dewey championed in their day, and that seems to me to be the most important social ideal.

So far, however, I have only claimed that we human beings need government of some sort in order to function. To say that is like saying that we need food in order to live. It is sufficiently vague to elicit virtually universal agreement. Yet even a brief survey of history shows that governments or, as would be more precise, rulers have often been a major source of suffering for their subjects. We want, then, a government that will not be a major source of suffering, but rather will enable citizens to flourish. What kind of society, that is, what kind of social organization, is called for? By analogy with the case of the sciences and the arts, we may say that societies will flourish and permit their members to flourish if they permit the free exchange of ideas, including in particular ideas about the organization of society itself. For only in that case will it be possible to apply what Dewey called intelligence to social problems.

Free speech, then, free media of all kinds. However, the free exchange of ideas is not enough: it must, and it does, lead to action. If that action is to be peaceful, there must be freedom to form associations dedicated to changing some feature of society, small and large (societies for the protection of the right whale, Amnesty International, political parties, etc.). There must also be mechanisms that enable individuals to replace their governors in some peaceful and orderly way: fair elections or a comparable procedure. Where all mentally competent adults are able to participate in such a process after being fully informed of the alternatives, we have a political democracy. Fallibilism applied to social problems calls for political democracy as the most suitable form of political organization. By political democracy I mean at least universal suffrage, fair elections, a free press, and freedom of association.

I want to make quite clear that this argument for political democracy is not based on any metaphysical assumptions about the nature of individuals or the goals they must have. I do not argue against dictatorships on the grounds that they violate human autonomy or stifle the full development of human capacities. Of course they do that, and, of course, I find that deplorable. Beyond that, dictatorships cause their victims unbearable physical and emotional pain, and they do not hear the cries of their victims. In fact, they make it nearly impossible for their victims to cry out. One does not need to be a fallibilist, one does not need to believe in moral objectivity, to be opposed to institutionalized cruelty. But because they insist that all voices be heard (that all the evidence must be considered), fallibilists oppose not only malicious, oppressive, exploitative arrangements, but also any benevolent system, if such there be, that is not democratic. Simply because such a system would deprive itself of a means of self-correction. I do not, of course, reject the moral arguments just alluded to, indeed I endorse them completely. I am, however, suggesting that they do not go far enough, that they leave room for benevolent autocracies.

I also do not claim that my argument for democracy is value-free. The argument takes it for granted that human beings prefer getting along with each other to civil strife, and that they value some states of affairs that can be achieved only by cooperation, thus that they value social arrangements that foster cooperation. It also assumes (because otherwise the ideal of political democracy could not be realized) that human
beings want to have some say in how matters are arranged in their societies. I am deliberately vague. Some of us must want, or at least be willing, to be legislators, or judges, or executives on some level of government. Many of us must want, or at least be willing, to be involved in some way in choosing these public agents. Some of us, the more the better, must be willing to form informed opinions on matters of public concern and to share these opinions with our representatives on various levels of government. The machinery must allow for peaceful but effective pressures to be applied.

In 1908 Dewey wrote, “Externally viewed, democracy is a piece of machinery, to be maintained or thrown away, like any other piece of machinery, on the basis of its economy and efficiency of working. Morally, it is the effective embodiment of the moral ideal of a good which consists in the development of all the social capacities of every individual member of society” (MW 5:424). Externally viewed democracy is political democracy. But that machinery, as does all machinery, serves some good. Included in that good is that the machinery must protect and maintain itself. John Rawls (1971) has taught us to think about the stability of a social arrangement. A society that is just in the sense of “justice as fairness,” he argued, would be stable. Living under such arrangements would make one want to sustain them. But a Rawlsian just society is more than a political democracy. It is a just society, and that means that its basic principles rule out certain forms of oppression or exploitation of one group of citizens by another. Rawls’s great contributions to political philosophy are, in my opinion, his principles of justice. The first principle spells out in greater depth what makes a political democracy a liberal democracy. The second asserts, roughly, that a just policy would create inequalities, or permit inequalities to continue, only if they are in the interest of the least advantaged (Rawls 1971, p. 302). I am, of course, aware of Rawls’s brilliant reconception of the social contract; however, that kind of thought experiment does not fit into a pragmatist argument. Of course, one should try to imagine, in as much detail as possible, how various courses of action under consideration would unfold, but that is a quite different kind of thought experiment from that required by Rawls’s constructivism.

Let us, then, return to Dewey’s remark that, morally speaking, democracy embodies the ideal of the development of all the social capacities of every individual member of society. “All the social capacities” require a guaranteed economic minimum. People who need to worry daily where their next meal comes from, or where they will find shelter that night, or how to obtain medical care without sinking into abject poverty – such people have neither the time nor the strength to develop all their talents, or to participate in the democratic process. Of course, much more could be and needs to be said about social democracy, but space does not permit me to do so. Suffice it to say that where there are very large differences in wealth and income and/or where many are deprived of adequate schooling the outcome of the political process will be severely distorted in favor of the interests of the wealthy.

Social democracy is not an all or nothing affair. Some of the industrial democracies are more egalitarian than others. Maintaining what social democracy we have and trying to expand it is an everlasting struggle. Richard Rorty’s term “social hope” is useful here (1999). We must begin with the hope that we can achieve a social democracy and let that hope spur us to ever greater effort.
There are, I said earlier, no intrinsic goods, no ends that are not subject to revaluation. Yet one finds in the writings of James, and even more so of Dewey, again and again an emphasis on individual growth, individual flourishing. These expressions are so vague that fallibilism and reconsideration will inevitably enter as we try to give them specific content. In any case, individual flourishing seems to be one of those transcultural goals that we can all agree on, though, of course, what we mean by it will differ widely. It may range from acceptance of a strict monastic rule to the pursuit of artistic excellence; from a modest life caring for one’s family to seeking the highest political office; from a life devoted single-mindedly to an arcane research project to a life of varied interests pursued with varied intensity. It may mean faithful adherence to the lifestyle of one’s ancestors or an enthusiastic embrace of modernity. To provide genuine opportunity for all this flourishing, society must make it possible for people to pursue varied lifestyles and members of society must respect each other’s notion of flourishing. This is the pluralism that William James argued for passionately in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (Works TTP, pp. 132–49). He wrote of this essay that he wished he could have made it “more impressive,” and that it is connected to his “pluralistic philosophy” according to which “the truth is too great for any one actual mind . . . to know the whole of it . . . [T]here is no point of view absolutely public and universal” (Works TTP, p. 4). Pluralism, then, in the sense of respect for a variety of lifestyles, as long as they are respectful of others, is the final ingredient in the pragmatist wide conception of democracy. James spoke of tolerance, but I believe that tolerance is not enough, since tolerance is compatible with disdain. One needs to be respected by those whom one respects in order to have self-respect, and one needs self-respect in order to flourish.

References and further reading

The question of whether or not pragmatism has any particular political implications is a sharply contested one, even among pragmatists themselves. On one side, lie those such as Richard Rorty (see Rorty) and Richard Posner who have asserted that pragmatism has no political valence, that even though John Dewey (see Dewey) was clearly a liberal democrat, “there is no reason why a fascist could not be a pragmatist, in the sense of agreeing with pretty much everything Dewey said about the nature of truth, knowledge, rationality and morality” (Rorty 1999, p. 23). On the other side, one finds those such as Hilary Putnam (see Putnam) and Cheryl Misak who have claimed that pragmatism provides “an epistemological justification of democracy” (Putnam 1992, p. 180).

Rorty, Posner, and other agnostics on this question take as their guide William James’s (see James) famous remark that pragmatism “stands for no particular results,” that it aims to be but a hallway from which “innumerable chambers open out of it” (Works Prag, p. 32). Although it was metaphysical and religious chambers James had in mind here, the agnostics argue that his metaphor applies to political bedrooms as well. As evidence of the diversity of political possibilities to which pragmatism might be linked, they point to the wide range of substantive political positions adopted by leading pragmatists. This range includes the cranky conservatism of Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce); the genteel liberalism of James; the democratic progressivism of Dewey and George Herbert Mead (see Mead); the revolutionary Marxism of the young Sidney Hook (see Marxism and Critical Theory); the welfare-state liberalism of Rorty; the libertarian conservatism of Posner; and the democratic socialism of Richard Bernstein, Hilary Putnam, and Cornel West. There are no fascists in this number, but if one gives credence to Benito Mussolini’s embrace of pragmatism and acknowledges the pragmatic strain in onetime Nazi Martin Heidegger’s thinking, then perhaps Rorty has a point.

But Putnam, Misak, and other critics of the agnostics argue that politics is a matter of methods and procedures, of hallways as well as bedrooms. James, they note, qualified pragmatism’s neutrality by saying that “it has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method” (Works Prag, p. 32). By virtue of its methodological commitment to experimental inquiry, they argue, pragmatism is not neutral between democrats and fascists but, rather, has a powerful affinity with liberal democracy. That is, liberal democracy...
too is (in part, at least) a set of methods, and at their best the methods of democracy and pragmatic inquiry intersect. Pragmatic inquiry, one might say, shares a “discourse ethics” with democracy. Pragmatists who embrace Dewey’s conviction that politics should be a mode of organized intelligence (see Democracy and Value Inquiry) believe that the intelligence of political communities, like that of all communities of inquiry, should be organized democratically. “Democracy is a requirement for experimental inquiry in any area,” Putnam says. “To reject democracy is to reject the idea of being experimental” (1994, p. 64). Pragmatists who do not embrace democracy risk a contradiction between their epistemology and their politics.

**Epistemology and Politics**

Pragmatists who would conjoin their epistemology and politics, their pragmatism and their liberal democratic convictions, generally advance an argument with three broad elements. First, following Peirce, they hold that the best way that human beings have found to fix belief is by means of the methods, practices, and values of communities of competent inquirers, the best exemplification of which is the community of modern science. Such communities begin their investigations under the stimulus of particular doubts within the context of a body of warranted beliefs that they have no good reason to doubt, and they settle such particular doubts with further warranted beliefs that, like all warranted beliefs, are not certain, but fallible and subject to revision should fresh doubts about their warrants arise.

Second, such pragmatists extend the range of inquiry to include moral and political judgments. This move is of particular significance for the argument, since it is the application of inquiry to these sorts of judgments which makes its practices relevant to the sort of questions most likely to confront social and political communities. “We have learned something about how to conduct inquiry in general,” Putnam says, “and that what applies to intelligently conducted inquiry in general applies to ethical inquiry in particular” (1992, p. 186).

Finally, the argument holds that in order to be epistemically effective, communities of inquiry, including political communities of inquiry, must be democratic. That is, the quality of inquiry is affected by the degree to which a community is inclusive or exclusive of all the relevant participants in its inquiry (see Pluralism and Deliberative Democracy) and by the democratic or undemocratic character of the norms that guide its practice. Exclusive communities of inquiry might overlook or ignore pertinent evidence and argument that those excluded might bring to bear on the question at hand. Undemocratic practices might similarly distort inquiry by precluding the airing of significant evidence and debate.

As this latter point suggests, to the extent that pragmatist democracy is liberal, it is so because of its peculiar justification of democracy. That is, pragmatists do not feel compelled like many liberals to qualify their commitment to democracy by hedging democratic practice about with exogenous protections of liberty, because their conception of democracy by its very nature includes these protections. As Putnam says, the need for such things as free speech follows “from requirements of scientific procedure in general: the unimpeded flow of information and the freedom to offer and to criticize
hypotheses” (1992, p. 188). Much like Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas), a philosopher with an abiding respect for pragmatism, these pragmatists invest liberal principles in their very conception of democracy. For these pragmatist democrats, a democracy that repressed free speech or engaged in racial discrimination would no longer be a democracy even if its actions were sanctioned by a majority of citizens. As Habermas might say, such a polity could not claim to be democratic without entangling itself in a performative contradiction.

Peirce

Even though it is Peirce who starts this epistemological justification for democracy rolling with his conception of truth as the work of communities of inquiry, it is not an argument that he advanced or would have embraced had it been suggested to him. Indeed, there is every reason to believe he would have strenuously resisted it.

Peirce’s own politics were anything but liberal or democratic. His political views, randomly expressed, were reactionary and dyspeptic. “Folly in politics cannot go further than English liberalism,” he told his friend Lady Welby in 1908. “The people ought to be enslaved” (Hardwick 1977, p. 78). Describing himself aptly as an “ultraconservative,” Peirce avowed that he was “an old-fashioned Christian, a believer in the efficacy of prayer, an opponent of female suffrage and of universal male suffrage, in favor of letting business methods develop without the interference of law, a disbeliever in democracy, etc. etc.” (Hoopes 1998, p. 19).

Peirce’s use of political language and metaphors in his seminal article “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) to characterize the inferior methods for fixing belief – tenacity, authority, and consensual taste – has nonetheless invited commentators to identify the superior method of scientific inquiry with a freely deliberative democratic politics, and hence to find in Peirce’s early work the beginnings of the pragmatist epistemological argument for democracy. But a good deal of evidence cuts against any temptation to claim that Peirce saw it this way, most notably his blunt assertion that “for the mass of mankind” the method of authority was best. “If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves,” he haughtily remarked, “then slaves they ought to remain” (W 3:251; EP 1:118). If anything, the essay pointed toward rule by an intellectual elite, an “epistocracy,” alone capable of scientific thinking. And Peirce did occasionally suggest as much. In 1892 he intertemporately envisioned a “modern Pythagorean brotherhood” of those “sincerely devoted to pure science” who would “subject the rest of mankind to the governance of these chosen best” (Eisele 1985, vol. 2, pp. 561–2).

Yet Peirce most consistently aimed not to associate scientific inquiry with either technocratic or democratic politics, but to insulate it from politics of every sort, in the interest, as he saw it, of both science and politics. That is, Peirce proved especially anxious over the course of his career to demarcate clear boundaries between “theoretical” and “practical” belief and the methods for securing them, and to wall off scientific inquiry from moral and political life. In effect, he sought to annul the pragmatist epistemological argument for democracy at its second step. Reasoned inquiry, he argued in his later work, was of modest use at best in practical affairs, which should be governed instead by sentiment and instinct, and sentiment in turn only poisoned
the work of scientists and philosophers. As Peirce said, this sort of sentimentalism, which posited a tenacious clinging to established folkways, “implies conservatism” (CP 1.631; EP 2:32). Those who have singled Peirce out as the one traditionalist conservative among pragmatists are on target.

James

William James was as little a political theorist as Peirce, and his work has been of modest significance to efforts to link pragmatism to liberal democracy. He authored but one substantial essay devoted to a political theme, “The Moral Equivalent of War,” published in 1910, the year of his death (Works ERM, pp. 162–73; Writings, pp. 660–71).

James’s own politics were, for most of his life, those of the ‘mugwumps’: the genteel, independent, late nineteenth-century American reformers who sought rule by the “best men.” Mugwumps saw themselves as men of superior education, culture, character, and moral sensibility, and they believed they were entitled by virtue of these credentials to political leadership. As James saw it, the central problem of democracy was to secure the leadership of “our better men.” The “social-value of the college bred,” he argued, was “to divine the worthier and better leaders,” for “in our democracy where everything else is so shifting, we alumni and alumnae of the colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries” (Works ECR, p. 110).

To be sure, James was in many respects an unusual mugwump in that he lacked many of the prejudices and the cranky self-righteousness that made them such an unattractive bunch. James was much more favorably disposed to both workers and immigrants than most mugwumps, usually reserving the occasional note of ethnic prejudice and class condescension for his correspondence with his novelist brother, whom one suspects brought out the worst in him in this respect. Like many mugwumps, James was an anti-imperialist and a vigorous voice of protest against American policy in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. Yet his anti-imperialism was marred by none of the racism so prominent in that movement. In the last years of his life, James was radicalized by his anti-imperialist activism and was oft-given to expressions of sympathy with anarchism. But even the historian who has done the most to expose these sympathies acknowledges that they were, for the most part, communicated privately and must be “pieced together” (Coon 1996).

Apart from the example of his generous, tolerant temperament, perhaps the most important contribution James made to liberal democratic politics was the warning he issued in the midst of his attack on imperialism against a politics waged by “arch abstractionists” such as Theodore Roosevelt, guilty of the “crime” of “treating an intensely living and concrete situation by a set of bald and hollow abstractions” (Works ECR, pp. 162, 164). Here James tied his philosophical opposition to rationalism and absolutism to their political manifestations. As Frank Lentricchia says (1990, p. 802), for James the will to unity of all forms of rationalism and absolutism was an “expression of impulses that would control by making uniform the variegated world of autonomous individuals, that would destroy individuality, personal and national, by trimming, fitting, and normalizing autonomous individuality, making the world safe
for structure (mine, not yours, ours, not theirs).” In short, James’s pragmatism pro-
posed a liberal democratic politics friendly to pluralism and uncertainty on guard against
the imperial ambitions of any theory, including its own.

Dewey

As Putnam says (1992), a pragmatist epistemological justification for liberal demo-
cracy leans most heavily on the work of John Dewey, though here too some “piecing
together” is required. Dewey subscribed to all three steps in the argument, and
pioneered the second and third.

Dewey, like Peirce, located truth in the practices of communities of inquiry. Unlike
Peirce, he included communities of moral and political inquiry among them, arguing
that one could, as he put it in the title of an early and obscure article, elaborate the
“logical conditions of a scientific treatment of morality” (MW 3:3–39). This was one of
Dewey’s best-known, and most controversial claims, and he worked it out in many of
his logical writings over the course of his career. Dewey also insisted that effective
inquiry required liberal democratic practices and virtues, and contended that as far as
moral and political inquiry was concerned, most citizens were competent participants.

In his most extended work of political theory, The Public and Its Problems (1927),
Dewey took on critics such as Walter Lippmann who argued that a complex modern-
ity precluded active citizenship. Lippmann (1922, 1925) called for a more modest,
constricted conception of democracy, coupled with an expansion of the authority
invested in experts. Dewey argued against resting content with elite inquiry into social
problems and for including the wider public to the greatest extent possible in the
making of public policy (see Pluralism and Deliberative Democracy). Without the
participation of the public in the formulation of policy, he said, it could not reflect
the common needs and interests of the society because these needs and interests
were known only to the public. They could not be made known without democratic
“consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles.” Hence, “a
class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class
with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge
at all” (LW 2:364–5).

Dewey also argued that just as experts could not make policy that was truly public,
so too all policy-makers need not be experts. It was not necessary for every citizen
to have the knowledge and skill to conduct the specialized inquiries necessary for
making intelligent public decisions. But when it came to judging “the bearing of the
knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns.” Dewey believed that most people
possessed this capacity, and he charged that advocates of the rule of experts greatly
exaggerated the intelligence and ability it took to render these kinds of judgments
(LW 2:366). “Faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and
action if proper conditions are furnished.” Dewey declared, “is so deeply embedded in
the methods which are intrinsic to democracy that when a professed democrat denies
the faith he convicts himself of treachery to his profession” (LW 14:227; ED 1:342).

Epistemological arguments for democracy – those essentially concerned with pro-
cedural democracy – were not the only arguments for democracy that Dewey made.
He also advanced substantive ethical, aesthetic, and even metaphysical arguments for "democracy as a way of life" to which the universe offered an "encouraging nod" (MW 11:48; ED 1:75). But the epistemological argument was not the least of these arguments, for he believed that "democracy is estimable only through the changed conception of intelligence, that forms modern science" (MW 4:49).

Dewey’s activism, particularly his efforts to transform American schools, was in part an effort to provide every citizen with this intelligence and to develop the “proper conditions” for the expansively democratic politics that his pragmatism prescribed. He advocated a kind of public education that would reconstruct a common schooling for American children which would provide them with the skills and knowledge necessary to effective citizenship. He envisioned schools that would “cultivate the habit of suspended judgment, of skepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventional idealizations” (MW 13:334). He called for classrooms and schools that would themselves take shape as communities of inquiry that would at once develop the capacities of youngsters for democratic life and prefigure the reconstruction of the wider society along more democratic lines.

Dewey also worked tirelessly in a variety of political organizations and as an engaged intellectual to foster the development of local and national “publics” in which adults could also learn by doing. The education that participating in such publics provided would, he predicted, “render nugatory the indictment of democracy drawn on the basis of the ignorance, bias and levity of the masses” (LW 2:371). From his first venture into the public sphere in the early 1890s as the ally of utopian crank Franklin Ford, who proposed to supplant the commercial press with “Thought News,” Dewey struggled to find the means to forge a more inclusive, deliberative democratic politics. This work continued in his support for the social settlement movement, labor unions, women’s suffrage, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; in his leadership of the Outlawry of War movement in the 1920s; and in his efforts to spawn a third party to the left of the New Deal in the 1930s.

Dewey’s politics grew steadily more radical over the course of his long career. Eventually he came to the conclusion that democracy of the sort he envisioned required the replacement of capitalism with a decentralized socialism that would not only better provide for the material needs of ordinary people but also give them a greater opportunity to assume control over the decisions that shaped their lives. If liberalism was to stand for “the liberation of individuals so that realization of their capacities may be the law of their life,” he wrote in 1935, then liberalism “must now become radical” (LW 11:41, 45; ED 1:323, 325). Liberal democrats were doomed unless they were prepared to “socialize the forces of production, now at hand, so that the liberty of individuals will be supported by the very structure of economic organization” (LW 11:62; ED 1:334).

Neo-pragmatism

The revival of pragmatism led by Richard Rorty that began in the early 1980s has seen a revival of the pragmatist epistemological justification of liberal democracy that
lay dormant in the years following Dewey’s death in 1952. But this is an aspect of the revival which Rorty himself has actively opposed. Indeed, the cogency of this epistemological justification is one of several bones of contention that divide Rorty and Putnam, the two most distinguished of contemporary neo-pragmatists.

Rorty’s opposition to any efforts by pragmatists to offer an epistemological justification for democracy is readily explicable. Not simply does he recoil from epistemological arguments for anything, least of all democracy, but he has also called for a “pragmatism without method” (1991, p. 63). Since it is pragmatism’s method – its argument that the best route to warranted belief is cooperative inquiry – that ties it to democracy, a pragmatism without method would indeed be bereft of political implications, as Rorty asserts.

Rorty identifies the abandonment of the effort to “show that a certain procedure for justifying belief is more likely to lead to truth than some other procedure.” that is, the attachment to “scientific method,” as one of the two great differences between classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism (1999, p. 35). (The other is that neo-pragmatists have made the “linguistic turn” and hence talk about “language” rather than “experience.”) But while this position “against method” does clearly mark Rorty off from the classical pragmatists, there are many neo-pragmatists, led by Putnam, who still think there is something to be said for believing that some methods for justifying belief are more likely to lay doubt to rest than others.

Rorty’s politics are impeccably liberal. The grandson of the leading Social Gospel theologian Walter Rauschenbusch and son of anti-Stalinist radical James Rorty, Rorty has since the early 1990s emerged not only as the most well-known American academic philosopher but also as an engaged intellectual weighing in on public issues of moment. This engagement is perhaps most evident in Achieving Our Country (1998), an impassioned call for a left-wing patriotism that would wrestle American national identity away from conservatives and press it in a social-democratic direction. Rorty has been critical of the drift of the American left toward a cultural politics centered around identities of race, gender, and sexual orientation and away from an egalitarian politics focused on inequalities of social class. His heroes are figures such as A. Phillip Randolph and Irving Howe, and he envisions a country in which Americans “agreed that the promise of American life could be redeemed only as long as Americans were willing to sacrifice for the sake of fellow Americans – only as long as they could see the government not as stealing their tax money but as needling it to prevent unnecessary suffering” (1999, p. 249).

Although Rorty explicitly ties his political views to those of Dewey, he insists that his pragmatism cannot be wedded tightly to them as Dewey supposed it might. “Pragmatism,” he says, “is not a strong enough philosophy to make moral community possible” (1991, p. 177). And certainly he is correct about his own pragmatism, if not that of Dewey and other pragmatists who see pragmatism as an epistemology with a tropism toward democratic community. Rorty strips pragmatism of the crucial ingredient – the “methodism” – that generates this tropism. Hence, although it would be unlikely, contra Rorty, to find fascists who claim that they agree with “pretty much everything Dewey said about the nature of truth, knowledge, rationality, and morality,” one might well find fascists who agree pretty much with everything Rorty has had to say on these subjects, as he himself admits.

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Rorty turned to pragmatism because of its deconstructive “anti-foundationalism,” its attack on certain, incorrigible grounds for knowledge (see Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism). He refuses any but the most deflationary conceptions of truth — “truth” for him is little more than a trivial compliment we pay to consensual belief. More to the point, he urges his fellow pragmatists to abandon the constructive effort to link any conception of truth-seeking to any particular politics, which is the very effort by which they have linked pragmatism and liberal democracy (1999, p. 35). Absent this constructive effort, Rorty has no “philosophical backup” for his liberal-democratic convictions and no philosophical arguments to advance against fascism, as he readily acknowledges (1991, p. 178).

If it is Putnam who put the epistemological argument on the agenda of neo-pragmatism, it is another of Rorty’s critics, Cheryl Misak, who has developed it most fully in the face of his challenge. She more or less follows the three-step argument, but at each stage she elaborates on its particulars in especially illuminating fashion.

Misak’s neo-Peircean pragmatism rests on what she nicely terms a “low-profile” conception of truth, one that is deflationary but significantly less deflationary than Rorty’s. For pragmatists of her sort, truth is nested firmly in human inquiry, which is the means for resolving doubt and sorting out true from false beliefs. “A minimal characterization of good inquiry” is that it “takes experience seriously,” and hence beliefs to be adequately tested must be subject to the widest possible range of experience. Therefore, effective inquiry must be communal and democratically inclusive.

“Truth and objectivity are matters of what is best for the community of inquirers to believe, ‘best’ here amounting to that which best fits with the evidence and argument.” To assert a belief is to make a truth claim and thereby to undertake a commitment to subject that belief to inquiry (Misak 2000, pp. 1, 78).

For the pragmatist, “a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument.” But since no inquiry can be exhaustive, we can never know for sure that any of our beliefs are true, however indubitable they may seem at present. Truth is thus a “regulative ideal,” an ideal that is unrealizable and yet serves a valuable function, in this case that of keeping the road of inquiry open. Truth is “what inquirers must hope for if they are to make sense of their practices of inquiry.” Truth is the aim of inquiry, but the best that can be secured at any moment in its course is well-justified belief, which is not necessarily true. It is nonetheless rational to adopt well-justified beliefs, even if these beliefs later prove to be false (ibid., pp. 49, 98, 69, 53).

Pragmatism’s low-profile conception of truth thus opens the door to “moral cognitivism,” a door closed by correspondence theories of truth that insist that a proposition is true “if and only if it corresponds to something like a fact in the believer-independent world.” Pragmatism insists not on such correspondence — a criterion that moral belief cannot meet — but only that in morals and politics we have “genuine beliefs with truth as their aim,” and that these beliefs answer to experience and to inquiry. Moral and political beliefs meet this relatively low threshold and are thus “truth-apt” for pragmatists. Though its conception of truth may be low-profile,
Pragmatism is a good deal more strongly anti-skeptical and anti-relativist than Rorty would allow (ibid., pp. 2, 88).

Pragmatism’s low-profile conception of truth also leaves its conviction of the truth-apt character of moral and political beliefs unthreatened by disagreement, even seemingly intractable disagreement. The pragmatist conception of truth makes agreement a regulative ideal as the goal of inquiry. Yet pragmatists need not make a fetish of actual agreement. Adding heft to Putnam’s similar arguments on this point, Misak demonstrates that although pragmatists respect “bivalence” (the notion that a statement must be false if not true) and “stability” (the notion that true statements must remain true from person to person), their conception of truth does not require the unrestricted application of these principles (as cognitivism grounded in a correspondence theory would). Echoing Putnam, she urges a view that

is not one which insists that all moral and political questions must have right answers, whether or not we can ever know them. That would be a strenuous cognitivism. Neither is it a view that infers from the fact that morals and politics are rife with unanswerable questions that the notion of a right answer is inappropriate. That would be a strenuous non-cognitivism. I have advocated a cognitivism which is modest, in that it holds that our moral judgments aspire to truth and have varying chances of attaining it. (Ibid., p. 144)

This modest cognitivism asserts that moral and political beliefs are (pragmatically) truth-apt, since they answer to experience and they are subject to inquiry, yet it does not falter in the face of a measure of non-bivalence or instability. Again echoing Putnam, Misak observes that beliefs may prove disjunctive, if not entirely so: “We need not think of agreement as being a case of which one way of life is best or which goods are good for all. Rather we might agree that a number of (but not all) incompatible ways of life or a number of (but not all) incompatible things are reasonable, permissible, or acceptable” (ibid., p. 137). But pragmatist epistemology alone is enough to provide grounds for criticism of those who refuse to open their beliefs to the widest possible range of experience and inquiry. So not everything goes, and Misak’s pragmatist would have something modestly adversarial and philosophical to say to a fascist or any other anti-democrat (something along the lines of your “belief” is not really a belief since you refuse to respect the experience of others and thereby open your belief to the sort of inquiry that the very act of asserting a belief implies). But within these limits, pragmatism not only tolerates but also invites a plurality of values and ways of life: “Because there are different ways in which a human life can go well, we can have a plurality of right answers to our questions” (Ibid., p. 138).

Misak, like Putnam, points to the obvious political inferences of this argument. Pragmatism leads to the conclusion that “deliberation must be encouraged and political institutions and mechanisms for decision-making must be as inclusive as is reasonably possible. The pragmatist voices the requirement that we try, at least until such attempts fail, to include rather than exclude others” (ibid., p. 127). Many of the liberal principles – autonomy, equal moral worth, tolerance, cultural pluralism, free speech – that liberals worry about sacrificing to democracy are embedded in pragmatist democracy as crucial features of its democratic deliberative practices. And since inequality can pose an obstacle to entry into these practices, they also imply a social democratic egalitarianism.
Perhaps the most telling tribute to the power of the pragmatist epistemological justification for democracy is Richard Posner’s concession to its cogency. Posner, like Rorty, is a pragmatist who long denied that pragmatism has a particular political valence. But unlike Rorty, Posner is firmly committed to pragmatist “methodism.” Indeed, he has gone so far as to say that “in an important sense pragmatism is the ethics of scientific inquiry” (1991, p. 34). Since it is this methodological commitment to which other pragmatists have tied liberal democracy, either Posner is wrong about the political implications of this commitment or the other pragmatists who have argued that it brings a lot of democratic baggage with it are mistaken.

Posner’s opposition is political as well as philosophical. Perhaps the most conservative of neo-pragmatists, he is an intellectual of the libertarian right who has gone to some pains to strip pragmatism of any putatively left-leaning tendencies. He claims that:

not only has pragmatism no inherent political valence, but those pragmatists who attack pieties of the right while exhibiting a wholly uncritical devotion to the pieties of the left (such as racial and sexual equality, the desirability of a more equal distribution of income and wealth, and the pervasiveness of oppression and injustice in Western society) are not genuine pragmatists; they are dogmatists in pragmatist’s clothing. (Posner 1991, p. 34)

Nonetheless, Posner has of late admitted that the epistemological justification for democracy that Dewey and other pragmatists have offered is a cogent one (Posner 2003). Torn now between an appreciation of philosophical pragmatism and his political convictions, Posner has opted to abandon philosophical pragmatism for what he terms “everyday pragmatism.” Everyday pragmatists, he happily admits, are the sort of “unedifying,” even vulgar, pragmatists who are “practical and business-like, ‘no nonsense,’ disdainful of abstract theory and intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian dreamers.” His pragmatism “has no moral compass,” certainly not one with an epistemic needle. Despite his ongoing regard for some elements of philosophical pragmatism, if the price of such regard, as it apparently is for many, is an affinity for more participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy, then Posner would just as soon leave the club (ibid., pp. 50, 55).

From where a conservative, “everyday pragmatist” such as Posner sits, philosophical pragmatist arguments for more thoroughgoing democracy are the worst sort of utopianism, “a pipe dream hardly worth the attention of a serious person” (ibid., p. 163). Echoing Lippmann, he would have Americans rest content with a much more restricted understanding of democracy not as self-government but as a periodic check on the ambitions of powerful ruling elites. This understanding would radically minimize the distance between democratic ideals and prevailing practice in the United States and elsewhere.

Views such as Posner’s must be taken seriously by philosophical pragmatists, for if they are not inclined as he is to anti-intellectualism, they are required to consider the means to their ends and to avoid pipe dreams. As Dewey said:

[U]nless ideals are to be dreams and idealism a synonym for romanticism and phantasy-building, there must be a most realistic study of actual conditions and of the mode or law of natural events in order to give the imagined or ideal object definite form and solid substance – to give it, in short, practicality and constitute it a working end. (MW 14:162)
ROBERT B. WESTBROOK

Even if one objects that for pragmatists the expansive democracy that their philosophy invites is not a utopia but a regulative ideal (like truth), the political task of rendering this ideal a “working end” remains daunting. And, as Dewey was not hesitant to admit, it requires not only compelling logic but also a robust will to believe.

References and further reading


Pluralism and Deliberative Democracy:
A Pragmatist Approach

JUDITH M. GREEN

Why are Pluralism and Deliberative Democracy Important Now?

Pluralism and deliberative democracy became closely conjoined aspects of contemporary work in moral and political philosophy in the last twenty years of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. This was in response to their crisis-related emergence in lived experience as, respectively, a challenging aspect of daily living for peoples in all regions of our world reflecting now-inescapable globalization processes, and a way of naming an aspiration toward a mode of collaborative transformative engagement that many have come to believe may have the power to ameliorate major problems now troubling humanity and our wider biotic community.

Though philosophers have contributed to the development of the concept of democracy since ancient times, and many thinkers of the modern period contributed a number of alternative formulations of the concept, John Dryzek attributes fairly recent coinage of the term “deliberative democracy” to Joseph Bessette (1980), while noting that the work of Bernard Manin (1987) and of Joshua Cohen (1989) fostered its development, and that the term’s adoption by John Rawls (1993) and Jürgen Habermas (1996) (see Habermas) in reference to their own views gave it prestige. Thus, Dryzek writes: “The final decade of the second millennium saw the theory of democracy take a strong deliberative turn. Increasingly, democratic legitimacy came to be seen in terms of the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of those subject to collective decisions” (2000, p. 1).

