

The background is a dark blue collage. On the left, there are numerous white line-art icons of various military assets: tanks, fighter jets, transport aircraft, and naval vessels. On the right, there are several triangular photo cutouts. The top triangle shows a missile launch with a large orange plume. The middle triangle shows a large aircraft carrier at sea. The bottom-left triangle shows a military truck. The bottom-middle triangle shows a large transport aircraft. The bottom-right triangle shows a soldier in camouflage gear.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

THE ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF
GLOBAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES
AND DEFENCE ECONOMICS

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Editor's Introduction

Two years into the coronavirus pandemic, armed forces across the world continue to support public health measures. This support is likely to persist if new COVID-19 variants emerge. Nonetheless, in 2021 many armed forces sought to resume activities that had been affected by the pandemic. Military training and exercises adapted to become COVID-secure, to the extent that was possible, and large-scale deployments resumed, such as the UK-led Carrier Strike Group 21. However, infection risks remained as armed forces grappled with introducing vaccinations and other preventive measures: COVID could still undermine operational readiness. At the same time, as in 2020, there was no reduction in conflict or confrontation. Heightened perceptions of great-power competition still motivated many countries' defence-planning considerations and influenced important procurement decisions.

Persistent conflicts remained unresolved. In Africa, France moved to reshape its involvement in the Sahel, focusing its military presence around the *Takuba* counter-terrorist mission, while elsewhere, war in Ethiopia and insurgency in Mozambique provoked concern. In the Middle East, wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen continued, even if a combination of fatigue and stalemate led to tentative de-escalation.

Middle Eastern states also awaited decisions on future US force dispositions. In 2021 the US withdrew missile-defence batteries, and the Biden administration has said it would 'right-size' the US regional presence. Specific details, however, remained scant in advance of the National Security Strategy, expected in 2022. Moreover, reports of the conclusions of the Global Posture Review contained little firm detail other than the ambition to develop a more robust presence in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. This was linked to the administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which said the US would end 'forever wars'.

Biden's election brought expectations for improved transatlantic ties. However, the manner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan – and the knowledge among European states that they lacked the military capability to do anything but follow Washington's decision – dampened hopes for a strengthened relationship, particularly when viewed alongside the diplomatic fallout in Europe from the announcement in September of the AUKUS arrangement. Despite unifying rhetoric, European allies were still expected to do more for their own defence. It is likely that this will be reflected in NATO's new Strategic Concept and in the EU's so-called 'Strategic Compass'.

Defence spending

Nonetheless, it is clear that European states have turned a corner in terms of their defence spending, since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent military intervention in eastern Ukraine upended the continent's security landscape. In 2021, European defence spending grew by 4.8% in real terms, more than in any other region. This marked the seventh

consecutive year of real-terms growth. The 2021 increase, combined with reduced spending in other regions, means that European spending represented 18.7% of the global total, after hovering between 16.5% and 17% annually since 2014.

The continued upward trajectory of European defence spending reflects sharpened threat perceptions. Moreover, this higher European spending is adjusted for inflation; elsewhere, surging inflation has reduced the effect of nominal defence-budget increases. Indeed, while global spending rose again in 2021, reaching USD1.92 trillion – 3.4% higher than in 2020 – inflation in all regions meant this amounted to a 1.8% reduction in real terms. There were real-terms spending contractions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa and in Russia and Eurasia, even though nominal increases were evident across most regions. In real terms, spending in Latin America – largely insulated from any major threat – is at the same level as in 2009. Meanwhile, economic constraints in sub-Saharan Africa have continued to subdue defence expenditure. In real terms, the region's spending in 2021 is the same as it was in 2012. If inflation continues to rise, it may increase pressure on defence budgets.

Defence spending in Asia has proven resilient, and there is little evidence that the pandemic has derailed planned defence investments. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021, with its defence budget of USD207bn supporting Beijing's military modernisation. Our budget projections indicate that, if current trends continue, China's official budget could reach just under USD270bn by 2030.

China and Russia

The public revelation that China was probably pursuing a significant expansion of its nuclear forces highlighted the breadth and scale of ambition underlying its military modernisation.

China's naval transformation has in recent years been remarkable and rapid by any measure. Fully developing the capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy will, however, require further investments, not least in training. Nonetheless, the navy may be at an important stage in its force development. China's shipbuilding output remains prodigious. Near-seas capability has been strengthened, with 72 Type-056/056A corvettes commissioned into service since 2012. But the commissioning of the first Type-075 large aviation-capable amphibious assault ship, continued aircraft-carrier development and the commissioning of a growing number of frigates and destroyers reflect determined efforts to develop a blue-water navy. In late April, in the presence of President Xi Jinping, the navy simultaneously commissioned its third Type-055 cruiser, a Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine and the amphibious assault ship.

Importantly, as well as commissioning new vessels, the retirement of legacy platforms continued. The last Type-053H1 frigate in service is likely to decommission soon. Meanwhile, China's Coast Guard is an important component of a three-layered maritime strategy alongside the navy and the maritime militia. The introduction of two 12,000+-tonne *Zhaotou*-class cutters was particularly noteworthy; these are the largest such coast guard vessels in the world.

The PLA Air Force has continued to exercise its capabilities, including close to Taiwan. From January to November 2021, the PLA conducted 230 incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone. Over 800 aircraft were employed, including fighters, bombers and also special mission types, particularly KQ-200 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, as well as ASW and army attack helicopters. Meanwhile, the appearance of China's Y-20 transport aircraft in a tanker variant indicated not only that the days of the ageing H-6U may be numbered in that role, but also that China may soon possess a more modern means of refuelling its aircraft and extending their range over the South China Sea. The scale and quality of the air force's re-equipment programme is concerning other air forces in the region (notably India, Japan and Taiwan) and also making it a credible peer-level threat to US forces. Beijing is also offering for export increasingly capable combat aircraft, uninhabited aerial vehicles and guided weapons, such as the PL-15 (CH-AA-10) medium- to long-range air-to-air missile – which only entered PLA service in 2018.

In late 2021, attention again focused on Russia's build-up of forces near the border with Ukraine. The November build-up once more highlighted not just the military units Moscow could mobilise and deploy, but also the supporting civilian and military infrastructure that enabled this. The navy continued testing 3M22 *Tsirkon* sea-launched hypersonic missiles, with the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the *Yasen* (Project 885) vessel *Severodvinsk*, in October. The first serial-production *Tsirkon* weapons are scheduled to enter service in 2022. The Aerospace Forces have begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 *Fullback* bombers, but other air force re-equipment was limited: service entry for the Su-57 *Felon* remains some way off, while the new *Checkmate* combat aircraft concept is perhaps intended more for export. Meanwhile, Russia has looked to introduce upgraded capabilities in various locations, including in the Arctic and the Far East.

Regional reactions

It is clear that concern over Chinese and Russian military developments is driving regional as well as wider international military developments. In Europe, there is continued focus on improving combat air capabilities as well as air-defence and rocket artillery, while there is growing attention on countering the non-military tools that Russia employs as part of its overall strategy. These worries are also driving closer cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states that are particularly concerned by Russia's activity, notably Finland, Sweden and Ukraine.

In Asia, China's military modernisation provides a lens through which to examine regional states' defence poli-

cies and capability development programmes. Much attention has focused on PLA activity near Taiwan, but Southeast Asian countries are also feeling Chinese military pressure. Indonesia's government and armed forces have become increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands, while Malaysia's government issued a tender for a new long-range air surveillance radar a month after its air force intercepted a formation of PLA transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak State in May. Meanwhile, Japan is strengthening its military capabilities: it will acquire F-35Bs and its *Izumo* helicopter carriers will be modified to operate these aircraft.

In contrast to Europe, there is no multilateral alliance framework in Asia, so states there have used bilateral or mini-lateral groupings to support their security and defence efforts. An example is the AUKUS partnership, signed by Australia, the UK and US in September, which while initially concerned with helping Australia develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability is also intended to promote deeper collaboration between its three members on cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and 'additional undersea' capabilities. However, effective military cooperation also depends on a range of often unheralded bilateral agreements, for instance relating to military logistics support and intelligence sharing.

Technological change

China's development of and integration of advanced defence technology continues at pace. US government officials reportedly expressed surprise at the level of technological sophistication evident in the August test of a hypersonic glide vehicle. China is, of course, not the only nation pursuing such technology. Russia's boost-glide *Avangard* system is already entering service and other nations, including the US, are developing new hypersonic systems. But Beijing is attempting to build an overarching integrated strategic structure in which the civilian, defence and national-security sectors are closely aligned and coordinated. In Western states, attempts at civil-military technology collaboration have run into problems. As the speed of technological change accelerates, and as states look to integrate into their defence capabilities emerging technologies like AI and machine learning, it will be important for states in the West to tackle this issue. NATO is seeking to do so with its Defence Innovation Accelerator, but this will probably still rely on national pledges to the innovation fund, making effectiveness dependent on national priorities. At the same time, adopting more complex capabilities also risks creating vulnerability, for instance to adversaries targeting the systems on which networked armed forces depend. It also has the potential to complicate military cooperation, if not all members of an alliance can afford to keep up. Plans for increased Western military deployments to the Asia-Pacific will exacerbate these issues. The US may be able to afford to meet these tasks and to modernise its armed forces while facing challenges from China as well as Russia, but the same is not true of other Western or like-minded states. Moreover, the problem of managing these demands will only become more acute as long-term 'strategic competition' replaces 'forever wars' in the lexicon.

Chapter One

Domain trends

Defence economics

- Global defence expenditure reached USD1.92 trillion in 2021, 3.4% higher than 2020 levels. However, surging inflation in all regions meant this amounted to a 1.8% reduction in real terms. If inflation continues to increase, this will put pressure on defence budgets as factor-input costs increase, while military personnel may call for higher wages to keep pace with cost-of-living increases.
- In 2020, the United States was the primary driver of global defence-spending growth. However, US defence-budget authority fell to USD754bn in 2021, from USD775bn in 2020. Inflation rose from 3.1% to 6.4% in 2021, which meant that the budget contracted by 6% in real terms.
- High inflation rates also resulted in real spending contractions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Russia and Eurasia, even though nominal increases were evident across most regions. In real terms, Latin American spending is at the same level as in 2009. Meanwhile, economic constraints in sub-Saharan Africa have continued to subdue defence expenditure. In real terms, the region's spending in 2021 is the same as it was in 2012.
- Middle Eastern regional defence spending has been relatively stable in nominal terms, but with rates of inflation averaging 6.9% annually (and in some countries exceeding 30%), there have been sizeable real-terms reductions, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021.
- Defence budgets in Asia have proved resilient, despite a constrained fiscal backdrop, and there is little evidence that the coronavirus pandemic has derailed planned defence investments. Regional spending growth slowed in 2020 and 2021, down to 3.4% and 2.8% respectively from 5.3% in 2019 in real terms, but only a few countries implemented cuts, with others choosing instead to rein in spending plans. With a defence budget of USD207bn, China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn.
- In 2021, European defence spending grew by 4.8% in real terms, higher than in any other region. This marked the seventh consecutive year of real-terms growth. The 2021 increase, combined with reduced spending in other regions, means that European spending represented 18.7% of the global total after hovering between 16.5% and 17% annually since 2014.

Land

- The proliferation of more precise and longer-range fire-support capabilities will continue to complicate ground manoeuvre at both the tactical and operational levels. While some armed forces are increasing their investments in both kinetic and non-kinetic defensive systems and countermeasures, their relative cost is likely to limit availability in the near term, leaving armed forces at risk of being overwhelmed by larger quantities of cheaper offensive systems.
- The use of civilian-transport and logistics-support capabilities in Chinese exercises and Russian readiness drills in 2021 illustrates the key role such assets can be expected to play in any large-scale conflict between peer adversaries. Even countries that have invested in substantial military-transport and logistics equipment inventories, such as China and the United States, would still be dependent on non-military capacity to mobilise, deploy and sustain forces in the required quantities.
- Military capacity-building in fragile states remains a challenging concept, particularly under fraught political conditions, as illustrated by the rapid collapse of the Afghan security forces. Nonetheless, demand for such external assistance continues to grow, particularly in states facing significant challenges from armed non-state actors, such as Mozambique. This has led to a proliferation of different actors and approaches, often with competing ideas about the objectives of such capacity-building.

Maritime

- The importance and challenges of the underwater battlespace continue to grow, as do investments in subsurface capabilities. This was underlined by the September 2021 AUKUS partnership, under which Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will work together to develop nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for the Royal Australian Navy. Meanwhile, the UK also announced contracts in September for early design work on its next-generation SSN; South Korea commissioned a conventionally powered boat capable of launching ballistic missiles; NATO members continue to enhance submarine and anti-submarine warfare training; and Germany confirmed in June an order of five P-8A *Poseidon* maritime-patrol aircraft.
- The US and some of its major allies and partners are engaging in increasing numbers of complex, often multinational naval task group exercises, chiefly but not exclusively in the Indo-Pacific, to hone skills for operating in high-intensity peer or near-peer scenarios.
- There is a growing focus on hybrid or 'grey zone' threats in the maritime domain, challenging naval forces in terms of capabilities and doctrine. They must also balance the competing deployment requirements of more aggregated capabilities for high-end tasks and those for a more dispersed presence. This has led to an increase in forward-deployment patterns among some naval forces, as well as moves towards

coordinated deployments and shared maritime-domain awareness.

- Navies are continuing to balance increasing capability requirements for high-intensity warfare (including increased magazine provision) with the demand for greater affordability to maintain or increase hull numbers for presence and lower-end maritime-security missions. Germany and Italy will

likely join the group of states procuring 10,000-tonne-plus principal surface combatants, while next-generation UK and US destroyers could also be in that class or, in the UK's case, perhaps within a dispersed system of systems. Meanwhile, the UK is pursuing the more affordable Type-31 and Type-32 designs, while France, Greece, Italy and Spain are leading the European Patrol Corvette programme.

Aerospace

- Range and speed are of heightened importance for peer and near-peer powers looking to their next generation of aircraft and weapons. The US focus on the Indo-Pacific places a premium on both. The geography of the region favours longer-range combat aircraft, given the likely mission radius required for operations there. Extended-range weapons will allow for greater stand-off, while increased speed will reduce the time from launch to target. Washington, however, is not alone in pursuing such goals, with Beijing and Moscow developing high-speed land-attack and anti-ship missiles.
- Air forces continued to struggle with balancing the cost of quality with the growing demand for quantity. The re-emergence of the risk of peer or near-peer state-on-state warfare, and the associated consequence of high attrition rates, is focusing attention on combat aircraft numbers and how they could be supplemented. Crewed-uninhabited teaming, and uninhabited systems more broadly, are emerging as ways to supplement combat-aircraft fleet numbers and reduce the potential attrition rate of crewed platforms in high-threat environments.
- Comparatively low-cost armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly being adopted to supplement more

traditional airpower. China and Turkey are emerging as leaders in addressing this market. The corollary is that there is a further increase in efforts to develop detection and engagement systems to defeat armed UAVs. Uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) research and development is ongoing in several countries, with India the latest to begin flight tests of its design as part of the *Ghatak* UCAV programme. Russia and China also have UCAV flight vehicles in test.

