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The academic discipline of geography has historically been dominated by men, perhaps more so than any other human science. In the UK, the Royal Geographical Society refused, with a few rare exceptions, to elect women as fellows until 1913. Between 1921 and 1971, a mere 2.6 per cent of papers in the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* were written by women; in *Economic Geography* the figure was 6.0 per cent. In 1973, 12.3 per cent of members of the Association of American Geographers were women, and in institutions offering higher degrees in geography in the USA and Canada only 3.1 per cent of regular staff members were female. Between 1973 and 1978, women authored 9 per cent of the papers in *Australian Geographer*. Five per cent of the papers in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* were by women between 1974 and 1978; and between 1989 and 1990, 13 per cent of papers in *Area* were authored by women. In 1978, only 7.3 per cent of full-time university teachers of geography in the UK were women: by 1988, this percentage had actually fallen to 6.9 per cent. In 1991, 25.1 per cent of members of the Institute of British Geographers were women. There is other evidence to show that women work disproportionately in part-time and temporary posts, are consistently paid less, are awarded fewer honours, and hold positions of power less often than men in the discipline (the Institute of British Geographers has only ever had one woman president, Alice Garnett). Linda McDowell, among others, has catalogued the verbal, vocal and visual power which many men wield in geography, their patronizing attitude to female colleagues, the jokes, the sexual harassment of women, and men's reluctance to
acknowledge either women's intelligence or their dedication to teaching and to students when it comes to appointments and promotions. Clearly, women have been and continue to be marginalized as producers of geographical knowledge. Nor are they prominent as the subjects of that knowledge. Not until 1982 was there enough work on women by geographers (usually women too) for the first systematic survey of geographical studies of women to be published. In 1984, the first – and still the only – book-length overview of geography and gender was published; it is now out of print.

Feminist geographers have long argued that the domination of the discipline by men has serious consequences both for what counts as legitimate geographical knowledge and who can produce such knowledge. They have insisted that geography holds a series of unstated assumptions about what men and women do, and that the discipline concentrates on the spaces, places and landscapes that it sees as men's. This bias in research topics is argued to have two main effects. The first is that it makes the discipline more appealing to men than to women, and it is thus cited as a major reason why women choose to leave geography, particularly in the shift from undergraduate to postgraduate work. The second effect is the assumption held by many male geographers that women should not really be interested in geographical topics – one of the first discussions of the male domination of geography described it as the result of 'stubborn, persistent discrimination' against women trying to enter the profession. The preponderance of men in the discipline not only results in women not being studied by academic geographers, then, but also in too few women academics in geography.

Open criticism of women's under-representation in geography began to be published in the discipline's journals in the early 1970s. According to Zelinsky, the timing of this discussion can be attributed to the slightly belated impact on geography of the liberation movements of the late 1960s, including the civil rights movement and feminism. Others have commented that the timing coincides more directly with anti-sex discrimination legislation in the USA and a fear that geography departments there might face legal action; certainly interest in women's position in British geography began rather later in the 1970s. In the USA and the UK, the initial demands were for women to have equal access to the discipline as its practitioners, and for women to receive more attention in geographical research. Rapidly, however, a more explicitly feminist geography developed, which offered a critique not only of what geography looked at, but also of the concepts used by the discipline to organize its knowledge in
order to exclude what it saw as women's issues. This critique has surely been the most challenging and exciting development in geography in the past 15 years. The early insistence that women matter has led to a radical reworking of how geographers can think of social life. The socialist feminism of most – though by no means all – feminist geographers has argued that women are associated with reproductive labour, and that this ideological association is a fundamental aspect of the division of labour in workplaces, between work and home, and in the home. Feminist geographers insist that reproduction is as important a part of social and economic life as the sphere of production that geographers have traditionally explored, and that the interconnections between the two spheres are central to a fully human geography which acknowledges women as social subjects. Feminist geographers have fragmented the old categories of geography and added new concerns through richly complex empirical work. Excellent and detailed feminist geographies of women have already been written, and I will not repeat them here. Instead, I focus on rather a different issue: why contemporary human geography continues to be so resistant to work on and by women.

For feminism remains 'outside the project' of geography. Feminists have engaged with several of the key debates in the discipline since the late 1970s, and each of the chapters in this book stages an encounter between feminism and geography; yet I have had to represent these encounters not as a series of conversations between equals but more as a series of brush-offs. Feminism has been consistently marginalized by mainstream geography. Feminism's concerns are never wholly acknowledged by the geographical arguments with which it engages, and geography continues virtually to disregard feminist theory. Papers may contain an odd reference or two to feminist authors, and a feminist chapter or two, written by some combination of the valiant few feminist geographers, is obligatory now in most edited collections, but there is hardly ever a sustained engagement with feminist work. A recent undergraduate textbook on the relationships between geographies and social theories since the 1970s demonstrates and sustains this continued exclusion by refusing to address feminist geography.

To me, this deep reluctance to listen to feminism and to its focus on women, not to mention the continuing under-representation of women in the discipline, suggest a more fundamental resistance to women as subjects and authors of geographical knowledge than simply the fact that women are assumed to be interested in different issues from men. In fact, as Liz Bondi remarked in a recent review of feminist geo-
graphy, most feminist work in the discipline addresses social, economic and political issues with which geographers are already broadly familiar.\textsuperscript{17} It seems to me that women's exclusion is not only a question of the themes of research, nor even of the new concepts with which feminists work to organize those themes, but rather a question related to the very nature of hegemonic geographical knowledge itself. I suspect that there is something in the very claim to knowing thought in geography which tends to exclude women as producers of knowledge, as well as what are seen as women's issues as objects of knowledge. So in this book I explore the possibility that it is the specific notion of knowledge through which geographers think that marginalizes women in the discipline.

I argue that to think geography – to think within the parameters of the discipline in order to create geographical knowledge acceptable to the discipline – is to occupy a masculine subject position. Geography is masculinist. 'Masculinist' is a term I have adopted from Michèle Le Doeuff, who describes as masculinist 'work which, while claiming to be exhaustive, forgets about women's existence and concerns itself only with the position of men'.\textsuperscript{18} This definition is helpful because it emphasizes not only the focus of research, which in its partiality impacts detrimentally on women, but also because it highlights the active erasure of 'women's existence and concerns'. Masculinist work claims to be exhaustive and it therefore assumes that no-one else can add to its knowledge; it is therefore reluctant to listen to anyone else. Masculinist work, then, excludes women because it alienates us in its choice of research themes, because it feels that women should not really be interested in producing geography, and also because it assumes that it is itself comprehensive. And, as Le Doeuff insists, these assumptions operate not only in the realms of theory and epistemology, but also in the everyday activity of academic work.\textsuperscript{19} Women live with the costs of arguments that they are less capable of producing knowledge than men, because these are not merely arguments but also practices. Masculinism can be seen at work not only in the choice of topics made by geographers, not only in their conceptual apparatus, not only in their epistemological claim to exhaustive knowledge, but also in seminars, in conferences, in common rooms, in job interviews. As Rosa Braidotti says, "'I, woman', am affected directly and in my everyday life by what has been made of the subject of woman; I have paid in my very body for all the metaphors and images that our culture has deemed fit to produce of woman'.\textsuperscript{20}

In exploring the masculinism of geography at some length, this is
not a book about the geography of gender but about the gender of geography; it considers ‘the itinerary of the silencing rather than the retrieval’. But to claim that geography is masculinist immediately raises two key questions. First, just how are the connections between masculinity, men, knowledge and power to be conceptualized? And, second, what does a particular theorization of those connections mean for feminist critiques? These are two themes of this book, and the next two sections introduce my arguments and explain how the following chapters will address them.

Masculinity, Men, Knowledge and Power

Feminists have made many different connections between masculinity, men, knowledge and power. To elaborate the masculinism of geography, I draw on a kind of feminism which, by developing certain arguments from poststructuralism and psychoanalysis, connects masculine subjectivity to powerful claims to know. I start with subjectivity because I want to insist on the social context and consequences of geography’s claims to know: geography’s epistemic exclusions are enacted by and impact on specific people. This section introduces my approach, and makes some preliminary connections between geographical knowledge and a particular form of masculinity.

The feminist work on which I depend begins with the premise that identity is relational. Who I think I am depends on me establishing in what ways I am different from, or similar to, someone else. We position ourselves in relation to others. Marilyn Frye explains this structure of identity in terms of gender by using an analogy between foreground and background:

I imagine phallocratic reality to be the space and figures and motion which constitute the foreground, and the constant repetitive un-eventful activities of women to constitute and maintain the background against which this foreground plays. It is essential to the maintenance of the foreground reality that nothing within it refer in any way to anything in the background, and yet it depends absolutely upon the existence of the background.

Frye is arguing that, although it will not admit it explicitly, masculinity depends on femininity for its existence. Similar arguments can be made for other social relations: white requires black, straight needs gay, bourgeois depends on proletarian, and so on. However, this structure
of identity is not simply a matter of free choice and the unbiased perception of others. Both psychoanalysis and poststructuralism insist that identity is riddled with – and even formed through – mistakes, mis-recognitions, fantasies, instabilities and contradictions: we never perceive others fully or accurately. And feminists add to this that identity is also formed through relations of power. Constellations of systematic (but not necessarily coherent) ideas about, say, gender both construct gender as relational – masculine and feminine – and also evaluate one gender over another – masculine over feminine – so that, to return to Frye’s analogy for a moment, men are in the foreground and women in the background. I will call such constellations of ideas (and their associated practices) discourses: our identities are made through them. Discourses intersect, so that certain identities are constituted as both more powerful and more valuable than others; thus, in the dominant culture of the West now, a white bourgeois heterosexual man is valued over a black working-class lesbian woman. These discursive intersections are extraordinarily diverse and complex and, of course, contested. However, central to the arguments of this book is what Donna Haraway has called the ‘master subject’: that is, the subject constituted as white, bourgeois, heterosexual and masculine. Especially important to my arguments is the manner in which that white bourgeois heterosexual man perceives other people who are not like him. From his position of power he tends to see them only in relation to himself. He understands femininity, for example, only in terms of its difference from masculinity. He sees other identities only in terms of his own self-perception; he sees them as what I shall term his Other. And I will refer to him as the Same because, in his inability to recognize difference from himself in terms which do not refer to himself, this dominant subject position can only see himself.

Feminists such as Le Doeuff argue that this structure of Same and Other is embedded both in what it means to be masculine and in the production of knowledge about the world. This argument has been developed through studies of a particular form of masculine rationality that emerged during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. I will outline this feminist work here, because it begins to suggest aspects of the masculinism that geography shares with so much Western thought. After examining many of the founding texts of philosophy, science, political theory and history, feminists have argued that the notion of reason as it developed from the seventeenth century onwards is not gender neutral. On the contrary, it works in tandem with white bourgeois heterosexual masculinities. To generalize, they argue that what theorists of rationality after Descartes saw as defining
rational knowledge was its independence from the social position of the knower. Masculinist rationality is a form of knowledge which assumes a knower who believes he can separate himself from his body, emotions, values, past and so on, so that he and his thought are autonomous, context-free and objective. Many feminists see this desire for autonomy as typical of the master subject; but the assumption of an objectivity untainted by any particular social position allows this kind of rationality to claim itself as universal. This supposed universality is what Le Doeuff refers to as the exhaustiveness of masculinist claims to knowledge; it assumes that it is comprehensive, and thus the only knowledge possible. It is underpinned by the Same-ness of the masculine subject positions, which can understand (difference) only in relation to themselves. Thus, by the late eighteenth century, a certain form of rationality became identified with, and in turn identified, masculinity. Conversely, femininity was associated with the non-rational Other, a point to which I will return below.

Feminist geographers have begun to suggest that these arguments about masculinist rationality can and should be applied to geography. Several have commented that, in the words of Liz Bondi and Mona Domosh, geographers too see themselves as ‘detached explorers’ who produce ‘transcendent visions’ of neutral truth untouched by the contexts in which they are produced. Geographers desire knowledge of the whole world – ‘the world is our oyster’, as a President of the Institute of British Geographers recently proclaimed – but, more importantly for their claims to power through knowledge, they also desire a whole knowledge of the world. Geographical knowledge aims to be exhaustive. It assumes that, in principle, the world can be fully known and understood. Michael Curry has recently described this as geography’s ‘architectonic impulse’: a ‘desire to create an ordered, hierarchical system . . . which seeks to refer all sciences to one principle’. The founding fathers of geography wanted to render the world amenable to the operation of masculinist reason, and thus sought a kind of knowledge that would apply universally. This project required just that rational, objective gaze at the world which so many feminists have associated with dominant masculinities, and Domosh has described its importance to the gaze of the nineteenth-century male explorers who founded the academic discipline; they looked at the world from an unproblematized position. They made no connection between the world as it was seen and the position of the viewer, and the truth of what they saw was established by that claim to objectivity. Their denial of their partiality was both produced by, and reproduced, their power as master subjects. And it is important to note, in the
context of the imperialist origins of geography, that not only did a masculinity enable this claim to exhaustiveness; so too did the whiteness of these geographers.\textsuperscript{31}

The erasure of the specificity of geographical knowledge continues today and, as Bondi and Domosh also note,\textsuperscript{32} it is clearly evident in the discipline’s dominant style of writing. Geography has a particular written voice — unextravagant, unembellished, unpretentious, unexceptional. Un(re)marked. Although the question of textual strategies has been raised quite recently in the discipline, I think that — for feminists — the most revealing discussion of the ideological work done by geography’s usual textual style was published in 1983 in Billinge’s critique of humanistic geography.\textsuperscript{33} According to Billinge, humanistic geography consists of poorly thought-out or banal ideas dressed up in an elaborate language which aims to hide their inadequacy. Leaving aside for the moment the accuracy of his verdict on the intellectual competence of humanistic geography, the terms that Billinge uses to reject their textual style show with rare explicitness the subject constituted by the usual geographical voice. Billinge dismisses the humanists for their fussiness and deception, their florid and decorative prose style, the deliberate emotion that they invoke, their wanton wordsmithery, their embellishment and luxury, their vacuousness and tendency to harangue (does he mean, perhaps, to nag?). In contrast, he wants the prose of craftsmen (sic) — plain, unobtrusive, lucid and even. The gendered character of this distinction is clear in his approving quotation of ‘Samuel Butler’s famous dictum, that “a man’s style in any art should be like his dress — it should attract as little attention as possible”’.\textsuperscript{34} Billinge is advocating a particularly masculine form of writing — transparent, characterless, neutral, evacuated of any particular author — and humanistic geography’s writing is condemned by him in implicitly feminized terms, as too elusive, too decorative, too emotional and too superficial. Instead, Billinge wants the plain wordsmithery of men — and, with a few exceptions, this is what the discipline practises. This unobtrusive prose style works to deflect attention away from its author, and the effect is to invest the writing with the authority of rational men. The style attempts to erase the specificity of the author and to represent his writing as an objective expression of reason. Billinge proposes George Orwell as an ideal model for geographical writing, but Orwell’s work has been criticized precisely because of the inhibiting authority which his style carries. Swindells and Jardine argue that ‘the desire for male speech, the desire to \textit{author} the case — in other words, to write well about it — is preemptive’;\textsuperscript{35} it pre-empts other interpretations of what is being written
The gravitas of a style bereft of distinguishing marks makes other voices seem, well, frivolous. This is an example of the exclusions which claims to exhaustiveness produce. Another unfortunate consequence of that style's dominance is that most geographical writing exemplifies Valerie Solonais's verdict on the patriarchy: 'at best, an utter bore'. It's all the Same.

As I have mentioned, though, a Same requires an Other against which it can identify itself. 'Reason' is not the whole story of masculinism. As feminist critics of masculine rationality have argued, in order to establish rationality, there must be a contrast with the irrational. Disciplinary knowledge can define itself through its own ability to know only if there are others who are incapable of knowing. For a masculinity defined in part through its rationality, its Other must be deemed irrational. Those feminist historians of philosophy and science who have established the conflation of masculinity and reason have also demonstrated that irrationality was associated with femininity: women were not considered to be capable of rational thought. While men claimed objectivity by denying their specificity and pretending to enact pure reason, women were understood to be incapable of transcending their position. The Other of rational masculinity was feminized, and this is a consequence of discourses of heterosexuality as well as gender: both discourses constitute a feminine only in relation to a masculine. In particular, while men assumed that their knowledge depended only on the abstract thought of the mind, they argued that women were ruled by the passions of their bodies. In order to legitimate the operation of the rational mind, then, there had to be a contrast to those mired in their bodies. The association between the feminine and the bodily is a recurring theme in this book, since geographers' ability to know depends on the existence of those who cannot know too. For example, not everyone was deemed capable of creating imperialist geography. The fellows of the Royal Geographical Society did not seem able to admit that women, even white women, could produce reports of their travels which counted as geography, and that was the reason why they refused for so long to admit women as members; only the 'objective' gaze of white men could explore and describe other places in appropriate scientific detail. I would argue that geography's continuing reluctance to acknowledge the academic work of women, and work on women's lives, is an expression of its need to maintain its Other in order to legitimate itself.

The first aim of this book is to explore the masculinism of contemporary geographical discourse. In particular, I focus on the way in which a masculine Same depends on a feminised Other; but, as this
section has already argued, gender is not the only discourse through which geographers’ claims to power and knowledge are mediated. Race, class and sexuality are also central. The master subject of geography is not only masculine but white, bourgeois and heterosexual, and the book also sketches some of the consequences of these inflections of masculinity. However, I do not want to argue that this dominant subject position is monolithic. I do not want to suggest that there is some kind of plot on the part of male geographers to exclude women (although it sometimes feels as though there is): the influence of psychoanalysis on the interpretation of subjectivity used here means that masculinism is not understood as a conscious conspiracy. Moreover, geography’s practices are not only symptoms of geography’s masculinism; they also constitute quite specific geographical masculinities. And since not all men become masculine in the same way, geography will not attract all men, and those it does attract will react in different ways to the discipline. Performances such as seminars or writing styles or fieldwork establish certain kinds of masculinity as more or less acceptable; they enact particular masculinities. Moreover, women can and do participate in such performances, whether with commitment, or in parody, or with reluctance, or for other reasons. Thus I am not suggesting that no man can escape the masculinities that I identify as central to geography; nor that women cannot occupy a masculine position; nor that women are incapable of producing geographical knowledge. Rather, I argue that both men and women are caught in a complex series of (historically and geographically specific) discursive positions, relations and practices. The relationship of individual men to the masculinism of geography may be highly problematic and unstable.

I also argue that there is no one masculinity that dominates geography; instead, I argue that there are at least two kinds. What distinguishes them is their relation to the Other. The need for a feminine Other beyond, or incapable of, a discourse does not mean that the feminine never appears in that discourse: on the contrary, references to the feminine occur in order to reaffirm the superiority and reality of masculine knowledge. Ironically, these references to an Other can undermine masculinism’s own claims to exhaustiveness, a point on which the strategies of this book depend. By examining these references I distinguish between what I will call social-scientific masculinity and aesthetic masculinity. Social-scientific masculinity asserts its authority by claiming access to a transparently real geographical world; chapter 2 explores aspects of its operation in the case of time-geography. This masculinity represses all reference to its Other in
order to claim total knowledge. The second kind of masculinity that I identify, aesthetic masculinity, establishes its power through claiming a heightened sensitivity to human experience. Chapter 3 describes this masculinity by using humanistic geography as an example; I suggest there that aesthetic masculinity admits the existence of its Other in order to establish a profundity of which it alone has the power to speak. The next two chapters are then efforts to delineate in some detail two possible forms of masculinism in contemporary geography.

Strategies of Resistance

The arguments that I make about the masculinism of geography have implications for strategies of critique. The white bourgeois hetero­sexual masculinities which are attracted to geography, shape it and are in turn constituted through it, imagine their Other in part as feminine. Their Other is associated with all that they deny as part of themselves: the bodily, the emotional, the passionate, the natural and the irrational. Teresa de Lauretis calls this imagined feminine Woman. Woman is a masculinist fantasy figure, and as Le Doeuff remarks, ‘we [women] are constantly being confronted with that image, but we do not have to recognise ourselves in it’. However, the question of how to resist is complicated, since ‘women no less than men, though undoubtedly in a different fashion, are products of culture and cannot coherently claim for themselves an a priori purity or absence of contamination by its values, its language or its myths’. Woman and women are not completely unrelated. The figure of Woman offers a subject position to women, and one which is extraordinarily difficult to escape from entirely, even though many of the oppressions women face in masculinist society occur because women are expected to fulfil the role of Woman. Similarly, feminism is itself caught in already existing masculinist discourses of meaning and subjectivity, such as, for example, the discursive field of the Man of Reason and Woman of Unreason. Feminists are increasingly aware of the difficulties that this poses for their critiques. The second theme of this book is an exploration of some possible feminist strategies in geography.

Feminism’s fraught engagement with hegemonic discourses of gender has historically created two basic strategies of critique, according to Ann Snitow. She remarks that ‘a common divide keeps forming in both feminist thought and action between the need to build the identity “woman” and give it solid political meaning and the need to tear down the category “woman” and dismantle its all-too-solid
The strategy on one side of this divide is to celebrate all that is associated with the feminine. For men, women's closeness to their bodies is exemplified by menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth, characteristics to which so many feminists have turned as the sources of all the good things about women – love, creation, emotion and nurturance. They use the qualities associated with Woman as a source of strength: but they also use them to define by contrast all the terrible qualities of men – violent, cold, individualistic and deathly. The problem with this strategy, of course, is that it depends on patriarchal ideas about women, and can end up reinstating them and confining women once more to the limits of Woman. It is a strategy that can backfire. The alternative strategy of critique adopted by many feminists on the other side of the divide is to avoid the conflation of women with Woman at all costs. This can take different forms: for example, it may stress the home as a site of domestic labour, or of domestic violence. It may also emphasize differences between women. However, this second strategy also has its problems. In its denial of all Woman-ly qualities it is difficult to know what could unite women as feminists: it is a strategy that dissolves the possibility of struggle by women as women. Thus efforts to retrieve and celebrate the difference of women from men often end up by affirming Woman and inadvertently trapping women into the stereotypes of masculinism, while abandoning Woman entirely for the diversity of women can be politically disabling because it removes any common ground for alliance and struggle.

Feminists have debated the rights and wrongs of many versions of these two strategies at great length. Some recent commentaries, though, suggest that the conflict generated by such debates is misplaced. Perhaps, as Snitow argues, it is practically impossible to choose one strategy over the other: feminism has always been divided between the two, and for good strategic reasons. Patriarchal power is not monolithically stable, and if the enemy is differentiated and fluid, then so too must be the forms of resistance. Chela Sandoval has recently argued that what she terms ‘U.S. third world feminism’ is not as concerned as much as white feminism about choosing the single most politically correct position of critique. She suggests that this is because the politics of many women of colour has a strong sense of the diversity and mobility of forms of power: their politics sees mobility as vital when the struggles to be waged are so necessarily complex, given the shifting structures of capitalism, masculinism, racism and so on. Sandoval calls this mobility ‘oppositional consciousness’, and says that it is ‘comprised of seeming contradictions and difference, which
then serve as tactical interventions in the other mobility that is power'.

The impact of these arguments from black feminists, and similar ones from lesbian politics, is marked in several contributions to a recent collection of essays examining Conflicts in Feminism. These essays suggest that strategic mobility is actually feminism's greatest strength. If masculinity is itself fluid and diverse, and intersects with class, race and sexuality in complex and unstable ways, one form of feminism cannot be adequate to the task of resistance. De Lauretis is especially insistent that the subversive potential of feminism lies as much in its form, in its critical mobility, as in what particular feminist positions argue:

...the essential difference of feminist theory must be looked for in the form as well as the contents of its political, personal, critical, and textual practices, in the diverse oppositional stances feminism has taken vis-à-vis social and cultural formations, and in the resulting divisions, self-conscious reflection, and conceptual elaboration that constitute the effective history of feminism.

For de Lauretis this mobility is not only a practical political necessity; its diversity also avoids the exclusions and erasures of masculinist claims to exhaustiveness.

Therefore, different feminist strategies offer different and equally necessary critiques of different kinds of geography. The next two chapters are engagements with two kinds of geography, which contingently adopt two rather different forms of feminism for specific critical purposes. Chapter 2 examines time-geography and its apparently universal bodies and spaces. In order to question that universality, I contrast those bodies and that space with the bodies and spaces associated with women. The contrast is instructive: it suggests that time-geography in fact refers to masculine bodies and spaces. Put another way, I recover time-geography's Other in order to define more clearly the qualities of its Same. Chapter 3 looks at a rather different kind of geography - humanistic geography - and so tactically adopts a different strategy. Humanistic geographers idealize place. In order to reveal their version of place as a masculinist one, I echo some feminist critiques of the home and community. I use these different strategies in order to reveal the diverse masculinities of geography. As Haraway says, 'the political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point'.


But this critical mobility has risks of its own. It too runs the danger of reinscribing the structure of identities to which it is opposed. It may remain an oscillation between two poles, both structured by the opposition between Man and Woman; it may continue either to invoke the disruptive potential of the Woman of Unreason, or to masquerade in the clothes of the Man of Reason. As Audre Lorde says, 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house', and both Reason and Unreason, as categories each depending on the other, are the master's. So, as McDowell and Bondi have recently argued in relation to feminist geography, a strategy of displacing the poles of this oscillation is also necessary. This task is begun in chapter 4. There I consider the masculinism examined in chapters 2 and 3 in a wider disciplinary context. I suggest that the different masculinities of geographical discourse are much less stable than masculinist geographers assume. Because geography both desires and fears, both needs and rejects, its Other, the structure of the Same and the Other is contradictory, and this disrupts the exhaustiveness of the discipline's masculinism. Chapter 5 explores the instability of a form of aesthetic masculinity in some detail: I examine some recent discussions of landscape by cultural geographers, and argue that they cannot sustain the exclusions on which their claims to knowledge depend. Therefore, chapters 4 and 5 examine some disruptions internal to masculinism. Chapter 4 also suggests that there are disruptions from discursive positions struggling to reach beyond masculinism which contest the centrality of both Man and Woman. Chapter 6 looks at a direct challenge to masculinism – feminist geography. I suggest that, like much other feminism, feminist geography oscillates between two forms of critique, and that like much other feminism this oscillation runs certain risks. It aligns feminists with masculinist work at certain moments. But I also suggest that its critical mobility offers a glimpse of another kind of geography, beyond the imagination of masculinist geography. Finally, chapter 7 focuses on the feminist theorists on whom this introduction has depended, and argues that they imagine a geography based not on the exclusions of a mode of knowing that is dependent on a relationship of dominance between Same and Other, but on an acknowledgement of difference. By introducing issues of race and sexuality, and by considering the absences of masculinism, the hegemony of Man/Woman is challenged and new geographies are imagined. Chapter 7 examines that geography and its possibilities for emancipation. That is the book’s third aim: to evoke one possible geography that is centred on women as knowledgeable, as knowing their own geographies.
Seductions

To make the last and important point of this introduction, I want to mark my own complicity with geography. I have tried to make my prose sound differently from the unmarked tone of so much geographical writing but, as you have probably noticed, I have found it extraordinarily difficult to break away from that style. Instead, I have attempted to take this text beyond the closures of masculinism's exhaustiveness through a movement between different analytical positions and a refusal to advocate one as better than the other. However, the mobility that I adopt is an effort to resist by playing with the powerful, by knowing their language and juggling with its possibilities – it is a strategy enabled by intimacy with masculinist geography. Both my writing style and my argument that feminism is caught in the discursive structures that it would replace are connected to my own relation to the academy. This intimacy has shaped my critique; and as another effort not to echo the exhaustiveness of masculinism, I want to insist that my arguments depend on and are limited by this context.

Obviously, my own position is empowered by my whiteness. I may feel marginalized in geography as a woman, but my whiteness has enabled my critique of geographical discourses by allowing me to get close enough to them to have a good look. And when I look my reactions are mixed. Like Jane Miller, I have to say that 'I was, and still am, seduced by men’s systematic and exhaustive claims on our meanings and our realities through their occupation of everything which is thought of not as male, but simply as human'.50 Like Snitow and de Lauretis, Miller argues that this seduction is unavoidable: 'women can no more escape being adulterated than they can escape being adulteresses'.51 My own desire as a student to be part of the academy was intense. I was first introduced to the powers and the pleasures of theory by tutors, lecturers and supervisors – almost all men – and listening to their arguments and conversation I desperately wanted to be able to join in, to be part of debates among knowledgable men, to speak. Seduction also refers to my class background. The first in my family to go to university, the university seduced through the lower middle class desire to do well, to do better than parents did, to become a professional (of any kind – no matter what). This book, then, is informed by that early attraction to academia and to theory. And here I am now, writing something of my own, giving seminars and entering geographical debate.

But somehow it isn’t like I’d imagined – I still do not feel part of it.
I think that this is a shared experience: many women participate uneasily in the academy. I didn’t find a voice of my own when I was a student, and at university I felt a fraud much of the time, never quite as good as the confident bourgeois men (and often women) I studied with. Yet this didn’t always bother me. A small voice always insisted (and still does) that the academy wasn’t all it thought it was. Miller too suggests that women remain ‘irritatingly unabsorbable’. Lisa Jardine says that we master theory ‘and if we don’t actually enjoy it, at least we can fake it’. Perhaps much of my motivation to write this book comes from the refusal of the university to deliver what it so seductively promised: I wonder if my focus here on the texts of my involvement in the academy is a kind of revenge on men who fail to keep promises. My first undergraduate tutorial, which delighted me by suggesting that geography involved more than just facts, and which was my first explicit introduction to theory, was a discussion of time-geography, the theme of the next chapter. My postgraduate thesis took the idea of local spatial divisions of labour as its starting point, and these reappear in chapter 6. I now teach cultural geography and its work on landscape, which forms chapter 5. Chapter 3 focuses in defiance on what was damned as worthless by my undergraduate teachers. And they never even mentioned the feminist critique examined in chapter 4...

So, because my writing style, my strategies of critique and my choice of geographies to discuss are all marked by my particular involvement in the academy, I want to insist that my book is read in this context as partial and strategic.
Feminists have long been aware of the importance of spatial structure in the production and reproduction of masculinist societies. A collection of essays gathered together by Ardener in 1981 was one of the earliest explicit discussions of the way in which the ‘social map’ of patriarchy was translated into ‘ground rules’ of spatial behaviour: in it, Ardener declared that ‘behaviour and space are mutually dependent’.¹ This chapter examines the spaces of the everyday and the maps that women’s movements chart as they pursue their ordinary labours and pleasures across space and through time. For feminists, the everyday routines traced by women are never unimportant, because the seemingly banal and trivial events of the everyday are bound into the power structures which limit and confine women. The limits on women’s everyday activities are structured by what society expects women to be and therefore to do. The everyday is the arena through which patriarchy is (re)created – and contested. In the words of Teresa de Lauretis, feminism ‘remains very much a politics of everyday life. The edge is there: the sense of struggle, the weight of oppression and contradiction’.²

For white feminists, one of the most oppressive aspects of everyday spaces is the division between public space and private space. One of the earliest discussions of the public and the private was an essay by Kate Millett published in 1969, and her arguments show how many feminists have connected the public/private distinction with patriarchal power.³ Millett’s essay was a reading of one of the central manifestos of Victorian sexual politics: ‘Of Queens’ Gardens’ was a lecture that John Ruskin delivered in Manchester Town Hall in 1864, and the
‘queens’ of his title are the bourgeois women in his audience. In the lecture, Ruskin explained that the home was where women should stay, for only man could be the doer, the creator, the discoverer: in contrast, woman was passive, self-effacing, pious and graceful, and it was this natural perfection that prompted Ruskin to describe women as flowers. Their ‘garden’, bounded by its walls, was the home, which he described as a private, domestic, feminine space, quite separate from the male sphere of waged work and politics. Millett comments that, ‘having through mere assertion “proven” that the sexes are complementary opposites, Ruskin then proceeds to map out their worlds, reserving the entire scope of human endeavour for the one, and a little hothouse for the other’. His metaphor of the garden indicates both the supposed naturalness of women’s spiritual beauty and the boundaries to their existence. For Ruskin, wherever woman was became a home, a space endowed with special qualities, a haven of tranquility and love: although she was to be ruled by her lord, she could be his conscience and moral guide and so influence his actions in the wider world. Millett tartly remarks that this ‘unctuous sludge’ should be translated into its advocacy of women’s total subordination to men: ‘it presupposes an ideal state of awed reverence toward virtuous womanhood while it temporizes hypocritically on the issue of status, idly pretending an eagerness to award a superior position to a group whom it in fact begrudges an egalitarian place’. For Millett, the ‘private’ was an ideological prison: like many other feminists, she would agree with geographer David Harvey when he says that ‘the assignment of place within a socio-spatial structure indicates distinctive roles, capacities for action, and access to power within the social order’. Carole Pateman has even described feminism as a kind of spatial politics: ‘the dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of feminist struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is about’.

This understanding of the distinction between public and private space as a debilitating one for women is clearly evident in the work of feminist geographers using time-geography. As the first section of this chapter shows, time-geography shares the feminist interest in the quotidian paths traced by people and, again like feminism, links such paths, by thinking about constraints, to the larger structures of society. The second section demonstrates how, in recording women’s everyday experiences of spatial mobility, feminist time-geographers stress the extent to which women’s movements in public space are constrained by the ideological claim that women’s space is the private domestic arena. However, time-geography and feminism are not entirely congruent.
Feminism refracts the space of the everyday through an awareness of the distinction between public and private space; whereas time-geography, I will argue, does not. Instead, time-geography insists on a singular space; the space through which it traces people’s paths claims to be universal. In other words, time-geography assumes that its space is exhaustive. There are suggestions, though, in the work of feminist geographers, that this universality in fact excludes some aspects of women’s experiences. This chapter argues that the implicit claim to exhaustiveness made by time-geography conceals a specific kind of masculinism. Time-geography depends on a space associated with a particular masculinity, but claims that it is universal. In the third section I develop this argument by invoking the space most associated with the feminine by some kinds of white feminism – the private, the domestic – and the kind of sociality thought to occur there – emotional, relational and embodied – and contrast them with the space and sociality of time-geography. This tactical recovery of what seems to be missing from time-geography marks the supposedly universal space of time-geography as specific: as a particular kind of masculine. I will argue that part of the specificity of this masculinity is its whiteness: I therefore use the arguments of white feminism about the public and private strategically as a means of highlighting the whiteness of time-geography’s masculinism. The final section of the chapter elaborates the intersection of power and knowledge in this particular masculinity, and labels it ‘social-scientific masculinity’.

The Spatiality of Everyday Life

The recovery of space by geographers in recent years has a complex theoretical history. The spatial geography with which this chapter is concerned – time-geography – was part of geography’s recourse to social theory, mentioned in the previous chapter. In the early 1980s, many geographers were arguing that space was a universal feature of all social relations because ‘spatial structure [was] seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds but as a medium through which social life is produced and reproduced’.

Geography was to become central to social theory as the importance of space as the setting for social interaction was elaborated: space was the medium of social processes as well as their outcome. Drawing on the work of a range of writers, including Pierre Bourdieu, Alaine Touraine, Roy Bhaskar, Jürgen Habermas and Peter Berger with Thomas Luckmann, and especially inspired by the ‘structurationism’ of the English sociologist
Tony Giddens, society was seen as a real spatial totality, constituted by the routine actions of human agency:

For any given area, over any given time, society may be defined as the agglomeration of all existing institutions, the activities (practices, or modes of behaviour) associated with the institutions, the people participating in the activities, and the structural relations occurring between the people as individuals or collectivities, between such people and the institutions, and between the institutions themselves.\(^{10}\)

The stress was on theorizing the connectedness of social phenomena in space, and Giddens's particular contribution was to consider the role of human agency in reproducing this social structure. His project was introduced to geographers in 1981 by Gregory in these terms:

The central theorem of Giddens's scheme is the 'duality of structure', the claim that social life displays an essential 'recursiveness'. By this he means that in the reproduction of social \textit{life} (through systems of interaction) actors routinely draw upon interpretative schemes, resources and norms which are made available by existing structures of signification, domination and legitimation, and that in doing so they thus immediately and necessarily reconstitute those \textit{structures}: in short, 'the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems'.\(^{11}\)

Through their everyday interactions with people and objects, individuals develop certain kinds of knowledge — conscious, subconscious and ideological — and their subsequent actions based on these kinds of knowledge reproduce a social structure.\(^{12}\) It was argued that this perspective would resolve a central problematic of modern social theory, that of agency and structure. The grand debate in social theory between those stressing the causal power of human subjectivity and meaning — represented in geography by humanists — and those who emphasized structure — marxists in geography — would be ended by the recognition that individual human agents knowledgeably undertaking everyday routine tasks through time and across space produced and reproduced the structures of society, the economy, the polity and culture. The detailed composition of this theoretical framework was developed in a series of key papers in the early 1980s, and consolidated in the collection of essays published in 1985 entitled \textit{Social Relations and Spatial Structures},\(^{13}\) and its general claim is now commonplace among many geographers.
It was argued by Pred and by Thrift, and more cautiously by Gregory and Giddens, that structurationism could be represented diagrammatically by time-geography.¹⁴ Time-geography is a perspective on the temporospatial structuring of social life developed by the Swedish geographer Törsten Hägerstrand. He describes the paths taken by individuals to fulfil their everyday tasks, or projects, using representations of three-dimensional time-space, such as that in Illustration 1. He argues that the interpretation of these maps requires an understanding of the constraints on an individual’s mobility. Hägerstrand identified three general kinds of constraint: capability

Illustration 1 An example of a time-geography diagram.
constraints, which concern the physical limits to movement, including the inability to be in two places at once, the need to sleep and eat, and the type of transport available; coupling constraints, which compel people to come together at certain times and in locations such as factories or schools; and authority constraints, which are social rules banning or encouraging certain temporospatial behaviour, such as laws forbidding those under a certain age to enter bars. For early structurationists, explication of specific constraints involved a reconstituted humanist marxism and the determinate social relations of mediation between society and nature, although other structures, including patriarchy, were also mentioned. Time-space diagrams could then show how ‘the details of social reproduction, individual socialization, and structuration are constantly spelled out by the intersection of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations’. The recursiveness of agency and structure meant that ‘for you and me, for society as a whole, history and everyday life incessantly penetrate one another’. In the new perspective that time-geometry (and structuration) offered to geography, both the constraints on human agency and its thinking consciousness were acknowledged in a manner which tried to avoid both the idealism of humanist geography as well as the often excessive structuralism of marxist geography.

The structurationist theorization of the production and reproduction of social structures by human agency is an ambitious project, and this chapter does not deal with it directly or fully. Instead, I focus on the intersection between structurationism and time-geometry in studies of everyday time-space routines, because this is where feminist time-geometry is located.