Helpful and reliable accounts of the history of democratic thought through and beyond this “deliberative turn” are available in works by James Bohman and William Rehg (1997), John Dryzek (2000), Samuel Freeman (2000), and Noelle McAfee (2004). They all recognize the importance of the great American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey’s (see Dewey) contribution (in, for example, The Public and Its Problems (1927)) to keeping alive a participatory democratic tradition in the years after World War I, when the elitist conceptions of democracy that came to dominate both political theory and public life during the middle years of the twentieth century were first coming into great influence due to the efforts of “democratic realists.” Until that time, the most influential modern democratic thinkers had tended to emphasize representative political institutions, the opportunity of all adults to vote, and the trustworthiness and
stability of majority rule as hallmarks of democratic self-government. Against this tradition, democratic realists argued that the issues that modern societies face are too complex for most voters to understand, and thus, their policy preferences tend to be uninformed and therefore unwise. In addition, democratic realists drew upon empirical data from sociology and political science to show that majorities in various countries and local contexts have tended to prefer authoritarian leaders and to reject the human and civil rights claims of minorities. Some of these realists, most influentially Samuel Huntington, have argued that active citizen participation in democratic government beyond the franchise tends to destabilize societies and to raise unreasonable expectations that in turn lead to apathy and cynicism. However, the dominance of the democratic realists and the elite-guided public policies they favored was challenged from the mid-twentieth century onwards by mass movements and particular thinkers advocating civil and human rights of oppressed minorities and indigenous peoples, an end to various wars (especially the Vietnam War), feminism (see Feminism), economic justice, various environmental causes, and equal social inclusion of gays and lesbians as well as persons who are physically and mentally “handicapped” in relation to dominant Western social norms. By the end of the twentieth century, not only had the public guidance of the dominant democratic realist elite come to seem wrong-headed to many, but, additionally, the earlier theoretical emphasis on voting mechanisms within representative government had come to seem dangerously inadequate as a mode of democratic self-expression, social evolution, and trustworthy self-government.

In recent years, deliberative democracy has entered the philosophical mainstream as an active project for theoretical and practical development in response to the world’s on-going experience with democracy, emerging in relation to a series of global crises in diverse local contexts. With the end of the Cold War, locally guided national democratization projects throughout Central and Eastern Europe sought simultaneously to satisfy long-term cultural longings, to meet their citizens’ basic needs, to develop new institutional forms, and to enter effectively into globalization’s harsh economic, technological, social, and political climate. These newly independent nations and their guiding movements needed a philosophical approach to creating locally feasible and desirable democracies in circumstances that were very different from those in which democracies emerged earlier in wealthy and powerful Western nations. Moreover, in spite of what some called “the triumph of capitalism,” democracy-minded critics within the West expressed persisting ethical concerns about the inclusiveness of their nations’ economic and political decision processes and the justice of their outcomes, including Robert Heilbroner’s reminder (1989) to capitalist econocratic triumphalists that there is a still-living “spirit of socialism” and Jacques Derrida’s evocation (1994) of a “specter of Marxism” still seeking other channels for expression, communication, and influence. During this same period, largely non-violent preliminary victories achieved by people’s movements to shape democracies appropriate for their own needs, cultures, and histories in the Philippines, South Africa, and Yugoslavia, as well as frighteningly violent defeats for democratic hopes in Rwanda and Kosovo and lingering threats to democratization processes in Nigeria’s regional-religious struggles, in Russia’s efforts to control Chechnya, and in the terrorism-breeding daily violence between Israelis and Palestinians, vividly demonstrated that the challenges of pluralistic, non-authoritarian, democratic living require but go far beyond crafting a
“standard form” national constitution and a set of laws and institutions for operating a government and an economy.

Even in “experienced democracies” like prototypical America, failure to solve the problem of how to live a mutually appreciative pluralism has tended to undermine and even to reverse social-national progress toward basic justice and democratic living, with unbridged divides deepening in many interlinked social dimensions: economics, politics, education, race, religion, gender, sexual preference, views and values concerning war and peace. Since 9/11, a widespread citizen hunger for effective citizen participation in reshaping New York City and America’s more intimate daily relations with other global situations has confronted anti-democratic national government policies of secrecy, expert decision-making, suppression of dissent, and enforced patriotism in a dangerous and violent “war against terrorism” in which “those who are not with us are against us,” including increasing numbers of Muslims worldwide as well as most of America’s previous allies within the United Nations. At the same time, other highly developed and experienced democracies like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in which relative cultural homogeneity was once thought of as normal, now must deal for the first time with deep cultural differences of the kinds that Americans have wrestled with for centuries. In meeting these challenges, a formal conception of democracy that focuses on constitutions and voting mechanisms does not offer helpful guidance. Instead, all of these nations need new norms and practices to guide daily democratic living as well as democratic transformation of their institutions and public policies, because the challenges they face are social and ethical at least as much as they are economic and political, and all of them involving reckoning with pluralism.

In seeking to develop a conception of democracy and of democratization processes that is useful to both experienced and emerging democracies in the actual conditions of the twenty-first century, it is important to recognize that the adequacy of a descriptively and normative analysis of pluralism directly affects the adequacy of a descriptive and normative analysis of deliberative democracy. Descriptively, if the twenty-first century reality of deep differences within and between nations is ignored, a related analysis of deliberative democracy will be descriptively gappy, missing some of the emergent trends and transactional dynamics that are keys to understanding the actual functioning of democracies and the challenges they face. Normatively, if pluralism is treated only as a problem to be contained, reduced, or resolved, rather than a set of group and individual differences that can be a source of insight, a source of checks on the inclusiveness and the justice of a society’s functioning, and a source of lines of potential sub-allegiances and support systems that can strengthen and “oxygenate” the whole, less democracy than is desirable, less than is adequate to the needs of the present, and less than is sustainable into the future will be advocated and achieved. Properly understood, pluralism and crisis can be causes, occasions, and resources for growth of individuals and groups, for further clarification and refinement of goals, and for deliberative transactions that more intelligently frame their choices and coordinate actions that help to create future fates and goods in their common as well as their more restricted and personal aspects. Thus, pluralism and deliberative democracy form a complementary dual focus for thinking about how to resolve or at least ameliorate some of the great problems of the twenty-first century in ways that are both feasible and desirable.
The Current Stage of Deliberative Democratic Theorizing

As John Dryzek’s helpful taxonomy suggests, many different philosophical traditions are actively developing analyses of deliberative democracy, working out the implications of their distinctive metaphorical, evaluative, and social-locational assumptions while drawing on particular bodies of empirical research and less formal lessons from experience (Dryzek 2000). Some of these differing schools of thought are closely allied with experimental efforts to work out practical models of deliberation concerning contentious public policy issues (McAfee 2004). Interestingly enough, many theorists working within these differing traditions seem to be reading each others’ work and actively seeking to respond to criticisms of their own efforts as well as important insights and promising suggestions that other “teams” develop, so that a kind of imperfect though genuinely pluralistic deliberative democracy seems to characterize the current stage of development of theorizing on this subject. Dryzek identifies seven distinctive approaches to contemporary democratic theorizing that engage pluralism and deliberation, three of them generally in favor of deliberative democracy (Rawlsian liberalism, Habermasian critical theory (see Habermas), and communitarian republicanism), two expressing suspicions and reservations that call for significant changes in existing social institutions as well as in mainstream theorizing about deliberative democracy (“difference democracy” and “green democracy”), and one opposed to deliberative democracy as neither feasible nor desirable (social choice theory). The seventh, Dryzek’s own approach, which he calls “discursive democracy,” draws from all of them while positioning itself as a more critical version of critical theory. Similarly, McAfee notes important differences in approach within the interdisciplinary literature on practical modeling of deliberative forums, which she divides into “the preference-based model” (akin to what Dryzek labels social choice theory), “the rational proceduralist model” (in which she combines the work of Rawlsian liberals and Habermasian critical theorists, as Dryzek does under the label of liberal constitutionalist deliberative democrats), and “the integrative model” she favors, which combines elements of both in particular contexts while adding new elements that reflect her inheritance from John Dewey; McAfee’s experience suggests that “any combination would work, in practice, even though some of the methods may, again in practice, work at cross purposes” (2004, p. 44).

A matrix of similarities and differences among these rival approaches to theorizing deliberative democracy reveals significant family resemblances that probably reflect their transactions with one another over the past 20 years as well as their engagement with a common or at least partially overlapping set of common social problems that are distinctive to this historical period. However, such a matrix also reveals that the focal centers of their work, in their treatments of pluralism, and in their accounts of democracy and deliberation, the meaning of “public,” the goals of democratic deliberation, and the challenges democratic deliberations must overcome are different enough as to suggest that theorists of the rival schools are talking past each other to a great extent, reflecting differences in the metaphysical, evaluative, and social-locational assumptions they bring to the project, even though Rawls had suggested that such differences need not and should not make a difference for democratic theory (Rawls
Thus, theorists whom Dryzek gathers together as advocates of “liberal constitutionalist” views (Rawls, Habermas, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, et al.) tend to agree in treating pluralism in individual values, beliefs, perspectives, and conceptions of the good as real in modern societies and as creating the need for democratic deliberation; they agree in emphasizing the kinds and qualities or reasons that individuals give in support of their views within public processes; they agree in worrying about others’ influences interfering with the freedom of individuals to formulate and express their own views and to assent to public policies, laws, and constitutional frameworks that they reasonably believe are just and will promote the common good without unduly interfering with their own private sphere of decision and action; while they disagree among themselves about how much emphasis to give to deliberative procedures and how much to substantive outcomes, and also about how to understand the meanings and roles of truth and justice in relation to deliberation within democracies when these are understood in terms of normative depths rather than merely in terms of formal political institutions. In contrast, theorists who advocate “communitarian republican views” (Sandel et al.) tend to agree in treating pluralism in group-linked values, beliefs, perspectives, and conceptions of the good as real in modern societies while also noting some group-linked commonalities in these cognitive dimensions as well as in grounding stories, habits of daily living, intellectual-communicative modes, and shared senses of a common fate and a common good that can serve as prerequisites to and partial dimensions of those interim goals and strategies about which they deliberate. Their challenge in seeking to foster common public values and cross-difference support for public policies and processes is to structure democratic inter-group processes that do not privilege one group’s commonalities over others’ in ways that lead to illegitimate and unjust public policies, laws, and constitutional frameworks. “Difference democrats” (Young et al.) tend to agree with communitarian republicans in treating pluralism in values, beliefs, perspectives, conceptions of the good, and even certain kinds of communicative capabilities as group-linked in ways that are important to acknowledge, and in some cases to preserve in fostering a more just and democratic social order. However, they tend to be skeptical about achieving agreement about common public values and policies anytime soon, and they tend to worry that the kinds of deliberative processes and public reasons favored by liberal constitutionalists, as well as the kinds of civic republican processes favored by communitarians, tend to bias the deliberative situation as well as its substantive outcomes in favor of those who currently wield oppressive power. Some “difference democrats” are so suspicious of deliberative contexts as to agree with social choice theorists (and practitioners of McAfee’s preference-based model) in emphasizing limitations on the power of communicative influence, and perhaps even advocating some non-deliberative approach to developing preferable public policies. Dryzek divides “green democrats” into two groups, those whose views and values focus on human welfare and those who focus on the welfare of a larger whole within which humans participate, whose other-than-human “voices” also must be heard within democratic deliberations that can influence the emergence of feasible and desirable public policies for humans; the former group’s views can be and have been to some extent taken in and reconciled with their own views by mainstream liberal constitutionalists, whereas the latter group’s views require a significant shifting of the background and the deliberative processes.
Though Gutmann and Thompson’s “liberal constitutionalist” work (2000) as well as Young’s approach to “difference democracy” (2000) have gained great influence in recent years, in part because of their demonstrated abilities to learn from other schools of thought while at the same time listening carefully to the lived concerns of their core social-locational constituencies, one of the most promising theories of deliberative democracy at this point in the development of the field is Dryzek’s critical and synthetic “discursive democracy,” which owes a great deal to both of these other theoretical approaches. Dryzek’s view focuses on an open-ended contestation of “discourses” in the public sphere, seeking to influence reflective preferences in ways that influence collective outcomes, transcending the state but seeking to influence it as long as it is the main location of public decision making and public exercise of power (2000, p. 162). He explains:

Discourses are shared means of making sense of the world embedded in language. Any discourse will always be grounded in assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. These shared terms of reference enable those who subscribe to a particular discourse to perceive and compile bits of sensory information into coherent stories or accounts that can be communicated in intersubjectively meaningful ways. Thus a discourse will generally revolve around a central storyline, containing opinions about both facts and values. (Ibid., p. 18)

The public sphere can include a variety of such discourses, operating in competition and loose association with others, depending upon areas of policy concern (ibid., p. 51). Reflective choice among them may be possible, and some may be more consensual and less oppressive than others, as Michel Foucault recognized in his later years (ibid., p. 64). Such discourses can exist in coordination with the organizations of civil society, yet transcend them, spontaneously constituting a second kind of social order that coordinates individual understandings and actions in ways that “need know no geographical boundaries” (ibid., p. 159). By “contestation of discourses,” Dryzek means that it is both unavoidable and desirable that people’s preferences, and even the background views or discourses in terms of which these are framed, will be influenced by coming into interactive contact with those of others, not only within narrowly political processes associated with the state, but also in the wider public sphere within a pluralistic society (see Democracy and Value Inquiry). The question is not whether, but how differing discourses, not all of which are progressive, will interrelate in the public sphere as they seek to influence interpretations and the outcomes of social action. Dryzek’s normative requirement is that discursive contestation be democratic, i.e., “engaged by a broad variety of competent actors under unconstrained conditions” (ibid., p. 77) while leading effectively to moments of decisive collective action, which may mean action through the state or within the wider public sphere, depending on time and place (ibid., pp. 79–80). Instead of ruling out oppressive discourses in his model of deliberative democracy, as both liberal constitutionalists and “difference democrats” have suggested, Dryzek trusts to processes of contestation to transform them. Nor does he include only what Rawls calls “public reasons” or even limit deliberation to rational argumentation, though he suggests that rational arguments will always have a kind of regulative role in assuring that other deliberative resources, such as...
rhetoric and storytelling, are both relevant and deployed in non-oppressive ways. Thus, acknowledging Young’s influence, Dryzek proposes that “authentic deliberation” allows for argument, rhetoric, humor, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip, inducing reflection non-coercively, thereby allowing resources of the deliberative process to rule out domination via exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception, expressions of mere self-interest, threats, and attempts to impose ideological conformity; equality in deliberative competence across political actors (which may involve differing arrays of particular communicative resources) is the key to counteracting such “agents of distortion.” Dryzek argues (ibid., pp. 1–2). While he argues that many inequalities in power can be handled by the process of democratic deliberation, Dryzek highlights their importance:

Unlike many of those who sail under the deliberative banner, I will argue that a defensible theory of deliberative democracy must be critical in its orientation to established power structures, including those that operate beneath the constitutional surface of the liberal state, and so insurgent in relation to established institutions. (Ibid., p. 2)

Summarizing key aspects of his wide-ranging and relatively complete view, Dryzek argues that deliberative democracy must be

pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions (including the tradition of deliberative democracy itself), transnational in its capacity to extend across state boundaries into settings where there is no constitutional framework, ecological in terms of openness to communication with non-human nature, and dynamic in its openness to ever-changing constraints and opportunities for democratization. (Ibid., p. 3)

Some Pragmatist Suggestions About Deliberative Democracy

Because it reflects so much critical learning from others and encompasses so much that an agenda for deliberative democracy must include in order to be adequate to the multiple needs of our present problem situations, local and global, Dryzek’s view offers a helpful starting point for adding some pragmatist reflections to the contemporary theoretical and practical conversation about pluralism and deliberative democracy. Dryzek is right to argue that an adequate descriptive and normative theory of deliberative democracy must be pluralistic, transnational, ecological, and dynamic, while at the same time flexible in contextually orienting action toward states, toward the public sphere that exceeds them, or toward both. He is right about the importance of stabilizing the gains of democratic transformative action within constitutions, laws, and formal social institutions, though he is misleading in his suggestion that these are somehow more stable, more influential, or more basic than changes in cultures and lifeways. He is right to address issues of power directly and critically, and to insist on a certain kind of realism about the current set of state imperatives – economic sufficiency, perceived legitimacy, and security against both internal and external threats, and perhaps ecological sustainability – that limit even quasi-democratic states in their range of policy alternatives. However, Dryzek is too accepting of the current,
capitalism-structured imperative to keep investors actively and appreciatively involved in the national economies on which states rely for resources, and whose success greatly determines the extent to which citizens regard their states’ leaders and even their constitutions as legitimate. When they overstep certain complex, contextual, hard-to-define yet important boundaries, wealthy investors and major corporations join the important threats against which states (democratic or otherwise) must protect citizens and insure their own stability. Moreover, other economic actors, including less-wealthy investors, other corporations and small businesses, citizen-consumers, and citizen-activists, also have significant powers to influence the business climate that would-be plutocrats depend upon for their own success and security, not only by influencing laws and constitutions, but also by influencing stock markets, which are highly responsive to scandal, to protest, and to changes in consumer sensibilities that directly affect the flow of major investors’ life-blood: the perceived worth of their holdings. In his work before 9/11, Dryzek already recognized the potential transformative power of non-government organizations and networks, including those of a non-progressive character, but he still treated states as the most powerful centers of decision-making and collective influence. But 9/11 has changed that, throwing into stark relief the already-developed power of both economic networks and transnational discourses to undermine the semi-autonomy and redirect the lifeways of even the most powerful nation-states.

Dryzek’s focus on discourses accurately captures the protean flow of contemporary communications across the structural lines of state, language, religion, class, caste, gender, and culture that once deeply divided people and limited their access to information. Increasingly, twenty-first-century people have access to what William James (see James) called a “fund of experience” that can both stimulate and ground their reflections about their immediate situation, opening up a wider range of future alternatives for their imaginations to consider and transmogrify into both fearful and desirable possibilities for their own lives. There is now no part of the world that is completely cut off from the web of global communications, welcome or intrusive as such omnipresence may be. At the present time, most of the dominant communicative streams are commercially motivated and controlled, often pandering to and helping to shape people’s fears, anxieties, antipathies, acquisitive greed, and materialistic self-identifications. Influencing the redirection of this dangerous misuse of worldwide human communicative potentials must be an important agenda item for proponents of deliberative democracy. Fortunately at present, the worldwide telecommunications web allows people to communicate different news and views to expand their experience and to coordinate learning, deliberation, and action across great distances, as well as among locally proximate partisans of movements and causes. Unfortunately, a combination of commercial and state actors in various countries, including America and China, has already shown interest in monitoring and controlling internet communications for the sake of interests that their ruling elites regard as more important than free, democratic communication. Therefore, maintaining the freedom of the internet must also be a matter of great interest and concern for proponents of deliberative democracy, because it has played a key role in recent years in fostering both a transstructural flow of discourses and the critical process of challenging and correcting the dominant flows.
While Dryzek is right to argue that reflective choice among discourses is possible to some extent, and that some discourses are less oppressive than others, he gives insufficient attention to the importance of access to alternative discourses and to communicative resources of support and information for challenging one’s own. This may be because he misconceives the relationship between a discourse and an individual interpreter. Dryzek suggests that we can and do semi-consciously process “bits” of information from daily experience in building up a storyline or in critically assessing a whole discourse, suggesting something like John Locke’s psychology of perception. However, we actually seem to take in and to be carried along by larger flows of information – events and storylines – of which we are largely unaware at the time, building up what William James described as interpretive nets within and concerning different aspects of our lives and of the world through which future flows of experiences are filtered, only rarely and with difficulty reflexively reforming certain areas of these interpretive nets, which are largely inaccessible to us.

George Herbert Mead (1934) (see Mead) insightfully theorized the socially shared character and constitutive depth of these interpretive nets – and also the critical, imaginative, and collaborative means of transforming them – in his analysis of the social self (see Expressivism and Mead’s Social Self). From our earliest days of life, Mead suggested, we participate in a communicative flow of significant gestures (even before we understand words) that direct our attention and stimulate us to respond to others in particular ways, shaping a “me” that already has a language, a culture, and a set of social norms and expectations in relation to a “generalized other” and some particular valued others even before an “I” emerges that is capable of self-consciously and reflexively choosing and expressing some alternative possibility. This social self is further shaped according to shared socio-cultural expectations during childhood through free play that imaginatively tries on observed social roles using traditional toys and tools, as well as through rule-structured games that teach standard relationships among diverse roles, with a limited degree of freedom to invent variations. Most of these roles and rules carry over into the similarly scripted activities of adult social life. However, Mead suggested, challenges and even psycho-social crises for whole persons, social groups, and communities can be generated by the interplay of differing, even incompatible “generalized others” that make strong formative and reformative demands on the “me,” opening up wider possibilities for the “I” to image and interactively express critical reformulations of the roles, rules, and scripts of any or all of them.

Communicative access to multiple “generalized others” is a common feature of globalized, twenty-first-century living, stimulating many to challenge the norms of their culture of upbringing. This is why so many conservative forces within various cultures urge a return to a narrow tribalism, in which hierarchies of interpreters shape “fundamentalist” life scripts of rules and roles within which individuals are encouraged to seek security and comfort, or, alternatively, to seek meaning by sacrificing themselves in “holy wars” to preserve these life scripts and the lifeworlds they shape from influence and perhaps transformation by the invasive flow of others’ communications, as well as the economic and military forces for which they make channels. The key to opening up such fundamentalist regimes of all kinds seems to be communication: not only assuring the free flow of alternative discourses across boundaries through various media, and not by assisting in the development of general
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Communicative capabilities like those Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum emphasize, especially literacy, but also by educatively developing the critical and imaginative capacities that Dryzek and Foucault suggest are possible, and for which Mead suggests a developmental mechanism. This same mechanism may work to allow us as modern or postmodern persons who play multiple roles—as workers, citizens, family members, nature-lovers, neighbors, avocationalists, committed members of religious and/or political communities, and dreamers of better futures for ourselves and others—critically to reconsider the relationships among different aspects of our lives for which our interpretive nets or storylines may be incompatible with one another, leading us to experience existential stress, anxiety, immobility, anger, and an unnamable dissatisfaction, and on this basis to begin to reshape them and to seek communicative contexts and networks with others who can assist us in this process, and also in transforming the social norms and institutions that block us in our ability to act out a reflectively preferable form of life. This leads us back to and beyond Young’s consciousness-raising groups, suggesting that Dryzek is right in urging the need for collective action focusing on the state and/or the public sphere, but also suggesting that deliberative democracy and transformative action must begin and find sources of inspiration and support in the formation and growth of whole, healthy, and effective social selves.

In my own view, an adequate descriptive and normative theory of deliberative democracy needs to focus on its location and role within a highly contextual nexus of institutionally structured social relations and transactions, within which the characters, values, beliefs, habits of thinking, and intellectual-communicative skills of diverse participating persons affect and are affected by this kind of transactional process within its network of related kinds of processes. Many currently influential analyses focus too narrowly on only one or a few of these inextricably interrelated aspects, leading to distorted analysis and inadequate normative guidance. A singular focus on certain kinds of abstract reasons (such as Rawlsian “public reasons”) and on specific reasoning processes (such as Habermasian communicative rationality) takes in too narrow and too shallow a set of these elements. As Young, Dryzek, and others have argued, value-laden persuasive rhetoric and some other, supplemental intellectual-communicative modes also rightly may be employed in deliberation; these include practices of hospitality broader in scope than the subset Young specifies as “greeting,” which can be trust-building, identity-expressive, and participant-connecting (Green 2004b), and also practices of storytelling like those traditionally employed within Native American philosophical traditions, which can convey a sense of the location of broad valuations within experience as well as a sense of ongoing interrelationships among processes, institutional impacts, and influential actors that may not, need not, and perhaps cannot be conveyed in a statement of reasons or a tightly logically structured argument. Many practitioners of preference-based social choice theory and some “difference” democrats regard such supplementary intellectual-communicative modes as somehow coercive, in that they aim to influence and may actually succeed in doing so. However, such a general claim rests on an insufficiently realistic ontology about actual interconnections, both between reasoning and emotions within psyches, and also among persons within any significant social-communicative transaction. Dewey and Mead offered more robustly realistic accounts both of the role of the emotions and of the depth of human sociality. Unless other factors enter in (e.g., radically
unequal, institutionally structured, personality-destructive power relations, or situation-specific personality-suppressive power relations of threat-and-fear, or torture-linked conditions of sleep deprivation, etc.), the normal social influences of deliberative participants upon one another that inevitably and inseparably combine intellectual, emotional, and social-locational factors like group memberships should be regarded as non-objectionable per se, though perhaps better acknowledged than hidden and denied. However, in light of the importance of such personal, cultural, discursive, and other differences, both as challenges and resources for deliberative democracy, a focus on what ideal actors would conclude (as is typical of both Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to deliberative democracy) is misleadingly context-independent, too uniformitarian about deliberative participants, too non-transactional, too oblivious of actors’ social-institutional locations and related differences in power and in participants’ previous opportunities to develop and to employ diverse and distinctive intellectual-communicative excellences and prerequisite habits.

For related reasons, a focus on constitutions as already accomplished and to-be-accepted (rather than to-be-reconstructed) institutional and intellectual-communicative frameworks privileges as quasi-ideal the real actors who constructed them, ignores real power inequalities as well as perspectival and valuational differences then and now, and unreasonably limits the scope of deliberation in ways that silence reconstructive criticisms of the goals they were designed to serve while implicitly ratifying their various institutional strategies and distributive outcomes. Rawls agreed with Aristotle that we cannot reasonably deliberate or choose about ends. Dewey (1939) more insightfully understood that deliberation always concerns ends that are undergoing transactional negotiation and experiential emergence, either “ends-in-view” (operational objectives) or the larger ideal ends that frame the purposes and values within our lives. Especially in the historical context of a real constitutional history like America’s, in which chattel slavery was first constitutionally permitted and then constitutionally abolished without redistributing ill-gotten gains from its beneficiaries to its victims, in which land was taken from Native Americans in violation of America’s international treaties with them and without just compensation or reparations for genocidal harms wrought through this process, and in which women were barred from voting and many other valued forms of public participation as well as many forms of property-holding and most higher educational institutions and professions until relatively recently, the presumption that a national constitution is to-be-accepted as legitimate is profoundly anti-democratic and unreasonable. Instead, the more reasonable democratic presumption must be the pragmatist one: that such a national constitution must be progressively reconstructed in order to become legitimate, as those against whom it once licensed oppression, exclusion, and serious, unrectified harms increasingly gain capacities to express their own values, perspectives, beliefs, and goals, using those communicative-intellectual modes they regard as most expressive of their standpoints and most likely to influence others with whom they participate in constitution-reconstructive, power-redistributing democratic deliberation processes. To presume the legitimacy of a constitution that is known to result from an obviously undemocratic deliberative process, as Rawls does in the American case, implicitly treats neo-classical economists’ concept of “pareto optimality” as an adequate standard of justice; that is, it implies that existing distributions are not to be criticized within
a current holdings-respecting transactional process of attempting to improve distributions for all interactive participants. In such a real historical context, Rawls’s “difference principle” signifies nothing more than a strategic device for keeping the worst-off participants from being “extinguished from the game” in terms of the limited rules for preferable voluntary redistributions within the “Edgeworth box” of neo-classical economics.

Likewise, a focus on law alone ignores too many other dimensions of transactions that are always in play in deliberative contexts, many of them “causal” as well as “consequential” of the laws on which deliberative transactions may focus in some cases. Moreover, reconstructive change in laws may be very slow; in some twenty-first-century contexts, slower than changes in values, beliefs, goals, habits, and daily patterns of inter-group relations. However, focus on individual and group differences alone obscures felt as well as sometimes unnoticed aspects of the kind of “common fate” that many Americans experienced for the first time on 9/11, as well as desired or desirable aspects of a “common good” to be achieved, perhaps as an amelioration of a “common fate,” both of which depend upon cross-difference transactions. At the same time, focus on broad social transactional processes alone overlooks the legal and institutional structures that can stabilize individual and group identities, as well as the differing social locations and opportunities, the related beliefs, habits, skills, and focal values these shape or influence, and the common aspects of future fates and goods that democratic deliberation prepares or allows participating actors to contribute to bringing into being.

Instead, the focus of a more adequate account of deliberative democracy must be on dynamic transactional actors treated as whole persons who are valuable in their semi-autonomy, in their valued group memberships, and also in their social hopes and individual aspirations, the realization of which depends upon their growth of character, loyalties, gifts, outlook, and intellectual-communicative skills through group and inter-group transactional processes within stabilizing social-locational structures of families and friendships, workplaces, social institutions, cultures, states, and global relations. In addition to their focal function of guiding collaborative decision and action, democratic deliberative processes must be understood as educative in nature, among the educative institutions of adult life about which Dewey theorized, ideally approached with the mutual openness to learning from and with others about which Jane Addams (2002) theorized. Students should be practically prepared for deliberative democracy in all aspects of adult living through school curriculums within the kind of cross-difference educational processes Alain Locke described, ones that teach students to practice a critical loyalty to their own culture and other social groups of which they are members, instead of an unthinking jingoism, framing those group loyalties in terms of a broader geo-political understanding of history and of current events that fosters preliminary, appreciative understanding of others’ cultures and group memberships while insisting on the wider “loyalty to loyalty” that Josiah Royce (1908) theorized; a commitment to broadly shared human rights so understood as to include the lived importance of differing group memberships and continuously reconstructed interpretive nets that can guide diverse peoples in standing together against oppressions of any people.
Public reason as understood in this pragmatist way is not a narrow or merely meta-level process that aims to prevent our deeper, more real, or more personal reasoning processes from emerging in public life, much less some separate and distinctive subset of our actual beliefs, values, or interests. Rather, pragmatist public reason goes “all the way down” insofar as one realistically acknowledges the inextricable social and emotional intertwining of one’s own life and those of other members of all the groups to whom one feels loyalty or with whom one experiences practical transactions within larger, emergent social processes and outcomes – and insofar as one’s own moral engagement encompasses the experiences of all other humans and other-than-human beings who share a single transactional web of life, whose common fate and whose common good we can and should seek to influence reflexively, respectfully, and cooperatively. Such influence is not always or even primarily coercive – it is normal, inevitable, and often desirable, provided that it is mutual, intelligent, caring, effectively coordinated and stabilized, reflective of differences in perspective and aspirations, and deeply democratic.

In addition to these practical ways of educating for democratic pluralism both critically and appreciatively, and this theoretical way of understanding pluralistic public reasoning processes as both wide and deep, as mutually affective, and as most valuable when recognized as such, contemporary pragmatism in this classical American vein suggests the value of epistemic pluralism in inquiry. For us pragmatists unmodified, in contrast with Rortyean neo-pragmatists (see RORTY), truth is real and important, but it must be creatively brought into being through experience-including, opinion-influencing transactions within dynamic social-natural processes, rather than discovered as an already-existing “fact” (Bohman 2004; Misak 2004). Thus, deliberative participants must be included in inquiry not only for the sake of their own educations, though this is important for the legitimacy and stability of deliberation’s conclusions, but also because their dispersed, experience-based knowledge must be included and critically corrected by others’ input in order for the fullest truths, the most substantively just policies, and the most respectful social relations to be created through the transactional process. Pragmatism is thus more realistic than liberal constitutionalism and communitarian republicanism concerning deep disagreements rooted in cultures, loyalties, and daily living both between and within significant social groups; it is committed to seeking more substantively just, reconstructive transformations in existing distributions of wealth and opportunities, and necessarily with this, changes in many individuals’ preferences and background views of the deep kind that will tend to make it unacceptable to libertarian social choice theorists. At the same time, pragmatism is more realistic than some “difference democrats” about the necessity of finding a desirable and effective modus vivendi amidst deep differences that allows even historical antagonists to collaborate in achieving preferable solutions to shared, life-diminishing problems. Such a pragmatism seeks a moral depth of inclusiveness of differing voices in transactional democratic processes within all aspects of social-institutional living, not just in “politics,” arguing that there is no way to effectively separate the moral and the political, and that a deeper democracy must emerge in the way each pole of this traditional duality reflectively conditions the other (Green 1999, 2004c).
Judith M. Green

Such a pragmatist vision of deliberative democracy evaluates pluralism as a desirable aspect of future global living, treating pluralism as a multidimensional source of value that can lead to communicative richness, experience-based trust, and the possibility of a positive peace, as a stimulus to individual, institutional, and cultural growth, as liberatory “oxygen” for individuals within the life communities and nation-states to which they are critically loyal, and as suggesting a multiplicity of social experiments from which all can learn, as communities draw on shared histories, deep-rooted values, and natural terrains within their own specific “logics of place” (Pratt and Huhndorf 2000), while critically and loyally transforming these within semi-autonomous trajectories that promote their growth, their internal tolerance of differences, and their existential sustainability without threatening other peoples.

Pragmatism offers multiple suggestions toward the development of a descriptively and normatively more adequate general model of deliberative democracy, including a more realistic emphasis on growth in participants’ understanding of issues and of one another’s lives within diverse global contexts, as well as a more ideal emergence and continuous involvement of mutually educating individuals and publics capable of considering, deciding, and shaping public goods and public policies, thus suggesting a crucial focus on projects of citizen education and public formation. Such a pragmatist approach offers ontological advantages in its realistic inclusion of whole persons, their real reasons and diverse reflective processes, and their significant group memberships in framing legitimate and just deliberation processes. It offers epistemic advantages in highlighting the guiding function of ideals that grow within and respond to experience; in framing useful truths as socially emergent, convergent, and operable without giving up on the search for truths of greater generality, and perhaps deeper Truths of our cosmic system; in urging the development of diverse, contextualizable intellectual-communicative skills; in calling for inclusion of more experiential standpoints that can contribute new information while critically correcting one another; in suggesting the need for more adequate scoping of issues, more effective employment of relevant information that otherwise would have been ignored intentionally, and more appropriate valuation of diverse intellectual-communicative modes of educative transaction. Such a pragmatist approach offers moral advantages in its emphases on active responsibility, on developing moral capability, character, habits, transactional openness and concern to understand and aid others as well as oneself, on greater inclusiveness of differences, as well as through its transformative emphasis on both substantive and procedural justice, and its practical ways of encouraging the kind of shared social hope that can stimulate and guide action. It offers aesthetic advantages in recognizing the importance of citizen satisfactions that derive from participation within complete and effective circuits of public thought-and-action, and in its approach to refining and elevating differences, rather than erasing or transfixing them. Finally, a pragmatist approach to rethinking deliberative democracy offers advantages in implementation: it suggests the need for various sources of productive assistance to nurture the formation of publics who can advocate, collaborate, and incorporate desirable aspects of a common fate and a common good, which eventually will mean fewer wars, fewer NIMBYs, a healthier planet, and more sustainable existential satisfactions in living, both for humans and for other-than-humans.
PLURALISM AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

References and further reading


Philosophy as Education

JIM GARRISON

John Dewey (see DEWEY) provides a seemingly absurd conception of philosophy that, properly understood, conveys us to the existential core of classical pragmatism: “If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education” (MW 9:338, emphasis in original; see also pp. 341 and 342).