- The weaponisation of space continues in parallel with efforts to curtail or manage this. China, Russia and the US are developing a variety of counter-space systems. Middle powers are also bolstering their space capabilities. France, having established a space command in 2019, carried out its first satellite-defence exercise, *AsterX*, in March 2021. The United Kingdom and Germany created space commands in April and July 2021 respectively.
- Air forces remain worried about platform survivability, principally that of enablers including tankers, early warning aircraft and large UAVs, which are vulnerable even at long range to some air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles currently in development. Concerns over runway vulnerability have also re-emerged, with more air forces now conducting training in dispersed operations for their combat-aircraft fleets.




Cyber

- Defence policymakers are now coming to terms with the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on all aspects of military and intelligence operations. Advanced military powers are increasingly seeking cyber capabilities supported by narrow artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) for both defensive and offensive operations. The use of narrow AI/ML is confined mostly to standardising secure data collection, as well as network mapping and incident detection, although AI/ML-supported cyber tools are being slowly introduced alongside investments in zero-trust and cloud network architectures. This is leading military powers to concentrate on increasing numbers of AI-literate personnel. A deficit in governmental AI talents is increasingly seen as a key challenge to using these technologies for enhanced national-security purposes.
- Efforts are continuing among leading military powers to connect weapons systems, platforms, information infrastructure, and other devices in the Internet of Military Things (IoMT). There is also an ongoing push towards integrating electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are interlinked because the IoMT primarily relies on radio frequency pathways for connectivity. US Cyber Command has expressed a demand for radio-

frequency-enabled cyber tools for operations at the tactical level.


- Defence budgets are reflecting a new priority to expand military cyber forces and provision for commissioning external providers for specific cyber operations. This is being driven in part by military needs but also by growing concern that civilian cyber-defence mechanisms are inadequate by themselves to protect national critical infrastructure – both in wartime and peacetime.
- Trends towards multi-domain integration and multi-domain operations (MDO) are continuing. However, MDO concepts, the integration of capabilities, and the synchronisation of operations and fires across all domains are imposing new demands on military information and communications systems, requiring investments that perhaps only some countries will be able to meet. As part of overall MDO efforts, Australia, the UK and the US are increasingly experimenting with the integration of narrow AI/ML as part of their tactical suites. A major concern remains to what degree such command and control capabilities (and MDO) will be feasible in a degraded operational environment.

Defence budgets and expenditure




† At current prices and exchange rates

Real global defence-spending changes by region, 2019–21*




* Excludes states for which insufficient data is available

2021 regional defence spending, growth (%) and % GDP




Note: Chart compares regional defence spending totals (size of circle) in 2021, the real growth in 2021 spending compared to 2020 levels (x-axis), and defence as % of GDP average allocations (y-axis) in 2021. Please note growth rates are in real terms and will therefore reflect the higher rates of inflation globally in 2021. The North America drop in 2021 is the result of a return to trend budget level in the US following a surge in 2020 evident in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and military construction account of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.

Composition of real defence-spending increases 2020–21†




Composition of real defence-spending reductions 2020–21†



Tracked self-propelled artillery: selected current and next-generation systems

Self-propelled artillery systems provide mobile indirect firepower to support many armoured and mechanised manoeuvre formations. They also provide several important benefits over towed systems. For example, they can move under their own power to firing positions and they take less time to prepare for firing or for repositioning, which is intended to increase survivability against counter-battery fire. A number of nations are pursuing improvements to tracked and armoured self-propelled systems. These are designed for tactical mobility on unprepared ground, benefiting from a level of protection that enables close liaison with armoured units. That said, they may have a larger logistic


footprint than wheeled self-propelled artillery systems, which offer greater mobility on roads. Current and next-generation tracked systems are focused on achieving longer ranges and higher rates of fire. Developments in computerised fire control and automated gun laying also allows many systems to perform Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) fire missions. An increased rate of fire allows fire missions to be conducted more rapidly, enabling faster repositioning before counter-battery fire can be effectively brought to bear. Most self-propelled artillery systems – both wheeled and tracked – are also capable of firing precision guided shells, enabling greater accuracy at long range.



PzH 2000

Key features


- Entered service in 2008
- 56 tonnes
- 5 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 155mm L52
- Range:**
 - Standard round – 30 km
 - Base bleed round – 47 km
 - Rocket-assisted round – 60 km
- Rate of fire**
 - 10 rounds per minute
 - 5 round MRSI



M109A7

Key features


- Entered service in 2015, based on 1960s design
- 38 tonnes
- 4 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 155mm L39
- Range:**
 - Standard round – 24 km
 - Rocket-assisted round – 30 km+
- Rate of fire**
 - 4 rounds per minute



K9

Key features


- Entered service in 1999
- 47 tonnes
- 5 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 153mm L52
- Range:**
 - Standard round – 30 km
 - Base bleed round – 40 km
 - Rocket-assisted round – 50 km
- Rate of fire**
 - 6–8 rounds per minute
 - 3 round MRSI



2S19M2 Msta-SM

Key features

- Entered service c. 2013
- 43 tonnes
- 5 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 152mm L48
- Range:**
 - Standard round – 25 km
 - Rocket-assisted round – 29 km
- Rate of fire**
 - 10 rounds per minute
 - 4 round MRSI




M1299 Extended-Range Cannon Artillery

Key features

- Developmental
- Weight n.k. but the programme aims to maintain 'the weight found in current systems'
- 4 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 155mm L58
- Range:**
 - Rocket-assisted round – 70 km
- Rate of fire**
 - 4 rounds per minute
 - There are future plans to add an autoloader, which will significantly increase the rate of fire.
 - MRSI

The Extended-Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) is in development to replace the US Army's older M109 systems. Based on the M109A6 Paladin Integrated Management chassis, ERCA aims to achieve a range of 70 km through a combination of its longer 58 calibre armament and higher-energy propellant charges.



2S35 Koalitsiya-SV

Key features

- Entered service for testing in 2020
- Estimated 48 tonnes
- 3 crewmembers
- Armament:**
 - 152mm L52
- Range:**
 - Base bleed round – 29 km
 - Rocket-assisted round – 70 km
- Rate of fire**
 - Approximately 16 rounds per minute claimed
 - MRSI

Koalitsiya is beginning to enter service as the Russian army's next-generation self-propelled artillery system. A high level of automation allows for a faster rate of fire, and Russian sources claim a maximum range in excess of 70 km when using rocket-assisted ammunition.

Amphibious ship programmes and capabilities

China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has filled a major gap in its amphibious warfare inventory with the arrival of the Type-075 (*Yuzhen*) large aviation-capable amphibious assault ships with a floodable well-deck (LHD). Such vessels can transport and rapidly land a significant embarked force and its equipment. Because of the versatility of such platforms, a number of countries have recently invested in them, notably Australia, Egypt, France, South Korea and Spain. Italy and Turkey each have a new LHD nearing completion, Russia has begun building two and India has a long-standing requirement for up to four. Others have been acquiring Landing Platform Dock

(LPD) and Landing Ship Dock (LSD) vessels, designed to fulfil roles from amphibious power projection to strategic sealift and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), the latter seen as of particular strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific. For the PLAN, the Type-075 will reinforce its fleet of Type-071 (*Yuzhao*) LPDs, likely to be used for regional power projection, HADR, and to support Beijing's growing global interests. There are reports of a possible follow-on Type-076 LHD with enhanced aviation facilities. The United States still maintains the most sizeable fleet of large amphibious vessels but is also considering a new class of light amphibious warships (LAWs) for dispersed operations.

Wasp/America-class LHD/LHA
 ⚙️ 42,000–44,000 tonnes
 ⚙️ 23–29 aircraft/helicopters;
 1,687–1,800 troops
 ⚙️ US (9 + 1 in build)

Juan Carlos I-class LHD
 ⚙️ 21,500 tonnes
 ⚙️ 18 aircraft/helicopters; 900 troops
 ⚙️ Australia (2), Spain (1) and Turkey (1 in build)

Mistral-class LHD
 ⚙️ 21,500 tonnes
 ⚙️ 16 helicopters; 450 troops
 ⚙️ Egypt (2) and France (3)

Trieste-class LHD
 ⚙️ 36,000 tonnes
 ⚙️ 15 aircraft/helicopters; 600 troops
 ⚙️ Italy (1 on trials)

Dokdo-class LHD
 ⚙️ 19,000 tonnes
 ⚙️ 10 helicopters; 700 troops
 ⚙️ South Korea (2)


Type-075 (*Yuzhen*)-class LHD

⚙️ Full-load displacement: Est. 35,000 tonnes
 ⚙️ Capacity: Est. 28 helicopters; 800 troops
 ⚙️ Operator: China (1 + 2 on trials)

Design provides potential to accommodate future short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft in a light aircraft carrier role

24-cell Guided-Missile Launch System for HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) point-defence surface-to-air missile

H/P J-11 close-in weapons system




Full-length flight deck with seven spots for helicopter operations

H/P J-11 close-in weapons system


Floodable stern well deck for tank landing craft, air cushion vehicles and amphibious vehicles

Internal hangar and other facilities for helicopters, armoured vehicles and embarked troops

Principal amphibious ship inventories




Principal amphibious ship inventories: Asia



Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)

To support the US Marine Corps' vision of a more distributed and agile future operating concept including its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations model (chiefly intended to respond to a more contested operating environment and the challenge from China), the US Navy is seeking a new class of LAW of approximately 4,000 tonnes and with the capacity to


carry at least 75 marines and their equipment. A number of design concepts have already been produced. The US Navy would like 24–35 of such vessels. Judgements about the nature of the future operating environment will affect how navies operate and equip their LHDs, LPDs and LSDs in the future, and could generate a variety of new amphibious ship designs.



In-service or in-development bomber aircraft

Only a handful of nations continue to operate what are considered dedicated bomber aircraft. Two are the world's main nuclear powers, Russia and the US, while the third, China, is modernising and expanding its nuclear arsenal. All of the designs currently in service had nuclear weapons delivery as a core part of their role when conceived, and the same is likely true for those in development. Long-range bombers remain part of Moscow's and Washington's nuclear triad, while China is now at least on the brink of fielding the same capability. All three nations are also pursuing new bombers, with the US Northrop Grumman B-21 *Raider* most likely to be flown and introduced into service

first. The status of the Chinese Xian H-20 and the design, by Tupolev, to meet Russia's PAK DA future bomber requirement is less certain. Russia is also returning the Tu-160 *Blackjack* to production and upgrading the aircraft through its capacity to conduct the two programmes in parallel has been questioned. All of the new aircraft are assumed to be subsonic flying wing designs with low observable characteristics, for operating in contested airspace. At the same time, older designs like the B-52 continue in service with this latter aircraft increasingly envisaged as a stand-off weapons delivery platform.



LACM: land-attack cruise missile; *Selected type variants shown; ** nuclear and conventional LACM shown. First flight, Entry into service.

Defence intelligence

Maintaining relevance in the open-source era

Defence intelligence organisations are generally less well known than civilian, ostensibly more secretive, intelligence agencies. Whilst in recent years Russia's GRU has entered the public eye because of its involvement in the Salisbury poisonings in the United Kingdom in 2018 and other similar operations, it is less familiar than Russia's domestic-intelligence agency, the FSB. Similarly, there is more public awareness of the United States' CIA or the UK's MI5 or MI6 than the United States' Defense Intelligence Agency or the UK's Defence Intelligence. The same arguably holds true for these countries' signals intelligence agencies. Much less has been written about or by defence intelligence organisations, despite their work often underpinning the strategic intelligence insights that support decisions in defence ministries and at the highest levels of government, as well as their respective country's deep expertise on topics such as nuclear or chemical weapons.

Defence intelligence organisations should start with the advantage of being part of a system, within defence organisations, which is predisposed to require insights to support both policy and operational decisions. Armed forces and defence ministries turn to their 'J2' intelligence branch when they need information on, for instance, an adversary's order of battle or the capability of its weapons systems. Indeed, an intelligence division is as much a part of a standard military organisation as an operations or logistics branch. However, defence intelligence organisations are distinct from the intelligence sections found in military units, which provide tactical intelligence to support operations. That said, while not all will follow the same model (as, for instance, the GRU in light of the operation cited above), defence intelligence organisations nevertheless share similar functions, such as the oversight of or responsibility for intelligence collection from military sensors (for example, on aircraft or ships), and the provision of analysis to support decision-making at the defence ministry level.

The growth of 'open source'

Relevance is a perennial problem for any intelligence body. There is a risk that if it is not providing insights

or contributing to the thinking of decision-makers, its value will be questioned and it may be sidelined and have its level of funding reviewed (perhaps under the guise of an administrative reorganisation). At any time, but perhaps more so today than before, such organisations are faced with competing sources of information, ranging from domestic and foreign newspapers, magazines and journals and the output of think tanks to personal contacts, special advisers and meetings with foreign leaders. Accordingly, it may be tempting for ministers, senior civilian officials and military officers to question what extra value their intelligence organisation can offer. However, 'open source' (often referred to as 'publicly available') information is nothing new. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Vice Admiral Nelson's multilingual chaplain, and effectively his intelligence officer, would go through and summarise foreign newspapers and pamphlets. More recently, in the UK, a key conclusion of the Franks Report on the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 focused on open-source material:

The aim should be to ensure that the assessments staff are able to take fully into account both relevant diplomatic and political developments and foreign press treatment of sensitive foreign policy issues ... We consider that the assessment machinery should be reviewed ... [including] the arrangements for bringing to the Joint Intelligence Organisation's attention information other than intelligence reports.

A key difference in the current era is that so much more material is available and publicly accessible, alongside tools that can triage and analyse information to help citizen analysts make sense of it. During the Cold War, access to satellite imagery was highly sensitive and restricted to those with the highest security clearances. Today, clear and detailed satellite imagery of any place in the world is open to all, in what has been called 'the democratisation of information'. Crowd-sourced, academic and think-tank-driven projects have made remarkable discoveries and contributed analysis to issues ranging from the location of Chinese ICBM

silos to an image of a North Korean missile in flight. The investigation by Bellingcat, the Netherlands-based investigative-journalism website, into the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 – attributing it to a Russian missile launcher – is just one example of how ‘citizen journalists’ have used satellite imagery, together with photographs and videos taken by locals in the area. This poses a challenge to intelligence organisations, because they have to justify their added value, as well as the expense and risk involved in maintaining them and in collecting secret intelligence. With the possibility that leaders question the distinctiveness of their agencies’ intelligence assessments compared to what they themselves can find in the media or on the internet, defence intelligence organisations have to adapt to survive. However, there are means available that can help this process, including the same tools and techniques that appear to threaten these agencies’ previously unique position.