**Women’s Time-Space Paths**

Time-geometry was adopted by some of the earliest feminist geographers, and it is not hard to see why: it recovers the everyday and the ordinary, and many feminists have argued that the mundane world of routine is the realm of women’s social life in masculinist society. Examining the lives of women requires attention to the ordinary, to the unexceptional, because women are excluded from arenas of power and prestige; and time-geometry, its proponents claim, is ‘admirably suited to this type of “bottom-up” study’, both theoretically and methodologically. This section examines the relationship between feminism and time-geometry.
Time-geometry and women: some case studies

An indication of the potential of time-geometry for feminist geographers is given by Miller’s series of papers on the time-geometry of suburban life in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century USA. These began as an attempt to rectify geographers’ previous exclusive focus on the male head of the household as the cause of the bourgeois family’s migration to the suburbs in the mid-nineteenth century. It was assumed that he was the one benefiting from improved mass transport, but Miller wanted to know about other members of the family and whether they too enjoyed greater mobility and freedom to travel. Guessing that the women of the household did not, Miller wondered what caused their relative spatial confinement: was it the socio-economic status of the family, the roles of family members, or the relative location of the family’s residence? To answer this, Miller used census data as well as more qualitative sources to reconstruct five hypothetical households of mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia; those of a merchant, a physician, a carpenter, a broker and a phrenologist—and their wives, who did not work for wages. He also modelled the transport network and social geography of Philadelphia in 1850 and 1860, before and after the arrival of the horsecar. He then calculated the time-budgets of the women of each family, considering both capability and coupling constraints, and the social mores, or authority constraints, that would also have affected their lifestyles: for example, women could not go out at night without a chaperone. All the women were responsible for the unpaid domestic labour of the household, and Miller assumed that some would also spend time doing charity work and paying social visits. His conclusion was that women’s free time to do what they wanted to was limited most severely by their responsibility for domestic work in the home. Differences between the women’s mobility depended almost entirely on their family’s ability to pay servants to undertake some of the wife’s labour. A second study by Miller focused on the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and noted that the increasing size of US cities such as Philadelphia meant that servants became more and more reluctant to work in the increasingly distant suburban houses that their wealthy employers wanted to live in, and thus their middle-class mistresses became increasingly able to travel into city centres to shop and socialize. He discusses at some length how this problem was exacerbated by the increase in standards of domestic hygiene towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the way in which this compelled many women to work even harder in the home. The pressures placed on
women's activities by the role of 'experts' and advertising in the mass media is developed in Miller's third paper, on magazine advertisements in the early twentieth century. Through his concern with the temporospatial constraints that structured women's lives, Miller ends up emphasizing the patriarchal 'unwritten rules and customs' about women's domestic role.

The emphasis on women having to fit diverse domestic tasks into limited time-space resources continues in studies of contemporary women's time-geography. A prominent theme in contemporary studies, however, is the increased pressure that women face in combining domestic work with waged work. A recent study summarized the temporospatial impact of women's continuing responsibility for domestic labour on the geography of their waged work thus: 'due to their gender position, women tend to work closer to home, have limited car availability and use the bus more frequently than men'. Jackie Tivers's large survey of women with children under five years old in south London detailed these constraints. Tivers discovered that women often did want to work outside the home for wages, but that they were frequently prevented from doing so by the lack of local childcare facilities. Even shopping trips were not easy for them, as public transport and shopping centres were not designed for women carrying heavy bags and young children. Almost all of the women that she spoke to who did work for wages worked part-time and locally, in low-status jobs. Some women's options were widened if they had access to a car, but in one-car families, the husband usually had first use of it. Fortuijjn and Karsten stressed the importance of different kinds of local labour markets in structuring women's time-geography. They compared women's time-budgets in two towns in the Netherlands: Haarlem, a town with a range of services and work opportunities; and Grootslag, a fairly new dormitory town with few local jobs. They argued that in these two places there were three general types of time-budgets. They described the first, which dominated in Grootslag, as the traditional domestic type. This referred to women who had lots of time but little money; their poverty was caused by not having a job and therefore being unable to afford a car to drive to work elsewhere. The second type was described as the new local type, with a tight time-budget and a tight money-budget; they worked locally part-time and did their own domestic work, but valued their leisure time highly. The third type was the new mobile type, who had a restricted time-budget but ample money; these owned a car and often travelled a long way to good jobs, and they paid for domestic services. The latter two types dominated in Haarlem.

These studies stress the constraints placed on women because of
their domestic role, and argue that gender relations structure their time-space patterns; time-geography is being used to reveal the map of everyday patriarchy. However, Isabel Dyck's work suggests some ways in which women may resist the pressures involved in combining home and work. Her ethnography of mothers' daily lives in an outer suburb of Vancouver places their experiences in the context of local economic restructuring and women's increasing participation in the waged labour force. She examines the guilt that many women feel about leaving their children in order to go out to work, but suggests that their very responsibility for mothering creates a spatially segregated social world in which women, as neighbours and friends bound by a shared concern for children, endow mothering with their own collectively negotiated meanings. To some extent, women rework the views of the 'experts' on what a good mother is, and Dyck argues that this allows them to ease the tension that they perceive between going out to work and remaining a good mother. Women are not just the victims of patriarchal constraints, then; they contest the ideological limits placed on what they are allowed to do.

These studies show that time-geography can access the way in which women are shaped by the changing masculinist definitions of femininity and domesticity. It can reveal the complex roles and tasks allotted to women, and demonstrate differences between women across places and classes. Time-geography can offer accurate descriptions of the spatial consequences of a masculinist (and classist) society, especially through its revelation of the time-space zoning in the home and neighbourhood of many women's domestic activities. It emphasizes the reproduction of patriarchy in the banal activities of everyday life. But its webs represent not only the complex outcome of constraint; they also evidence women's contestation of those limits. As Dyck's important work shows, time-geography can also highlight how women negotiate those pressures, and even contest them. Her work reinforces Miller's claim that in order 'to examine social change we should look at social practice as it grows out of the everyday activities of individuals, keeping in mind that the relationship between individuals and structure is a dialectical one, materially continuous in time and space'. Time-geography's nets of paths and projects can weave with clarity a story of women's routines and resistances.

Time-geography and feminism: some doubts

The point of locating women in the everyday, and using time-geography to elucidate the restrictions on women's lives, was to show that women's lives were different from men's. This was usually seen in
terms of differences in mobility, in movement through time-space, and in the constraints which caused this differential geography. However, it seems to me that this work, often only implicitly, also speaks about other kinds of differences, the implications of which are quite serious for time-geography's claim to represent social life and human agency as a whole. In particular, feminist work points to a kind of gendered subjectivity which produces a specific kind of feminine sociality.

Women's distinctiveness has often been associated by feminists with the maternal and the domestic, as noted in chapter 1. These associations have been made by a diverse range of feminists. Eco-feminists, for example, see housekeeping and child-rearing as the key experiences which teach women to be more caring and tender, and argue that this femininity is inevitable for all women because women mother. Mothering is argued to involve a strong sense of the bodily: 'it can mean the experiencing of one's own body and emotions in a powerful way'.29 Others, rejecting such biological determinism, follow the work of Nancy Chodorow and argue that women's psychic relationship to mothering produces a different, more interrelational subjectivity than men's.30 Anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo, for example, relied on Chodorow's arguments in a highly influential paper, published in 1974, on the distinction between the public and the domestic.31 Rosaldo suggested that since, unlike boys, girls never have to distinguish themselves from their mothers, they continue to define themselves in terms of their relationships with other people; she then claimed that women's domestic sociality is interpersonal and particularistic. Still others, such as sociologist Dorothy Smith, agree about the nature of women's subjectivity, but argue that it is a consequence of women's specific role in the division of labour, not its cause. Smith argues that since under patriarchy women's everyday, local, particular experience of labour is that of work which services other people, women's consciousness will involve 'a subordination of attentiveness to self and a focus on others'.32 Smith refers to both waged and unwaged labour, but suggests that the work of the 'housewife' exemplifies this focus on others. Aptheker also suggests that 'women's actual experiences' of domestic tasks create 'a consciousness of social reality that is different from that put forth by men',33 and that this consciousness is one of nurturance and sustenance.

There are difficulties with each of these arguments: some are essentialist, others universalist; and all may neglect differences among women. Nevertheless, for the moment, I want strategically to agree with this feminist claim that women are different in these ways from men; that the routine work of mothering and domesticity does create a
specifically feminine kind of subjectivity and sociality. I provisionally agree not because I want to argue that all women are different in the same way from all men, but because I want to be able to ask: Can time-geography speak fully of this so-called womanly subjectivity, of this possible difference? There are hints in the literature examined in the last subsection that it cannot. None of the contemporary studies use their interview material to elaborate at any length on the emotional attachments between mothers and children, for example; Dyck's otherwise excellent ethnography seems oddly muted in this respect. Miller complains that, having used time-geography for its emphasis on human agency, he has nevertheless produced an account that is more structural than agential – women and their feelings somehow got lost. It is as if feminist time-geographers refer to a world of nurturing and caring of which time-geography cannot quite let them speak. (The strictures on writing 'proper' geography discussed in the previous chapter are surely relevant here.) This impression is confirmed by feminist historian Mary Ryan. In her study of the formation of the middle class of Oneida County, New York, between 1790 and 1865, she undertakes a detailed case study explicitly in order to look at the full range of social relations in a place as they were made and remade by its inhabitants. Although not a time-geography, she presents an implicitly structurationist account of 'an active arena where purposeful human agency jostles problematically with tendential social determinations to shape everyday activity, particularise social change, and etch into place the course of time and the making of history'. Ryan describes the shift from an agrarian economy confined to the regional market, to an early form of industrial capitalism focused on the textile mills at New York Mills a few miles away; and finally, by 1850, to full integration with the national and international economy centred on New York City. Her account of the recursive relationship between this system integration and the lives and identities of Oneida inhabitants is rich and complex, partly because of her detailed use of the letters and diaries of local people, which pays special attention to gender. She shows how individual strategies were influenced by and in turn influenced the wider socio-economic system in which they were spatially and temporally positioned. A successful structurationist history? It would seem so. But towards the end of her book Ryan confesses to a certain unease with her text. She summarizes its overall argument thus:

The women's welfare system was but one element in a complex and gerrymandered women's sphere, part of a whole social geography of gender that meshed with its male complement to ensure the pro-
duction and reproduction of urban society. In its structure and operation, this system seems like a clever piece of social machinery, with multiple, interconnected parts, regularly oiled with a supportive ideology (both the myth of the self-made man and the cult of true womanhood) and functioning smoothly to meet social needs and guarantee social order.37

There are several possible causes of her text's over-coherence, one of which, for example, may be her desire to produce a more carefully specified account of the connection between the cult of domesticity and industrial capitalism than previous historians. But what makes Ryan unhappy are the exclusions produced by her text's overwhelming sense of order. The nature of these exclusions is revealed in her concluding discussion, almost a postscript, of what she had not until then found an appropriate moment to speak of: the personal pain of women who did not fit the system, the anguish of mothers who had lost children or women who could not have them, the grief of widows, and the biography of an Oneida County woman who became a feminist campaigner. In other words, Ryan's autocrìte highlights exactly the same omissions as I have noted in relation to time-geography: the emotional, the passionate, the disruptive, and the feelings of relations with others.

When many feminists focus on the everyday they see a profound difference between the public and the private (and the masculine and the feminine) within the social, and they celebrate the emotions of mothering and the nurturing compassion they find in the domestic. However, despite its claims to exhaustive knowledge of the social, time-geography appears to find it difficult to acknowledge this domestic sociality. It is women and emotion which Ryan has to add in at the end of her study and which Miller feels are erased in some way; time-geography seems to neglect what many feminists have argued is women's difference from men. Women are somehow not quite addressed by time-geography; time-geography appears to erase a difference in the everyday which feminists associate with women. Yet if, as so many feminists have argued, the public/private distinction is central to particular constructions of masculinity and femininity, time-geography's ignorant of the domestic may mean that time-geography itself represents only public space. Its claims to exhaustiveness would then depend on repressing any differences from itself. In order to examine this possibility, the next section strategically elaborates all that is associated with the feminine and the domestic – the particular, the relational, the emotional, and also the bodily – in order to see if, in
contrast, the universal claims of time-geography turn into something rather more specific – the disembodied, the universal, the individualistic, the passionless, the masculine, the public.\footnote{It tactically recovers a repressed Other in order to mark the Same.}

**Time-geography and Hegemonic Masculinity**

For many feminists, both the nurturant sociality and the oppressiveness of the everyday is embodied. In her comments on the importance of the everyday to feminism, for example, de Lauretis argues that ‘the stakes, for women, are rooted in the body’.\footnote{Feminism insists on the body as a site of struggle. ‘Your body is a battleground’, goes a recent pro-abortion slogan, and Adrienne Rich exhorts us to consider:}

The politics of pregnability and motherhood. The politics of orgasm. The politics of rape and incest, of abortion, birth control, forcible sterilization. Of prostitution and marital sex. Of what had been named sexual liberation. Of prescriptive heterosexuality. Of lesbian existence.\footnote{This is a politics of struggle against the control of women's bodies by men, and against the entrapment of women through that control. Many feminists have argued that the body – the bleeding body, the pregnant body – is central to an understanding of women’s oppression by and difference from men. This argument, like that about the everyday, can take different forms. It can be biologically determinist; but this chapter’s tactical concern with the bodily follows de Lauretis’s stress on the representation of the body. Her comment on the everyday that the stakes, for women, are rooted in the body continues, ‘which is not to say that the body escapes representation, but quite the opposite’.\footnote{Her claim that bodies matter is a response to the crucial place of the body in Western masculinist culture. Although some feminists continue to invoke a brute body, its processes and reactions unmediated by cultural encodings of their significance, others such as de Lauretis are now exploring the meanings given to the body’s materiality: in the words of Denise Riley, ‘in a strong sense the body is a concept’.\footnote{In contrast to the commonsense understanding of the body as completely natural, in this literature bodies are understood as interpreted ‘in a milieu of social meaning and value’ which creates what Gatens calls the ‘imaginary body’: ‘the imaginary body is developed, learnt, connected to the body-image of others and is not}
The notion of the body as natural is seen as a cultural construction, and bodies matter to these feminist accounts because certain socially constituted relations and identities become naturalized when their source is claimed to be the body. The construction of different kinds of bodies – male and female, say – naturalizes social difference, with profound consequences. If women are ‘naturally’ less rational than men, for example, their exclusion from the academy becomes ‘natural’ too. The cultural meanings of bodies legitimate certain power relations. Yeatman challenges the naturalization of women’s difference, of women’s sociality, by problematizing the conflation of domestic sociality, women, childbirth, mothering and nature:

The critical point here is that this reproductive identity or role is no simple biological datum. It is a value-laden complex of meaning that is integrally bound up within a wider symbolic structure concerning who men and women are, and what parentage is. Yeatman refuses an essentialist account of difference while arguing that difference as it is presently constituted matters enormously. She thus simultaneously asserts that there is no brute biology underlying social relations, and makes a claim for the centrality of bodies to conceptions of social life.

Bodies also seem central to time-geography, because the routine actions of individual human agents in time and space, producing and reproducing social structures, are represented by the paths that their bodies follow. But it is these paths that define Hägerstrand’s oddly minimalist account of the body. In reference to the body, he notes only that an individual cannot be in two places at once, and that certain constraints are imposed by the need to eat and sleep, comments so obvious as to be unobjectionable. Movements of bodies which cannot be explained with reference to these inherent limits to a body’s possibilities of locating itself in time-space are assumed to stem from social, cultural or economic causes. This, of course, is one reason for feminist geographers’ use of time-geography to reveal the restrictions that women face on their mobility: it allows masculinism to reveal itself as an unnatural constraint on women’s lives. However, when our attention is directed towards social constraints in this way, the body itself is rendered unproblematic. Indeed, it virtually disappears altogether, for the body in Hägerstrand’s account becomes its path – it is reduced to its movement. As Hägerstrand says, ‘people are not paths, but they cannot avoid drawing them in space-time’. In this context, I can only echo Riley’s comment that ‘the queer neutrality of
the phrase "the body" in its strenuous colourlessness suggests that something is up. Time-geography tries to ignore the body; the next subsection rescues it from its invisibility.

**Western bodies: possessed and repressed**

I can begin by noting that the body/path of time-geography is undifferentiated: all bodies are the same because no body is specified; and these bodies are any bodies, or so they claim. But their very lack of defining characteristics begins to specify them. They are literally colourless, for example; the trace that they leave does not tell whether the body is white or black. Skin does matter to these bodies though, since a corporeal boundary is assumed by time-geographers in their claim that external (to the body) social relations are internalized by human agents in the course of their life-path. This sense of a bounded body has implications for its biology. This biology is a peculiarly selective one, since bodily processes which transgress the boundary between inside and outside the body – childbirth, say, or menstruation – are ignored as characteristics of the body when it is reduced to its path. To emphasize other ways of imagining the body, Iris Marion Young has described childbirth for women who have chosen to become pregnant and can give birth safely precisely in terms of bodily boundary confusions:

... the birthing process entails the most extreme suspension of the bodily distinction between inner and outer. As the months and weeks progress, increasingly I feel my insides, strained and pressed, and increasingly feel the movement of a body inside me. Through pain and blood and water this inside thing emerges between my legs, for a short while both inside and outside me.

In contrast, the agency of time-geography is clearly delimited and bounded – its paths mesh but never merge, always individual. There is no bodily passion or desire.

But whose, then, is the minimalist, colourless, bounded body/path that represents human agency? Feminist historians offer an answer in the context of their arguments that two of the most important ways of encoding bodies now are through their gender and sexuality. Some of the historical shifts towards this interpretation of the body have been traced, and Riley claims that from the seventeenth century onwards it has become more and more difficult to speak of 'the' body, because since then bodies have become read more and more by masculinist
science through a bipolar understanding of gender and sexual orientation. Poovey has drawn on the arguments of Laquer to suggest that the nineteenth century in particular witnessed an enormous amount of ideological work which strengthened the masculine/feminine dualism, both establishing gender difference and assuming heterosexuality. Medical discourse in general, and gynaecology in particular, argued that women’s spontaneous ovulation meant that they were dominated by their reproductive system. This particular reading of their bodies meant that women were represented as natural creatures, beyond culture and society, compelled to remain in the private domestic sphere by their natural maternal instinct. Victorian racism also legitimized its assertions about black sexuality and white superiority by citing biological difference. Far from being natural, then, bodies are ‘maps of power and identity’; or, rather, maps of the relation between power and identity.

However, the construction of imaginary bodies involves what Wolff describes as both the repression and possession of ‘the’ body. While white bourgeois men classify others through oppressive interpretations of Others’ embodiment (possession), they assume that they themselves are only contained by their body, not controlled by it (repression). As Simone de Beauvoir sardonically notes at the beginning of *The Second Sex*:

...there is an absolute human type, the masculine. Woman has ovaries, a uterus: these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it.

A history of the white masculine heterosexual bourgeois body in Euro-America can therefore be told in terms of a series of denials of its corporeality. Elias has traced that body’s loss of vulgar and feminine orifices and excretions from the seventeenth century onwards, for example: the civilized body was one with limited and carefully controlled passages between its inside and outside. This corporeality was merely a container for a consciousness capable of classifying others, for the Enlightened masculine mind was argued to be clearly separate
from and untainted by its body. This Enlightenment dualism between mind and body, which saw the mind as rational and the body as the place of emotion, passion and confusion, has been discussed by Bordo. She examines the importance of a ‘complete intellectual transcendence of the bodily’ in the work of Descartes. The concern with clear boundaries is an expression of separation not only from Man’s own body, then, but also from others represented as less able to overcome theirs. And, as Bordo has also argued, the denial of the body is still central to Western masculinity.

The notation of the body in time-geography as a path which does not merge depends on this particular masculine repression of the bodily. This bounded body and its role as a neutral container of rationality both contribute to the idea that we are socialized by internalizing lessons which the ‘outside’ world teaches us when we act in it. This is the model of socialization used in time-geographic accounts, as we have seen. The unbroken border between inside and outside which this assumes is not only masculinist, however; it is also racist. It represents itself as colourless skin, but in racist discourse, ‘the body could not be separated from its colour’. Colour is a key signifier of difference, but only those seen as different from the master subject are designated ‘coloured’. Whiteness retains its hegemonic position by denying its own colour and so becoming transparent to the critical gaze. Critiques of whiteness stress the importance of absence to the representation of the ‘white’ body, an absence of colour. Yet in time-geography there are apparently colourless bodies. This white masculinist self-representation as a number of denials of its own embodiment accounts for the minimalism of time-geography’s account of embodied agency: it is an effort to be limited in as few ways as possible by corporeality.

It is now possible to understand more fully why Ryan has to add the emotions and passions of the body on at the end of her account, instead of being able to integrate them within it. Her stories of women’s anger and frustration, of the domestic grief of wives and mothers, speak of relations with others through love or maternity or desire. So do feminist geographers’ accounts of mothers and their time-space zoning, with their implicit stories of childbirth and love: ‘I’m very involved with my kids – they come first before anything else’. It is these kinds of emotional and physical fusion between people which time-geography cannot admit in its reduction of human agency to a path and its consequent masculinist, bourgeois and racist repressions of the body. Ryan has to add these in almost as a postscript because the
agency of time-geography embodies masculinity to the exclusion of passion; as Judith Butler suggests, 'the denial of the body... reveals itself as nothing other than the embodiment of denial'.

Public life, public space, public theory

Time-geography embodies an agency that purports to be human but, as we have seen, this agency inhabits a masculine (no)body. This subsection considers whether the space that these agents travel through is also masculine.

Like the embodiment of its agency, there is little discussion in the time-geography literature about space itself: it is taken for granted as the medium of social life. However, a rare attempt to articulate its sense of space is revealing. It emphasizes space as infinitude and unboundedness, transparency; it is simply everywhere, and what is stressed above all is the liberty possible in this space: 'it is freedom to run, to leap, to stretch and reach out without bounds – and without constraint'. And even though time-geography focuses on constraints, its language is untouched by the experiences of being constrained, by the feelings that come with the knowledge that spaces are not necessarily without constraint. Sexual attacks warn women every day that their bodies are not meant to be in certain spaces, and racist and homophobic violence delimits the spaces of black, lesbian and gay communities. Thinking about bodies and emotions against their repression by time-geography, then, does not only invoke the pleasures and desires, lovers and children, of the previous section. It can also invoke violence and horror, brutality and fear. In its erasure of these experiences, time-geography speaks the feeling of spatial freedom which only white heterosexual men usually enjoy.

Many feminists have looked at women’s unease in and fear of public spaces, and many argue that ‘women’s sense of security in public spaces is profoundly shaped by our inability to secure an undisputed right to occupy that space’. Feminist geographers Gill Valentine and Rachel Pain have examined the effects of women’s fear of attack on their mobility. June Jordan argues that there is:

... a universal experience for women, which is that physical mobility is circumscribed by our gender and by the enemies of our gender. This is one of the ways they seek to make us know their hatred and respect it. This holds throughout the world for women and literally we are not to move about in the world freely. If we do then we have to understand that we may have to pay for it with our bodies. That is
the threat. They don’t ask you what you are doing in the street, they rape you and mutilate you bodily to let you remember your place. You have no rightful place in public.66

Following these arguments, the group of feminist designers called Matrix note that ‘many men still perceive women’s sexuality as partly defined by their location’.67 Valentine has noted the connection between the public and the private which underlies this masculinist perception of women’s place.68 She argues that women are seen as properly belonging to the domestic sphere, and she notes how vulnerable to men’s violence this makes women, both inside and outside the home: inside, it is no-one else’s concern; outside, she deserved it.

The most sustained elaboration of the masculinity of public space is found in feminist critiques of arguments about the ability to undertake political action in the public sphere. Although, in political theory since Plato, ‘the existence of a distinct sphere of private, family life, separated off from the realm of public life, leads to the exaggeration of women’s biological differences from men, to the perception of women as primarily suited to fulfill special “female” functions within the home, and consequently to the justification of the monopoly by men of the whole outside world’,69 feminists have detected historical inflections in the justifications for the exclusion of women from politics. The key period in these discussions is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the development of ideologies of nationalism and individualism which allowed only certain people the ability to be active individuals in the national polity. The realm of the public and the political was constructed as one of rationality, individuality, self-control and hence masculinity, since only men could be fully rational individuals, free from passionate attachments. Citizenship, the ability to participate in politics and public life, was limited to (property-owning) men, and feminist geographer Sallie Marston has explored the political exclusions of such discourses in the context of citizenship in the USA.70 The body politic was masculine, but this individualism did not preclude certain forms of collective action: indeed, the public is the sphere of collectivities, and Pateman has explored in detail the form that this collectivity takes in order not to lose the individualism of its components – the contract. Pateman focuses on the seventeenth-century contract theorists, and renames their social contract a ‘fraternal social contract’.71 The term ‘fraternal’ comes from her reading of Freud’s story of the overthrow of the primal father by his sons, and she uses it to distinguish this ‘new, specifically modern’ form of patriarchy from the earlier political theory based on the powerful father. Both the
citizen and the contract are explicitly opposed in classical political philosophy to the particularistic bonds of the feminine family and private life; and both become meaningful through the exclusion of the domestic as the world of unreason:

The separation of 'paternal' from political rule, or the family from the public sphere, is also the separation of women from men through the subjection of women to men... the fraternal social contract creates a new, modern patriarchal social order that is presented as divided into two spheres: civil society, or the universal sphere of freedom, equality, individualism, reason, contract and impartial law – the realm of men or 'individuals'; and the private world of particularity, natural subjection, ties of blood, emotion, love and sexual passion – the world of women, in which men also rule.72

Riley notes too that femininity became 'intimate, particular, familial, pre-rational, extra-civic, soaked in its sexual being' from the late seventeenth century onwards.73 Other writers such as Okin and Elshtain focus on the eighteenth century, especially Rousseau's emphasis on women's innate domestic nature and its importance to affective rather than to public political life.74 By 1785, when Jacques-Louis David painted the 'Oath of the Horatii', masculine and feminine bodies were starkly differentiated in relation to the public. On the left and in the centre of the canvas the men stand erect and rigid, caught in the act of swearing loyalty to the greater good of the state; their spoken oath binds them to action and battle. Citizenship, the formal right of entry into political discussion, is represented by the ideals of autonomy and selfhood which constitute masculinity and masculine bodies. In contrast to this bounded masculine body, on the right of the canvas swoon a group of women; silent, passive, grieving and intertwined, their softness, emotionality and marginality to the action embodies their exclusion from the masculine, public and political sphere.75 Through the masculinization of the body politic, public space was also represented as a masculine arena.

This construction of public space as masculine does not go uncontested, nor is it without contradictions. Some women – from the Communard citoyennes to Take Back the Night marches – have struggled to reconstruct public space by demanding equal rights in it for, as Jones remarks, a 'new claim on public space' also implies 'a new social form'.76 Feminist geographers using time-geography offer a similar challenge to its space. Just as they implicitly challenge its disembodied human agent, so have they hinted that there are more
spaces than meets its eye. Dyck argues that the construction of motherhood through the everyday negotiation of meanings in particular spaces means that women’s conceptions of space may alter; ‘women generate definitions and understandings of appropriate modes of mothering and the spaces within which this takes place through the recurrent practices of mothering work beyond the immediate confines of the home’. By watching their children playing in the street, women get to talk with other mothers – their neighbours – and networks develop which establish a safe place for their children beyond the confines of the home, as well as renegotiating the meaning of motherhood. Dyck is suggesting that the social constitution of different identities may also imply different kinds of space. This implies that everyday space is not only not self-evidently innocent, but also bound into various and diverse social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power. The possible contradictions created by this complexity have been the subject of several recent studies by feminist historians of the public/private distinction.

Outram suggests that the masculine claim to public space is potentially fragile not only because of these contestations of its meaning, but also because what it excludes can erupt into it; moreover, its masculinization through a certain policing of bodies means that every new body requires disciplining in order to guarantee its reconstitution. This policing can be violent. In her discussion of the costs of the fraternal contract, Pateman stresses that the military exemplifies fraternities in action, and espies ‘the figure of the armed man in the shadows behind the civil individual’. Thus she makes a link between the contract and the violence with which public spaces are kept as white masculine, heterosexual spaces. This bounded individualism, with its violence, remains as a condition of hegemonic masculinity and citizenship today, as Watney makes clear in his discussion of men with AIDS in the UK. He argues that they are not seen as worthy of the same rights as full citizens because their sexuality transgresses the boundaries of acceptable, masculine behaviour; gay men too are victims of violence in the public streets of this masculine individual, of course.

To conclude this section: in Haraway’s description of the individualism of masculine subjectivity, its particular geography is also revealed. She speaks of the ‘“West’s” escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space’. Haraway’s ‘space’ is the outer space in which the male astronaut survives alone supported only by his technology, entirely distant from other people and from Mother Earth, and this is
precisely the space which Gould suggests is used in time-geography.\textsuperscript{83} The space of time-geography, then, seems to be the dominant space of patriarchy: public, masculine space, which fully acknowledges only (repressed) white heterosexual bourgeois masculine bodies. The ability to act in the public sphere, as opposed to breed in the private, is a privilege violently reserved for men, and the human agency produced in time-geography also speaks only of this masculine sociality and its public spaces. Buttimer’s description of time-geography as a \emph{danse macabre} seems entirely appropriate.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{The Constitution of a Masculinity Through Time-geography}

This chapter has argued so far that both the human agency and the space through which it moves in time-geography are masculine; they are constructed in the image of the master subject. For all its claims to self-evident reality, to be ‘anchored in certain basic facts of life’,\textsuperscript{85} and to represent those facts objectively, time-geography assumes unproblematized but in fact highly specific theorizations of society and space, and of the bodies which constitute human agency, and this specificity excludes other socialities, spaces and bodies from knowledge. Its notions of agency and space are taken for granted as universal, and other understandings are thereby refused. This is masculinism’s false exhaustiveness of the Same. Although it is difficult to think of anywhere beyond the mapping capabilities of this kind of geographer, it is not impossible, as I have argued. There are other spaces, and other kinds of subjectivity. The erasure of such different subjectivities and socialities means that time-geography makes a claim to power through its knowledge. I now want to address this power/knowledge relation more directly. In particular, I want to suggest that this masculinism is not only an effect of a specific masculinity; it also constitutes that masculinity.

Geographers believe that space can always be known and mapped; space is understood as absolutely knowable. That is what its transparency, its innocence, signifies: it is infinitely knowable; there are no hidden corners into which time-geography cannot penetrate. This is a necessary consequence of its search for totality; for if the societies structured through space are understood as wholly visible, as they are in time-geography, then space must be wholly representable. It is real, natural and unproblematic: time-geography’s space clearly presents no problem to its theorizers. The visual has always been central to masculinist claims to know, as chapter 5 here elaborates. Seeing was
certainly important to the emergence of the social sciences towards the end of the nineteenth century. Philanthropists, journalists, early social scientists and voyeurs of every sort then went into the city to gaze at its horrors and systematize its dreadful spaces: they wanted to see completely and so to produce and control knowledge of urban social life. Contemporary cities are subjected to the same heroic feats of interpretation: Los Angeles is probably the best example of a city interpreted by great men from their lofty vantage points.

Implicit in this claim to see all and know all are the subjectivity and compulsions of the bounded body that I have already described as the object of time-geography. I want to suggest that this imaginary body is also the author of time-geography. Remember that the construction of imaginary bodies involves both the repression and possession of the body. Fundamental to its construction and possession of other imaginary bodies is the masculinist denial of the male body; others are trapped in their brute materiality by the rational minds of white men. This erasure of his own specificity allows the master subject to assume that he can see everything. In our own time, Haraway has talked about the contemporary escalation of this 'unmarked category' through the proliferation of visual technologies: 'vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice'. As Ryan implies at the end of her representation of society as a piece of well-oiled machinery, no cog or gear snagging or grating, everything accounted for, time-geographers seem to be pulling the god-trick hard and fast. Their masculine consciousness peers into the world, denying its own positionality, mapping its spaces in the same manner in which Western white male bodies explored, recorded, surveyed and appropriated spaces from the sixteenth century onwards: from a disembodied location free from sexual attack or racist violence. Space for them is everywhere; nowhere is too threatening or too different for them to go. Time-geographers become the invisible observers of social life, tracing its patterns and making sense of it all, its reproduction, resistance and contradiction.

The contemporary character of this particular masculinity can be caught by paraphrasing Haraway: objects come to us simultaneously as indubitable recordings of what is simply there and as heroic feats of social-scientific production. The heroism of being able to know what really exists both depends on a certain masculinity and constitutes it. Time-geographers' particular masculinity is established through their assumption that all space is white, bourgeois, heterosexual masculine
public space. They deny other possibilities, including an Other; the domestic is not addressed as the Other of public space – it is ignored. The costs of its claim to truth through privileged position and universalized categories have been summarized by Deutsche:

In the act of denying the discursive character of those objects, such depictions also disavow the condition of subjectivity as a partial and situated position, positing instead an autonomous subject who observes social conflicts from a privileged and unconflicted place. As this total vantage point can be converted from fantasy into reality only by denying the relational character of subjectivity and by relegating other viewpoints – different subjectivities – to invisible, subordinate, or competing positions, foundational totalizations are systems that seek to immunize themselves against uncertainty and difference. 

I will call this denial of the Other (as well as the claims of others) in order to establish a claim to know what is really there ‘social-scientific masculinity’. Transparent space, as an expression of social-scientific masculinity's desire for total vision and knowledge, denies the possibility of different spaces being known by other subjects.

However, feminist geographers working with time-geography do refer to different spaces and other worlds; they focus on women's everyday world and the centrality of women's embodiment. This chapter has elaborated their implicit references to a feminized realm of mothering and bodies, of blood spilt for love and in violence, of passion, desire and hate, in order to reveal the specificity of time-geography. The aim of that elaboration of time-geography's repressed Other was to mark the unproblematized universal spaces and bodies of time-geography as masculine (and white and straight and middle-class), and to that extent my strategy succeeded, I think. But that strategy also has its risks, and these are examined in chapter 4. Meanwhile, chapter 3 elaborates another feminist tactic in response to another kind of masculinity.
Place is one of geography's most fundamental concepts. Places differ one from another in that each is a specific set of interrelationships between environmental, economic, social, political and cultural processes – what Lukermann has called a 'bounded element complex'\(^1\) – and geography has always been concerned with elucidating these complexes. Place is thus a central theme of the discipline, and its theoretical elaboration has been correspondingly diverse. The particular development examined in this chapter, however, is that of humanistic geography. Place was the geographical concept with which humanistic geographers mostly worked, and as a result they are responsible for much of its current connotive baggage. They focused on the emotional response of people to places: places for them were locations which, through being experienced by ordinary people, became full of human significance. Humanistic geographers tried to recover the ways in which places were perceived, arguing that it was impossible to make sense of the social world unless academics listened to the interpretations of those who lived in it.

The humanistic conceptualization of place must be understood as a response to the positivism which dominated the discipline in the 1960s. Humanistic geographers characterized positivism as a form of scientific rationality, and they had two, related, criticisms of it. The first was that scientific rationality could not explain the causes of the patterns that it could model and correlate with such technical sophistication, because it was uninterested in the social and political processes in which spatial patterns were embedded. The second was a disbelief in the claims to objectivity and neutrality made by practitioners of
statistical and positivistic techniques. In a key text of humanistic
geography, Ley and Samuels were in no doubt about the impossibility
of value-free science; 'that the sciences, and especially the social
sciences, either reinforced the status quo or else ignored the ethical
debate surrounding the intellectual community in the name of neutrality,
detachment, or objectivity, seemed, at least to many, an admission of
academic irrelevance, not to mention the height of hypocrisy'. In a
context of global pollution, poverty and war, humanistic geographers
argued that such an evasion of social, economic and political processes
was unacceptable. Moreover, they perceived a link between scientific
knowledge and these environmental and social problems. They argued
that the former led to the latter:

For all its munificence, the overarching growth ethic, highlighted by
an explosive technology both on the planet and in extraterrestrial
space, increasingly appeared as the bearer of monumental self-
destruction. The convergence of science and technology, once the
Promethean harbinger of utopian society, began to emerge more as a
central villain in the exhaustion and despoilation of man's [sic] own
environment. The linking of scientific rationality and politics, once
the hallmark of enlightened democracy, began to emerge as the chief
mechanism for a stronger, of a more subtle and less penetrable,
despotism.

Academic geographers were asked to consider whether their own
concern to build an objective, neutral science of space in fact cloaked
their complicity in global inequality and exploitation; for surely,
argued humanistic geographers (and marxist ones too), the positivist
emphasis on quantitative technique only served to hide the conflicts
in values which an unequal world produced. Were not geographers
simply describing patterns of inequality and injustice when the point,
surely, was to change them?

That these ethical and moral arguments required conceptual shifts
was an argument made by both humanistic and marxist geographers
during the 1970s. Humanist Ann Buttimer claimed in 1976 that 'to heal
the wasteland and to erode the anachronisms and injustices in our
current modes of regionalizing space demands more than campaigns
against hunger, poverty, and international war; a radical re-orientation
of thought and vision within geography is also required'; and after
David Harvey's enormously influential conversion to Marx in his book
Social Justice and The City, published in 1973, more and more marxist
geographers made similar claims. However, Ley's response to Harvey's
text reveals why he at least refused to follow the marxist path. Harvey
had developed a rigorous but very abstract economic analysis, and Ley argued that this kind of marxism was in fact quite similar to the positivist geography that Harvey thought he was leaving behind: Ley pointed in particular to the reductionism, determinism and refusal to interrogate the sources of their claims to know the world, which he felt were shared by both positivism and Harvey's marxism. As an alternative to the epistemological inhumanities of scientific rationality, whether positivist or marxist, Ley and other humanistic geographers demanded a return to what they termed 'Man' in all his depth and complexity. (I will consider this use of 'Man' more fully later in this chapter.) Ley and Samuels wanted 'man put back together again with all the pieces in place, including a heart and even a soul, with feelings as well as thoughts, with some semblance of secular and perhaps transcendental meaning'; Man should be 'back in the center of things as both a producer and a product of his world'. It was bringing such arguments about the importance of people's meanings and feelings into geography which created the concern for the importance of place to human life, for place raised precisely the question of human meaning. Yi-Fu Tuan argued that:

*How a mere space becomes an intensely human place is a task for the humanistic geographer; it appeals to such distinctively humanist interests as the nature of experience, the quality of the emotional bond to physical objects, and the role of concepts and symbols in the creation of place identity.*

Place was the key humanistic geography concept; in contrast to spaces, which were represented through scientifically rational measurements of location, places were full of human interpretation and significance. For Relph, 'to be human is to live in a world that is filled with significant places: to be human is to have and to know your place'. Humanistic geographers recognized the precedents of their own concerns in the earlier work of geographers such as Vidal de la Blache, J. K. Wright and David Lowenthal, but their own positions were developed through an interpretation of existentialism and phenomenology. Through these philosophies, humanistic geographers sought to recover the essence of the experience of place.

Even from this brief introduction to humanistic geography, it is possible to see several important differences between their approach and that of the time-geographers examined in the previous chapter. 'Places' are not transparent like time-geographic 'space', for example, but are laden with meanings, including the meaning attached to place.
by the geographer. As a result of this claim, interpretations by humanistic geographers tended to be more self-aware than the gaze of time-geographers; humanistic geography did make some effort to reflect on and problematize its own position. And, as I will show, its awareness of its own involvement in the production of knowledge about senses of place also led humanistic geography to try to overcome some of the divisions which, I argued, structured time-geographers' claims to know – between subject and object, between analysis and emotion, between mind and body. Ley and Samuels described this as the holism of humanistic geography,¹¹ and in some ways it offers a critique of the social-scientific masculinity outlined in the previous chapter. The first section of this chapter elaborates this possibility. The two other aspects of humanistic studies noted by Ley and Samuels – reflexivity and anthropocentrism – are examined in the second and third sections.