For Charles S. Peirce (see PEIRCE), William James (see JAMES), Dewey, and George Herbert Mead (see MEAD), dispositions are embodied habits that emotionally propel and intellectually guide transformative action. When quiescent, habits form attitudes and moods whereby we receive existence.

The pragmatic doctrine, that we must work out all proposed meanings, truths, and values through their consequences, makes pragmatism a temporal, evolving, and future-oriented philosophy. The pragmatic conception, remarks Dewey, is of “a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James’ term, ‘in the making,’ ‘in the process of becoming,’ of a universe up to a certain point still plastic” (LW 2:13; ED 1:8). This means that reason and thought has “a creative, constructive function” (ibid.).

If Homo sapiens, or any other sapient beings, frame purposes, form general ideas, and then act on them, they produce consequences in the course of real events that would not otherwise exist. Creativity is crucial to pragmatism (see CREATIVITY AND SOCIETY). Pragmatists think we are active participants in an unfinished universe, and not idle detached spectators of a consummated cosmos. They assume an attitude of reverent awe toward the very fact there is something rather than nothing, while expressing piety toward the infinite possibilities of existence. While not overly optimistic, pragmatism remains melioristic and hopeful. Pragmatism overcomes the usual existential tendency toward nihilism by taking delight in the joys of artistic creativity and aesthetic appreciation (see AESTHETICS).

Philosophy is a form of thought that searches for totality, generality, and ultimate-ness. Philosophers have pursued their subject matter by two divergent paths. The first attempts to gather the dispersed and varied details of all existence into a single unity, while the second attempts to reduce the details to a small number of ultimate,
immutable, and eternal principles. Pragmatism pursues the first path; most of modern
philosophy takes the second.

Pragmatists are committed to the idea of an evolving universe. In a Darwinian
world, such ideas as totality and ultimateness do not literally apply, so we cannot
define philosophy solely as the search for some settled subject matter. Therefore, it is
better to approach the philosophical quest through the dispositions, intellectual and
emotional, of those individuals and communities that seek as much unity, wholeness,
and finality as a contingent, ever-evolving universe has to offer, while delighting in
the creative possibilities of a world without end.

The remainder of this chapter addresses philosophy as the formation of dispositions,
that is, habits, first in their active, transformative phase and then in their passive,
receptive phase. I want to show how socio-linguistic practices create meaning and
knowledge and how cultural customs inscribe that meaning on individuals as embod-
died dispositions to act. The incessant philosophical quest for unity is really just another
socio-linguistic practice that attempts to unify cultural practice into a single whole.
Because we acquire our habits of action by participating in the social practices of a
culture, the quest for cultural unity and personal unity overlap. Our fundamental
dispositions toward nature and other human beings shape our philosophical under-
standing. Learning creates our habits and attitudes while education transmits them,
which is why philosophy is “the general theory of education.”

Pragmatism emphasized the social from the beginning when Peirce insisted upon
the primary role of the community of inquiry across generations in working out the
meaning and universality of concepts. Ironically, because philosophers themselves
have become a specialized class engaged in their own distinct social practice with
their own technical language, they fail to realize that philosophical problems arise
from conundrums in communities of practice. Pragmatic philosophers of culture
seek unity among the diverse meanings and values that emerge when different social
practices transact with and transform the rest of existence. Most modern philosophers
find this search misplaced because they are confident that philosophy is about ulti-
mate knowledge regarding the “truly” real beyond every social practice. They fail to
realize that the limits of our socio-linguistic practices are the limits of learning and
knowing.

Let us begin by setting the idea of social practices in the context of the linguistic
turn. Neo-pragmatists such as W. V. Quine (1969) (see Quine) and Richard Rorty
(1979) (see Rorty) have called attention to the similarities shared by the two former
schoolteachers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Dewey. These similarities readily extend to
other pragmatists as well. In Wittgenstein’s famous slab game, those who can eventu-
ally respond correctly learn to become members of a social and linguistic community
of practitioners: bricklayers perhaps; those who cannot respond correctly must join
other communities. All such games are educational. Becoming a member of any
community of practice is an educational experience that involves explicit teaching
and learning. Those who engage in the socio-linguistic practice of philosophy may
perceive a more general unity of social practices, but the limits of their language
remain the limits of their world. Since we only acquire and transmit socio-linguistic
practices through education, we might also say the limits of our education are the
limits of our world.

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All social practices are but complex recursive variations on the basic game of language acquisition. Meanings are means to consequences. The tool of any given practice, say the bricklayer’s level, is simply a means to the ends of a given practice; they are the permanency of labor. Nonetheless, language remains the tool of tools (bring me a slab!), the means to any other consequence, including the making of ordinary tools.

For pragmatists, habits constitute the self. They are, in the Aristotelian sense, functions (*ergon*) that coordinate with their habitat and form our second nature, including the content of our character. They impart skilled “know-how” to the art and craft of any practice. Habits are the embodied instruments of interpretation, judgment conception, reason, imagination, and recall. They are the product of prior learning and inquiry that support subsequent inquiry and learning.

We acquire our habits from our habitat, especially the customs of our social habitat. For pragmatists like Dewey and Mead, to have a mind is to participate in the social practices of a culture; to have a self is to take the attitude of the other with regard to our own behavioral gestures. Minds and selves are thoroughly social and entirely bound up with socially conditioned habits of action. By participating in the social practices of a given culture, we acquire that culture’s repository of meaning. Such participation is education: it forms an individual’s fundamental dispositions.

Intellectually, the most important thing about habits is that they are general concepts. Their existential import is that when they guide our actions they produce consequences that would not have existed otherwise. Peirce grasped the educational significance of this fact: “[T]he sense of the process of learning, which is the preeminent ingredient and quintessence of reason has its physiological basis quite evidently in the most characteristic property of the nervous system, the power of taking habits” (*EP* 1:264). He also observes: “Our beliefs guide our desires. . . . The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions” (*EP* 1:114). Peirce provides a biologically sound contribution to the general theory of education.

Peirce’s semiotics made the linguistic turn early while quickly recognizing its shocking educational consequences: “But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: ‘you mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought’.” In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other (*EP* 1:54). Before examining the embodied interpretants of thought, let us pause to reflect on this statement.

No finite being is logically omniscient: that is, no one knows all the logical consequences of any semiotic construction or sociolinguistic practice. Further, for Peirce, logical copulation is procreative. The meanings of terms expand with their consequences. Therefore, language is always poetic; hence, the semiotic universe is still in the making and, since the language we make makes us, humanity too is a work in progress. Existentially, Peirce thought we could not settle the meaning of a sign or the meaning of its user until all the consequences are determined. For him, reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community. Insofar as one expresses unique individuality in thought, it must, for Peirce, deviate from this ultimate community; hence, individuality is “manifested only by ignorance and error” (*EP* 1:54–5).
Although it is not entirely clear, Peirce seems to think that at the end of education, which coincides with the end of history, we would realize the finalization of all meanings. Existentially, absolute perfection is a disaster; for in such a world there is no more meaning to be made except in moral fallenness, aesthetic decay, or cognitive error. James and Dewey’s infinitely pluralistic universe forestalls any such disaster; there is no end of philosophy because there is no end of education.

Peirce avoids the flirtation with linguistic idealism we find in deconstruction, and even the neo-pragmatist Rorty. Peirce identifies three kinds of embodied semiotic interpretants (EP 2:430). The first is a “feeling-interpretant” (ibid.). The second is “dynamical action” (EP 2:411). The third regards “the ultimate intellectual interpretant” which “are habits” (EP 2:431). Habits are generalized rules of action, or concepts, in that they are predispositions to respond to similar stimuli (objects, situations, etc.) in similar ways. Peirce may think there are ultimate interpretants in the sense of what deconstruction calls “the transcendental signified”; if so, he is mistaken. Nonetheless, if the play of signs is ever to translate into human action, for instance political action, individual bodies within the body politic are the ultimate interpretants. Unlike deconstruction, pragmatism may readily engage in practical action.

Existence is not self-interpreting. Any meaning it comes to possess depends on the emergence of meaning makers (linguistically competent sentient creatures) within existence. Those who realize this verity take a very distinct existential attitude toward philosophy. James decries the notion of a monistic “block universe” wherein all relations are, at least at the end of history, fully actualized internal relations and, hence, there is no more meaning worth making. In a pluralistic universe there are and always will be unique individuals with external relations to the rest of existence. Nonetheless, as James states it, every individual is “in some possible or mediated connexion, with every other part however remote” (Works PU, p. 146). Creating connections involves the artistic social practices of the individual’s community, including labor, tools, and language that, through education, impart to individuals their minds and self-identity. The process of meaning production is endless in an infinitely pluralistic universe. To the existential question – what is the meaning of life – pluralist pragmatists answer that the meaning of life is to make more meaning. Likewise, the ultimate aim of education is more education.

Dewey accepts James’s pluralism, thinking it “alone justifies struggle in creative activity” and “gives intrinsic significance to individuality” (LW 14:101; ED 1:219). He then supplements it with a crucial idea by preserving the metaphysical notion of potentiality, but rejecting latent potentiality. In Western metaphysics, acorns become oak trees because they have the latent potential to actualize their eternal fixed essence (eidos). Dewey argues instead that “potentialities must be thought in terms of consequences of interactions with other things” and, therefore, potentialities are only knowable after the interactions have occurred (LW 14:109; ED 1:223). Inquiry, including scientific inquiry, is the education of humankind in the consequences of socio-linguistic transactions that actualize the potentials of existence. That means what actually exists at the end of inquiry is only potentially there at the start. Unlike spectators, participants in a pluralistic universe transform existence when they transact with it.

Like Peirce, Dewey found the community, or, more exactly, “the social,” to be, as he titled one of his essays, “The Inclusive Philosophical Idea” (LW 3:41f; ED 1:308f).
Whereas Peirce emphasizes the semiotic and logical function of the community of inquiry, Dewey emphasizes the metaphysical and artistically creative function of the social because he thinks social transactions not only most fully disclose the transactional potential of the universe, but are also the place the universe becomes cognitively known and aesthetically unified (see Aesthetic Experience and the Neurobiology of Inquiry). Additionally, moral transactions among social creatures and the potential released thereby influence the unfolding of the universes for better or worse. In human experience, actualizing the universes potential for unified connection, totality, generality, and ultimateness is an endless moral, cognitive, and artistic pursuit passed from generation to generation. That is why Dewey thought “philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme human interest in which, moreover, other problems, cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head” (LW 5:156; ED 1:19).

Thus far, we have been discussing the role of dispositions as habits in their intellectual, emotionally dynamic, projective phase, while emphasizing logical and cosmological issues. Habits also have an emotional, passive, and subdued phase that frames the attitudes by which we welcome the world. In what follows, I will emphasize moral and aesthetic issues.

While dormant, habits may nonetheless develop and prepare themselves for subsequent action upon the removal of inhibitions. In this quiescent phase, intellectual and emotional habits express themselves as attitudes. Those in a thoughtful, compassionate, and reverent attitude receive and respond to the “same” events differently from those in a dismissive, malicious, or derisive mood.

Pragmatists are predisposed to seek intimate relations with the rest of existence wherein their creative actions matter. Knowledge is of value to them only insofar as it quickens and enlightens action. Even if we had a complete account of the ultimate principles structuring the universe, those with an inquisitive attitude would soon begin to ask existential questions: What does it mean? How should I live my life given such knowledge? Of what value is it? Dewey remarks: “And by these questions he would not signify the absurd search for a knowledge greater than all knowledge, but would indicate the need for projecting even the completest knowledge upon a realm of another dimension – namely, the dimension of action” (MW 11:47; ED 1:74–5). Given perfect knowledge, we may still ask how to use it to live better lives.

We may distinguish two attitudes toward knowledge. The first seeks absolute knowledge, after which it seeks repose. The other, more existential attitude, involves the “human eros” to live a life of expanding meaning and value (see Alexander 1993). Modern philosophy is largely a Cartesian quest for the certainty of a single super-science that can sum up all the details of life under a few ultimate first principles. However, for those who think we live in a universe still in the making and who seek to celebrate that fact, “the wholeness characteristic of philosophy is a power to learn, or to extract meanings, from . . . experience and to embody what is learned in an ability to go on learning” (MW 9:335). The wholeness of learning lies in the education of human-kind across generations. For those who seek such wholeness, knowledge is both an end in itself and a means to the end of living a life of expanding meaning and value.

Taking an existential attitude toward knowledge by inquiring into its value for life dramatizes a Platonic insight. The love of wisdom, philosophy in the etymological sense, concerns the good that is beyond knowledge alone. Dewey declares:
By wisdom we mean not systematic knowledge of fact and truth, but a conviction about moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led. Wisdom . . . refers not to the constitution of things already in existence, not even if that constitution be magnified into eternity and absoluteness. . . . It refers not to accomplished reality but to a desired future which our desires, when translated into articulate conviction, may help bring into existence. (MW 11:44; ED 1:73)

In an unfinishable universe, there are always desirable possibilities beyond any given actuality, which means there is always more to learn.

Values provide the varied social practices with direction, while those practices determine the fundamental dispositions society seeks to inculcate in its members. That is why a philosophical theory making no difference in educational endeavor “must be artificial” and why education “is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested” (MW 9:339). The test of philosophical totality, unity, or wholeness in a contingent, endlessly evolving universe resides in dispositions that value consistency and continuity in developing current habits of response to meet the demands of novel events and situations; it is, indeed, the power to learn continuously. The test of generality in such a universe lies in dispositions toward creating connections and making more meaning. The test of ultimate or finality dwells in dispositions that value a passion for persistent, penetrating thought endlessly engaged in imaginative criticism and artistic creation.

Beings with bowels, brains, values, emotions, imagination, moral character, practical skills, conceptions, powers of interpretation, and reason affect the course of reality in an ever-evolving world where learning is without surcease. Through their creative acts, they bring meaning into existence and gather it into artistic, moral, and scientific forms that philosophers strive ceaselessly to unify. Those who take such attitudes toward existence find it easy to conceive of education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions toward existence and to define philosophy as the general theory of education.

References and further reading

Dealing with the phenomenon of creativity from the pragmatist viewpoint does not mean introducing yet another determinant of human action. The pragmatic interpretation puts forward a more profound thesis to the effect that creativity constitutes human action in its entirety. The argument for creativity is meant to suggest a paradigm shift in the study of action. Those features in action that traditionally have been thought of as most basic are seen to be less basic and less general from this perspective, although they do not lose all their relevance for the study of action.

In short, the pragmatist interpretation argues for the creativity of action, rather than for the creativity of human individuals as such. Individuals may also be creative, but this is due to the creativity of their action rather than vice versa. As a happy dictum has recently expressed the matter, “Creative people are not dreamers. They do things” (Karlqvist 1997, p. 105). This principle in itself sets this approach apart from today’s postmodern ways of thought that also make frequent use of the creativity term, but mean by it human visions rather than human doings. As noted, pragmatism understands creativity as an anthropological universal in human action, not as the gift of some exceptional individuals. Accordingly, the pragmatic interpretation maintains that whenever we do something, we exercise this universal creativity. Not, however, as completely free subjects, but always in the confines of the particular situation where the action is taking place. The term “situation” reminds us of the fact that our history, though made by us, is not made in circumstances of our own choice, to borrow an old expression by Karl Marx. Thus, the right name for the pragmatic interpretation of creativity apparently is “situated creativity.”

This expression, and the creative interpretation of action in general, was introduced by Hans Joas in his book *The Creativity of Action* (1996). That book clearly is a part of the current international renaissance of pragmatism, particularly in its attempt to make use of and develop further the ideas of the classical pragmatists and not just rehearse them in an exegetical sense.

The creative interpretation is mostly directed toward problems in the social sciences, although it does have general philosophical relevance as well. As noted, the creative interpretation suggests that traditional conceptualizations of action can be, and have to be, reconsidered. Sociological action theory in particular has been wont to maintain that means–ends relations are the most basic relations in the study of action, so that
our discussion of action has to concern itself with them. It is not necessarily so, the creative interpretation answers; it is possible to bring out some tacit conceptual commitments on which the means–ends scheme is based, but which do not show themselves in its explicit formulations. Accordingly, the creative interpretation of action is able to show that vestiges of utilitarianism and economism still permeate sociological theory to a larger extent than what first meets the eye. Somewhat ironically, utilitarian influence can be found even in such sociologists who in their own opinion are inveterate critics of utilitarian and positivistic ways of thought. However, before we can discuss the further implications of the creative viewpoint for the study of action, its relation to preceding pragmatism needs to be explained.

Overcoming Cartesian Dualism with a New Interpretation of Action

Although the classical pragmatists continually emphasized that their philosophy was meant to be a new and more thorough philosophy of action, it took a long time for this truth to sink in, in the “epistemocentric” climate of our philosophical heritage, to borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s (2000, p. 50) expression. Philosophy has traditionally approached action in terms of knowledge, being, or some other basic concept, whereas pragmatism has right from the beginning maintained that this order is to be reversed. Traditional philosophical questions, like those of knowledge and morality, are to be settled in terms of action, not vice versa – this is the standpoint of pragmatism (Pape 2002). Pragmatism is a post-Darwinian philosophy. In an evolutionary perspective, the existence of action cannot depend on the existence of self-reflective mind, but the opposite order is to be assumed (Mead 1934, 1938). As the physiological psychologist Antonio Damasio (1994, ch. 5) puts the matter today, there are living beings with mere activities. There are also beings with mind (cognitive processes) and activities, but no one has ever found creatures with mind but no activities.

All interpretations of pragmatism agree about one thing, about its critical attitude toward Cartesianism (see Peirce and Cartesian Rationalism). Although this is an often-repeated truth, not all of its implications apparently have already been spelled out. The Cartesian mind–body dualism itself may have only a few explicit adherents today, but most conceptualizations of action, outside the pragmatist tradition, still take this dualism tacitly for granted. Those vestiges of Cartesianism appear in the ordinary treatments of perception, cognition, and volition separately from their corporeal execution in action. Pragmatism has always disputed this assumption – not in the sense that those cognitive phenomena could not be treated as analytically abstracted from action, of course, but this is something that needs to be explicitly mentioned. According to pragmatism, perception, cognition, emotion, etc., take place as phases in action, rather than as something outside it or preceding it.

Accordingly, pragmatism presents a model of action that differs from its ordinary conceptualizations. Its model “reverses the order of naturalness” (Scheffler 1974, p. 59), “as the modern concept of inertia reversed the natural state from rest to motion.” Pragmatism thus understands action as an ongoing process, not as a sequence of
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discrete separate “actions,” triggered off by what are known as their “determinants” or “explanantia.” These are not irrelevant for the study of action, but their proper place is inside rather than outside the action process (Dewey MW 14:173; Mead 1936, p. 345). What it means to say that they are located inside action becomes perhaps easier to grasp if one keeps in mind that in pragmatism the basic concept to refer to action phenomena is not “action” but habit (Camic 1986; Kilpinen 2000; Hartmann 2003).

About this term “habit,” the first thing to be noted is that it does not mean “mere slothful repetition of what has been done, mere tendency to repeat any action you happened to perform,” as Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce), the founder of pragmatism, already pointed out (1976, vol. 4, p. 143). In his and other pragmatists’ usage, “habit” does not mean conditioned, mindless routine, as it does in its garden variety meanings. In pragmatism, this term serves two theoretical purposes: it is a reminder of the process nature of action, and it is the way to overcome classic Cartesian dualism.

Pragmatism’s use of “habit,” in this context, has as many mental as corporeal connotations. Indeed, classical pragmatists can go so far as to maintain that “knowledge is habit” (CP 4.531), or in the more detailed words of John Dewey (see Dewey):

The reason why a baby can know little and an experienced adult know much when confronting the same things is not because the latter has a “mind” which the former has not, but because one has already formed habits which the other has still to acquire. The scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and politician know with their habits, not with their “consciousness.” The latter is eventual, not a source. (MW 14:128)

Dewey does not mean that consciousness would play no role in those specialists’ knowing, but he does assert that mere contemplative understanding of knowledge and/or consciousness does not suffice: they must be intrinsically related to action. As he continues, the relation between reflection and corporeal execution is such that “Activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection; activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal” (MW 14:133). But although the classical pragmatists do give the above radically new meaning to the term “habit,” they do not forget its traditional reference to corporeal routine. They are aware that there are also mechanical patterns of action, like “putting my left leg into my trouser before the right,” as Peirce says (CP 2.148). These patterns, however, help rather than hinder human reflection, because they make possible what William James (see James) in his Principles of Psychology calls “the principle of parsimony in conduct” (Works PP, vol. 2, p. 496). The principle of parsimony means, in the picturesque expression of Peirce, that “It is bad economy to employ the brain in doing what can be accomplished mechanically, just as it would have been bad economy for Napoleon to write his own dispatches” (1976, vol. 4, p. 71).

On the other hand, when it is time to employ the brain – or mind, if you like – pragmatism finds that it also does something else besides sending the acting subject on its way, as is the traditional interpretation. According to pragmatism, the mind performs two important tasks in relation to action. It monitors or supervises the ongoing action process, and it reconstructs that process if it fails. Mind supervises action by
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anticipating future happenings and reflecting on past experiences. Even with this supervision, however, action is not safe from failure. Pragmatism is the first philosophy to pay systematic attention to the fact that human action can fail and falter and often does so. If that happens, the task of the mind is to reconstruct the miscarried action process by reflecting on what went wrong. In the words of George Herbert Mead (see Mead):

Reflective thinking arises in testing the means which are presented for carrying out some hypothetical way of continuing an action which has been checked. Lying back of curiosity there is always some activity, some action, that is for the time being checked. The problem is always a stoppage of something one is doing by the excitement of some other action. The solution of the problem will be some way of acting that enables one to carry on the activity which has been checked in relation to the new act which has arisen. (1938, p. 79)

Pragmatism thus confronts and criticizes the traditional Cartesian dualism in regard to the question of action, not in regard to the human being qua being. It overcomes that dualism by rethinking the meaning of the concept of habit and giving it a new content, one with both mental and corporeal connotations. Accordingly, pragmatism has a more comprehensive understanding of action phenomena than ordinary theories have. It understands action as an ongoing process and as a cyclical rather than a linear process. The cyclical structure of the action process is due to the principle of fallibility, noted above, to the idea that failure in action is always possible. Thus, a model of cyclical fallibilism might be appropriate to describe the idea that pragmatism maintains about action. The ultimate roots of this model lie in Peirce’s philosophy of science, particularly in what is known as his “doubt-belief theory of inquiry.” Although Peirce introduced fallibilism and the cyclical structure of inquiry as principles for the philosophy of science, he already was aware of their general action theoretic relevance. “Everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it.” he said while launching his theory (W 3:254; EP 1:120), and he did not change his mind even later. Principles of this cyclical model were subsequently appropriated by John Dewey (EW 4:96–105; EW 5:96–109) and other younger pragmatists, who not only developed them further but applied them more explicitly to the analysis of action, also in the domain of social and political thinking (Joas 1985, 1993; Sleeper 1986; Westbrook 1991; Cook 1993; Campbell 1995; Ryan 1995).

Creativity or Rationality as the Nexus in Social Theory?

Whereas pragmatism in systematic philosophy is a critical reaction to Cartesianism, in social thinking it is a critical reaction to utilitarianism, and from the same viewpoint, the viewpoint of action. In spite of considerable diversity in the political opinions of the classical pragmatists, they all shared a negative opinion about utilitarianism as a social philosophy. By and large, one can say of utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham; the Mills, father and son; Herbert Spencer) the same thing that was noted about Cartesianism above: the number of its explicit adherents is not that large. However, the argument
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of creative pragmatism is that tacit vestiges of utilitarianism and Cartesianism even today permeate social thinking to a larger extent than what first meets the eye.

During its efflorescence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pragmatism produced also a rich social-scientific tradition of its own, one that in many respects stands comparison with the classic European paradigm, in its criticism of utilitarianism for example (Joas 1993; Kilpinen 2000; Hodgson 2004). Today, however, this alternative tradition is practically forgotten. Meanwhile, in sociology in particular, another paradigm has been established, one that considered itself to be the definitive critique of utilitarian and positivist ways of thought. This is the interpretation of sociological theory and sociology’s history that Talcott Parsons put forward in his 1937 tour de force, The Structure of Social Action (2nd edn., 1949). Parsons stated that an inherent paradox or dilemma haunts all utilitarian thinking: From its own premises it is not able to explain in rational terms the existence of social order. A solution, however, Parsons maintained further, is forthcoming from classical sociology, from the contributions of Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Vilfredo Pareto, and the solution is in the normative orientation of human action and in the value-sphere of society that these theorists have taken as their theme. In order to show how classical sociology is also a solution to the utilitarian problem, Parsons had to interpret both of them as theories of action and to show how utilitarianism discusses only the rational choice of means of action, but leaves its ends unexplained. This is what classical sociology puts right: it is able to show how acting people develop also the ends of their action, by relating them to the norms and values of their society.

It goes without saying that Parsons’s theory, very roughly paraphrased above, has received its share of criticism, also for its understanding of what action is (for overviews, see Camic 1989 and Joas 1996). However, from the pragmatist viewpoint it seems that those criticisms have not gone quite to the heart of the matter. From the pragmatist perspective, it even turns out that the normatively oriented sociological theory that Parsons codified still contains many dubious presuppositions that stem from the utilitarian tradition and other earlier sources. In the first part of The Creativity of Action (Joas 1996), it is demonstrated how difficult it was for the sociological classics (Weber, Durkheim, etc.) to integrate their own ideas about creative action (such as Weber’s understanding of charisma) into their action-theoretical frameworks. The second part of the book deals with the attempts of so-called “expressivism” (Johann Gottfried Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, etc.), Marxism, and Nietzscheanism to conceptualize human creativity, and leads to a new appreciation of pragmatism as the philosophy of “situated creativity” (see above). But the most important part is the third one. It takes as its main task to lay bare the “tacit assumptions that remain latent in the models of rational action and normatively oriented action” (ibid., p. 5; emphasis added). Simultaneously to this, the new theory of course offers its own suggestions for the basic concepts in social analysis. These fundamentals of a theory of creative action are threefold: “situation,” “corporeality,” and “sociality.”

These concepts thus have a double task, to bring out and criticize misleading preconceptions in previous theories of action and to serve as building blocks for the new theory of creative action. They are developed partly, but not exclusively, from the original ideas of the classical pragmatists, so that more recent contributions are also incorporated in them. In addition to those three key terms, one might consider even a
fourth theme where pragmatism advances beyond ordinary ideas of rational action, namely in its creative interpretation of rationality itself. The roots of this conception stem from Peirce’s logic, from his criticism of merely “necessary” modes of reasoning, and its creative nature has also been explicitly recognized (Hintikka 1997a; see also 1997b, 1998).

The above three key terms of creative action question critically the following presuppositions in particular on which social-scientific discussions of action have relied. They are sometimes claimed to be self-evident, sometimes taken unwittingly for granted, and they can be located as follows:

All theories of action which proceed from a type of rational action – irrespective of whether they are based on a narrower or broader, a utilitarian or a normative concept of rationality – make at least three assumptions. They presuppose firstly that the actor is capable of purposive action, secondly that he has control over his own body, and thirdly that he is autonomous vis-à-vis his fellow human beings and environment. (Joas 1996, p. 147)

The creative theory thus intends to present a positive critique or a reconstructive introduction of the concept of rational action, without making use of those questionable preconceptions. As we question the supposition that the actor is capable of purposive action, we of course do not mean to deny purposivity itself. The point is that ordinary conceptions of rational action recognize only one kind of purposivity or intentionality, one which from the creative viewpoint is a special rather than a universal case. The usual interpretation of intentionality, whereby we pursue one goal at a time, is one example of our creativity but does not exhaust the latter concept. The critique of the means–end scheme here is inspired by John Dewey’s emphasis on the reciprocal relationship between ends and means in action. Dewey does not presuppose that the actor normally has a clear goal in mind. Very frequently, the goals are relatively undefined and become more specific as a consequence of the decision to use particular means. Means are not neutral with regard to goals. Only when we recognize that certain means are available to us do we discover goals that had not occurred to us before. In Dewey’s philosophical and pedagogical writings we can find his strong interest in “play” as a clear case of an inner regulation of action. Such an inner regulation becomes a sort of yardstick for Dewey to evaluate all forms of action. The crucial issue for him is the difference between goals which are external to the action and prescribed and goals which emerge in the course of the action itself but which can also be revised or abandoned.

Taken together, the first two of the usual presuppositions, the naïve interpretation of intentionality and the assumption that the actor has control over his or her body, turn out to be consequences of the Cartesian dualism. They are in an inverse relation so that the mental side is in exclusive charge of intentionality, whereas the corporeal side is devoid of any. In other words, the body is taken as an instrument that in an unproblematic manner is at mind’s disposal. This quickly leads to the assumption that lethargy is the natural human state, to which action is something exceptional. However, the alternative view maintains that:

[G]oal-setting does not take place by an act of the intellect prior to the actual action, but instead the result of a reflection on aspirations and tendencies that are pre-reflective and
have already always been operative. . . . But where exactly are these aspirations located? They are located in our bodies. It is the body’s capabilities, habits and ways of relating to the environment which form the background to all conscious goal-setting, in other words, to our intentionality. (Ibid., p. 158; original emphases)

This leads to a new view of the ways in which the body image or body scheme is developed, as the way the body is “given” to the actor. Not only does control of the body have to be learned, but also the intentional relaxation of that control, of the instrumentalization of the body.

The third frequent presupposition in the social sciences is “the unreflected assertion that the self-interested, autonomous individual is the natural starting point of all social theory” (ibid., p. 184). Here, originally innocuous methodological individualism turns willy-nilly into a position of social ontology. The creative interpretation maintains instead that “primary sociality,” or intersubjectivity, comes before autonomy, the latter is a consequence of the former. In action-theoretic terms this means that social action rather than individual action is the paradigmatic form of human action. Social action, further, is here meant in a strong sense of joint undertakings, as something more than mere co-presence of several acting individuals who pursue their own individual goals, but also as the intense experience of self-formation and of an opening up of the boundaries of the self.

Since the time of the original publication (in German) of The Creativity of Action (in 1992), research on this latter theme has advanced rather rapidly, so that we today begin to know for sure, on empirical grounds, that an invisible precognitive social tie not only joins human individuals together, but is what makes human cognition possible in the first place (Damasio 1994; Bogdan 2000). The original pragmatist argument (Mead in particular) for the irreducible intersubjectivity of human beings is thus being verified in ample terms (see Kilpinen 2002). For the study of action, this means that our native capacity for action is only a potentiality. The actualization of this potentiality is dependent on interaction with our fellow humans, in which we acquire, or do not acquire, our adult capacity for intentional action, social and individual. The creative interpretation thus maintains that our agency itself is something that we create (and continuously recreate) ourselves, in and by our doings.

The next sections sketch some of the directions in which this neo-pragmatist program in the social sciences has been pursued in recent years.

How Rational is Rational Choice? Creative Pragmatism and Economic Sociology

In recent years a hoary social-scientific theme has returned into the center of academic interest, economic sociology, which strives to create a more fruitful change of ideas between the neighboring disciplines of economics and sociology. This discussion revolves around the old truth that economic action does not take place in a social vacuum, it is “embedded” within a wider social totality (Granovetter 1985; for a summary of these discussions see Swedberg 1998). From the pragmatist viewpoint, theoretical interchange between disciplines is in itself most wholesome, but in this
particular problem field there are some conceptual risks involved. Not only have some people noticed a tendency toward “economic imperialism” (Fine 1999, 2002) in these redefinitions of disciplinary borders: neo-classical economics tends to present itself as a universal normative model for the other social sciences. In addition, pragmatism in particular finds that unless special care is taken, the economic understanding of action easily sneaks also into sociological analysis. Needless to say, the dubious element here is not the economic element itself (scarcity, etc.), but the “mind-first” explanation of action, which is more easily taken for granted in economics than anywhere else. The pragmatist argument has so far made three different cases against the alleged universality of the economic model.

In the first place, two scholars have drawn on the original theory of creative action to maintain that “rational choice theory does not deserve a paradigmatic privilege” in sociology, or even in economic sociology, as Josh Whitford (2002) puts the matter. From this perspective it also appears that sociological factors do not act as mere “constraints” in regard to economic activities, but that even economic efficiency itself owes its existence to them, as is Jens Beckert’s thesis (2002, see also 1996, 2003). Beckert deals with the problems of innovation and of action under the conditions of uncertainty, both cases in which the theory of creative action seems to him to be superior to the rational action models. The conclusion is that this “forces the revision of the action theory that underlies the understanding of economic action” (Beckert 2002, p. 2).

Secondly, arguing from within economics, Geoffrey Hodgson (2001, 2004) maintains that neo-classical theory does not exhaust economic theory in the first place. Neo-classicism to the contrary notwithstanding, the old “institutional” economics in the United States (T. B. Veblen, W. O. Mitchell, etc.) was a bona fide theoretical approach, and the only obstacle in seeing this is that the latter school maintained different action-theoretic presuppositions – suppositions derived from pragmatism. Hodgson’s project strives to revitalize institutional economics on a modern pragmatist basis. Thirdly, there is a research program, outlined in particular by Elias Khalil (2004), to draw from John Dewey’s theory of action such consequences that would be directly applicable in the construction of a comprehensive and up-to-date economic methodology.

There is an implicit tendency in all these arguments to strive to relativize the notion of rational choice, to show that it is a particular rather than a universal principle. This tendency can be made explicit and the argument forged stronger by referring to yet another pragmatist source, its creative interpretation of logic and rationality (C. S. Peirce) mentioned above. That interpretation allows one to assert that the sore point in rational choice theory is that it has a one-sided understanding of rationality itself (see also Kilpinen 2003). In Peirce’s classic terms, rational choice theory recognizes only one kind of rational operations, “necessary reasonings,” as he called them. According to Peirce, however, necessary operations were not the whole story about human reason, so that he defined for it two normative aims, its “security and uberty” (EP 2:463f.). The latter characteristic refers to the fact that rational operations can also produce new unforeseen truths, not just draw on what we have known before. However, only the latter knowledge interest is recognized in economics and rational choice theories. According to Peirce, the creativity of human reason comes out in that it draws also ampliative, truth-advancing inferences (“abductions” and “theorematic
deductions,” as were his technical terms), not just truth-confirming and explicative inferences (“corollarial deductions”; see further Hintikka 1997a, 1997b, 1998). This latter “corollarial” operation is what answers to the conception of rationality in rational choice theories. The relevance of this distinction extends even to the descriptive level. As Peirce’s starting point was that “the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action” (W 3:265; EP 1:131), we may ask how thought produces such habits when it operates in the ampliative mode. Hintikka (1998, p. 516) answers this question by saying that Peirce’s creative modes of inference yield at the concrete level “policy recommendations,” not suggestions for individual actions one by one. On the basis of these policies, one then chooses that particular action that is called for by the particular situation. Accordingly, rational choice does have a task to perform, but that task is only in putting the finishing touch to solving one action problem at a time.