The data explosion

Figures vary, but a 2020 study by the US-based International Data Corporation reported that ‘the amount of data created over the next three years will be more than the data created over the past 30 years, and the world will create more than three times the data over the next five years than it did in the previous five’. This prediction may not translate precisely into the volume of data for defence and national security, but it is unlikely to be much different. The days when an analyst could file all the material on their subject in secure cabinets in their office are long past. It is impossible for human analysts to keep pace with such a rate of growth, even if money is no issue. Additionally, those inside government are constrained by high-security information technology (IT) systems designed to protect the most sensitive information, obtained at high cost and risk by their intelligence agencies. While those secret ‘nuggets’ ought to provide key insights that are not available to those in the unclassified world, they can be drowned out by the data that is publicly available.

Classified systems can also be limited in the ways they can present data in an attractive and accessible way and share it with customers. In this realm, much use has been made of text-based documents and PowerPoint presentations in hard copy or on secure office computers – a less attractive means of accessing and engaging with information compared to an interactive tablet computer at home. An additional

challenge for the intelligence analyst arises when information comes from a respected citizen-journalist body and appears more rapidly than a classified assessment. While long aware of the problem, defence intelligence organisations around the world have been slow to respond beyond limited steps – partly because changing IT in government is a slow process and partly because of a predilection amongst analysts for secret intelligence. Added to this is the complexity of exploiting material in multiple languages, some relatively obscure, and the need to teach analysts how to effectively exploit material on the internet and in social media.

The pace of events also presents a challenge and requires agility. Supporting deployed forces at a speed that can inform their decision-making cycle and at a classification that they can deal with combines all the issues highlighted above. In other words, what is the level of classification that the deployed unit’s systems can safely hold? If timely assessments are not delivered by their intelligence organisations, there is a risk that frustrated decision-makers may be tempted to turn to unfiltered news reports and social media.

Ways of adapting

Improved technology

While technological solutions are available, and some are already in use, intelligence assessment organisations have generally been slow in taking full advantage of new tools and technologies. To a degree, this can be explained by the time it takes to effect change within government IT infrastructures. This challenge has been recognised in the UK, with attention given to improving intelligence-related IT in the government’s ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ and the Defence Command Paper, both published in March 2021. The latter placed emphasis on regaining the technological lead over the UK’s adversaries, including implementing a ‘secure Digital Backbone’ linking different secure networks. It also suggested that to succeed in the modern environment, ‘open source intelligence, automation and AI [artificial intelligence] provide potentially game-changing ways to understand and counter these new challenges’. Automation and AI are not seen as supplanting analysts, with the ‘Integrated Review’ emphasising the need for ‘rigorous, independent assessment for effective national security policy-making’. But advanced IT tools – like those that can scour the internet, predigest material to present to the analyst and combine it in one place with other,

highly classified material – need to be delivered more rapidly than normal government IT projects. And they need to draw in innovative solutions from the private sector. At the same time, the increasing use of technology raises other issues that need to be addressed, including understanding how AI makes decisions and the ethics of allowing machines to make decisions, as well as deciding where and when humans should intervene.

Access and ethos

Technology, however, is not the only answer. Intelligence analysts have a unique advantage in that they can work alongside their customers; for instance, attending their meetings, listening to their problems and requirements and, as a result, responding in a tailored way. This relationship should be interactive. Meetings like these enable customers from policy and operations backgrounds to ask further questions; indeed, according to senior practitioners, these personnel have a responsibility to be questioning and demanding. It is important for clear priorities to be established, with each side holding the other to account for their contribution. This means that honest and robust discussions are needed from the early planning stage. While it is difficult to generalise, most military and civilian analysts work in government with a sense of public service, of service to their country, and not for profit or personal gain. They are accountable for their advice but have to work on the basis of providing the best advice that they can to the decision-maker without advocating any particular course of action. As a result, their advice may be unwelcome but – depending on the process followed in each country – it can be probed and questioned, and should be presented with clear statements about the degree of confidence analysts have in their judgements and about the alternatives that have been considered. This may lead to uncomfortable discussions; though in these cases, the decision-maker knows that the assessment they receive has not, for instance, come with an eye to a future contract or a desire not to upset the client.

The importance of training

However, there is a risk that the consumers of intelligence assessments may forget that these are not simply another ‘point of view’. In the Five Eyes intelligence assessment community (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US), there has been much emphasis in recent years on professionalising the business of intelligence assessment, particularly in

the light of lessons from the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks in the US and from the UK’s ‘dossier’ entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government’. For instance, analysts are better trained now than in the past to understand the advantages and limitations of different types of intelligence. They learn analytical techniques to help them to recognise and minimise biases and to be open to challenge. And they learn to make reasoned judgements and to be able to explain and justify them. Increasingly, formal training includes guidance on how to make the most of open source, such as using the tools available to them, conducting safe and effective searches and making judgements about the veracity of different sources, ranging from social media to scientific publications. But that training needs greater emphasis and weight in an analyst’s overall career development, and to be renewed and refreshed. It is also important that customers of intelligence assessments become demanding and critical consumers, and understand the product they are receiving and the process that has gone into its creation; this will help them to recognise that an all-source intelligence assessment is not simply an opinion.

Classified sources

Despite the emphasis on open sources, analysts within government continue to have access to confidential insights provided by diplomats and other government officials with relevant access, as well as classified material acquired by their intelligence agencies, sometimes from highly technical capacities. The exclusive nature of secret intelligence should be able to give analysts insights that are not available to those without access. The optimum combination should be to provide insights that can only be gained through the fusion at scale of both open source and classified information. However, the agencies that collect secret intelligence (and diplomats) need to be tasked effectively and need time to develop their sources and access, whether human or technical. This means that the process cannot necessarily be as agile as an analyst may need, especially in a developing crisis in an area not previously considered a priority. The analyst also needs to be able to recognise how best to address the problem they are trying to understand. It might be that open-source information is perfectly adequate to meet a particular requirement. But if this is the case, the analyst still has to use the analytical process to give it the same level of scrutiny and ‘added value’ as that given to secret sources. For these analysts,

to rely on open source, rather than classified intelligence, may not always be instinctive. It also requires collection agencies to focus on where they can make a difference, not to simply collect what might be regarded as 'low-hanging fruit'. This calls for clear prioritisation, emanating from the most senior policy/operational decision-makers, that feeds into collection and analysis. It also requires a close and open relationship between the collector and the analyst about where secret intelligence can make a real difference. Without that, agencies risk following the approach taken by Soviet agencies during the Cold War, when extracts gained from official publications or think tanks were stamped with a security classification and given the status of secret intelligence, whether or not they had originally come from the public domain.

Allies and burden-sharing

Defence intelligence organisations can also draw on the insights, sources, and challenge function that can be offered by their counterparts around the world. While the Five Eyes relationship may be the most enduring, trusting and deep, others can provide insights and local knowledge that add value and are worth investment, especially in their specific region, or where their armed forces are deployed on operations. In some countries, particularly where the armed forces are more prominent in government and the security apparatus, the defence intelligence relationship can be more important and valuable than that between the traditional civilian agencies. 'Burden-sharing' in the strict sense, where countries decide not to collect and instead rely on a partner country to do this, is more difficult than it may appear because governments are usually unwilling to sacrifice their own capacity to provide analysis. But it does happen in some areas and can be particularly valuable when an issue or crisis arises in a place that is normally a low priority – especially when they know they can rely on the analysis of their counterparts.

Developing genuine all-source analysis

If analysts are to develop the best all-source analysis, this also means that the security and classification of material need to be addressed. Security can stifle engagement with experts in academia and think tanks, and particularly with those 'citizen analysts' whose contributions should be part of a genuine all-source process; the latter especially may be unfamiliar to agencies. This places a premium on the regular review of security systems and processes to ensure

that they are not self-defeating. While security is essential to protect sensitive material and the means by which it was acquired, it also gets in the way of making intelligence useful and sharing it with those who need it most. For instance, intelligence insights are not just for senior decision-makers in secure locations, but for troops deployed in challenging environments, perhaps with limited communications bandwidth. Moreover, in the face of pressure for increased openness, and with greater value placed on countering disinformation, defence intelligence organisations – like other members of the intelligence community – will need to consider either their conclusions can be made publicly available, whether on an ad hoc or regular basis. There will, therefore, always need to be pressure on the classification process so that intelligence becomes more accessible.

Intelligence analysts have always had a challenging task: they are working in an environment that can be fast-moving and where they can have significant gaps in their knowledge. Yet decision-makers want immediate answers with a degree of certainty that the analyst cannot generally provide. The vast increase in data of all types is both an asset – it can give insights only previously available through secret intelligence – and a huge challenge if it is to be assimilated and used to advantage. And there is always a requirement to be relevant and timely or risk obsolescence. There is a greater chance that this task can be achieved by analysts who are able to work closely with their customers and have the ability to fuse secret and open sources of information in order to create an all-source assessment that is tailored, objective and non-partisan. But this needs to be paired with a continued desire to improve, including incorporating new tools and techniques. Those tools, IT and training exist and could help the analyst in their work. In the UK, the government's 'Integrated Review' recognised the importance of delivering on these issues if decision-makers are to retain an advantage over their adversaries. But this issue is not one for the UK and its close allies and partners alone. With information increasingly ubiquitous, crossing national borders and challenging previous definitions of classification, similar concerns over how to cope with the rise of open-source data and analysis face defence intelligence organisations around the world. Those in closed regimes, who might regard open source as more of a threat than an opportunity, and perhaps with analysts who are encouraged to 'toe the line' and are actively discouraged from providing challenging assessments, may find it harder to adapt.

Simulation and defence

Training benefits and trends

Simulation has become progressively more important to military forces, defence industry and defence organisations. Its utility is being seen in training and mission preparation and other key defence activities, including experimentation, concept development, and equipment design, manufacturing, testing and support. Although computer-based simulation or synthetic environments have supported armed forces since the latter half of the twentieth century, contemporary advances in technologies, such as the internet, artificial intelligence (AI), gaming and eXtended Reality (XR) systems, are increasing the practical and potential utility of simulation technologies. Whatever use is intended for them, simulations imitate the real world over time and are intended to help the armed forces, government and defence industry to prepare for the future and enhance their readiness. However, while simulations are often seen as driven by computers, this does not necessarily need to be the case, and some live exercises or paper-based war games may require no or only limited computer support.

Although simulation is used across defence organisations, analysts suggest that it is not often managed strategically, with piecemeal procurement and support leading to duplicative investments (for example, acquiring multiple terrain databases) and to reduced interoperability between systems and the data that they rely on. Simulation is an approximation or an estimate and cannot completely replicate the real world, as the models it employs may not be accurate and variables may be unknown in advance. Further, important real-world physical and psychological effects may not be faithfully replicated in simulation, reducing its training benefit or, in the worst case, leading to ‘negative training’, where incorrect information or invalid concepts are unintentionally introduced or acquired. Nevertheless, the saying that ‘all but war is simulation’ remains common among simulation practitioners; that nothing can fully prepare personnel for the actual operational and physical environment.

Simulation and training

In its earliest days, simulation was used in training principally for safety reasons. Simulation supported

higher-risk activities such as pilot training; for example, instrument flying could safely be taught and practised in a simulator prior to taking to the air. Used from the early twentieth century, pilot-training devices like these transformed from largely mechanical to electrically powered devices by mid-century, before the widespread adoption of analogue then digital computers further improved their capability. Up until the 1990s, simulation was important particularly for pilot training, although it was also used in the maritime and land sectors. The cost of flying, as well as safety, were significant factors. In the 1990s, non-defence sectors, such as IT and gaming, began to influence military-simulator technology, moving it progressively away from bespoke and highly expensive technology to more commoditised hardware and software. This trend, together with more adaptable technology, has meant that simulation has become more affordable to training designers and providers for land, sea, air and space, and for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and cyber. Today, most training courses can be supported by simulation, in part or wholly.

Beyond safety and cost, simulation has other advantages to purely live training. Simulation is not weather dependent, so the risk of an exercise being cancelled or curtailed due to bad weather is minimised. Indeed, to a large extent, weather can be altered within the simulation to best reflect the training requirement and increase variety within training serials. Additional important benefits of simulation are that complexity can be introduced into training, and certain tactics and techniques can be practised – or novel capabilities introduced into exercises – which might be impracticable or carry security risks if conducted in a live environment. This is particularly relevant to the modern, networked, multi-domain battlespace, where many activities and capability effects can be simulated as part of training programmes. That said, one of the downsides of training in such a secure environment is that the training cannot readily be observed and thus has little of the deterrence or influence benefits that

come from more obviously 'advertising' capability developments or from training close to a border, with partners, or in another country. Live training can be instrumented to an extent, but simulations by their digital nature are data rich, which can make after-action reviews and debriefing additionally insightful and increase training value. Another benefit of simulation may be in helping armed forces to reduce their carbon footprint.

Live/synthetic balance

Armed forces around the world are considering the balance between live and synthetic training at a more strategic level. While simulation might have been previously considered on a case-by-case basis, military leaders are now pursuing broader defence-wide approaches to save resources and respond to environmental pressures. By making central investments in simulation research and technology, together with providing the necessary leadership and culture changes, those in charge of training systems seem to be demonstrating greater motivation to move more training from the live environment to simulation. The live/synthetic balance is not only a consideration of cost effectiveness. Platforms like the F-35 combat aircraft cannot easily train and test their full capabilities in the real world, not least for security reasons. Typically, the time spent in the aircraft versus the simulator is split at least 50/50, and the time spent in the simulator is only expected to grow. That said, armed forces ultimately conduct their missions in the live environment, and rather than simulation being seen as a direct competitor to live training, it is likely that this will not be a binary choice; in time, simulation will be a precursor and means to better prepare for live training – which in turn, although reduced, may be better utilised.

Simulation types

Training simulation systems reflect the diversity of military training; for instance, the years-long training for a warship captain, or firefighting training that must be delivered in volume. They are typically termed live, virtual or constructive (LVC). Live defines a simulation involving real people operating real systems and, for some training, it will be instrumented to enhance training and debriefing. Virtual describes a simulation involving real people operating simulated systems; the flight simulator is a typical example. A constructive simulation is one involving simulated people operating simulated systems, for example,

one that supports command-and-control training, where a live-training equivalent would be expensive for a relatively small training audience. Moreover, live, virtual and constructive simulations can be combined to provide a richer LVC-based training experience. For instance, the British Army's 'synthetic wrap' is intended to generate capabilities that are difficult to reproduce in live training, injecting into the training both real and synthetic forces and C4ISR feeds to enhance headquarters training. Similarly, a real pilot in a flight simulator can interact with a live land-training exercise, negating the need for flying. Such LVC-training capabilities can also generate useful data for improving both the lessons-learned process and analysis after the training is over. Mock battles at the United States' National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin demonstrated this functionality: when simulators and instrumentation were added to existing capabilities, they reportedly showed that attack helicopters on both sides were vulnerable to tank main armament, something that neither US armour nor army aviation personnel had anticipated.