To say that humanistic geography is very different from time-geography is not to suggest that humanistic geography is itself feminist, however. Very few feminists in the discipline have worked with humanistic ideas, because humanistic geography has not adequately theorized the broader social power relations which in all sorts of ways structure experiences of place. In 1984 a group of feminist geographers remarked that ‘humanists tend to show a general concern for the way in which ordinary people are subject to various forms of authority, rather than analysing the specific forms of exploitation and oppression that occur’.¹² This is certainly a serious flaw in much humanistic work, and more recent studies of place have begun to address the interrelation of power and place: this development will be explored in detail in chapter 5. However, this chapter focuses more on the power implicit in the epistemological claims of earlier humanistic work. In the second section, I examine the reflexivity of humanistic geography in order to examine its claims to know. I suggest that humanistic work makes its claims about being able to access the essence of place in a highly authoritative manner. The following section on the anthropocentrism of humanistic geography argues that those claims are masculinist because the essence of place is theorized in terms of an implicit masculine norm. The possibility of other experiences of place – some women's, say – is ignored.

This masculinism is not the same as the masculinism of time-geography, however, as the fourth section here shows. Like time-geography, humanistic geography erases what may be the very different interpretations of geography made by women (among others): unlike time-geography, its discourse explicitly depends on a feminized con-
cept. I argue that humanistic geography feminizes its notion of place. This makes it a very different kind of masculinity from that of time-geography. Whereas the latter’s social-scientific masculinity repressed all reference to a feminized Other in order to establish a claim to exhaustive knowledge, humanistic geographers acknowledge an Other in the form of place itself. The masculinity of humanistic geographers is then asserted through their sensitivity to place. I call this ‘aesthetic masculinity’, and its particular relationship to its Other requires a particular form of critique. The masculinism of its epistemology is characterized not by an overt repression of its Other, but by confronting its Other: it erases women, not by ignoring all that is associated with them, but by engendering its explicit Other through masculinist notions of Woman. This particular kind of masculinist exhaustiveness requires a critique which denies the conflation of women with this Other. This chapter thus adopts the second kind of feminist strategy outlined in chapter 1; I try to distinguish between women and Woman. I try to deny the connection between place as the humanists imagine it and women as complex and diverse social subjects. To do so I draw in part on certain socialist-feminist accounts of women in community action and urban social movements: community is a term from this literature which humanistic geographers often equate with ‘place’. These studies are of women campaigning to change the conditions of their home or neighbourhood, and they problematize the association between femininity and domesticity. I also discuss feminist studies of the representation of place and community which explore the ways in which place is feminized as an Other at the expense of women. The choice of feminist work here then is again strategic. Feminist arguments which try to dislocate women from Woman have been chosen in order to examine the specificities of a geographical discourse which claims to be exhaustive through its feminized Other but actually excludes other kinds of knowledge from its own.

**Holism**

That place is a holistic experience is one of the central arguments of humanistic geography. Relph, for example, adopted phenomenology because its assumptions ‘proceed from an acceptance both of the wholeness and indivisibility of human existence’, as well as from ‘the fact that meaning defined by human intentions is central to all our existence’. This is part of humanistic geography’s resistance to
scientific rationality, for while abstract thought divides and fragments the world in order to understand it, humanistic geography and its concept of the ‘dynamic wholeness of the lifeworld experience’ retains the ordinary and everyday understanding of existence as a complete immersion in an experienced totality. This argument encourages humanistic geographers to avoid organizing their work through the disconnected categories of science. Rowles recognized that this was a difficult project, since any kind of selection is also a kind of abstraction. He argued that even the most naïve retelling of an interview by the researcher destroys the holism of the interviewee’s experience: ‘translation from the prereflective understanding of everyday life to the language of social science mirrors an operational categorization of what is in experience an undifferentiated coherent whole’. Nonetheless, the attempt is made.

The holism of humanistic geographers made an effort to bridge the distinction between the academic researcher and the subject that they captured in their studies. They argued that the understanding of place by academic geographers shared a common root with the interpretation of places by their subjects: ‘the geographer’s discourse and the people’s discourse are like two sides of the same coin’. Thus geographers had no reason to dismiss non-academic feelings about place. They valued the experiences of the everyday, through which all people live their lives; they recovered the banality of everyday life and asserted its importance for the understanding of social life. The need to see routines and habits afresh was one reason why Buttimer turned to phenomenology, because she felt that its problematization of the researcher’s assumptions could overcome the transparency and obviousness of the everyday and turn it into something difficult, requiring interpretation. Sometimes by assertion and sometimes by in-depth ethnographic fieldwork, they tried to evoke the ordinary and extraordinary experiences of place. Humanistic geographers thus insisted on the indivisibility of humans from their environment, and in Ley’s work this produced an interest in social context not replicated in other humanistic geography. Ley argued that ‘as man and environment engage each other dialectically, there is no room in a humanistic perspective for a passive concept of man dutifully acquiescing to an overbearing environment. But neither is man fully free, for he inherits given structural conditions and, indeed, may be unaware of the full extent of his bondage’. This led Ley always to stress the context of human life in terms of the complex fo social, economic, political and symbolic relations through which an individual constructs his or her meanings. Ley argued that ‘there are here a whole range of social
contexts, local and over-arching, self-conscious and hidden; and all introduce varying degrees of influence and authority relations to the ongoing emergence of action'. The role of the humanistic geographer was to lay all these elements of everyday social context bare. There is a parallel here with the feminist interest in the everyday outlined in the previous chapter, and its emphasis on different interpretations of spaces.

Another parallel between feminism and humanistic geography is the latter's accounts of individuals' understanding of their contextual world, which overcome the exclusion from the social sciences of talk about emotions and feeling. The humanists brought the sensibilities of everyday, place-bound life into academic discourse. Relph argued that the sense of place itself was a feeling; a feeling of belonging, of being inside. This gave rise to what he described as the authentic sense of place, which was 'a direct and genuine experience of the entire complex of the identity of places - not mediated or distorted through a series of quite arbitrary social and intellectual fashions about how that experience should be, nor following stereotyped conventions'. Tuan wrote a whole book about affectionate attachment to places; he termed this affection 'topophilia', and described it as pleasure, delight and joy. It was:

... fleeting visual pleasure; the sensual delight of physical contact; the fondness for place because it is familiar, because it is home and incarnates the past, because it provokes pride of ownership or creation; joy in things because of animal health and vitality.

It was often argued that the home was a particularly significant place, intensely experienced and full of deeply meaningful memories and experiences. Tuan claimed that 'hearth, shelter, home or home base are intimate places to human beings everywhere', 'that special place to which one withdraws and from which on ventures forth', a 'field of care'. Relph suggested that the home is 'an irreplaceable centre of significance', and Seamon affirmed that 'the dwelling-place is generally the spatial centre of at-homeness'. Although I will return critically to this emphasis on the home as the ultimate sense of belonging to place, it is important to note here that this work was an exception to geography's masculinist uninterest in the home. As the Women and Geography Study Group of the Institute of British Geographers have noted:
Despite the significance of home-based 'private' activities in people's lives, particularly the lives of women, most human geographers would include in a list of their subject matter only those activities which take place outside the home, in the 'public' sphere.\textsuperscript{28}

Humanistic work did not ignore the home. Some humanistic geographers also retrieved the body into their studies. 'Body implicates space; space co-exists with the sentient body', wrote Tuan, and topophilia is felt in part corporeally.\textsuperscript{29} Seamon elaborated what he called the 'place-ballet' of people physically and routinely moving through familiar places, and suggested that at moments of heightened sensitivity to place, the boundary between the self and the world could be momentarily dissolved.\textsuperscript{30} This acknowledgement of the bodily could point towards a notion of place aware of gender differences in senses of belonging to a place. Although Seamon does not specify 'the' body of his place-ballet, his focus on embodied subjectivity in places could nonetheless highlight the need to consider differently embodied subjectivities for understandings of spaces and places.\textsuperscript{31}

Analysis and empathy, insider and outsider, thought and pleasure, body and mind, individual and context: these are some of the dualisms that humanistic geography explicitly attempted to overcome in its efforts to interpret the world. As the previous chapter argued, they are also dualisms that fundamentally structure claims to know in the geography of social-scientific masculinity. The dissolution of such dualisms is one of the most central aspects of the contemporary feminist project, because such dualisms are always bound into the power relations of a society, including its masculinism. The consequences of humanistic geographers' efforts to think beyond the dualistic structure of meaning bequeathed to them by their discipline had some startling results in a discipline which has, until the very recent advent of feminist geography, refused to consider the domestic, the home, the emotional or anything else associated with women. Humanistic geographers talked about the home and retrieved the experiences of the domestic everyday; they even recovered the body from its invisibility in geography. The next two sections explore the congruence between humanistic geography and feminism more critically.

\textbf{Reflexivity}

The reflexivity of humanistic geography referred to the self-reflection required from the author, and the reasons offered for its necessity
centred on a perceived need to speak accurately about senses of place. Phenomenology demanded the removal by the author of all their \textit{a priori} assumptions before undertaking research, so that the experiences of the researched could be accessed fully. Some humanists, such as Relph, Buttimer and Rowles, attempted this, but others thought that it was an impossible goal and preferred instead to make clear their own presuppositions in their work in order to mark the author's impact on the research. Eyles offers the most extended effort at such self-exposure in the form of an autobiography in which he traces the influence of his Englishness, the poverty of his parents, his education and his search for a home and for comfort on his sense of what for him is a meaningful place.\footnote{A different argument was made by Ley and Samuels, who suggested that the expression of choice, commitment and responsibility by the author was part of the existential emphasis on the commitment to human life.} Reflexivity was also seen as a necessary part of the ethics of humanistic geography. The position of the disembodied, unmarked researcher was refused: as Eyles said, 'I must apply my own reasoning to my own life'.\footnote{Academics were not invulnerable to the processes that they studied, and these claims appear to parallel feminist efforts to deconstruct the ease of unmarked, authoritative claims to know, which reek not only of knowledge but of power.} Sustained self-reflection was rarely attempted, however, and when it was the aim was to legitimate the claims being made about the essence of place. Humanistic geographers offered taxonomies of senses of place, and historical narratives and global geographies of its development. Their self-reflection did not function to contextualize their knowledge, then; rather, it allowed them to universalize their claims. The self-reflection of humanistic geographers was a means of understanding the truth of place, or at least knowing their specific distortions of that real. They reflected on their position in order to validate the objectivity of their insight. This is not to suggest that humanistic work was unaware of conflicting interpretations of place: 'urban imagery is one thing for the computer executive and quite another for the slum child on the stoop or the vagrant with time, but little else, in his hands'.\footnote{But they assumed that their own interpretations had transcended such conflicts. Humanistic geographers even insisted that to be as sensitive to place as they were was to be fully human. Samuels, from his existentialist position, suggested that those who recognize the alienation of the human condition 'are more human than we who have a place', while Tuan argued that 'to know the world is to know one's place'.} Relph explained that the aim of humanistic work was to legitimize the claims being made about the essence of place. Humanistic geographers offered taxonomies of senses of place, and historical narratives and global geographies of its development. Their self-reflection did not function to contextualize their knowledge, then; rather, it allowed them to universalize their claims. The self-reflection of humanistic geographers was a means of understanding the truth of place, or at least knowing their specific distortions of that real. They reflected on their position in order to validate the objectivity of their insight. This is not to suggest that humanistic work was unaware of conflicting interpretations of place: 'urban imagery is one thing for the computer executive and quite another for the slum child on the stoop or the vagrant with time, but little else, in his hands'. But they assumed that their own interpretations had transcended such conflicts. Humanistic geographers even insisted that to be as sensitive to place as they were was to be fully human. Samuels, from his existentialist position, suggested that those who recognize the alienation of the human condition 'are more human than we who have a place', while Tuan argued that 'to know the world is to know one's place'. Relph explained that the aim of humanistic
geography is 'to illuminate the places and environments of the world, and to interpret them, good or bad, so that others can appreciate their significance'.

The implication of this celebration of place is that those of us who are not interested in place are less than alive, less than human, less than the sensitive geographers who are aware of such important things.

This authority is central to humanistic geography, despite its own critique of the equally authoritative assertions of those who claimed scientific status for their work. The humanists' demands for self-reflexivity was a strategy for gaining a fuller knowledge of place, and this was not seen as completely unrelated to the scientific rationality which many of them also criticized. Ley and Samuels, for example, were fully aware of the legacy of Descartes's kind of rationality, which they shared – if in a slightly different form – with the sciences.

Cartesian scientific rationality sought certainty through empirical observation of the world, but the existence of the self observing was never entirely established. As Ley and Samuels noted, Descartes's formula 'I think, therefore I am' rested on a doubt about being. Humanistic geographers saw themselves as resolving this fundamental doubt by searching for essences. Humanistic geographers were given no less a task than the 'description of the entire structure of the phenomena being studied in all its possible meanings'. Their kind of knowledge was thus seen as complementing the knowledge of science, even as being superior to it in their refusal to do anything more than accurately describe the world. Their work 'looks at human experience anew and records resulting discoveries as accurately as possible'.

They were to search for the essences of the structures of perception and describe them as truthfully as they could. Relph quite explicitly saw the humanist project as a supplement to the 'limited intentions of scientists', and insisted that humanistic geography was not 'some type of irrational anti-science'; instead, it sought the development of a 'science of experience'. He later commented that advocating humanism as a cure for the ills of scientific rationality was 'like prescribing whisky to cure alcoholism'.

No wonder then that the point of humanistic geographers' reflexivity was not to contextualize and limit their claims to knowledge, but to strengthen their claims to truth. The effect of the self-reflection undertaken in humanistic geography was to increase the unmarked authority of the geographer's account. The next section elaborates what this authority established as its implicit norm, and what was deviant from this norm.
Anthropocentrism

Humanistic geography is based on the premise that 'no object is free of a subject'. Each object, every person and event, only becomes meaningful through its interpretation by a thinking, feeling human. This humanity was assumed to be universal, and so was the desire for a sense of place. Although mediated in its expression by cultural differences, the desire to belong was supposed to be an essential aspect of human existence. This section suggests that the form of that desire in humanistic geography is more specific.

Man as man

The claim that a sense of place is a universal human trait had slightly different inflections in humanistic geography. Phenomenologists argued that full humanity comes only from a sense of insiderness, and Relph, for example, drew on Heidegger's notion of 'dwelling' to elaborate this claim. Existentialists such as Samuels, on the other hand, suggested that the need to belong is a consequence of the alienation and distance which is the human condition, and saw a link between 'the logic of alienation [and] the existential need for relationship'. There was also disagreement about the extent of cultural mediation of the desire for place. Rowles, for example, argued that the expression of a sense of place by individuals was unique because it was a result of the different biography of every individual; the accumulated experiences of a lifetime were incomparable, and were therefore 'beyond the realm of generalization'. This position made discussion of the cultural constraints on senses of place difficult to elaborate. It also marginalized discussion of the ways in which senses of place could be ideological; that is, constructed as part of the symbolic legitimation of a particular arrangement of social relations. Other humanistic geographers were certainly aware of these issues. Relph, for example, acknowledged that the universal sense of place is mediated by cultural differences, and he tentatively suggested that this may be because 'we have been taught to look for certain qualities of place emphasized by our cultural groups'.

He was also sensitive to historical shifts in senses of place: he attributed what he saw as the increasing inauthenticity of modern places in Euro-America to big business, to the centralization of political authority and to mass communication and culture. But none of these discussions of differences in senses of place were sustained to the extent of questioning the concept of place itself. The desire for place was assumed as universal.
Tuan affirmed its universality descriptively, through cross-cultural studies. His study of topophilia is the most ambitious of these, drawing on anthropological evidence from a vast range of societies to argue for the importance of places to humankind. In comparing an Anatolian neo-Hittite temple two millennia old with the round city of Mansur near Baghdad completed in 766 AD with Ebenezer Howard’s plans for garden cities from England at the turn of the twentieth century (to take a typical example of his style), Tuan claims that ‘they all aspire toward an image of social and spatial order that is patterned ultimately on the vault of heaven’. For Tuan, though, the existence of a sense of place in so many cultures speaks not only of an existential human condition, but also of a biological one. ‘However diverse our perception of the environment, as members of the same species we are constrained to see things a certain way’, he says, because we share ‘similar organs’, and because of this basic similarity, it is always possible for people of different cultures to understand each other and to ‘enter into the world of another’. Tuan therefore had no qualms about the possible ethnocentrism of his anthropological data, nor of his own possible cultural specificity. Instead, he argued that a sense of place was so universal that it should be linked to biological characteristics such as the size of the body – places too large in relation to the human body could not be truly known places – and to equally universal distinctions between front and back, centre and periphery, and closed and open. Tuan explained this tendency towards antinomy through a passing reference to Levi-Strauss and ‘common psychological structures and responses’.

One of the ‘fundamental binary oppositions’ which, Tuan argued, structure all perceptions of the world was masculine/feminine. Although gender receives very little attention in humanistic geography, both Tuan and Relph mention women briefly. Their comments reveal the limits to the supposed universality of their humanism. Tuan’s discussion of gender differences in topophilia is in terms of women’s physiology. Tuan cites evidence proving that women feel the cold less than men; that they are more sensitive to touch; that they have better olfactory organs than men, especially after puberty, and so on. In his discussion, women are examined in terms of their bodily difference from men: he asks if ‘the female has a characteristic way of structuring the world that is different from the male?’. Men are not compared to women; thus men are established as normal and women as the exception. Women are deviations from an implicitly masculine subject. Women are also anomalies in Relph’s work. It is Relph’s discussion of inauthentic placelessness which produces his only comments on
women: the suburban woman in the USA who has to be careful finding her way home because she lives in a wasteland of identical houses, and the 'pornscape' of prostitution. Both Tuan and Relph mention women as part of a discussion of exceptions to their specific norms, then: Tuan argues that all people share the same perceptions because we have similar bodies – except women – and Relph assumes that a sense of place is necessary to humanity – and mentions women in the context of its lack. The appearance of women in their accounts in this way indicates that the use of Man in humanistic geography makes men the baseline against which difference is spoken. Their Man is actually a man. The authority of humanistic geography is masculinist because it falsely assumes that the experience of men can represent all experiences.

Home as place as man's

This subsection pursues the question of specificity. I have argued that man is the implicit norm of humanistic geography. However, humanistic work also invokes aspects of place which are often associated with the feminine, as the section on its holism pointed out – the everyday, the emotional, the bodily, the domestic. The claim that home is the exemplar of place is persistent in humanistic work. Although it was often noted that home need not necessarily be a family house, images of the domestic recur in their work as universal, even biological, experiences: Tuan remarked that 'human identification with the familiar, nurturing place has a biological basis'. This enthusiasm for home and for what is associated with the domestic, in the context of the erasure of women from humanistic studies, suggests to me that humanistic geographers are working with a masculinist notion of home/place.

To examine this possibility, this subsection presents some women talking about place: or, rather, about local community, which – as I have noted – several humanistic geographers argue is very close to their notion of place. These discussions are about community in the context of women's involvement in community action. Such action is interpreted by certain feminist arguments in a way that criticizes community, the domestic and, by extension, place. For white socialist feminists writing in the late 1970s, community was damned by definition because of the critical way in which they saw the family and home life. Their arguments are presented here not as the only feminist response to the family and community – black feminists have made very different arguments – but as a strategic effort to mark the (hu)manistic desire for place/belonging/home as masculinist.
In the late 1970s the family was seen by socialist feminists as the major site of women's oppression. The family was the site of women's labour in the reproduction of the capitalist system: women gave birth to future workers, women's role in the home sustained and satisfied children and adults and thus maintained the capitalist system ideologically, and materially women fed and clothed and serviced the labour force. Women's unwaged domestic labour reproduced the social relations of capital. One of the earliest analyses of the family in these terms was that of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James:

Serving men and children in wageless isolation had hidden that we were serving capital. Now we know that we are not only indispensable to capitalist production in those countries where we are 45 per cent of their waged labour force. We are always their indispensable workforce, at home, cleaning, washing and ironing; making, disciplining and bringing up babies; servicing men physically, sexually and emotionally.  

Dalla Costa and James linked their analysis of the family to the community by pointing out that much of women's reproductive labour depended on using resources located in the community. Far from celebrating women's involvement in community and place, then, Dalla Costa and James saw such involvement as a symptom of women's oppression; the title of their pamphlet associated 'the power of women' with 'the subversion of community'. Elizabeth Wilson agreed that articulating 'the power of women' would inevitably mean political struggle for local change, because she saw community as the social locale through which the state maintained the traditional family form:

The reality of community life... is women living in a direct relationship to the State as mediated through housing departments, schools and the State welfare system which supports the family. The division of labour within the family usually means that it is women who attempt to grapple with the schools, women who are interviewed by the social worker.  

For Wilson, the community was the arena for struggle and resistance because the community is the site of the state's attempts to control family life, especially that of the working-class family. To summarize her argument crudely, the capitalist state supervises family life in order to ensure the adequate reproduction of the labour force through women's domestic labour. The welfare policies of the state assume the Victorian ideal of the passive, nurturing mother and breadwinning
father, and this explains, for example, the lack of childcare facilities provided by the state and the discrimination between men and women in its tax and benefit systems. When families deviate from this norm, they are disciplined by, for example, social workers. Women's community struggles are seen in this framework as resistance to the state. In all this work, the family and, by extension, the local community is where women are exploited by the social relations and institutions of capitalist patriarchy.

So, to white feminists who argued that the home was 'the central site of the oppression of women', there seemed little reason to celebrate a sense of belonging to the home, and even less, I would add, to support the humanistic geographers' claim that home provides the ultimate sense of place. These feminists saw it only as a site of exploitation. The strategy most advocated therefore was to break the link between women and the home. Although Dalla Costa and James demanded that the value of women's invisible labour should be recognized by paying women a wage for their housework, other feminists saw the Wages for Housework Campaign as merely reinforcing women's role as domestic workers. If the Campaign was successful, women working in the home would be waged but still understood as naturally domestic and home-loving. A wage for housework would not in itself challenge the ideology that constructed women as fit only for the home. Wilson argued that it 'would surely lock the housewife yet more surely in her isolation... A wage for housework could not in practice challenge the role assignment of home and child care that seems to many women just as important as issues related to pay and wages'. This is also the reason for feminists' refusal to reinforce women's gender role in their analyses of women's politics. They criticized interpretations of women's community struggles that saw them exclusively in terms of women's domesticity, and discussions of urban social movements that understood women's political activism solely in terms of women's relationship to the reproductive services provided collectively. Bondi and Peake have provided ample evidence to refute the notion that 'community' is the only political arena in which women, and women only, participate. Women are involved in production as well as reproduction, and men can be concerned about reproductive issues; moreover, Bondi and Peake also stress the differences of region, class and race in women's participation in reproduction and in their experiences and interpretations of such participation. The restrictive consequences of representing women as housewives, than, is the reason why feminists have refused too close an identification with community and place. If the only sense of place
offered to women is one based on their role as mother, housewife and shopper, many feminists want nothing to do with it.

To conclude this section: the odd mentions of women in humanistic geography appear to be symptoms of a deeper malaise in humanistic work. The humanistic geographers' search for the essence of place was a search for something characterized in terms of home – but this was an ideal home. For the socialist feminists presented here, women are never theorized as relaxed enough, satisfied enough or powerful enough to feel 'at home in place', \(^63\) even in, and perhaps especially in, their actual homes. Feminist analyses of the power relations that humanistic geography neglects to address have understood homes and communities as sites of oppression – by the state, by capitalism and by patriarchy – and women have constructed their politics as theory through such socialist feminist discourses. Indeed, Ann Henley has recently remarked on a feminist literary 'tradition of equating the loss of place with the acquisition of identity'. \(^64\) The humanists' refusal to consider possible systematic differences in experiences of home erases consideration of feminist arguments, and suggests that only masculinist work could use the image of place as home so unproblematically.

**Place as Woman**

So far I have argued that humanistic geography is masculinist because it assumes that its understandings are exhaustive and objective. Its claims to really know depend on the master subject's denials of his own specificity; the humanists assume that they can find an objective truth about place. Humanistic work also idealizes place as home. Its home/place is not one that many feminists would recognize, though: it is conflict-free, caring, nurturing and almost mystically venerated by the humanists. It seems that the humanistic notion of place has little to do with women: its masculinism marginalizes alternative accounts of place. So how can its interest in place as home be accounted for? I suggest in this section that the persistent references to the home signify a feminization of place. Place is represented as Woman, in order that humanists can define their own masculinist rationality. The following subsection examines some feminist work on the association of Woman with place – even the conflation of Woman with place – in order to characterize the specificity of this particular masculinity more fully.
**Place and Woman**

This subsection interprets the ‘place’ of humanistic geography in the context of certain other feminist discussions of place, community and Woman. This feminist work suggests that place can become feminized through reference to the fantasized maternal Woman. I will suggest that something similar happens in humanistic accounts of place.

I will begin with soap operas. Soaps offer one of the most influential images of community in the contemporary UK. They depend on a range of female characters holding the community together – Dyer, for example, notes the ‘plethora of splendid Mums’ in one of the most successful soaps, *Coronation Street* – and they also often have a detailed sense of place. Several studies have examined the relationship between the representation of women and place in soaps. Geraghty suggests that in some senses soaps are women’s stories; they have what she terms a ‘mothering structure’, which focuses on the emotional world of personal relations in specific and carefully delineated places and meditates at length on the moral questions that relationships raise. They explore the sociality of the family and the community, and show that women’s concerns are important. Geraghty suggests that they appeal to women viewers because of the way in which they centre on the domestic and the relational, which many women in contemporary society do identify as their realm. However, the characters do not replicate the complexity of actual women (and viewers are fully aware of this). Instead, they draw on stereotypes. Soaps and their communities operate through a series of archetypal images. Importantly for my argument, these images are of women defined through their relation to motherhood, as Marion Jordan shows in her discussion of *Coronation Street*: grandmother figures and marriageable women (the latter category subdivided into mature, sexy women, spinsterly types and young women). Other, non-motherly figures work to disrupt the stability of community: the ‘gossip’ and the ‘tart’ and, more recently, the Career Woman. These studies of soaps as an important contemporary representation of community suggest that they depend on a certain version of Woman, then: Woman as mother. Community is meant to be warm and caring, secure and relational, and communication between women, constituted as subjects in masculinist discourse through just these qualities, is central to this particular cultural representation of place.

Such stereotypes are remarkably powerful. For many men in the socialist movement in the UK, working-class community is a political ideal: to take just one example, Seabrook has argued that the com-
Community neighbourhood is an exemplary model for local, democratic and participatory politics. And for many, the qualities of the community which render it an ideal political model are epitomized by its women. Working-class Mums are represented and remembered as 'women of tireless energy, remarkable domestic skill and inspiring compassion'. Seabrook is typical again in his celebration of his Mum, 'Mum the formidable and eternal Mum, Virago, domestic lawgiver, comforter and martyr'. Seabrook's vision of an ideal community of mutual caring and compassion is expressed in terms of female figure – his mother. And through this representation she also ceases to be his mother, and becomes everyone's Mum, and then simply Mum, symbol of a communal utopia. Nor is the representation of place by female figures confined only to the scale of local community. Nations have been described as 'imagined communities', and hegemonic – and therefore idealized – visions of nations also often use female figures to envision themselves; England and France are represented by the allegorical figures of Britannia and Marianne, for example. Obviously, not all places are represented by allegorical women; female figures are used only when feminized qualities are being represented. But if a place is known in terms which are culturally associated with the feminine, such as community, then figures of Woman can stand in for it.

Now, there is a vital network of social relations that contains recognizable echoes of Seabrook's Mum, which feminist historians and sociologists have charted. However, as Swindells has pointed out, Seabrook gives no voice to his actual mother. The reader never hears her actual words, her opinions or her own interpretation of her life and times: nor is the reader permitted a sense of what sense of community she had and shared (or not) with her neighbours. Instead, we are offered a symbolic Mum who represents not herself or her community but her son's reading of the importance of that community. As well as the discursive and material realm of women in specific places at specific times, making their own maps of meaning of the world, there is also a symbolic Woman who represents Community. The utter silence of Seabrook's mother suggests to Swindells that she is confined wholly to the symbolic. Seabrook's mother becomes in his work not simply an attenuated or distorted image of herself, but an allegory for something else entirely. Cynthia Cockburn has commented on this move:

...woman is, for Left as for Right, metaphorical material. The outcome is that Left men do not really see women as part of the socialist project. Rather they are a territory of the imagination, destined to absorb the desires and fears of men.
(This means, among other things, that the figure of Woman as Mum in the community is no less oppressive to women than the exclusions of Enlightenment political discourse mentioned in the previous chapter.) The figure of Woman, emptied of the meanings that women give to themselves, can represent place as community. Simone de Beauvoir argued that it is the patriarchal assumption that women are dominated by their maternal function which allows this. The morality and goodness of Seabrook’s Mum is constructed through her representation as a natural, instinctive mother, as innately caring and supportive. De Beauvoir argues that such a naturalization of women as men’s Other creates a kind a mystified awe which, as she says, ‘spiritualises’ women into Woman as Mother. ‘Man feminizes the ideal he sets up before him as the essential Other, because woman is the material representation of alterity; that is why almost all allegories, in language as in pictorial representation, are women’. This masculine insistence on the mystery and marvel of women enables figures of Woman to represent social groups as a whole:

The beauty, the warmth, the intimacy that man wishes to enjoy through woman, are no longer tangible qualities; instead of summing up the immediate and enjoyable quality of things, she becomes their soul; deeper than the carnal mystery, a secret and pure presence in her heart reflects the truth of the world. She is the soul of the house, of the family, of the home. And she is the soul of such larger groups, also, as the city, state, and nation.

Evacuated of any meaning on her own terms, Womanly icons represent the values of others, including their sense of belonging to a place.

These arguments highlight certain aspects of humanistic geographers’ accounts of place. In humanistic geography, place is just that spiritualized soul of life described by de Beauvoir, and humanistic geographers search for its essence. Their association of place with belonging and the home is now more understandable. Place is understood in the same terms as a maternal Woman; humanistic geography is characterized in terms of a relationship with the (m)Other. For all their desire for place, for example, humanistic geographers argue that their own work can never access a full sense of place. Their texts deny them the places of which they speak: they see language as separating them from place itself. Humanistic geographers argue then that the felt experience of place is antithetical to analysis: it is beyond the discourse of knowledge. In a sense, place is unspeakable: ‘Original space is a contact with the world that precedes thinking; hence its opaqueness to analysis’.

They insist that the experience of place is pre-conscious. Butttimer, for example, suggests that there is little reflection in the everyday world:
'the meanings of place to those who live in them have more to do with everyday living and doing than with thinking'. Relph describes a pragmatic space which is pre-conceptual and underlies all our senses of place, and Rowles was concerned about 'the translation from the prereflective understanding of everyday life to the language of social science'. Olsson saw place as the site of uncertainty, ambiguity and unknowability. This is surely the place of the infant before entry into language. And place is also the arena of embodiment, of the closeness of the mother and child. Topophilia involves sensuality and physicality, not thought: Seamon's place-ballet consists of habitual actions so routine as to be undertaken unconsciously and automatically. And place is security; it is a holistic ensemble promising satisfaction through union with itself; it is thoughtless passivity and unthinking immersion in the natural. It is a 'retreat into the hedonistic and pampered world of an infant', it is both the 'infinite vanishing point of the maternal' and 'the maternal site of origin'. Humanistic geography is 'a nostalgia for this first and ultimate dwelling place'. Desired but lost, place seems to stand for nothing other than the inaccessible plenitude of Mother. Place becomes the feminized Other in the discourse of humanistic geography, idealized as Woman, spoken of in terms of the (lost) Mother.

**Woman, aesthetic masculinity and critique**

The masculinism of humanistic geography can be seen in its attempted exhaustiveness. But there is a paradox in this masculinism: it seeks exhaustive knowledge of something that it argues is unknowable. This final section suggests that this paradox is characteristic of what I will call aesthetic masculinity.

Humanistic geography assumes masculinity as its implicit norm, and does so with all the authority of masculine claims to really know. The possible overlap between humanistic geography and feminist geography with which this chapter began is thus more apparent than real. The refusal of scientific rationality, the rejection of many of the dualisms which structure social-scientific knowledge of society, the recovery of emotion and the home, the demand for reflexivity by the researcher – these are themes which recur again and again in feminist writing and which were also raised by humanistic geography. But humanistic geography develops these issues in such a way as to establish its own power. Its claims to knowledge depend on a form of rationality which still assumes that objectivity is the touchstone of true knowledge. That rationality is constituted through a contrast with an Other. I suggest
that it is the notion of place itself which is that Other: mysterious, unknowable, beyond language and rationality, and feminine. Because of its construction of a feminized Other against which its struggle for knowledge is rendered authoritative, humanistic geography has to be seen as another strand of geography's masculinism. It is certainly a strand subordinated to the more dominant social-scientific masculinity because of its interest in feminized issues, as the criticisms of the humanists' writing style mentioned in chapter 1 demonstrate. However, it still asserts its own claims to know through a contrast with a feminized Other.

Here, however, is the paradox: despite its prominence as the object of humanistic study, this Other must remain beyond the reach of knowledgable men in order to render their own rationality meaningful. Thus place, as the humanistic Other, remains essentially unknowable, despite being the focus of humanistic claims to knowledge. In its opacity and unknowability, all place can do is reflect men's image back to them: in Olsson's rather obscure account, the study of place is related to 'the dialectic of Duchamp's bride stripped bare by her bachelors only to discover that what we see is nothing but ourselves looking',87 (with Olsson, 'we' here are assumed to be the bachelors). This paradox produces the particular structure of aesthetic masculinity: a masculinity which claims to know through its sensitivity to an obscure but profound human experience. To caricature, social-scientific masculinity claims complete access to a transparent and knowable world; but aesthetic masculinity claims complete sensitivity to a mysterious yet crucial world.

This aesthetic masculinity has required a particular form of critique. In response to the masculinist invocation of the mysteries of Woman through place, I turned to feminist work which insisted on the difference between Woman and women. This work rejected the association of the feminine with the home, the domestic, the community and place. Instead it saw the home/place as a site of oppressive labour, the community/place as the site of a patriarchal state, and the representation of Woman/place as a process of erasure. It insisted that women were not the same as this Woman. This is a very different strategy from that adopted in the previous chapter. There, the implicit feminine was recovered in order to subvert the exhaustive claims to know of time-geographers. Here, the more explicit references to Woman by humanistic geographers have been critiqued in order to mark humanistic geography as masculinist. The next chapter explores these masculinities and these strategies for resistance – and their relationships – in more detail.
Concepts of place and space are implicitly gendered in geographical discourse. *Place* is understood by humanistic geographers in terms of maternal Woman – nurturing, natural, but forever lost. In stark contrast, the discourse of time-geography depends on a transparent *space*, which refers only to the public space of Western hegemonic masculinities. What both place and space have in common, however, is the exclusion of women (among others) from the geographical through certain masculinized understandings of geography. An unmarked claim to knowledge allows specifically (white, bourgeois, heterosexual) masculine concepts, whether related to men or to men’s fantasies of Woman, to masquerade as universal ones, and this is not only a textual exclusion: public space is violently policed to exclude its Others, and Irigaray remarks that ‘the mother woman remains the *place separated from its “own” place*, a place deprived of a place of its own’. The discourses of geography resist other geographies different from theirs in various ways. However, if women are excluded from this imaginary, masculine understandings of the feminine are not. Both the opaque unknowability of place and the transparent knowability of space depend in their different ways on a feminized Other to establish their own quest for knowledge. This chapter returns to the relations between masculinities, knowledge, power and critique with which I began this book, and examines them in more detail in the light of the discussions of different kinds of geography in the previous two chapters.

My interpretation of the Same/Other structure of masculinist geographical discourses is similar to that found in other feminist work
on Western masculinist knowledges, especially science and philosophy. This is not surprising: the founding assumptions of Western philosophy mark geography as they do all academic knowledges, and geographical exploration and discovery was central in establishing the empiricist methods of modern science. One of the earliest critiques of modern scientific rationality as masculine in theory, method and practice was that of Evelyn Fox Keller. I will summarize her arguments now because they offer a framework within which to link modern science to a specific subjectivity, and thereby connect a certain epistemology to its social context and consequences: she offers a sexual politics of one dominant form of knowledge, and provides a starting point for this chapter's attempts to develop similar arguments in terms of the sexual politics of geographical knowledge. Keller's interest is in science's goal of producing reliable and verifiable knowledge, and she begins with the premise that 'the making of men and women has affected the making of science'. She argues that the emergence of modern science in the seventeenth century was deeply implicated in the growing polarization of gender which was occurring in the same period. Debates during the Scientific Revolution between mechanical and hermetic philosophies about what science should be were in part a response to an increasing distinction between masculine and feminine, but definitions of science also came to shape some of the terms of that debate. The mechanical theories of science that eventually dominated saw science as an objective revelation of an already existing order, according to Keller, and they argued that only men were capable of such objectivity: the necessary distance from the object of study was a quality associated with the shift towards a new hegemonic definition of masculinity. Although contemporary science has lost some of its faith in the successful completion of the search for truth, most geographers continue to believe that the true nature of the world can, in principle, be explored and revealed by objective study. This is what my opening chapter referred to as geography's 'architectonic impulse', and it has been connected by Livingstone to the importance of geography to the emergence of modern science. He argues that the contemporary discipline continues to constitute itself as a search for foundational knowledge through the trope of discovery, which implies that geography retains the assumptions of the kind of modern science that feminists such as Keller have dubbed masculinist. The previous two chapters have explored the workings of some of those assumptions.

The search for knowledge, then, is for Keller shaped by a series of 'selection pressures exerted by ideology in general – and gender ideology in particular'. And although Keller acknowledges that these
pressures were never monolithic, that they were often contested, and that they changed historically, especially as ideas about gender altered, she nonetheless claims that they are based on a specific ‘emotional substructure’ which affects the theory and practice of science. Keller elaborates her claim by drawing on the work of a certain kind of feminist psychoanalysis, the work of object relations theorists such as Chodorow. Keller begins by stressing the importance of autonomy to human subjectivity: all babies must develop a sense of independence from the world around them, and especially from the mother, in order to become subjects themselves. The process of developing autonomy is a highly emotional one, fraught with both pleasure and a fear of loss, and Keller stresses that its extent and outcome are not certain. One of its usual patterns, though, is a difference between boys’ and girls’ sense of autonomy. Keller argues that to the child the mother signifies merger and union – non-autonomy. In contrast, differentiation and independence are, in Western nuclear families, associated with the father, who represents individuation. Unlike Chodorow, Keller argues that these are symbolic roles in part defined by cultural context. I have already argued in chapter 2 that autonomy is especially central to the identity of white, bourgeois, heterosexual masculinity; and Keller’s arguments must be read as referring to the subjectivity and the science of the master subject. In such a context, specific gender roles are important, especially for many boys’ realization of their difference from their mother. To become a man, a man like his father, the boy turns away from his mother: ‘The mother becomes an object, and the child a subject, by a process that itself becomes an expression of opposition to and negation of “mother”’. This process is not the same for girls, who continue to identify more with their mothers and with interrelating. Keller argues that boys’ greater sense of autonomy is a psychic structure which more or less clearly separates self from Other; and this correlates with the cognitive structure of objectivity on which science is premised. The ideal of distanced objectivity reflects and reaffirms masculine autonomy from others, and the consequence is ‘men who have difficulty loving and women who retreat from science’. Keller’s final point about this structure is that it is embedded in power relations. For boys especially, the fear of conflict as they try to insert themselves into a dominant position in the social hierarchy may mean that their sense of autonomy encourages attempts to control and dominate others who are perceived as weaker. Masculinity’s power is established at the cost of all non-masculine Others. Keller argues, then, that this complex psychosocial process of sexual differentiation, which interpellates (most) men through a certain relation between
Same and Other, means that certain types of subjectivity are attracted to science, and that science both constitutes and is structured by that subjectivity. This, then, has consequences for who undertakes science and how science represents the world. In general terms, this book makes a similar connection between geography and its masculinities.