From the pragmatist perspective, rationality is a long-term affair and constitutes our conduct of life in its entirety, not only at individual choice occasions. Thus, the question of the rationality of action is not so much about how we choose a line of action. It rather is about how we follow such a line through.

How Do Values Emerge?

Whereas neither the rational action model nor the normatively oriented understanding of action in the social sciences offers a convincing explanation of the processes in which values emerge, pragmatism allows us to develop such an explanation. This at least is the thesis of Hans Joas’s book *The Genesis of Values* (2000) in which the author attempts to develop such an explanation mostly out of the pragmatist writings on religion. These pragmatist writings were part of a larger discourse on this question that took place between 1887 and 1934 and almost disappeared afterwards. The explanation is to be found in the dynamics of experiences of self-transcendence, for example in religious rituals and collective ecstasies, but also in an individual opening-up of the symbolic boundaries of his or her self in intense experiences of love, communication with others, of a fusion with nature, with God, etc. This book offers a phenomenology of such experiences of self-transcendence together with theoretical reflections on the importance of an adequate understanding of these experiences for a historical sociology of value-change on the one hand and for moral philosophy on the other hand. For historical sociology it is crucial to distinguish four different ways in which we have to analyze the “genesis” of values:

Firstly, it can involve the original historical promulgation of a value; secondly, the defense of this value by a small, but growing, group of disciples; thirdly, the genesis of a new commitment in individuals (through conversion, for example) to values which are by no means historically new: fourthly and finally, a resuscitation of values which have lost their drive or sunk into oblivion. (Joas 2000, p. 165)

In the original pragmatist writings, for example William James’s *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902, *Works VRE*) and John Dewey’s *A Common Faith* (1934, in *LW 9*), there is also a certain tendency to consider the interpretation of an experience...
as an emanation from it and thus underestimate the interplay between articulation and experience, or rather between the situation experienced, pre-reflective experience, individual articulation and the cultural repertoire of interpretative patterns. In recent work about the articulation of religious experience (Joas 2004), a further attempt to go beyond the classical pragmatists in this regard has been made.

With respect to moral philosophy, pragmatism is analyzed here as a rare combination of moral universalism with a conception that is sensitive to the contingency of the processes in which values emerge. Pragmatism conceives moral problems from the standpoint of actors – and not, like the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas) and Karl-Otto Apel that is based on a selective reception of pragmatism, from the standpoint of a mere justification of validity claims in situations disconnected from the pressures of actual action. But the pragmatists are not relativists either, because for them the problem of universalization appears with necessity in the situations of action.

If with Kant and his followers it remained unclear whether the universalization test of the categorical imperative is directed at our inclinations or at the maxims of our action, then this was due to his failure to understand the interplay obtaining between our prereflective conations and our conscious intentions. If, however, one assumes a theory of action which anchors intentionality in the situation-specific reflection on our prereflective conations, then it becomes clear that the right can only ever be an examining authority – unless it itself becomes the good, the value of justice. In these situations, we can only ever achieve a reflective equilibrium between our orientations. Certainly, the extent to which we subject our orientations to this test may vary. For this reason, there is in the point of view of the right a perpetual, unflagging potential to modify the good, in order to enable it to pass the universalization test. But it does not follow from the universality of the right that, in action situations, we should give precedence to the right over all other considerations as a matter of course – nor that we should not do this. This means that universalistic norms and particular values necessarily stand to each other in a complex relationship full of tension. Every institutionalization is particular, but not necessarily particularist. The notion, however, that in order to overcome particularism, particularity itself must disappear, overlooks the necessarily contingent character of values. Such a notion is condemned to remain a mere morality, and, cut off from the attractiveness of values, to assert the possibility of motivation by morality alone.

The Contingency of Social Change

A theory of the creativity of human action is only possible if we see the world as the possible location for such creativity: it cannot be combined with a determinist ontology of the material world or an understanding of social processes that sees these as being independent of human action. Although this may seem to be a trivial statement, it is an important objection to influential paradigms of macro-sociological research. One strain of neo-pragmatist social-scientific work is, for that reason, directed at a critique of modernization theory (see especially Knöbl’s (2001) magisterial volume). In this connection the sociological analysis of wars – their causes, processes, and
consequences – has moved to the center of attention (see Joas 2003). Wars demonstrate the contingent, i.e. non-necessary, character of the interconnection of human actions in a particularly forceful way. The actors are confronted with situations that make their creativity “on the spot” unavoidable. They also lead to (traumatizing) experiences of violence, be it as victims or as perpetrators, which change the relationship of the actors to the world as much as the value-constitutive experiences mentioned above do. The analysis of experiences of violence and of religious experiences together allows for an understanding of social change that is sensitive to its contingency. The most pressing tasks for a neo-pragmatist theory of action that emphasizes the creative character of human action are the historico-sociological analysis of the genesis of universalist moral orientations on the one hand and an analysis of our present epoch as an age of increasing contingency on the other. On this basis, the weakness of the last part of The Creativity of Action, namely its merely critical character, can be overcome. The theory of the creativity of action has to be supplemented by a theory of the contingency of social change.

References and further reading


HANS JOAS AND ERKKI KILPINEN


Religious Empiricism and Naturalism

NANCY K. FRANKENBERRY

Just as pragmatism itself has been a distinctive development within American philosophy, so has the religious thought associated with it. Displaying a method, set of themes, and relation to culture very different from Continental philosophy and religious thought, pragmatism’s religious investigations have been marked chiefly by radical empiricism and naturalism. The most basic theme of religious empiricism is that the divine exists as a force, a process, or a quality wholly within nature and history, and may be known through experience. From the 1930s on, some religious empiricists would describe this divine presence or sacred quality not as a universal process but as a varied, local, and contingent one, arising from particular networks of relations and social and natural circumstances. Although all religious empiricists are naturalists, not all religious naturalists share an interest in reconstructing theological concepts on an empirical and non-supernaturalist basis. Some contemporary naturalists view nature as metaphysically and religiously ultimate; they eschew debates about theism, even the revisionary theisms and panentheisms developed by radical empiricists, in favor of more straightforward versions of pantheism or humanism or, in a new coinage, “naturism” (Crosby 2002).

Three broad historical cycles can be designated within this uniquely American movement. The first cycle encompassed the disparate writings on religion of the classical pragmatists, Charles Peirce (see Peirce), William James (see James), and John Dewey (see Dewey), including the religious naturalism of George Santayana and the naturalistic cosmology of Alfred North Whitehead. The first generation of the Columbia University School of Naturalism, especially Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and then his student John Herman Randall, Jr., introduced a strain of naturalism that would prove less conducive to religious interests over the years and more inclined to the view, as Justus Buchler later insisted, that nature is irreducibly plural, not a single, all-inclusive system or unity.

A second, overlapping cycle saw the development of religious empiricism at the University of Chicago Divinity School over three generations: (1) the early Chicago school (1908–26), focusing on the socio-historical method of Shirley Jackson Case and Shailer Mathews; (2) the heyday of religious empiricism (1926–46), due to the arrival of Henry Nelson Wieman; and (3) the theological appropriation of religious empiricism (1946–66) as advocated by Bernard Meland, Daniel Day Williams, and
Bernard Loomer. During the second and third eras of the Chicago School, the philosophy of Whitehead was a strong influence, particularly as Loomer interpreted his empirical method.

A third complex cycle of religious empiricism and naturalism began to gather momentum in the 1970s and continues to be lively into the twenty-first century. It consists of a variety of investigations conducted by religious empiricists like William Dean (1986), process philosophers of religion like David Ray Griffin (2000), pragmatic historicists like Sheila Davaney (2000), and prophetic pragmatists such as Cornel West (1989). In this most recent cycle, resolute modes of religious naturalism, shorn of any connection to panentheism, are appearing in the work of such authors as Henry Levinson (1992), Jerome Stone (1992), Willem Drees (1996), Robert Corrington (1997), Ursula Goodenough (1998), Karl Peters (2002), and Donald Crosby (2002). In a theological strand, Gordon Kaufman (1993) acknowledges as divine the “serendipitous Creativity” of Nature, whose emergent activity generates what Goodenough has called “something more from nothing but.”

Other chapters in this volume are devoted to the thought of individual pragmatists. In this chapter I will be concerned less with individual figures within the three main religious cycles than with overall principles and themes that characterize the movement’s continuous thrust, diverse as its contemporary expressions have become.

Naturalism and Religious Empiricism as World-view

The determination of what is to count as “empirical” is always a highly theoretical matter. The major themes taken as “empirical” by religious empiricism, as well as the various appeals made to “experience,” should be recognized as already effects produced by the particular theory it has adopted to render the “empirical” epistemically accessible to reflection in the first place. This dependency has not always been explicitly recognized in the complex history of empirical method, even by some representatives of American religious empiricism. But without a systematic account of “experience” — its sources, limits, ingredients, and possibilities of expression — the empirical appeal to “experience” solves nothing and signifies anything. The theory of “radical empiricism,” as William James called it, consists of a methodological postulate, a statement of fact, and a generalized conclusion. Methodologically, the things debated need to be definable in terms derived from experience; as a matter of fact, both conjunctive and disjunctive relations are given in the flux of experience, and experienced as given in a way denied by British empiricism; generalizing the fact that relations are as real as any terms they relate, one can conclude, with James, that the universe needs “no extraneous connective support” but possesses its own “concatenated” or continuous structure (Works MT, pp. 172–3).

Summariy stated, religious empiricism presupposes a naturalistic, neo-materialistic world-view in which the basic constituents of reality are energy-events, happenings, or processes. Nature comprises the realm of the experienceable. Matter turns out to be patterning energy and energy is radiating matter, the only “stuff” of experience. “Substances” are radically deconstructed into their constitutive processes of becoming, and processes themselves are thought of as constituted by energy-events. All
so-called substances or enduring entities can be understood as processes of becoming which are radically relational. Change the dynamics of relational composition, and a novel emergent will occur. In this world-view, “no doer before the deed” is needed to account for ontological identity or agency, for the doer is produced precisely in and through the becoming of the deed, as the effect and not the cause of its own conditions.

This emphasis on process as the fundamental reality out of which things are made, and attention to the organic, profoundly relational, nature of reality, including any religious reality, is a mark of the naturalism of Whitehead and a variety of organismic thinkers whose work inspired several generations of religious empiricists. In their adherence to a processive-relational conception of reality, religious empiricists look to what is concrete about process, namely, the decisions (in the root sense of “cutting off”) and the relations that are constitutive of the very becoming of anything real, including the highest reaches of human spiritual life. As a result, religious empiricism is distinguished by its orientation to the analysis of the concrete, where the meaning of “concrete experience” is synonymous with energy-processes in their wholeness or unique qualitative particularity.

No fact–value dichotomy can be presumed at this level of concreteness. And no subject–object dualism enters into the analysis of concrete experience. Most religious empiricists would affirm William James’s definition of what he called a “full fact,” consisting in “a conscious field plus its object as felt or thought of plus an attitude toward the object plus the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs” (Works VRE, p. 393; Writings, p. 768). Concrete reality is variously characterized in this empirical tradition as duration (Henri Bergson), as creative event (Wieman), as perceptual flux and élan vital presenting a constant “More” (James), and as the unmanageable depth of the living situation (Meland). For James and for religious empiricism in general, the body is the most immediate and elemental site in human life for experiencing that which is most concrete. Descriptively generalized, the body may even become synecdochal for all social systems, including that of reality itself.

Religiously, the adoption of a naturalistic world-view marks an important shift from a perspective that regards the resources for salvation as derivable ultimately from a transcendent deity, to a perspective that recognizes nature’s grace as emergent within the relational depths of concrete experience. More than simply exchanging the image of “heights” for that of “depths,” religious empiricism promotes a philosophical articulation of the religious meaning of nature. It endeavors to spell out the myriad ways in which, in the words of Bernard Loomer, “all the heights and depths, the originating causes and final ends, the realities symbolized by the principalities and powers (including the demons and angels) that were formerly thought to inhabit the lower and upper worlds, are now found within the many mansions of this world” (1969, p. 151). Its preoccupation with “nature” as much as with “history” distinguishes religious empiricism from existentialist, neo-orthodox, and post-liberal schools of theology as well as from most varieties of revelationally based or evangelical religious thought in American life.

To characterize the naturalistic outlook of American religious thought in terms of its repudiation of any transcendent realm beyond nature still does not capture its constructive vision. Though these vary throughout the literature, I identify the major elements of that vision in terms of the following ten principles.
1 The conception of nature as co-extensive with “reality” or the “life process” and as constituted by spatio-temporal energy-events entails the corollary that there are no disembodied possibilities, ideals, souls, heavens, or gods. The Word not only “becomes” flesh, but is literally no-thing apart from or prior to its incarnation somewhere. A disembodied Logos located nowhere would lack all existence, subsistence, or ordering efficacy. Whitehead’s ontological principle illustrates this assumption by postulating that “actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities,” from which it follows that every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that event, or in the character of the event itself as it is coming to be (Whitehead 1978, p. 24). If the one world, with all its incalculable possibilities, is the sole locus of meaning and value, then all principles, descriptions, and explanations must be understood to refer to events and their relations. The ultimate in explanation is finally the most general concrete description of the way in which constitutive relations are coordinated.

2 The universe is an evolving, ever-unfinished arena of ceaseless creative activity. The fundamental image of nature is in terms of interpenetrating fields of forces and organically integrated wholes, not self-contained, externally related bits of particles or inert matter. Not only supernaturalisms and transcendentalisms, but also all subjective idealisms have been superseded by twentieth-century relativity and field theories in physics. Once mechanism is no longer the root metaphor of science, idealism is no longer the only recourse for resolving the tension between science and religion or for introducing “mind” into “matter.” Closely related to the assumption that the being of any natural entity is constituted by its relationships and its participation in ever more inclusive fields, the idea that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” has become central to the development of systems theory, biological ecology, and field analysis. To some philosophers of religion this has suggested a vision of the world-totality as a complex, unified individual, itself divine. Religious empiricists, however, have been more cautious in depicting the nature of the totality, wanting to guard against the idealistic tendency to see the human mind writ large in nature itself (see James, Empiricism, and Absolute Idealism). The overarching consciousness of “an all-inclusive divine mind,” deemed so essential by the idealist tradition, can be jettisoned.

3 Human nature is a factor within nature and not a mere spectator to it. The processes and events, the qualities and relations which constitute nature are objective in the twofold sense that nature is fully real in its own right and by its own operations, and is not dependent on any other order of reality: both in its parts and as a whole, it is independent on human thinking. Every item of the experienced world and hence every item of knowledge is an item in nature, a participant in natural processes, and dependent upon the reality of the external world for acquiring knowledge. All objects and all subjects are therefore natural entities. The world of objective actualities enters into the constitution of each subject, which in turn becomes a conditioning cause in the becoming of subsequent subjects.

4 Nature is both pluralistic and continuous, thus ruling out monisms as well as dualisms. While nature may be one, at the same time it is also many and, contrary
to Plato, the many, far from being a mere appearance of the real, are themselves real. While nature exhibits discontinuities in the form of emergent plateaus, its parts are bound together by common structures of becoming. Nature, in short, though individualized, is not bifurcated. It does not admit of dualisms, whether spirit–matter, mind–body, value–fact, possibility–actuality, one–many, religion–science, or God–humans. This principle is illustrated by Peirce’s doctrine of synechism (see Not Cynicism, but Synechism: Lessons from Classical Pragmatism).

Nature is infinite and inexhaustible. In the absence of any “far-off divine event toward which all creation tends” (Tennyson), nature’s possibilities are infinite. Religious empiricists envisage no eschatological “time” in which all possibilities will be completely exhausted or fully actualized. The assumption that temporal process is without absolute beginning or absolute end intensifies the sense of wonder, of contingency, and of mystery that attends the living of life.

Quality and structure are aspects of all processes and their analysis is at the heart of empirical method. Quality, or a complex of qualities, is energy as experienced by the human organism. If every event is an instance of energy, insofar as it is accessible to human experience, it is also an instance of quality. Henry Nelson Wieman goes so far as to say that “quality, then, is the ultimate substance of the world out of which all else is made” (1946, p. 302). Structure, as Wieman also explains, is the term given to the demarcations and interrelations of events whereby we can apprehend them as different events and yet in meaningful relation to one another. Structuring the world so that qualities become more appreciable is the common goal of life – for individuals, societies, or whole historical epochs. This goal, however, is confounded by the simultaneous interweaving in nature of less-than-creative processes that are tragic, contradictory, disorderly, or, at best, ambiguous.

Nevertheless, “ultimate reality,” as construed by virtually all religious empiricists and naturalists, has a creative character. Here “ultimate reality” refers to the overall character ascribed to the real, not to any supervening reality. In the last analysis, nature is not dead, blank, or indifferent, amounting only to blind, onrushing upsurges of sheer energy without form. Rather, the form that evolution takes is orderly and characterized by creativity, a creative synthesis productive of novel emergents. That is to say, the force of sheer energy is always found ordered, shaped, and possessed of a measure of purposefulness, however meager. Although the process cannot be rendered as progressive, some modicum of teleology is asserted or assumed by religious empiricism and it is this claim that distinguishes it from humanistic naturalism and provides the basis for the naturalistic meaning of “God.”

Value is intrinsic to nature. Wherever else in nature value may reside, it is found in the experiences of subjects and is a function of some subject’s response. Value is not supernatural or in any way transcendent of nature. It is continuous with “fact” and organic to it, not imposed on nature or altogether projected by the human mind. Creative advance in nature is measured in terms of the emergence of qualitatively richer and more complex individuals and societies. Such increase in value occurs as a contingent outcome of the synthesis of great contrasts, bordering even on incompatibilities, into effective harmonies. Therefore, aesthetic
order (see Aesthetics) that yields beauty is regarded as more inclusive, as well as more concrete, than ethical or political or conventionally religious order. For most of us, the overall life process appears marked more by a terrible beauty than by the urgencies of Protestant moralism.

Transcendence in nature is a function of the nexus of internal relations that comprises the communal ground of all existence. The nexus of relationships, or plenum of interconnected events that forms existence, is not projected, but given. We do not create these relationships, we experience them, and to that extent we acknowledge that human life is rooted in a biological reality deeper than consciousness, and from which it draws its sustenance, nurture, and creative power. Both the creative ground and the redemptive life afforded by the web of internal relations are empirical traces of the transcendence found within nature.

Finally, religious naturalism is a recognition and celebration of the common creaturehood of all beings. Ecological studies have shown that human life is intertwined with the movements of the sun and moon, migrations of animals, and the advance and retreat of polar icecaps. Evolutionary theory has found that humankind’s roots go back to early primates, backboned fishes, primeval sea worms, and the element-building stars. And biological studies have revealed that life extends to an attenuated pre-life hidden in the heart of inanimate matter. Religious naturalism holds that humans have no privileged position above or outside this web of nature and life. We not only live and move and have our becoming within this matrix, but we are, literally, creatures of the earth, born of its evolutionary processes, nurtured and sustained by its intricate interchanges, and recreated within its enveloping environment. This is also the inescapable matrix of perishing and loss of value.

Radical Empiricism and Pragmatism

My account of religious empiricism favors the ontology of naturalism and process-relational philosophy, and the epistemology of radical empiricism and pragmatism. The most important epistemological assumptions and the arguments that support them can be developed in terms of the following themes.

The primacy of perception

More than any other thesis, this is what distinguishes religious empiricism from other varieties of empiricism and also from the epistemology of critical realism. Radical empiricism maintains that the concrete data of perception are the particular actualities that are directly and perspectively prehended, whereas most other modern schools of empiricism have contended that what is directly given are abstract forms of sense data in terms of which the concrete actualities may be inferred. The claim that perception, or “knowledge by acquaintance,” involves a deeper event than analysis and description is a characteristic and controversial feature of radical empiricism. According to William James:
The deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience. Here alone do we
acquaint ourselves with continuity, or the immersion of one thing in another, here alone
with self, with substance, with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time,
with cause, with change, with novelty, with tendency, with freedom. (Works WB, p. 54)

For Alfred North Whitehead the primacy of perception entailed the judgment that
“the deliverances of clear and distinct consciousness require criticism by reference to
elements in experience which are neither clear nor distinct. On the contrary, they are
dim, massive, and important” (Whitehead 1967, p. 270). Radical empiricism insists
that a wide range of modes of experience is relevant in assessing claims and theories,
whether philosophical or religious. In addition to experiences of the five senses, we
have experiences of memory and anticipation; of causal efficacy and the “withness” of
the body; of aim, purpose, freedom, and novelty; of spatial location and the flow of
time. “Experience drunk and experience sober,” as Whitehead put it, embraces feelings
of moral obligation, aesthetic sensibility, and religious aspiration; of felt connectedness
with other persons and other sentient beings, and even, as Dewey called it, “a sense of
the whole.”

The reality of relations

Relations are given in the flux of experience and felt as given. They are as real as the
things related. What is radical about radical empiricism is chiefly this thesis. As
James put it, “the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just
as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the
things themselves” (Works MT, pp. 6–7; Writings, p. 314). Other forms of empiricism
have recognized only the reality of external relations, but radical empiricism holds that
internal relations, the conjunctive experiences, are just as important to the complete
analysis of experience as Hume’s external relations of “contiguity” or “resemblance.”
One of several significant themes to follow from this philosophical basis, as it has
become explicit in the tradition of religious empiricism, concerns the social nature
of the self as a communal individual who is created out of the internal relations that
call that self into being. As articulated by James and Dewey and George Herbert Mead
(see Mead), this theme has produced a much more profound conception of selfhood in
American thought than is found in the Continental discussion of Heidegger’s analysis
of dasein-mit. The Heideggerian notion is that of an individual who lives in commun-
ity, while the pragmatist conception asserts that the community also lives concretely
within the self.

The interactive model of experience

Unlike the literature of classical empiricism which problematizes discourse about “the
experience of reality” and “experience of the world,” religious empiricists have tended
to talk in terms of “the reality of experience” and “the world of experience.” The differ-
ence is subtle but crucial. Replacing the spectator view of knowledge implicated in
classical empiricism, radical empiricism relies on an interactionist model in which the
ongoing interactive process between organisms and their environment produces the
funded character of experience. According to the interactive model, experience is not
understood as the raw material knowledge seeks to understand, but rather knowledge is viewed as the active process which produces its own objects of investigation, including empirical “facts.” Far from being adequately understood as a passively received tissue of subjectivity, or as an actively imposed layer of ideology, “experience” in the American grain has been theorized as a socially constituted process, semiotically and historically constructed in an ongoing interaction between organisms and their environment. Nothing is immediately present in the form of an unmediated real. From the beginning, radical empiricism avoided the “myth of the given” critiqued by later pragmatists.

The cognitive value of feeling

The model of disembodied Reason is repudiated in favor of the view that knowledge is saturated with feeling, mood, affectivity. Following Henry Nelson Wieman, some religious empiricists restrict the term “knowledge” to that which involves interpretation, reflection, and prediction. Others, following Bernard Meland, prefer to widen the term “knowledge” so as to include the mode of acquaintance by which what is directly given is grasped feelingly, and feeling is taken to have cognitive import. The issue between these two approaches turns on the type of data to which one chooses to attend. Radical empiricists typically look to the more vague, unmanageable, and only dimly given data of feeling or prehension. They assume such data can be lifted to specifiable structures of expression and articulated faithfully, if not fully. Other empiricists who may be motivated, as Meland thought Wieman was, by the lure of certainty, generally reserve the honorific term “knowledge” for the more manageable data of experience as clearly and distinctly given. In either case, the prehensive or feeling quality of experience is said to have cognitive import, whether directly or indirectly.

The linguistic turn

The hermeneutical recognition that all experience is mediated by language, or, more broadly, by semiotic systems, carries special implications for the ongoing development of religious empiricism. If religious empiricism has been significant for maintaining a distinctive objectivity to the datum of experience, it is also true that the understanding of that datum rests on conventions generated by systems of signification. Objects, events, relations, and meanings of whatever kind do not simply present themselves to human minds in prepackaged units with labels, ready to be read from the face of experience. Rather, with the intervention of human acts of interpretation, meanings become linguistically reticulated in terms of certain structures and in relation to other meanings. The thoroughly linguistic, even if elliptical, quality of conscious human thought and knowledge is an important corollary of religious empiricism in its current third cycle, in contrast to the subordination of language to primary experience in the first two cycles.

The instrumental role of conceptual reasoning

The notion of the relative poverty of conceptual formalizations and linguistic formulations in comparison with the richness of lived experience forms a constant theme in
religious empiricism. Properly understood, radical empiricism is a complement, not an alternative, to rationalism, and the distinction between the two methods should not be made in any disabling way. Indeed, religious empiricism presumes an underlying rationalism, in the widest sense, that emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity in explanation. Precisely because it assumes no ontological gaps in modes or dimensions of reality, such as natural versus supernatural, or phenomenal versus noumenal, religious empiricism is committed to continuity of explanation. Rationalism within the context of an empirical outlook also entails a resistance to abrupt leaps of faith. The instrumental value of reason means that ideas emerge from and must be validated in lived experience, not in logic or language alone.

The absence of foundations

Along with American pragmatists, the later Wittgenstein, and contemporary deconstructionists, religious empiricism rejects not only the representational theory of knowledge and the Cartesian search for certain foundations, but the whole idea of the isolated subject caught in an egocentric predicament of trying to acquire knowledge about a public world on the basis of her or his private experience. This anti-foundationalism (see Pragmatism as Anti-authoritarianism), combined with the continued use of the difficult category of “experience,” produces a distinctive stance. For the present generation of radical empiricists, pragmatic historicists, and religious naturalists, not even “experience” can be taken as foundational without privileging the interpreter’s partial reading of the meaning of the term. To avoid essentializing that category into an appeal to something fixed and unitary and determinate, religious empiricists try to be alert to the countless ways in which any appeal to “experience” is always already transgressed and constituted by axes of difference, involving gender, race, class, ethnicity, and culture.

Pragmatism as mediating method

Steering between a naive realism which would assume that the religious interpreter simply reads off the face of experience, and, on the other hand, a subjective idealism which treats its own projections as mirrored and matched by nature, the pragmatic religious empiricist and historicist knows that human interpretations do not remold the world, without remainder, into patterns of our own choosing, and they do not simply reflect the world either. Instead, human interpretive schemes create and impose structures of meaning on experience just as much as they also derive meaning from experience. Because the experiential continuum is so diffuse, it affords no single selective principle or set of organizational categories. Even the categories and themes of pragmatists are regarded as one set among many, justified pragmatically by their fruitfulness, not by their correspondence.

Beyond realism and anti-realism

The extent to which religious empiricism is committed to realism, and the exact meaning of “realism” itself, is currently a matter of considerable debate. Given a pragmatic approach to the question, only a minimalist form of realism survives, one that simply
Religious empiricism and naturalism asserts that a world exists independently of human life and knowledge, and that in some sense that world imposes constraints on what humans can sensibly say about it. From the perspective of religious empiricism, the assumption that theological concepts originate as social constructions, imaginatively projected, rather than as pure givens, realistically reflected, seems trivially true. However, short of committing some version of the genetic fallacy, this says nothing about the claims to truth these ideas can make or what reference they may have to the world. For religious empiricists, the fact that we inevitably live inside institutionally constituted paradigms, with all the possibilities of distortion and bias and repression this entails, does not prevent our testing and verifying these paradigms against facts that are independent, not of all paradigms, but at least of whatever one we are currently interested in testing.

Religious Themes

Although it shares in common with religious existentialism such themes as freedom (see Experience as Freedom), intersubjectivity, temporality, corporeality, finitude, and death, as well as a focus on such particular human experiences as anxiety, hope, despair, guilt, and care, religious empiricism has not been typically preoccupied with existentiality, in the sense of the abstract structures or essence of human existence. Whereas religious existentialism has focused almost entirely on the distinctive structures of the human person, religious empiricism has tended to look for those structures and factors that define our existence as biological organisms. As a result, existentialists may have achieved a depth of analysis with respect to anthropological categories that has not been available in the writings of empiricists and naturalists who, for their part, tend to be less impressed by the surds, the angst, and the de trop character of human existence. The sense of vital mystery, as an unmanageable depth of existence, figures far more frequently in the writings of American empiricists than sickness unto death. Its presence inspires neither nausea nor rebellion, but humility.

The theme of the baffling ambiguity of good and evil haunts the efforts of religious empiricism to come to terms not only with the theodicy question but also with the human predicament. The multiple ways in which some good may emerge from the disasters of destructive evil and the ways, too, in which the good may be transformed into the demonic defy the usual religious blandishments. Every emergence of good carries with it a potential for evil that risks plunging life into deeper ambiguity. The ambiguity of all natural, historical, and social processes is compatible, however, with taking nature as a fitting focus of religious commitment.

This is also a religious outlook that views moral choice as a matter of profound social responsibility, but remains deeply skeptical of the Kantian argument that since our rational moral demands are legitimate, the fact that they are not fulfilled in this world provides compelling reason to believe that they must be fulfilled elsewhere, in a transcendent realm. Having abandoned the yearning for an absolute of any kind, religious empiricism holds, with James, that “all ‘homes’ are in finite experience; finite experience as such is homeless” (Works Prag, p. 125; Writings, p. 457).

The theme that experience yields knowledge of God, characteristic of much American religious thought from the Puritans to Jonathan Edwards to the present, receives
careful qualification in connection with religious empiricism. In general, the appeal to religious experience is methodologically legitimate only to the extent that it is coupled with and refers to an interconnected set of interpretations about what constitutes the nature, scope, and limits of experience. It forfeits legitimacy if it is advanced as a simple appeal to an isolated fact or set of facts. Least credible is any introspective appeal to “religious experience” understood individualistically. On that level, everyone’s experience, whether religious or not, is a \textit{mélange} of the attributed, the imposed, and the lived.

In the liberal and modernist phase of religious empiricism, the theme that experience yields knowledge of God took two major forms. The socio-historical method of Shailer Mathews, Shirley Jackson Case, and Edward Scribner Ames was chiefly interested in analyzing ideas, doctrines, and institutions in terms of functional needs and responses. This phase of the Chicago School employed pragmatism’s method of ascertaining the practical consequences in experience of the \textit{idea} of God, whereas the next phase, exemplified in different ways by the systematic-philosophical method of Wieman, Meland, and Loomer, was interested primarily in ascertaining the \textit{reality} of God in human experience, however different that might turn out to be from orthodox religious ideas. In this phase, “experience” was theorized through a unique combination of organismic imagery, phenomenological claims, and process-relational interpretive structures derived from Whitehead, James, Dewey, and Bergson. Now in what might be called its postmodern phase, religious empiricism emphasizes that the appeal to experience is never an incontestable source of evidence nor an originary point of explanation. The historicizing tendency of this new phase of religious empiricism, as developed by William Dean, Sheila Davaney, and others, highlights the experience of religious meaning in connection with historical events, interpreted within specific communitarian contexts. Here religious ideas and realities suggested by experience are seen, not as generic to all creatures, but as historically specific and influenced by the social location of the experiencing community. For example, writing just before the second wave of feminism in America, Bernard Loomer could claim that one way of interpreting the empirical meaning of Jesus Christ for Christians is as the answer to a particular question that emerged in the life of a particular people with a particular history: “How can the strength of our egocentricity be transmuted so that we can live for others?” (1969, p. 164). According to Loomer, the unsurpassable answer for all who ask this question is the cross—a life of self-sacrificial love. But implicit in Loomer’s construal was an insufficiently historicized reading, now made visible by feminist critique. Arising out of the event of the women’s movement is an entirely different and historically conditioned question that asks: “How can the strength of our relationality be transmuted so that we acquire and maintain autonomy?” A christological figure who would embody an answer to this question for all those who, in fact, ask such a question, would not represent an ethic of self-sacrifice.

As it arises in religious empiricism, the question of “God” is not a question about another being in the total inventory of What There Is; it is a question concerning the nature of the experienced universe, not only taken as a whole, but taken in its individual parts as well. Religious empiricists have sought to identify an activity operative in the universe and human life that issues in growth of value. This growth or progressive integration is regarded as one factor within evolution. It is persistent, but not
inevitable, or omnipotent. The theme of a finite God, defined by a certain type of causality, is distinctive of much religious empiricism, although not exclusive to it. Conceived as finite, God is that factor that makes sense of the ways in which harmony and complexity, patterned order and novel emergents arise and are sustained in nature generally, as well as in the dim regions of organic evolution and amid the conflicts of historical strife. The key to this empirical conception of the nature of God is the idea not simply of “process” but also of “relations,” understood as active, dynamic, vectorial transmissions of energy, having both magnitude and direction. The disclosures of twentieth-century quantum physics and field theory persuaded Bernard Meland, among others, that a common core of images such as “a sensitive nature within nature,” “rapport,” and “matrix of sensitivity” were indigenous in the organic behavior of nature, not simply projections of human nature into the void. On this account, no matter how differently “value” is theorized as to its nature or source, its increase can be said to take place in terms of relational activities that yield emergent novelty, more complex integration, and intensified mutuality and sensitive support. Observationally, these “transitive relations,” as William James termed them, are the very type of relations that foster the kind of growth and creative transformation that is organic. Evil, destruction, and conflict, on the other hand, consist in the blockage or obstruction or decay of just such transitive relations in nature. Because it is organic interconnectedness that leads to the greater good, to the growth of value and qualitative meaning, as Wieman continually analyzed it, this is taken to comprise the empirical meaning of the divine in human life.

This way of depicting the meaning of God, in terms of a complex sustaining matrix of transitive relations in nature which is creative of organic interconnections, displays the close affinity religious empiricism has to process theology as it developed in America. However, despite significant overlapping themes, sources, and influences, in at least three crucial respects religious empiricism and process theology diverge. First, the confidence among many process theologians in the applicability of personal, agential models of God is not shared by most religious empiricists. They point out that we simply do not know, even analogically, the meaning of “love” or “justice” on a cosmic level, and so they will often substitute transpersonal or even impersonal imagery for the personalistic language of devotion. The suggestion that cosmic love might mean something like “sympathetic feeling of feeling,” as proposed by some followers of Charles Hartshorne, lacks empirical warrant.