Military-simulation specialists have worked for several decades to develop international simulation standards that permit such interoperability. As well as LVC interoperability, simulation standards also facilitate distributed simulation and training. One example is the US Air Force (USAF) Distributed Mission Operations Network, which since 1999 has enabled interoperability and training between dissimilar aircraft platforms located across the globe in a virtual environment. Moreover, broader networks are periodically established. The Swedish-led *Viking* exercise is another example. In a recent iteration, up to 2,600 participants, representing 24 countries and 33 organisations, were networked in order to enhance multinational and multifunctional cooperation in peace operations through distributed command-post exercises. Simulation-based training can now also be delivered to individuals and small teams over military networks or the internet using standard information-services technologies such as personal computers and mobile devices. Further, good levels of immersion can be achieved through today's off-the-shelf virtual reality (VR) headsets.

Fidelity

The realism of a training simulation, or its fidelity, is an important driver of a system's cost and complexity. Its definition can depend on the industrial sector but, for defence, it can be considered, as the UK MoD has

termed it, 'the necessary degree of correspondence between the training and operational environments'. Motion and vision are important aspects of simulation fidelity, but how the simulation responds to human input can also be critical to training. Motion is a cost driver because expensive systems are often required to generate motion features, although whether it is actually required can be based as much on precedent and human judgement as science. Visuals were a significant cost driver up to the late 1990s, as until then the technology behind computerised graphics was generally bespoke for the application. However, as gaming and wider IT technology have advanced, the relative cost has come down, for instance, as components such as graphics cards have become commoditised. Further, small domes (structures onto which simulations can be presented 'in the round' via projection) and XR systems are reducing the cost further. Ultimately, simulation design needs to be driven by training needs and, because of this, the highest levels of physical fidelity are not always required. Instead, good instructors and training design may be more critical in delivering the necessary 'psychological fidelity'.

International trends

Barriers to the adoption of simulation in training have traditionally been the change to culture and process required to transition from live training, as well as cost. However, as simulation has improved and become more cost-effective, it is now being exploited at all levels of training. This trend is being seen across the world, and also in countries with only modest defence budgets. Furthermore, pressures to reduce the cost and duration of training are progressively increasing adoption. Some current initiatives are looking to simulation and new processes to transform training; for instance, the USAF is introducing its Rebuilding the Forge (Reforge) Concept of Operations. This is looking to reduce the time by over a year between finishing undergraduate pilot training and assuming the position of a combat flight leader in an operational fighter. Reforge builds on the USAF's Pilot Training Next trials of VR-based simulation and redesigned courses, and will also involve AI tools to help identify student strengths and weaknesses. Likewise, the British Army is looking to make its collective training more challenging and to conduct training in more dynamic and complex environments (physical, virtual and cognitive) through its Collective Training Transformation Programme.

This programme will make greater use of virtual training with a paradigm shift to 'virtual before live', where training will be carried out in virtual simulation before going to live instrumented training. LVC-simulation systems will be routinely held and operated at the unit level, with all training data captured, analysed and exploited. The US Army's Synthetic Training Environment (STE) is similarly seeking to transform training through technology but also to enhance mission rehearsal in support of multi-domain operations. Full operational capability is planned for 2023 and it is planned to combine all LVC-training environments into a single STE, accessing One World Terrain software and data, which will be compatible with Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control architecture. Simulation has supported mission preparation before, but this has been mainly on a case-by-case basis – for instance, the NTC was turned into simulated Iraqi and Afghan provinces for the pre-tour training of US Army brigades. In contrast, STE is a US Army-wide initiative. The global exploitation of advanced simulation technology can be exemplified by China, which has established a pilot-training simulation centre that, according to reports, has reduced live training. Beyond pilot training, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is reported to be using VR simulators to train for naval pipeline maintenance and to have introduced VR-training simulation rooms for instruction in some areas, while the PLA Rocket Force is said by Chinese media sources to be using similar simulation technologies to practice missile launches.

Technological advances

Today's simulation systems have high-fidelity graphics and audio capabilities, principally leveraging advances in computer-gaming technology, and military leaders are now looking to other advances to improve the flexibility, accessibility and cost effectiveness of training. These fall into five broad categories: human interfaces; data and analytics; AI; networking and the cloud; and system convergence.

The most prominent human interfaces now are XR technologies. These encompass real-and-virtual combined environments, such as virtual and augmented reality (AR) as well as human machine interfaces. Fully immersive systems, such as VR, are now routinely used for military training. Mixed reality (MR) systems that blend the physical and digital worlds are also showing promise and may reduce the need for expensive simulator domes, or at

least support training when domes are not available. Their maturity can be illustrated by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency's recent approval of an MR-based helicopter simulator for (civil) pilot training. It is possible, meanwhile, that XR may develop to the extent that the distinction between live and virtual simulations becomes less relevant and creating a live/virtual blend may become increasingly viable. AR systems overlay virtual content onto the real world and are finding utility in training, for example the combination of manikins and AR overlays in medical training, and in operations, such as the US Army's development of its Integrated Visual Augmentation System.

Data and analytics can enable a more quantitative approach to training design and assessment. Indeed, technology trends are offering new opportunities. Data can be captured through wearables, eye-tracking and a variety of other sensors to provide improved feedback to trainees and instructors and to influence training design. At the 'enterprise' or headquarters level, such data can help to monitor the cost-effectiveness of training and training systems, enabling authorities to rebalance resources as necessary. The concept of linking digital replicas with real-world data, known as 'digital twins', has existed for some time, but it is becoming more mainstream with advances in digital technologies. The benefit for armed forces is that there will be a single source of data for simulations accessible across defence organisations, accurately and dynamically representing future operating environments and able to capture the whole life of operational systems, such as wear-and-tear over time.

AI will likely influence many areas of military training. It has the potential to accelerate the planning and preparation of training events, reduce the demand for human role players, support training data analytics, and support more realistic environments as well as human and team behaviour. Moreover, simulation can also assist in the training of the AI systems themselves, which will likely become more important as humans and machines increasingly operate together in the battlespace.

The networking of simulation systems allows training audiences to be expanded and geographically dispersed. It also offers the prospect of connecting to public or private cloud services, interacting with larger, more secure data sources, and reducing local-hardware requirements through streaming services. Although network bandwidth, latency, reliability

and security are all issues to be addressed, gaming is already moving in this direction and similar trends are anticipated in simulation. Wireless technologies, such as 5G, may also enable training establishments with currently poor fixed-line networks to benefit from simulation technologies in order to enhance their live and virtual training.

Specialists are now discussing the convergence of systems, where previously distinct simulation systems become more closely integrated and unified; for example, simulation systems may draw on a single source of data for a training scenario or forthcoming operation, or trainees and instructors will use the same user interface regardless of the system they are using for training. This convergence is still some way off, because of the number of legacy systems that need to be updated, but nonetheless, the adoption of open standards and consolidation in the wider technology sector will drive this trend. Moreover, it will not be restricted to simulation systems. For example, United States Special Operations Command is funding a simulation and training company to create a digital ecosystem that fuses data from a variety of sources and delivers a common operational picture. Indeed, some simulation specialists consider that the ultimate convergence may be in the form of the so-called metaverse: a future vision of the digital world that goes beyond today's internet, in which people socialise, work and play across multiple connected virtual domains, but remain socially and economically integrated with the physical world. This remains some way off, and it will likely be some time before defence establishments could themselves create such an environment, but it is apparent that some technology CEOs see the metaverse as the direction in which these developments may ultimately move.

Training and the pandemic

At the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, travel restrictions and base closures led many training events to be cancelled or scaled back. The reliance on civilian contractors for simulator operations and maintenance further contributed to disruption. However, the pandemic also led some military officials to more fully consider the power of distributed learning, training and connectivity. For instance, in the UK, the Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry, an Army Reserve light cavalry regiment, set up – under their own initiative – a distributed system based on existing military and gaming software so they could continue to train from their homes. Another, perhaps

unforeseen consequence of social distancing has been its impact on instructors who previously worked close to trainees, for example, within flight simulators. In such cases, instructors were moved outside the simulators but remained nearby. Moreover, some training centres started to include short online courses for their trainees, which had the benefit of allowing students to review subjects before attending practical training. But perhaps the greatest change is the realisation within the simulation and training community that capabilities previously seen as only desirable, such as remote training, could overnight become imperative. Trends that existed before the pandemic have rapidly accelerated.

Beyond training

Simulation is widely used in training and mission preparation but is also supporting a broad range of other defence activities. The UK MoD is funding a 'single synthetic environment', or digital replica of the country, to test resilience to natural disasters and attacks by hostile states. With geographical and critical infrastructure layers, the virtual 'twin' uses AI to simulate future scenarios and support the war gaming of responses. Meanwhile, the UK/Italy/Sweden sixth-generation fighter-jet collaboration, known as *Tempest* in the UK, has been put on a 'digital first' footing, whereby simulated design and testing are expected to significantly reduce costs, time and carbon emissions. In the field of AI, the environments within which new systems will operate can be simulated, and the resulting synthetic data used to train the system using machine learning. These digital twin approaches to defence planning and equipment design and acquisition are likely to become more important and main-

stream as technology advances, though issues of data ownership, financing and control will need to be addressed.

Future simulation

In the 1985 novel *Ender's Game*, the young protagonist learns how to fight and lead others in a training simulator, but what he is told is his last training exercise is in fact a real operation – one that he leads successfully. This is perhaps the ultimate simulation, one that accurately reflects the operational system such that the trainee(s) can seamlessly move from training to operations. *Ender's Game* is not just about such technology; it has other human characters who provide guidance and instruction to the protagonist and his comrades. As such, however good the simulation is and however capable AI becomes, the role of humans in instructing and inspiring trainees is unlikely to go away. Nevertheless, as simulation and training technologies advance and as training content becomes more ubiquitous, the trainees of today and tomorrow may look to instructors and other trainees more as mentors and collaborators, with training adapted to individual styles of learning. Decision-makers also need to consider a generation of new recruits who have predominantly grown up with digital technologies and gaming, the so-called Generations Z and A, who may have quite different views and needs regarding the best way for them to learn and train. It is possible that in the longer term, as today's recruits become decision-makers who have been immersed their whole lives in virtual worlds with seamless connectivity, simulation may be seen instinctively by them as an important means of helping to solve a raft of defence problems.

Military adaptation to climate change

Reducing emissions and maintaining military effectiveness

Climate change is an accelerator and multiplier of conflict risk. First-order physical effects of the changing climate include storms, floods, heat-waves and droughts. Second-order effects include degradation of water supplies, reduced agricultural productivity, and damage to infrastructure and disruption to energy generation, with all these having potential consequences for economies and employment. These changes could increase migration and forced displacement, adding challenges to stressed governance systems that could in turn increase grievances, weaken the social compact and contribute to political instability. In late 2021, the United States National Intelligence Council published an assessment referencing many of these challenges, also raising the possibility that competition and disputes may grow as states look to acquire technologies and resources needed to assist their adaptation to renewable energy sources or carbon reduction.

These trends are likely to increase the requirement to deploy military forces for humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief missions, both at home and abroad. They will also increase the demand for a range of peacekeeping, stabilisation and combat missions. Furthermore, climate change has the potential to affect global trade patterns, for instance by opening up waterways in previously ice-bound regions, which might lead some states to adjust their overseas deployments. The radius of action and frequency of international military operations may increase as a result. With current military equipment, this would increase military greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Mitigating the impact of climate change on military effectiveness

Military operations will be increasingly affected by climate change. This is not only because it may make planning and executing operations more complex, but also because armed forces will need to adapt their equipment capabilities for operations in warming and variable climates. For example, as polar ice melts, it is possible that ice floes may fragment more than before, creating challenges for ships and possibly requiring extra hull strengthening to enable safe operations in

previously ice-free areas. Further south, the likely rise in summer temperatures in the Gulf will increasingly strain the performance of people, radios, aircraft and warship engine-cooling systems; changes in water temperature and salinity will affect underwater operations; while there may also be effects on sensor and weapons performance. Moreover, ameliorating these problems can bring unhelpful secondary effects. For example, fitting additional cooling systems, as these are currently designed, will increase GHG emissions.

Climate change will have negative effects on military bases and infrastructure. Ports and other coastal installations will be threatened by rising sea levels from unpredictable weather events, while rising temperatures may require longer runways. Some of these risks can be alleviated by physical defences, but it is possible that some bases will have to be abandoned. Similarly, a growing threat of fires on increasingly arid military-training areas and ranges will require mitigation.

The armed forces and decarbonisation

These trends raise the question of what actions armed forces and defence establishments might undertake to reduce their emissions and contribute to national sustainability targets. In the 2015 Paris Agreement, many nations committed to reducing carbon emissions to net zero by 2050. While many countries have made policy declarations to this effect, only a few have so far legislated to achieve this goal, including France and the United Kingdom. However, it is still up to each nation whether they include their military emissions in net-zero targets. Military emissions were exempt under the Kyoto Protocol and, while Paris eliminated that loophole, reporting on them remains voluntary. For states that include military emissions in their legal net-zero requirements, the question of reducing military emissions may be one of not 'when' or 'if', but 'how', although this is not the same for all. Moreover, much depends on how states actually report their emissions: pressure groups that aggregate military-related emissions data that is reported to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change assert that reporting remains partial.

Indeed, calculating military emissions remains an inexact science, something NATO hopes to address for the Alliance with its Climate Change and Security Action Plan.

Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that military facilities and equipment emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, with these rising as a consequence of increased use – for instance on operations. As one example, the UK Ministry of Defence assessed that in 2020 about 3.8 million tonnes of these gases were emitted by its forces. This was about half of all UK government emissions. If emissions by the UK defence supply chain were included, this figure rose to 5m tonnes.

Accepting these caveats on overall reporting, reducing emissions to a net total of zero by 2050 will nonetheless be a challenge for governments wishing to do so. The full spectrum of military activity, including travel and training, will need to adapt to reduce unnecessary emissions. Increasing the proportion of training in simulated environments would assist in this change. Military estates of barracks, docks, airfields and training areas offer opportunities to reduce emissions, such as through better insulation; to generate renewable energy, for instance by using solar power; and to capture carbon dioxide emissions, with planting trees one example. This could help offset military emissions elsewhere and may increase resilience by making bases more energy independent.