Keller’s argument about (a particular kind of) masculinity and (a particular kind of) knowledge is helpful for beginning to think about masculinity and geography in more detail. Her emphasis on the centrality of the distinction between subject and object for reliable knowledge is the focus of the first section of this chapter. As many feminists have argued, one of the main consequences of this distinction is thinking through binary oppositions, in which knowledge is organized through a stable term against which other terms are contrasted. This structure is homologous with the masculine subject’s identification of himself as the centre against all non-masculine Others. The first section approaches the discursive oppositions of geography by discussing geographers’ practice of fieldwork. Although seemingly far removed from the theoretical discussions which this book has so far explored, fieldwork remains central to academic geography — all students are taken on field trips as part of their introduction to the discipline. I suggest that fieldwork is an example of geographical masculinities in action. Fieldwork is a performance which enacts some of the discipline’s underlying masculinist assumptions about its knowledge of the world: it is one of what Butler terms ‘the regulatory practices of gender coherence’, which intersect with the regulatory fictions of class and race, and which reproduce the relationship between men (and women) and their discipline’s masculinities. The section focuses on the specific dualistic distinction between Nature and Culture on which a certain fieldwork tradition depends, and argues that it also structures many other aspects of geographical knowledge. The section also argues that geographers’ enactment of this opposition is highly contradictory, much more so than seems evident from feminists’ accounts of science.

This contradictoriness is a major theme of this chapter. I have already argued that geography is masculinist in highly diverse ways. The distinction between space and place, for example, is central to the debates within the discipline which battle to establish geography’s field of knowledge, and I have suggested that these two concepts depend on two different kinds of masculinity. In order to establish the space of time-geography, the Other of the masculine Same is repressed in the name of (social) science; but humanistic geography’s masculinist concept of place admits its Other as the ground of an authoritative
aesthetic sensitivity. This chapter argues that both the repression of and a fascination with its Other constitute the masculinism of geography. This ambivalence within geographical discourse to the Other makes the structure of geographical knowledge rather more complex than the modern science sketched by Keller, and this requires some qualifications to Keller's Chodorovian argument about a specific masculine subjectivity.

The second section of the chapter considers the implications of these arguments about the particular relation between subjectivity and knowledge in geography for feminist critiques of the discipline's masculinism. I begin by examining the dangers involved in simply inverting binary oppositions in order either to valorize the qualities usually condemned as inferior or to adopt the qualities usually seen as superior. Both of these strategies can be criticized for their reflection of the hegemonic mode of knowledge. They stand as warnings about a potential complicity with the structures of domination that feminists seek to overcome, and the section continues by questioning whether the two strategies adopted so far in this book are themselves caught up in the very dualisms that this chapter examines. Does the effort to examine the repressions of social-scientific masculinity and its discourse on space necessarily invoke masculinist fantasies of Woman? And does challenging the figure of Woman as maternalized place on which aesthetic masculinity depends always mean obliterating women's only source of solidarity against and difference from men? This section discusses the possibilities of disrupting geography's masculinism which do not themselves replicate its masculine Same and feminized Other.

Dualistic Thinking in Science and Geography

Keller argues that masculinity defines itself through a rejection of the non-masculine, and that the autonomy that this implies establishes a distance between the masculine self and its Others. The objectivity assumed to be necessary for reliable knowledge similarly demands a separation from the object of study. However, as Keller also emphasizes, that insistence on distance is itself a sign of a certain subjectivity; the very anonymity of the scientists is a kind of signature. One of the most fundamental implications of that separation which feminists examining masculinist philosophical discourse have emphasized is a tendency towards thinking in terms of binary oppositions which are structured through the association of one of the terms with the Same
and one with the Other. Cixous begins her discussion of the gendered implications of this structure thus:

Where is she?
Activity/passivity,
Sun/Moon,
Culture/Nature,
Day/Night,
Father/Mother,
Head/heart,
Intelligible/sensitive,
Logos/Pathos
Form, convex, step, advance, seed, progress.
Matter, concave, ground – which supports the step, receptacle.

Man

Woman

She claims that this system of meaning is 'related to “the” couple man/woman', and emphasizes that the terms in each of these pairs are not equal but hierarchized; the term associated with the masculine is valued over that associated with the feminine. Cixous also remarks that the relation between the terms of each pair is one of violence and repression. As her list implies, this kind of binary opposition has many more pairings associated with it. One of the most pernicious, as chapter 2 noted, is that between mind and body, which has for so long marginalized women from rationality and its public sphere. Masculinist objectivity pretends to be a disembodied and context-free knower, and positions others as mired in the specificity of their (social) bodies. Keller discusses another closely related opposition, that between science and Nature:

In the ideological system that emerged and prevailed, science was a purely male and chaste venture, seeking dominion over, rather than commingling with, a female nature; it promised, and indeed helped to promote, the simultaneous vanquishing of nature and of female voracity.  

This section examines the specific form of dualistic thinking in the discourses of geography.
Nature/Culture, Woman/Man

One of the most important dualisms in Western thought is the distinction between Nature and Culture. Strathern argues that it is a central metanarrative through which Western societies in particular explain themselves: "we" use a hierarchical contrast between nature and culture to talk about relations internal to society, predicated on notions of transformation and process that see society as "produced" out of the natural environment/individuals. It is appropriate to consider this particular dualism here because not only is it basic to what it means to be human in the West, but it is also a distinction central to the discipline of geography. Most obviously, it is reflected in the contemporary division of geography into human geography, which studies the social world, and physical geography, which explores the natural environment. This places the reluctance of human geography to discuss the bodily, noted in the previous two chapters, in a wider perspective, as part of its separation from anything associated with the natural. A very few geographers have remarked on this divide. Marxists in particular have described the distinction between Nature and Culture as a form of bourgeois ideology, since "for human nature" to fulfil its ideological function there must be a separate nature with its own inviolable powers, and they have argued that geography should not therefore replicate the separation. The distinction between Nature and Culture is, however, deeply embedded in geography, and I suggest here that the character of this opposition in geographical discourse is clearest in geographers' most direct encounter with Nature, during fieldwork.

Feminists have discussed the distinction between Nature and Culture at some length, because they see it as one of those oppositions which are heavily gendered and power-ridden. Simone de Beauvoir long ago remarked on the conflation of Nature and Woman — 'man finds again in woman bright stars and dreamy moon, the light of the sun, the shade of grottoes; and, conversely, the wild flowers of thickets, the proud garden rose are women' — and the discursive opposition between masculine Culture and feminized Nature has been elaborated by several feminist historians of science, including Keller. They note that the notion of Nature as feminine and as distanced or separate from (hu)man culture was made in classical times. Women were considered to be closer to Nature than men, partly because of their childbearing capabilities, but partly also because of the Judaean-Christian story of Eve accepting the apple from the serpent in Eden. The comparison between Woman and Nature was correspondingly complex.
The femininity of Nature invoked both the passive and nurturing Mother Nature of organic theories of the self and cosmos, as well as the tempestuous and uncontrollable wild Nature of storms, pestilence and wilderness; both Woman’s fecundity and her evil lust placed her closer to Nature than men, and both characterized Nature itself. The discourses of modern science, especially during the Scientific Revolution, reinforced an association between the feminine and the natural. Merchant has emphasized the consequent costs to the environment.17 Mechanical theories of the world developed in the seventeenth century represented Nature as passive and female: she was seen as a set of discrete functioning mechanisms that could be controlled and also exploited, and that exploitation was legitimated through the images of conquest, violation and penetration which constituted scientists’ claims to know Nature. The transcoding of feminine qualities to Nature, and of naturalness to women, is still strong today, as Haraway’s studies of primatology argue.18 It also continues in geography. The Nature which human and physical geographers study in the field is characterized as feminine: Carl Sauer, one of the founding fathers of geography in the USA, based his life’s work on the study of the relationship between human cultures and what he termed the ‘maternal natural landscape’,19 and much more recently a President of the Association of American Geographers referred repeatedly to Mother Earth in his presidential address.20 For geographers in ‘the field’, though, even the city can still be characterized as feminine. Here is an account of Venice:

The organic, curving outline of the island city is surrounded and penetrated by tidal waters, its streets and canals form a dark and mysterious labyrinth to which we gain access by way of the sparkling and highly-decorated symbolic entrance of the basin of San Marco, the sinuous Grand Canal and the Piazzetta, leading to the womb-like enclosure of the Piazza.21

Going out to look at ‘Mother/Nature’ is something all geographers do, its purpose being the direct observation of the land, flora, fauna and people. This once involved mastering the skills of surveying, mapping, sketching and photographing the land; now it is rather more casual. Nevertheless, it still holds that ‘when we train and seek to inspire a new generation of geographers we must by precept and by example remind them that the great discoveries and advances made in geography have been made by men who went to look and think in the field’.22 Every schoolchild and student is taken on visits to the field, and undergraduate field trips are the initiation ritual of the discipline.
Field trips instil the ethos of the discipline into its students, and it is an heroic ethos:

In the discipline a major approach has been through field study, in which geographers go directly to the original source of all geographical knowledge and confront the raw and undisturbed phenomena with which they have to deal. Field study has been carried on under a succession of theories from various viewpoints with various methods and techniques at various times, in an endless effort to bridge the gap between raw data and penetrating comprehensive knowledge. 23

Geographers become stronger men by challenging Nature - 'geographers, like the mythical giant Anteus, derive their strength from contact with the earth. Anteus became stronger each time he was hurled to the ground' 24 - and the real geographer faces wild Nature for the sake of knowledge, 'even though it may on occasion mean taking risks, living dangerously'. 25 As Stoddart proudly tells us, 'on uninhabited Pacific atolls, sailing alone the barrier reefs of Australia and Belize, in the mangrove swamps of Bangladesh, on English coastal marshes, I have been concerned with making sense of nature'. 26 More prosaically, fieldwork also involves the necessary amount of drinking in order to prove how manly the fieldworker is; Stoddart subtitles a photograph of an eminent physical geographer lying on the grass in front of a building displaying a sign for Friary Ales as 'S. W. Wooldridge engaged in fieldwork on the Fernhust Anticline'. 27 Ho ho. Stoddart traces this tradition of what he uncritically calls 'militant geography' to the late eighteenth century and its expeditions which aimed to record scientifically 'the exotic, spectacular and remote'. 28 It remains central to the interpretation of landscape by geographers today - even those engaged in fieldwork in the museums (and bars) of Venice feel compelled to legitimate themselves with reference to it 29 - and its tough heroism establishes fieldwork as a particular kind of masculine endeavour.

Clearly there are elements here of the distant and domineering relation to a feminized environment described by Merchant, and the costs of such an attitude have been articulated most clearly by radical feminists. Collard and Contrucci argue that:

In patriarchy, Nature, animals and women are objectified, hunted, invaded, colonised, owned, consumed and forced to yield and to produce (or not). This violation of the integrity of wild, spontaneous
Being is rape. It is motivated by a fear and rejection of Life and it
allows the oppressor the illusion of control, of power, of being alive.
As with women as a class, Nature and animals have been kept in a
state of inferiority and powerlessness in order to enable men as a
class to believe and act upon their ‘natural’ superiority/dominance.  

Like Keller, radical feminists focus their challenge on the autonomy of
men, arguing that their brutality and desire for deathly control comes
from their abhorrence of life and a revoluted separation from it. Men
distance themselves from life, from women and from Nature, claim
radical feminists, and in so doing lose all sense of interrelations; the
interdependence of all living creatures and Mother Earth is beyond
their comprehension, and thus they create alienating and polluted
landscapes. Susan Griffin invokes the way in which men rip the world
apart, dismembering fragments from the whole hatefully and for profit:

...from the flower, the metal from the mountain, uranium from the
metal, plutonium from the uranium, the electron from the atom,
the atom splitting, energy from matter, the womb, spirit, from her
body, from matter, cataclysm, splitting, the chromosome split, spirit
burned from flesh, desire devastated from the earth.

One of the most important ways in which this violence is sustained,
argue radical feminists, is through men's language and knowledge.
Man-made language distinguishes between men and everything else:
'man named himself by an act of separation from and power over
Nature, animals and women, ensuring his pre-eminence through the
ownership of all'. This separation divides what should be united, rips
apart what should be whole, dismembers and slashes, naming only
man and relegating all else to the status of condemned Other. Such
language cares nothing for what it speaks of, so that 'the equation for
oxygen stays in his mind but he cannot breathe what he used to call
air. The equation for water stays in his mind, but there is nothing he
can drink that will not poison'.

Radical feminist writing discloses the extreme consequences both
for the environment and for women of a subjectivity dependent on
separation and domination, especially on the separation between
masculine Culture and feminine Nature. One immediate difficulty with
their work, however (others will be discussed below), and one which
is particularly relevant to geographical discourse, is that masculinist
attitudes towards Nature are much more complicated than what radical
feminism describes as phallic lust. Geographers are highly ambivalent
about the Nature that they observe. There is without doubt a desire to dominate; but there is also a strong sense of pleasure in the ‘complex, surprising, exciting, and utterly magnificent world we live in’. For many, there is pleasure and wonder in fieldwork; looking gives the researcher the gorgeous scene, the enlightening detail, the breathtaking view, the beauty of diversity. As a president of the Association of American Geographers has commented, ‘many of us are in geography because it involves using our eyes, and for the latitude it allows for wonderment at the world around us’. Geographers speak of their awe and respect for the environment they encounter on fieldwork, even of their dependence on Nature: ‘perhaps we should designate Anteus as one of the patron saints of geography, because we too grow weaker the farther we depart from Mother Earth’. But the feminization of Nature continues even when – especially when – her beauty is in focus:

It is [in] the face and features of Mother-Earth that we geographers are mainly interested . . . The characteristic of the face and features of the Earth most worth learning about, knowing and understanding is their beauty.

One consequence of geographers’ respect for as well as fear of the environment is the desire not only to be an objective scientist, ready with survey equipment and computer to reveal the underlying workings of the land, but also to be the poet of the landscape. The geographer in the field requires the sensibilities of the aesthete as well as the objectivity of the scientist. The regions examined during fieldwork are ‘subjective artistic devices’ as well as units of analysis requiring ‘careful observation, measurement, and recording’. The fieldworker is both the distanced scientist and the sensitive artist; both analysis and imagination are prerequisites of fieldwork.

Pleasure in and awe of Nature are celebrated by geographers, then, but this can often create a certain tension in their work. Pleasure in the landscape is often seen as a threat to the scientific gaze, and it is argued that the geographer should not allow himself to be seduced by what he sees. The need for a certain analytical distance from the aesthetic pleasures of the view is repeated in recent accounts of looking at landscape. Nature then is both desired as a field of knowledge and feared as too mysteriously seductive. The ambiguity of geographers’ reverence for Nature is aptly summarized by J. K. Wright:

In the course of fieldwork or on a summer holiday we have all climbed a mountain and gazed over uninhabited or unfamiliar country...
In the contemplative mood that mountain tops induce, we have brooded over the view, speculated on the lay of the land, experienced a pleasurable sense of the mysterious – perhaps felt even a touch of the sinister. We have heard the Sirens’ voices.\(^{40}\)

Geographers’ uneasy mix of pleasure, mystery and fear in the face of Nature is represented by the alluring but dangerous feminine figure of the Siren. The gaze of the fieldworker is similarly equivocal, intimate and humbled, as well as distant and domineering. This, then, is an obvious distinction between geography’s relationship with Nature and that of science. Geographers relate to Nature through aesthetic appreciation as well as through science, and with pleasure as well as the desire to conquer.

**Dualistic thinking in human geography**

Margaret Fitzsimmons has argued that human geography as a whole is implicitly structured around the distinction between Nature and Culture.\(^{41}\) This subsection begins with her claim and examines the importance of gendered dualistic thinking to the discipline. I then argue that the ambivalence towards a feminized Nature expressed in accounts of fieldwork is symptomatic of a more general ambivalence in geographical knowledge, which has consequences for the specific form of its masculinism.

Fitzsimmons begins her discussion of Nature and Culture in human geography by arguing that the distinction became especially meaningful as part of the emergence of a division between the rural and the urban during the development of industrial capitalism. She then suggests that through a series of other associations and distinctions, different branches of human geography have defined themselves through a dependence on particular conflations within a system of binary oppositions. For example, she argues that space became associated with the urban: academics see intellectual life as urban and therefore implicitly prioritize it, and do so through a turn to science as the most prestigious form of knowledge. In the 1960s, having won ‘access to their scientistic authority and the complicity of scientific power’, geographers began to build models of urban life on featureless isotropic planes.\(^{42}\) Fitzsimmons argues that this abstract kind of space dominates the work even of radical urban geographers today, reinforced by the discipline’s fear of environmental determinism. She also claims that those geographers who retained an interest in Nature – cultural geographers – did so by arguing that what they termed the geographical ‘primitive’ had to be understood before the greater
complexities of economic and urban culture could be addressed (a hint at the way in which these oppositions can be implicitly racialized as well as gendered). Her argument concerning the impact of the Nature/Culture opposition and its alignment with other binary terms in human-geographical knowledge might be summarized thus:

- Culture — Nature
- city — countryside
- space — Nature
- Culture — primitive

Further examples of pairs of terms associated with Nature and Culture in human geography can be adduced. Sayer, for example, has examined the binary oppositions at work in geographers’ debates over the local studies of economic restructuring popular in the mid-1980s. He picks out these oppositions as particularly influential:

- theory — empirics
- general — specific
- abstract — concrete
- nomological — contextualizing

As Sayer notes, these oppositions may be meaningful in horizontal pairs in this list, but the list of pairs also became conflated vertically. His aim is to sort out the methodological and epistemological confusions that this conflation causes, but he does not ask why the conflation occurs in the first place. I suggest that it is encouraged by the implicit gendering of the oppositional terms; the terms are en-gendered through the Nature/Culture opposition. Knowledge, the social, the theoretical — all these are associated with the masculine and with the cultural and the scientific, the work of Man. The bodily, the specific, the private, the relational — these are feminine, and are associated more with the natural, separate from Man. The endurance and versatility of this opposition was evident even more recently, when geographers, like many other social and cultural theorists, presented the ‘postmodern challenge’ as a choice between two opposing positions:

- modern — postmodern
- deep — shallow
- seminal — playful
- great — fecund
- thrusting — titillating
- penetrating — veiled
Again, the two positions are clearly gendered.

The discussions of dualistic thinking by Fitzsimmons and Sayer begin to suggest a wider context for the geographies examined in the previous two chapters. For the two geographies described there also seem to line up with this binary structure:

- time-geography – humanistic geography
- public – private
- transparent – opaque
- social – body
- knowledge – maternity
- rational – emotional
- space – place

Again, the two sides of this series of pairs are gendered, one as masculine and one as the masculine idea of the feminine. And associated with the study of each side are the two masculinities that I have so far suggested are central to the discipline – the social-scientific and the aesthetic.

This suggests that the apparently different geographies of social-scientific and aesthetic masculinities are both related – if in different ways – to a structure of dualistic thought. This relationship has implications for the exclusions contained in geographical claims to know. The two sides of the lists of dualisms listed above are not two discrete alternatives, because the feminized side is defined in relation to the masculine. The two sides are not oppositions between two unrelated terms, which might be represented as A and B: what I have outlined is not a relationship between men's space and women's place, say, in which each are accorded equal epistemological status. Rather, this is a field of knowledge divided between two related terms. Woman is described in terms of Man, as the Other of the Same: these lists of dualisms show the field of the Same. What these lists of oppositions represent is a relationship between A and not-A. This is a field which excludes because it is structured around A, the masculine. It is phallocentric. There is no B, or C, or D, E or X. The relationship between A and not-A is exclusionary: it delimits what is knowable in the terms of the Same. It cannot admit radical difference from itself. Humanistic geography clearly reveals the limits of this dualistic field of knowledge in never allowing its demands to know places completely to challenge its own masculine fantasy of Woman. For while it reveres the notion of place, it also refuses to understand it; it is argued to be unrepresentable, enigmatic and unrecoverable. This is a discourse which, despite
its concern for what it sees as beyond itself, resists the knowledge of those who may be (partially) outside itself. Its exclusions show that geography's masculinities are not quite as different as they seem, for both social-scientific and aesthetic geography focus on a different aspect of this dualistic epistemology. Social-scientific masculinity is an implicit assertion of $A$, its autonomy demonstrated by its unmarked masculinity: aesthetic masculinity marks the arena of not-$A$ by circling around a strange opacity.

What has been constructed through the retention of oppositional thinking in the discipline, then, is a field of knowledge structured through a dualistic distinction between two positions; and, crucially, each of these requires the other to make sense. Geographers have never decided for one masculinity against the other; geography as a discourse has been defined through both. Space and place need the other to establish their own specificity: both the masculine and feminized sides of dualisms are prominent in geographical work. Now, Keller's account of science suggests that one side of such an oppositional structure— that associated with the masculine and with science—will always be valued over the Other, feminized side. In some debates in geography this does happen: some arguments for space are highly likely to be arguments against all that is associated with women—the bodily, the particular, the everyday, the emotional—as the discussion of time-geography in chapter 2 argued. However, geographers also valorize the 'feminine', as chapter 3 claimed in its discussion of humanistic geography. And some geographies try to do both at the same time; during fieldwork, for example. I suggest that the unease with which fieldworkers approach (M)Other Nature is echoed by a disciplinary uncertainty about which side of any dualism to value over the other.

One consequence of geography's insistent valorization of both $A$ (in social-scientific masculinity) and not-$A$ (in aesthetic masculinity) is that dualisms are never solid in geographical discourse. Words slip from one side to the other, since, as the discussion of fieldwork implied, the two sides can both be highly prized. The meanings of terms shift, and the values given to each term can vary. To take one example, which uses a gendered rhetoric in order to make a case for not attending to the gendered language used to describe Nature, Smith says he prefers to explicate 'the concrete process and pattern of the production of Nature under capitalism' rather than exploring why Nature is 'sodden with metaphor'. Comparing this to Sayer's list of dichotomies above, two different meanings are given to the term 'concrete', defined by what they are contrasted with:
Sayer abstract – concrete

Smith concrete – sodden

Similarly, while Fitzsimmons notes the influential association in geography of the city with culture/science/space, this chapter has already quoted a description of Venice couched in terms of nature/aesthetics/place. Geographical discourse is thus extremely mobile: it shifts focus, and remains explicitly concerned with both sides of its constitutive opposition. It is a field fascinated by the Other as well as hostile to it. This distinguishes geography from (natural) science; and it suggests that the subjectivity which underlies this discursive structure should be characterized rather differently from Keller’s Chodorovian account.

Fear and desire

In geography, then, a controlling, objective distance is not the only relationship which positions the knower in relation to his object of study. There is rather an ambivalence, which produces the restlessness of the signifiers within the discipline’s dualistic thinking. On the one hand, there is a fear of the Other, of an involvement with the Other, which does produce a distance and a desire to dominate in order to maintain that distance. This is central to social-scientific masculinity. On the other hand, there is also a desire for knowledge and intimacy, for closeness and humility in order to learn, and this is the desire of aesthetic masculinity to invoke its Other. Therefore, the desire for knowledge can have different emphases.

However, the different emphases of different masculinities are not completely distinct: each depends on and invades the other. This is especially clear in the case of humanistic geography, which insists on its rationality even as it celebrates its irrational Other, but it is evident in other geography too: the next chapter offers a further example, from cultural geography. This fascination with the Other suggests that the master subject of geography has a particularly ambivalent relation to feminized Others. Keller’s work on subjectivity and scientific rationality does not emphasize the possible contradiction between desire for and fear of the Other which appears to constitute geography’s masculinism. This is perhaps because that ambivalence is less marked in science than in geography; but it may also be a result of her reliance on Chodorow’s account of gendered subjectivity. As several feminists have remarked, Chodorow’s account tends to present the acquisition
of gender as a fairly straightforward process towards coherent identity.\textsuperscript{47} Other accounts of subjectivity, particularly those which draw on Lacanian psychoanalysis rather than on object relations theory, are more able to speak of the kind of dynamic uncertainties which I have argued are central to geographical masculinism, since Lacan emphasized again and again the instabilities and contradictions of identity. The next chapter will explore the arguments of certain feminists who adapt his work, in order to detail the complexities of geography's aesthetic masculinity.

Meanwhile, the next section reconsider[s] strategies of critique in the light of this chapter's elaboration of the discipline's masculinism.

**Strategies of Critique**

For women, the stakes of the Nature/Culture distinction are especially high in the discipline of geography, because the distinction is so central to its self-definitions. Deciding what kind of strategies are productive in this battlefield is therefore crucial.

**Oppositions: to invert or not to invert?**

The strategy practised by radical feminists is simply to invert the opposition between Nature and Culture and valorize its feminine side. This produces an extraordinarily empowering vision of women's possibilities. Griffin's text, for example, begins by mimicking the patriarchal abstract voice, but gradually she inserts the insidious voice of woman, 'the dim, simmering voice of self'.\textsuperscript{48} At first it is just an ironic echo:

> The availability of treasure. \textit{We were told that we exist for his needs, that we are a necessity.} Mineral salt. Coal. Metallic ores. \textit{That it is in our Nature to be needed.} The production of soil for agriculture. The general dispersal of metals useful to man.\textsuperscript{49}

But it develops and gains strength, becomes angry:

\ldots \textit{because we lack the capacity to be reasonable} and emotions they said must be distrusted \textit{because we are filled with rage} that where emotion colors thought \textit{because we cry out} thought is no longer objective \textit{because we are shaking} and therefore no longer describes what is real \textit{shaking in our rage, because we are shaking in our rage and we are no longer reasonable}.\textsuperscript{50}
And at last it can name itself:

*This secret life in us. The seen and the unseen. The speaking and the unspoken. The one who is what she ought to be and the one who is not. This other. The one from whom we are split away. Who follows us. Whose words lie under our tongues. Who speaks to us in our dreams.*

This is the voice speaking a new language which will shatter men’s ways of seeing the world and enable women to imagine new images on which to build life, and it is a language which, in Mary Daly’s work especially, is built on the celebration of what men have condemned in women. As well as finding suppressed meanings in words and coining neologisms such as ‘biophilia’ (the original Wild and Womanly Lust for Life), she gives new meanings to old words in order to expose the workings of the patriarchy and challenge its hierarchy. Daly describes women who are challenging men with their own powers and strengths as Witches, Hags, Crones, Spinsters, Harpies, Amazons and Furies, all Journeying towards the Hagocracy where Women’s values have destroyed the present men-tality. Gyn/ecology then is the arch-enemy of patriarchy. For this is the Essential, says Ynestre King: ‘women are the flesh and fact of connectedness’.

In the words of Griffin:

*Air knows grass knows water knows mud knows beetle knows frost knows sunlight knows the shape of the earth knows death knows not dying. And all this knowledge is in the souls of everything, behind naming, before speaking, beneath words.*

Mothers tell daughters this truth, and Griffin suggests that daughters will always respond with true knowing to their mother’s knowledge:

*... we know ourselves to be made from this earth. Temporary as this grass. Wet as this mud. Our cells filled with water. Like the mud of this swamp.*

This draws on the knowledge that generations of women have used in being mothers and housekeepers, mediating the links between family and earth. For radical feminists, sharing the experiences of raising children and keeping house has enabled women to retain a knowledge beyond that of the phallic Father. For me, the most wonderful parts of these books are the places in which they succeed in imagining a space in which women might really be free:
We are no longer pleading for the right to speak; we have spoken; space has changed; we are living in a matrix of our own sounds; our words resonate, by our echoes we chart a new geography; we recognize this new landscape as our birthplace, where we invented names for ourselves; here language does not contradict what we know; by what we hear, we are moved again and again to speak.\textsuperscript{56}

This is a marvellous apocalypse; and it is most marvellous because all we have to do to achieve it is \textit{to be as we already are}. All the things that we women are taught to despise about ourselves – our bodies, our menstruation, our domestic toil, our gossip, our emotionality – all these are precisely our routes to freedom. However, playing with the opposition between Nature and Culture is to play a dangerous game, and many feminists have criticized the work of Griffin and Daly and their sisters, arguing that they only reinforce masculinist knowledge. This is because their work actually depends on the gendered Nature/Culture dualism described above. This is quite explicit in some accounts of the socialization process: Collard and Contrucci, for example, argue that the education of the child from the natural state into an enculturated one is less fully achieved in the case of girls and so women remain closer to Nature. Influenced by their own bodily rhythms, close to their children and in touch with their wild emotions, women identify with the environment as like to like, they claim:

Nothing links the human animal and Nature so profoundly as woman’s reproductive system which enables her to share the experience of bringing forth and nourishing life with the rest of the living world. \textit{Whether or not she personally experiences biological mothering, it is in this that woman is most truly a child of Nature}.\textsuperscript{57}

However, Nature itself is not problematized in their work; rather, it is taken for granted as an emancipatory category for women. This produces several problems. First, radical feminists themselves depend on an absolute separation between male and female, grounded in anatomical difference. Yet, as chapter 2 suggested, only hegemonic readings of the body encode bodies into two absolutely different kinds. Appeals to biology cannot establish a binary gender opposition, since anatomy and biology are much less certain foundations of gender than radical feminists assume; human bodies do not neatly divide into two genital types.\textsuperscript{58} This invocation of Nature as bipolar biology also has effects on radical feminist claims to knowledge. It grounds their claims
about 'men' and 'women' in essentialist terms, and these essential qualities are also argued to be universal: all women are essentially the same, as are all men, and each is the opposite of the other. For example, their condemnation of men rests on a notion of phallic lust, which "as aggression . . . rapes, dismembers and kills women and all living things within its reach". I have already remarked that this is not a particularly accurate representation of geography's attitude to Nature. More importantly, it is not helpful in developing a critique of the relation between power and knowledge because it allows radical feminists to argue that they know what all women and all men are really like. This essentialism and universalism has been heavily criticized for the way in which it implicitly retains the assumptions of the master subject on issues other than gender, such as race. Daly, for example, uses Chinese footbinding, Indian suttee and African clitoridectomy, as well as European witch hunts and American gynaecology, to demonstrate the worldwide oppression of women, and this has drawn criticism from many black feminists who accuse her of using white norms to judge other cultures and of neglecting the resistances of women of colour. Claims that women are inherently nurturing also erase white women's involvement in colonial brutalities. These erasures are legitimated by radical feminism's resort to Nature, which replicates the epistemic violence grounding certain accounts of the 'natural' as absolutely true. Even to suggest that there may be difficulties with Daly's position immediately qualifies me as a deaf 'fembot', a mere automaton of patriarchy - hers are not texts which invite dialogue. Either you accept them entirely (provided that you have the right biological equipment), or you are a dupe of patriarchy. This kind of elitism makes gyn/ecology itself quite immune to the arguments of other feminists, and simply repeats the silencing of feminism in general by patriarchy. Radical feminism's celebration of Nature then absolutely erases differences between women as well as between men, and replicates the closures of masculinist thought.

There are therefore severe problems with accepting the patriarchal conflation of women and Nature. However, there are also problems in rejecting it. This is shown in Le Doeuff's discussion of the work of Simone de Beauvoir. In de Beauvoir's case, the dualisms arise from her use of Sartrean existentialism, which distinguishes between the transcendence of the (masculine) subject struggling to achieve ever new projects, and the immanent (feminine) subject trapped in itself and in repetition; between the responsibility of attempting transcendence and the bad faith of not; and, notoriously, between the masculine transcendence of penetrative logic (and culture) and the
feminine immanence of (natural) slime and holes. Simone de Beauvoir tried to overcome this misogyny by using it as a description of masculinism rather than as an ontological reality, and by insisting that immanence was not entirely a matter of a lack of individual effort but could by caused by material constraints. However, this also encouraged de Beauvoir to suggest that women's emancipation would happen when they escaped the constraints of their bodily immanence: women would be freed by becoming like men. This erasure of the bodily is as insidious as the biologism of radical feminism, because in Western discourse the bodily is almost always represented by women's bodies. It is never 'the body' which is erased, but women's bodies, because the master subject so rarely acknowledges his. Erasing the body then also reaffirms the opposition between mind and body, Culture and Nature.

Dualisms maintain order by offering only two positions, both of which are constituted around a single term – the masculine Same. De Beauvoir's free women are freed by becoming the masculine part of the dichotomy: Daly's Wild Women necessitate 'fembots' and men in order to establish themselves in their feminine difference. Similar dangers are evident here if chapters 2 and 3 are read separately, as free-standing essays in opposition to the geographies they interpret. Each of their strategies of critique may echo an aspect of masculinism which other kinds of feminism have challenged. The 'metaphorics of the maternal fix', to quote Miller, which I used in the second chapter to mark the exclusions of time-geography, may reinstate all that has oppressed women by implying a reference to natural Woman. To associate women with the domestic, the bodily and the emotional may be to invoke the misogynist stereotyping of women. Yet the rejection of the maternal which I staged in chapter 3, in an effort to explicate the masculinism of humanistic geography, risks losing any sense of women's difference from men. To reject the (maternal) body entirely may replicate all that has sustained the power of masculinity by assuming that women are untainted by Woman which, given the dualistic field of the Same, suggests that women are actually just like men. Each chapter's critique was in some way complicit with the geographical discourse with which it engaged.

Put like this, the choice of critique for feminists appears to be either to mimic the men, or to enact men's fantasy of the Woman. Neither option seems emancipatory: both encourage the dizzying doubt that 'the symbolic (that is, masculine) subject is the subject who can say "I" of himself; it is never clear that in saying "I" the female subject is not in fact referring to a masculine "you"'. However, there are ways in which to challenge that choice.
Other tactics

The desire to settle in a correct position and the long-standing existence of two such positions within white feminism has been noted by several writers. These two positions correspond to what I described above as imitating the men or becoming men's idea of the Woman, and each is to some extent complicit with hegemonic masculinism. One possible resistance to that complicity with the exclusionary field of the Same and its Other has already been discussed in the first chapter here – an oscillation between different forms of resistance. Feminists may refuse to make a choice between two strategies. Many argue that it is no choice at all: we do not have to take sides when we have had so little say in the rules of the game. Different masculinities invite different critiques, but to claim one particular critique as the only response to what is a diverse masculinism is inevitably to occupy a ground already defined by the masculine. As Le Doeuff says:

...it is very difficult to establish that 'men are this', because they differ greatly from each other; wanting to differentiate oneself from a highly diverse reality is a sad and hollow plan of action which soon leads nowhere, for is there any place that no man has ever occupied?

An insistence on mobility may avoid entrapment by the options offered by masculinist discourse, and thus also avoid replication of those options. As a feminist geographer, I find this oscillatory strategy very productive, because it allows me to challenge two very different but equally phallocentric kinds of geography from positions which try to evade geography's dualistic structure.

However, given the discursive mobility between geography's Same and its Other, which this chapter has stressed, a critical feminist oscillation needs to be rather more complex than simply invoking the Other to the Same. Masculinist geography has itself done that. What is needed is a displacement of the dualism of Same and Other. Thus the strategies of the second and third chapters here tried not to occupy the alternative position neatly as it was offered by the two masculinities that they addressed. It was precisely in order not to offer a naïve reflection of masculinist discourses that I tried to emphasize that the strategies in chapters 2 and 3 were deliberate tactics: each of the two positions adopted there were thought about together in order to avoid either being completely caught by the masculinism of geography. Each strategy has an influence on the other in an effort to avoid the alternative offered by the specific dualistic structure of the masculinist
geography concerned. I tried to destabilize the exclusionary structure of the masculinist Same/Other through an awareness of diverse critical possibilities. Chapter 2 recovered the Other of social-scientific masculinity, but tried to avoid invoking the Other of the disembodied Same/space by drawing on arguments about the specific and differentiated cultural encoding of the bodily. Woman was recovered not as an essential category but as a constructed one. Chapter 3 denied the fantasized Woman but still focused on women as a coherent category; a coherence which, as Diana Fuss has argued, implicitly refers to an essential Woman. Thus the rejection of Woman was tempered by continued reference to the social group most defined by Her. In these ways these chapters tried to avoid a complete distinction between women and Woman, which would be yet another dualism: both chapters invoked both (essential) Woman and (diversified) women. Perhaps some such mobility is especially necessary for feminists in geography, because their discipline has itself been so mobile in its occupation of the scientific and the aesthetic, space and place, the masculine and the fantasized feminine.

Oscillation for its own sake is not the point, then: the goal of such a critical mobility must be to deconstruct the polarities that it oscillates between. The structure of the Same and the Other must be destabilized. Another strategy to achieve that subversion in geography is to emphasize the ambivalence of its discourse as an inevitable and internal contradiction. This may be possible because, as I have suggested, geography’s masculinities depend on the same structure of Same and Other, yet neither can speak of the Other; and the practice of fieldwork suggests a certain fear of seduction by this mysterious but necessary Other. This suggests that the fear of the Other will recur in geography, and that the unstable ambivalence that it produces between knowledge and pleasure is inherent in the masculinism of geographical knowledge. Geography has ‘an internal enemy’: it desires what it represses or refuses to know. Insisting on such contradictions can undermine the authority of the Same by seeking out the incoherencies of its supposedly singular and stable position: examining the internal inconsistencies in the Same shatters the avowed homogeneity on which its universalistic claims depend. It displaces the markers which structure the oppositional field of knowledge, and suggests that it is not as stable and powerful as it represents itself to be. This is the importance of the theorization of subjectivity offered in the previous section, because it insists that such instabilities and ambivalences will always exist. The next chapter embarks on this project of undermining a form of aesthetic masculinity by examining that masculinity’s own contradictions.
Another tactic of critique is suggested by the notion of other fields of knowledge beyond \( A/\text{not-}A \). The previous section argued that masculinism in geography denies the existence of \( B \), or \( C \), or \( D \), \( E \) or \( X \). Elsewhere, however, these other possibilities may struggle to exist and imagine themselves against the dominant discourse. As Judith Butler says, 'if the regulatory fictions of sex and gender are themselves multiply contested sites of meaning, then the very multiplicity of their construction holds out the possibility of a disruption of their univocal posturing'. Differences in the Same stem not only from the Other but from others. In the following chapters my argument therefore begins to move away from a mainly epistemological critique of geographical knowledge towards formulating a different kind of knowledge by drawing on different theorizations of different experiences. The next two chapters return to geography as an academic discipline and explore some different kinds of knowledge, some offered by geographers, some by feminists, and some by feminist geographers. They examine geography's own internal disruptions and also detail certain challenges to its claims to know space, place and landscape. Central to these other kinds of knowledge, I will argue, is a spatiality that articulates a new relation to power and knowledge. I explore some of the spaces of other, politicized identities in an effort to think about a different kind of geographical imagination which could enable a recognition of radical difference from itself; an imagination sensitive to difference and power which allows others rather than an Other.