Second, religious empiricists are willing to say with William James that the last word is not sweet, that all is not “yes, yes” in the universe, and that the very meaning of contingency is that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of life, with something permanently drastic and bitter always at the bottom of the cup (Works Prag. p. 141; Writings, p. 470). Therefore, they find little or no warrant for process theology’s claim that the divine totality preserves whatever is good, as everlasting and immune to perishing. Value, according to religious empiricists and naturalists, is a function of its realization, not its conservation. The principle of the primacy of becoming over being leads to an appreciation of the intrinsic value of radical contingency and temporality, not to an expectation of its everlasting duration, even for a God.

Third, the empirical tradition is skeptical of the evidential warrants for the idea of a complex all-inclusive totality, especially one that has the concrete unity of an
experiencing subject. The difference between the concept of God as one kind of process included within nature (religious empiricism) and, on the other hand, the concept of nature as included in God (process theology) is not unlike the difference between a pluralistic, loosely federated commonwealth, and a totality leaning toward monism. In the Hartshornian version of panentheism, empirical theologians are inclined to see the same temptations inherent in totalitarian systems, namely, a tendency to subordinate the parts to the whole, to make freedom instrumental, to value the present mostly in terms of the formation of a vague future, and to find the lasting meaning of all things in their contribution to the transcendent totality.

The idea that immediacy and ultimacy traffic together, best thematized in the work of Bernard Meland, calls attention to the primal flux of experience as itself holy ground, generating in its vital immediacy all of the sacred that we are apt to find in the secular. Like the Buddhist teaching that “samsara is nirvana,” which depends for its understanding on the further doctrine of co-dependent origination, this theme of religious empiricism rests upon an understanding of organismic and the relational character of process. On the basis of an organismic understanding of the interplay of internal relations in nature, religious empiricists aim to correct the picture that Kantian epistemology paints of the primal flux of experience as a chaos of unformed impressions awaiting form through conceptualization. The countering claim of organismism is that organizing structures arise in the first place in the very process of experience through complex interweavings of internal relations. The vital immediacy of the present moment is structured by distillations of past events as they persist into the present, giving shape as well as openness to possibilities that may emerge from those lines of influence. This is the empirical alternative to the Kantian transcendent ego.

Here, too, in the very midst of life’s immediacies now, the religious empiricist expects to find an empirical referent for three of the most powerful insights of Western theological anthropology: creation, sin, and grace. The symbol of creation, for instance, rendered empirically, affirms that the realities of existence, though tragic, are not tainted: that the many energies of life are not in malevolent and insoluble conflict with its meanings. Neither nature nor time is a closed system within which the human is starkly determined, but both are open in their continual encounter with the human passion for freedom. This realization makes possible the biblical affirmation “It is good for us to be here,” or, as Robert Frost frames it, “Earth’s the right place for love: / I don’t know where it’s likely to go better.” Likewise, the experience of sin, in its way, has asserted against every attempt to submerge human choice under the category of causation or the caprice of chance, the reality of human responsibility. The struggle to become human reaches deeper than the realm of finitude or fortune; it can be accomplished finally only in the realm of freedom. A change in chance or circumstance, however welcome, can serve it only when accompanied by a change of heart. The Eden of dreaming innocence is finally uninhabitable by a human life, and if prolonged by sheer force of an isolated will, turns into hell. Yet everyone who endeavors to direct his or her will toward a concern in common, who tries to will the good because it is the good, will encounter very quickly the inner obstacles that the boy Huck Finn ponders in the first pages of Twain’s novel as he “couldn’t see no advantage about it” and decides to “just let it go.” It is so difficult to get any further than Huck on the matter,
the obstacles are so relentless and defeat so frequent, that most people retreat from the struggle into the rituals of self-righteousness. The experience of grace, however, calls attention to the human capacity for contrition and change. Poised between the weight of the past and the fear of the future is the possibility of grace in the present moment. Understood as a goodness within relationships, grace emerges as a concrete social energy. Beyond all sentimentality, the fact is that, against the odds, and in the face of resistance, the human spirit does from time to time triumph over its own worst temptations, does sometimes discover and other times invent just the resources the moment demands, and does in its religious reflection ascribe this occurrence to grace, as a power not one’s own that makes for resourcefulness.

In conclusion, I want to call attention to a final theme which I believe goes beyond the prevailing forms of religious empiricism but is implicit in it. This has to do with the way in which the perspective engendered by radical empiricism itself, when exhaustively and thoroughly realized, changes one’s world-view in ways that can carry new religious significance. The most far-reaching result of radical empiricism is to convert static nouns into dynamic verbs, thus dissolving what Bergson complained of as “the logic of solids” and Wittgenstein called “the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of grammar.” When their meaning is no longer confined to discrete events “once upon a time,” Christian doctrines such as Creation, Incarnation, Redemption, or Resurrection can be understood as ongoing events of a continuously creating universe, a redeeming and incarnating nature, an ever resurrecting reality.

Unfortunately, the logic of solids has been the pre-eminent logic upon which concepts, including religious concepts, have been formed. Religious empiricism has suffered from the absence of a language adequate to its meaning, one able to avoid the limitations of “things” and “beings.” Indo-European languages have so spatialized our perception of the world that nouns are regarded as self-contained “things” occupying something called space. “Things” are commonly thought of in the way Aristotle did in his *Metaphysics*, as a duality of form and matter. Distinguishing container from contained, we ask for “a glass of water” rather than “a water.” In the Hopi language, however, we would find it natural to ask for “a water” and unnecessary to fragment the vital immediacy of experience into something called matter, and something else called spirit, which activates matter. As a further source of confusion, the inveterate Indo-European habit of spatializing time entails translating dynamic events into “things” strung out a “long” time ago or a “short” time ago. A spatialized view of time has of course been exploded by the new vision of the world discovered by twentieth-century science, but language lags behind and none quite fits the kind of vision implicit in radical empiricism and recent religious naturalisms. Most Western philosophical and religious thought has been constructed on the subject-verb sentence pattern, and thus smuggles in an outdated dualistic metaphysic. The grammatical logic of solids leads to grave problems with such themes as creation, fall, incarnation, and redemption. In each case the solidified noun form insinuates a metaphysic of agent–action, cause–effect, subject–object, which imposes unempirical distinctions in the guise of dogmatic formulae.

Avoiding nouns and agentive nominalizations, a radically empirical language would emphasize creative advance rather than static completion in a universe that is viewed as more a process than a product, not so much designed as designing. “Creating”
would point to an ongoing process, the working out of a power that is within. If indeed the process is the reality, creation is creat-ing. Employing a language suitable to its own vision of reality, religious empiricism would speak not of “creation” and “creator” but of a creat-ing universe, not of “redemption” and “redeemer,” but of a natural redeem-ing process, and not of a “revelation” and a “revealer,” but of an ongoing reveal-ing of an indwelling spirit in nature that is poured out on all beings.

On the radically empirical principle that there is no doer before the deed, there would be no need to assume the “Father” behind the “Son,” the “Word” behind the “Ile,” or “divinity” behind “Jesus.” As Yeats asked, “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” By understanding the universe of experience radically in terms of the logic of concrete processes rather than of solids, in terms of deeds but no hidden doers, of movement but no prior mover, empiricists will avoid the error of reifying observable behaviors into metaphysical abstractions said to underlie, precede, or ground nature. In a radically religious empiricism, Christian symbols such as Creation or Providence do not refer to the reason for nature, but to the fact of its ongoingness. Natural piety is an appropriate response to nature’s magnificence.

References and further reading

RELIGIOUS EMPIRICISM AND NATURALISM


Aesthetics

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I

In Western modernity, the aesthetic has traditionally been defined in opposition to the practical and has been characterized (in Kantian) terms of disinterestedness and purposelessness. Since pragmatism is known for its respect for practice, the practical, and the functional, it might seem strange that pragmatism would take aesthetics very seriously and would have something valuable to say about it. However, pragmatism has long recognized the great significance of the aesthetic not only for life but also for philosophy itself. Like pragmatism as a whole, pragmatist aesthetics does not present a single, uniform system of doctrines to which all pragmatists who work in aesthetics would subscribe without qualification. Pragmatist aesthetics, like pragmatism itself, instead involves a tradition with a multiplicity of voices that, nevertheless, often converge on certain key themes. Perhaps the most crucial points of convergence are the centrality of experience in aesthetics and the way that aesthetic experience extends well beyond the circumscribed field of fine art to pervade manifold dimensions of life, action, and culture. Hence for pragmatism, aesthetics cannot be narrowly equated with the philosophy of art, at least when art is understood in the modern institutional sense of the established fine arts of high culture.

Pragmatist aesthetics received its first systematic formulation by John Dewey (see Dewey) in his *Art as Experience* (1934, LW 10), but two earlier American thinkers anticipated many of his central ideas in aesthetics: the poet-essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson and the African-American philosopher and cultural critic Alain Locke (see Locke). Before considering these three thinkers in detail, I should say something about the role of aesthetics in the thought of Charles S. Peirce (see Peirce) and William James (see James), since these thinkers preceded and influenced Dewey and together with him constitute the three towering figures of classical pragmatism. Peirce, who not only founded pragmatism but was also a father of semiotics, made important contributions to the theory of symbols and interpretation that have lasting value for philosophical aesthetics. Appreciative of the role of play in creative expression and thought (which he tried to capture through an intriguing concept he called “musement”), Peirce also emphasized the immediately felt quality of experience (which is crucial to aesthetics) as his first category of consciousness or “Firstness.” Finally, Peirce urged
the continuity and collaboration of aesthetics and ethics, even going so far as “making Ethics dependent upon Esthetics” (EP 2:142) and treating “the morally good . . . as a particular species of the esthetically good” (EP 2:201). If “Ethics is the science of the method of bringing Self-Control to bear” to gain what we desire, “what one ought to desire . . . will be to make [one’s] life beautiful, admirable. Now the science of the Admirable is true Esthetics” (Brent 1993, p. 49).

William James, an individual of great aesthetic taste and wide culture whose first career choice was painting, did very little in the way of formal theorizing in philosophical aesthetics. But this was because he thought that formal principles and discursive definitions of philosophical aesthetics necessarily fail to capture the crucial nameless subtleties of art that make all the difference in actual aesthetic experience. The same general definition or verbal category (e.g. novel, symphony, triptych, etc.) could equally apply to a work of genius or a work of mechanical dullness. Despite his lack of interest in writing about the philosophy of art, James thought the aesthetic dimension of experience (its specific felt quality and the appeal that such quality exercised on our minds and behavior) was extremely important. Insisting that such aesthetic considerations deeply pervaded one’s preferred philosophical perspective, he even argued that contentions between rival philosophies or world-views rested largely on “aesthetic” discord or conflicting temperaments (see A Pluralistic Universe). James also devoted specific attention to the aesthetic emotions as “subtler emotions” (along with intellectual and moral feelings) in the course of his famous chapter on the emotions in The Principles of Psychology.

II

We should now return to Emerson, Dewey, and Alain Locke, who together provide the most substantial and formative vision of pragmatist aesthetics. Emerson, of course, predates pragmatism and his identification with the movement is sometimes contested (Cavell 1998), though he is also often claimed as proto-pragmatist or forefather of the movement. In any case, Emerson’s essays certainly touch on most of the major themes of pragmatist aesthetics that John Dewey later expressed with more philosophical power and precision. Dewey formulated his aesthetic theory rather late in his career, in a book entitled Art as Experience (1934), though some of his aesthetic ideas were earlier adumbrated in Experience and Nature (1925, LW 1). Between Emerson and Dewey’s Art as Experience, the African-American philosopher Alain Locke propounded many of the key ideas of pragmatist aesthetics in his famous anthology The New Negro (1925) and some other writings. Locke was the guiding theorist of the Harlem Renaissance movement but also a very influential critic of African-American art, music, and literature, as well as of the plastic arts of Africa. Dewey clearly seems to have been strongly influenced by Emerson’s aesthetics though he does not adequately acknowledge it (Shusterman 1999). Dewey’s aesthetics may also have been influenced, at least indirectly, by Locke’s aesthetic ideas (just as Locke was obviously appreciative of Dewey’s widely influential philosophical work). If there were an influence of Locke on Deweyan aesthetics, it could have derived not only from the significant cultural impact made by Locke’s The New Negro, but also from the fact that one of Locke’s supporters and
collaborators in promoting African art and African-American culture was the Philadelphia art collector-critic and industrialist Albert C. Barnes, who was a close friend of Dewey and was the person Dewey acknowledged as the major influence on his aesthetics. Dewey’s *Art as Experience* was even dedicated to Barnes. More important than the question of influence is the evidence of significant convergence in the aesthetic theory of Emerson, Locke, and Dewey. In what follows, I illustrate several major themes of pragmatist aesthetics by citing their views.

The first theme is naturalism. Though art can be correctly described as cultural and even spiritual, pragmatism insists on art’s deep roots in the natural world, in the elemental desires, needs, and rhythms of the human organism interacting with that world. Emerson defines art as “nature passed through the alembic of man” (1990, p. 5), just as Dewey holds that “underneath the rhythm of every art and every work of art, there lies . . . the basic pattern of relations of the live creature to his environment” (*LW* 10:155–6). For Emerson and Dewey, art is not pursued purely for its own sake but for the sake of better living (“to serve the whole creature in his unified vitality,” *LW* 10:122), and the highest art is “the art of life.” Alain Locke argued that African and African-American art were a much needed resource for Western culture because they expressed a greater vitality that is crucial for artistic excellence and that comes from closer links to the natural world. “Art cannot disdain the gift of . . . a return to nature” and black artists have “an imagination that has never broken kinship with nature” (1925, p. 52).

Art’s service to life implies a rejection of the traditional aesthetic/practical opposition that defines art by its contemplative non-instrumentality. In the Kantian tradition, functionality is firmly rejected for the appreciation of pure form. Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics contrastingly insists on art’s wide-ranging functionality, while affirming the pleasures of its immanent experience (including its pleasures of dynamic form). “The work of esthetic art satisfies many ends. . . . It serves life rather than prescribing a defined and limited mode of living” (*LW* 10:140). Emerson likewise demands that art, in serving life, be both “practical and moral.” “This division of beauty from use [is something] the laws of nature do not permit” (1990, pp. 193–4). Pragmatism, I repeat, is not at all opposed to artistic form; it simply seeks a greater recognition of art’s more-than-formalist values and functions. Appreciatively attentive to art’s formal values, Locke also insisted on art’s crucial uses for “self-expression,” “self-determination,” “cultural recognition,” and even “material headway” that were especially important for African-American society. Thus, “the social promise of our recent art is as great as the artistic” (1925, pp. ix, xi, 15, 52).

Recognition of art’s deep functionality and immediate experience of vital delight leads Emerson to celebrate art over science as representing the peak of human experience. Science, he argued, suffered somewhat from being dully “unpoetical” and overly divisive in its analysis of things. Dewey was, of course, extremely appreciative of science, but he still seems in some way to privilege art, and largely for the same reasons that Emerson does. With its richer blend of sense, affect, meaning, and thought, art engages more of the vital human organism in a more meaningful, lively, and immediately satisfying way – not merely explaining our experience but constituting a very meaningful and directly enjoyed experience in itself. Dewey thus claims that “art, the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed
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possess, is the culmination of nature, and that ‘science’ is properly a handmaiden that conduces natural events to this happy issue” (LW 10:33, 90–1). Similarly, Locke respected science but warned against scientism’s “fanatical cult of fact” as a totalizing explanation of value, since he insisted that values were dominantly based on feeling. By working more powerfully on the feelings, art seemed more efficacious in the power to revaluate ideas and groups that have been disvalued and give them more cultural recognition.

If Dewey seems to place art above science, we must emphasize that he also insists on their continuity. When properly practiced, both disciplines are creative, symbolic, well-formed expressions that emerge from and restructure life’s experience and that demand intelligence, skill, and trained knowledge in order to improve experience. As science can be imaginative, so art can provide insights into truth and knowledge (see Aesthetic Experience and the Neurobiology of Inquiry). Just as there is a kind of continuity between art and science and everyday experience in terms of their use of intelligent, purposeful behavior and problem-solving, so it is important to emphasize that the notion of continuity is more generally an important and pervasive theme in Emerson’s and Dewey’s thought and in pragmatism as a whole. The theme of continuity is evident in Dewey’s repeated criticisms of the dualisms that dominate aesthetic theory (such as art/life, art/nature, fine/practical art, high/popular art, spatial/temporal art, aesthetic/practical, artists/ordinary people) but also of other dualisms that plague philosophical thinking well beyond the realm of aesthetics (such as body/mind, material/ideal, thought/feeling, form/substance, means/ends, self/world, and subject/object). Emerson famously critiques the institutional compartmentalization of human life that produces fragmentary monsters instead of complete humans, while urging that creative genius “unites the hitherto separated strands into a perfect cord” of wholeness (1990, pp. 37–8, 89). In Alain Locke’s aesthetics, the notion of continuity is expressed not only in the idea that the arts are closely related and share common elements, but also in what I would call an “aesthetics of the mix,” a view that the richness and value of an artwork (or a culture as a whole) tend to be enhanced through the tasteful mixing and interaction of different elements. Through recognizing the specificity of African-American culture, Locke was not an ethnic separatist but urged that American culture would be greatly improved by the closer collaboration of its different ethnic cultures (Locke 1925, Shusterman 2002).

One of contemporary theory’s most popular dualisms is that between nature and culture or nature and history. Defying these dichotomies, Emerson and Dewey explain art as much through cultural history as through nature, showing that not only the content but also the very concept of art has altered through historical change. As Dewey outlines the historic reasons for “the compartmental conception of fine art” in terms of the growth of museums through modern nationalism, imperialism, and capitalism, so Emerson traced our culture’s evolution from the aesthetic unity of beauty and use in ancient Greece to modern art’s romantic, anti-functional aestheticism that links art not with practical life but with “reveries” and “death” (Emerson 1990, pp. 192–3). Both Emerson and Dewey celebrate the link of novelty and historical tradition. “The greatest genius,” writes Emerson, “is the most indebted man”; “the new in art is always formed out of the old” (ibid., pp. 187, 329). Dewey echoes: “When the old has not been incorporated, the outcome is mere eccentricity. But great original
artists take a tradition into themselves” (LW 10:163). This recognition of history, however, is coupled with a demand for openness to new experiences and new technologies (our modern “mills, railways, and machines,” Emerson 1990, p. 194) that call for new aesthetic expression. Machines, for Emerson and Dewey, are not in principle unesthetic; what very often makes them so is their design and deployment for narrowly mercenary ends. In Locke we find the same idea of combining tradition and creative novelty. If strong ties to the energies of African tradition were a resource to the creativity of the Harlem Renaissance, so were the new technologies and modernized bustle of life in New York City.

Among pragmatism’s most distinctive features is its attitude of meliorism, its desire not simply to understand reality but to improve it. This meliorism is evident also in aesthetics, which should not aim at mere formal definitions or abstract truths about art and beauty. Its prime goal instead is to improve art and enhance the appreciation of art and other aesthetic phenomena. Locke appreciatively studied Negro spirituals not for the mere purposes of history and preservation but to develop their potential for new creativity and transformation as a “contribution to the music of to-morrow” (1925, p. 210). Moreover, art’s goal is not simply to produce improved art techniques, artworks, and art appreciation (in the spirit of “art for art’s sake”) but instead to improve life itself. As Emerson claimed, “There is higher work for Art than the arts, . . . Nothing less than the creation of man and nature is its end” (1990, p. 192). Dewey and Locke affirm this view, emphasizing the power of art for both personal and social transformation.

One vital area for melioristic transformation is the democratization of art, the goal of broadening the notion of art to embrace the experience and expression of more people from more classes, races, and walks of life. This theme is central to the pragmatist aesthetics of Emerson, Dewey, and Locke. Opposing the elitism of high culture that divides society and dries up the fountains of invention, Emerson recommends “the literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life” as “the topics of the time” that art should treat (1990, p. 50). Dewey similarly blasted the stultifying elitism of “the museum-conception of fine art” that denies legitimacy to popular art: “Philosophic theory concerned itself only with those arts that had the stamp and seal of recognition. Popular arts must have flourished but they received no literary attention. They were not worthy of mention in theoretical discussion” (LW 10:191). Unfortunately, Dewey fails to provide popular art with any of the sort of careful, appreciative, legitimizing critical study that by his own account seems necessary. In contrast, Locke provides very detailed practical criticism and legitimizing study of the African-American popular arts, not only the musical arts (especially spirituals and jazz) for which African-Americans were most respected, but also the arts of literature, drama, painting, and sculpture (Locke 1925, 1936a, 1936b, 1940, 1983; see also Harris 1999, Shusterman 2002).

Perhaps the most central theme in Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics is the primacy of experience in art. Dewey famously distinguishes the physical object as mere “art product” from the heightened experiential activity that is the real artwork: “the actual work of art is what the product does with and in experience” – first, the creating artist’s experience, then that of the work’s audience (LW 10:9, 87, 121, 167). For
Dewey, the aesthetic experience that defines art is an intensified, well-structured, directly fulfilling experience that involves heightened vitality and feeling and that stands out from the ordinary flow of experience as something special, as an experience that is strongly felt, unified, distinctive, and memorable. Emerson also stressed the concept of deeply felt experience in art and in life more generally. Since life means movement, a life-serving art cannot be a matter of lifeless artifacts but implies dynamic, changing, lived experience. Hence “true art is never fixed, but also flowing.” “The true poem is in the poet’s mind,” for “the poet has . . . a new experience to unfold,” and through the sharing of this experience with his audience makes them into new artists (1990, pp. 119, 189, 192, 200). Although Locke’s aesthetics does not explicitly emphasize the concept of experience, the importance of that concept is implied in his emphasis on “the feeling-quality” of value, which can only be derived and appreciated through experience. It is also worth noting that the important pragmatist social thinker George Herbert Mead (see Mead) was influenced by Dewey to devote specific attention to aesthetic experience (Mead 1981).

III

Dewey’s great stature as a philosopher and public intellectual certainly helped to put pragmatist aesthetics on the cultural map, and Deweyan-style pragmatist aesthetics received some useful elaboration and refinement in the work of Horace Kallen (1942) and Irwin Edman (1939). Dewey’s ideas also had impact on the art world, influencing such important painters as Robert Motherwell, Thomas Hart Benton, and Jackson Pollock. Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics was, moreover, an inspiration (insufficiently acknowledged) for the artistic practice and theory of Alan Kaprow, who helped create the genre of performance art known as the “Happening” (Kaprow 1993). But after the middle of the twentieth century, Dewey’s aesthetics began to decline in influence, even in the academic world of philosophy. Analytic philosophers of art generally dismissed his aesthetics as “a hodgepodge of conflicting methods and undisciplined speculations,” and since analytic philosophy dominated mainstream Anglo-American philosophical aesthetics, the profile of pragmatist aesthetics significantly fell for a few decades (Isenberg 1987, p. 128; Shusterman 1992). Although the important analytic aesthetician, Monroe Beardsley, was clearly influenced by Dewey’s theory of aesthetic experience and indeed made that concept the key to his own definitions of art and aesthetic value (1958), the spirit of Beardsley’s definitions and definitional aims was rather remote from Dewey’s (see Shusterman 2000b). Outside the analytic establishment, however, Dewey’s aesthetics continued to receive careful interpretive attention and creative commentary by philosophers such as John McDermott (1986) and Thomas Alexander (1987), and later by Casey Haskins (1992), Crispin Sartwell (1995), and Robert Innis (2002).

There have, however, been a number of philosophers who have had strong links to analytic philosophy, but who have built on Deweyan and other pragmatist insights to enrich the tradition of pragmatist aesthetics by offering new pragmatist approaches to traditional aesthetic topics (such as the interpretation and definition of art and of
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the very notion of aesthetics) and to more distinctively contemporary issues ranging from mass-media arts and multiculturalism to postmodernism and the stylizations of the art of living (see Shusterman 1992, 1997, 2000a).

Nelson Goodman, for example, develops Dewey’s theme of the continuity of art and science. Rejecting the idea of “autonomous aesthetic objects,” valued merely for the pleasure of their form, Goodman urges the fundamental unity of art and science through their “common cognitive function.” Hence aesthetics should be placed with philosophy of science and “should be conceived as an integral part of metaphysics and epistemology”; and aesthetic value is subsumed under “cognitive excellence.” Despite his attempt to supply extremely strict definitions of works of art in terms of the conditions of identity and authenticity of the material objects that exemplify them, Goodman insists with Dewey (and Beardsley) that what matters aesthetically is not precisely what the material art object is but how it functions in dynamic experience. He therefore advocates that we replace the question “what is art?” with the question “when is art?” (1969, p. 259; 1978, pp. 70, 102; 1984, pp. 6, 148). Moreover, Goodman offers a critique of contemporary museum practices and ideology that greatly resembles the spirit of Dewey’s critique of the museum conception of fine art, though Goodman, of course, has a very different style of argumentation (Goodman 1984). Both thinkers warn against the fetishization and compartmentalization of art objects, arguing instead that our purpose should be the maximization of the active use of such objects in the production of aesthetic experience.

Other philosophers trained in the analytic tradition, such as Joseph Margolis, Richard Rorty, and Richard Shusterman, have used pragmatist ideas to show how the interpretation of artworks can be meaningful and valid without the need to posit fixed entities as the unchanging objects of these valid interpretations. Their arguments explain how traditionally entrenched but dialogically open practices can be enough to secure identity of reference for discussion of the work (and thus ensure that we can meaningfully talk about the same work) without positing that there is therefore a fixed, substantive nature of the artwork that permanently defines its identity and grounds all valid interpretation. This basic strategy of distinguishing between substantive and referential identity is formulated in different ways by these contemporary pragmatists. All three of these theorists stress the historicity and culturally embedded nature of artworks, but only Margolis tries to erect this idea into a ramified metaphysics of cultural objects (Margolis 1999a, 1999b). Opposing the idea (shared by Rorty, Margolis, and the literary pragmatist Stanley Fish) that all our aesthetic experience is interpretive, Shusterman (1992) deploys Dewey (but also Wittgenstein) in arguing for some level of experience “beneath interpretation” and even beneath language.

As Nelson Goodman revived Dewey’s continuum of art and science, so Richard Rorty (1989) extends Dewey’s pragmatist blending of aesthetics and ethics by advocating “the aesthetic life” as an ethics of “self-enrichment,” “self-enlargement,” and “self-creation.” Rorty’s vision of the aesthetic life has been criticized for its reductive isolation in the private sphere, its narrowing focus on language and high cultural texts, and its consequent failure to engage with popular art forms and robustly embodied experience. In contrast, affirming a role for aesthetics in our pursuit of democracy as a way of life, Shusterman urges greater appreciation of the aesthetic experience of
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popular arts by providing detailed aesthetic analyses of contemporary popular art genres (such as rap and country music) and of somatic-centered disciplines that can augment our aesthetic experience and creative power in the art of living. Rorty counters not only by questioning the idea of a somatic aesthetics but also by expressing his “scepticism about ‘aesthetics’ as a field of inquiry,” “another of Kant’s bad ideas” (2001, p. 156).

Although Stanley Cavell seems reluctant to carry the label “pragmatist,” his excellent, detailed work on popular cinema and television (1979, 1981, 1984) certainly helps extend the respect for popular art that Dewey advocated. Moreover, although it does not particularly emphasize the aesthetic dimension, Cavell’s vision of moral perfectionism (1990) importantly contributes to the pragmatic idea of philosophy as an art of living. Of course, with respect to perfectionism and other themes, Cavell typically takes Emerson rather than Dewey as his mentor, but that is no reason to exclude Cavell from the pragmatist tradition. For, as we have already seen, an excellent case can be made that Emerson himself anticipated almost all the major themes that we identify as pragmatist in Dewey’s aesthetics.

References and further reading


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Aesthetic Experience and the Neurobiology of Inquiry

JAY SCHULKIN

Classical pragmatism claimed that inquiry lies at the heart of the human invention, ingenuity, and creativity. Inquiry is a broad based proclivity. This sort of pragmatism understands that inquiry is not something just for the sciences, but is fermented in the arts and in any form of human engagement and with some sort of self-corrective process. As John Dewey (see Dewey) said, the deepening of human experience is one important end of human inquiry and “every experience is a moving force” (LW 13:21).

The early pragmatists were biologically oriented. In such works as Experience and Nature (1925, LW 1) and Art as Experience (1934, LW 10), Dewey understood that the origin of inquiry is linked to adaptation to the world, a precarious place, fraught with insecurity, instability and uncertainty. Aesthetics (see Aesthetics) is a way to cope with the world, to represent the world, to learn to reduce some of its uncertainty to something predictable. This way of understanding aesthetics may not be obvious, for aesthetics is usually associated with fine arts, but aesthetics underlies the practical engagement with the world. Aesthetics of course runs across the breadth of human activities and experiences, and is knotted to inquiry and reward. Dewey, for example, suggested that the cognitive and neural resources involved in scientific problem-solving are no different from those involved in other forms of human activity, including that of aesthetics. Cognitive predilection underlies scientific problem-solving and aesthetic judgment.

One means of coping with the world is to understand it. Knowledge, or the process of inquiry, is a contact sport, and cognitive resources evolved to discern the complexity of the environments that we are adapting to (Schulkin 1992; Godfrey-Smith 1998). However, it is not only the precariousness of existence that drives this desire for knowledge, but also a natural curiosity, and the creation of aesthetic expression.

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We are clearly and profoundly a species that is responsive to wondrous beauty. We marvel at the smallest of objects to the greatest, we are in tune to diverse sounds; we create and admire objects as representations of ourselves, of others, and of our experiences. Information-processing systems pervade aesthetic judgment. Noting this
fact does not detract from the experience of aesthetics. It merely means that cognitive systems are throughout the brain; there are no representations that are not codified by information-processing systems. I have suggested (Schulkin 2000, 2004) elsewhere that the brain is a cognitive organ, and cognition is endemic to aesthetic experiences. Our representational capacity, the play and flexibility of cognitive systems, the detection of discrepancy; all are reflective, in other words, of our aesthetic judgments.

Aesthetics is pervasive in everyday life. It is not just for the museum, parlor, or theater. Aesthetic judgments draw one close, eliciting approach behaviors, but they also can repulse and make us withdraw from objects. In *Art as Experience* Dewey stated romantically, “because experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is esthetic experience” (LW 10:25).

Diverse pragmatists from Peirce (see Peirce) on have argued that our attention becomes focused when encountering something that stands out as discrepant from the usual: our curiosity is piqued; beholding an aesthetically pleasing or offensive object, our interest is raised, our sensibility elated or offended (Hebb 1949). Expectancy is part of the information-processing in the brain. Expectancy resides in rudimentary learning, perceptual detectors in object recognition, social recognition, and underlies certain kinds of aesthetic judgments.

Dewey noted in many places that appetitive and consummatory experiences are fundamental features of the human condition, including aesthetics. The appetitive phase reveals a hunger we have when something occurred that is out of order, that needs fixing (Craig 1918) – a need has been aroused, in which stability is sought while precariousness is restrained. These appetitive and consummatory experiences pervade the exploration of our world and the creation of new artifacts.

Dewey’s view of learning, whether aesthetic or otherwise, is one in which the failure of an expectation initiates the process of learning. In other words, some form of discrepancy is noticed. This view of aesthetics is explicated, for example, in Leonard Meyer’s work on music (1973), in which the discrepancy model of learning figures importantly in aesthetic judgment and learning. In other words, the breakdown of an expectation results in the search for a solution, as seen in musical expectations and the fulfillment of an expectation.

One way in which issue of discrepancy from expectations is revealed is in experiments in which musical syntax is violated. I would not suggest that syntax predominates over other forms of information-processing that permeate our musical experiences. However, in experimental studies, musical experts tend to prefer syntactical understanding compared with novices in their expectations of form and play (Smith 1997). But even novices are sensitive to syntactic atypicality (Smith and Melara 1990). When a discrepancy is noticed in the musical composition, some sort of cognitive equilibrium is sought. Again, the emphasis on syntactic structure and music does not mean that the other forms of musical experiences are not within information-processing systems; surely they are, as information-processing extends to images. The point is merely that discrepancy detectors underlie aesthetic experience. Cognitive realignment is a core adaptation, and the classical pragmatists were correct to emphasize this fact about us.
My focus is on one core feature of aesthetic experience and in particular musical experience, namely that cognitive expectations permeate aesthetic judgment. Importantly, regions of the brain that may underlie syntax, probability judgments, and responses to novelty, also underlie aesthetic experiences (Maess et al. 2001). I do not think there is an extra area of the brain that evolved exclusively for aesthetic judgment. Thus, for example, Broca’s area is known for its involvement in the processing of the formal aspects of language and there are obviously cognitive systems throughout music.

In one brain activation study (using magnetoencephalography), unexpected or discrepant musical syntactical structure elicited greater activation of Broca’s area (and the homologous right side) than a musical composition that was reported as syntactically predicted (Maess et al. 2001). This region of the brain is generally responsive to syntactical musical expression. The authors suggested that the left (pars opercularis) region is more involved in the processing of language, and the right (pars opercularis) side in the processing of musical syntax.

In other related studies, syntactical discrepancy has been linked to event-related brain potentials for both music and language recognition. The P600 event-related potential was initially linked to language syntax, but it has now been demonstrated that the P600 evoked potential is linked to a broader class of syntactical organization in the brain (such as music: see Patel et al. 1998). The neural mechanisms for the organization of musical judgment are not identical to those of human language expression, but there are interesting overlaps, and one appears to be in the context of Broca’s area.

The detection of discrepancy is one feature that figures in aesthetic appreciation (Meyer 1973, 2001), but surely not the only factor (Smith 1997). But the brain is essentially oriented to detect and respond to discrepancy. And, it is important to note that a wide variety of both neocortical and paleocortical sites have been linked to musical sightreading, hearing, and performance (Koelsch et al. 2002).

**Probability, Expectations, and Learning**

Uncertainty is a basic feature our existence. And we have evolved a wide variety of resources to cope with uncertainty. Moreover, as one noted musicologist, much influenced by Dewey, has said, “uncertainty is anathema to humankind” and “we devise ways of reducing uncertainty both in the out-there world and in our personal lives,” but “in the arts and other playful activities such as sports, games and gambling we actually relish and cultivate a considerable amount of uncertainty” (Meyer 2001, p. 353).