Decarbonising military equipment

Military equipment is currently optimised for military advantage, with little consideration of climate sustainability issues such as emissions reduction. Many planned future equipment acquisitions appear to continue in this mode. For nations that have committed to decarbonisation, the most difficult issue will be whether operational capability should be reduced to meet emissions targets, or whether priority should be given instead to protecting capabilities at the expense of emissions reductions. It is unlikely that politicians, citizens or armed forces will want decarbonisation to result in the loss of military capability.

On the other hand, adopting climate-adapted equipment could reduce emissions and might provide useful options for improving military effectiveness, operational capability and climate resilience. For example, increased use of uninhabited, robotic and autonomous systems would, by removing

human operators, reduce fuel consumption and thus emissions. Moreover, reducing fuel consumption and carbon emissions would increase the range and endurance of military platforms, thus expanding options for employment and reducing logistic dependency.

There is much research and development (R&D) underway in relevant civilian industries. Examples include increased use of electric vehicles, reducing aircraft fuel emissions and reducing the carbon footprint of shipping. In the medium term, advanced fuels and new sources of energy may further reduce emissions, but it is likely that some options will have limitations without significant technological progress. There are range and payload trade-offs to consider, for one thing. For example, it is probable that electrical propulsion would have utility for short-haul missions with aircraft carrying relatively light payloads, but be insufficient to power large aircraft or jet fighters.

However, notwithstanding the global diffusion and commercial availability of advanced technologies, progress in this area might still be faster among those states in the global ‘north’ that have the funds and technical capacity either in government or in the private sector to pursue or acquire them. Indeed, even in these states, the pace of private-sector development indicates that for many military capabilities, the best option will likely be ‘fast following’ of civilian R&D, applying new technologies to new-generation systems, but also to mid-life updates of in-service equipment.

Near-term steps

US President Joe Biden has identified climate change as a national-security issue, underscoring the growing impact it will have on US and allied armed forces from combat units to their support and logistics arms. The Pentagon has published an ambitious strategy for climate change adaptation and mitigation, paralleled by ongoing efforts in the US services to explore relevant technologies, such as the US Marine Corps developing more sustainable combat outposts and the US Army trialling electric drives for its vehicles. But the Pentagon has neither been set any hard targets to reduce emissions, nor imposed them on the four US services. In the UK, meanwhile, the MoD has issued a blueprint for addressing the environmental challenge as a consumer and emitter. Its leadership, including service chiefs, has publicly committed to achieving net zero by 2050.


Nonetheless, the fact remains that achieving net zero, for armed forces, largely remains dependent on national policy on emissions reporting. Moreover, few countries would find it politically feasible to agree to net-zero commitments if it constrained their ability to defend themselves. Indeed, the dilemma remains – for the states that do go down this route – of accepting risk, aware that some adversaries might not follow the same path and may instead focus on maintaining either legacy or new equipment that is emission-intensive but which they judge is necessary to secure military advantage. So, being a ‘first mover’ may

have its disadvantages. But perhaps there are also advantages, and faster transformation could occur if states are able to field climate-adapted equipment that increases military advantage in a progressively climate-changed world. The fact remains, however, that not all states will be able to, or may wish to, follow this path. For countries who are looking ahead at emission reduction targets, as well as the future threat landscape, the question of whether and how to include military emissions in their climate efforts, and navigating the potential political repercussions of these choices, is likely to become increasingly complicated.

North America

- While the US defence budget's USD715 billion top line constitutes an USD11.27bn increase on the enacted FY2021 US defence budget, the FY2022 budget request is essentially flat in real terms when adjusted for inflation. Reflecting the Pentagon's focus on the Indo-Pacific, the air force and navy budgets are set to increase, making up 52% of the top-line DoD budget in FY2022, up from 48% in the enacted FY21 budget.
- The US conducted its Global Posture Review during 2021. The Review was anticipated to reshape global United States military deployments, likely heralding reductions in all regions bar Europe and the Indo-Pacific, where there were to be increased infrastructure developments with a focus on survivability.
- The US army is recapitalising its mobile air defence. The first prototype M-SHORAD Increment 1 vehicles arrived in Germany in early 2021. Meanwhile, M-SHORAD Increment 2 is a directed-energy variant. Another project, the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2, is designed to tackle threats including from uninhabited aerial systems and cruise missiles.
- While uncertainty remains over plans to increase the size of the US navy's fleet, there has been consistent focus on an eventual fleet that is more distributed, with a shift in balance to smaller surface combatants and with significant numbers of uninhabited surface and underwater vehicles.
- The US air force's stated acquisition target of 1,763 F-35As is coming under scrutiny. F-15EX *Eagle* IIs are being bought to replace F-15Cs, and there was talk of restarting F-16 acquisition or even building a new successor. Meanwhile, a demonstrator for elements of the Next-Generation Air Dominance programme reportedly flew in 2021. In September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said that five B-21 bombers were in various states of production.
- Air transport and air refuelling remain essential to US expeditionary operations, as the evacuation from Afghanistan showed. This also highlighted the importance of overseas bases for logistical support. There are as yet no identified replacements for the C-17 or C-5M; a C-17 sustainment contract was awarded in late 2021.
- Canada and the US are building more icebreakers. Three new heavy icebreakers are being procured for the US Coast Guard, to be followed by three medium icebreakers. In June 2021, the Royal Canadian Navy commissioned the first of its six planned *Harry DeWolf*-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships.

United States, attack submarines 2014–21



■ SSN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine
 ■ SSGN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles

Active military personnel

(25,000 per unit)



US
1,395,350




Canada 66,500


Global total
19,605,000

7.5%
Regional total
1,461,850


US F-35 numbers, 2014–21




US heavy air transport and tankers, 2014–21




US cruisers, destroyers and frigates, 2014–21



US real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21



Canada real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21



North America

UNITED STATES

Defence policy

The Biden administration took office in January 2021. President Joe Biden pledged a wholesale overhaul of foreign policy, vowing to bring back professionalism, multilateralism, diplomacy and cooperation after the Trump presidency. The chaotic nature of the final withdrawal from Afghanistan cast some doubt on these goals, though Biden emphasised that he was following through on commitments made by his predecessor. Overall, on many other matters – including the defence budget, weapons acquisition, overseas basing and force deployments, and principal ideas for defence innovation – there had been only limited change as 2021 drew to a close.

This continuity is attributed by some to factors including bureaucratic inertia, the influence of the defence-industrial sector and congressional earmarks, as well as it being the administration's first year. But it also seems likely that there is strong bipartisan consensus around many of the ideas in the Trump administration's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which was drawn up during the term of the then-defence secretary James Mattis. That document, and the budgetary changes that accompanied it, were themselves in part inspired by the 'rebalance' in the Indo-Pacific and the 'Third Offset' of the Obama administration. These earlier initiatives placed a much greater emphasis on great-power competition, and deterrence, than had been the case under previous political and military thinking in the post-Cold War period.

Minor modifications, so far

The main change over the last half decade is arguably the approximate USD100 billion increase in the annual total defence budget – from the low USD600bn range in the late Obama years (2013–15) to the mid-USD700bn range in place since 2019. While this might mean that some of the goals set out in the 2018 NDS can be addressed, such as high-technology projects, the actual shift in relative priorities has been modest. It is generally easier for the Pentagon

to add new ideas, such as a greater emphasis on artificial intelligence, or research into boost-glide hypersonic vehicles, than to reduce emphasis on previous priorities. For instance, when discussing the military challenges posed by Russia and China, and how these states field new capabilities, the Future of Defense Task Force report, issued in 2020 by the House Armed Services Committee, stated (in reference to the Pentagon's acquisition system) that 'the current system is predisposed and incentivized to invest in incrementally better versions of existing legacy systems'.

The Biden administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (NSSG), issued in March 2021, ranged across themes including transnational threats like the coronavirus pandemic, strengthening America's democracy, 'building back better' at home and restoring alliance solidarity as much as it discussed specific defence priorities. Regarding the latter, those mentioned ranged from improving conditions for personnel and their families, enhancing force training and readiness, innovation and modernisation, the need to focus more on China and Russia, and ensuring cyber and climate resilience. Other priorities were to shift emphasis from 'unneeded legacy platforms' and the suggestion of a reduction in the overall US troop presence in the Middle East.

During the Trump administration, troop numbers in South Korea and Germany did not substantially change, despite the then-president's call to reduce numbers. Indeed, the period from 2014–21 produced a stronger US presence in Poland in particular, as NATO buttressed its position in front-line states. However, the withdrawal from Afghanistan indicated that more consequential change was likely.

The Interim NSSG clearly stated that 'the United States should not, and will not, engage in "forever wars"'. And the president was unrepentant in the wake of the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and the Ghani administration, stating that Washington was implementing agreements made by his predecessor. Moreover, as Biden said in a speech on 31 August, the decision concerning Afghanistan 'was not just about Afghanistan'; it was

also about ‘ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries’. The lessons were that ‘first, we must set missions with clear, achievable goals – not ones we’ll never reach. And second, we must stay clearly focused on the fundamental national security interest of the United States of America.’ If anything, this accorded with the Interim NSSG, which said that the US would ‘right-size’ its presence in the Middle East ‘to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests ... as we position ourselves to deter our adversaries and defend our interests ... our presence will be most robust in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.’ The US presence has been boosted in Europe, but there has been minimal change so far to the size or deployment patterns of the Indo-Pacific Command’s assets. Moreover, Afghanistan dominated the defence-policy debate in mid-2021, and it remains to be seen whether the nature of the final exit from that country, and its aftermath, will adjust thinking on future deployments, particularly in the Middle East. The Global Posture Review will set the scale and pattern of the future US military presence abroad, though there was little detail made public when the document was approved in November 2021.

Looking ahead

While in recent years there have been a number of new DoD documents and concepts, such as the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy document and the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative (related to the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept), so far this year there has generally only been minor modification to the armed forces’ size and structure. Exceptions include the creation of the US Space Force and the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) decision to give up main battle tanks as it seeks to develop a more agile and distributed force. Modernisation priorities such as the replacement of the nuclear triad, the army’s ‘big six’ priorities and the development of a new bomber, the B-21 *Raider*, remain on the agenda. But while continuity may have been the watchword so far, there may be more movement in 2022, as the Biden administration prepares its first comprehensive budget request (for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023), as well as its own formal defence strategy document, while the services further develop their own modernisation plans.

A key issue for the DoD is that while it is urged to refocus its plans and priorities and to innovate, reform and improve great-power deterrence, it has to meet

a range of demands, including its disparate global responsibilities. And while modernisation plans might herald ground-breaking capabilities, ‘legacy’ platforms will continue to arrive and established logistics enablers – like refuelling and transport aircraft – will remain key to future operations. Indeed, as the armed services look to reshape for future military operations and develop novel formations (such as the Space Force and the army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces) (MDTFs) – it remains the case that the force still has to focus on other areas: the army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades, for instance, are being adapted to align with Combatant Commands (a key reason underpinning these units is that they can free up Brigade Combat Teams for other operations). That said, as the Pentagon charts its course, a number of the initiatives from the final months of the Trump administration and the early period under Biden could be consequential in determining the direction of defence policy and procurement and future capability development. They include:

- The administration’s budget request for FY2022 (which will likely increase real resources by about 3%, as the 2018 NDS had advocated);
- Former secretary of defense Mark Esper’s late 2020 ‘Battle Force 2045’ proposal to raise the overall goal for the navy’s fleet size to at least 500 vessels, with a future fleet comprising a mix of uninhabited and crewed vessels;
- JADC2, which emphasises the construction of a survivable, inter-operable and fast-acting command-and-control network. Related service initiatives include Project Convergence (army), Project Overmatch (navy) and the Advanced Battle Management System (air force).
- Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s concept of ‘integrated deterrence’ which seeks to combine economic, diplomatic and allied instruments of foreign policy into an overall framework for handling China’s rise and deterring aggression.

This may constitute a significant departure in US security policy, particularly if it is carried through into the Biden administration’s future national-security strategy and security planning in Washington and allied capitals. As Austin said, when discussing the idea at an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore, ‘we’re


▼ Figure 1 US missile defence assets

By the end of 2020, around half of the US Army's long-range air- and missile-defence units were forward deployed in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. However, in early 2021, the army began a significant drawdown of its air- and missile-defence assets in the Middle East, reducing its overall footprint in the region by about two-thirds.

These moves will help relieve the immediate pressure on both crew training and equipment overhaul and maintenance, as well as offering the Pentagon greater flexibility in its planning, by recreating a sizeable 'contingency' force based in the United States that can be deployed in response to future operational demands. This strategy of emphasising a central reserve over forward-deployed forces offers its own

challenges, however. Transporting a notional battalion-sized force of *Patriot* and/or THAAD systems from the United States to Europe or Asia by air in a single lift would require the use of between 60 and 80 heavy transport aircraft, about a quarter of the total US inventory, at a time when these aircraft can be expected to be in high demand from other arms and services.

Using multiple sequential airlifts, or shipping these forces by sea, as the army has historically preferred to do, however, risks depriving operational commanders of these key defensive assets in advance of, or in the early stages of, hostilities, when the threat from hostile missile forces is likely to be at its greatest.



aiming to coordinate better, to network tighter, and to innovate faster. And we're working to ensure that our allies and partners have the capabilities, the capacities, and the information that they need.' The examples he quoted included cyber-defence cooperation with Singapore, more complex exercises, and the test (by US and Japanese forces) of the HIMARS artillery system in Japan. However, it will be important for Washington to ensure that concepts like integrated deterrence, as well as US actions (such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan) and relationships (like the AUKUS security partnership and that with the 'Quad' countries), are mutually reinforcing developments that also strengthen the US security posture and core alliances and are not disconnected, improvised policy developments.

US Army

The US army continues to adapt, based on the priorities identified in the Army Strategy and the National Military Strategy, both released in 2018, which highlight the re-emergence of great-power competition and the need to deter or defeat conventional attacks. The March 2021 Interim NSSG maintained this emphasis. The administration's new national security and military strategies are awaited not only to see if the army's current plans and priorities need to be modified, but also to gauge its share of the budget in relation to the other armed services given the continued focus on rebalancing the US defence establishment towards military challenges in the Indo-Pacific. At present the army is aiming to transition to an MDO-ready force under its AimPoint initiative for 2035. As part of this process, the army has set a 'Waypoint 2028–2029' to assess its progress towards the 2035 target and then reassess its assumptions and adjust as required.

Improving interoperability

Project Convergence, the army's series of annual experiments and exercises intended to improve joint inter-operability, is intended to help the army integrate into the JADC2 concept. The army's development of very long-range weapons under its Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) programme will rely heavily on the type of joint inter-operability that the JADC2 programme seeks to enable.