In this chapter I have tried to break with the expected smooth authoritative textual narrative: this is an interruption which looks both back and forward, marking this text as constructed through a specific politics. The text pivots around this specific centre. But this centre is also a hinge. The previous two chapters have explored the masculinism of geographical discourse, trying to describe its main outlines. This chapter has reflected on what they found. The next two chapters both end with feminist work which asserts women's difference from men but, in stressing women's difference for each other, also denies the figure of Woman. They offer glimpses of a different kind of geography, too, a geography which the final chapter elaborates in more detail. From this point on, the book starts towards one possible re-imagining of geography.
Landscape is a central term in geographical studies because it refers to one of the discipline's most enduring interests: the relation between the natural environment and human society, or, to rephrase, between Nature and Culture. Landscape is a term especially associated with cultural geography, and although 'literally [the landscape] is the scene within the range of the observer's vision', its conceptualization has changed through history. By the interwar period, for its leading exponents, such as Otto Schlüter in Germany, Jean Brunhes in France and Carl Sauer in the USA, the term 'landscape' was increasingly interpreted as a formulation of the dynamic relations between a society or culture and its environment: 'the process of human activity in time and area'. The interpretation of these processes depended in particular on fieldwork, and fieldwork is all about looking: 'the good geographers have first been to see, then they have stopped to think and to study the conclusions of others before finally recording their findings for us in maps and print'. Just as fieldwork is central not only to cultural geography but also to the discipline as a whole, however, so too the visual is central to claims to geographical knowledge: a president of the Association of American Geographers has argued that 'good regional geography, and I suspect most good geography of any stripe, begins by looking'. The absence of knowledge, which is the condition for continuing to seek to know, is often metaphorically indicated in geographical discourse by an absence of insight, by mystery or by myopia; conversely, the desire for full knowledge is indicated by transparency, visibility and perception. Seeing and knowing are often conflated.
More recent work on landscape has begun to question the visuality of traditional cultural geography, however, as part of a wider critique of the latter's neglect of the power relations within which landscapes are embedded. Some cultural geographers suggest that the discipline's visuality is not simple observation but, rather, is a sophisticated ideological device that enacts systematic erasures. They have begun to problematize the term 'landscape' as a reference to relations between society and the environment through contextual studies of the concept as it emerged and developed historically, and they have argued that it refers not only to the relationships between different objects caught in the fieldworker's gaze, but that it also implies a specific way of looking. They interpret landscape not as a material consequence of interactions between a society and an environment, observable in the field by the more-or-less objective gaze of the geographer, but rather as a gaze which itself helps to make sense of a particular relationship between society and land. They have stressed the importance of the look to the idea of landscape and have argued that landscape is a way of seeing which we learn; as a consequence, they argue that the gaze of the fieldworker is part of the problematic, not a tool of analysis. Indeed, they name this gaze at landscape a 'visual ideology', because it uncritically shows only the relationship of the powerful to their environment. This is an important critique of the unequal social relations implicit in one element of geographical epistemology, and the first section of this chapter examines these arguments.

Questions of gender and sexuality have not been raised by this newer work, however. This seems an important omission: the previous chapter cited Fitzsimmons's comment that cultural geography retained an interest in Nature, and also noted the feminization of Nature in geographical discourse. A consequence has been that, historically, in geographical discourse, landscapes are often seen in terms of the female body and the beauty of Nature. Here, for example, is one of the quotations from the previous chapter expanded to highlight the parallels that it makes between 'live, supple, sensitive, and active' Nature and a female body:

It is [in] the face and features of Mother-Earth that we geographers are mainly interested. We must know something of the general principles of geology, as painters have to know something of the anatomy of the human or animal body . . . the characteristic of the face and features of the Earth most worth learning about, knowing and understanding is their beauty.
Stoddart’s celebration of geography’s exploration and fieldwork tradition similarly conflates the exploration of Nature with the body of Woman; for example, his frontispiece is an eighteenth-century engraving representing Europe, Africa and America as three naked women. This feminization of what is looked at does matter, because it is one half of what Berger characterizes as the dominant visual regime of white heterosexual masculinism: ‘women appear’, he says, but ‘men act’. This particular masculine position is to look actively, possessively, sexually and pleasurably, at women as objects. Now, Berger’s comments refer to the female nude in Western art; but I will suggest in this chapter that the feminization of landscape in geography allows many of the arguments made about the masculinity of the gaze at the nude to work in the context of geography’s landscape too, particularly in the context of geography’s pleasure in landscape. The second section of this chapter suggests that geography’s look at landscape draws on not only a complex discursive transcoding between Woman and Nature, as the previous chapter argued, but also on a specific masculine way of seeing: the men acting in the context of geography are the fieldworkers, and the Woman appearing is the landscape. This compelling figure of Woman both haunts a masculinist spectator of landscape and constitutes him.

The pleasures that geographers feel when they look at landscape are not innocent, then, but nor are they simple. The pleasure of the masculine gaze at beautiful Nature is tempered by geography’s scientism, as the last chapter suggested. The gaze of the scientist has been described by Keller and Grontkowski as part of masculinist rationality, and to admit an emotional response to Nature would destroy the anonymity on which that kind of scientific objectivity depends. Keller and Grontkowski trace the tradition of associating knowledge with vision back to Plato, and they argue that by the seventeenth century the equivalence of knowing with seeing was a commonplace of scientific discourse. It remains so today. But when Descartes discovered that the eye was a passive lens, in order to retain an understanding of the accession to knowledge as active he was forced to separate the seeing intellect from the seeing eye. This was one aspect of the split between the mind and the body so much associated with his work, and it rendered the objects of the gaze separate from the looking subject: ‘Having made the eye purely passive, all intellectual activity is reserved to the “I”, which, however, is radically separate from the body which houses it’. Such disembodiment separated knowing from desire, and protected men’s scientific neutrality from Woman’s wild nature. For Keller, the scientific gaze is another
aspect of the distanced, disembodied objectivity of science. However, as chapter 4 described, geographers are constituted as sensitive artists as well as objective scientists in their approach to Nature and landscape. This contradiction produces a conflict between desire and fear in visual forms. It creates a tension between distance from the object of the gaze and merger with it, which is at work both in the conflict between knowledge and pleasure — a conflict between ‘a highly individual response’ and ‘a disinterested search for evidence’ — and also within the pleasured gaze. These complex contradictions between and within (social-)scientific objectivity and aesthetic sensitivity disrupt cultural geography’s claim to know landscape, as the second section argues. These disruptions are elaborated there through the work of psychoanalytic feminists who suggest that ‘the specificity of visual performance and address has...a privileged relation to issues of sexuality’. This second section is adopting one of the tactics outlined in the previous chapter, then — finding contradictions in the Same. I argue that the structure of aesthetic masculinity which studies landscape is inherently unstable, subverted by its own desire for the pleasures that it fears.

The third section uses another tactic of critique, and looks at various attempts to re-present a different relation between subject and environment from other spectating positions. None draws on the structure which posits Woman as Nature in order to establish Man as Culture, and all stress differences between women. They begin to imagine different kinds of landscape.

Landscape as Visual Ideology

Recent critiques of the landscape idea in geography insist that landscape is a form of representation and not an empirical object. As Daniels and Cosgrove remark, ‘a landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings’. Whether written or painted, grown or built, a landscape’s meanings draw on the cultural codes of the society for which it was made. These codes are embedded in social power structures, and theorization of the relationship between culture and society by these new cultural geographers has so far drawn on the humanist marxist tradition of Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson and John Berger. All of these authors see the material and symbolic dimensions of the production and reproduction of society as inextricably intertwined.
one of the most prominent theorists of the new critique of the landscape idea, defines culture as:

...symbolisation, grounded in the material world as symbolically appropriated and produced. In class societies, where surplus production is appropriated by the dominant group, symbolic production is likewise seized as hegemonic class culture to be imposed on all classes.¹⁶

In his work, landscape becomes a part of that hegemonic culture, a concept which helps to order society into hierarchical class relations.

Cosgrove points out that landscape first emerged as a term in fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy, and he argues that it was bound up with both Renaissance theories of space and with the practical appropriation of space. Euclidean geometry was 'the guarantor of certainty in spatial conception, organisation and representation',¹⁷ and its recovery paved the way for Alberti's explication of the technique of three-dimensional perspective in 1435. Other geometrical skills were being developed contemporaneously, especially by the urban merchant class, and these too involved the accurate representation of space: calculating the volume and thus the value of packaged commodities; map-making to guide the search for goods and markets; and surveying techniques to plot the estates that the bourgeoisie were buying in the countryside. All of these spatial techniques were implicated in relations of power and ownership. Cosgrove is particularly interested in Alberti because, using his manual, artists could render depth realistically, and so establish a particular viewpoint for the spectator in their painting – a single, fixed point of the bourgeois individual. (Cosgrove does remark that this individual was male, but does not develop the point.)¹⁸ From this position, the spectator controlled the spatial organization of a composition, and Cosgrove argues that this was central to landscape images. Merchants often commissioned paintings of their newly acquired properties, and in these canvases, through perspective, they enjoyed perspectival as well as material control over their land. Cosgrove concludes that the idea of landscape is patrician because it is seen and understood from the social and visual position of the landowner. Other writers agree and emphasize the erasure of the waged labour relation in landscape painting. In the context of eighteenth-century English landscape painting, for example, Barrell notes that the labourers in these images are denied full humanity, and Bryson argues that the fine brushwork technique favoured in Western art until the late nineteenth century effaces the mark of the artist as
waged worker.\textsuperscript{19} It is argued then that landscape is meaningful as a ‘way of seeing’ bound into class relations, and Cosgrove describes landscape as a ‘visual ideology’ in the sense that it represents only a partial world view.\textsuperscript{20}

This is an extremely important critique of the ideologies implicit in geographical discourse. Its strengths are evident in the interpretation shared by cultural geographers of the mid-eighteenth-century double portrait of Mr and Mrs Andrews, by the English artist Thomas Gainsborough (Illustration 2).\textsuperscript{21} In their discussions of this image, geographers concur that pleasure in the right-hand side of the canvas – those intense green fields, the heaviness of the sheaves of corn, the English sky threatening rain – is made problematic by the two figures on the left, Mr and Mrs Andrews. Berger, whose discussion of this painting geographers follow, insists that the fact that this couple owned the fields and trees about them is central to its creation and therefore to its meaning: ‘they are landowners and their proprietary attitude towards what surrounds them is visible in their stance and their expressions’.\textsuperscript{22} Their ownership of land is celebrated in the substantiability of the oil paints used to represent it, and in the vista opening up beyond them, which echoes in visual form the freedom to move over property which only landowners could enjoy. The absence in the painting’s content of the people who work the fields, and the absence in its form of the signs of its production by an artist working for a fee on a commission, can be used to support Cosgrove’s claim that landscape painting is a form of visual ideology: it denies the social relations of waged labour under capitalism. \textit{Mr and Mrs Andrews}, then, is an image on which geographers are agreed: it is a symptom of the capitalist property relations that legitimate and are sanctioned by the visual sweep of a landscape prospect.

However, the painting of Mr and Mrs Andrews can also be read in other ways. In particular, it is possible to prise the couple – ‘the landowners’ – apart, and to differentiate between them. Although both figures are relaxed and share the sense of partnership so often found in eighteenth-century portraits of husband and wife, their unity is not entire: they are given rather different relationships to the land around them. Mr Andrews stands, gun on arm, ready to leave his pose and go shooting again; his hunting dog is at his feet, already urging him away. Meanwhile, Mrs Andrews sits impassively, rooted to her seat with its wrought iron branches and tendrils, her upright stance echoing that of the tree directly behind her. If Mr Andrews seems at any moment able to stride off into the vista, Mrs Andrews looks planted to the spot. This helps me to remember that, \textit{contra} Berger, these two people are
not both landowners – only Mr Andrews owns the land. His potential for activity, his free movement over his property, is in stark contrast not only to the harsh penalties awaiting poachers daring the same freedom of movement over his land (as Berger notes), but also to the frozen stillness of Mrs Andrews. Moreover, the shadow of the oak tree over her refers to the family tree she was expected to propagate and nurture; like the fields she sits beside, her role was to reproduce, and this role is itself naturalized by the references to trees and fields. As chapter 2 noted, this period saw the consolidation of an argument that women were more ‘natural’ than men. Medical, scientific, legal and political discourses concurred, and contextualize the image of Mr and Mrs Andrews in terms of a gendered difference in which the relationship to the land is a key signifier. Landscape painting then involves not only class relations, but also gender relations. Mr Andrews is represented as the owner of the land, while Mrs Andrews is painted almost as a part of that still and exquisite landscape: the tree and its roots bracketing her on one side, and the metal branches of her seat on the other.

Many feminist art historians have argued that heterosexual masculinism structures images of femininity: following that claim, my interpretation of the figure of Mrs Andrews stresses her representation as a natural mother. Obviously, her representation also draws on discourses of class and even nation. I emphasize her femininity, however, because there are feminist arguments which offer a critique not just of the discourses that pin Mrs Andrews to her seat, but also of the gaze that renders her as immobile, as natural, as productive and as decorative as the land. Such arguments consider the dynamics of a masculine gaze and its pleasures. The next subsection introduces their claim that more is involved in looking at landscape than property relations.

**Woman, landscape and Nature**

This subsection begins to examine the gaze which sees landscapes, and it focuses on the construction of the landscape as feminine. I concentrate mainly on feminist interpretations of nineteenth-century landscape paintings in Europe and North America. The massive social, economic and political upheavals in those places during that period – upheavals which included the colonial explorations through which geography developed as a discipline – meant that many of the schema previously used by artists to represent the world seemed increasingly outmoded, and new iconographies were sought to articulate the
changes producing and reproducing the lives of art’s audience, the bourgeoisie. By the mid-nineteenth century, the emergence of this new public for paintings was fuelling a vigorous debate about the role of art: art was drawn into debates about social, political and moral standards which might structure the emerging modern world and, as feminists have remarked, central to these wider issues was the figure of Woman – fallen, pure, decadent, spiritual. Parker and Pollock suggest that the very importance attached to Art in the realm of Culture reasserted the association of women with the natural:

... woman is body, is nature opposed to culture, which, in turn, is represented by the very act of transforming nature, that is, the female model or motif, into the ordered forms and colour of a cultural artefact, a work of art.

Woman becomes Nature, and Nature Woman, and both can thus be burdened with men’s meaning and invite interpretation by masculinist discourse: for example, chapter 3 has already discussed the way in which feminine figures can stand as symbols of places. It should be emphasized that the ‘naturalization’ of some women is asserted more directly than that of others: allegorical figures especially, but also, in bourgeois and racist society, working-class and black women. Thus the visual encoding of nineteenth-century Western hegemonic masculinist constructions of femininity, sexuality, nature and property are at their most overtly intertwined in the landscapes with figures set in the colonies of Europe and America. To take an example relevant to one of geography’s heroic self-images, Theweleit has suggested that the image of the South Sea maiden ‘began to construct the body that would constitute a mysterious goal for men whose desires were armed for an imminent voyage, a body that was more enticing than all the world put together’, and perhaps the most well-known paintings which fuse beautiful, sexual, fertile, silent and mysterious Woman with a gorgeous, generous, lush Nature are Gauguin’s paintings of Tahitian women. In perfect stillness, they offer the produce of their island to him in the same gesture as they offer themselves, their breasts painted like fruits and flowers. The first French encounter with Tahiti is described by Stoddart as one of the founding moments of scientific geography, and the encounter that he chooses to elaborate is a sexual one. Tahitian women represent the enticing and inviting land to be explored, mapped, penetrated and known. This subsection concentrates on the representation of female figures in landscapes, then, in order to examine one moment of the complex transcoding of
femininity and Nature in the field of vision. I suggest that, as well as contextualizing stories of geography's beginnings, the conflation of Woman and Nature can also say something about contemporary cultural geography's visual pleasure in landscape.

Lynda Nead has demonstrated the complexity of the social relations which were mediated in images of the landscapes at the heart of Empire, and she stresses the importance of gender relations to the representation of both class and nation. Nead suggests that, in the face of the transformations of the Victorian era, 'confirmation and reassurance... were two of the most important functions of nineteenth-century cultural discourse', and one of the most resonant symbols in England was that of the village in the countryside. The social stability associated with the village - people and land in traditional harmony - was so strong that by the 1840s landscape painting was for many art critics a contender as the truly national art genre of England. A contrast between the town and the country has a long tradition in English culture, of course, but by the mid-nineteenth century, despite the continuing arguments for the urban as the centre of civilization and progress, images of the countryside showed a rural idyll which gained much of its impact in opposition to representations of the city as polluted and depraved. The fields and villages of England were painted as embodying all the virtues that the towns had lost - stability, morality and tranquility - and social harmony was fundamental to this discursive construction. The rural idyll was envisioned as a village community. Everyone knew their place, and the harmony of such a community was centrally represented through 'natural' gender differences. Ideas about natural order were epitomized in the 'natural' difference between men and women, with women naturally natural mothers. Nochlin stresses the importance of the rural working mother figure to the rhetoric of Nature and the natural in her discussion of nineteenth-century French paintings of peasant life: 'The peasant woman, as an elemental, untutored - hence eminently "natural" female - is the ideal signifier for the notion of beneficent maternity'. And Nochlin describes how the stress on the naturalness of this role led to peasant women being equated directly with the land and animals they tend in many of these genre scenes - both were shown as essentially reproductive.

The supposed closeness of women to Nature was also explicit in other painting genres of the period, particularly those in which classical, fantastical or allegorical women appear surrounded by wild Nature. Dijkstra has catalogued these imaginary scenes in European and American nineteenth-century art. Often nude, in England these
images of women required a classical gloss to withstand the puritanism of some critics, although bourgeois patrons adored them. Elsewhere, in Europe and America, less excuse was needed to paint nudes: sleep was a popular allegory allowing scenes of women in unself-conscious abandon, oblivious to the spectator's gaze. In the eyes of nineteenth-century morality, such sexual potential brought these women excitingly close to Nature, and they are found in fields and woods throughout late nineteenth-century bourgeois art: 'Passive but fertile, they personify what had come to be a standard conception of woman as the infinitely receptive, seed-sheltering womb of a sweltering earth'. As nymphs and dryads they entwined themselves in trees, or lay on the leaf-covered earth, languid and passive, so that, according to Dijkstra's somewhat over-empathetic account, 'we can almost hear them call to us like animals waiting to be fed'. In a final iconographic twist, women became allegories of nature itself; for the seasons, for weather, for the time of day, for flowers. In making such a parallel between Woman and Nature these paintings offered the possibility that women could be used as Nature was: 'did not the earth, nature herself, meekly permit her body to be plowed, seeded, stripped, and abused by man?'. Nature and Woman were equally vulnerable.

This equivalence between Woman and Nature leads Armstrong to compare the female nude in Western art directly to a landscape:

The female nude, when free of narrative situations, is most often constituted frontally and horizontally – as a kind of landscape, its significant part the torso, its limbs merely elongations of the line created by the supine, stretched-out torso.

The female figure represents landscape, and landscape a female torso, visually in part through their pose: paintings of Woman and Nature often share the same topography of passivity and stillness. The comparison is also made through the association of both land and Woman with reproduction, fertility and sexuality, free from the constraints of Culture. Incorporating all of these associations, both Woman and Nature are vulnerable to the desires of men. Armstrong examines this vulnerability by arguing that if Art and the spectator constitute both Woman and Nature as what they work on and interpret, they do so especially by looking at both in a similar manner. Both are made to invite the same kind of observation. Rarely do the women in landscape images look out from the canvas at the viewer as an equal. Their gaze is often elsewhere: oblivious to their exposure, they offer no resistance to the regard of the spectator. Perhaps they will be looking in a mirror,
allowing the viewer to enjoy them as they apparently enjoy themselves. If they acknowledge the spectator/artist, they do so with a look of invitation. The viewer's eye can move over the canvas at will, just as it can wander across a landscape painting, with the same kind of sensual pleasure. Here is another parallel between Woman and landscape: the techniques of perspective used to record landscapes were also used to map female nudes, and the art genre of naked women emerged in the same period as did landscape painting (Illustration 3).

One of the earliest discussions of this kind of visual power over the representation of women was Berger's.41 Like his reading of Mr and Mrs Andrews, his arguments focus on the question of ownership. Speaking of the woman in a nude painting, he says that 'this nakedness is not, however, an expression of her own feelings; it is a sign of her submission to the owner's feelings or demands'.42 Just as he argues that the painting of a landscape in oils was a sensuous celebration of land ownership, so he claims that the representation of a woman in oils turns her too into a commodity, passive and prostrate, able only to welcome the gaze of the owner of the canvas. Being an owner gives material and visual power over property, whether that be land or the image of a woman.

Feminist art historians have acknowledged the force of Berger's account, but they suggest that not only the commodification of art and sex (and land) is involved in 'the landscape of the reclining torso';43 so too are the (hetero)sexual fantasies of both artist and spectator. It is the imagined and desired sexuality of the female nude that is offered to the (implicitly masculine) spectator. Nochlin was one of the first feminists to argue that the sexuality of the Western female nude was represented only through masculine desires:

As far as one knows, there simply exists no art, and certainly no high art, in the nineteenth century based upon women's erotic needs, wishes, or fantasies. Whether the erotic object be breasts or buttocks, shoes or corsets, a matter of pose or of prototype, the imagery of sexual delight or provocation has always been created about women for men's enjoyment, by men.44

This means that the sensual topography of land and skin is mapped by a gaze which is eroticized as masculine and heterosexual. This masculine gaze sees a feminine body which requires interpreting by the cultured knowledgeable look; something to own, and something to give pleasure. The same sense of visual power as well as pleasure is at
Illustration 3  A Draughtsman Drawing a Nude, by Albrecht Dürer.
work as the eye traverses both field and flesh: the masculine gaze is of knowledge and desire.

This discussion of the visual representation of women and landscape has concentrated on the complex construction of images of 'natural' Woman as the objects of male desire. I have argued that Nature and Woman are represented through masculinist fantasies, and that makes looking pleasurable. Women are seen as closer to Nature than men because of the desirable sexuality given to them in these images and other discourses. In a rare and welcome discussion of pleasure in landscape images, Daniels reveals this desire at work. Noting Berger's claim that painting has an energy which pulls the viewer further from the visible status quo than they could manage alone, he suggests that images of the countryside evoke deep and pleasurable emotional responses which can empower; and this pleasure is described in Berger's words, as 'a going further than he could have achieved alone, towards a prey, a Madonna, a sexual pleasure, a landscape, a face, a different world'. This conflation of hunting, a virgin and the single male orgasm stands as a summary of the pleasure of landscape. Pleasure in landscape, it appears, is for straight men's eyes only.

A blind spot in geographers' ways of seeing

There is a great reluctance among geographers to engage critically with this masculine pleasure, even though pleasure in the landscapes encountered during fieldwork is, as the previous chapter commented, frequently admitted (even erotic pleasure is occasionally conceded). Daniels, for example, only prostrates himself before the aesthetic power of landscapes in speechless admiration: he seems to share Tuan's belief that, in confronting the mystic power of art, 'the proper response is silence'. The critical evasion of a pleasure described as a fundamental human experience aligns this newer cultural geography with the discipline's aesthetic masculinity.

The refusal to address the pleasure which marks this cultural geography as masculinist is enabled in part by the ideological notion of Art as the ultimate form of human expression: its pleasure is assumed to be untainted by the specificity of social relations. It is also enabled by the use of the metaphor of landscape as text. The visual, new cultural geographers argue, can be interpreted only if it is understood as textual and then read. Texts may include visual images – the techniques of geometry and perspective learnt from books, for example, in the Italian Renaissance – as well as written political, economic or cultural texts, and the metaphor has been detailed by Barnes and Duncan:
... a landscape possesses a similar objective fixity to that of a written text. It also becomes detached from the intentions of its original authors, and in terms of social and psychological impact and material consequences the various readings of landscapes matter more than any authorial intentions. In addition, the landscape has an importance beyond the initial situation for which it was constructed, addressing a potentially wide range of readers. In short, landscapes are characterized by all those features that Ricoeur identifies as definitive of a text.49

The meaning of any landscape/text is open to interpretation and contestation, they imply: the author of the landscape/text is dead. But then I find their stress on the fixity of the landscape/text puzzling. Obviously most landscapes are physically solid, but this surely matters little to geographers so concerned with meaning and culture. But if meaning is not stable, what does ‘objective fixity’ mean? The ‘concretization’ of the landscape/text is not an uncommon claim, and Short, for example, suggests that texts ‘are language made solid, conversations frozen in print and picture’.50 I suggest that the notion of solidity is necessary in order to imply the possibility of certain knowledge about landscape. For in all of this work the only representations of landscape which seem able to retain their interpretive certainty (overtly at least) are those of the geographers themselves. The deflection of the notion of contested texts away from geographers’ own writing is made explicitly by Barnes and Duncan when they remark that ‘to understand critically our own representations, and also those of others, we must therefore know the kinds of factors bearing upon an author that makes an account come out the way it does’.51 The move from a personalized ‘our’ to an abstract ‘author’ shifts the focus of this argument about the specificity of texts away from geographers and towards somebody else. This removes the geographer from the interpretive rules that he applies to the texts of others, and renders him invincible as an author – all-seeing and all-knowing. He can reveal the contestation over another landscape image, and in so doing establishes the acuity and insight of his own reading. As Burgess has remarked in the context of a discussion about postmodern built landscapes, ‘the analyst remains in the dominant position of telling readers what these landscapes mean for the people who purchase and live in them’.52 Removing himself also makes him invisible, because his texts then remain part of the anonymous voice of hegemonic geographical discourse. The texts of the new cultural geography remain, overtly at least, unmarked: (embodied) specificity is banished and distant authority put in its place. The metaphor of landscape as text works to establish an authoritative
reading, and to maintain that authority whenever emotion threatens to erupt and mark the author as a feeling subject. Knowledge/texts/evidence are asserted over and against emotion. Daniels himself uses text to staunch his own admission of desire: he repeats the quotation from Berger twice, almost like a talisman against the disruption of which it speaks. Those few words name that pleasure for Daniels, and their reiteration seems to stabilize it, delimit its impact, and ground it so that knowledgeable discussion can proceed around it. The textual metaphor aims to stabilize disruptions and demonstrate learning and sensitivity: landscape textualized renders geographers' knowledge exhaustive. It performs as another example of aesthetic masculinity in geography.

Textualizing landscape is an attempt to deny the phallocentrism of the geographic gaze, while also establishing a specific masculinity as the norm through which to access visual knowledge. The revelation of the masculinity of the gaze at landscape is thus highly disruptive to cultural geography's authoritative claims to interpret landscape, and within the dualistic structure of geographical knowledge it encourages a retreat back to a disinterested and therefore disembodied search for evidence and truth. This is geography's tense oscillation between knowledge and pleasure. Visual pleasure is seen as something disruptive, and its persistence leads to cultural geographers' suspicion of landscape as secretive, ambiguous, duplicitous, mysterious and Other—feminine again. Their 'lust' for landscape dissipates, and this 'invariably prompt[s] the questions "Why did I read this?" "Why did I go there?" "Why did I desire her?"' But visual pleasure never ends, and has its own contradictions. Theorists of the visual argue that there is a specific logic of the gaze and that visual pleasure is deeply bound into the regulatory fictions of heterosexuality. The next section addresses this pleasure and its repressions, and suggests that the retreat to a critical distance is no escape at all. Geographers are pursued by their internal enemy, which ensures the failure of their efforts to stabilize their knowledges.

Sexuality in the Field of Vision

The recurring but uneasy pleasure that geography finds in landscape, acknowledged but never addressed, is a version of the discipline's aesthetic masculinity. This section examines the persistence of its visual pleasure, and emphasizes that pleasure's disruptions and contradictions in order to subvert that masculinism's claims to exhaustive-
ness. I will draw on the arguments of feminists working with Freud and with Lacan’s re-reading of Freud, because several have focused on the contradictoriness of ‘sexuality in the field of vision’ through these forms of psychoanalysis. 56

Clearly, there are many problems with any engagement between psychoanalysis and feminism. Many feminists argue that both Freud and Lacan take patriarchy for granted and do not theorize change – the latter problem epitomized by Freud’s notorious claim that ‘anatomy is destiny’ – and Lacan has been criticized even by those feminists drawing on his work for his implicit phallocentrism. 57 Psychoanalysis has therefore been condemned as incapable of challenging the oppression of women. 58 Nonetheless, for writers such as Elizabeth Grosz, Juliet Mitchell, Laura Mulvey and Jacqueline Rose, all of whom I draw on here, a critique of the hold that ideologies have over our innermost psyches must inform any liberatory politics: further more, psychoanalysis, for all its problems, is the only elaborated theory available that takes the sexuality of the subject as its fundamental problematic. Their feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis stresses two themes; both of which, they argue, allow for failures in and resistances to ideology. The first is the unconscious. The unconscious is the location of powerful desires, impossible to satisfy, repressed by the conventions of society but constantly threatening to make themselves known, and they argue that it allows for the constant possibility of disruption to the norms of everyday life. The second is the stress in Lacan’s work on the symbol and the image, which leads Rose to comment on the ‘fictional nature of the sexual category to which every human subject is none the less assigned’; 59 Lacan insists on the difficulty of human identity and even on its failure. The feminist encounter with Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests that it is possible to undermine the relentless Sameness of masculinist codes of meaning by reading for the disruptive symptoms of its desires. With Grosz, I would argue that:

... feminists cannot afford to reject or accept [Lacan’s] work. This ambivalence is not, however, a failure to ‘make up one’s mind’. Rather, from the present vantage point, it can be seen as a tactical position enabling feminists to use his work where it serves their interests without being committed to its more troublesome presumptions. 60

This section will trace some of the contradictions and disruptions in geography’s ambivalence towards landscape, for the insistence on the fragility of human identity also informs feminist psychoanalytic
interpretations of masculinist visual pleasure. In the work of both Freud and Lacan, a strong ‘identificatory investment in images’ is outlined, replete with difficulties and contradictions, for when ‘describing the child’s difficult journey into adult sexual life, [Freud] would take as his model little scenarios, or the staging of events, which demonstrated the complexity of an essentially visual space, moments in which perception founders’. The seen image is central to feminist psychoanalytic theory: the gaze is theorized as being eroticized, so that ‘visual space [is] more than the domain of simple recognition’. The gaze is eroticized through heterosexual desire. Its power in racist contexts also depends on the whiteness of the spectator, as Gaines has argued. This section argues that these feminist psychoanalytic commentaries offer an eloquent critique of geography’s white, heterosexual, masculine gaze, a gaze torn between pleasure and its repression.

Mulvey’s account of the gaze and identity begins with scopophilia, pleasure in looking. Mulvey argues that this pleasure is voyeuristic: it is curious, controlling and distanced. As the child enters subjectivity, this voyeurism shifts and is joined by other ways of looking. Especially important in this process is what Lacan called the ‘mirror stage’, which is the moment at which the child begins to realize, by seeing its image in a mirror or in the reactions to its actions by its mother or nurturer, that it is a bounded body. The child pleasures in this, too, and again and again affirms itself through the reflections of others. This recognition of self in images outside the self is narcissistic, and the tension between narcissism – identification with the image – and voyeurism – a distancing from the image – is central to the continuing dynamics of the gaze. This contradiction is there in the mirror stage itself, for the seen unity of the subject is in fact a fantasy. It is a coherence seen in a mirror from a distance: the unity perceived with the image depends on a split between the child and the mirror or its mother/nurturer, and this mirror/mother is what I have also been calling the Other. This moment of recognizing oneself is a moment of misrecognition: every look re-enacts the subject’s split between its gaze and its image, itself and the external order. The gaze is then always torn between two conflicting impulses: on the one hand, a narcissistic identification with what it sees and through which it constitutes its identity; and on the other a voyeuristic distance from what is seen as Other to it.

Feminists argue that this contradictory gaze is not sexually neutral. As Mulvey argues, it constitutes:

Woman as image, man as bearer of the look... in a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between
active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly. The (hetero)sexuality of the active gaze is structured as masculine in phallocentric cultures and societies, and feminists argue that it is central to the construction of sexual difference. Their arguments focus on the Oedipus/castration complex, through which boys are forced to repress their desire for their mother through the threat of castration. (This first repression forms the unconscious.) This threat marks the mother as the site of lack because she is seen as already castrated. It is important to note here how the mother comes to signify lack, because it is at this point that accusations of biological determinism are most often levelled at Freud and Lacan. Mitchell insists that ‘in and of itself, the female body neither indicates nor initiates anything’. She emphasizes the fictional, not biological, nature of identity: this must be an account of the formation of masculine and feminine positions; not, as in Mulvey’s polemic, of men and women. Mitchell’s remarks also stress the centrality of a certain vision to the constitution of Woman as lacking, since it is only through the sight of patriarchal law that the mother’s genitalia come to signify lack or castration. As Grosz notes, ‘the female can be construed as castrated, lacking a sexual organ, only on the information provided by vision’. As in the mirror stage, the look is again central to subjectivity, and the active look which sees the mother as lacking rather than simply different is phallocentric. The active look is constituted as masculine, and to be looked at is the feminine position. But this is not a coherent look: narcissistic identification with the powerful, pre-Oedipal, phallic (m)Other and voyeuristic fascination with her lack remain, and so the look ‘oscillates between memory of maternal plenitude and memory of lack’.

These connections between identity and vision suggest why visual pleasure recurs in geographical discourse: it is a fundamental part of the masculine subjectivity which shapes and is constituted through that discourse. And geography’s pleasure in landscape images can be interpreted through the psychoanalytic terms across which the gaze is made – loss, lack, desire and sexual difference. One possible reading follows. It is a supplement to the argument of the previous chapter about the ambivalence of geography towards Mother Nature. It is an insistence on the disruptions of the Other in the gaze of the geographic Same; it is a sustained attempt to undermine both the anonymity of the authoritative cultural geographer and the stability of his claims to knowledge.

I will begin with the mother. Pollock notes that there is ‘a function
for the image as a means to regain visual access to the lost object', the lost object being the mother before her denial through the Oedipus/castration complex. Images of women, of Nature, of Mother Nature and the ‘maternal natural landscape’, to quote Sauer again, can assuage the loss of the pre-Oedipal mother because they offer plenitude, passivity, lusciousness, nurturance and incorporation: this chapter and the last have already quoted geographers celebrating all these qualities in landscape. Pleasure in landscape comes partly from its seductively sexual vision of narcissistic reunion with the phallic mother. The work of Kolodny on the metaphors used by European male settlers of North America to describe the land that they were colonizing demonstrates just such a comforting elision between the land and Woman. She argues that the earliest immigrants compared the continent to a Woman and developed the European pastoral tradition into:

...what is probably America’s oldest and most cherished fantasy: a daily reality of harmony between man and nature based on an experience of the land as essentially feminine – that is, not simply the land as mother, but the land as woman, the total female principle of gratification – enclosing the individual in an environment of receptivity, repose, and painless and integral satisfaction.

The metaphor of land-as-woman affected men’s attitudes towards the environment in complex ways, and Kolodny locates this complexity in the conflict induced by the metaphor itself. The land was imagined as a mother, whose generosity and abundance were marvellous, Edenic, but which could overwhelm settlers and corrupt their efforts at self-sufficiency. To distance themselves from this possibility, men continued to work the land, to explore it and to penetrate its mysteries, and this invoked another aspect of land-as-woman, the land as irresistible temptress. ‘Implicit in the metaphor of land-as-woman was both the regressive pull of maternal containment and the seductive invitation to sexual assertion’. As the ownership and exploitation of territory for agriculture and for the raw materials of the new industries grew in the nineteenth century, this ambiguity led to increasing unease in North American male writers’ relationship to their landscapes. Domination of the land began to be seen as both incest and rape, and the horror of this necessitated a psychological and emotional separation from the land and from woman. Kolodny argues that this separation, together with the indifferent land’s refusal to be either Mother or Mistress, legitimated the degradation of the landscape then and continues to destroy it now.
Kolodny's work points to some of the contradictions involved in seeing the land as feminine, as both Mother and object of desire. She hints at a fear of Mother Earth, and this has been noticed by several commentators on white bourgeois masculinity. Wild and threatening landscapes haunted Victorian Europe, and colonialists' deep horror as well as their fascination with foreign lands can be understood through this. Fear of being unmanned by a too-generous landscape has been noted by Kolodny in the case of the European settlement of North America. Stott describes a different fear in her discussion of the novels of Rider Haggard, in which the horrors of the Africa imagined by white explorers are embodied in the overwhelming and ghastly figure of She. 74 Theweleit too pursues the theme of terrifyng feminized landscapes in his study of the soldiers of the interwar German Freikorps: here, he argues that they saw threats to the land of Germany through images of deluge and engulfment, and Theweleit characterizes their horror as a fear of dissolution into the mother. 75 The powerful phallic mother can herself threaten in these different ways because, as Mulvey notes, 'the representation of the female form in a symbolic order . . . speaks castration and nothing else'. 76 If images of women can disavow lack, they also necessarily represent it; 'as the place onto which lack is projected, and through which it is simultaneously disavowed, woman is "symptom" for the man'. 77 Landscape can then be not the welcoming topography of nurturing mother but terrifying maternal swamps, mountains, seas, inhabited by sphinxes and gorgons. These accounts of the desired and feared Mother, both phallic and castrated, suggest one interpretation of Stoddart's account of the encounter of the first scientific geographers with Tahiti. 78 He too tells of pleasure and horror, both embodied through Tahitian women. His story is of a crew member who is seduced by Tahitian women: this is the feminization of the land to be penetrated and known, already mentioned. But the man returns to the ship and says that whatever punishment the captain devises for him could not be worse than the women themselves. I wonder what part of his anatomy he feared for most. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Stoddart's is one of the finest accounts of the pleasures in the small details of landscape: a fetishized response to the fear of castration by Woman.

This fear also motivates the voyeuristic gaze which sustains a gap between the subject looking and what they see. The voyeuristic gaze is investigative and controlling, instituting a distance from and mastery over the image. Such a distance is established from both the (M)Other and the masculine self during the Oedipus/castration complex, and
through this self-denial of bodily pleasures and visualization of the self, the masculine body is erased. This has epistemological consequences:

The masculine is able to speak of and for women because it has emptied itself of any relation to the male body... The establishment of the ego through its visual representation in the mirror-image forms the pre-conditions for the alienation required for language, in the first instance, and for knowledge and truth in the second. The evacuation of the male body is the condition required to create a space of reflection, of specul(ariz)ation from which it can look at itself from the outside. 79

This once again affirms that the disembodied gaze of knowledge is masculine. The disembodiment of the voyeur establishes the claim of the phallocentric look to be transcendent, pure and universal. Moreover, that single viewpoint identified by Cosgrove as bourgeois also enacts a masculinist self-erasure, because 'the condensation of the gaze and the body of the viewer into another single point... reflects the viewer back at himself in the form of invisibility'. 80 The inherent fears in geography's visual pleasures, its suspicion in its pleasure, produce its persistent refusal to problematize its pleasure - geographers are invisible to themselves.