Probability judgments are prevalent in human reasoning (see Inquiry, Deliberation, and Method), and while it is a mistake to exaggerate their role in aesthetic judgment, one can assume that in some contexts, such as the one depicted above, they do play a role. Human beings use probabilities to assess the likelihood of events, but never, or hardly ever, perfectly (Peirce 1992; Gigerenzer 2000). A legitimate question
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concerns the process by which and the extent to which mechanisms designed to predict predators and prey, food sources, and sexual success might have become linked to aesthetics (LW 10; Meyer 1973). Prediction for one set of circumstances extends to new domains in our evolutionary ascent (Rozin 1998); our cognitive apparatus extends and expands and now can underlie aesthetic judgments.

When expectations are thwarted, a broad array of learning occurs through new problem-solving search principles (Rescorla and Wagner 1972). This is close in scope to Peirce’s view of inquiry and the development of new solutions to problems. Of course, inquiry is more than this. An important discovery was that not only is there a set of learning equations that is not coupled to contingencies, but time of occurrence is not an axiomatic factor in learning per se, but is rather for predicting events (ibid.). This view of inquiry and learning was prescient, for the variants of this view would capture learning theory through what became known as the Rescorla-Wagner equation:

\[ \Delta V = \alpha \beta (\lambda - V) \]

The Rescorla-Wagner model depicts the associative strengths of stimuli and how discrepancies from expectations are resolved. An association, and thereby learning, occurs by the strength of the predictions that are being developed. The model becomes then not simply a mathematical approach to neural science, but also incorporates a cognitive point of view. In the equation, \( V \) represents the current associative strength of the stimulus, while \( \lambda \) shows the maximum associative strength of the primary motivating event. The salience of conditioned and unconditioned stimuli is represented by \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), respectively. The predictability of the primary motivating event is shown in the \((\lambda - V)\) term. When the current and maximum associative strengths of the stimulus are equal, the conditioned stimulus fully predicts the reinforcer. However, when the term is positive \((\lambda > V)\), the associative strength increases and the conditioned stimulus does not fully predict the reinforcer – there is room for learning to occur. With increased associative strength, learning occurs, and in fact only occurs when the conditioned stimulus does not entirely predict the reinforcer. In contrast, a negative \((\lambda - V)\) term occurs when there is a loss of associative strength, the predicted reinforcer has failed (extinction). General informational search and discrepancy mechanisms, such as the one outlined above, may play a role in those aesthetic judgments that reflect a response to violations of expectations. One neurotransmitter, tied to expectations of reward or pleasure, is dopamine, to which we now turn.

Dopamine, Discrepancy and the Prediction of Reward

It’s been known for a long time that neurotransmitters in the brain play an important role in learning and reward. There is no univocal conception of “reward” and I use it in a common-sense manner as something desired, something labored for, something attained.

Dopamine, an important neurotransmitter underlying the organization of thought and action, provides an excellent example of the role of the body in the prediction of rewarding events (Schultz 2002), and may underlie aesthetic judgment. Dopamine is involved in both action and thought, and, as such, is a necessary chemical information molecule for us in maintaining a coherent world in which to function.
An interesting set of studies on dopamine neurons in the brains of macaque monkeys has suggested that one function of this neurotransmitter in specific regions of the brain is the prediction of rewarding events; dopamine neurons tend to fire more in anticipation of rewarding events. But the unpredictable feature of the stimulus is importantly tied to dopaminergic activation, and reinforces the Rescorla/Wagner model of predictability since it is a primary feature in expectancy, attention, and learning (Schultz 2002). In studies, representations of reward predictability or uncertainty were correlated within populations of dopaminergic neurons; the greater the uncertainty of reward occurrence the greater activation of the dopamine neuronal population (Fiorillo et al. 2003). Two sets of neuronal populations are responsive to these events: one set changes to reward probability, while another changes to reward uncertainty.

In other words, the important point is that this is a model of expectancy and learning, and the model of dopamine release should have some application to aesthetic appreciation. What is expected and easily predicted creates less of a reaction than something that is novel, unique. The same may hold perhaps for the perception of beauty or aesthetics (Juslin and Sloboda 2001), which creates a definitive reaction in the brain, seen through the dopamine neurons. Uncertainty follows from the recognition of a discrepancy. When expectations begin to falter, what could formally be relied upon no longer has the same weighted value. A search for a new solution emerges.

The recognition of discrepant events, as both Peirce and Dewey were prescient in noting, is a heuristic that pervades information-processing in the brain, including the organization of motivated behaviors. While the detection of discrepant events underlies the sense of the beautiful and the mundane, it also underlies the regulatory and the basic physiological. Cognitive resources are required in trying to understand our surroundings and to forge a coherent world in which to move, in which to decide, and in which to act.

One motive that underlies this search for knowledge is perceived informational needs; shortcomings are detected, new inquiry emerges, and new learning takes place. Of course, this is another version of discrepancy and expectations and their violation. And the knowing process is larger than this characterization. As Peirce put it, “the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry.” But in closing the sentence he goes on to say: “though it must be admitted that this belief is sometimes not a very apt designation” (Peirce 1992, p. 114).

The brain is an information-processing organ; motivation represented in neural circuits coded by neuropeptides or neurotransmitters (Schulkin 2004). There can be no doubt that when information is unusual there is a strong desire to acquire it and broad-based responses to discrepancy are an important behavioral adaptation. In the discrepancy model, disruptions of expected events result in recruiting a greater number of behaviors that might reflect learning.

Informational acquisition and control is a strong desire. As I indicated earlier, we are prepared to recognize discrepancy, and we then search to fill in the gaps. Human experiences in decision-making suggest that human choice is based on informational variables that reduce uncertainty (Loewenstein 1994; Loewenstein, unpublished observations). Drawing on animal experiments (Miller 1959), motivation increases at the point of resolving uncertainty, of finding a solution. In a number of experimental
paradigms activation of approach and avoidance mechanisms reflect the gradient of conflict and resolution.

For example, in one experiment, subjects were shown parts of a human body (body parts) in a visual array presented such as to evoke curiosity. Different groups of subjects were shown different numbers of body parts. They were shown hands, feet, a torso, etc. Subjects were asked to predict the age of the person depicted in the collection of body parts. They were also asked how curious they were to find out the age. One prediction was that those subjects shown a greater number of body parts and thus afforded a greater opportunity for visualizing the body as a whole would be more curious about the age of the depicted person. In other words, the greater propensity to fill in the perceived information gap should be stronger in those shown more information about the possible age of the subject, and this should be correlated with their self-reports of curiosity. The experimenters found corroborative evidence for these expectations.

Musement and the Play of Ideas

Peirce called a state of curiosity also one in which “musement” was expressed. Some of us really enjoy gently musing about things. Sometimes interesting ideas emerge at these times. The play of ideas is something sweet and precious to us, a luxury to be savored and enjoyed, and, where possible, extended. It is no less real or important because an idea is constructed with a sense of play.

We are the species driven to offer explanations of what we encounter; and of course some of us do this, and do it better than others. We come prepared to associate and categorize events. Many kinds of information-processing systems generated by the brain are operative and they reflect lower-level bodily events. We are driven to explain phenomena. It is a core characteristic of the human problem-solver. Knowledge can be quite pleasurable, as many thinkers have pointed out, including Dewey. Hitting on the right hypothesis, for those of us who have struggled in science, is rather rare; if we waited for that to underlie what we do on a daily basis, we would derive little pleasure (but the anticipation perhaps carries us a bit).

The search for explanation is goal-driven. The search for meaning, semiotic connections of events, coherence and security, is a pervasive activity. And satisfaction is an important element in any explanation. The explanatory content varies with the kinds of issues that are trying to be explained. Interestingly, Peirce wrote that the instinct to explain is strongly engraved in our mental architecture and experiences: theories come all too easily (see Hookway 2000). The empirical issue is what constrains hypothesis-formation. Some of the constraints are built into the architecture itself, others are acquired through maturation and experience. According to pragmatism, the human mind looks to satisfy its explanatory desires, and to feel satisfaction with some sort of closure.

Conclusion

As the classical pragmatists claimed, cognition is essential to problem-solving. The roots are within biology. There are a number of information-processing systems operative in
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the nervous system that function quite well through evolutionary selection procedures. They also underlie aesthetic judgment. Several features stand out: responding to discrepant events; the arousal of learning processes that underlie everyday inquiry, and that are codified in the prediction of events and instantiated in regions of the brain in which the neurotransmitter dopamine is an important information molecule that underlies the prediction of reward; aesthetic sensibility; and the organization of action.

Expectations within the organization of behavior are inherent in human experience, from science to aesthetics. I have highlighted several features suggested by pragmatism. Aesthetic experience is rich in appetitive and consummatory experiences, in which expectations and their violations are features of the search for coherence and explanatory satisfaction. We are driven to explain events, to fill in the information gaps in what is presented or violated in human experience. These events instantiated in the brain organize diverse forms of learning that figure in inquiry.

The sense of relatedness in our experience is what James’s *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) emphasizes. Human experience is in the transactions with the world and in the engagements with one another (LW 1; Neville 1974). Individuals are not abstract entities experiencing bodily sensibility, but are concrete existential instances of experiencing emotional joy, fear, loneliness, apathy, and envy. They are enjoying aesthetics, and are being revolted by moral transgressions. Pragmatism understands that information-processing should not be merely cold and detached understanding, with human experience denied and omitted.

References and further reading


The words “pragmatism” and “cognitive science” are seldom spoken in the same breath. There are two reasons for this. First, cognitive science is substantially different today from what it was during the flourishing of classical pragmatism. Second, many contemporary pragmatist philosophers tend to dismiss the sciences of mind, which they regard as overly reductionist in spirit and as incapable of doing justice to the most profound insights of pragmatist views of mind, thought, and language. Consequently, there has been very little recognition of the great potential for mutually beneficial dialogue between pragmatists and cognitive scientists.

William James (see James) and John Dewey (see Dewey) are the two central figures around which to define a new field covering the intersection of pragmatism and cognitive science. Both philosophers made extensive use of the best available biological and cognitive science of their day in developing their views of mind, knowledge, and value. Were they alive today, they certainly would have seen the cognitive sciences as profoundly informing their inquiries into the nature of human experience.

Only in the past few years have pragmatists seriously begun to pay attention to the cognitive sciences. The principal reason for this delayed engagement is that earlier, first-generation cognitive science was based on assumptions radically at odds with pragmatist views. It was not until the recent emergence of a new second-generation cognitive science that the deep connections to central pragmatist themes became evident. First-generation cognitive science developed in the 1950s and 1960s from the convergence of analytic philosophy of mind, information-processing psychology, generative theories of language, model theory, computer science, and research in artificial intelligence. This developing functionalist paradigm regarded mental operations as formal functional programs that could be run on any of a number of suitable hardwares (machines) or wetwares (biological organisms). It thus saw “mind” as dis-embodied, in the sense that it was taken to be merely a program of mental operations computed by the brain. It regarded propositions to be the core of meaning and thought, and it used formal logic and propositional attitude theory to describe conceptualization and reasoning.
During this early period, pragmatists correctly discerned the fundamental incompatibility between disembodied functionalist models and pragmatism’s interactive, embodied, non-dualistic accounts of mental phenomena. In short, first-generation cognitive science rested on some of the same dichotomies and mistaken metaphysical assumptions that pragmatists had so painstakingly challenged decades earlier. Hence, there could be no fruitful dialogue between the two radically different orientations. Consequently, at this stage, pragmatists were right to challenge the entire philosophical framework of disembodied cognitive science.

By the mid-1970s, however, new empirical cognitive science research in linguistics, psychology, biology, computer science, and neuroscience called into question most of the founding assumptions of the first-generation paradigm. In particular, converging evidence from these different sciences challenged any ontological split between mind and body, and that evidence supported the idea that all meaning, thought, and symbolic interaction are shaped by the nature of our bodies, brains, and the environments we inhabit (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). What emerged from this research was a second-generation “embodied” cognitive science that shares many of the key tenets of pragmatism.

Convergence Between the Cognitive Sciences and Pragmatism

There are several important themes around which pragmatism and recent second-generation cognitive science converge.

Naturalism, with respect to mind, is the view that the empirical methods of the natural sciences are necessary for the study of all aspects of human cognition and symbolic interaction. It is useful to distinguish at least two different conceptions of naturalism. The first, which is materialist and reductionist in spirit, insists on an exclusive focus on causal explanations and denies supernatural entities and causes. The second, less reductionistic, version recognizes that the natural sciences are not the only appropriate methods of inquiry, acknowledging that other critical and interpretive methods may also prove necessary to explain the full range of cognitive phenomena. This broader conception of naturalism is shared by many cognitive scientists and virtually all pragmatists. It is naturalist in the sense that it understands humans to be complex, highly evolved, embodied organisms in ongoing interaction with their environments. It treats humans as inextricably part of nature, and it favors a non-dualistic metaphysical and epistemological stance.

An important consequence of naturalism is the insistence that at least part of the explanatory story must rest on a neuro-physiological account of mental events (see Aesthetic Experience and the Neurobiology of Inquiry). Dewey boldly proclaimed: “To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy” (LW 1:224). Organism, nature, nervous system, brain, cortex – all are inextricably bound together in massive ongoing interaction. These are the keys to
philosophy. James, likewise, developed an entire philosophical orientation on the basis of the magnificent account of perception, imagination, conception, and reasoning that he so laboriously spelled out in *The Principles of Psychology* (1890). Despite his oft-repeated worries about whether a strictly scientific account of mind could ever adequately explain the moral and spiritual yearnings of humankind, James worked out some key parts of a naturalistic account that in many respects continues to maintain its respectability in the face of dramatic developments in cognitive neuroscience over the last century. James put tremendous emphasis on the relevance of the burgeoning brain science of his era, taking as his working hypothesis that “the immediate condition of a state of consciousness is an activity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres” (1892, pp. 5–6). Contemporary neuroscience is committed to the existence of neural correlates for any mental events, and it investigates the multidimensional, massively parallel activations of neuronal clusters that underlie different unconscious processes, conscious experiences, and acts of bodily movement.

**Non-reductive explanations of mental events**

One of the great virtues of pragmatism is its insistence on multiple intertwined layers of explanation as necessary to capture the depth and complexity of experience. Dewey famously argued for a richly textured conception of experience that “includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine – in short, processes of experiencing” (*LW* 1:18).

Dewey recognized both a “biological” and a “cultural” matrix woven together in human experience. Explanations that treat people only as biological and neural organisms cannot account for the crucial role of culture and shared symbols that lie at the heart of a person’s identity as a social creature, while theories that speak only of cultural constructions miss the equally crucial role of embodied meaning and thought. In James and Dewey, in particular, there is always a deep tension between their naturalistic tendencies and their recognition of the need for other methods of explanation, in light of the fact that available naturalistic causal accounts could not explain the full range of phenomena.

The mistaken impression that contemporary cognitive science necessarily leads to reductionist views of the person is based on ignorance of the many and diverse empirical methods employed in the cognitive sciences. A major part of our insight about human cognition and symbolic interaction comes not just from the neurosciences, but also from investigations in linguistics, developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, anthropology, and sociology. There is no overarching theory that could explain all of these complex and diverse cognitive phenomena in terms of a single explanatory level (such as neuroscience or evolutionary biology).

**Non-dualistic theory of mind**

First-generation cognitive science, which is still widely popular today, is disembodied and formalist, and so it often assumes an underlying dualism, manifest in distinctions between the mental and the physical, the cognitive and the emotive, theory and
practice. In stark contrast, second-generation cognitive science claims to reject, on empirical grounds, all of the metaphysical and epistemological dualisms that are founded on the traditional mind–body split. Varela et al. (1991) thus replace the idea of an interaction of body and mind with the non-dualistic notion of enaction, suggesting that what we call “body” and “mind” are simply abstractions from an ongoing process of organism-environment engagements. Enaction entails that “(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action, and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” (p. 173).

Dewey famously coined the term “body–mind” and referred to experiential transactions (rather than interactions) in his similar effort to overcome dualistic conceptions (see Dewey, Dualism, and Naturalism). He also formulated a principle of continuity as the key to explaining all meaning, cognition, and communication, arguing that “the distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is thus one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events” (LW 1:200). According to the principle of continuity, there are no ontological gaps between these various levels of activity: “there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations. ‘Continuity’ . . . means that rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge” (LW 12:26). Self-movement, mind, and communication, for example, all emerge in human development via increased complexity, rather than via the introduction of some new extrinsic principle of organization.

Although James steadfastly refused to foreclose on the possibility that dualism might prove to be the best explanation of certain phenomena, his work provides the basis for a consistent non-dualistic and naturalistic theory of mind. He argues:

Mental facts cannot be properly studied apart from the physical environment of which they take cognizance. The great fault of the older rational psychology was to set up the soul as an absolute spiritual being with certain faculties of its own by which the several activities of remembering, imagining, reasoning, willing, etc. were explained, almost without reference to the peculiarities of the world with which these activities deal. But the richer insight of modern days perceives that our inner faculties are adapted in advance to the features of the world in which we dwell, adapted. I mean, so as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst. (1892, p. 3)

Embodied view of meaning

Dewey’s continuity thesis entails that there will be no gap between our perceptual acts and bodily movements, on the one hand, and what we call our “higher” cognitive acts of thinking, reasoning, and communicating. Meaning, in other words, is grounded in, and shaped by, the body:

Since both the inanimate and the human environment are involved in the functions of life, it is inevitable, if these functions evolve to the point of thinking and if thinking is naturally serial with biological functions, that it will have as the material of thought, even of its erratic imaginings, the events and connections of this environment. (LW 1:212–13)
James’s *Principles of Psychology* provides a massive sustained account of the ways our sensory-motor experience is the basis for our abstract thinking. In the “Stream of Thought” chapter James gives his account of the continuous process of thought by which our higher cognitions grow from our embodied capacities and operations. Our embodiment is even implicated in our most theoretical acts of knowing: “Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which some awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever we know” (*Works PP*, pp. 234–5).

The bodily grounding of meaning and thought has become a central theme of contemporary second-generation cognitive science. According to the naturalistic assumption of the continuity of the “bodily” with the “mental,” the new field known as cognitive semantics investigates the emergence of “higher” cognitive processes from those involved in the sensorimotor processes of perception, object manipulation, and bodily movement. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Johnson and Lakoff (2002) present empirical evidence “that meaning is grounded in our sensorimotor experience and that this embodied meaning [is] extended, via imaginative mechanisms such as conceptual metaphor, metonymy, radial categories, and various forms of conceptual blending, to shape abstract conceptualization and reasoning” (2002, p. 245). Conceptual metaphor is a principal means for using structure from domains of bodily experience to understand abstract concepts and to make inferences about abstract entities in fields as diverse as physics, law, psychology, mathematics, political science, economics, and philosophy. It is the embodiment of meaning, understanding, and reasoning that distinguishes second-generation cognitive science and makes it profoundly relevant for pragmatist philosophy.

**The role of feeling in thought**

James is justly famous for his extended argument for the presence of feeling in thought:

> If there be such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum natura, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known. There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relations which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought. (*Works PP*, pp. 238)

As a remarkably astute phenomenologist, James explored the vast uncharted continent of feeling that underlies even our most abstract intellectual acts. He tried to show that all of our transitions in thinking between one stable idea and another are actually felt as tendencies and movements by which we work out the implications of our experience. James carried this embodiment hypothesis to its logical conclusion, arguing that even logical relations are realized as feelings of directions in our thinking: “We ought to say a feeling of *and*, a feeling of *if*, a feeling of *but*, and a feeling of *by*, quite as readily as we say a feeling of *blue* or a feeling of *cold*” (*Works PP*, p. 238). In order to develop a theory of meaning that includes a central role for feeling, James employed the metaphor of the “fringe” or “halo” of felt tendencies and connections that surrounds every thought of any particular object. Dewey likewise emphasized the felt qualitative aspects of experience, which have been mostly overlooked by philosophers. He saw that the
nearly exclusive focus in theories of knowledge (and, I would add, in first-generation cognitive science) on propositions leads philosophers to overlook the pervasive qualities that characterize the situations we experience and reason about. To regain its relevance for our lives, philosophy must be grounded in these overlooked qualities of experience, qualities that are not merely subjective feelings, but are instead objective aspects of situations. Dewey warns us that “the selective determination and relation of objects in thought is controlled by a pervasive and internally integrating quality, so that failure to acknowledge the situation leaves, in the end, the logical force of objects and their relations inexplicable” (LW 5:246).

The issue of the role of feeling in thought is one area in which contemporary cognitive science is perhaps only recently catching up with the earlier arguments of James and Dewey. The “problem of qualia” – the impossibility of capturing the felt characteristics of experience by neuro-computational models – is today a lynchpin of popular arguments that no functionalist first-generation cognitive science could adequately explain experience (Jackson 1986). In a broadly pragmatist vein, Flanagan (1992) argues for the indispensable role of felt qualities in any adequate view of cognition, but he recognizes that we do not yet have good explanations of how neuro-chemical processes result in the qualities we feel. However, cognitive neuroscientists are beginning to address this perplexing problem with accounts of the role of the limbic system (Tucker 1992) and of interacting functional neuronal clusters (Edelman and Tononi 2000; Damasio 2003). The most elaborate contemporary phenomenological treatment that parallels James’s and Dewey’s account of the role of feeling in thought is Eugene Gendlin’s description (1997) of the cooperation of the formal, structural, and conceptual dimensions of experience with the nonformal felt sense that carries forward the meaning of any thought or symbolic expression.

Emotion and reason

It is a small step from the presence of feeling in thought to the role of emotion in reasoning. James notoriously held the view that emotions were not causes of thoughts, bodily expressions, and actions, but rather were effects of our being aware of our bodily states. His theory was that “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (Works PP, p. 1065; italics in original). In other words, James saw emotions as modes of awareness of our changing bodily states. In its simplest form, this view has been subjected to extensive criticism from the perspective of recent brain research (LeDoux 2002, p. 202f.). But other neuroscientists have embraced at least some aspects of James’s theory. Antonio Damasio (1994, 2003) grants that James did not give sufficient weight to higher-level evaluations of situations that give rise to emotion, and he recognizes the need to supplement James’s account with newly acquired neuroscience. Nonetheless, Damasio argues that James was basically correct in stressing that the emotions play a crucial role in the organism’s monitoring of its internal states and its ongoing assessment of its changing relations to aspects of its environment. Such evaluative assessment is essential to all forms of social reasoning and cooperative behavior. As James said, emotion plays a crucial role in reasoning; rather than being its enemy, emotions are part of what makes good reasoning possible.
Consciousness as a Functional Process

Another major area of substantial convergence between classical pragmatism and modern cognitive science concerns the nature of consciousness. Both agree that consciousness is a functional process, not a thing. From an evolutionary perspective, Dewey argued that consciousness emerges only when certain types of sentient organisms encounter problems and tensions within their experience, giving rise to a special kind of cognitive activity (inquiry to resolve the problematic situation). Consciousness arises in the activity of remaking or transforming a situation in the face of the organism’s needs and desires: “Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation” (LW 1:233). Consciousness is the awareness of feelings and of the meanings of situations.

However, absent a transcendental ego or fixed self to experience its own states, how is one to account for our apparent awareness of certain states as ours. In James’s terms, without a fixed entity that could bind together my thoughts and recognize them as mine, how could we have anything but a random flow of disconnected successive thoughts? James answered that each present pulse of thought, moving like an ever-flowing wave, carries forward parts of every preceding thought and presses forward toward each succeeding thought. The only thing that binds these thoughts together, as my thoughts, is our feeling of “warmth” and “intimacy” toward them: “For, whatever the thought we are criticizing may think about its present self, that self comes to its acquaintance, or is actually felt, with warmth and intimacy. Of course, this is the case with the bodily part of it; we feel the whole cubic mass of our body all the while, it gives us an unceasing sense of personal existence” (Works PP, p. 316). James concludes that “Our entire feeling of spiritual [i.e., mental] activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked” (Works PP, p. 288; italics in original).

Owen Flanagan has shown how James’s “ego-less” conception of the self is quite in harmony with recent neuroscience accounts of consciousness, in which “the self emerges as experience accrues, and it is constructed as the organism actively engages the external world” (1992, p. 178). Using evidence from lesion studies, neuro-imaging techniques, and other scientific studies of the mind-brain, Damasio (1999) has developed an elaborate Jamesian model of consciousness and the sense of self. As mentioned above, Damasio argues that a person’s continued existence and flourishing depends on constant monitoring, by means of emotions, of its internal bodily states and its ongoing interactions with aspects of its environment. Consciousness emerges in this bodily monitoring process whenever there arise “non-verbal images” of the organism’s processing of experience. Consciousness is a feeling of what is happening to you – it is how you know yourself as affected by what is happening at a given point in time, even though there is no fixed, eternal self that is being affected: “The continuity of consciousness is based on the steady generation of consciousness pulses which correspond to the endless processing of myriad objects, whose interaction, actual or recalled constantly, modifies the proto-self. The continuity of consciousness comes from the abundant flow of nonverbal narratives of core consciousness” (Damasio 1999, p. 176).
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With explicit references to the ways their view is similar to James’s, Edelman and Tononi (2000) suggest possible neural mechanisms underlying consciousness as a process. What they call the “dynamic core” is a functional process by which a cluster of interacting, but functionally diverse, neuronal groups are bound together within a very brief window of time. Consciousness arises through “re-entrant mappings” among functional parts of neuronal clusters, so that the organism becomes aware of its overall state and changes from one state to another.

James’s and Dewey’s ego-less, functional, process-oriented view of consciousness meshes nicely with recent cognitive science work on the development and loss of various states of consciousness. It is this sense of an embodied, value-laden, transient (yet relatively stable) self that lies at the heart of a naturalist, non-dualistic view of the person.

The Productive Interplay of Pragmatism and Cognitive Science

Contemporary cognitive science has much to offer to pragmatism. Cognitive science is a group of related scientific endeavors that bring multiple empirical methods of inquiry to bear on questions about the nature of meaning, thought, language, self, mind, and value. If, as pragmatists argue, there can be no foundational knowledge, no single all-encompassing method of inquiry, then the multiple methodologies of the cognitive sciences, recognizing many levels of explanation and insisting on empirical support, should be an important part of our self-understanding. No one of these methods can be taken as exclusive and final, but together they can give clues to an adequate theory of mind and experience, at least where their divergent methodologies generate convergent evidence. Pragmatism must be an “empirically-responsible philosophy” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) informed in part by empirical results of the sciences of mind.

Pragmatism’s principal contribution is to provide the larger philosophical framework for appreciating and criticizing the assumptions and results of the cognitive sciences. The cognitive sciences cannot provide absolute knowledge, so their methods and assumptions must be continually subjected to the critical scrutiny of pragmatist inquiry. Such inquiry is tied to concrete situations of life – it starts from concrete experience, takes up real-life issues, subjects those issues to critical inquiry, and returns to experience, now transformed by those reflections. In short, pragmatism grounds, critiques, and applies the results that are continually emerging from the cognitive sciences.

Another crucial role for pragmatist philosophical inquiry is to locate the cognitive sciences within a theory of value. Part of the critical responsibility of pragmatist philosophy is to ask what various empirical results mean for how we should understand and live our lives. The sciences have notoriously failed to address such issues. For example, if there is no radical ontological difference between “body” and “mind,” then what does this mean for questions about will, freedom, moral judgment, and the possibility for moral self-transformation? Specific sciences cannot adequately deal with such broad and foundational questions unless they rely on some overarching philosophical framework that connects our views of mind, body, world, knowledge, judgment, communication, and value. Pragmatism should provide such a framework.
Cognitive science

one that is responsive to the best cognitive science available and that tells us what the emerging view of the person, experience, and the world means for our lives.

References and further reading


Charles Peirce (see Peirce) and John Dewey (see Dewey) made the topic of inquiry the central problem of their pragmatic philosophies and both took inquiry to have the character of practical deliberation aimed at choosing policies suited to promoting the goals of the deliberating agent. Unlike Dewey, Peirce thought that inquiry whose result is the fixing of belief ought to have goals that are distinct from the moral, political, economic, prudential, and aesthetic concerns that agents also have. Nonetheless, Peirce, like Dewey, thought of inquiry as seeking to realize some goal or solve some problem, and thought of the intelligent conduct of such goal-directed inquiry as analogous in this respect to practical thinking.

This common feature of pragmatism leaves many questions unsettled. In particular, what analogy between practical thinking and scientific inquiry is to be exploited? Sometimes practical thinking is concerned with the choice of one among a set of best available actions with respect to the goals of the agent and the agent’s beliefs. This is deliberate decision-making. Sometimes practical thinking is concerned with the choice of a rule or procedure for responding to external inputs rather than a choice of a course of action. This is routine decision-making.

When it comes to fixing belief, a similar distinction may be drawn between the deliberate fixing of belief and routine fixing of belief or fixing belief according to a routine. To what extent does inquiry into some specific question settle on an answer on the basis of a deliberate decision that identifies one potential answer as the best, all things considered – i.e., as the best answer relative to the goals of the inquiry, the potential answers that have been identified and the relevant information already available? And to what extent is the question not a matter of what the best answer is but what the best routine or program for obtaining answers?

The question is important for pragmatists to consider. Although William James (see James) explicitly adopted a decision theoretic framework for determining how momentous religious and moral issues are to be settled and Peirce sometimes flirted with such ideas in the context of scientific inquiry, for the most part the classical pragmatists spoke of methods or rules for fixing beliefs. The trouble here is that the term “rule” is too coarse-grained to get at the important question that needs addressing.
Deductive Rules and Fulfilling Commitments

Deductive logic, when applied to regulating the beliefs of agents, is expressed as a system of prescriptions or rules constraining the doxastic commitments of the state of belief of a given agent at a given time. Such rules are rules for modifying beliefs only insofar as they prescribe how an agent ought to change doxastic performances in order to fulfill current doxastic commitments. They are not rules for changing doxastic commitments or criteria for justifying changes in such commitments.

Thus, when X recognizes that X has failed to recognize that fully believing that \( g \) is the deductive consequences of X’s commitment to believe that \( h \), X should not give up \( h \) unless X is committed to fully believing that \( \neg g \) as well. To suggest otherwise is a pernicious use of formal logic. Of course, X may have an inconsistent set of commitments. That is one good reason for changing doxastic commitments. It is not the only one. However, there is no justification for abandoning commitments to full belief because one has failed to calculate the logical consequences of one’s commitments as one should.

When rules recommend how an inquirer should change his or her state of belief (in the sense of doxastic commitment) by adding new information, the pragmatists contrasted this change in belief with the first kind of change mentioned by taking the first kind of change to be “explicative” and the latter kind “ampliative,” thus following the lead of John Stuart Mill. In hindsight, appealing to such meaning theoretic notions seems like backsliding. We do better to replace talk of meaning with talk of commitments. Failure to fulfill commitments calls for therapy, training, and exhortation in order to improve performance. Explicative reasoning enables the inquirer to better fulfill his or her commitments, i.e., what the inquirer intends. The relation between this and our many tortured obsessions with linguistic meaning is at best tenuous.

Rules as Programs for Routine Expansion

But even if we set aside deductive rules and focus instead on rules for changing commitments, more distinctions need to be considered. This is where the contrast between routine expansion of a state of full belief and deliberate expansion becomes salient. This contrast might be approximated by the more familiar distinction between information obtained directly (i.e., without inference) and information (ampliatively) inferred from whatever is already taken for granted.

Peirce tended to think of information obtained directly – such as by observation – as a species of inference. I believe that this view is mistaken. In observation, an inquirer responds to external stimulation by expanding his or her belief state. The external stimulation is not a premise from which the inquirer infers the new beliefs. Such responses may conform or fail to conform to a rule or, as I prefer to say in this context, to a “program” for routine expansion. If implementation of the program has an acceptable chance of producing true and valuable information, the program is a good one. If the inquirer X on the particular occasion has implemented such a good program and as a result formed a new belief, the expansion of X’s belief state is legitimate. But the
expansion is not an inference. There are no premises from which a conclusion is infer-
red. There is instead a response to external stimuli in conformity with a given program.

X may have been programmed to a certain type of routine expansion by a combina-
tion of natural biological and cultural factors. As long as the reliability and informat-
iveness of the applications of the programs are not called into question, there is no
deliberation involved. However, the goodness of programs for routine expansion can
come into question and inquirers may then engage in deliberation concerning how
to improve them. The deliberation here concerns choosing improved programs for
routine expansion. This may involve learning how to correct for perceptual illusions,
using instruments as aids to observation, controlling the conditions under which
observations are made, and the like. The improvement of such programs may entail
considerable inquiry and the acquisition of considerable information in its own right.
But this inquiry is not itself a process of acquiring new information by implementing
the program for routine expansion that is being subjected to investigation.

Because the “goodness” of a program for routine expansion depends on a consid-
erable amount of background information, it is plausible to say that the process of ac-
quiring new beliefs by observation is “theory-laden” or “mediated” by such background
information. But the implementation of the program is not itself an inference whose
conclusion is the new belief that is acquired. The testimony of the senses is directly
acquired but it is not immediate. And the new beliefs are not deliberately chosen in
order to promote the goals of the inquiry but are acquired in conformity with a program
for routine expansion that may be acquired by nature and nurture or may involve a
deliberate effort to improve upon what nature and nurture can provide.

New information is obtained by routine expansion not only when inquirers make
observations but also when they consult experts or the testimony of witnesses. Peirce
and the students of the Neyman-Pearson-Wald school of statisticians proposed to use
programs for routine expansion also where the outputs were the estimates of statistical
parameters or the rejection of statistical hypotheses and where the inputs were
statistical data. Peirce took this to be paradigmatic of quantitative induction and called
it inference. But his own account did not allow that the statistical data could be part
of the “evidence” or “premises” on the basis of which a statistical hypothesis could
be inferred. If it were so used, on Peirce’s own accounting, the total evidence would
undermine the inference proposed. It was crucial to Peirce’s thinking that the statist-
cal data function as input and not as evidence. In this respect, statistical estimation
according to Peirce, Neyman, Pearson, and Wald is acquiring new beliefs directly from
the data (used as input) according to a program for routine expansion. Such estima-
tion should, therefore, be classified as belief acquisition in a category relevantly similar
to acquiring information via observation and testimony rather than as inference.
(Neyman denied that the process was inference; but he suggested that it was inductive
behavior suggesting misleadingly that it was not the acquisition of beliefs but acting in
other ways.) In this case, it is clear that a considerable body of background informa-
tion mediates the process.