Modernisation

The LRPF programme remains the top priority among the army's six key modernisation areas,

although disagreement remains about how much and what type of very long-range fires capability the army needs in relation to the other services. The Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) programme (dubbed 'Dark Eagle') began delivering hardware in early 2021, with an initial battery planned to be operational with prototype equipment by 2023. While the army has been tight-lipped about the LRHW's capabilities, it was reportedly confirmed that its range is anticipated as being 'greater than 2,775 km'. At the other end of the army's range spectrum, the 1st Armored Division's 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment has started taking delivery of revised Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) platforms for operational testing. Coupling a longer 58-calibre gun with new rocket-assisted ammunition, ERCA aims to increase the maximum range of the army's current self-propelled artillery to 70 km. The service expects to have the first battalion of the XM1299 (Increment 1C) Improved Range variant fielded by 2023 and is working on an XM1299A1 (Increment 2) Increased Rate of Fire variant.

The army's Air Defense branch suffered cuts to both its force structure and its modernisation programmes during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in mobile systems designed to protect manoeuvre forces. The arrival of the first prototype M-SHORAD Increment 1 vehicles (based on a *Stryker* chassis fitted with *Stinger* and *Longbow Hellfire* missiles) with the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (5-4 ADA) in Germany in early 2021 marks the first step in renewing this capability, and the army currently plans on fielding ten battalion sets of M-SHORAD. In addition to the kinetic capabilities of the Increment 1 vehicles, the army is also looking at directed-energy capabilities, with an initial platoon of 50Kw-class laser-fitted vehicles planned for delivery in 2022 as part of M-SHORAD Increment 2. Another priority is the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 project, which is designed to tackle threats including from uninhabited aerial systems and cruise missiles. Two systems were reportedly tested against this requirement in early 2021: the Rafael and Raytheon bid of the *Iron Dome* system and *Tamir* interceptor and the Dynetics *Enduring Shield* variant of the army's Multi-Mission Launcher paired with Raytheon's AIM-9X *Sidewinder* missile. In September, the army officially announced it had selected Dynetics' offering. The eventual fate of the two *Iron Dome* batteries that had already been delivered as part of the testing

process for an interim cruise-missile solution remains unclear. IFPC work also has a directed-energy strand, with prototype platoons of 300Kw-class laser and high-powered microwave systems (respectively dubbed 'Valkyrie' and 'Thor') due for delivery by 2024 and intended to defend fixed sites.

Balancing between Europe and Asia

Emphasis on the Indo-Pacific in the recent strategic guidance has led the army to explore how it would contribute to operations in that region, and there is particular interest in establishing a role for its still-evolving very long-range fires capabilities. However, it remains unclear where those new fires units could be based, while there is equal importance in determining the army's role, alongside other services, in the event of a conflict in the region.

At the same time, there remains a need to deter possible Russian aggression in Europe. In mid-September, the 2nd MDTF was officially activated in the European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) whilst it was conducting its first exercise, in Norway, designed to test capabilities and tactics. Subsequently, the army's first (EUCOM-based) Theater Fires Command (TFC) was also activated in the EUCOM-AOR in November 2021. TFCs, part of the army's adaption for MDO, are intended to plan very long-range fires at the theatre level, while the brigade-sized MDTFs are intended to synchronise effects across domains, including traditional fires as well as space and cyber operations.

Broader equipment recapitalisation efforts are also proceeding, with an eye on EUCOM requirements. The EUCOM-based APS-2 (Army Prepositioned Stock 2) has nearly completed its expansion to two Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) sets, including some of the latest M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 variants and M109A7 Paladins. The pre-positioning of supplies and unit equipment is being expanded, including in Germany, the Netherlands and also at Powidz, in Poland. The Powidz APS-2 site is scheduled to be operational by 2024 at the latest.

The M1074 Joint Assault Bridge is being fielded after issues during testing were resolved; the bridge is reported to have a higher load-bearing capacity than its predecessor and to be able to support the new, heavier Abrams and Paladin variants. Meanwhile, deliveries of the Trophy Active Protection System were reported as complete in early 2021, though it is unclear whether any of the four ABCTs on which the army intends to field Trophy have yet integrated

the capability. The plan is that these ABCTs will pair Trophy-fitted M1A2 SEPv2 and SEPv3 Abrams with upgraded Bradley M2A4 IFVs for the EUCOM theatre; after some delay the first brigade is now scheduled to be equipped with the A4 Bradley in late 2022.

US Navy

The US Navy continues to grapple with questions over the size and structure of its future fleet, budget allocations and long-term shipbuilding plans, as well as how to integrate uninhabited systems into the fleet mix. Meanwhile, the force remains under stress from the current high operational tempo.

In December 2020, the navy, the USMC and the US Coast Guard (USCG) jointly unveiled a new maritime strategy 'Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power'. While it portrayed a maritime domain characterised by persistent competition from both China and Russia, the focus was on the former. It stressed integration of the services and the value of alliances and partnerships. As well as high-end combat capabilities, it set out a requirement for presence and for 'a more assertive posture' in routine operations to counter the incremental, grey-zone approaches of adversary states.

Driven by concern about the pace of Chinese maritime developments, the document also called for aggressive force modernisation and experimentation. US naval forces, it said, must 'boldly' modernise by creating a new 'balanced, hybrid fleet' of existing and new platforms, both crewed and uninhabited. US naval forces will divest themselves of legacy capabilities, it said, and there would be a new mix between larger platforms and smaller, more affordable ones. Future combat readiness would be prioritised over near-term demands.

In early 2021 the navy and USMC unveiled a new Arctic strategy, which spoke of the need for US naval forces to operate more assertively, but also more cooperatively with like-minded nations, in response to the challenges from Russia and China in the region.

Nonetheless, uncertainty remains over plans to increase the size of the fleet. The official ambition set in 2016 was for a 'battle force' of 355 ships, compared to a recent level of just around 300. Various efforts have been made to update the target, among them Battle Force 2045, proposed by then-defence secretary Mark Esper in October 2020. All these efforts have tended to include the characteristics of a more distributed fleet, with a shift in the balance from larger to smaller

surface combatants and with significant numbers of uninhabited surface and underwater vehicles.

The Biden administration gave no early sign regarding its intentions in this area. A new Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, was only confirmed in August 2021, although in his confirmation hearings he endorsed the principle that the fleet should increase. A key challenge is the prospect that future budgets are likely to be static or declining in real terms. As a result, the navy's FY2022 budget request included the addition of just eight new ships – four combatants and four support vessels – which is below the level necessary to build towards a 355-ship navy. As a corollary, in the context of a 'divest to invest' approach, the navy is seeking to retire seven of the ageing *Ticonderoga*-class cruisers and four more Littoral Combat Ships.

This led to friction with legislators in Congress. Concerns have included the loss of capability by retiring the cruisers, as well as doubts about the navy's approach to replacing them, especially its plans for incorporating uninhabited vehicles into the fleet.

In June 2021, the navy also released a long-range shipbuilding document looking 30 years ahead. It included a range of targets for fleet growth, of between 321–372 crewed vessels and 77–140 uninhabited vessels. A Congressional Budget Office report in September 2021 estimated that such targets would require higher shipbuilding budgets than have been allocated in recent years. As a result, the navy's force-structure work appeared to be a 'work in progress'. In part this may also be a result of the fact that the Pentagon is also conducting the Global Posture Review and a review of the NDS.

In shipbuilding terms, the navy's top priority is the new-generation *Columbia*-class of SSBNs, 12 of which are slated to replace the existing 14 *Ohio*-class SSBNs. The construction contract for the lead vessel of the class, and advanced funding for the second, were announced in November 2020. USS *Columbia* is scheduled to undertake its first patrol in 2031, but there remain concerns about possible delays and potential cost growth. The other key project is for the *Constellation*-class frigates. Construction of the first vessel – a modification of the Italian variant of the Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design – is due to begin in the latter part of 2021 or early 2022. The initial plan was to build 20 vessels, but their eventual significance in future fleet composition remains to be seen.

A high operational tempo continued in 2021, including freedom of navigation operations in and around the South China Sea. Transits of the Taiwan Strait were being conducted at a rate of approximately one per month, on par with 2020. The navy also deployed a carrier presence to help cover the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, including the deployment to the Central Command area of the Japan-based carrier USS *Ronald Reagan*, in part a reflection of the operational stress on the carrier force. That said, the much-delayed new carrier, USS *Gerald R. Ford*, may finally be ready for a first deployment in 2022.

Meanwhile, the USS *Carl Vinson* undertook a first operational-carrier deployment into the Pacific with F-35C *Lightning II* combat aircraft and the CMV-22B *Osprey* vertical take-off transport aircraft incorporated into its air wing. Land-based trials of a prototype MQ-25 *Stingray* uninhabited air-to-air refueller were also under way ahead of anticipated shipboard trials in 2022.

In August 2021, the *Carl Vinson* strike group took part in the navy's Large-Scale Exercise 21 (LSA21), dubbed the largest of its kind in a generation. Among other things, it incorporated five carrier strike groups and four amphibious groups and ranged across the west and east coasts of the United States, the European theatre and the western Pacific. It was designed to test doctrines for high-end combat, including the navy's Distributed Maritime Operations concept, as well as the US Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment concepts.

US Marine Corps

The marines continue to implement and update their plan to transform into a more agile, distributed force under the Force Design 2030 concept, which has included the loss of its main battle tank units. Among the aims is to integrate more fully with the navy for its sea control and naval interdiction missions.


This was underscored during LSA21 when the USMC demonstrated its Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). In the context of the EABO, which is essentially an 'island-hopping' strategy for the western Pacific in a potential confrontation with China, NMESIS provides a mobile land-based anti-ship missile capability, and specifically in this exercise the Naval Strike Missile. It could also include the *Tactical Tomahawk* cruise-missile variant. The plan is for NMESIS to deploy operationally from 2023.

▼ Figure 2 R/UGM-109 Tomahawk Block V upgrade

The R/UGM-109 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (LACM) has undergone multiple upgrades since its introduction into service with the US Navy in 1983. Early iterations of the missile mostly had nuclear roles amid only limited precision-strike capability. However, improvements in guidance technology have correspondingly enhanced the Tomahawk's suitability for conventional roles. The latest version of the Tomahawk, the Block V, will provide the US with a more survivable system with greater targeting options (including striking moving targets for the first time). The Tomahawk's continued evolution highlights that, despite significant interest in developing hypersonic (Mach 5+) LACMs, accurate and survivable subsonic systems still have significant value for long-range and deep-strike roles.

Tomahawk Block V

- IOC:** 2021
- Range:** 1,500 km
- Warhead:** 454 kg conventional warhead (Block V TACTOM and Block Va)
- Joint Multi-Effects Warhead System (Block Vb)
- Circular Error Probable:** 4 metres
- Key features:** The Tomahawk Block V will be produced in three versions: TACTOM, Block Va for maritime targets and Block Vb for destroying hardened targets



	Block I (TLAM-N, BGM-109 <i>Gryphon</i> and TASM)	Block II (TLAM-A, TLAM-B)	Block III (TLAM-C, TLAM-D)	Block IV (TLAM-E)
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)	1983	1983	1994	2004
Range (kilometres)	2,500 km (TLAM-N: submarine-launched) 2,500 km (BGM-109 <i>Gryphon</i> : ground-launched) 460 km (TASM: submarine-launched)	1,300 km (both variants, ship-launched) 925 km (both variants, submarine-launched)	1,300 km (ship-launched)	1,500 km (ship-launched)
Warhead	W80 5 – 150 kt nuclear warhead (TLAM-N) W84 0.2 – 130 kt nuclear warhead (BGM 109 <i>Gryphon</i>) 454 kg conventional warhead (TASM)	454 kg conventional warhead (TLAM-C) 454 kg fragmentation unitary warhead (TLAM-D)	454 kg conventional warhead	454 kg conventional warhead
Circular Error Probable (CEP)	30 metres	10 metres	10 metres	4 metres
Key features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First variant of Tomahawk • TASM version equipped with active radar seeker. • Capable of various flight patterns and profiles, including sea-skimming. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved booster rocket. • Installation of a radar altimeter. • Equipped with Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of jam-resistant GPS guidance. • Reduced mission planning time. • Ability to loiter over target area. • New turbofan engine for lower fuel consumption and increased thrust. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faster launch timeline. • Upgraded data link allowing re-routing in-flight to pre-planned or new targets. • Installation of electro-optical sensors provides battle damage information.

Plans were also proceeding to stand up the first of potentially three lighter regimental units – to be called Marine Littoral Regiments – consisting of some 1,800 to 2,000 personnel (compared to the current Marine Regiment model of about 3,400 personnel) in the latter half of 2021 or early 2022. This, again, is to be better adapted to fulfil the EABO concept.

Related to this, in June 2021 the US Navy issued concept design contracts to five companies for a Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). Essentially a small to medium landing craft, up to 35 LAWs could be purchased, and they are seen as critical enablers to the new USMC strategy of being able to move small units around flexibly. One consequence of this change is that the long-time force goal of up to 38 traditional large amphibious ships is essentially being abandoned. The navy's long-range shipbuilding plan suggested a force goal of 28–31 traditional amphibious ships, along with the LAWs.

US Coast Guard

Another aim of the new Tri-Service Maritime Strategy is greater integration of the USCG. To this end, the USCG continued high-profile deployments in the western Pacific, not least the participation of the USCG cutter *Munro* in a Taiwan Strait transit in August 2021, while the USCG cutter *Hamilton* deployed to the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea (the first USCG cutter in more than a decade to deploy there) in April 2021.

The USCG continues a significant recapitalisation programme. Partly in recognition of its expanding presence operations, Congress has authorised and funded new *Legend*-class National Security Cutters (NSCs) over and above the eight originally planned. The ninth NSC, *Stone*, was commissioned on 19 March 2021. The tenth and eleventh ships of the class are also under construction, out of a possible 12.

The next priority is the slightly smaller Offshore Patrol Cutter programme for up to 25 vessels, with the first set to be delivered in 2022. The most high-profile procurement programme, however, is for three new heavy icebreakers or Polar Security Cutters (PSCs), to be followed by three medium icebreakers, or Arctic Security Cutters. Despite growing interest in the Arctic, the current US fleet consists of just one ageing heavy and one medium icebreaker. The first PSC was due to start construction during 2021 for delivery in late 2025.

US Air Force

The United States Air Force (USAF) is re-evaluating its tactical aircraft force mix, under the guidance of Chief of Staff General Charles Brown. A previous commitment to fifth-generation aircraft seems increasingly balanced by consideration of more diverse missions and concern over operating costs. Fiscal pressure may be just one of the reasons that the USAF's target of growing to 386 squadrons, declared in September 2018 and labelled 'The Air Force We Need', is no longer the goal.

Like the other services, the USAF assumed an increase in funding following expiration of the Budget Control Act caps in FY2021. That anticipated additional funding has yet to arrive, not least because the incoming Biden team, like many new administrations, only submitted a modestly revised budget for its initial 2022 submission while promising full details and five-year projections in the fiscal 2023 plan. Further diluting the 386-squadron aim, Brown has placed renewed emphasis on readiness, and better means of gauging this rather than a specific number of units. Brown has posed the question, rhetorically at least, as to whether the same effectiveness could be provided by fewer squadrons, asking 'what is the capability that would give me the equivalent of 386?' His August 2020 policy paper 'Accelerate Change or Lose' will affect force structure, doctrine and systems, with legacy systems or programmes that 'once held promise, but are no longer affordable or will not deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines' facing cancellation.