However, as chapter 4 remarked, geography does have a tradition of celebrating its encounters with Nature: the self-erasure of the voyeuristic gaze is contradicted by the narcissistic assertion of self through what is seen. The heroic ethos of fieldwork can be contextualized through Mulvey's classic essay on Hollywood cinema, which suggests that the image of landscape as a perspectival space centred on the hero - geographer or movie star - is a necessary part of the grandeur and authority of masculinity. 81 Mulvey argues that our enjoyment of movies comes partly from our sheer pleasure in looking, but also that films re-enact our own mirror stage and force us, male or female, to identify with the self-certain he(ro). We see ourselves on the screen, ourselves as we would like to be - movies visualize the ego ideal in the form of their hero. The use of landscape structured through Renaissance perspective is central to this process:

... the active male figure (the ego ideal of the identification process) demands a three-dimensional space corresponding to that of the mirror recognition in which the alienated subject internalised his own representation of his imaginary existence. 82
Here, Cosgrove’s discussion of perspectival techniques is important for its insistence that it is not inevitable that ‘the specular image positions the child within a (perspectively organised) spatial field’. perspective as a way of seeing is historically and culturally specific, and so must Mulvey’s account be. However, if – contingently – heroes in landscapes correspond to the coherent, active subjects that we (mis)recognize in the mirror, this process surely accounts for some of the satisfaction of fieldwork for geographers. They see themselves as the ego-ideal hero in a landscape; they can assert and establish their manliness in the face of Nature. In other words, they can secure an identity for themselves through a visualized relation to the mirror/mother. And this narcissism, this attempted assertion of the self through the Other, also underpins the claim fully to know the land: it ‘apprehends an objective reality which is wholly manifest and exists solely for him: he misses nothing’ – hence, once again, the authority of geographical knowledge of landscape.

The intersections of voyeurism and narcissism, then, structure geography’s gaze at landscape. The gaze which identifies lack in the compelling vision of Nature as Woman maintains a voyeuristic distance from that which represents lack; but it is also compelled to gaze and gaze again through its desire to interpellate itself through the feminine. This produces contradictions in the gaze, and the above discussion implied at several points that these contradictions intersect with the tension that geographers themselves recognize between pleasure and knowledge. When desire becomes too persistent – when the Sirens sing too loudly – geography claims to revert to objective knowledge. However, the final suggestion of this section’s efforts to mark the phallocentric repressions of cultural geography is that, despite its fears and all its efforts, geographical knowledge is deeply complicit with its pleasures. Geographers try to repress their pleasure in landscape by stabilizing their interpretations as real; but that knowledge is, in its need for critical distance, implicated in the pleasures of voyeurism. They try to win knowledge through intimacy with the land, and their intimacy becomes narcissistic. Geography’s opposition between pleasure and knowledge does not hold. Cultural geography is seduced despite itself by what it fears. As Cixous notes in her discussion of dualisms, ‘the movement by which each opposition is set up to produce meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed’. In the words of Irigaray, ‘the quest for the “object” becomes a game of Chinese boxes. Ever receding’. The quest for knowledge of aesthetic masculinity is a dynamic process constantly attempting closure and constantly failing: wherever it rests, its contradictory desires will allow no such com-
promise. Its desire for complete knowledge can never be satisfied. The unknowable feminine will recur. This is cultural geography’s erotics of knowledge.

**I Won’t Play Nature to Your Culture**

This masculinity entails costs. In her critique of the gaze as it constitutes knowledge of the contemporary city, Deutsche asks:

What repressions enable the equation of voyeuristic models of knowledge with objectivity and adequacy? Whose subjectivities are the casualties of epistemologies that produce total beings? What violence is enacted by authors who speak and pretend that reality speaks for itself? Who signifies the threat of inadequacy so that others may be complete? Whose expulsion and absence does completion demand?87

The absence of a ‘feminine’ or ‘black’ or ‘homosexual’ position from which to look in the foregoing discussion provides the answer to this question. The particular dominant gaze constructs access to knowledge of geography as a white bourgeois heterosexual masculine privilege. And this gaze is not only the gaze at the land, although its dynamics are most clearly revealed there: it is also a gaze at what are constituted as objects of knowledge, whether environmental, social, political or cultural. Caught in the geographic landscape, people are looked at by a contradictory and exclusionary masculine gaze, which cannot see women because they are the social subjects most in the shadow of Woman, and puts even the men it can see in a feminized, subordinate position. And this in turn necessitates a further question:

If there is no more ‘earth’ to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and always to desire (for one’s own), no opaque matter in which theory does not know herself, then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the subject? If the earth turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of the subject might thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and penetration. For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over? And in?88

Irigaray’s mischievous query invites some discussion of feminist efforts to dislodge the Mother Earth/Father Culture opposition, and this returns the discussion once again to the question of strategies of critique.
Mulvey's work has been criticized for the zero options that it offers the female spectator of cinema – either a sadistic identification with the male hero, or a masochistic identification with the passive heroine. Mulvey addressed this difficulty in her later work by suggesting that the female spectator was 'restless in its transvestite clothes'. She suggests that women can shift between the options of passivity or activity offered to them, and such shifts can become deliberate manipulations of position. This echoes the critical strategy of mobility with which the previous chapter ended, but specifies it in the visual field: as Doane remarks, such a mobility there produces a 'defamiliarisation of female iconography' which destabilizes the masculine structure of the look. Other feminists prefer to emphasize the disruptive power of the unconscious as a radical contribution to a feminist critique of phallocentrism. In terms of the gaze, Lacanians argue that some kind of disturbance of its pleasure is unavoidable; because our identificatory moments are never wholly successful, 'the relationship between viewer and scene is always one of fracture, partial identification, pleasure and distrust'. Following this stress on disruption and uncertainty, de Lauretis has suggested that the unconscious could be seen as a site of resistance against masculine and feminine identities.

To conclude this chapter, this final short section examines some feminist work which occupies a spectating position that enacts neither the dominant masculine gaze nor an essentialist Womanly alternative. This work challenges the identification of Woman as natural and of Nature as Woman achieved through the gaze at landscape. It resists that transcoding not by offering a simple 'feminine' alternative to masculinist vision, because, as the previous chapter argued, that would simply be to invert an already existing opposition and to repeat its closures once more. Rather, this section focuses on challenges to the hegemonic masculine gaze which offer explicitly contingent alternatives to its voyeurism and narcissism even as they invoke 'women' and 'the feminine'. The authors here take up the position of a female spectator who, while working within a phallocentric economy of meaning, nonetheless refuses to sanction its codes: she contests them by manipulating them.

One continuing form of resistance against the fictional identities of phallocentrism has been the effort by feminists, as daughters, to re-imagine the mother as the subject of desire, and to explore motherhood as a symbol of a non-phallocentric mode of social relation. Given the powerful interpellation of Nature as Mother in Western culture, this effort has some implications for seeing the land. This is obviously a complex move and encompasses a wide range of feminist writers,
including the radical feminists discussed in the previous chapter. However, several non-essentialist feminists have argued that women see the environment differently from men; or, rather, that there is a feminine position from which to perceive the land. This claim can be based in psychoanalytic work. Irigaray, for example, insists that 'for girls, the mother is a subject who cannot readily be reduced to an object', and the suggestion that women thinking through a position as mothers/daughters will have a more nurturing attitude towards Nature has already been made by many feminists drawing on the work of Chodorow. These include the geographers Janice Monk and Vera Norwood, who gathered together a collection of essays on the landscapes of the American South West which argue that many women have wanted to live in harmony with the environment there. Unlike Chodorow, however, Monk and Norwood pay a good deal of attention to differences among women in the South West, contrasting Anglo, Hispanic and Native American women in order to avoid positing an essentially feminine relation to the land. They stress that different women have painted the southwestern desert, written about it, represented it in their craft work and photographed it, with rather different aims, motivations and results. Kolodny's work on the letters, diaries and novels of some women on the American frontier before 1850 insists on difference too, both social and historical. Kolodny notes that the writers she looks at were all by definition educated and therefore middle-class; they were also white, and this shaped their relationship to the land. These women, like their fathers and husbands and sons, wanted to transform the wilderness they found themselves surrounded by in the east of North America. But they did not want to subdue and exploit it as men did; rather, they saw the frontier as a place in which to make gardens, a place where a landscape of harmony between soil and weather and plants and people was possible, a place in which relations among people would reflect the tenderness of caring for the land. Later, when women left the claustrophobic wooded regions of the east and moved west, the open prairies of Illinois and Texas were perceived as ready made gardens. Always, 'they dreamed... of locating a home and a familial human community within a cultivated garden', and this dream was part of their social location as white bourgeois women and the concomitant importance to them of the distinction between the public and the private. Their relationship to the land was mediated by their particular domestic role. Geographer Jeanne Kay has written about similar women in the second half of the nineteenth century, and she also maps their imagined geography through their domestic spaces and relationships.
She suggests that the social relations which developed from their concern with their gardens and domestic labour gave them a specific position from which to see the land. A network of interaction replaced the individualized and domineering view of the single point of the omniscient observer of landscape: they placed themselves in a contingent position defined in relation to friends and neighbours.

Other feminists have stressed not so much the position of the viewer of the land, but the focus of the gaze which re-presents the land. Susan Ford has also discussed gardens, those of late-Victorian England, and she argues that to do as gardens invite and focus on the details challenges the grand sweep of the masculinist gaze: she suggests that both in its design and in the small-scale pleasures that it affords, the garden constitutes one form of a non-phallocentric look. Pollock too has explored the specific spaces of the nineteenth-century bourgeois to find examples of an equal gaze between artist and subject, looking at the work of Cassatt and Morisot in the gardens and houses of Paris. She suggests that in their paintings there is a tendency to abandon the wide and grand view and instead to represent a more confined space which both shows and reworks the limits placed on avant-garde women by their domestic position. She suggests that the reworking involves ‘the rearticulation of traditional space so that it ceases to function primarily as the space of sight for a mastering gaze, but becomes the locus of relationships’.

All of these accounts posit a feminine relationship to landscape, yet all refuse to see an essential femininity. They offer a ‘feminine’ resistance to hegemonic ways of seeing which dissolves the illusion of an unmarked, unitary, distanced, masculine spectator, but which also permits the expression of different ways of seeing among women. They suggest that strategies of position, scale and fragmentation are all important for challenging the particular structure of the gaze in the discipline of geography, but offer no single better alternative. Their accounts self-consciously manipulate the notion of femininity in order to subvert hegemonic ways of seeing without imposing an alternative which could only assert a specific femininity as universal in an equally repressive manner. Their task is to develop ‘the conditions of representability of another social subject’, and it is a task which is addressed again in the next chapter.
The previous chapter concluded with the work of some feminist geographers who were imagining landscapes beyond the compulsions and desires of geography's aesthetic masculinity. This chapter focuses on the work of feminist geographers who are addressing social and economic themes, in order to explore the possibility of a different kind of space beyond the exclusions of social-scientific masculinist space. I discuss feminist geography not so much in terms of its findings on the geography of women and on gender relations, but more in terms of the epistemological challenge that its work offers to the attempted closures of masculinism. The chapter interprets feminist geography as a critical form of knowledge struggling from within geographical discourse to escape the constraints of masculinist desire and power.

Feminists writing geography have an ambivalent relationship to the discipline; they share some things with geography but also feel excluded from it. On the one hand, they have worked with several geographical approaches. Chapter 2 examined their encounter with time-geography, for example; but perhaps their closest links have been with marxist geography. This chapter focuses on this intersection between marxist and feminist geography. Like marxist geographers, many feminist geographers have argued that unequal social relations are both expressed and constituted through spatial differentiation. While marxists examine the uneven development of capitalist production, feminists focus on the relationship between production and reproduction as part of capitalist patriarchy. Feminist work, then, has depended in part on concepts drawn from non-feminist radical geography. On the other hand, of course, feminist geographers have
also insisted on their difference from geography. They have presented their work as a challenge to hegemonic geography, because they want to insert women and women’s issues into a discipline which has resolutely ignored them. Marxist geography is no exception to this masculinism. Feminist work in the discipline still has to insist that gender should be central to geographical theory, and in that sense feminism remains outside the geographical project.1

Another ambivalence in feminist geography is its approaches to the claims to knowledge made by marxism. Feminist geographers have both adopted authoritative marxist categories as empowering, and rejected them as unhelpful. There have been several efforts by feminist geographers to conceptualize the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy through the truth claims implicit in structural marxism, for example. The feminist Hayford, writing in the first, determinist flush of marxist geography, claimed that the cause of both production and reproduction was simply the ‘impersonal, invisible, and enormous power of capitalism’.2 Almost a decade later, McDowell presented a much more detailed case for the argument that capitalism and patriarchy should be conceptually integrated as one structure: she claimed that ‘domestic labour is part of the capitalist mode of production, and not a separate mode’,3 and theorized patriarchy in quite abstract terms as a consequence of certain contradictions in the capitalist mode of production.4 Sarah Whatmore has conceptualized women’s work on family farms in terms of a domestic political economy.5 In contrast, Foord and Gregson have depended on the truth claims of realism to argue that patriarchy and capitalism must be understood as two distinct systems.6 There have been efforts, then, to develop, in the words of Foord and Gregson, ‘an overall theoretical framework’ for feminist geography.7

However, other feminist geographers are much more suspicious of these attempts to theorize gender relations at such high levels of abstraction. For example, in a response to Foord and Gregson, Johnson reminded her readers that many feminists see claims to absolute knowledge as also involving claims to absolute power; realist ontologies in particular make unmarked claims to truth which deny the partiality of the author.8 She concluded that the ‘objective to create an overarching theory to explain all women’s oppression using criteria and a concept somehow detached from history and social context puts [the] discussion into the realm of patriarchal knowledge, not in opposition to it’.9 Grier and Walton also suggested that grand theoretical statements may obscure more than they reveal: ‘any attempt to theorize patriarchy which does not focus on historical and cultural
specificity can only promote crude biological determinism'.¹⁰ Susan Christopherson has warned against the dangers of 'the construction of power through theory';¹¹ and Sue Brownill has argued that 'a strict adherence to rigid and contrasted concepts is little more than theoretical terrorism... we should be aiming towards a more flexible approach towards theory and its relation to practice'.¹² Ruth Fincher has noted the orientation of much feminist geography not to grand theory, but to detailed case study research which elucidates the complex intersection of class and gender in particular social contexts.¹³ For Gerry Pratt, this insistence on the complexity of women's lives demands a detailed, contextual and fine-grained epistemological approach:

The finding that the relations between class and gender are mediated at a very fine intra-urban scale suggests that our theoretical understandings of the interconnections between gender, class, ethnic and race relations are likely to be most productively forged at a fairly low level of abstraction, rather than in terms of 'patriarchy' and 'capitalism' as 'systems'.¹⁴

Related to this suspicion of over-abstraction has been a constant insistence on the legitimacy of subjectivity and sensitivity as ways of knowing that are just as important as the analysis and science favoured by social-scientific masculinist geography. In 1973, Burnett spoke of the necessity to 'place as much emphasis on development of intuition, speculation, courage, creative imagination and empathy with people in the urban geographer, as in the development of facility in handling observation and measurement tools'.¹⁵ A decade and a half later, Christopherson was again arguing for a recovery of the categories of experience and subjectivity: 'in a transformed geography, we would express faith in legitimacy of subjectivity, and thus provide a basis for resistance to authority, including our own'.¹⁶ The advocacy of excluded sources and methods of knowing is also a commitment towards accessible and non-intimidating forms of work. It is a recognition of the exclusion of women from the categories and epistemologies of geographical discourse, and has produced an insistence on sources and methods of knowledge beyond those of the academy. This is not a naive empiricism because it is not a critique of theory itself, merely of the currently hegemonic version.

In terms of both theory and epistemology, then, feminist geographers find themselves both inside and outside geography. In this chapter I stress this uneasy relationship between feminism and geography. Other feminist geographers have told of their encounter with
masculinist geography in rather different terms. They emphasize the increasing theoretical sophistication of feminist work, from early descriptive accounts which added women into geography by interpreting their lives through the concept of gender roles, to later studies of gender relations and the power of men, and of the oppression and resistances of women. As McDowell summarizes it, ‘feminist geographers have trodden a path from description to grand theory’. Instead of the ambivalence that I am stressing, McDowell’s history is phrased in terms of a growth from youthful naïveté to maturity. However, the latter story is written for the feminist chapter in essay collections and for the introductory editorial for special issues of journals on gender, and its aim is to persuade non-feminists that feminism has inexorably come of age and can no longer be ignored: that is, it is a strategic narrative which asserts the right of feminism to be addressed by geographical discourse. It insists that feminist work must now be central to geography. Other ways of describing feminism and geography may serve other purposes, and it is also possible to see feminist geography in terms of the oscillation which writers such as de Lauretis argue is constitutive of feminist discourse. As I have noted previously, for de Lauretis feminism is a form for critique shaped by its uneasy relation to hegemonic ideas and practices. Feminisms have to speak through a phallocentrism which depends on the exclusion of women; they thus tend to be either ‘excluded from the established discourse of theory and yet imprisoned within it or else assigned a corner of their own but denied a specificity’. This chapter represents feminist geography as an ambivalent discourse straddling both the need to represent women and the need to speak of differences among women. After the first section has outlined the encounter between feminist and marxist geography, the second and third sections of this chapter argue that feminist geography seems to oscillate between the alternatives as they are given by both the content of marxist geography and its exclusions. In particular, I explore one contradictory form of feminist geography – a swing between emphasizing women’s diverse experiences of production and women’s shared experience of reproduction in the context of the Western city. This is not to suggest that there are two discrete positions within feminist work; the different oscillations and ambivalences, that I have so far mentioned intersect in complex ways. I only want to suggest that there is a tension in feminist geography between these two emphases. I have two reasons for offering this reading.

The first is to stress that feminist geography is to some extent bound into the terms of its masculinist discipline, and that this has entailed
certain costs. In positioning feminist geography as an oscillation between two alternatives as they are given, it is possible to remark on a certain complicity with the field structured by those polarities. The closures of geography’s discourse around what constitutes knowledge and of what there can be knowledge have been the theme of much of this book, and given their power it is not surprising that they have left their mark on feminist geography too (including this text). Reading feminist geography in terms of its relation to geographical discourse highlights, in particular, the specificity of the ‘women’ that it recovers. Discussions of the construction of sexuality and race have been notably absent from both masculinist and feminist geographies, and although feminists in the discipline have always been aware of these aspects of subjectivity – and McDowell has recently argued that their discussion is the challenge now facing feminist geography – they have not addressed them as intrinsic to and constitutive of gender and class identities. This is a consequence both of the recurrence of the figure of Woman in discussions of reproduction, and of the erasure of women’s specificity in discussions of production. Feminist geographers’ struggle to articulate women’s spaces and places has some limits of its own, then, and this chapter is an effort to delineate them.

The second reason for talking about feminist geography in terms of an internal tension between two positions is that, despite its complicity with the discourse that it wants to subvert, its contradictions do allow feminist geography to destabilize the opposition on which it depends. The final section of this chapter argues that feminist geography begins to reveal a new kind of geography by admitting to an excess in its work which is outside the categories within which it must work. Its oscillation between possibilities destabilizes the exclusions of masculinist geography: it refuses to replicate the exhaustiveness sought by masculinist theories in the discipline, and allows for something beyond the discipline’s hegemonic imagination.

Spatial Divisions: Production and Reproduction

Like feminist geography, marxist geography was developing from the early 1970s onwards, greatly helped by having a journal, Antipode, in which to publish its work. To caricature an extremely rich and diverse literature in order to highlight the intersection of marxist and feminist work, marxist geographers were arguing that material spaces are intrinsic to the processes of capitalism in all their complexity and dynamism. Spaces, places, regions and localities were understood as
being shaped by the essentially uneven nature of capitalist development, and a range of sources for this unevenness were theorized: differences between sectors, or within class relations, or large and small capitals, for example.

This account of space clearly differs from the masculinist interpretation of space produced in time-geography, in that whereas the latter sees space as singular, marxist geography has from its inception focused on the differentiation of spaces; and this is one reason for the feminist turn towards it. One of the very earliest essays in feminist geography appeared in *Antipode* in 1973, and cited the uneven urban spatial impact of certain social structures, including patriarchy, as a means of understanding the social geography of the city, including the geography of women: 'the societal division of labour, income, and mobility (e.g. access to a private car) by class, sex, and race produces the urban income distribution, the pool of work skills, and the conditions of urban accessibility which are recognisable as controlling the parameters of city form and development,' argued Burnett.21 In developing a socialist-feminist geography, the unevenness explicated was that between the social relations of production and reproduction, already implicit if under-theorized in marxism. Mackenzie, for example, has summarized her perspective as a feminist geographer in terms of 'seeing life in capitalist society as structured by our relations to the means and processes whereby we produce goods and services and reproduce ourselves as biological and social beings'.22

The first detailed feminist discussion of how the relationship between production and reproduction creates different kinds of spaces was Hayford's 1974 paper.23 Published in *Antipode*, she began in good historical-materialist fashion with the household and its labour. Hayford argued that the household was originally a productive unit which through its labour transformed resources into food, clothing and shelter. She saw women's labour as fundamental to the survival of the household, and suggested that women remain identified with the home and domesticity because of this early division of labour. She also argued, however, that this pre-capitalist household was the focus of economic and political relationships with elsewhere, particularly through kinship networks, and 'because women play such central roles in the establishment of kinship it becomes important for them to be subjected to group control'.24 Not 'natural' motherhood then but its economic, political and symbolic roles restricts women to the domestic sphere in non-capitalist societies, according to Hayford. As production relations and political organization changed with the development of the capitalist mode of production, however, the household lost its
economic and political functions. These were always in some tension with the wider polity and economy, and under capitalism they were absorbed by the wider entities to become part of the 'public' sphere. Hayford suggested that 'men control this new area of production because they traditionally had more external connections than did women, and thus moved logically into capitalist productive relations during the period when women remained at the eroding core of the household'. The household became more exclusively an arena for the reproduction and socialization of labour, the welfare state eventually taking over much of even these functions. Women's status declined accordingly. As the public sphere grows, Hayford argued that the private realm remains only because capitalism needs it. It needs it to support those who cannot work, to prevent their disaffection with the system, and it needs it as a safe haven in which the workers can recover from the alienation of waged labour sufficiently to return to work the next day. The spatial segregation of the private home reinforces this latter ideological role, argued Hayford.

Whatever historical qualifications need to be placed on this narrative, Hayford's essay set several of the theoretical parameters of subsequent feminist analyses of the geography of gender. She argued that there was no natural basis for women's association with the home; that the association was ideological but had material consequences; that the spatial division between reproduction and production is not universal, but is a consequence of specific historical-geographical changes; and that despite the ideological and spatial division of the two spheres, production and reproduction were intimately connected. A paper by Mackenzie and Rose, published in 1983, worked through these claims by focusing on the nineteenth-century Anglo-American city and its separation of waged labour from the home. This was a process which began for middle-class families in the early nineteenth century, with their move to the suburbs and the idealization of the private domestic haven, in contrast to the competitive and aggressive masculine world of the marketplace and political forum. Mackenzie and Rose argue that the terrible social conditions of early industrial capitalism also caused the workers to struggle for a safe haven from the alienation of waged labour: they say that by the second half of the nineteenth century a new form of working-class family was established through campaigns for protective legislation for women and children, such as the Factory Acts. Although Mackenzie and Rose agree with Hayford that the powerful domestic ideology which legitimated this shift in family form was convenient for capitalism, particularly in its denial that reproductive labour was in fact work, they also argue that
the working class had won their battle for a home that was safe from waged work. These campaigns released women for domestic labour which reproduced labour physically, through childbirth, materially, by preparing food, washing clothes and so on, and ideologically, by seeming to offer a haven from work relations. And thus the separate spheres of home and work were mapped on the ground; and working-class suburbs grew, as well as those of the middle class.

Sharing the marxist critique of uneven development, then, feminists have noted that the unevenness between the social relations of production and reproduction was also unequal. Feminist geographers argue that, in modern Europe and North America, productive labour in workplaces is seen as men’s sphere, while women’s work has been designated as reproductive and takes place in the home: hence women’s oppression, for ‘the view that women’s waged work is secondary and so insignificant as a major source of income... helps both to maintain women’s low wages and unequal job opportunities and to undermine women’s own expectations of waged work’. The concern of feminist geography is with this oppressive interrelation between production and reproduction:

This day-to-day and generational renewal of people-as-workers, carried on in the home, is an important part of what marxists refer to as the ‘reproduction of labour power’, which, in its simplest sense, means the renewal of the capacity to work. Since home life plays such an important part in this reproduction process, it clearly should not be separate in analytical terms from industrial life, from the ‘sphere of production’.

The social relations of production and reproduction are understood to occur in different spaces and to be structured through them, but relations of both class and gender intersect in those spaces. Reproduction is not explained with reference only to patriarchy, nor production to capitalism; nor is gender confined to the home and class to the workplace, for ‘the construction of gender identity actually occurs in the workplace as well as at home and in the community.’

These accounts deny the gulf between production and reproduction by demonstrating the interdependence of the domestic labour and capitalism, and they thus produce an explicit and crucial critique of orthodox interpretations of the city made by geographers. By focusing on reproduction – physical, material and ideological – feminist geographers persuasively reveal the connections between the supposedly ‘separate’ spheres of private domesticity and public labour. They
thus bring what is seen as women’s sphere into academic accounts of social and economic life, and this is undoubtedly one of the major achievements of feminist geography because, due to this physical and ideological divide between home and waged work, geographers have tended not to see the home as a social location. The divide between home and work is also reflected in the way in which geography as a discipline studies the city: economic geography studies industry and social geography studies neighbourhoods, and even marxist geography refuses to link the geography of production in workplaces to that of reproduction and consumption of households and neighbourhoods. As McDowell forcefully argues, this ideology of a private sphere beyond the reach of capitalism has led to the exclusion from analyses of the city of women’s domestic labour and privatized consumption and, like many other feminist geographers, she demands that ‘the oversimple dichotomy between the public and the private sectors, work and home’ be replaced with ‘the interrelationship of production and reproduction as part of a single process’ which would integrate women into all aspects of geographical study.

There are, however, hints in the essay by Mackenzie and Rose that this consideration of production and reproduction tended to integrate women into geographical knowledge in specific ways. The opposition between production and reproduction produced two different emphases in its recovery of women. Production gave rise to a concern with women’s diversity. In arguing that the processes which caused domestic ideology differed because of different relations to the mode of production, Mackenzie and Rose fragmented ‘women’ by class, and thus also mapped them onto different areas in the social geography of the city. They emphasized differences between middle- and working-class women. However, their discussion of women’s reproductive labour mutes this sense of difference among women. They argue that all women’s domestic labour was increasingly disciplined by the late nineteenth century: ‘the suburban environment also enabled the actual role of the housewife to be extended and elaborated. The single family home in its suburban neighbourhood provided a material space where women could practice the newly-conceived science of “home economics”’. This superficially elevated the status of housekeeping while confining it ever more closely to women and the family home: according to Mackenzie and Rose, this meant that by the early twentieth century, women were seen as something separate from and inferior to the supposedly normal world of waged work and the marketplace. I argue that this tension between the similarity of women due to their shared experience of reproductive work and their diversity
due to different experiences of uneven production relations structures geographers' feminist oscillation. The next two sections develop this claim. They also suggest that certain inflections of these emphases are symptomatic of hegemonic geography's exclusions.

The Similarities of Women's Reproductive Labour

The notion of a city divided in two by the gender-specific relations of production and reproduction was an elegant model, and it became an extremely influential interpretive lens through which the modern Western city could be viewed. In the 1980s, many feminist accounts of the modern Euro-American city interpreted its built form through ideas of a domestic, reproductive space and a masculine, productive space. Jos Boys summarized the argument:

... the design of the built environment has maintained a consistent 'distancing' of women from sites of production (and for that matter from other facilities). This has combined with the general lack of access to resources suffered by women because of their social 'place' in relation to the labour market and the family, to exaggerate women's isolated position in the social structure.33

Despite the theoretical emphasis on the interconnections between production and reproduction, this interpretation could be used to divide the city into different sociospatial areas, to be explored separately. Several studies did this by focusing on residential areas in order to examine women's reproductive work; other work examined home and community in order to emphasize the importance of reproduction over production in their impact on women's lives. This section examines these studies of women as reproducers. It looks first at the possibilities of critique offered by the focus on women as reproducers, and then at its limitations.

Life in the suburbs

Although women's reproductive labour is diverse, studies of women in their reproductive role have tended to examine their work as mothers: reproduction seems to have been interpreted in its most literal form, in an echo of the concern about women as mothers that is typical of much Western feminism.34

Many studies have emphasized the difficulties of mobility and access
facing mothers who have to care for young children: much of the work on women’s time-space patterns, described in chapter 2, examined women’s efforts to escape or renegotiate the confines of their domestic location, hampered by the lack of convenient transport and childcare services. This sense of women’s domestic isolation with children was especially strong in studies of women in suburbia. Feminist geographers have argued that suburbs were built for a commuting husband and a domestic wife, and that their spatial structure reinforces the separation of women from waged work and public life. Studies of both postwar British New Towns and North American suburbia have noted the lack of public transport and services such as childcare provision, and the low density of the American landscape was argued to inhibit travel and sociability. Suburban life was seen as monotonous and uniform. Miller examined the importance of advertising in the construction of suburban, feminine domesticity in the early twentieth century, and suggested that these advertisements were influential in homogenizing the diversity of suburbia, but the home is also seen as monotonous in that it is a place in which all women face the same oppression. A recent study of the contemporary meaning of housing to women focuses only on women’s differences from men and not, for example, on differences among women, and the logic has been summarized in the Australian case thus:

... women are concerned not only with housing access but also with their association with the ‘private’, in a space supposedly outside the sordid world of public commerce, where there is rest, safety and satisfaction. What these assumptions belie is the reinforcement of women’s ‘private’ realm by the public affirmation of wage and tax laws which makes their incomes always less than men’s and guarantees men unfettered command over their bodies and labour in their private castles. Such a situation is as acute for aboriginal and ethnic Australians as it is for white Australians.

Women were united in their experience of oppressive domestic labour. The emphasis on women’s shared domestic experiences has also shaped studies of women’s waged work. Many feminist geographers note that the contradiction between the cultural ideal of the suburb and social practice increased from the 1960s onwards, as more and more suburban women left the home to work for the wages needed to maintain a dream house, and more and more workplaces were located in the suburbs. The blurring of the socio-spatial boundaries between women’s suburban home and men’s city work has resulted in studies
that emphasize the impact of women's reproductive responsibilities on their access to waged labour. Hanson and Pratt, for example, have published the results of a large-scale survey of about 600 households and their work patterns in Worcester, Massachusetts, over the past few years. Their arguments begin with the feminist-geographical claim that 'home and work cannot be treated as separate spheres. It is equally inappropriate to make a priori, overly simplified assumptions about home–work linkages'. And although they have suggested ways in which waged work affects the home, their innovative study stresses the structural limitations placed on all women by their domestic labour. One of their earliest papers exploded the myth on which so much social geography has been based — the socially homogeneous neighbourhood — by considering the occupational similarity among women across the city. They argued that 'because so many women are now in the labor force and because they are segregated into a few occupations, one cannot assume that urban neighbourhoods — or even households — are homogeneous with respect to class'. Why women are so occupationally segregated has been examined in a series of studies by Hanson and Pratt, which stress that their 'family responsibilities structure women's participation in the labor force'. In a discussion of how the men and women of Worcester found employment through their communities, for example, Hanson and Pratt argue that both genders primarily use informal social networks to find out about jobs. However, they found that women had quite different kinds of networks from men: they talked to women in their neighbourhood in order to find out about primarily local employment. Women also tend to search for part-time work, the hours of which coordinate with the demands of their family and with the working hours of their partner. Hanson and Pratt argue that the preference for part-time work is especially significant in sustaining the occupational segregation of most women in low-status work. An emphasis on the reproductive work of women stresses their shared experiences, then, whether in the home, neighbourhood or workplace.

The domesticity of women, and all that is associated with it, can be used to critique the masculinity of geography. Chapter 2 suggested that the figure of the mother, so central to this work on women as reproducers, offered a challenge to the implicit masculinity of time-geography. The realm of reproduction, the private, the bodily and the emotional was presented as means of detailing the exclusions of masculinist space and agency. The qualities of empathy and care invoked by feminist geographers in their demand for the legitimacy of subjectivity and imagination as ways of gaining knowledge might also
be described as maternal (although their authors did not do so). These strategies in geography never reach the extremes of radical feminism: they do not explicitly invoke Woman as the alternative to the brutalities of Man, for reasons that the next section will address. However, like radical feminism, they too are caught in a relationship with hegemonic discourse.

The specifics of solidarity

The strong sense among feminist geographers of a city divided in two echoes a similar enthusiasm among North American feminist historians for the division between the public and the private; but, as Kerber remarks, interest in the distinction between the public and the private as an interpretive tool for nineteenth-century women's history began to decline at about the same time as Mackenzie and Rose's paper was published.\(^45\) One reason was the critique of that model of the city by feminists with very different experiences and theories of urban living. Saegert has argued that the associations of the city with the masculine and the suburbs with the feminine are pervasive cultural constructions rather than accurate descriptions of sociospatial reality: while influential, she argued that 'the segregation of public and private, male and female domains appears strongest as a guiding fiction'.\(^46\) This suggests that the mapping of reproductive labour onto suburban locations may be influenced by particular experiences and values – the focus on mothering as a burden of domestic labour may speak not to all women but only to some. The 'women' recovered by feminist geographies of reproduction may be more specific than feminist geographers recognize. Boys has argued just that in a recent essay on the built environment.\(^47\) She suggests that the analytical emphasis on the ideology of domesticity and on 'the home as women's place' depend on a white middle-class conception of domesticity. She says that, as a result, it simplifies what are extremely complex patterns and processes, and she points out that the isolated housewife should not be the only focus of feminist research.

The social specificity of the 'private' is made clear in the comprehensive critique of the distinction between public and private by feminists of colour. They have argued that the distinction is a white one. Omolade notes that if black families adopted the ideal of a home separated from work, it was only as a survival strategy in racist white society; however, Higginbotham too points out that in the post-bellum USA whites refused to believe that black women could be ladies and not go out to work, and to challenge such racism some black women adopted
the standards of the white middle-class cult of domesticity.\textsuperscript{49} Collins has detailed some of the reasons why the public and the private may not be appropriate terms for interpreting the social geography of Afro-American communities.\textsuperscript{50} The private was not always equivalent to the domestic home, for example; rather, 'private' could refer to black community spaces beyond the reach of white people, both men and women. The private could thus be a resource for women – not a burden – and the notion of everyday domestic oppression suffered by isolated or individual women has been challenged by Collins as specific to white feminism.\textsuperscript{51} The specific social relations and activities associated with the different spheres in white culture are also challenged by black feminism. Black motherhood has often incorporated an explicit ethic of hard work, argues Collins, and mothering could also involve 'othermothers' in the community as well as 'bloodmothers'.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover, the lives of women of colour are more often interrupted by the state than those of white middle-class women: welfare legislation, sterilization programmes and policing all intervene to deny them the right to a private life.\textsuperscript{53} The boundary between 'the public' and 'the private' does not necessarily mean the same thing, or even exist, for (different) women of colour and white women.

The question arises, then, of the complicity of the category of reproduction with the white bourgeois ideology of the private. Clearly, the elaboration of the notion of reproduction aims to diagnose the sources of women's oppression in an unequal division of labour; it aims to refer to an oppressive social process. Yet Johnson, for example, has suggested that the categories of both production and reproduction are too deeply embedded in bourgeois gendered assumptions to be critical tools of analysis.\textsuperscript{54} She has argued that marxist modes of analysing capitalism have actually depended on the exclusion of feminine, privatized labour, and that this gendering of reproduction is also classed and racialized because it reflects the white bourgeois ideal of the domestic woman who does not work for wages. Since, she argues, the concept of reproduction assumes women's role as reproducers, its use also reaffirms that role. She concludes that feminist geographers cannot easily use marxist-inspired analyses without substantially revising their analytical categories. I too would argue that in feminist geography the analytical concept of reproduction has been interpreted through the lens of white bourgeois cultural values. The notions of the home as a specific space of reproduction, the individualism of the figure of the mother isolated in her home, the uninterest in differences between women over the meaning of the home: if not a direct echo of the white bourgeois ideal of the private, the notion of reproduction
certainly seems to have been inflected by some of its specificities. Sanders is in no doubt that ‘geographic gender studies have fallen victim to the myth of “universal womanhood”’ which has in effect rendered black women invisible in feminist geography. This myth marks an aspect of feminist geography’s complicity with its discipline; the work that stresses reproduction hints at a universal Woman and erases questions of race. Feminist geography shares both the discipline’s racism and is affected by its masculinism.

Very recently, some of the generalizations about the geography of women made by feminist geographers have begun to be criticized by feminists concerned with the intersection of gender, race and class. McLafferty and Preston, for example, have taken feminist geography to task for its claim that women generally work closer to home than men because of their dual role as mother and waged worker: they say this not universally the case in New York because ‘black and hispanic women commute as far as black and hispanic men, and their commuting times far exceed those of white males and females. These results persist even after controlling for income, occupation, and industry of employment’. This pattern is the result of the diverse consequences of racism: black and hispanic employment is disproportionately concentrated in low-wage and low-status jobs, these populations rely on public transport, and their inner-city residential location entails long journeys to suburban offices. Other feminist geographers have acknowledged that race and class as well as gender interact to structure women’s lives. Consideration of these interrelations suggests a much more diverse geography of women than feminist geographers have hitherto contemplated.

Production and the Diversity of Women

Paradoxically, one of the central concerns of feminist geography has always been to explore differences among women. Class divisions and geographical diversity in particular have been stressed, and this section looks at their discussion in the context of marxist geography’s concern in the 1980s with the local consequences of economic restructuring.

Spatial divisions of women

The spatial division of labour has been a key concept for understanding social and spatial differentiation, and in the 1980s the work of Doreen Massey was especially influential on feminist and non-feminist geo-
graphy alike. Massey outlined her position in her book, *Spatial Divisions of Labour*, published in 1984, and her main concern then was the impact of global economic restructuring on the local geography of the UK since the mid-1970s. She argued that each round of capitalist investment leaves its own geographically specific legacy of skills, plant, infrastructure and so on. These interact with the residue of previous rounds' impacts, and this locally specific complex then influences the subsequent round of investment in its search for competitive—and, in this model, intrinsically locational—advantage. Hers was a powerful historical-materialist account which stressed the diversity of places by looking at the unique intersections of spatially specific social and economic processes, including patriarchy. Along with the contemporary economic changes on which it focused—the consequences of which were often highly localized, reflecting the increasing flexibility of capital—Massey's work encouraged many geographers both to theorize local specificity and to research localities. Given that the main concern, at least initially, was to examine economic change and its social and political consequences, and given Massey's stress on the discrimination with which multinational companies now choose their workforces, localities were defined in terms of labour markets. The debate then tended to be framed in terms of capitalism and class, so that when women and gender were mentioned in this literature—and they were, quite often, which is an indication of the impact of six or seven years of feminist work in the discipline—they remained marginal to the main narrative. Bowlby, Foord and McDowell outlined the consequences. They said that 'women' were simply added into analyses so that men remained the unproblematized norm, that the power relations between men and women were neglected, that the male world of waged labour was prioritized—and that the characteristics of 'women' and 'men' were taken for granted.