Implementing a program for routine expansion where data is used as input may
require considerable calculation. The data need to be collected, and organized. They
need to be fed into some formula from which an estimate is derived. All of this calcu-
lation looks much like inference from the data as premises. But all of this calculation and
inquirers may require deliberation in order to calculate what the recommended response of the program is in a setting where he or she is already precommitted to adopting the recommendation whatever it may be. Following the rule here is fulfilling a commitment already adopted to change one’s doxastic commitment rather than a commitment to fulfill a doxastic commitment already endorsed.

Rules in Deliberate or Inferential Expansion

Deliberate expansion is strikingly different from this. The inquiring agent considers on the basis of the total evidence – i.e., his or her current belief state – which of rival potential answers to a question under investigation would best serve the goals of problem-solving in that setting. The total evidence includes not only the information available prior to obtaining testimony either from the senses or from witnesses, but that “data” as well is used as evidence and not as input. Whereas in routine expansion, the topic of deliberation is the modification or a program for routine expansion, in deliberate expansion it is the choice of a potential expansion.

Rules can be ingredient in deliberate expansion. The injunction to choose a potential answer that maximizes expected utility or that is E-admissible with respect to the goal of obtaining new, valuable error free information and to choose the weakest among optimal or E-admissible expansions if such exists is a rule. But it is a rule that captures common features of a category of decision problems where the inquirer engages in deliberate expansion choosing among potential answers the best, “all things considered.”

What Recommends Scientific Method over Other Methods of Fixing Belief?

It is clear that the question of the extent to which inquiry ought to be routine decision-making or deliberate decision-making should be of interest to pragmatists who recognize that spelling out common features of the conditions under which change in view is justified ought to be the central topic of epistemology.

Peirce and Dewey agreed that inquiry has other tasks besides selecting changes to be implemented in the inquirer’s belief state. An inquirer must identify potential answers to the question under investigation. Doing so is the task of abduction. Indeterminate situations are thereby converted into problematic situations. But selecting among the potential solutions to the question in a way that terminates the inquiry (at least for the time being) may still be done by deliberate choice or by deliberately implementing a program for routine expansion. Recall Peirce’s discussion of the methods of fixing belief. If one follows the method of tenacity, the method of authority or the method of a priori reason, there is always a risk of ending up with conflicting verdicts.

One of the salient ways routine expansion differs from deliberate expansion is that routine expansion, when properly implemented, can lead to importing beliefs that are in conflict with beliefs already present. Deliberate or inductive expansion properly made cannot lead to inconsistency.
The methods of tenacity, authority, and a priori reason seem to be understood by Peirce to be different ways of consulting oracles that have the conflict-injecting feature of routine expansion. But insofar as the methods of science are routines for expansion, they too are also conflict-injecting. As already noted, induction as conceived by Peirce is a species of routine expansion and should, therefore, be capable of yielding inconsistency. Peirce thought, however, that the other methods did not and could not provide for resolving these conflicts without resorting to other methods. He insisted, however, that scientific methods of inquiry are self-correcting. What did Peirce mean by this?

Let inquirer X begin with the information K asserting that 99 percent of the balls in an urn are black or 99 percent are white. There is no need to justify this claim. X does not doubt it and no inquiry is required. X is about to make an observation of the color of a ball drawn from the urn. In making an observation, X will follow a program, to which X is precommitted, of forming a belief about color in response to observing the color of that ball. X is also precommitted to forming another belief in response to the same sensory input according to a different program. The program provides the following instruction: Believe that the urn contains 99 percent black (white) balls in response to the selection of a black (white) ball. X may have adopted this program quite deliberately. Given X’s information about the statistical model, the statistical probability of X’s forming a true belief will be 0.99 whether the urn has 99 percent black or 99 percent white balls and even if X does not repeat the process ever again.

To be sure, X cannot legitimately infer with 0.99 probability that the urn is 99 percent black balls from the premise that the ball selected is black taken together with the background information. The chance of the color of the ball being representative of the contents of the urn is 0.99 on a random selection from the urn. The chance of the color of the ball being representative is 1 on a random selection that yields a black when the contents of the urn are 99 percent black and 0 otherwise. To obtain the 0.99 probability, X would have to begin with a prior probability of 0.5 for the hypothesis that the urn’s contents were 99 percent black and 0.5 for its rival. Neither Peirce, Neyman, nor Pearson would be prepared to do this. The upshot is that using the data (the observation that the ball selected is black) as evidence or as a premise would have been inconvenient. It is far better to avoid the information as new belief until the belief about the contents of the urn is formed.

Suppose, however, that after having observed a black ball and having endorsed the hypothesis that 99 percent of the balls in the urn are black, X observes a second ball. X now has not only full belief that the ball first selected is black but that the urn contains 99 percent black balls. He should expect a black ball on the second draw according to his highly reliable rule for predicting outcomes of sampling. Suppose, however, that X observes a white ball. Now X has contradictory beliefs about the second ball drawn: that it is black and that it is not black.

Scientific method in this excessively simplistic example leads to conflict, just as it does in any other kind of routine expansion. And if one has qualms about seeing confidence interval estimation as instantiating scientific method, consider that carefully designed experiments and observations do come into conflict with received theory. Scientific method, as Peirce acknowledged, is full of surprises. How can scientific method correct itself as Peirce maintained?
Peirce claimed it could. Having been surprised by the second draw, X should contract X’s state of full belief so as to entertain once more the possibility that the contents of the urn are 99 percent black and then run the same experiment again. X could be confident before doing this that the outcome of the process would be the formation of a true estimate of the contents of the urn. The scientific method would have corrected its own mistake.

Peirce’s answer here is too fast. The routine that produced the conflict is a program for routine expansion, for adding new beliefs to those already held. That such routine expansion can produce surprises is Peirce’s way of acknowledging that routine expansion can inject conflict or inconsistency into X’s state of full belief. The problem is to rationalize the way in which retreat from inconsistency by giving up some belief or other is carried out. Peirce seems to overlook one way this can be done. The inquirer might call into question the reliability of the program for routine expansion and thus preclude the use of the same program for routine expansion to be used in making corrections as was used previously. Can Peirce preclude this possibility?

To my knowledge, Peirce did not specify a way of retreating from inconsistency. He recognized the phenomenon of surprise and thought that it is obvious that such surprise would occasion a retreat. Granted that inconsistency is “epistemic hell,” as Peter Gärdenfors has called it, it remains unsettled how the inquirer should retreat. Should he give up the claim that the second ball selected is white? Should he give up some other conviction that belongs in the set such as that the first ball selected is black? Should he retreat from the assumption that the urn contains either 99 percent black or 99 percent white by admitting some other possibilities such as the proposition that 50 percent are black and 50 percent are white? This issue begins to look rather like a decision problem concerning how to contract that needs to be resolved deliberately. That is the way in which I originally presented the question of contraction.

Deliberation and Inconsistency

Erik Olsson and Kevin Kelly rightly complained that deliberation from an inconsistent point of view couldn’t be conducted coherently. Rather than give up on the notion that routine expansion can be conflict-injecting, I have proposed that all routine expansion should include a proviso for contracting from inconsistency that specifies what the options for contraction from inconsistency should be, how they should be evaluated and a contraction obtained. What follows is a summary of my response to Olsson (2003) in Levi (2003).

This proposal appears to be in difficulty, because the details of the program for routine expansion cannot be spelled out until the inquirer has expanded into inconsistency. On the view I have favored, the available strategies for contraction depend upon which beliefs prior to expansion are contradicted by the expansion into inconsistency.

There is no problem in coherently discussing how to evaluate these strategies from a point of view prior to expansion into inconsistency except for the fact that one cannot anticipate in advance which items will come into conflict via expansion into inconsistency. I do not think this poses a serious obstacle to my proposal. One can be precommitted to following a certain procedure for retreating from inconsistency.
including a procedure for identifying the options for contraction and their evaluation. Even if the identification of the options and their evaluation takes place in epistemic hell, the inquiring agent is precommitted to implementing a program for retreat from inconsistency. The details uncovered in the midst of epistemic hell are details of that program. The inquirer is entitled to consider them from the (presumably) consistent point of view when the inquirer adopted the precommitment strategy. Just as the implementation of programs for routine expansion can entail a considerable amount of calculation and deliberation designed to enable the fulfillment of the precommitment to adding new information, so too calculation and deliberation can be appropriate in attempting to fulfill the precommitment to retreat from epistemic hell.

If this view of retreat from epistemic hell is accepted, Peirce’s account of self-correction may appear to be in good shape. There is, however, a serious objection that needs to be considered. Sometimes, retreat from inconsistency recommends undermining the self-correcting features of the method being used. Thus, if the second ball drawn is white, retreating from inconsistency may recommend giving up the assumption that 90 percent of the balls in the urn are black or 90 percent are white. At least one additional possibility might be entertained – to wit, that blacks and whites fill the urn in equal proportion. If one repeats the old program, the chance of a correct answer is now the interval from 0.5 to 1. The self-correcting character of the method has surely been diminished. It then becomes necessary to look for new routines whose legitimacy may require deliberate expansion of the state of full belief.

This situation is even more severe in contexts where routine expansion is via observation or the testimony of witnesses. When such expansion leads to inconsistency and withdrawal therefrom, it can happen that the reliability of the program for routine expansion is challenged. So the observational practices cannot themselves be relied upon. They need to be revised. And the attempt at revision may require the deliberate modification of beliefs not only by contraction but by expansion as well.

The point of these remarks is to call into question the self-correcting character of scientific method if by “a method” Peirce means a program for routine expansion as he sometimes seems to suggest. Nor can it mean correction by some program for routine expansion where the reliability of the program is taken for granted. The inevitable need for modification of assessments of reliability will lead to the necessity for deliberative or inferential expansion.

The most plausible characterization of the self-correcting character of scientific method is not that it relies on routine expansion or even routine expansion from observational data, but that in science, full beliefs that serve as evidence in inquiry are themselves subject to modification, and that the canons of justification, whether routine or deliberate, provide for such modification. This is so even though, according to the pragmatist outlook, what are modified are full beliefs that serve as the inquirer’s standard for serious possibility and are therefore not to be subjected to questioning by “paper doubts.” Peirce’s fallibilism on this view is a fallibilism concerning future beliefs.

Of course, scientific method so conceived is bound to look better than appealing to authority exclusively. But by the same token, the scientific method so conceived should look better than the method of relying exclusively on the testimony of the senses. Scientific method is now conceived of as constituted by the background information, programs for routine expansion, and research programs that direct the demands for
information that inquirers currently endorse. This ever-changing body of methods is, indeed, self-correcting as compared to exclusive reliance on programs for routine expansion via consulting authorities or, for that matter, consulting only the testimony of the senses. But just as routine expansion via the testimony of the senses can on some occasions be a legitimate way of obtaining new information, so can the consultation with experts. The use of authorities judged to be reliable sources of information is surely vital to the success of scientific inquirers who must engage in a division of cognitive labor.

One final point should be made. I have argued that the self-correcting character of scientific inquiry requires an appeal to deliberate changes in view. But we cannot get along in inquiry without the consulting of oracles via routine expansion either. The reason is that inference, even ampliative inference, cannot yield the information we seek unless it is supplemented by the use of programs for routine expansion to acquire information from external sources.

For a pragmatist, therefore, there is no foundational status to be found in the testimony of the senses. We rely on the senses because of our interest to acquire new information that may not be available by inference alone. But by the same token, we need deliberate or routine or inductive expansion because routine expansion may not be in a position to provide the resources for correcting programs for routine expansion and their reliability.

Let us return to the question with which we began. I have adopted the position that I see as derived from the great American pragmatists that the fundamental problem of epistemology is to give an account of inquiry concerned with justifying changing beliefs. In keeping with pragmatism, I have insisted that such justification should show how the changes promote the goals of inquiry. Although the goals themselves should be autonomous cognitive goals, the structure of justification should be practical. For a pragmatist, there should be no difference between practical and theoretical rationality, although an important contrast may be made between practical and theoretical goals.

However, the analogy between practical and scientific reasoning ought not to be predicated on too narrow a conception of practical justification. We should not veer in the exclusive direction of those who emphasize the use of reliable programs for routine expansion. Nor should we insist exclusively on choosing among options in a way that maximizes expected utility. The analogy between practical deliberation and scientific reasoning must be broad enough to include both routine and deliberate decision-making.

This is, of course, a very modest conclusion. The devil, of course, is in the details.

References and further reading

The Existential Component of Realism

Realism has two indispensable and inseparable components: the one existential and ontological, the other cognitive and epistemic. The former maintains that there indeed is a real world: a realm of concrete, mind-independent, objective reality. The latter maintains that we can to some extent secure adequate descriptive information about this mind-independent realm, and that we can validate plausible claims about some of the specifics of its constitution. This second contention obviously presupposes the first, seeing that behind the question “Are our claims about an item correct?” there unavoidably stands the question “Is there indeed such an item for our claims to be about?” But how can that pivotal, ontological thesis of metaphysical realism be secured within a generally pragmatic approach? How can functional considerations of use and purpose come to have a relevant, let alone formative, bearing on theoretical matters of correctness, truth, and fact?

The answer lies in the consideration that metaphysical realism represents a commitment that we presuppose for our inquiries rather than discover as a result of them. For we do not, and cannot, discover as a result of (mind-managed!) inquiry and investigation that a totally mind-detached reality actually exists. This is clearly not an inductive inference issuing from the scientific systematization of our observations, but rather represents a regulative, thought-guiding presupposition that makes empirical inquiry possible in the first place. How could we possibly learn from observation that our mental experience is itself largely the causal product of the machinations of a mind-independent manifold? How could we learn that subjective experience has objective bearing because all those phenomenal appearances are causally rooted in an altogether mind-external physical realm whose reach and range outrun the confines of our experience?

What is ultimately at issue here is a practice-enabling presupposition that experience is indeed objective. That what we take to be evidence indeed is evidence, that our sensations yield information about an order of physical existence outside the experiential realm itself, and that this experience is not just merely phenomenal but represents the appearance of something extra-mental belonging to an objectively self-subsisting order. All this is something that we must always presuppose in using experiential data as
“evidence” for how things stand in the world. For if we did not presume from the very outset that our sensations somehow relate to an extra-mental reality so as to be able to evidentiﬁate claims about its nature, then we could clearly make no use of them to draw any inference whatever about “the real world.”

Commitment to a mind-independent reality is, all too clearly, a precondition for empirical inquiry rather than a consequence of it – a presupposition we have to make to be able to use observational data as sources of objective information. We really have no alternative but to presume or postulate it. Objectivity represents a postulation made on functional (rather than evidential) grounds: we endorse it in order to be in a position to learn by experience. What is at issue here is not so much a product of our experience of reality as a factor that makes it possible to view our experience as being “of reality” at all. As Kant clearly saw, objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is an available given from the outset rather than the product of experience; this is an ex post facto discovery about the nature of things. Kant held that we cannot experientially learn through perception about the objective reality of outer things, because we can only recognize our perceptions as perceptions (i.e., representations of outer things) if these outer things are supposed as such from the first (rather than being learned or inferred from representations). As he summarizes the matter in the “Refutation of Idealism”: “Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we can only infer outer things – and this, moreover, only in an untrustworthy manner. . . . But in the above proof it has been shown that outer experience is really immediate” (Critique of Pure Reason, B276). Here “is really immediate” should be construed as: “must be accepted non-inferentially from the very outset, because inference could not accomplish what is needed to arrive at those outer things.”

Our endorsement of the reality of observation-engendering causes in nature, which as causes of experience in the order of being also do double duty as inferences therefrom in the order of learning, is not based on empirical investigation but on general principles of a procedural character. What we learn from science (see Scientiﬁc Realism, Anti-realism, and Empiricism) is not and cannot be that an inherently unobservable sub-observable order of physical causality undergirds nature as we observe it, but rather what – with their reality taken as given – these underlying and preliminarily presumed agencies must speciﬁcally be like. Science does not (cannot) teach us that the observable order emerges from underlying unobserved causes and that the phenomena of observation are signs betokening this extra- and sub-phenomenal order of existence. This is something that we must presume from the outset of any world in which observation as we understand it can transpire. What science does teach us (and metaphysics cannot) is what can plausibly be taken to be the descriptive character of this phenomena-engendering order once its existence is taken for granted. For once an objective reality and its concomitant causal operation has been postulated, then principles of inductive systematization, of explanatory economy, and of common-cause consilience can work wonders in exploiting the phenomena of experience to provide the basis for plausible claims about the nature of the real. But we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start. Without that natural commitment to a reality serving as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the
interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world-order that we share in common. Only by way of a facilitating presupposition (albeit that is ultimately retrovalidated through its applicative utility and efficacy) can we ever hope to establish that our observational experience (unlike our dream experience) is ever evidence for anything objectively mind-external, that is, is ever able to provide information about a “real world.”

Accordingly, that second, descriptive (evidential) component of realism stands on a very different footing from its first, existential (presuppositional) component. For reality’s nature is something about which we can only make warranted claims through actually examining it. Substantive information must come through inquiry, through evidential validation. Once we are willing to credit our observational data with objectivity, with reality-orientation and thus with evidential bearing, then we can, of course, make use of them to inform ourselves as to the nature of the real. But the objective bearing of observational experience is not something that we can pre-establish; it is something we must presuppose in the interest of honoring Charles S. Peirce’s (see Peirce) pivotal injunction never to block the path of inquiry. And the functional nature of this practice-enabling presupposition means that the validation process at work must, at this fundamental level, be altogether pragmatic. It represents a step we take prospectively in order to put ourselves into a position to satisfy our goals.

Realism in its Regulative/Pragmatic Aspect

The preceding deliberations point clearly in the direction of a pragmatic justification for a realistic stance toward our experience as intentionally indicative of something beyond itself. The commitment to realism is the possibilizing instrumentality for a certain practical modus operandi. Accordingly, we have good reason – good pragmatic reason – for standardly operating on the basis of the “presumption of objectivity” reflected in the guiding precept: “Unless you have good reason to think otherwise (that is, as long as nothing impedes: nihil obstat), treat the materials of inquiry and communication as veridical, as representing the nature of the real.” The ideal of objective reality is the focus of a family of convenient regulative principles and is a functionally useful instrumentality that enables us to transact our cognitive business in the most satisfactory and effective way. And so, bearing this pragmatic perspective in mind, let us consider this issue of utility and ask: What can this postulation of a mind-independent reality actually do for us?

The answer is straightforward. The assumption of a mind-independent reality is essential to the whole of our standard conceptual scheme relating to inquiry and communication. Without it, both the actual conduct and the rational legitimation of our communicative and investigative (evidential) practice would be destroyed. To be evidentially meaningful, experience has to be experience of something. And nothing that we do in this cognitive domain would make sense if we did not subscribe to the conception of a mind-independent reality. And since this is not a learned fact, then it is (and must be!) an assumption whose prime recommendation is its utility.

To begin with, we indispensably require the notion of reality to operate the classical concept of truth as “agreement with reality” (adaequatio ad rem). Once we
abandon the concept of reality, the idea that in accepting a factual claim as true we become committed to how matters actually stand – “how it really is” – would also go by the board. The very semantics of our discourse constrains a commitment to realism; we have no alternative but to regard as real those states of affairs that are affirmed by the contentions we are prepared to accept. Once we put a contention forward by way of serious assertion, we must view as real the states of affairs it purports, and must see its claims as facts. We need the notion of reality to operate the conception of truth. A factual statement on the order of “There are pi mesons” is true if and only if the world is such that pi mesons exist within it. By virtue of their very nature as truths, true statements must state facts: they state what really is so, which is exactly what it is to “characterize reality.” The conception of truth and of reality come together in this notion of _adequatio ad rem_, the venerable principle that to speak truly is to say how matters stand in reality, in that things actually are as we have said them to be.

In the second place, the nihilistic denial that there is such a thing as an objectively mind-independent realm would destroy once and for all the crucial Parmenidean divide between appearance and reality. And this would exact a fearful price from us, since we would then be reduced to talking only of what we (I, you, many of us) think to be so. The crucial contrast notion of the real truth would no longer be available: we would only be able to contrast our putative truths with those of others, but could no longer operate the classical distinction between the putative and the actual, between what people merely think to be so and what actually is so. We could not take the stance that, as the Aristotelian commentator Themistius put it, “that which exists does not conform to various opinions, but rather the correct opinions conform to that which exists” (Maimonides 1904, I, 71, 96a).

The third point relates to the issue of cognitive coordination. Communication and inquiry, as we actually carry them on, are predicated on the fundamental idea of a real world of objective things, existing and functioning “in themselves.” without specific dependence on us and so equally accessible to others. Intersubjectively valid communication can only be based on common access to an objective order of things. All our ventures at communication and communal inquiry are predicated on the stance that we communally inhabit a shared world of things. They presuppose there is a realm of “real objects” amongst which we live and into which we inquire as a community, but about which we ourselves as individuals presumably have only imperfect information that can be criticized and augmented by the efforts of others.

This points to a fourth important consideration. Only through reference to the real world as a common object and shared focus of our diverse and imperfect epistemic strivings are we able to effect communicative contact with one another. Inquiry and communication alike are geared to the conception of an objective world: a communally shared realm of things that exist strictly “on their own” within which and, more importantly, with reference to which inquiry proceeds. We could not proceed on the basis of the notion that inquiry estimates the character of the real if we were not prepared to presume or postulate from the very outset a reality for these estimates to be estimates of. It would clearly be pointless to devise our characterizations of reality if we did not stand committed from the outset to the proposition that there is a reality to be characterized.
The fifth consideration is that the very idea of inquiry as we conceive it would have to be abandoned if the conceptions of “actual reality” and “the real truth” were no longer available to serve their crucial contrasting roles. We could no longer assert: “What we have there is good enough as far as it goes, but it is presumably not ‘the whole real truth’ of the matter.” Without the conception of reality we could not think of our knowledge in the fallibilistic mode we actually use, as having provisional, tentative, improvable features that constitute a crucial part of the conceptual scheme within whose orbit we operate our concept of inquiry. For our commitment to the mind-independent reality of “the real world” stands together with our acknowledgment that, in principle, any or all of our present scientific ideas as to how things work in the world, at any present, may well prove to be untenable. The information that we may have about a thing, be it real or presumptive information, is always just that: information we lay claim to. We recognize that it varies from person to person. Our attempts at communication and inquiry are thus undergirded by the stance that we communally inhabit a shared world of objectively existing things, a world of “real things” amongst which we live and into which we inquire (but about which we do and must assume that we have only imperfect information at any and every particular stage of the cognitive venture). Our conviction in a reality that lies beyond our imperfect understanding of it (in all the various senses of “lying beyond”) roots in our sense of the imperfections of our scientific world-picture, its tentativity and potential fallibility. In abandoning our commitment to a mind-independent reality, we would lose the indispensably objective impetus of inquiry.

After all, reality (on the traditional metaphysicians’ construction of the concept) is the condition of things answering to “the real truth”; it is the realm of what really is as it really is. The pivotal contrast is between “mere appearance” and “reality as such,” between “our picture of reality” and “reality itself,” between what actually is and what we merely think (believe, suppose, etc.) to be. Our allegiance to the conception of reality, and to the appearance/reality contrast that pivots upon it, roots in the fallibilistic recognition that, at the level of the detailed specifics of scientific theory, anything we presently hold to be the case can possibly turn out otherwise, and indeed, certainly will do so if past experience gives any auguries for the future.

Sixthly and finally, we need the conception of reality in order to operate the causal model of empirical inquiry regarding the real world. Our standard picture of man’s place in the scheme of things is predicated on the fundamental idea that there is a real world (however imperfectly our inquiry may characterize it) whose causal operations produce inter alia causal impacts upon us, providing the basis of our world-picture. Reality is viewed as the causal source and basis of the appearances, the originator and determiner of the phenomena of our cognitively relevant experience. “The real world” is seen as causally operative both in serving as the external molder of thought and as constituting the ultimate arbiter of the adequacy of our theorizing.

In summary, the postulate of an objective order of mind-independent reality is needed for at least six important reasons.

1. To preserve the distinction between true and false with respect to factual matters and to operate the idea of truth as agreement with reality.
To preserve the distinction between appearance and reality, between our picture of reality and reality itself.

To serve as a basis for inter-subjective communication.

To furnish the basis for a shared project of communal inquiry.

To provide for the fallibilistic view of human knowledge.

To sustain the causal mode of learning and inquiry and to serve as basis for the objectivity of experience.

Above all, it is crucial for realism that the idea of mind-independent reality is functionally pivotal in matters of communication. Subscription to an objective reality is indispensably demanded by any step into the domain of the publicly accessible objects essential to communal inquiry and interpersonal communication about a shared world.

We could not establish communicative contact about a common objective item of discussion if our discourse were geared to our own idiosyncratic experiences and these conceptions bound up with them. But the objectivity at issue in our communicative discourse is a matter of its very status as putatively communicative, rather than somehow depending upon its specific content. For the substantive content of a claim about the world in no way tells us whether it is factual or fictional. This is something that we have to determine from its context, which means, in effect, that in general it is provided for by a pre-established conventionalized intention to talk about “the real world.” This intention to take real objects to be at issue, objects as they actually are, our potentially idiosyncratic conceptions of them quite aside, is fundamental because it is overriding; that is, it overrides all of our other intentions when we enter upon the communicative venture. Without this conventionalized intention we should not be able to convey information or misinformation to one another about a shared “objective” world that underlies and connects those variable experiences of ours.

If it were not reality as it actually is that we are concerned to discuss, but merely “reality-as-I-conceive-it-to-be,” then we could not really manage to agree or disagree with one another. Indeed, we then just could not communicate successfully in the informative mode. We are able to say something about the (real) moon or the (real) Sphinx because of our submission to a fundamental communicative convention or “social contract” to the effect that we intend (“mean”) to talk about the very thing itself as it “really” is, our own personal conception of it notwithstanding. We adopt the standard policy in communicative discourse of letting the communally established language, rather than whatever specific informative notions and conceptions we may actually “have in mind” on particular occasions, be the decisive factor with regard to the things at issue in our discussions. When I speak about the Sphinx (even though I do so on the basis of my own conceivably strange conception of what is involved here), I will be discussing “the real Sphinx” in virtue of the basic conventionalized intention governing our use of referring terms within the wider community.

Any effective venture in communication must be predicated on the fundamental intention to deal with the objective order of this “real world.” What is at stake here is thus ultimately a principle of practice; though, to be sure, it is thought-practice that is at issue. Accordingly, the justification for this fundamental presupposition of objectivity is not evidential at all; postulates as such are not based on evidence. Rather, it is
practical and instrumentalistic: pragmatic, in short. It is procedural or functional efficacy that is the crux. The justification of this postulate lies in its utility: we need it to operate our conceptual scheme. We could not form our existing conceptions of truth, fact, inquiry, and communication without presupposing the independent reality of an external world. In its absence, we simply could not think of experience and inquiry as we actually do. (What we have here is a “transcendental argument” of sorts, namely one that proceeds from the character of our conceptual scheme to the unavoidability of accepting its inherent presuppositions.)

Any and all pretensions to the primacy and predominance, let alone the definitive correctness, of our own conceptions regarding the realm of the real must be set aside in the context of communication. In communication regarding things, we must be able to exchange information about them with our contemporaries and to transmit information about them to our successors. And we must be in a position to do this against the background of the recognition that their conceptions of things may not only be radically different from ours, but conceivably also rightly different. Thus, it is a crucial precondition of the possibility of successful communication about things that we must avoid laying any claim either to the completeness or even to the ultimate correctness of our own conception of any of the things at issue. This renders critically important that (and understandable why) conceptions are not pivotal for communicative purposes. Our discourse reflects our conceptions and perhaps conveys them, but it is not substantively about them. We thus deliberately abstain from any claim that our own conception is definitive if we are to engage successfully in discourse. We deliberately put the whole matter of conceptions aside, abstracting from the question of the agreement of my conception with yours, and all the more from the issue of which one of us has the right conception. This sort of epistemic humility is the price we pay for keeping the channels of communication open.

But why embark upon the objectivity-presupposing projects of inquiry and communication at all? Why not settle back in comfortable abstention from this whole complex business? The answer is straightforward. The impetus to inquiry for knowledge-acquisition reflects the most practical of imperatives. Our need for intellectual accommodation in this world is no less pressing and no less practical than our need for physical accommodation. But in both cases, we do not want just some house or other, but one that is well built, that will not be blown down by the first wind to sweep along. Skeptics from antiquity onward have always said, “Forget about those abstruse theoretical issues; focus on your practical needs.” They overlook the crucial fact that an intellectual accommodation to the world is itself one of our deepest practical needs: that in a position of ignorance or cognitive dissonance, we cannot function satisfactorily. After all, the project of cognitive development is not optional, at any rate not for us humans. Its rationale lies in the most practical and prudent of considerations, since it is only by traveling the path of inquiry that we can arrive at the sorts of good reasons capable of meeting the demands of a “rational animal.” Man has evolved within nature into the ecological niche of an intelligent being. In consequence, the need for understanding, for “knowing one’s way about,” is one of the most fundamental demands of the human condition. The practical benefits of knowledge, on the other hand, relate to its role in guiding the processes by which we satisfy our (non-cognitive) needs and wants. The satisfaction of our needs for food, shelter, protection against the elements,
and security against natural and human hazards all require information. Satisfaction of mere desiderata comes into it as well. We can, do, and must put knowledge to work to facilitate the attainment of our goals, guiding our actions and activities in this world into productive and rewarding lines. This is where the practical pay-off of the information we secure through inquiry and communication comes into play. Here again, pragmatic considerations are paramount.

Our commitment to the mind-independent reality of “the real world” stands alongside our fallibilistic acknowledgment that in principle any or all of our present scientific ideas as to how things work in the world, at any present, may well prove to be untenable. Our conviction of a reality that lies beyond our imperfect understanding of it (in all the various senses of “lying beyond”) roots in our sense of the imperfections of our scientific world-picture, of its tentativity and potential fallibility. In abandoning this commitment to a mind-independent reality, we would lose the impetus of inquiry. And yet realism’s epistemic status is not that of an empirical discovery, but that of a presupposition whose ultimate justification is a transcendental argument from the very possibility of the projects of communication and inquiry as we standardly conduct them.

The presuppositional conception of a mind-independent reality accordingly plays a central and indispensable role in our thought about matters of cognition. It is the epistemological object of veridical cognition, in the context of the contrast between “the real” and its “merely phenomenal” appearances. Moreover, it is the target of telos of the truth-estimation process at issue in inquiry, providing for a common focus in communication and communal inquiry. (The “real world” thus constitutes the object of our cognitive endeavors in both senses of this term – the objective at which they are directed and the purpose for which they are exerted.) And, further, reality is also to be seen as the ontological source of cognitive endeavors, affording the existential matrix in which we live and move and have our being, and whose impact upon us is the prime mover for our cognitive efforts. All of these facets of the concept of reality are integrated and unified in the classical doctrine of truth as it corresponds to fact (adaequatio ad rem), a doctrine that not merely invites but indeed requires a commitment to mind-independent reality as constituting at once the framework and the object of our cognitive endeavors in science. Their ultimate ratification lies in their role as indispensable presuppositions for our unavoidable practices.

The Role of Presumption

That our experience relates to the lineaments of an objective thought-independent order of things is not something that we learn: it is something we presume from the outset. With presumption we take to be so what we could not otherwise derive. This idea of such presumptive “taking” is a crucial aspect of our language-deploying discursive practice. For presumptively justified beliefs are the raw materials of cognition. They represent contentions that, in the absence of pre-established counter-indications, are acceptable to us “until further notice,” thus permitting us to make a start in the venture of cognitive justification without the benefit of prejudiced materials. They are defeasible alright, vulnerable to being overturned, but only by something else yet more secure, some other pre-established conflicting consideration. Presumptively justified
Beliefs are entitled to remain in place until displaced by something better. Accordingly, their impetus averts the dire consequences that would ensue if any and every cogent process of rational deliberation required inputs which themselves had to be authenticated by a prior process of rational deliberation, in which case the whole process could never get under way.

Yet indispensability apart, what is it that justifies making presumptions, seeing that they are not established truths? The answer lies substantially in procedurally practical considerations. Presumptions arise in contexts where we have questions and need answers. It is a matter of \textit{faute de mieux}, of this or nothing (or at any rate nothing better). Presumption is a thought instrumentality that so functions as to make it possible for us to do the best we can in circumstances where something must be done. And so presumption affords yet another instance where practical considerations play a leading role on the stage of our cognitive and communicative practice. Presumption is, in the end, a practical device whose rationale of validation lies on the order of pragmatic considerations.

The obvious and evident advantage of presumption as an epistemic recourse is that it enables us vastly to extend the range of questions we are able to answer. It affords an instrument that enables us to extract a maximum of information from communicative situations. Presumption, in sum, is an ultimately pragmatic resource. To be sure, its evident disadvantage is that the answers that we obtain by its means are given not in the clarion tones of knowledge and assertion but in the more hesitant and uncertain tones of presumption and probability. We thus do not get the advantages of presumption without an accompanying negativity. Here, as elsewhere, we cannot have our cake and eat it too.

We proceed in cognitive contexts in much the same manner in which banks proceed in financial contexts. We extend credit to others, doing so at first to a relatively modest extent. When and as they comport themselves in a way that indicates that this credit was warranted, then we extend more. By responding to trust in a “responsible” way – proceeding to amortize the credit one already has – one can increase one’s credit rating in cognitive as much as in financial contexts.

In trusting the senses, in relying on other people, \textit{and even in being rational}, we always run a risk. Whenever in life we place our faith in something, we run a risk of being let down and disappointed. Nevertheless, it seems perfectly reasonable to bet on the general trustworthiness of the senses, the general reliability of our fellow men, and the general utility of reason. In such matters, no absolute guarantees can be had. But, one may as well venture, for, if venturing fails, the cause is lost anyhow, as we have no more promising alternative to turn to. There is little choice about the matter: it is a case of “this or nothing.” If we want answers to factual questions, we have no real alternative but to trust in the cognitively cooperative disposition of the natural order of things. We cannot pre-establish the appropriateness of this trust by somehow demonstrating, in advance of events, that it is actually warranted. Rather, its rationale is that without it we remove the basis on which alone creatures such as ourselves can confidently live a life of effective thought and action. In such cases, pragmatic rationality urges us to gamble on trust in reason, not because it cannot fail us, but because in so doing little is to be lost and much to be gained. A general policy of judicious trust is eminently cost-effective in yielding useful results in matters of cognition.
The Role of Retrovalidation

Of course, further difficulties yet remain. Pragmatic utility is all very good but what of validity? What sorts of considerations validate our particular presumptions as such? How is it that they become entitled to this epistemic status? The crux of the answer has already been foreshadowed. A twofold process is involved. Initially, it is a matter of the generic need for answers to our questions: of being so circumstanced that if we are willing to presume we are able to get . . . anything. But ultimately we go beyond such this-or-nothing consideration, and the validity of a presumption emerges ex post facto through the utility (both cognitive and practical) of the results it yields. We advance from “this or nothing” to “This or nothing that is determinably better.” Legitimation is thus available, albeit only through experiential retrovalidation, retrospective validation in the light of eventual experience. It is a matter of learning that a certain issue is more effective in meeting the needs of the situation than its available alternatives. Initially, we look to promise and potential, but in the end it is applicative efficacy that counts.