A review of the tactical aircraft portfolio is also looking at new capabilities, with results expected to appear in the FY2023 budget. Service experiments with comparatively low-cost uninhabited combat air vehicles, notably the XQ-58 *Valkyrie*, highlight future capabilities that could augment or even replace planned crewed-combat aircraft in some roles or in high-threat airspace. Experiments, including with directed-energy weapons, may give current platforms improved lethality. It is possible that the outcome of such experiments may lead to doctrinal changes and a subsequent shift in force mix.

Funding numbers

To date the procurement target of 1,763 F-35A *Lightning* IIs has not been revised since the programme began. But signs increasingly point to a more heterogeneous future fighter fleet. The service's procurement of an initial 144 F-15EX *Eagle* IIs to replace

F-15Cs, largely in the Air National Guard, was one such sign, followed by official talk of restarting F-16 acquisition or even building a successor from scratch, with details to be revealed in the 2023 budget submission. Another indication was the interest in the reported flying of a demonstrator for elements of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme, officially a research effort to develop five fighter-relevant technologies, of which only propulsion has been publicly acknowledged. NGAD is described variously by the USAF as a family of systems and/or a family of airframes. At the time of writing, it remains an open question which of the five NGAD-relevant technologies the demonstrator was being used to explore.

F-35A numbers will likely come under additional pressure as the B-21 *Raider* long-range bomber moves from research to production funding in FY2022. This procurement has so far been on schedule and budget, and Secretary of Air Force Frank Kendall said in September that five bombers were now in various states of production. However, the programme's ambitious timeline will leave the USAF juggling simultaneous acquisitions of F-35A, F-15EX, the T-7 *Red Hawk* advanced trainer, MH-139 *Grey Wolf* helicopter, HH-60W *Jolly Green II* combat rescue helicopter, KC-46A *Pegasus* tanker, and some C-130 variants at the very least. These programmes need to fit within the USAF's procurement budget, while also accommodating the investment for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent replacement for the *Minuteman III* ICBM and development of the network-based Advanced Battle Management System.

The scope of the recapitalisation programme – only the transport fleet is not undergoing replacement – is placing both financial and cultural demands on the service. Normally, the USAF acquisition chief would be entrusted with managing the challenges. However, Kendall has significant acquisition experience, so his input will likely be important. Meanwhile, it is not clear if procurement initiatives begun under former acquisition executive Dr Will Roper – designed to decrease development time, disaggregate production from development and support, and lower the bar for new entrants in the military aircraft market – will become policy under the new team.

Indo-Pacific real estate

The vulnerability and limited numbers of large bases in the Indo-Pacific is an increasing concern. The USAF has been experimenting with what is dubbed

'agile combat employment' where combat aircraft are dispersed to austere locations and challenged to operate without a significant logistical footprint. At the same time, the proposed enhancement of Andersen Air Force Base on Guam with munitions storage and stand-off weapon-reloading facilities has the effect of highlighting its relative vulnerability. Recent USAF wargames have also mooted the use of unspecified high-speed short take-off and vertical-landing aircraft, possibly a reference to a still-classified programme.

Room for space

The establishment and development of the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force may prove a mixed blessing. By moving space systems from Brown's agenda, the USAF has been able to simplify its message within DoD and to legislators regarding its priorities. The force-generation process for the service has been deliberative, as the other services consider which current capabilities they are willing to transfer, personnel are brought on gradually, and the new service develops its own organisation, doctrine and procedures. First on General Jay Raymond's list of goals is to protect and defend US assets in space. With peer rivals having demonstrated anti-satellite and space-control capabilities, the development of capabilities and countermeasures is proceeding apace. This leads to a second priority – changing the US space architecture so it is simultaneously more defensible while being accessible to allies and commercial partners. To reach this point, the Space Force is establishing a new acquisition structure and testing programme, but at the same time it has to keep existing space systems operating at full capacity.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

On 28 May 2021, the Biden administration released its FY2022 DoD budget request. The request included a top line DoD budget of USD715 billion. An additional USD37.9bn was requested for non-DoD defence spending, including funding for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, bringing the total spending on defence activities to USD752.9bn.

The USD715bn top line constitutes an USD11.27bn increase on the enacted FY2021 budget, a nominal 1.6% increase. Adjusting for inflation, projected by the IMF to reach 2.4% in 2022, the budget request is essentially flat in real terms.

Table 1 The US president's budget request by appropriation title, USDm

Requested Budget by Appropriation Title (USDm)	FY2021 (enacted)	FY2022 (requested)	Change
Military Personnel	162,270	167,285	5,015
Operation & Maintenance	283,395	290,361	6,966
Procurement	141,672	133,640	-8,032
RDT&E	106,447	111,964	5,517
Revolving and Management Funds	1,394	1,902	508
Military Construction & Family Housing	8,545	9,847	1,302
Total Defense Budget Request	703,723	715,000	11,277

Source: adapted from the United States DoD Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, Appendix A, FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (defense.gov)


The president's request is a starting point for negotiations. Congress has already moved to authorise up to USD740bn in core DoD funding, though there is little detail about how extra funds will be committed.

In July, the Senate Appropriations Committee passed a version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that included a USD25bn increase over the Biden request, and on 23 September the US House of Representatives approved an NDAA that included the USD740bn top line and USD778bn in total defence-related spending. The Senate debate on the NDAA, due to begin in October, was delayed by the inclusion of various amendments, including the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, a bipartisan measure aimed at combating China and boosting investments in research, technology and manufacturing.

Status quo top line foreshadows future trade-offs

The budget request should be considered within the context of the political and process constraints in which it was developed. First-year budgets of new administrations frequently inherit and only marginally adjust the assumptions of the outgoing administration's Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) due to the need to release a budget soon after the 20 January inauguration date.

Even though the top line reflected the existing state of affairs, the 28 May budget request was the latest since annual-budget submissions were first required in the 1920s. Moreover, the administration



[1] Figures refer to the National Defense (050) Budget Function (Budget Authority) as a % of GDP

▲ **Figure 3 US defence budget as % of GDP¹**

did not release an FYDP, which projects top-line budgets over five years and is traditionally included with the annual-budget request.

Some of this delay can be attributed to the contentious presidential transition. The efforts of the Trump administration to obstruct the incoming administration's planning caused delays in the budget release. But there are other structural reasons behind the late release. Critically, the Biden administration is currently in the process of developing a new national security and national defence strategy that will not be completed until FY2023. The FY2023 and, especially, FY2024 budgets are likely to more accurately reflect the Biden administration's vision for the future of DoD.

The budget request does, however, introduce some new dynamics. As expected, the budget eliminates the controversial Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund, which incorporated expenses related to overseas conflicts into the base budget as 'direct war and enduring contingencies'. Moreover, Biden's budget amplifies themes and reinforces priorities from the FY2021 budget – the enhanced focus on air and naval forces and the centrality of the challenge from China's growing military power – and reveals tensions likely to shape DoD strategy and budget discussions in coming years as it seeks to balance readiness and modernisation and sharpen priority missions related to its three articulated objectives of defending the nation, taking care of people and succeeding through teamwork.

China is the 'pacing challenge'

At the core of the defence-budget request is the need to meet an expanding threat environment and begin

Table 2 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000, 2010–22

USD in billions, current-year dollars	National Defense Budget Function		Atomic Energy Defense Activities	Other Defense Activities	Total National Defense			Department of Homeland Security	Department of Veterans Affairs	Total Federal Government Outlays	Total Federal Budget Surplus/Deficit
	BA	Outlay	BA	BA	BA	BA	Outlay	BA	BA		
2000	290.3	281.00	12.4	1.3	304.0	300.8	294.4	13.8	45.5	1,789.0	236.2
2010	695.6	666.7	18.2	7.3	721.2	714.1	693.5	45.4	124.3	3,457.1	-1,294.4
2011	691.5	678.1	18.5	7.0	717.0	710.1	705.6	41.6	122.8	3,603.1	-1,299.6
2012	655.4	650.9	18.3	7.7	681.4	669.6	677.9	45.9	124.0	3,526.6	-1,076.6
2013	585.2	607.8	17.5	7.4	610.2	600.4	633.4	61.9	136.0	3,454.9	-679.8
2014	595.7	577.9	18.4	8.2	622.3	606.2	603.5	44.1	165.7	3,506.3	-484.8
2015	570.8	562.5	19.0	8.5	598.4	585.9	589.7	45.3	160.5	3,691.9	-442.0
2016	595.7	565.4	20.1	8.3	624.1	606.8	593.4	46.0	163.3	3,852.6	-584.7
2017	626.2	568.9	21.4	8.7	656.3	634.1	598.7	62.3	178.8	3,981.6	-665.4
2018	694.5	600.7	23.3	9.0	726.8	700.9	631.2	103.0	191.8	4,109.0	-779.1
2019	712.6	654.0	24.0	9.1	745.7	718.8	686.0	61.4	194.2	4,447.0	-983.6
2020	738.8	690.4	26.0	9.7	774.5	756.6	724.6	114.2	233.3	6,550.4	-3,129.2
2021*	713.8	712.4	29.4	10.8	754.0	740.8	748.4	124.3	255.6	7,249.5	-3,668.7
2022*	727.9	729.5	29.9	10.5	768.3	752.9	770.6	69.5	283.9	6,011.1	-1,837.0

Notes

FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September)

* (request)

¹The National Defense Budget Function subsumes funding for the DoD, the Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and some smaller support agencies (including Federal Emergency Management and Selective Service System). It does not include

funding for International Security Assistance (under International Affairs), the Veterans Administration, the US Coast Guard (Department of Homeland Security), nor for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil projects administered by the DoD is excluded from the figures cited here.

²Early in each calendar year, the US government presents its defence budget to Congress for

the next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October. The government also presents its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which covers the next fiscal year plus the following five. Until approved by Congress, the budget is called the Budget Request; after approval, it becomes the Budget Authority (BA).

to implement a concept of national security that goes beyond military considerations solely. COVID-19 and pandemic preparedness (with USD500 million allocated) and adapting to and mitigating the risks of climate change (USD617m) both featured as priority DoD challenges.

Violent extremism, Iran, North Korea and Russia are all also mentioned in the funding request. But it is deterring and maintaining advantage over China that serves as the primary ‘pacing challenge’ for the DoD and that is animating congressional efforts to increase the budget. Several overlapping DoD efforts are explicitly designed to deter China.

The Pacific Deterrence Initiative received USD5.1bn in the request, USD4.9bn of which was allocated to joint-force lethality. In addition, the FY2022 DoD budget request included USD27.7bn in modernisation programmes for all three legs of the nuclear triad. Key programmes include the B-21 *Raider* bomber, the *Columbia*-class ballistic-missile submarine

(SSBN), the Long-Range Stand-Off missile (LRSO), and the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that will replace the *Minuteman* III intercontinental ballistic missile. The budget also included USD6.6bn to develop and field multi-service, multi-domain offensive long-range fires, a clear priority of the Indo-Pacific theatre, characterised by long distances and China’s increasingly sophisticated anti-access/area-denial capabilities.

Budget priorities: research, readiness and people

Biden’s first budget requested USD112bn for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). This was a 5.2% increase over the FY2021-enacted amount, which was itself the largest RDT&E budget at that time. The budget identifies several technologies as central to modernisation and innovation: microelectronics (USD2.3bn), artificial intelligence (USD814m), 5G (USD398m) and hypersonics (USD3.8bn).

In addition to the increase in RDT&E funding, the budget includes a 2.5% increase in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget as part of a parallel effort to ‘sustain and advance readiness’. The budget request allocates USD122bn to ‘readiness’ across the services, augmented by the proposed investment in personnel.

The Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget incorporates a 2.7% pay rise across DoD and provides USD8.6bn for family support and training programmes. The budget seeks to align DoD funding with broader DoD initiatives to address workplace and workforce challenges and inequities, including ‘extremism in the ranks’, and DoD efforts to implement the values of ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ in all aspects of DoD activities.

To pay for the increase in RDT&E, O&M and MILPERS, the FY2022 request cuts procurement by over USD8bn, dropping from USD142bn in FY2021 to USD134bn. Future budgets will likely continue to prioritise other areas of the budget as the DoD pushes forward with efforts at force-wide modernisation and deals with the loss of OCO funding.

Funds are also reclaimed through USD2.8bn-worth of equipment reductions across the services of ‘older and less-capable platforms and programs’, with notable targets including the A-10 *Thunderbolt II*, F-16 C/D *Fighting Falcon*, F-15 C/D *Eagle*, F/A-18 A-D *Hornet*, KC-135 *Stratotanker*, and KC-10 *Extender* as well as multiple Littoral Combat Ships. The navy and USAF are responsible for USD2.7bn in planned divestments. Choosing to divest legacy systems is politically sensitive, given legislators’ interest in keeping production lines that employ their constituents open. In September 2021, Kendall urged Congress to retain focus on the need to meet the pacing challenge of China, arguing that the US ‘will not succeed against a well-resourced and strategic competitor if we insist on keeping every legacy system we have’. According to Kendall, keeping ‘aircraft that we no longer need and that do not intimidate China’ is ‘consuming precious resources we do need for modernization’.

The services: naval and air focus

The budgets for the Department of the Navy and the USAF are set to increase as part of the effort to deter China and focus DoD operations on the Indo-Pacific. Together, the Department of the Navy and the USAF combine for a 52% share of the total DoD top-line budget, up from 48% in the enacted FY2021 budget.

Table 3 The US president’s budget request by service, USDm

Requested budget by service (USDm)	FY2021 (enacted)	FY2022 (requested)	Change
Army	174,265	172,734	-1,531
Department of the Navy	207,079	211,721 (Total) 163,900 (Navy) 47,800 (Marines)	4,642
Department of the Air Force	204,001	212,764 (Total) 156,300 (Air Force) 17,400 (Space Force) 39,100 (Pass-through)	8,763
Defence-wide	118,377	117,780	-597

Source: The US DoD FY2022 Budget Request Defense Budget Overview Appendix A as well as other open and publicly available sources, FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (defense.gov).

There is some nuance to how these budgets are allocated. Of the USD212bn requested for the Department of the Navy, USD164bn is for the navy, an increase of only 0.6% over the FY2021 enacted sum, while USD47.8bn is for the USMC, an increase of 6.2%.