This last point addressed the use by masculinist geographers of stereotypes which characterized all women as, for example, potentially dexterous and docile workers. Massey's account of gender relations suggested that in some areas, for specific historical reasons, this characterization of women might matter. She had argued that the spatial division of labour emerging in the UK during the recession of the early 1980s depended in part on the geography of the supply of cheap and inexperienced women workers, usually the wives of men employed in the declining heavy industries. With their husbands increasingly suffering unemployment, these women needed to work, and were even desperate for money, but had little or no experience of waged labour and trade union organization. For these reasons, Massey suggested
that they were perceived as a cheap and docile unskilled labour force which guaranteed profits to multinational companies searching for assembly-plant sites, and their availability explained the location of so many manufacturing branch plants in what were once heavy industry areas, such as South Wales and the North East. Lewis and Foord agreed with her analysis in their study of women's waged manufacturing work in two New Towns in the north of the UK; and North American studies of women's low-wage labour in the service sector have also made similar arguments, suggesting that routine office functions are increasingly located in suburbia in order to utilize the pool of 'housewives' there.

However, Massey's discussion of gender has also been criticized by some feminist geographers for its rather cursory nature: for example, Lewis's study of the role of women in the UK's postwar restructuring had insisted that definitions of men's and women's work were negotiated in the workplace, and that it was the power of male-dominated trade unions which resulted in women's jobs being defined as low-skilled and correspondingly low-paid. Nonetheless, Massey's work did encourage studies of the intricate geography of gender and class accessed through local studies, which took up the implication of her work that gender relations are unevenly developed in part because capitalism has been. For example, in a study of four localities in the mid-nineteenth century and in the present, McDowell and Massey stressed the impact of waged work on gender relations and argued that:

schematically... the contrasting forms of economic development in different parts of the country presented distinct conditions for the maintenance of male dominance. Extremely schematically, capitalism presented patriarchy with different challenges in different parts of the country.

They explored the consequences of spatial variations in the intersection of capitalism and patriarchy. Two of their case studies were the coalfields of Durham and the textile mills of Lancashire, both in the North of England. They compared the quite stark segregation between men and women, and subordination of women, in Durham in the nineteenth century to the way in which men and women worked together and shared a more equal status in Lancashire in the same period; and looked at the way in which male unemployment and female employment in 1980s Durham was challenging the gender hierarchy, while in Lancashire female unemployment was probably
increasing women's dependence on wage-earning men. The increasing wealth in the South East of England in the same period led to Lowe and Gregson's study of divisions between women; they looked at wealthy families in the south and their employment of nannies, au pairs, cooks and cleaners, who were often women who had migrated from the North East.66

Bowlby, Foord and McDowell suggested in 1986 that spatial variations in gender relations could be conceptualized by adding a third term to the intersection of workplace and home, that of community:

What it means to be a man or a woman in a particular place is based on the changing historical interlinkages between social relations in the home, in the workplace and in the community.67

Their point has been taken up by several studies of women in local politics. An essay by Mark-Lawson, Savage and Warde explored the extent of patriarchal control of the workplace in three textile towns in northwestern England in the inter-war period, and linked this to women's political campaigns demanding services from the local state which could relieve some of their domestic labour.68 They argued that in one town women in factories did have similar status to men, and they were particularly interested in the effects that this had on women's political activism. By comparing women's position at work with their political influence as measured by the local provision of maternal and infant welfare services, they argued that the greater women's workplace status, the more active they would be in the sphere of formal politics. Halford also looked at women's political activism, taking the case of women's initiatives in recent UK local government.69 These have a highly uneven distribution, and she argued that women's role in the labour force was an important explanatory factor; women with greater economic independence might be more likely to have greater aspirations and be prepared to campaign for them. But she also suggested that the geographical pattern of less patriarchal forms of gender relations was important: in the London Borough of Camden, she pointed to the unusually high proportion of non-traditional households and the existence of a strongly developed women's movement as contributing to the strength of the local council's women's committee. Duncan has also begun to sketch geographical variations in the form of patriarchy in the UK.70 Halford has acknowledged that the local state itself was also important, particularly in the context of shifts in the funding of UK local government in the 1980s: other work has explored the importance of the local state to gender relations in its provision of
both service-sector employment, which is likely to involve women, and of the services themselves, which women are most likely to use.\textsuperscript{71}

This work has placed gender relations firmly on the agenda of economic, social and political geography. It demonstrates some of the ways in which workplace, home and community are a matrix of sites through which the social relations of capitalism and patriarchy are constituted and contested. The focus on production in particular produced a concern with differentiation of women by class and by place, and has avoided invoking either the fantasy figure of Woman or the universal woman of whom Sanders spoke. Nonetheless, certain absences persist.

\textit{The limits to diversity}

The previous section argued that feminist geography's concern to retrieve women resulted in work which addressed the domestic oppression of all women, but that this spectre of sisterhood in fact rested on a specific social subject – the white bourgeois woman and her domestic oppression. Feminist geography has also explored the differentiations of class and place at some length, as the previous subsection has shown. Nonetheless, this concern with the fragmentation of the category 'women' also has its gaps. Differences other than class and gender have not been adequately addressed.

I have already argued that questions of race are marginalized by the complicity of some feminist work on reproduction with white bourgeois heterosexual notions of the private. I suggest that an echo of the distinction between the public and the private in the language of production and reproduction also limits feminist geography's interest in diversity; in particular, it cannot speak of sexual differences among women. Through its concern with production, the home becomes a workplace in feminist geography, since 'work is not restricted to waged labour, nor does it take place exclusively in specialised locations in urban space'.\textsuperscript{72} An effect of this insistence is that the 'private' and the domestic become understood in terms of economic production. As the site of both the material and ideological reproduction of the labour force, the domestic is to some extent conceptually assimilated into the public. Because of this integration of the domestic into the 'public', reference to what is associated with the 'private' is marginalized. It then becomes difficult for feminist work to discuss sexuality. This is not to suggest that questions of sexuality actually belong only to the 'private' – obviously they do not – but it is to suggest that their absence from many feminist discussions in geography can be accounted for if
the notion of reproduction is inflected by the connotations of the public. The personal becomes political, or at least economic, and another consequence is that the possibility of a different, domestic sociality is obscured. This is perhaps why feminist geography’s studies of women do not invoke the bodily and the emotional explicitly, and why chapter 2 had to draw on a rather different literature in order to tease out the subversive potential of the maternal. I suggest that the particular way in which production and reproduction are integrated by feminist geography renders the question of sexual difference of and among women invisible. As with the neglect of race, however, feminist geographers have acknowledged that much work needs to be done on sexuality. This work is beginning, and already debates are emerging about the differing spatial structures of lesbian and gay communities.

Feminist work in geography has clearly been affected by its engagement with the discursive particularities of a masculinist, white, bourgeois and heterosexual discipline. The traces of the risks of a feminist oscillation between two strategies are evident: some work has tended to invoke the figure of Woman, and other studies have neglected women’s difference from men by ignoring the possibility of a domestic form of sociality and by rendering women’s lives relevant only to the public. Moreover, the limits imposed by the discipline have created exclusions, and feminist geographers have perhaps accepted some of these too easily, especially those of sexuality and race. However, feminist geography is responding to some of the exclusions which its complicity with the hegemonic discourses of its discipline has encouraged. This work is producing new understandings of geography. And the next section argues that the very contradictions in feminist work – its oscillation between the elaboration of diversity and the solidarity of sisterhood – may also offer a glimpse of another geography which escapes the confines of hegemonic geographical discourse.

**Heterogeneous Spaces**

I have suggested that there is a tension in feminist-geographical work between stressing the shared position of women, through their similar experiences of reproductive labour, and emphasizing differences between women, because of their different experiences of productive wage labour. This is only a tendency in feminist geography, but it helps to explain its lack of interest in issues of racism and sexuality, because it shows the limits placed on feminist work by the discursive power of
the socially specific distinction between the public and the private. This section addresses feminist work in the discipline which seems to evade being caught in this tension (structured by feminist geography’s particular relationship to hegemonic geography and marxist geography) and my examples return again to the contemporary Western city. The changes experienced in these cities over the past two decades – gentrification, homeworking, offices in suburbs and boosterism – have been examined by many geographers. The city seems to be fragmenting, and the old models of urban process no longer work; but for many geographers this has created the need for new models which are as comprehensive as the old. Many are willing to admit that cities are divided along increasing numbers of social axes, and that this results in a growing diversity of spaces. But hegemonic geography still attempts to systematize those different spaces within one conceptual framework. For example, Knox notes, in his study of Washington, DC, that ‘fragmentation, multinodality, fluidity, plurality, and diffusion are more in evidence than homogeneity, nodality, and hierarchy’, but he still demands a theory which could comprehend all of this, built through what he calls the ‘organic totality of a sociospatial dialectic’. Masculinist geographers are by and large still demanding an omniscient view, a transparent city, total knowledge. Meanwhile, feminist geographers are understanding the contemporary city not as the increasing fragmentation of a still-coherent whole, but rather in terms of a challenge to that omniscient vision and its exclusions.

Feminist explorations of the different spaces of the contemporary city often reject the search for totality from a position of complete knowledge. Their work is more tentative, more grounded in the details of the everyday, and more likely to interpret social life and spaces in the city in terms of a radical heterogeneity. One reason for this – an openness to sources of knowledge located beyond the abstract categories of the academy – has already been suggested. Another may be the influence of the notion of the city as a place of liberation, in which difference is tolerated and can flourish. Feminist geographers can escape the terms of their oscillation by considering the diversity of city life. The work of Damaris Rose on the gentrification of Canadian cities exemplifies this concern for complexity. Rose noted that marxist urban geographers had seen gentrification only in terms of the production of certain kinds of housing stock, and had ignored such issues of reproduction and consumption. She argued in 1984 that ‘we need to analyse these processes in terms that go far beyond concepts of undifferentiated “gentrifiers” and upwardly mobile neighbourhoods’. She suggested that the reproduction of labour power and people is in
fact central to the gentrification process, and this led her to explore the production of gentrifiers. But she then pointed out that gentrifiers do not always conform to the ‘yuppie’ image so often assumed; many are single, middle-class women, sometimes with children, and other groups include the self-employed and young, or the young and educated but unemployed, often by choice, or gay couples. By focusing on household structure and lifestyle, she argued that gentrifiers are part of the polarization of the middle class in the 1980s caused by rising house prices, and that they come from both sides of the polarization. Some are wealthy. Others are not, and they move to the inner city because it can be cheap and convenient for city centre workplaces, and also because it can sustain their relatively unorthodox lifestyles. Bondi too has argued that gentrification may be a process which reconstitutes gender relations in more emancipatory forms. Rose notes that the existence of so many women among gentrifiers is in part a consequence of the Canadian context, in which women are unusually prominent in the professional service sector, but Warde suggests that this employment structure is more widespread; both argue that gender is constitutive of gentrification. Gentrifiers can be young, single, childless professional women of the salariat who may invest in a penthouse, or they may be women with children, searching for cheap housing in a tolerant and perhaps even supportive neighbourhood. Rose also notes that women in inner-city neighbourhoods have often been the victims of gentrification too, squeezed out of their community by rising rents and house prices. Rose’s work is innovative in its focus on reproduction which also acknowledges different forms of domesticity and community. The implicit reference in the term ‘reproduction’ to only one kind of lifestyle has been avoided, and this allows a greater sensitivity to differences among women. The small but growing literature on gay and lesbian urban communities also speaks of diversity. As a consequence of these and other studies, cities and localities have in feminist accounts become not so much fragmented as heterogeneous. They form a multidimensional tangle of many socialities, each with their own spatiality; some intersecting, some autonomous, some complementary and some contradictory, and all shifting historically and geographically.

And in this complex geography, there appear certain moments of excess, when the spaces and places referred to cannot be spoken of in the discourse of geography. This is especially clear in Mackenzie’s recent study of Canadian homeworkers. Her work focuses on women and their changing responses to economic restructuring, especially to the requirement that both partners in a suburban marriage earn a wage
in order to maintain their home. This is not so different from the orthodox concerns of socialist-feminist geography, but Mackenzie finds herself strangely disconcerted by her research:

Moving between work at home and work in public places, [women] bridged private and public spaces and activities. Women's daily activities were carried out in opposition to a city made up of distinct work spaces and home spaces... Women's activities were also rendering obsolete a geographical analysis based on... the dichotomies of the divided city. 81

This is a description of the theoretical effect of the feminist emphasis on the non-dichotomous complexity of contemporary urban women on masculinist geographical research, but it also describes her own uncertainties. She says that the categories which once seemed to make sense of the city – production and reproduction – no longer seem very helpful to her, because women are developing their own networks of labour which are neither reproductive nor productive. These involve community childcare and health networks, housing developments which integrate living space with a range of childcare, counselling and educational services, as well as networks of women earning money at home. Mackenzie sees this as the creation of a new kind of space, an informal economy in which women work not for capital but for each other; and so useless are the old categories to understand this that she is forced to suggest that she sees these women 'conceptually unclad and undisguised, so to speak'. 82 They are creating a different kind of space, supportive and interpersonal, which cannot be seen in the concepts of the simple dichotomous divided city; rather, these women are defying the terms of that division and rendering inadequate the space through which theoretical maps of the city are charted.

A similar exploration of uncharted conceptual territory can be detected in the work of feminists addressing the distinction between the public and the private in political geography. Brownill and Halford, writing about women in local politics in 1980s London, argue that the distinction between 'informal' politics based on domestic or community issues and 'formal' politics based on workplace or other public concerns is unhelpful in understanding women's actions. 83 They suggest that the distinction is 'a re-imposition of separate spheres' on what are highly complex political movements struggling over both 'productive' and 'reproductive' issues, which serves only to ghettoize and caricature women's politics. 84 Similar arguments have been made by Sallie Marston and Michelle Saint-Germain in their study of women com-
munity activists in Tucson, Arizona. Like Mackenzie, they suggest that these women's activities are not visible through the categories of conventional research in political geography — 'women's political activity at the neighbourhood level has been transparent to research' — and they argue that in order to make it visible geography requires a new definition of the political which can recognize women's personal involvement in community politics.

These studies interpret women's lives not through the categories of production and reproduction, but through another kind of sociality; or, women are seen as sometimes inhabiting a space which is neither the masculine public nor the feminized private. This work is not discovering an autonomous and constant world of women; all these accounts are of kinds of social relations which are historically and geographically specific. Like the feminist studies discussed at the end of chapter 5, their work has thus created a women's space, but one which does not depend on an essentialist understanding of women, and in this manner it escapes the terms through which masculinist geography interprets space; women are neither the same as men, nor men's opposite, nor the same as each other. This surplus to the geographical language of production and reproduction is a consequence not only of feminist receptivity to the struggles and experiences of women, but also of the feminist oscillation between the two terms of (re)production and the different kinds of femininity that they invoke. The insistence on diversity among women combines with the implicit lingering belief in women as being essentially different from men, to produce a sense of women as different from men which refuses to invoke the figure of Woman. Women are seen as geographical subjects, but the differences among us cannot be named in hegemonic geographical discourse. The closures of masculinist knowledge have been circumvented. This leaves a gap, a space, for radical heterogeneity among women, which is a space for struggle and resistance. Surpluses beyond the discourses of geography are acknowledged, and this produces a sense of space as itself excessive, and knowledge of it as above all political. The next chapter argues that a particular sense of spatiality is central to a feminist imaginary working to build a new relationship between power, knowledge and subjectivity.
A central theme of this book has been the intertwining of masculine subjectivities and academic geographical knowledge. The argument has been that various forms of white, bourgeois, heterosexual masculinity have structured the way in which geography as a discipline claims to know space, place and landscape. I have suggested that the necessary presence of the maternal or sexual feminine in this masculinist geographical imagination has produced an exclusionary field of knowledge. In that field, dominant subject positions see difference only in relation to themselves. Resistance to the consequent exclusions and absences of geographical knowledge is difficult, because it is impossible to find a position that is entirely outside hegemonic discourses. I have explored two particular difficulties faced by feminist geography as a political project: first, how to represent women as social subjects without referring to the figure of Woman; and, second, how to avoid complicity with the racism and compulsory heterosexuality of hegemonic geography. Despite such difficulties, the feminist work discussed in the previous two chapters has been able to suggest that there are spaces and landscapes beyond the attempted masculinist closures of geography. In this chapter, I want to explore the possibility of a space which does not replicate the exclusions of the Same and the Other. I examine a spatiality imagined by some feminists which can acknowledge the difference of others.

The chapter concentrates on the spatial imagination of what Teresa de Lauretis has called ‘the subject of feminism’. This subject of feminism is a particular sense of identity which tries to avoid the exclusions of the master subject, and I suggest that it therefore
imagines spaces which are not structured through masculinist claims to exhaustiveness. De Lauretis argues that the construction of the subject of feminism is a political project — ‘a political-personal strategy of survival and resistance that is also, at the same time, a critical practice and a mode of knowledge’ — which tries to displace the patriarchal dualism of Man and Woman. It attempts this firstly by asserting the importance of other axes of social identity. Teresa de Lauretis insists that, in order to to break out of the masculinist field of knowledge, feminism must think beyond sexual difference: in order to challenge the patriarchal claim that the field of Man/Woman is exhaustive, the subject of feminism must be positioned in relation to social relations other than gender. The subject of feminism is thus constituted ‘not by sexual difference alone, but rather across languages and cultural representations; a subject en-gendered in the experiencing of race and class, as well as sexual, relations; a subject, therefore, not unified but rather multiple, and not so much divided as contradicted’. And if the mediation of femininity by other social identities must be central to feminism, it follows, says de Lauretis, that ‘differences among women may be better understood as differences within women... the female subject is a site of differences’. The subject of feminism embraces these differences in order to displace masculinism. The strategies of critique advocated in chapter 4 could be seen in these terms as examples of the acceptance of diversity and of a productive mobility between differences.

The second way in which the subject of feminism challenges the dualism of Man/Women, according to de Lauretis, is by indicating the possibility of going beyond the dominant discourses of identity. She suggests that, as well as being interpellated into subject positions by hegemonic discourses, the subject of feminism also represents itself, and that this self-representation can challenge the exhaustiveness of masculinism. Her suggestion is that this challenge takes the form not of an explicit, prescriptive, utopian alternative to the prevailing organization of power, but rather of a sense that there are other possibilities beyond the discursive status quo. There is a notion of things that are not representable in masculinist discourse, but which women themselves may sense if not articulate. Feminist critique depends on a desire for something else. This second aspect of the subject of feminism seems to me to describe exactly the subversive intent of feminist geography — our suspicion that there is something different going on beyond what our discipline can say.

Both the differences within the subject of feminism and the possibility of her self-representation have been articulated by feminists
through spatial images. Her constitution through diverse identities, for example, is often referred to in terms of a ‘politics of location’. This term implies that any subject can be located within particular discursive and material matrices of power, resistance and subjectivity. The details of location in complex relations of power also describe the site of differences of any particular subject of feminism. In the notes made by Adrienne Rich towards a politics of location, Rich’s body provides a map of her specificity:

To write ‘my body’ plunges me into lived experience, particularity: I see scars, disfigurements, discolorations, damages, losses, as well as what pleases me. Bones well nourished from the placenta; the teeth of a middle-class person seen by the dentist twice a year from childhood. White skin, marked and scarred by three pregnancies, an elected sterilization, progressive arthritis, four joint operations, calcium deposits, no rapes, no abortions, long hours at a typewriter – my own, not in a typing pool – and so forth...

Moreover, Rich also sees her body as placed geopolitically. She is Jewish in the States, surviving and being what she is because she was born four years before the Third Reich began and 3000 miles from Europe; and she discovered what it meant to be a US citizen, ‘to be part of that raised boot of power, the cold shadow we cast everywhere to the south’, when she visited Nicaragua after four years of Sandanista rule. Rich locates herself like this in order to refuse the universalizing tendencies of white bourgeois heterosexual masculinity, and of some white feminism – ‘to say “my body” reduces the temptation to grandiose assertions’ – and also to suggest that women’s identity is more complex than the master subject’s notion of the feminine assumes. Teresa de Lauretis depends on spatial images too when she describes the resistance to hegemonic identities of the subject of feminism; she says that this resistance assumes a position ‘elsewhere’, beyond the limits of masculinist discourse:

... it is the elsewhere of discourse here and now, the blind spots, or the space-off, of its representations. I think of it as spaces in the margins of hegemonic discourses, social spaces carved in the interstices of institutions and in the chinks and cracks of the power-knowledge apparati.

Modleski too has remarked that feminist anger and politics depend on a sense of an ‘elsewhere’ beyond patriarchy.
Feminist writing makes use of spatial images extraordinarily often. A few titles of recent books and articles demonstrate the point — *Feminist Theory: from Margin to Center*, ‘Feminist politics: what’s home got to do with it?’, *Charting the Journey*, *In Other Worlds*, *Epistemology of the Closet*, ‘Cartographies of struggle’, *Inside/Out* — and of course references to *A Room of One’s Own* recur. As Pratt has remarked, the purposes to which such images are put are diverse. In this chapter I focus only on the sense of space which I argue is associated with the emergent subject of feminism. This space is multidimensional, shifting and contingent. It is also paradoxical, by which I mean that spaces that would be mutually exclusive if charted on a two-dimensional map — centre and margin, inside and outside — are occupied simultaneously. De Lauretis argues that, because of its constitution through as well as its resistance to the discourses of masculinism, the subject of feminism is in two places at once:

It is a movement between the (represented) and what the representation leaves out or, more pointedly, makes unrepresentable. It is a movement between the (represented) discursive space of the positions made available by hegemonic discourses and the space-off, the elsewhere, of those discourses... These two kinds of spaces are neither in opposition to one another nor strung along a chain of signification, but they coexist concurrently and in contradiction. The movement between them, therefore, is not that of a dialectic, of integration, of a combinatoric, or of *différence*, but is the tension of contradiction, multiplicity, and heteronomy.

Paradoxical space appears frequently in the work of feminists who share de Lauretis’s concern for difference. Other feminists speak of journeys made ‘with their forward and backward movements’: of how ‘textual points of departure and arrival are perpetual intersections of origin and destination’; ‘we return, in widening spirals and never to the same childhood place where it happened, first in our families, with our mothers, with our fathers’; ‘tones of extreme localization, of the intimately personal and individualized body, vibrate in the same field as global high tension emissions’; identities are a process of ‘both deterritorialization and reterritorialization’; ‘one confronts and accepts dispersal and fragmentation as part of the construction of a new world order that reveals more fully where we are, who we can become’; ‘every outside is also an alongside; the distance between distance and proximity is sometimes no distance at all’. These notions of space, location, place, position, mapping and landscape imply radically heterogeneous geometries. They are lived, experienced and
felt. And they also articulate specific arguments about power and identity. Their complex and contradictory spatialities are a 'precarious conceptual geometry of the non-Euclidean type' which speaks of power, resistance and the acknowledgement of difference. So I argue that this paradoxical sense of space can challenge the exclusions of masculinist geography.

I begin this chapter with some comments on why space is so central to arguments about the subject of feminism; this section once again emphasizes some of the material consequences of the discursive regime of Man and Woman, and I also suggest my own investments in thinking about the issues that this chapter raises. The second section discusses some descriptions of oppressive spaces as territories in which women, and others, are caught. The third section explores feminist resistances to this space from a variety of sources, especially from the diasporic theory of women of colour and from lesbian theory. These political-theoretical positions have contributed in fundamental ways to de Lauretis's notion of the subject of feminism, and each depends on a particular paradoxical spatiality. The final section discusses two autobiographical essays which work through the paradoxical space of the subject of feminism in order to articulate their insistence on an emancipatory recognition of difference. I want to end this book by arguing, then, that the spatial images which structure one kind of feminist imagination offer us one new way of thinking geography. They offer a new kind of geography which refuses the exclusions of the old.

Why Think About Spaces and the Subject of Feminism?

An interest in the work performed by spatial images in contemporary theory is not unusual; spatial images are proliferating in social and cultural theory, and Hebdige has suggested two reasons for their popularity. First, he notes the startling geography of contemporary socio-economic shifts, which geographers among others are charting: globalization, time-space compression and localization. Second, Hebdige points to the intellectual influence of Foucault. He suggests that Foucault's rejection of a teleological version of history, and his rescue of space from 'the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile', have encouraged many others to think spatially too. Whether this genealogy is the only one applicable to feminists, however, is questionable. Obviously feminists are responding to the so-called postmodern world, and some have explicitly worked with
Foucault’s ideas (although their interest has focused on his writings on sexuality rather than on space). But I think that feminists’ use of such imagery has a trajectory of its own too. This trajectory would also be an intellectual story materially embedded, but with a very different geography from the global economic narratives which are usually constructed to contextualize postmodern thinking. Consider this parable, told by Marilyn Frye to conclude her discussion of anger as a demand for respect and of the limits placed on women’s expression of anger:

No two women live, in a daily and detailed way, in identical spaces created by identical ranges of the concept of Woman... For better or for worse, though, in each of our lives, others’ concepts of us are revealed by the limits of the intelligibility of our anger. Anger can be an instrument of cartography. By determining where, with whom, about what and in what circumstances one can get angry and get uptake, one can map others’ concepts of who and what one is.

One woman took this thought home with her and tried it out. She walked about the apartment she shares, not unhappily, with her young husband, testing in imagination for the viability of her anger—in what situations would it ‘work’, would get uptake. She discovered that the pattern was very simple and clear. It went with the floor plan. She could get angry quite freely in the kitchen and somewhat less freely and about a more limited range of things in the living room. She could not get angry in the bedroom.


Frye’s domestic geography traces that woman’s role in patriarchal society: she is expected to be a housewife and therefore in the kitchen, the site of much of her domestic labour, she can challenge her husband, get angry, speak with authority, and be heard, ‘get uptake’. But in the bedroom she has no authority to speak independently. There she is not to speak her mind, but to be eloquent only with her body, for his pleasure. This everyday geography of kitchens and bedrooms—and streets and workplaces and neighbourhoods—is the geography of many women’s spatiality, and of feminism too.

Feminism, I think, through its awareness of the politics of the everyday, has always had a very keen awareness of the intersection of space and power—and knowledge. As de Lauretis says, there is ‘the epistemological priority which feminism has located in the personal, the subjective, the body, the symptomatic, the quotidian, as the very site of material inscription of the ideological’. De Lauretis also locates the struggle for self-representation by the subject of feminism
in the everyday and its ‘constellation or configuration of meaning effects’.  

My own feelings about space and power – feelings which have in large part motivated this chapter – certainly come from my own experiences of everyday spaces. I have a strong sense of space as oppressive, for example, from being scared walking at night in the city in which I live. I have to tell my own fears of attack in terms of space: when I’ve felt threatened, space suffocatingly surrounds me with an opacity that robs me of my right to be there; I cannot look around, the details surrounding me swamp me, the innocent transparency of the empty street becomes an aggressive plastic lens pushing on me. Space almost becomes like an enemy itself. This fear is partly about being defined as a woman. And it means that I too dream of an elsewhere beyond patriarchy, maybe one where, to repeat Susan Griffin’s words:

We are no longer pleading for the right to speak: we have spoken; space has changed; we are living in a matrix of our own sounds; our words resonate, by our echoes we chart a world geography; we recognize this new landscape as our birthplace, where we invented names for ourselves; here language does not contradict what we know; by what we hear we are moved again and again to speak.

Being en-gendered as feminine means that I too imagine somewhere beyond capture. I am not sure what this elsewhere would be like; but I’m certain that it would not be like here and now. The arguments of this chapter are partial; they depend on my experiences, and I cannot therefore offer them as a new feminist orthodoxy for thinking about space in geography. These experiences are not mine alone, though; the next two sections explore both the sense of being caught in an alien territory and the possibility of another kind of space in the work of other feminists.

Some Feminists Talking About Oppressive Spaces

When feminists talk about experiences of space, very often they evoke a sense of difficulty. Being in space is not easy. Indeed, at its worst this feeling results in a desire to make ourselves absent from space; it can mean that ‘we acquiesce in being made invisible, in our occupying no space. We participate in our own erasure’. I have already explained some of the ways in which spaces can be unpleasant for women:
chapter 2 examined the construction of public space as an arena in which neither women's bodies were legitimate nor women's voices were heard; chapter 3 looked at some women's sense of being trapped by being associated with the domestic and the community; chapter 5 suggested that landscape was a view open only to a masculine gaze which conflated women and Nature. This sense of being confined by space, into spaces, is not the only understanding of space that women have. I examine it here because, as I will argue, it offers a critique of the transparent space of geography by speaking of the costs of its masculinism.

Some experiences of confinement in space

In her discussion of the meaning of oppression, Frye uses a figure of confinement:

The root of the word 'oppression' is in the element 'press'. The press of the crowd; pressed into military service; to press a pair of pants; press the button... Something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing's motion or mobility. Mold. Immobilize. Reduce.29

Confinement is a recurring image in women's accounts of their lives. Iris Marion Young has argued that 'a space surrounds us in imagination that we are not free to move beyond; the space available to our movement is a constricted one'.30 We often do not gesture and stride, stretch and push to the limits of our physical capabilities. Frances Angela, describing her experience of being a working-class white woman, says:

... if I have to think of one word that could work as a motif for this experience, it is confinement - the shrinking of horizons, the confinements of space, of physical and assertive movements within institutions, the servility that masqueraded as civility, the subjugation of my body, emotions and psyche, the lack of opportunities in employment and education.31

For women of colour part of their sense of the difficulty of space is having to look white, and to act right, sometimes to sound right. Here is Rosario Morales, a Puerto Rican woman, describing her negotiation of a 'straight', 'tidy', 'neat', white geography:
what I do remember is to walk in straight and white into the store and say good morning in my see how white how upper class how refined and kind voice all crisp with consonants bristling with syllables protective coloring in racist fields looks white and crisp like cabbage looks tidy like laid out gardens like white aprons on black dresses like please and thank you and you're welcome like neat and clean and see I swept and scrubbed and polished ain't I nice que hay de criticar will I do will I pass will you let me thru will they let me be not see me here beneath my skin behind my voice crouched and quiet and so so still not see not hear me there where I crouch hiding my eyes my indian bones my spanish sounds muttering

Discussions about confinement are about a body feeling constrained by a particular gender, class and race position. For some women, as Russo remarks, there is no greater fear than that of making a spectacle of herself: too much rouge, a dingy bra strap showing, a voice too shrill in laughter. Skin colour, class and gender are all social attributes which are inscribed onto bodies; and part of women's sense of oppression, of confinement, is their awareness of that process. I think that much of the buffetting and bruising, the confinement and stumbling, of women's experience of space is part of a self-consciousness about being noticed: women watching themselves being watched and judged.

Women of all kinds are expected to look right, and to look right for a gaze which is masculine. Bordo has noted a history of particularly intense disciplinary moments for the female body. She correlates them with periods when women's actual political, economic and social activities are in conflict with the images of womanhood offered by the dominant culture. She suggests that the surge of such images in the both the late nineteenth and the late twentieth centuries coincides with moments of feminist activism. Braidotti agrees: 'it is as if men could not forgive women for having ceased to play the role of passive mirrors aggrandizing the male ego, and, incapable of looking critically at themselves, turned their gaze outwards, capturing women in images that are just anxious projections about the future of Man-kind'. There then occurs a proliferation of images of Woman, so that 'in contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women'. Bordo suggests that anorexia can be understood as a denial of the female body which sees that body and its desires in masculinist terms as excessive. Anorexia is an effort to deny the body in the manner of the master subject. It is also an effort to evade entrapment in an oppressive space:
The anorexic is always convinced she is taking up too much space, eating too much, wanting food too much. I've never felt that way, but I've often felt that I was too much – too much emotion, too much need, too loud and demanding, too much there, if you know what I mean.\textsuperscript{37}

The threatening masculine look materially inscribes its power onto women's bodies by constituting feminine subjects through an intense self-awareness about being seen and about taking up space.

Young has clarified a link between an awareness of embodiment and women's sense of space as not their own.\textsuperscript{38} She notes that the threat of being seen and evaluated is one of the most objectifying processes to which the body is submitted, and argues that the constitution of our bodies as objects to be looked at encourages many of us to see ourselves as located in space. Unlike men who believe they can transcend the specificities of their body and see themselves and their intentions as the originating co-ordinate for organizing everyday space, women see their bodies as objects placed in space among other objects. Because our bodies are an object to us, we see ourselves as positioned in a space not our own. And that space can feel like an alien territory. Women's sense of embodiment can make space feel like a thousand piercing eyes; 'location is about vulnerability'.\textsuperscript{39} This produces a sense of space as something tricky, something to be negotiated, a hazardous arena. The space spoken of by the women quoted here is far from being the transparent space of geography, then, and has none of the grandeur of visions of spatial differentiation; it is a space which constitutes women as embodied objects to be looked at. I suggest that these are the voices of women caught in the analytical stare of geography, caught inside spaces, speaking in places, figures in landscapes, telling the costs of geography's architectonic impulse.

Even as they speak its costs, however, these accounts also challenge the masculinist geographical imagination. This sense of space offered by these feminists dissolves the split between the mind and body by thinking through the body, their bodies. This way of thinking also seems to disregard any distinction between metaphorical and real space; spaces are made meaningful through experience and interpretation, which makes feminist spaces resonate with an extraordinary richness of emotion and analysis. Spaces are felt as part of patriarchal power.
Transparent space as the territory of the oppressors

If the costs of not being white, bourgeois, heterosexual and masculine have been described by feminists in spatial terms, so too has masculinism itself, as this subsection shows. I suggest that many women's difficulty in space can be understood not only in terms of an inscribed embodiment but also of masculinist claims to know which are experienced as a claim to space and territory. This spatialization of the master subject, far from being a mere figure of speech, invokes 'the referential suffering of women' and their struggles to resist.40 I develop the epistemological consequences of this imaginary now because they have implications for the paradoxical spaces imagined by feminists.

For Virginia Woolf, access to particular places as a woman and access to knowledge were directly equivalent. Absorbed by thought in the quad of an Oxbridge college,

I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot. Instantly a man's figure rose to intercept me. Nor did I at first understand that the gesticulations of a curious-looking object, in a cut-away coat and evening shirt, were aimed at me. His face expressed horror and indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was a woman. This was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me... As I regained the path the arms of the Beadle sank, his face assumed its usual repose.41

Soon after, she describes being refused entry to a college library because 'ladies are only admitted to the library if accompanied by a Fellow of the College or furnished with a letter of introduction'.42 Although women now are rarely physically debarred from entering the archives of knowledge, a sense of difficulty still arises in part from a feeling that we are caught within the effects of something strong and powerful which restricts us by claiming to know who women are. We are physically restricted, but there is also a sensation that the limits of what we are and can be have already been mapped by somebody else. Rich writes about a bumble-bee trapped in the room in which she is working:

...reeling, bumping, stunning itself against windowpanes and sills... It is looking for what it needs, just as I am, and, like me, it has gotten trapped in a place where it cannot fulfill its own life. I could open the jar of honey on the kitchen counter, and perhaps it
would take honey from that jar; but its life process, its work, its mode of being cannot be fulfilled inside this house. And I, too, have been bumping my way against glassy panes, falling half-stunned, gathering myself up and crawling, then again taking off, searching.43

Clearly more is being referred to here than physical access to particular places, although the very real problems that women face in reaching resources gives the images their weight and resonance and pain of frustration. The language of bumping against invisible barriers, of dead ends, of being jostled and bruised by sharp appraising glances, is a language of a body being defined by powerful others who control the view. Minh-ha, for example, argues that her sense of being caught and objectified is a consequence of the claims of the colonialist anthropologist to know her; ‘I have wondered time and again about my reading myself as I feel he reads me and my false encounter with the other in me whose non-being/being he claims to have captured, solidified, and pinned to a butterfly board’. 44 In Frye’s words, this is one expression of ‘the experience of being caged in: all avenues, in every direction, are blocked or booby trapped’. 45

The claims to know of the master subject are often imagined as a claim to territory. June Jordan, for example, talking about why racism continues, says that ‘once you try to answer that question you find yourself in the territory of people who despise you, people who are responsible for the invention of the term racism or sexism’. 46 Territory is a kind of property won, historically, often by violence and conquest. Dejean has noted that as the modern nation-state developed, so the subjectivity of its powerful masculine subjects was imagined as structured like a fortress, both for the protection of the self and the exclusion of others; 47 in some key early modern fiction, irrational Others are exiled to a no man’s land surrounding the master subject. Chapter 2 commented on how the establishment of rational masculine identity involves rule over public space, and it also noted the violence following the need for that rule continually to be reasserted. The epistemic closures and exclusions which legitimate that violence have been described as coercive in their claims to territories of knowledge; Braidotti, for example, suggests that ‘violence is the protective enclosure of rationality, which can only impose itself by processes of exclusion and denial. Violent reason. Reasonable violence’. 48 This violence is the guarantee of the Same, because ‘by means of that exclusion and that seizure, reality can be a quiet place in which to meditate on oneself’. 49 Kamuf describes this quiet place as a study:
... the privileged place in question is The Room of One’s Own. These capital letters will refer us to the original room, the room properly named, the room of the Cartesian subject, where *Ego sum* is struck as an emblem bearing a proper name, taking up space the limits of which can be delineated and, perhaps most importantly, where the subject becomes one – both singular and whole.\(^{50}\)

In the study the exhaustiveness of masculinism is asserted. In describing epistemic exclusion then, feminists imagine the space of masculine subjectivity as a territory that is violently defended: as Braidotti says, ‘the economy of the rational order is basically an economy of war, in which women [among others] have suffered’.\(^{51}\)

This image of territory is quite complex. In one sense it refers to the universal claims made by masculinism. It imagines that universality in terms of a spatial conquest. Everything in that space is known and captured by the Same; hence the sense of oppression for those caught in it. The white bourgeois heterosexual masculine theorist above all claims to see everywhere from nowhere, because all the contamination of specificity has been expelled from his position, although white feminists have also been criticized in terms of having a similar exclusionary sense of the freedom of space when they mistakenly claim to speak for all women.\(^{52}\) But, as feminists working with deconstructionist tactics argue, that territory also has internal differences; it contains an Other space that it perceives as outside itself. As Probyn has insisted, the Other is part of the territory of the Same.\(^{53}\) The master subject denies both his fragmentation and his dependence on his Others, but feminist accounts of his exhaustive claims to territory and knowledge challenge these denials by exploring the differences within the territory of the Same. Probyn argues that ‘the impossible *dehors* (outside) is also *dedans* (inside)’, and this leads her to thinking about the spatial image of the outside and inside no longer in terms of a meeting of two domains, but of a snag or a pleat, ‘the intricacy of the one stitched into the other’.\(^{54}\) Feminists then speak of the centre and its Same, and the margin of the Other. However, they also imagine somewhere entirely beyond this territorial logic. As de Lauretis says, there is the dream of elsewhere against which hegemonic space is perceived as oppressive. There is a desire for whatever is beyond the invisible but powerful limits to hegemonic imaginations. I imagine that this boundary between hegemonic subjectivity and what might lie beyond is what bruises many women, what many women batter themselves against in resistance. Women are not only imprisoned in the study as an object of knowledge, then, but also exile
themselves from the study, knowing that they are not what the master subject assumes. Prisoners and exiles: the first appearance of what I am calling paradoxical space. No wonder space is so tortuous for so many women.