The fact is that our cognitive practices have a fundamentally economic rationale. They are all cost-effective within the setting of the project of inquiry to which we stand committed (by our place in the world’s scheme of things). Presumptions are the instrument through which we achieve a favorable balance of trade in the complex trade-offs between ignorance of fact and mistake of belief and between unknowing and error.

The starting point of our justificatory reasoning was a basic project-facilitating postulation. Yet this does not tell the whole story. For there is also the no less important fact that this postulation obtains a vindicating retrojustification because the farther we proceed on this basis, the more its obvious appropriateness comes to light. With the wisdom of hindsight we come to see with increasing clarity that the project that these presuppositions render possible is an eminently successful one. The pragmatic turn does crucially important work here in putting at our disposal a style of justificatory argumentation that manages to be cyclical without vitiating circularity. What is at issue is a matter of unavoidable presumptions whose specific mode of implementation is ultimately retrovalidated in the light of experience.

We want and need objective information about “the real world.” This, of course, is not to be had directly without the epistemic mediation of experience. And so we treat certain data as evidence; we extend “evidential credit” to them, as it were. Through trial and error we learn that some of them do indeed deserve it, and then we proceed to extend to them greater weight. We “increase their credit limit,” as it were, and rely on them more extensively. And, of course, to use those data as evidence is to build up a picture of the world, a picture which shows, with the “wisdom of hindsight,” how appropriate it was for us to use those evidential data in the first place.

We accordingly arrive at the overall situation of dual “retrojustification.” All the presuppositions of inquiry are ultimately justified because a “wisdom of hindsight” enables us to see that by their means we have been able to achieve both practical success and a theoretical understanding of our place in the world’s scheme of things. Here, successful practical implementation is needed as an extra-theoretical quality-control monitor of our theorizing. And the capacity of our scientifically devised view of the world to underwrite an explanation of how it is that a creature constituted as we
are, operating by the means of inquiry that we employ, and operating within an environment such as ours, can ultimately devise a relatively accurate view of the world is also critical for the validation of our knowledge (see Rescher 1977). The closing of these inquiry-geared loops validates, retrospectively, those realistic presuppositions or postulations that made the whole process of inquiry possible in the first place. Realism thus emerges as a presupposition-affording postulate for inquiry. Realism is a postulation whose ultimate legitimation eventuates retrospectively through the results, both practical and cognitive, which the process of inquiry based on those yet-to-be-justified presuppositions is able to achieve. In sum, while our presumptions possibilize science in the first place, in the end its successor retrojustifies them.

Retrospect

Let us review the overall line of deliberation. Metaphysical realism, the doctrine that there is a mind-independent reality and that our experience can provide us with a firm cognitive grip upon it, does not represent a learned fact but a presuppositional postulate. As such, it has a complex justification that unfolds in two phases.

The first, initial phase is prospective, proceeding with a view to the functional necessity of taking this position – its purpose-dictated inevitability. For this step alone renders possible a whole range of activities relating to inquiry and to communication that is of the highest utility for us, and indeed is a practical necessity. In possibilizing a host of purpose-mandated activities – that is, bringing them within the range of the feasible – the postulate of metaphysical realism obtains its initial justification in the practical order of reasoning. (In English, we have no one-word verb “to make possible” akin to the German ermoeglichen, apart from the obsolete possibilitate, nowadays known only to readers of the OED. To adopt “possibilize” for this purpose would perhaps be sensible and certainly convenient.)

However, such an initial functional justification of metaphysical realism is good but not good enough. And so, a second phase of justification goes further, indispensably albeit only retrospectively. It proceeds by noting that when (which is to say after) we actually engage in the goal-directed practice that the postulate in question possibilizes, our applicative and explanatory efforts are, in fact, attended by success. Making the initial postulate has an immense pragmatic pay-off, since what is involved is not just pragmatic utility but pragmatic efficacy. This issue of actual efficacy is ultimately crucial for the justification of the practical postulate at issue.

In this way, then, the overall strategy of validation has two phases: the one preliminary and prospective, the other substantive and retrospective. That we must take on a commitment to realism is presupposed for the conduct of inquiry as we understand it. However, that we fare well through proceeding in this way in matters of communication and inquiry is something that has the status of an ex post facto discovery. Insofar as actual evidentiation is asked for, we have all that we can reasonably hope to obtain, given the inevitable realities of the situation we confront in this domain.

In seeking the most plausible rationale for realism, we enter the region of pragmatic presuppositions retrojustified through their applicative and implementational efficacy. The utility of the conception of reality is so great and the service it renders so
important that if it were not already there we would have to invent it. But the pragmatic success that ensues systematically when we put this conception to work goes to show that in doing so we have not proceeded capriciously.

Now insofar as realism stands on this pragmatic basis, it does not rest on considerations of independent substantiating evidence about how things actually stand in the world, but rather it is established by considering, as a matter of practical reasoning, how we do (and must) think about the world within the context of the projects to which we stand committed. Such a position sees this commitment to a mind-independent reality in an essentially utilitarian role, as a functional requisite for our intellectual resources (specifically for our conceptual scheme in relation to communication and inquiry). Thanks to its enmeshment in consideration of aims and purposes, it is clear that this sort of commitment to an objectivistic realism harks back to the salient contention of classical idealism that values and purposes play a pivotal role in our understanding of the nature of things. Seeing that a pragmatic line of approach pivots the issue on what is useful for us and productive for us in the context of our evaluatively legitimated aims and purposes, we return to the characteristic theme of idealism: the active role of the knower not only in the constituting but also in the constitution of what is known.

To be sure, this sort of idealism is not substantive but methodological. It is not a denial of real objects that exist independently of mind and as such are causally responsible for our objective experience. Quite the reverse: it is designed to facilitate their acceptance. But it insists that the justificatory rationale for this acceptance lies in a framework of mind-supplied purpose. For our mind-independent reality arises not from experience, but for it; that is, for the sake of our being in a position to exploit our experience to ground inquiry and communication with respect to the objectively real.

Accordingly, what we have here is an object-level realism that rests on a presuppositional idealism at the justificatory infralevel. We arrive at a realism that is founded, initially at least, on a fundamentally idealistic basis. In sum, paradoxical though it may seem, we obtain a realism the tenor of whose justifying basis is thoroughly idealistic.

References and further reading

Pragmatism’s Reputed Place in the Empiricist Tradition

Pragmatism is often identified with instrumentalism in the philosophy of science – sometimes also called empiricism, constructive empiricism, or anti-realism. The instrumentalist argues that scientific theories do not refer to existing entities in the world, but rather, are mere instruments for prediction and control – for helping us get on in the world. Our theories aim not at being literally true, but rather, at being useful, at saving the phenomena, or at being empirically adequate. On the opposing realist view, our theories refer to existing objects in the belief-independent world and science aims to give us a literally true story about that world. Truth is independent of us, but presumably, a literally true account of the world would be useful, would save the phenomena, or would be empirically adequate.

It is easy to see why pragmatism has been aligned with instrumentalism. The central insight of pragmatism, the pragmatic maxim, says that our concepts, beliefs, and theories must be linked to experience and practice. When William James (see James) brings this maxim to bear on the concept of truth, he arrives at the infamous conclusion that truth is what works for us. He argued in “What Pragmatism Means” that “no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but any one of them may from some point of view be useful” (Writings, p. 381). “Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is... true instrumentally” (Writings, p. 382). Indeed, James at times is a kind of ur-instrumentalist, in that he takes us to aim at arriving at all kinds of instruments – instruments to help us account for and predict the course of experience, instruments to help us feel more comfortable, etc. In its crudest manifestation, whatever is good for us to believe, whatever we will or want to believe, is true instrumentally. He rather infamously says: “If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much” (Writings, p. 387).

There is controversy amongst James scholars over whether he really did hold such a liberal instrumentalism. In his more careful moods, he seems to adopt something very similar to Charles Peirce’s (see Peirce) view of these matters. And we shall see
that, despite the surface similarities, Peirce’s account of truth cannot be neatly thought of as instrumentalist.

Peirce also brought the pragmatic maxim to bear on the concept of truth and he too argued that truth is what is best to believe. But it is very clear that what he means by this is that truth is what would be indefeasible or what would best stand up to evidence and argument. If Peirce is an instrumentalist, he is not the liberal instrumentalist that James at times appears to be.

The roots of instrumentalism are found in the British empiricists Berkeley and Hume and, more straightforwardly, in the logical empiricism of the mid-1900s. The logical empiricists’ verifiability principle decreed that a belief that is not empirically verifiable is not meaningful and hence is not a candidate for a truth-value: at best, it is an instrument for prediction and control. The only statements that can aim at truth are the observation statements of the physical sciences and of what is seen, heard, or felt here and now. Statements about unobservable entities, about what is right and wrong, about general laws, etc. are not such that they aim at truth. There were plenty of problems with this position (see Misak 1995) and contemporary instrumentalists distance themselves from many of the contentious claims, such as the claim about meaningfulness.

One of the leading logical empiricists, A. J. Ayer, thought that Peirce and James were fellow travelers. He said that Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim is indeed identical . . . with the physicalist interpretation of the verifiability principle” (1968, p. 45). That maxim has it that our beliefs must be connected to experience and certain of Peirce’s statements of the maxim do sound very much like the verifiability principle. He says that the pragmatic maxim serves as a standard for identifying metaphysical “gibberish” or “rubbish” (CP 8.191) and that knowing the meaning of an expression is knowing its “effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses.” And Peirce credits Berkeley’s arguments that all meaningful language be matched with sensory experience with being the precursor of pragmatism: “Berkeley on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism into philosophy than any other one man, though I was more explicit in enunciating it” (1903 letter to James, quoted in Perry 1935, p. 425).

But we shall see that Peirce does not so snugly fit into the instrumentalist camp. We shall see that it turns out that most instrumentalists in the philosophy of science are not instrumentalists all the way down, as they are realists about a core set of beliefs. Peirce, on the other hand, takes the same stance toward all our beliefs. The question might then arise as to whether Peirce is a more thoroughgoing instrumentalist than those found in the philosophy of science. He thought, after all, that theories are to be evaluated in terms of what the realist calls “pragmatic,” as opposed to “truth-conducive,” criteria. Theories, on Peirce’s view, are to be evaluated in terms of whether they are good explanations of the evidence, whether they account for the data, are simple, elegant, fruitful for further research, etc. These are the kinds of virtue that make a theory useful, but the realist argues that they are not necessarily the kinds of virtue that make a theory true. They are not the kinds of virtue that are linked to whether the theory gets right the believer-independent world. For a theory could have all of the pragmatic virtues and yet, the realist insists, fail to get the believer-independent world right.
But we shall see that this is not the best way to describe Peirce. For his position undercuts the categories of instrumentalism, realism, and anti-realism. It is a distinctively pragmatic position, which illuminates an interesting way forward for empiricism.

Peirce’s Naturalist Account of Truth

Peirce held that a true belief is a belief we would come to, were we to inquire as far as we could on a matter. A true belief is a belief which could not be improved upon, a belief which would forever meet the challenges of reasons, argument, and evidence. We have in our various inquiries and deliberations a multiplicity of local aims: empirical adequacy, coherence with other beliefs, simplicity, explanatory power, getting a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness for other research, greater understanding, and the like. When we say that we aim at the truth, what we mean is that, were a belief really to satisfy all of our local aims in inquiry, then that belief would be true. There is nothing over and above the fulfillment of those aims, nothing metaphysical such as “getting the mind-independent world right,” to which we aspire. As Peirce famously said:

You only puzzle yourself by talking of this metaphysical “truth” and metaphysical “falsity” that you know nothing about. All you have any dealings with are your doubts and beliefs. . . . If your terms “truth” and “falsity” are taken in such senses as to be definable in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience . . . well and good: in that case, you are only talking about doubt and belief. But if by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know nothing, and which Ockham’s razor would clean shave off. (CP 5.416)

It is in statements like these that Peirce is taken for an instrumentalist, arguing that the pragmatic virtues (simplicity, explanatory power, etc.), and not truth-conducive virtues, are relevant to theory choice. But the generality of Peirce’s thoughts about truth and the aim of inquiry distinguish him from his instrumentalist sympathizers.

Both the logical empiricists and the constructive empiricists are very clear that instrumentalism holds only for beliefs which go beyond the observable. Let us look at Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, as it is the contemporary standard-bearer of the instrumentalist position. What follows holds just as well for logical empiricism, but since no one these days is a logical empiricist, constructive empiricism is the instrumentalist position of most interest.

In The Scientific Image (1980), van Fraassen attacks realism about theoretical entities in science. The realist thinks that science aims to give us a literally true story about what the world is like and that when one accepts a scientific theory, one believes it to be true in this literal sense. The constructive empiricist, on the other hand, holds that science merely aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate and that acceptance of a theory involves only the belief that the theory saves or preserves the phenomena, not the belief that it is literally true. This empiricism is “constructive”
because “scientific activity is one of construction rather than of discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to the phenomena, and not discovery of truth concerning the unobservable” (van Fraassen 1980, p. 5).

But van Fraassen holds that we should take “literal” truth to be our aim in inquiry regarding observable entities. That is, he is a realist about observable entities and thinks that we should accept our beliefs about them as literally true. He sees a problem for realism only with respect to unobservable entities and our beliefs about them (ibid., pp. 202–3). Indeed, this is the defining characteristic of empiricism: “To be an empiricist is to withhold belief in anything that goes beyond the actual observable phenomena. . . . To develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as involving a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is actual and observable” (ibid., p. 202).

Universal generalizations, beliefs about causes, dispositions, and unobservable entities such as subatomic particles go beyond the observable and hence we should not take these beliefs to be true or false. Like the logical empiricists, van Fraassen takes such beliefs to be better or worse instruments. Since any reasonably complex scientific theory is going to go beyond the observable, the instrumentalist holds that scientific theories ought not to be believed, but merely ought to be accepted as empirically adequate. But there will be plenty of more simple beliefs that ought to be taken to be true and ought to be thought of in realist terms.

One of the problems the instrumentalist sees for realism about scientific theories is prompted by the thought that scientific theories are underdetermined by the observable data. The choice between theories thus must be made on those “pragmatic” grounds: on considerations of simplicity, explanatory power, coherence, etc. These considerations are not, the realist says, relevant to the issue of a theory’s truth. They are relevant to human needs and concerns, not to the “relation between the theory and the world” (ibid., p. 88). Explanations, for instance, are answers to questions we happen to be interested in asking. The only thing relevant to truth and falsity is the observable evidence and the observable evidence won’t be enough to determine whether our theories are true or false. For our theories go beyond the observable.

Peirce is clearly set against this instrumentalist position and he is set against it in an interesting way. He thinks (and all pragmatists join him here) that the realist is mistaken in looking for something that is independent of human concerns. The realist is mistaken in thinking that, with respect to beliefs about the observable, we can have a kind of truth and falsity that is “literal” or entirely independent of what the realist wants to call the “pragmatic” virtues. If you like, Peirce takes the “realist” virtue of accounting for the observable data or saving the phenomena and folds it into his general package of the aims of our inquiries. The realist who wants to give this aim special standing – who wants to link it to “the way things really are” – has notorious difficulty in making good on the claim. For at the heart of the realist position is the thought that a belief could be the best it could be by way of accounting for the evidence and fulfilling our other aims in inquiry and yet it could still be false. It could still fail to get right the believer-independent world. So what is the nature of this link between empirical adequacy and the literal truth? What reason do we have for assuming that beliefs that are empirically adequate are beliefs that are likely to get right the believer-independent world?
Another way of making this point is to say that Peirce undermines the very contrast that the instrumentalist position depends upon for its existence: the contrast between beliefs that aim at truth and beliefs that aim at fulfilling the pragmatic virtues. But that does not make him an anti-realist in the sense that he thinks that we should not aim at truth, but rather at something like agreement, or solidarity, or getting better instruments to help us get on in the world. Some contemporary pragmatists, Richard Rorty (see Rorty) for instance, have gone that way. Peirce would have been loath to be associated with this kind of position. He argued that we do and should aim at the truth. The truth is that which would be indefeasible. What more, he asks, could we ask of a theory than that it stand up to whatever we could throw at it, no matter how far we pursue our inquiries? It is an empty question to ask whether a theory that was as good as it could be is really true or not. To assert, on top of the fact that the theory is as good as it could be, the additional “fact” that it is true, is to add nothing at all. Such a conception of truth is spurious and ought to be abandoned in favor of the secular or naturalist view that truth is what would be best by way of belief.

### Pragmatism and Minimalism

We have seen that the secular, as opposed to metaphysical, nature of Peirce’s account of truth pulls him away from instrumentalism. But it takes him closer to a position that has become very popular these days: minimalism about truth. The insight at the heart of minimalism is that there is a close connection between inquiry and assertion, on the one hand, and truth, on the other. What we do when we offer a justification for “\( p \) is true” is to offer a justification for the claim that \( p \) itself. There is an unseverable connection between making an assertion and claiming that it is true. If we want to know whether it is true that Toronto is north of Buffalo, there is nothing additional to check on (“a fact,” “a state of affairs”), nothing over and above our consulting maps, driving or walking north from Buffalo to see whether we get to Toronto, etc. The question of the truth of the claim does not involve anything more than investigating the matter in our usual ways and seeing whether the claim meets the rigors of those investigations. When we wonder whether Toronto is north of Buffalo, we are wondering about the relative positions of Toronto and Buffalo, not about whether the claim or statement “Toronto is north of Buffalo” is literally true, or corresponds to reality, or some such thing. A claim’s fitting and continuing to fit with all the evidence and argument is all we can be interested in. Our attention must be on first-order inquiry into the claim itself, not on “philosophical” inquiry into the nature of truth. The best kind of philosophical inquiry into the nature of truth draws out the connection between truth and the satisfaction of our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry.

Peirce anticipates something like Arthur Fine’s (1986, p. 177) naturalism “California style.” We should not add anything philosophical to science, or to any other first-order inquiry: “no additives, please.” It is in this sense that Peirce’s account of truth is a kind of naturalism. There is a point or an aim to any particular deliberation – to solve a problem, to build a better piece of equipment, to decide what is just in the circumstances, or to confirm a hypothesis. When we have satisfied all the aims we have in an...
inquiry, the beliefs we have arrived at are rational and, were those aims to remain forever satisfied (were the beliefs not subsequently overturned by further evidence or argument), then those beliefs would be true.

But Peirce would reject the extreme kind of minimalism which holds that there is nothing at all to truth. Like Crispin Wright, who accepts the insight at the heart of minimalism but holds that there is more lurking behind the minimalist thought than most of its adherents would like to admit, Peirce argues that we can make sense of the idea of truth and of the idea that we aim at truth. Wright himself puts forward a truth predicate called superassertibility, which is virtually identical to Peirce’s truth predicate: “A statement is superassertible . . . if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information” (1992, p. 48). Wright thinks that this view of truth undermines the usual dichotomies of realism and anti-realism and gives us a fresh and productive way of understanding the objectivity, or lack of it, of any kind of discourse: for instance, of science, mathematics, morals, or the comic. This view of truth, that is, is metaphysically neutral (ibid., p. 61). We shall see in the next section that Peirce is in full agreement.

**Experience: Physical, Mathematical, Metaphysical, and Moral**

We have seen that Peirce is not an empiricist who holds that beliefs about the observable aim at truth and that beliefs that go beyond the observable do not aim at the truth and are to be evaluated, rather, in terms of second-rate “pragmatic” virtues. We shall see in this section that he is indeed a thoroughgoing empiricist, but an empiricist with an unusually broad conception of experience and of the observable. We can accept the idea that a belief must be responsive to experience without committing ourselves to anything as narrow as the verificationism of the logical empiricists.

The logical empiricists notoriously concluded that the only legitimate areas of inquiry are physical science and logic/mathematics, which is exempt from the verifiability principle because its statements are necessarily true. Peirce is not at all in agreement. He thought that the motto “Do not block the way of inquiry” “deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy” (CP 1.135; see also 7.480). The pragmatic maxim supports and promotes this principle. A hypothesis which has no consequences, which is severed from experience, would be useless in inquiry. It would be, as Ludwig Wittgenstein put it, a cog upon which nothing turned. Investigation into such hypotheses is bound to be barren and to direct attention away from worthwhile pursuits. We have seen that the pragmatic maxim is often taken to be a close cousin of the verifiability principle (if not identical to it, as Ayer claims). But the logical empiricist’s verifiability principle, Peirce would have argued, places very serious obstacles in the way of inquiry.

Peirce argued that items in our body of background belief are susceptible to doubt on a piecemeal basis, if that doubt is prompted by surprising or recalcitrant experience. We regard our background beliefs as true until some surprising experience throws one or some group of them into doubt. The inquirer “is under a compulsion to believe just what he does believe . . . as time goes on, the man’s belief usually changes in a
manner which he cannot resist... this force which changes a man’s belief in spite of any effort of his may be, in all cases, called a gain of experience" (MS 1342, p. 2).

Peirce links the scientific method to this empiricist epistemology. The scientific method is the method which pays close attention to the fact that beliefs fall to the surprise of recalcitrant experience. Inquiry "is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way" (CP 5.589). Accepted hypotheses and theories ("established truths") are stable and believed until they are upset by experience.

It is important to see that Peirce’s "scientific method" is not restricted to what we now call science. Any inquiry that aims at getting a belief which would forever stand up to experience and argument abides by Peirce’s method of science. We shall see that Peirce thought that metaphysics (when it is well-conducted) and mathematics are legitimate aspirants to truth. And so is moral deliberation. He thought, that is, that metaphysics, mathematics, and morals might satisfy his pragmatist maxim: the maxim that a genuine belief must be linked to experience.

Perception or experience, Peirce argued, is anything that is forced upon one. It goes far beyond what our ears, eyes, nose, and skin report:

[A]nything is, for the purposes of logic, to be classed under the species of perception wherein a positive qualitative content is forced upon one’s acknowledgement without any reason or pretension to reason. There will be a wider genus of things partaking of the character of perception, if there be any matter of cognition which exerts a force upon us. (CP 7.623; see also 6.492)

Peirce takes anything that is compelling, surprising, brute, or impinging to be an experience, regardless of what causes us to feel compelled and regardless of whether we can identify the source of the compulsion: “[t]he course of life has developed certain compulsions of thought which we speak of collectively as Experience” (CP 8.101). Experience just is whatever prevents someone from believing exactly what he wants to believe – it is what keeps us in check (MS 1342; see also MS 408, p. 146).

Peirce argues that there are two kinds of experience: “ideal” and “real.” The latter is sensory experience and the former is experience in which “operations upon diagrams, whether external or imaginary, take the place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in chemical and physical research” (CP 4.530; see also 3.516). This sort of thought experiment or diagrammatic experiment or experiment in the imagination is, Peirce argues, the core of mathematical and deductive inquiry. “The mathematician, like every other inquirer, begins by a conjecture, which usually is that a certain transformation of his icon [diagram] will lead him to, or towards, the end of his inquiry. He then performs that experiment” (MS 328, p. 43; see also CP 3.363, 4.233, 1.322, 5.162, 6.568). He draws subsidiary lines in geometry or makes transformations in algebraic formulae and then observes the results. Those results might be surprising, and since surprise is the force of experience, such reasoning is an experiment. This sort of experiment “is truly observation, yet certainly in a very peculiar sense; and no other kind of observation would at all answer the purpose of mathematics” (CP 1.240). Similarly, in valid deductive reasoning, we are compelled to accept a conclusion. The facts stated in the premises could not be, if the fact stated in
the conclusion were not. The conclusion is, in the first instance, irresistible. It comes upon the mind before one can control it. Only later do we critically compare the conclusion to our norms and ideals (MS 453, loose sheets; see also CP 2.96, 6.497).

Peirce sometimes puts his point about the breadth of experience by saying that everyone inhabits two worlds: the inner and the outer. We react with the outer world through the clash between it and our senses, and we react with the inner world – the world of mathematics, logic, and reasoning – by performing thought experiments. Inquiry, Peirce says, has two branches: one is inquiry into Outward Fact by experimentation and observation, and is called Inductive Investigation; the other is inquiry into Inner Truth by inward experimentation and observation and is called Mathematical or Deductive Reasoning (MS 408, p. 150; see also CP 3.527).

The distinction between the two different sorts of experiments is that the results of diagrammatic experimentation exert a comparatively slight compulsion upon us and we can change the construction of those diagrams, whereas the outer world is full of irresistible compulsions and is hard to change (CP 5.474, 5.45). But nonetheless, “the inner world has its surprises for us, sometimes” (CP 7.438). Peirce intends to leave the difference between the two sorts of experience vague: “We naturally make all our distinctions too absolute. We are accustomed to speak of an external universe and an inner world of thought. But they are merely vicinities with no real boundary between them” (CP 7.438).

Perhaps the contrast between the two sorts of experience is best made by Peirce’s distinction between practical and theoretical belief. In the 1902 manuscript “Reason’s Rules” (CP 5.538–45), he says that a practical belief such as “anthracite is a convenient fuel” will manifest itself in a disposition to behave on the part of the believer. All things being equal, she would sometimes use anthracite were she in need of a fuel. In addition, “sensible” or empirical consequences can be derived from the hypothesis. For instance, if (ceteris paribus) you were to light it, it would burn. On the other hand, a “purely theoretical” belief has to do not with “habits of deliberate action” or with sensible consequences, but with “expectations.” As examples of theoretical hypotheses, Peirce offers “there is an imaginary circle which is twice cut by every real circle” and “the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its side.” Of the latter, he says that although it is “difficult to see what experiential difference there can be between commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes,” there are nevertheless expectations: “a belief about the commensurability of the diagonal relates to what is expectable for a person dealing with fractions; although it means nothing at all in regard to what could be expected in physical measurements” (CP 5.539).

The pragmatic maxim asserts that if it is not to be “metaphysical jargon and chatter,” a belief must have a link with experience; it must issue in expectation for practice or theory. If there is an expectation, then the unexpected can surprise the believer. The only difference between a practical and a theoretical belief, says Peirce, is that the former involves sensation that is “muscular” and the latter involves sensation that is not muscular (CP 5.540).

Peirce thought that every kind of belief must issue in expectations and that he had a very broad account of what these expectations could be. But not all beliefs will pass his test. In “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” Peirce sets himself the task of showing how the hypothesis of God’s reality gives rise to expectations. In each of the
three drafts of the paper. He breaks off in frustration. Each time he begins to talk about “tracing out a few consequences of the hypothesis,” he abruptly changes the subject (see, for instance, MS 842, p. 127). All he can come up with is that if “God is real” were true, then we would expect there to be a tendency towards “growth and habit-taking” and we would expect that things would be harmonic in the world (CP 6.490; MS 842, p. 16; MS 843, unmarked page, 105 pages from the end of the manuscript). At the end of the 1910 “Additament” to the paper, he rather disingenuously says: “The doctrine of the Ens necessarium has a pragmaticist meaning, although I will not here attempt to sum up the whole of its meaning” (MS 844, last page; see also CP 6.491). But even in this failed effort, Peirce is clear that the religious hypothesis must, like any other hypothesis, give rise to expectations that might be dashed.

Clearly, many details in Peirce’s brand of pragmatism need to be worked out. Nonetheless, it is clear that we do not need to say, with the logical empiricists, that only beliefs in the physical sciences and logic/mathematics meet the empiricist standard. Will hypotheses about what is right or wrong, or just or unjust, meet the demand – can they be shown to be sensitive to experience so that they are candidates for belief and for truth-values? Do they set up expectations which can be met or unmet? Peirce sometimes very clearly said that moral judgments are linked to experience or “observed facts.” These are the “observations of everyday life” or observations which do not require special training or equipment.

This is exactly how Peirce thought that metaphysical hypotheses might meet the pragmatist standard and be a part of scientific inquiry. Metaphysics, he says, is thought to be inscrutable “because its objects are not open to observation.” But the blame for the “backward state” of metaphysics cannot be laid there, as metaphysics is indeed an “observational science” (CP 6.5). It “really rests on observations . . . and the only reason that this is not universally recognized is that it rests upon kinds of phenomena with which every man’s experience is so saturated that he usually pays no particular attention to them” (CP 6.2). Observations in the special sciences require special instruments, precautions, and skill because they are remote from everyday life (CP 1.242). Other phenomena, such as that which metaphysics studies, are “harder to see, simply because they surround us on every hand; we are immersed in them and have no background against which to view them” (CP 6.562; see also 1.134). They are commonplace and banal, but they are observations nonetheless.

A particularly helpful text regarding the question of moral hypotheses and the metaphysically neutral nature of Peirce’s account of truth is “Truth and Falsity and Error.” Here Peirce considers the possibility that for some questions, no answer would be forthcoming, no matter how long the discussion were to go on and no matter how advanced our methods of inquiry were to become. Perhaps the question of whether there is free will is like that; Peirce says:

Then in regard to that question, there certainly is no truth. But whether or not there would be perhaps any reality is a question for the metaphysician. . . . Even if the metaphysician decides that where there is no truth there is no reality, still the distinction between the character of truth and the character of reality is plain and definable. (CP 5.565)
After drawing the distinction between truth and reality, Peirce very carefully says that it holds not just for science, but also for ethics (CP 5.566) and for mathematics (CP 5.567). All of these inquiries aim at the truth:

Now the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe is a third; but all those different conceptions have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to – agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is the scientific truth. (CP 7.187)

There will of course be differences between kinds of inquiry: the mathematician, the chemist, and the inquirer into what is the morally right thing to do will not use identical methods. Nor will they find that their aspirations have identical prospects. Nor will they all be talking about the same sort of reality. As Hookway puts it:

We might agree that mathematical propositions, ethical propositions, propositions from the more theoretical reaches of science can all be assessed as true or false. Each, we might suppose, can be tested or “compared with reality.” This might involve looking for a proof, considering how the ethical proposition would appeal to someone who took up a distinctive disinterested viewpoint on things, or making explanatory inferences about what best systematises our other theoretical beliefs and experimental results. (2000, p. 97)

That is, comparing hypotheses with “reality” is bound to take different forms in different inquiries. I prefer this statement of Hookway’s position, rather than the following: “Some truths can be understood in a ‘realist’ manner, as dealing with a mind-independent reality, while others deal with matters whose character bears more marks of our interests, sentiments or constructive activities” (ibid., p. 77). For this last way of putting the point makes it seem as if there are different kinds of reality, some of which are deserving of the title “realist” and others not. Then the question must be whether those downgraded forms of reality ought to count as reality. In the same vein, notice that, despite Peirce’s language, there are not different kinds of truth – each kind of inquiry aims at getting an answer that will not be overturned by subsequent experience. That is the pragmatist elucidation of truth.

Peirce goes on to make his central, all-important, point: what is at the core of all these various inquiries is the surprise of experience, against a background of stable expectations or beliefs. He says: “Thus it is that all knowledge begins by the discovery that there has been an erroneous expectation. . . . Each branch of science begins with a new phenomenon which violates a[n] . . . expectation” (CP 7.188).

Let us look at the mathematical case, about which Peirce is exceptionally clear. In “Truth and Falsity and Error,” he says:

The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not there is any corresponding real thing, he does not care. His hypotheses are creatures of his own imagination; but he discovers in them relations which surprise him sometimes. A metaphysician may hold that this very forcing upon the mathematician’s acceptance
of propositions for which he was not prepared, proves, or even constitutes, a mode of being independent of the mathematician’s thought, and so a reality. But whether there is any reality or not, the truth of the pure mathematical proposition is constituted by the impossibility of ever finding a case in which it fails. (CP 5.567)

Peirce argued that mathematics does not answer to a physical reality, as it is not concerned with physical objects, but with possibilities (CP 4.234, 3.527) or the forms of relations (CP 4.530). He thinks that reality goes beyond the physical; generals and potentialities, for instance, are real. But, he says, that is a further question for the metaphysician since it goes beyond the basic pragmatist elucidation of truth.

“Truth and Falsity and Error” is thus a wonderful text for seeing how Peirce is an empiricist of a highly unusual sort. We have him saying that a belief can be sensitive to experience even if there is no underlying physical reality. Experience, for Peirce, just is a surprise. Perhaps a domain of inquiry which rests on an underlying physical reality will have more statements which are bivalent. But some kinds of inquiry, such as mathematics, will be full of bivalent statements and yet they are such that there is no underlying physical reality.

It should be clear by now that there is no simple sketch of the debate between realists and non-realists/empiricists/instrumentalists, never mind a simple sketch of the pragmatist’s place within that debate. Although it might be that James is an instrumentalist, Peirce’s position is much harder to classify.

The positions with the closest affinity to Peirce’s are, I suggest, those positions which attempt to challenge the typical causal account of evidence and reasons for belief. Perhaps the best expression of Peirce’s view in this respect is given by David Wiggins in his “Reflections on Inquiry and Truth Arising from Peirce’s Method for the Fixation of Belief” (2004). Wiggins asks whether, in Peirce’s hands, the scientific method requires a causal relationship between objects and beliefs. He focuses on Peirce’s requirement in “The Fixation of Belief” that beliefs be caused or determined by “circumstances not extraneous to the facts” and argues that the causal case (in which the perception of an object causes a belief) is just one case among many others in which a belief is caused by circumstances not extraneous to the facts. Mathematics and morals are two other kinds of cases. The weight of considerations and reasons in favor of a belief that \( p \) can suffice to make it such that the belief that \( p \) is determined by considerations not extraneous to whether or not \( p \).

The important thing to see, suggests Wiggins, is that the requirement on any genuine belief is that a genuine belief must be such that there is something that it is answerable to, or sensitive to, or responsive to. If a belief is answerable to experience, broadly construed, then it aims at the truth. On the surface, this position looks as if it resembles logical empiricism. But once the broad nature of experience is unpacked, it is clear that what Peirce offers us is the verificationist insight without the unwanted narrowing of the realm of legitimate inquiry.

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