The Paradoxical Spaces of the Subject of Feminism

The violence implicit in the spatial imaginary of the white masculine subject is a major reason why feminists have tried to think about a different subjectivity. We want to be neither the victim nor the perpetrator of the experiences of displacement, exile, imprisonment and erasure. The project of the subject of feminism is to comprehend the ‘positivity of otherness’, and resistance to the exclusions of dominant subjectivities is articulated through spatial images. These images are not used casually; I argue that they are structured in order to resist the territoriality of masculinism. They offer a sense of space which refuses to be a claim to territory and thus allows for radical difference. This section outlines their politicized, complex and paradoxical space.

Geometrics of difference

The subject of feminism is understood as ‘a site of differences’ because of the impact of critiques of dominant forms of feminism from other women over the past decade or so. Women who are not middle class, white, heterosexual and able-bodied have interpreted their experiences and insisted on being heard. Their arguments have enriched the spatial imaginary of feminism; chapter 6 noted, for example, that the centrality of the public/private distinction to white feminism has been challenged by the elaboration of very different geographies of work, home and community from black feminisms. The feminist political imaginary has also been diversified by the addition of interpretations of immigration, or of exile, or of certain structures of community, from the feminism of women of colour. What Miller has described as the ‘geopolitics of a poetics of gender’ has created a fragmented and rich geographical imaginary in feminism.

These articulations of different spatial structures have also complicated arguments about claims to know social spaces. For many feminists now, to think of the geography of difference is extremely complex. This geography can no longer simply be a mapping of social power relations onto territorial spaces: masculine and feminine onto
public and private, for example. The impact of black and lesbian feminism is evident in the recognition that everywhere all women are subject to constitution not only by gender but by sexuality and by class and by race and by religion, and by a whole range of other social relations; and feminists of colour insist that these relations are always experienced simultaneously. For the subject of feminism, then, 'the issue is dispersion'. Social space can no longer be imagined simply in terms of a territory of gender. The geography of the master subject and the feminism complicit with him has been ruptured by the diverse spatialities of different women. So, a geographical imagination is emerging in feminism which, in order to indicate the complexity of the subject of feminism, articulates a 'plurilocality'. In this recognition of difference, two-dimensional social maps are inadequate. Instead, spaces structured over many dimensions are necessary; what Haraway has described as 'geometries of difference and contradiction'.

As well as this multiplicity of dimensions, the subject of feminism also depends on a paradoxical geography. Any position is imagined not only as being located in multiple social spaces, but also as at both poles of each dimension. It is this tension which can articulate a sense of an elsewhere beyond the territories of the master subject.

The paradox of occupying both the centre and the margin

I have noted that the territory of the Same is differentiated between the centre of the Same and the margin of the Other. The Other is not outside the discursive territory of the Same. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has explored this paradox in the case of the homosexual and the trope of the closet; she suggests that the image of the closet represents homosexuality as an open secret around which a certain knowledgeable ignorance can centre. Diana Fuss has also pointed out the complexity of this doubled position for gay men and lesbian women. Their simultaneous inside-ness and outside-ness produces many unpredictable paradoxes: for example, 'to be out, in common gay parlance... is really to be in – inside the realm of the visible, the speakable, the culturally intelligible... [but] to come out can also work not to situate one on the inside but to jettison one from it'. These paradoxes of 'inside' and 'outside' can painfully disempower those caught within them but, as Fuss also argues, 'one can, by using these contested words, use them up, exhaust them, transform them into the historical concepts they are and always have been'. Here I examine the subversive potential of this paradoxical position.

The disruption of the unmarked exhaustiveness of the Same/Other
attempted by the strategy of oscillation has been imagined as a mobility between the two positions of centre and margin. Snitow describes this oscillation in a passage which is full of images of mobility and access:

The decision can never feel solid or final. No-one gets to stay firmly on her side; no-one gets to rest in a reliably clear position. Even when a woman chooses what shoes she’ll wear today - is it to be the running shoes, the flats, the spikes? - she’s deciding where to place herself for the moment on the current possible spectrum of images of ‘woman’. Whatever our habitual position on the divide, in daily life we travel back and forth, or, to change metaphors, we scramble for whatever toehold we can.66

The oscillation which Snitow argues is inherent in feminism involves the occupation of two positions at once in its constant movement back and forth between them: another spatial paradox. The destabilization of the Same/Other is also part of another paradoxical position described by Patricia Hill Collins.67 She describes the simultaneous occupation of a position both inside and outside the centre as the ‘outsider-within stance’, and she suggests that it is a position articulated very often by black women because of their role as domestic workers in white homes. There they were on intimate terms with the children of the family in particular, but were also made to know that they did not belong, that they were only employees; they were there but also absent. Collins argues that this gives black feminists a unique insight into the contradictions between the ideology and the practice of the dominant group. It is a location from which the credibility of the master subject can be undermined. Frye suggests a similar subject position for white lesbian and gays, but one which is enabled for different reasons; by acting straight they can be inside but also watch as outsiders.68

This simultaneous occupation of centre and margin can critique the authority of masculinism, then. Another kind of paradoxical space helps some feminists to think about both recognizing differences between women and continuing to struggle for change as women. This is evident in some recent discussions about separatism. For those feminists most insistent on the poststructuralist interpretation of subject positioning, essentialist radical feminism and its associated practice of physical separatism are often seen as a passing moment of great importance to feminism, but with a politics that is no longer tenable.69 The claim that separate women-only spaces enable the
recovery of an essentially feminine identity is condemned as a mere reflection of the importance of boundaries to hegemonic subjectivity, with all the violent exclusions that entails. Diamond and Quinby, who wrote one of the epitaphs for separatist feminism, describe separatism as a 'reverse discourse' which merely inverts the dominant value system without challenging its fundamental categories. These arguments were rehearsed in chapter 4. However, separatism of a kind is not dead: it is still advocated by many feminist writers. There are good reasons for separatism: Freedman has argued that in the nineteenth century, it 'helped mobilize women and gained political leverage in the larger society', and many women continue to argue that separatism can give women a breathing space to reflect, meditate, gain strength and recover a sense of identity. June Jordan asks the crucial question: ‘What is the purpose of your identity? That is the question. “So what?” is the way I would put it in my abrupt American way’. And an intimately associated question is: What are the boundaries of separation like? Separatism as a fortress, or even as the Cartesian study, is feminism at full speed in reverse. But very often these are not the advocated images of the separate spaces, nor are their purposes battle or universalism. Often separatism is offered, paradoxically, as a means of thinking about coalition and resistance. This is the stance taken by Barbara Smith, for example. Her preferred definition of separatism by lesbian women is just doing without men, and thinking about this immediately leads her to ponder on what might be lost by such a separatism; she wonders what men and women of colour share, and what coloured and white women share, and about the potential for alliances. Bernice Reagon also sees separation in communities as vital for deciding who you are, but only as a temporary strategy; coalitions with other groups is also necessary to avoid the chauvinism of exclusion. The image that she uses for such communities is that of the barred room, which keeps others out but which can also turn into a prison. What women find in contemplation may be a complex and divided self which recognizes the need for alliances in struggle. The difference of others is acknowledged and strategic alliances forged. The spaces of separatism in these discussions, then, is also a space of interrelations – another paradox.

The paradox of being within the Same/Other and also elsewhere

The manipulation of the field of the Same/Other, being both separate and connected, the simultaneous occupation of both the centre and the margin, being at once inside and outside: all these discursive spaces
depend on a sense of an ‘elsewhere’ for their resistance. The subject of feminism has to feel that there is something beyond patriarchy in order to adopt these strategies of subversion. Thus the paradoxes described in the previous subsection themselves depend on a paradoxical space which straddles the spaces of representation and unrepresentability. This space of unrepresentability can acknowledge the possibility of radical difference, as de Lauretis argues.

Marilyn Frye describes a space beyond representation, which she calls lesbianism. Frye’s defence of separatism argues that it is an effort by women to control men’s access to them and its point is to enable women to define more clearly who they are. ‘When women separate (withdraw, break out, step outside, migrate, say no), we are simultaneously controlling access and defining. We are doubly insubordinate, since neither of these is permitted’. But she does not prescribe what women will define themselves as; in fact, she goes on to celebrate lesbianism as an existence precisely beyond definition. She describes her search for a definition of lesbian as located in a ‘strange non-location beyond the pale’ in which she is ‘dancing about a region of cognitive gaps and negative semantic spaces, kept aloft only by the rhythm and momentum of my own motion, trying to plumb abysses which are generally agreed not to exist and to map the tensions which create them’. Sedgwick too sees lesbian practices as occupying the realm of the non-representable; she suggests that dominant discourses can leave ‘in the stigma-impregnated space of refused recognition, sometimes also a stimulating aether of the unnamed, the lived experiment’.

This notion of a ‘stimulating aether’ is not, it must be emphasized, in any simple sense outside the discourses of gender, race, class or sexuality; it is meaningful only in relation to the absences in those discourses – hence the paradoxicality of its spatial imaginary. This complicity is especially clear in the diasporic politics of many women of colour. Black feminism has spoken of segregated communities, of immigration, of exile, of the diaspora, of a ‘third world’ now found on the streets of New York and London as well as in the southern hemisphere, and speaks of these spaces not as ‘natural’ units which divide social groups but as part of a political consciousness of shared oppression and potential coalition. In a double gesture, diasporic feminist politics both claims the black identity given by white racism as basis for struggle, and also refuses to be interpellated as the white man’s Other by rejecting exclusionary, territorial claims to identity. This complex position has also imagined a paradoxical space which simultaneously grounds and denies identity – a “pre-post”-erous space – in order to articulate a politics of resistance.
The subject of feminism, then, depends on a paradoxical geography in order to acknowledge both the power of hegemonic discourses and to insist on the possibility of resistance. This geography describes that subjectivity as that of both prisoner and exile; it allows the subject of feminism to occupy both the centre and the margin, the inside and the outside. It is a geography structured by the dynamic tension between such poles, and it is also a multidimensional geography structured by the simultaneous contradictory diversity of social relations. It is a geography which is as multiple and contradictory and different as the subjectivity imagining it. I have already suggested how some of the founding antinomies of Western geographical thought are negated by this feminist subjectivity: its embodiment which overcomes the distinction between mind and body; its refusal to distinguish between real and metaphorical space; its refusal to separate experience and emotion from the interpretation of places. All these threaten the polarities which structure the dominant geographical imagination. They fragment the dead weight of masculinist space and rupture its exclusions. Above all, they allow for the possibility of a different kind of space through which difference is tolerated rather than erased.

**Explorations in a Different Space**

The subject of feminism insists that spaces are extraordinarily complex. The previous section attempted to describe and account for some of the specific features of that complexity. Its multidimensionality refers to complicated and never self-evident matrix of historical, social, sexual, racial and class positions which women occupy, and its geometry is one strung out between paradoxical sites. These feminist maps are multiple and intersecting, provisional and shifting, and they require 'ever more intricate skills in cartography'. I want to conclude this book with the work of two feminists who invoke this geography in their own understandings of their lives in order to think about a politics of resistance which recognizes the need to acknowledge difference. I try to specify some of the different sources of their geographies, which differ according to the experienced politics of the women concerned.

bell hooks describes a politics which fragments the territorial logic of white masculinity by describing a place both within and outside the dominant culture. Her argument develops from her experience of growing up in a Southern black community, segregated from the white centre of town by the railway tracks. Its segregation on the margin of the town belies its importance to the town's economy, however, for
many of its service workers – without which the town would cease to function – live there. The marginal community is also part of the town in the sense that its boundaries are not only the physical railway tracks but also the less tangible ‘oppressive boundaries set by race, sex, and class domination’. Its poverty is structured by those social relations. But hooks refuses to comprehend its geography by seeing it mapped only in these terms, a margin defined only by its relation to the centre. She insists that it can also be re-thought, re-imagined, in a different and liberating way, as a place of resistance, and that this re-thinking takes place from a different position, from both centre and margin together. hooks describes this as a process of transgression, ‘moving out of one’s place’. However, this resistance is not something that is easily achieved. Her essay begins by linking the struggle to fight with the pain of remembering the silencing of the margin by the centre. That pain flows from the difficulty of resistance, the high price paid by many black people for taking their sense of who they are into the racist centre, and the deprivation and exploitation which is also part of the margin. Precisely because of this pain and suffering, hooks demands a space for resistance, ‘spaces where one is able to redeem and reclaim the past, legacies of pain, suffering, and triumph in ways that transform present reality’. She argues that new interpretations of home are enabled by experiences elsewhere. The intersection of both home and the spaces of the centre allow a new politics of resistance. Speaking the margin, then, requires its own paradoxical space, where theorizing is grounded in a felt sense of history and geography. For hooks this produces a fragmented, multiple and oppositional voice: ‘private speech in public discourse, intimate intervention, making another text, a space that enables me to recover all that I am in language’. hooks argues that this position which contains both centre and margin must be chosen and struggled for because it is a space of radical openness which allows the creation of a counter-hegemonic politics, and she invites her readers to join her there. hooks’s essay, then, is not placed on a territorial imagined geography, where centre and margin are permanently marked and mutually exclusive. Instead, she positions herself in a fluid and multidimensional topography, doubled between two poles but finding that tension productive in the imagining of an elsewhere.

Hooks notes that her understanding of the margin and the centre is conditioned by her particular intellectual and political struggle; disruptive geographies develop in very different ways. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing hooks’s image of her black community with the discussion of ‘home’ in an essay by Minnie Bruce Pratt.
Pratt’s interpretation of her own position as a white Christian lesbian woman from the South of the USA uses a fragmented geography as a means of shattering the illusory coherence of the centre. For her, the oppressive (and scared and lonely) identity of her father represents the centre; he constituted himself as white, masculine and bourgeois only by excluding others he saw as inferior – blacks, women and poor folk. Pratt imagines this kind of identity as a claim to territory – ‘a narrow circle of the self’, a ‘coffined heart and body’ – and suggests that her father saw material landscapes in the same dominating way. She describes the view of her childhood town that her father wanted to give her by taking her to the top of the town’s courthouse tower:

What I would have seen at the top: on the streets around the courthouse square, the Methodist church, the limestone building with the county Health Department, Board of Education, Welfare Department (my mother worked there), the yellow brick Baptist church, the Gulf station, the pool hall (no women allowed), Cleveland’s grocery, Ward’s shoestore: then, all in a line, connected, the bank, the post office, Dr. Nicholson’s office, one door for whites, one for Blacks... I was shaped by my relation to those buildings and to the people in the buildings, by ideas of who should be working in the Board of Education, who should be in the bank handling money, of who should have the guns and the keys to the jail, of who should be in the jail; and I was shaped by what I didn’t see, or didn’t notice, on those streets.

Pratt’s position of privilege and power as a white woman is embodied in the view from the tower, which seemed so natural but, as she recognizes, contained a whole series of ideas about social hierarchies of race, gender and class.

Pratt’s self-critique started when her children were taken away from her because she began a lesbian relationship. This exposed to her what she saw as her vulnerability as a woman, and she became increasingly involved in feminist campaigns. Her desire was for an existence for herself and for other women without limits, but she gradually realized ‘what a limited, narrow space, and how short-lasting, it would be if only my imagination and knowledge and abilities were to go into the making of it’. Her fantasy free space, for example, drew on memories of childhood events which she later realized were based on the power of her family as white: security provided by a black servant, Laura Cates, walks in woods enabled by the White Citizens’ Council of her father. Gradually and continually, by deciding to work for it, Pratt
begins to see not a geography defined by the exclusions of a racist, classist, patriarchal centre, but by complexity:

I learn a way of looking at the world that is more accurate, complex, multi-layered, multi-dimensional, more truthful: to see the world of overlapping circles, like movement on a millpond after a fish has jumped, instead of the courthouse square with me at the middle, even if I am on the ground.\textsuperscript{90}

Everyday encounters thus become fractured through the history of race and sex and class. Here she describes the uncertainties which this feminist subjectivity provokes when walking down a street in a black area of Washington, DC:

In the space of three blocks one evening, I can debate whether the young Black woman didn't speak because she was tired, urban-raised, or hates white women; and ask myself why I wouldn't speak to the young professional white woman on her way to work in the morning, but I do at night: and she doesn't speak at all: is it about who I think I may need for physical safety?

And I make myself speak to a young Black man: if I don't, it will be the old racial-sexual fear. Damn the past anyway. When I speak directly, I usually get a respectful answer: is that the response violently extorted by history, the taboo on white women?\textsuperscript{91}

Crucially, though, this is not a simple move from one position to another. Like hooks, Pratt does not see the margin as an unproblematic alternative to the centre. She refuses to say that her shift of sexuality and politics is an inevitable process of reasoned enlightenment; she insists that her childhood, especially the racist fears of her father, continue to shape her: ‘Each of us carries around those growing-up places, the institutions, a sort of back-drop, a stage-set’.\textsuperscript{92} She is both exiled, living in Washington, DC in ways her mother cannot countenance, but also in some sense still home with her mother: ‘I am my father’s daughter in the present, living in a world he and my folks helped to create’.\textsuperscript{93} For Pratt this recognition of difference and complicity enables her effort to work towards a world in which people are able to live without trying to make others less than themselves.

These geographies do not come ‘naturally’ to these writers: they stress the effort with which they have constructed them. As Haraway says, ‘there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of the subjugated’.\textsuperscript{94} These paradoxical geographies are political projects which attempt to challenge the transparent geography created by
hegemonic subjectivity from an 'excessive critical position . . . attained through practices of political and personal displacement across boundaries'. Their engagement with the experiences of everyday fragmentation and dispersal have created not so much a space of resistance as an entirely different geometry through which we can think power, knowledge, space and identity in critical and, hopefully, liberatory ways.

**Concluding remarks**

I have tried to argue that feminist resistance to a certain kind of (historically and geographically specific) transparent space renders spatial images, such as 'territory', especially resonant in feminist work. Transparent space can be contextualized in terms of the discursive and visual engendering of the feminine body and in terms of the increasing specularity of certain cultures; and its costs for women can be immediate and painful. This chapter has explored the construction by feminists of a different kind of space in which women need not be victims. This space has been imagined even though feminisms are caught inside and as well as outside the unstable territories of masculinism. Feminisms imagine an elsewhere beyond the violence and repression of the master subject while also trapped within the limits of his desires and fears. What this chapter has described is thus a historically and geographically specific politicized space. The feminist discourse on which I have focused imagines a particular space, partial and strategic – a space imagined in order to survey the particular politico-epistemological dilemma which writers such as de Lauretis argue is central to contemporary feminism. This space is paradoxical because, as I have argued in this chapter, it must imagine the position of being both prisoner and exile, both within and without. It must locate a place which is both crucial to, yet also denied by, the Same; and it must locate a place both defined by that Same and dreaming of something quite beyond its reach. Paradoxical space, then, is a space imagined in order to articulate a troubled relation to the hegemonic discourses of masculinism.

I do not want to conclude with a demand that geographers acknowledge paradoxical space because of what I would argue is its emancipatory intent, however. Paradoxical space is one strategy currently adopted by a critically mobile feminism facing a particular dilemma, and to suggest that it is in some way inherently radical would be to deny the political flexibility and vigilance which other chapters in this
book have advocated. Space may be contested now in terms of its transparency or paradoxicality, but the terms of that contest will shift. Paradoxical space may not remain emancipatory. What this discussion of paradoxical space has clearly shown, though, are the costs of contemporary claims to see space transparently. Given the pain and struggles of those caught in transparent space, I want to end by asking for a geography that acknowledges that the grounds of its knowledge are unstable, shifting, uncertain and, above all, contested. Space itself—and landscape and place likewise—far from being firm foundations for disciplinary expertise and power, are insecure, precarious and fluctuating. They are destabilized both by the internal contradictions of the geographical desire to know and by the resistance of the marginalized victims of that desire. And other possibilities, other sorts of geographies, with different compulsions, desires and effects, complement and contest each other. This chapter has tried to describe just one of them. There are many more.
Notes to pages 1–16

1 All these figures are from W. Zelinsky, ‘Women in geography: a brief factual account’, *Professional Geographer*, 25 (1973), pp. 151–65, p. 159. As with the other percentages of publications by women in geographical journals, these figures refer only to authors whose sex was obvious; they are therefore probably slight underestimates of women’s actual publication record.


9 For an account of gender stereotypes in geographical research, see J. Monk and S. Hanson, ‘On not excluding half of the human in human geography’, Professional Geographer, 34 (1982), pp. 11–23. For early discussions of the impact of these stereotypes on women in the discipline, see W. Zelinsky, ‘The strange case of the missing female geographer’, Professional Geographer, 25 (1973), pp. 101–5; and Zelinsky, Monk and Hanson, ‘Women and geography: review and prospectus’, p. 319. The latter essay offers a good critique of the argument that boys have a better innate spatial ability than girls; see esp. pp. 326–8.

10 Zelinsky, ‘The strange case of the missing female geographer’, p. 102.

11 Zelinsky, ‘The strange case of the missing female geographer’, p. 102.

12 Johnson, ‘Gender, genetics, and the possibility of feminist geography’, p. 163.


16 P. Cloke, C. Philo and D. Sadler, Approaching Human Geography: an Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Debates (Paul Chapman, London, 1991). Their reasons are laid out on page xi; mainly, they feel that women are best qualified to speak about feminism.


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24 For a discussion of this Same-ness, see L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, tr. G. C. Gill (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1985).


32 Bondi and Domosh, ‘Other figures in other landscapes’, p. 204.


37 For comments on the presence of a feminized Other in the disciplines of history, philosophy and art history respectively, see C. Crosby, *The Ends of History: Victorians and ‘The Woman Question’*
Domosh, ‘Towards a feminist historiography of geography’. See also D. R. Stoddart, ‘Do we need a feminist historiography of geography – and if we do, what should it be?’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 16 (1991), pp. 484–7. Stoddart suggests that Domosh’s critique is misplaced because she is imposing anachronistic criteria on nineteenth-century men and women, while he is merely writing factual history; this entirely side-steps the issue of precisely who the ‘we’ in his title is. ‘We’ might include women who want a different kind of geography, and this project must involve reconsidering the history of the discipline, as Domosh so rightly perceives. Stoddart obviously finds this incredible, and the ‘we’ in his title is therefore the masculine collective ‘we’ of the hegemonic geographical imagination.


Gatens, *Feminism and Philosophy*, p. 87.


C. Sandoval, ‘U.S. third world feminism: the theory and method of oppositional consciousness in the postmodern world’, *Genders*, 10 (1991), pp. 1–24. Aida Hurtado has argued that the existence of two strategies may have something to do with the preponderance of white women in feminism. Hurtado suggests that white women’s intimacy with white men tends to give them poor skills at challenging authority; either they are seduced by promises of power and try to be like men, or they reject men entirely and adopt separatist politics. See A. Hurtado, ‘Relating to privilege: seduction and rejection in the subordination of white women and women of color’, *Signs*, 14 (1989), pp. 833–55, pp. 852–3.


A. Lorde, ‘The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’, in *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*, eds C. Moraga and G. Anzaldúa, second edition (Kitchen


50 J. Miller, Seductions: Studies in Reading and Culture (Virago, London, 1990), p. 1. Hurtado also uses the metaphor of seduction to describe white women’s relation to white men; see Hurtado, ‘Relating to privilege’.

51 Miller, Seductions, p. 3.

52 Miller, Seductions, p. 8.


Notes to pages 17–40


4 Millett, Sexual Politics, p. 93.

5 Millett, Sexual Politics, p. 97.

6 Millett, Sexual Politics, p. 127.


20 Miller, ‘Household activity patterns in nineteenth-century suburbs’.

21 Miller, ‘The Hoover in the garden’.


34 Miller, ‘The Hoover in the garden’, p. 85. For similar concern about the work of Giddens, see L. Murgatroyd, ‘Only half the story: some blinkering effects of “malestream” sociology’, in *Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens and his Critics*, eds D. Held and


37 Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, p. 218.

38 An essay which is particularly helpful on the need to discuss the domestic in order to mark the public is A. Yeatman, ‘Gender and the differentiation of social life into public and domestic domains’, *Social Analysis*, 15 (1984), pp. 32–49.


44 Yeatman, ‘Gender and the differentiation of social life into public and domestic domains’, p. 42.

45 D. Parkes and N. Thrift, *Times, Spaces, and Places: a Chronogeographic Perspective* (John Wiley, Chichester, 1980), pp. 247–8. This erases the body by relegating to the natural as opposed to the social or cultural; it thus depends on the opposition between Nature and Culture, which chapter 4 argues is central to geographical discourse.


47 Riley, ‘*Am I That Name?’*, p. 104.

48 Thrift, ‘On the determination of social action in space and time’, p. 43; Pred, ‘Social reproduction and the time-geography of everyday life’, pp. 166–70.

49 I. M. Young, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory* (University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1990), p. 163.

50 Riley, ‘*Am I That Name?’*. 


61 ‘Anna’, a mother quoted in Dyck, ‘Space, time and renegotiating motherhood’, p. 471.


71 Pateman, *The Disorder of Women*, p. 35.

72 Pateman, *The Disorder of Women*, p. 43.

73 Riley, ‘*Am I That Name?*’, p. 41.

74 Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*; Elshtain, *Public Man, Private Woman*.


77 Dyck, ‘Integrating home and wage workplace’, p. 330, my emphasis; see also Dyck, ‘Space, time and renegotiating motherhood’, p. 466. Dyck’s arguments track a trajectory in feminist geographers’ discussions of everyday space similar to that remarked on by Moore in anthropology: a shift from Ardener’s early formulation of space as a result of patriarchal structure to a recent insistence that space is better seen as an enacted and negotiated text; see H. L. Moore, *Space, Text, Gender: an Anthropological Study of the Marakwet of


Gould, ‘Space and rum: an English note on espacien and rumian meaning’.


Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*, p. 189. Haraway is in part referring to a National Geographic Society publication.


R. Deutsche, ‘Boys town’, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 9 (1991), pp. 5–30, p. 7. For a brief comment on the visual control of the city in certain geographical models, see L. C. Johnson,

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7 Ley and Samuels, 'Introduction: contexts of modern humanism in geography', pp. 2–3 and 7.


11 Ley and Samuels, 'Introduction: contexts of modern humanism in geography'.


13 Clearly, the translation between place and community is not always an exact one. Eyles found sociological discussions of community as
social structure and as ideology helpful in his study of senses of place, however; community allowed him to think about both the social practices in a place and what they were felt to mean by its inhabitants; see J. Eyles, *Senses of Place* (Silverbrook Press, Warrington, 1985). Seamon also argued that ‘a sense of personal satisfaction as well as a sense of community are both inescapably grounded in place’; D. Seamon, *A Geography of the Lifeworld: Movement, Rest, and Encounter* (Croom Helm, London, 1979), p. 9. ‘Community’ is a term laden with warm and positive connotations, and formulations which stress the importance of spatial location to community imply what Tuan would describe as a topophilic attachment to place.

15 Buttmer, ‘Grasping the dynamism of the lifeworld’, p. 279.
20 See especially Ley, ‘Social geography and social action’.
28 Women and Geography Study Group, *Geography and Gender*, p. 44.


34 Eyles, *Senses of Place*, p. 28.

35 Tuan, *Topophilia*, p. 223.


41 Relph, 'An inquiry into the relations between phenomenology and geography', p. 195.


44 Ley and Samuels, 'Introduction: contexts of modern humanism in geography', p. 11.

45 Samuels, 'Existentialism and human geography', p. 37.

46 Rowles, 'Toward a geography of growing old', p. 68.

47 Relph, *Place and Placelessness*, p. 45.

48 Relph, *Place and Placelessness*. David Ley's work was also particularly sensitive to these issues.

49 Tuan, *Topophilia*, p. 159.

50 Tuan, *Topophilia*, p. 5.

Tuan, ‘Geography, phenomenology, and the study of human nature’, p. 188.

Tuan, *Topophilia*, pp. 53–4. Tuan cites here the work of Erikson with boys and girls playing with building bricks: while boys tend to erect scenes with lots of towers, with figures on the outside moving around, girls generally build static scenes of enclosed spaces with people inside them. Tuan offers no explanation for such different behaviour, and the reader is left with the impression that they are the result of natural differences between the sexes.

Tuan, *Topophilia*, p. 53.


Wilson, ‘Women in the community’, p. 5.


Tuan, *Space and Place*, p. 201. The issue of domestic violence is clearly relevant here; see J. Hamner, ‘Community action, women’s aid and the women’s liberation movement’, in *Women in the
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73 Values associated with masculinity are invoked through male figures. Geographers have noted how advertisements for the economic potential of places, for example, use masculine figures. For case studies of the early television advertising campaigns of the London Dockland Development Corporation and of local efforts to regenerate two deindustrialized localities in Australia, see J. Burgess and P. Wood, ‘Decoding Docklands: place advertising and the decision-making strategies of the small firm’, in Qualitative Methods in Human Geography, eds J. Eyles and D. M. Smith (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988), pp. 94–117; S. Watson, ‘Gilding the

74 J. Swindells, 'Hanging up on Mum or questions of everyday life in the writing of history', *Gender and History*, 2 (1990), pp. 68–78.


77 de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, p. 211.


79 Tuan, 'Space and place', p. 215.


81 Rowles, 'Toward a geography of growing old', p. 69, my emphasis.


83 Tuan, 'Geography, phenomenology, and the study of human nature', p. 190.


87 It is rather hard to know what to make of Olsson's essay, other than to note that in its playful exploration of the ambiguity of language, figures of women recur as symbols of that ambiguity: Olsson, 'Of ambiguity or far cries from a memorializing mamafesta', p. 118.

Notes to pages 62–85

1 Many feminist discussions of space/place use these two terms interchangably. I argue here that they signify different forms of masculinism. I would argue that the work of what is described as a feminized *space* in much contemporary philosophy and cultural theory is in geographical knowledge performed by the notion of

8 Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science*, p. 86.


21 D. Cosgrove, ‘The myth and stones of Venice: an historical geography of a symbolic landscape’, *Journal of Historical Geography*, 8 (1982), pp. 145–69, p. 163. This is a knowing description; but it does not take into account the costs, either to women or to the environment, of their conflation. For a more critical discussion of the feminized city, see E. Wilson, *The Sphinx in the City* (Virago, London, 1991).


should emphasize again here that I am not suggesting that women cannot undertake fieldwork: only that its dominant style is a tough masculinity.


34 Hart, ‘The highest form of the geographer’s art’, p. 29.


38 Hart, ‘The highest form of the geographer’s art’, pp. 21 and 25.


41 Fitzsimmons, ‘The matter of nature’.


46 Smith, *Uneven Development*, pp. xiv and 13, both my emphasis.


57 Collard with Contrucci, *Rape of the Wild*, p. 106.


65 N. K. Miller, ‘Changing the subject: authorship, writing and the reader’,


71 Butler, *Gender Trouble*, p. 32.

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4 On the importance of the visual to the contemporary discipline, see D. Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, perspective and the evolution of the landscape idea’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 10 (1985), pp. 45–62, p. 46, p. 58. For a baroque example of the visual as a metaphor of knowledge, see E. W. Soja, 'The spatiality of


17 Cosgrove, ‘Prospect, perspective and the evolution of the landscape idea’, p. 46.

18 D. Cosgrove, ‘Historical considerations on humanism, historical


20 Cosgrove, 'Prospect, perspective and the evolution of the landscape idea', p. 47. The term 'ways of seeing' is after Berger, Ways of Seeing.


36 Dijkstra, *Idols of Perversity*, p. 82.


38 Parker and Pollock, *Old Mistresses*, p. 13. In fact, flower painting was the one genre in which women were well-represented as artists in this period. Women were accepted as artists in this area because there was thought to be some kind of reciprocity between artist and subject; women were often described as flowers by Victorian gallants, and ‘the flower analogy places both women and their work in the sphere of nature’. The encoding of nature as feminine not only gave rise to a series of visual representations of women as passive and fertile as nature itself then; it also limited the possibilities for women as artists; Parker and Pollock, *Old Mistresses*, p. 54. For an earlier account of the relation between Woman and Nature, see C. Fabricant, ‘Binding and dressing Nature’s loose tresses: the ideology of Augustan landscape design’, *Studies in Eighteenth Century Culture*, 8 (1979), pp. 109–35.


40 C. M. Armstrong, ‘Edgar Degas and the representation of the

45 Daniels, 'Marxism, culture and the duplicity of landscape'.
46 Berger, quoted in Daniels, 'Marxism, culture and the duplicity of landscape', pp. 203 and 215.
47 Y.-F. Tuan, 'Sight and pictures', *Geographical Review*, LXIX (1979), pp. 411–22, p. 422. There are connections between this cultural geography and the humanistic geography that I discussed in chapter 3 in order to define aesthetic masculinity; Cosgrove, for example, says that 'landscape acts as a visual signifier of place'. See D. Cosgrove, 'Power and place in the Venetian territories', in *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations*, eds J. A. Agnew and J. S. Duncan (Unwin Hyman, London, 1989), pp. 105–23, p. 108.
51 Barnes and Duncan, 'Introduction: writing worlds', p. 3, my emphasis.
53 Daniels, 'Marxism, culture and the duplicity of landscape'; J. S.


Bryson, Vision and Painting; see also Burgess, ‘The production and consumption of environmental meanings in the mass media’, p. 146; Pollock, Vision and Difference, esp. pp. 27–30.


Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 227.

Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 231.


Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, p. 19.


70 Pollock, Vision and Difference, p. 147.
72 Kolodny, The Lay of the Land, p. 4.
73 Kolodny, The Lay of the Land, p. 67.
75 Theweleit, Male Fantasies. Volume One.
77 Rose, 'Introduction – II', p. 48. Dijkstra discusses the images of monstrous as well as nurturant women: see Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity.
78 Stoddart, On Geography and its History, p. 35.
80 Armstrong, 'Edgar Degas and the representation of the female body', p. 239. See also the discussions of 'a non-empirical Gaze' in Bryson, Vision and Painting, p. 112; and S. Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Thames & Hudson, London, 1983).
82 Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, p. 20.
87 Deutsche, 'Boys town', p. 12.
88 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 133.
90 Mulvey, Visual and Other Pleasures, p. 37.
91 M. A. Doane, 'Film and the masquerade: theorising the female spectator', Screen, 23 (1982), pp. 74–87, p. 82.
92 Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 227.


Kolodny, *The Land Before Her*, p. xiii.


Pollock, *Vision and Difference*, pp. 50–90.


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7 Foord and Gregson, 'Patriarchy', p. 186.
9 Johnson, '(Un)realist perspectives', p. 212.
11 Christopherson, 'On being outside "the project"', pp. 87 and 88.
13 R. Fincher, 'Class and gender relations in the local labor market and the local state', in *The Power of Geography: How Territory Shapes Social Life*, eds J. Wolch and M. Dear (Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989), pp. 93–117, p. 95. This commitment is also evident in the work of those feminists whom I have also mentioned in the context of efforts at theorizing women's oppression.
19 McDowell, 'The baby and the bathwater'.
21 Burnett, 'Social change, the status of women and models of city form and development', p. 57.

Hayford, ‘The geography of women’.


Mackenzie and Rose, ‘Industrial change, the domestic economy and home life’, esp. p. 156.

McDowell, ‘Towards an understanding of the gender division of urban space’, p. 62.

Mackenzie and Rose, ‘Industrial change, the domestic economy and home life’, p. 170.


Johnson, ‘Gendering domestic space’, p. 23. Johnson did go on to suggest that the situation could be more acute for aboriginal and ethnic women because they tended to earn less than white women.

40 Hanson and Pratt, 'Reconceptualizing the links between home and work in urban geography', pp. 299–321.


44 Pratt and Hanson, 'Time, space and the occupational segregation of women', pp. 149–57.


47 J. Boys, 'Women and the designed environment: dealing with difference', *Built Environment*, 16 (1990), pp. 249–56. The geography of differences in the public/private distinction has been addressed by Little, who suggests that the distinction for women between the public and the private is stronger in rural areas of Britain: see J. Little, 'Feminist perspectives in rural geography: an introduction', *Journal of Rural Studies*, 2 (1986), pp. 1–8.

54 Johnson, ‘(Un)realist perspectives’.
58 McDowell, ‘The baby and the bathwater’.
61 Bowlby, Foord and McDowell, ‘The place of gender in locality studies’.
62 Lewis and Foord, ‘New towns and new gender relations in old industrial regions’. 
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65 L. McDowell and D. Massey, 'A woman's place?', in Geography Matters! A Reader, eds D. Massey and J. Allen (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984), pp. 128–47, p. 128. This assumes that capitalism and patriarchy are two different structures, in contrast to some of McDowell's other work.


71 Fincher, 'Class and gender relations in the local labor market and the local state'.


74 See S. Adler and J. Brenner, 'Gender and space: lesbians and gay


Feminists have seen the city both as a place of liberation and as a threatening environment. For some comments on the former, see E. Wilson, *The Sphinx and the City* (Virago, London, 1991).


Mackenzie, 'Restructuring the relations of work and life', p. 56.

84 Brownill and Halford, ‘Understanding women’s involvement in local politics’, p. 397.


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8 de Lauretis, Technologies of Gender, p. 25.


13 Grewal et al., *Charting the Journey*, p. 4.


23 See, for example, the essays in I. Diamond and L. Quinby, eds, *Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance* (Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1988). Kamuf's work is something of an exception here.


25 de Lauretis, 'Feminist studies/critical studies', p. 11.


30 I. M. Young, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist*
Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1990), p. 146.


35 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 135.


38 Young, Throwing Like a Girl.

39 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women, p. 196.


41 Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, pp. 7–8.

42 Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, p. 9.

43 Rich, Blood, Bread and Poetry, p. 211.


48 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 279.

49 P. Kamuf, ‘Penelope at work: interruption in A Room of One’s

50 Kamuf, ‘Penelope at work’, p. 158.

51 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 216.

52 See, for example, E. V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Beacon Press, Boston, 1988), p. 186.


54 Probyn, ‘This body which is not one’, pp. 119 and 120.

55 Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance, p. 264.


58 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 170.

59 Spelman rejects unequivocally the assumption in much feminism that middle-class white women are somehow only oppressed by patriarchy; see Spelman, Inessential Woman.


61 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 170.

62 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet.

63 Fuss, ‘Inside/Out’.


74 Quoted in Collins, Black Feminist Thought, p. 145.
77 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, p. 63.
81 hooks, Yearning, pp. 145–53. For an account from a working-class white woman on using the resources of the centre to remain on the margin and disrupt, see Angela, ‘Confinement’.
82 hooks, Yearning, p. 145.
83 hooks, Yearning, p. 145.
84 hooks, Yearning, p. 147.
85 hooks, Yearning, p. 147.
86 Pratt, ‘Identity’. For a very helpful commentary on Pratt’s work, see Martin and Mohanty, ‘Feminist politics’.
94 Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, p. 193.
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