The Department of the Air Force budget request of USD213bn is inflated by USD39.1bn in pass-through funding that is not controlled by the USAF and mostly is dedicated to classified activities. Removing the pass-through funding leaves a budget request of USD174bn. The USAF budget of USD156bn is a 2.3% year-on-year increase. The USD17.4bn requested for Space Force is a 13.1% increase from FY2021, reflecting the growing importance of the space domain to operations. Nearly USD8bn of the USAF budget is tied to ‘direct war and enduring costs’ that previously were funded by the OCO account.

The navy and USAF are taking different approaches to spending their requested budgets. The navy’s priority is to deliver a ‘combat credible’ force and to improve readiness. The DoD request includes USD48.5bn for the navy’s and the USMC’s readiness, with increases in O&M, MILPERS and infrastructure as well as RDT&E.

To cover these costs, naval procurement has declined by 5.7% from the sum enacted in FY2021. The navy will procure only eight ships in FY2022: two *Virginia*-class submarines, an *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyer, a frigate and four support ships. This is down from the 12 planned by the Trump administration, raising questions about future-force structure and the sustainability of the domestic ship-

building industry. A new force-structure review is underway, though in September 2021 the Chief of Naval Operations announced that the review may not be completed until 2023.

USAF spending includes an RDT&E increase of USD3.8bn and stresses modernisation, especially of the nuclear triad. The GBSD, LRSO, National Command, Control, and Communications infrastructure development programmes and B-21 *Raider* are all 'fully funded'.

Other priorities for RDT&E funding include the Advanced Battle Management System, the Air Force's component of DoD's Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) programme, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, and space-based capabilities such as the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared missile-warning system. The request includes funds for 85 F-35s across the USAF and navy as well as 12 F-15EXs. The KC-46A *Pegasus* tanker replacement programme receives USD2.5bn for 14 aircraft.

The army plays the role of bill payer in the FY2022 budget as it attempts to develop a vision for its role in the Indo-Pacific while also maintaining the capacity to deter Russia and the ability to meet contingencies elsewhere. The army budget of USD173bn is USD1.5bn below the 2021-enacted budget. It constitutes only 24% of the total top-line share, its lowest in a decade. The budget includes USD18.4bn in direct and enduring costs that previously would have been covered by OCO funds.

Within these budget constraints, the army has prioritised protecting its end strength, which will remain essentially constant. The army is also defending its 35 prioritised modernisation programmes, as well as 30 additional enabling programmes, deemed essential to future lethality and operational effectiveness. However, after three years of the 'night court' process of cutting non-priority programmes in order to free up money for modernisation, a senior officer was reported as saying in mid-2021 that there is little left to cut across its legacy systems. It has, according to acting secretary of the army John Whitley, become 'progressively harder to find lower-priority programs to realign'. While the top modernisation programmes are protected this year, the army RDT&E and procurement budgets have fallen by USD1.3bn and USD2.8bn respectively, reinforcing the long-term challenge to army modernisation in years ahead.

CANADA

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau won a new mandate in the snap general election held on 20 September 2021. This meant at least a degree of continuity in Canadian defence and security policy, which remains based on the Trudeau government's 2017 defence-policy review entitled 'Strong, Secure, Engaged'.

Nevertheless, Ottawa, like many other capitals, is grappling with the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic, not least potential budgetary implications and added project delays at a time when a number of long-term (and in many cases long overdue) procurement programmes are reaching key decision points. The 2017 review outlined continued support for alliance and coalition ties and a broad global deployment and engagement posture. It also promised to transform Canada's armed forces, detailing financial commitments and a major procurement programme.

Deployments to support NATO continued under the umbrella of *Operation Reassurance*. These included some 540 personnel leading the NATO Enhanced Presence Battlegroup in Latvia. The naval contribution continued to include the deployment of a frigate, and in January 2021 a Canadian commodore took command of Standing NATO Maritime Group One for 12 months. The air force again deployed to Romania as part of the NATO-enhanced Air Policing mission, while the *Operation Unifier* military-training mission to Ukraine was also due to continue until at least March 2022. There were also deployments in the Middle East, while in July a frigate took part in the Australia-US *Exercise Talisman Sabre* off northeast Australia.

At the same time, a number of major procurement programmes reached or were approaching important milestones. Since 2019, the army has been pursuing a new operating concept for complex operations against state and non-state actors. The army has also identified a number of equipment priorities, including a modern ground-based air defence system, with decisions pending on defining a programme to deliver an initial capability in 2026-27.

Among current land programmes, the first of 360 new Armoured Combat Support Vehicles (based on the LAV 6.0) was accepted in December 2020, with full operational capability scheduled for 2024. This will replace the LAV II *Bison* and M113. Meanwhile, the first mast was delivered in August 2020 for testing as part of the new Light Armoured

Vehicle Reconnaissance Surveillance System, to be incorporated as an upgrade to 66 LAV III vehicles (at LAV 6.0 standard). The first is due for delivery to the army in October 2021, with full operational capability planned for February 2023.

One of the looming pivotal capability decisions concerns Canada's Future Fighter Capability Project. Final selection to fulfil the requirement for 88 new aircraft is due in 2022, the remaining contenders being the Lockheed Martin F-35A *Lightning* II and the Saab *Gripen* E. There could be a down-selection eliminating at least one of the bids in late 2021.

This troubled project has been under way for more than a decade, and there are concerns about possible further delays resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. Nevertheless, the plan is for the first aircraft to be delivered in 2025 with all aircraft delivered by the early 2030s. Interim measures to sustain Canada's existing fighter capability have included the purchase of 18 second-hand F/A-18s from Australia, the last of which was delivered in April 2021, and the upgrading of 36 of Canada's remaining CF-18s with the AN/APG-79(V)4 active electronically scanned array radar. Another important development in terms of air-capability recapitalisation was the announcement in April 2021 that Airbus, with its A330 MRTT, was the only qualified bidder for the future Strategic Tanker Transport Capability to replace five CC-150 *Polaris* aircraft, with an initial operating capability from 2028–29.

In the maritime sphere, perhaps as consequential as the future fighter programme in the air domain, is the future Canadian Surface Combatant. After

the selection of the Lockheed Martin bid in 2018, based on the BAE Systems Type-26 frigate design, the programme has proceeded, but not without continuing concern about costs.

In April 2021, MBDA was awarded a contract to supply the *Sea Ceptor* air-defence missile. Given that the plan is also to equip the ships with SM-2 and Evolved *Sea Sparrow* missiles, the ambition for the capability in these vessels is considerable. Also in April, Leonardo was chosen to supply the OTO 127/64 LW *Vulcano* medium-calibre gun for the class, a departure from the choice for the Australian and UK versions of the Type-26, requiring some significant redesign. The plan is for 15 vessels to be delivered from the early 2030s through to the 2040s.

With growing attention on the Arctic, at the end of June 2021 the navy commissioned the first of its planned six *Harry DeWolf*-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. With a full-load displacement of 6,600 tonnes, they are currently the navy's largest surface combatants. The second ship was delivered in July 2021 with deliveries to the navy planned at one a year until 2025, followed by two more for the Canadian Coast Guard.

The plan remains that the first of the two *Protecteur*-class Joint Support Ships will be delivered in 2023, although this may be affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The 2017 review also announced a modernisation plan to extend the service life of the four *Victoria*-class submarines to the mid- to late-2030s. One of the submarines, HMCS *Corner Brook*, which has been undergoing long-running repairs and upgrades, will likely return to service in 2022.

Arms procurements and deliveries – North America


Significant events in 2021



APRIL

CANADA CANCELS TURKEY-RELATED PERMITS


Canada became the latest NATO ally to block the sale of defence equipment to Turkey after restricting 29 export permits. Principally, this stops the sale of WESCAM's CMX-15D electro-optical/infrared imaging system, which is fitted to some Turkish UAVs, such as the *Bayraktar* TB2. Canada's position is that the use of these UAVs in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was 'not consistent with Canadian foreign policy, nor end-use assurances'. The halt on exports to Turkey has hampered several programmes, though it is possible that Ankara will introduce a domestic replacement from ASELSAN for the CMX-15D. Tests began on the ASELSAN product in 2020.



JUNE

US NAVY RELEASES SHIPBUILDING PLAN

The Biden administration released a shipbuilding plan that retained the focus of its predecessor on, for instance, maintaining subsurface advantage. However, it abbreviated its ambitions in the new 30 year plan, indicating an aspiration for a fleet of 321–372 crewed warships and 77–140 uninhabited surface/subsurface vessels. In contrast, the final plan of the Trump administration, published in December 2020, aimed to have a fleet of 403 crewed ships and submarines and 143 uninhabited maritime systems by 2045. The latest plan is likely informed by a reassessment of industrial capacity and limited growth expected in future shipbuilding budgets, though the administration has indicated that a complete 30-year plan will be issued with the FY2023 budget.



JULY

USAF ISSUES KC-Y RFI


The US Air Force (USAF) issued a request for information (RFI) for 140–160 tankers based on a commercial aircraft design to replace the KC-135 *Stratotanker* under the 'Bridge' Tanker (KC-Y) programme. KC-Y is intended as a follow-on programme to the Boeing KC-46A (KC-X programme), of which USAF plans to order 179. However, the KC-46A has suffered from technical problems and has cost Boeing over USD5 billion in overruns to date. Interim capability was only certified in 2021, but it is possible that problems may be resolved by the time any KC-Y decision is made before the end of the decade. Indeed, KC-Y will very likely be a competitive programme, as Airbus is expected to offer the A330 MRTT, as it did in several KC-X competitions in the late 2000s and early 2010s. KC-Y will itself be succeeded by the Advanced Air Refueling Tanker (KC-Z) programme, which will be more ambitious, for instance in terms of signature management and endurance.



JULY

L3HARRIS DIVESTS BUSINESSES

Prior to the merger of L3 Technologies and Harris Corporation in 2019, to form L3Harris Technologies, both companies divested parts of their businesses and indicated that more were likely. These began in 2020 and the process has accelerated in 2021, with the sale of the defence-training business to Canada's CAE for USD1.05bn and propulsion systems to Germany's RENK for USD400 million. The acquisition significantly expands CAE's presence in the United States' simulation-and-training market, with a large F-35 training programme still to be tendered. Only Lockheed Martin currently has a larger market share. RENK's acquisition is likely also motivated by the potential value of future land programmes, in particular the series of projects that make up the US Army's Next-Generation Combat Vehicle programme.



























JULY


OMFV MOVES FORWARD

The US Army awarded Phase II Concept Design contracts, totalling USD299.4m, for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) to five industrial teams: BAE Systems Land & Armaments, General Dynamics Land Systems, Hanwha Defense and Oshkosh Defense, Point Blank Enterprises and Rheinmetall. A first request for proposals was cancelled in 2020 after companies could not meet the technical or procedural requirements. The reorganisation of the programme in April 2020 set out a five-phase process with a winner being selected in FY2027 and low-rate production beginning in FY2028. This is the third attempt to replace the *Bradley* infantry fighting vehicle following the cancellation of the Future Combat System and Ground Combat Vehicle programmes in 2010 and 2014, respectively.

Table 4 US fixed-wing fighter-aircraft exports, 2010–October 2021

Country	Equipment	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 [†]
Australia	 F-35A					2				8	8	14	9
Denmark	 F-35A												4
Egypt	 F-16C/D			7	20								
Indonesia	 F-16C/D					5	4	5	4	2			
Iraq	 F-16C/D						4	10	7	6	11		
Israel	 F-35I							2	7	5	6	4	6
Italy	 F-16A/B			3									
Italy	 F-35A							6*	2*	2*	1*	2*	1*
Italy	 F-35B									1*	1*	1*	1*
Japan	 F-35A							2	3 and 1*	4*	6*	6*	6*
Korea, Republic of	 F-15K	2	2	3									
Korea, Republic of	 F-35A									6	7	11	12
Kuwait	 F/A-18E/F											12	16
Morocco	 F-16C/D	3	13	6									
Netherlands	 F-35A			1	1						8	5	6
Norway	 F-35A						2	2	6	6	6	6	3
Pakistan	 F-16C/D	14	14	1									
Qatar	 F-15QA											4	6
Saudi Arabia	 F-15SA							4	29	19	21	11	
Singapore	 F-15SG	4		2				8					
Turkey	 F-16C/D		3	11									
Turkey	 F-35A									2	2		
United Arab Emirates	 F-16E/F	3	3	1									
United Kingdom	 F-35B			2	1			5	6	3	1	3	3
Total = 540		26	35	37	22	7	10	44	65	64	78	79	73

*Final assembly outside the US. †January–October

Figure 4  **Canada: non-US defence exports, 2000–20**

Canada's non-US defence exports* have quadrupled in value since 2000, with half of this amount coming from the sale of armoured vehicles. Canada's most significant exporters are subsidiaries of large US companies. For instance, the leading armoured-vehicle firm is General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada (GDLS-C) in London, Ontario. Originally a division of US firm General Motors, since the 1970s the plant has been building Canadian versions, known as Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV), of the Swiss firm MOWAG's *Piranha* wheeled armoured vehicle. (MOWAG is now part of General Dynamics.) As well as exporting the design to the United States, GDLS-C has also exported hundreds of LAVs to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, since 2000 total Canadian exports to Saudi Arabia comprise 40% of the non-US total, the vast majority of this being of armoured vehicles. Most recently, a contract was signed in 2014 for 928 LAVs, worth CAD15 billion (USD13.56bn). Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Yemen led to calls in Canada to either review or cancel the contract, though Canada's post-2015 Liberal government has suggested in statements that the contract has strict confidentiality clauses and stringent cancellation penalties. Two of Canada's other major companies are L3Harris subsidiary WESCAM and Pratt & Whitney subsidiary, Pratt

& Whitney Canada. The former supplies electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor systems that are fitted onto aircraft, including uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). The use of Turkish-built UAVs, fitted with WESCAM's MX-15D EO/IR sensor, in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict prompted the Canadian government to halt exports to Turkey. Pratt & Whitney Canada supplies turboprop engines for everything from large transport aircraft to small training aircraft. Canadian firm Bombardier manufactures civilian business jets, which are often sold to form the basis of special-mission aircraft.

*Canada does not report its exports to the US due to many not requiring permits.

Canada non-US defence exports by sector, 2000–20




Canadian non-US defence exports, 2000–20 (USD)



2009:
A contract worth USD2.2bn is signed to supply Saudi Arabia with 724 LAV II APCs.

2014:
A contract reportedly worth USD13.56bn is signed to supply Saudi Arabia with 928 LAV 6.0 APCs.

Deliveries of Canadian 'Armoured Combat Vehicles' and 'Large-Calibre Artillery Systems' to Saudi Arabia as reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 2000–20




Canada CAN

Canadian Dollar CAD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CAD	2.20tr	2.52tr	
	USD	1.64tr	2.02tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	43,295	52,791	
Growth	%	-5.3	5.7	
Inflation	%	0.7	3.2	
Def exp [a]	CAD	31.6bn	33.7bn	
	USD	23.6bn	26.9bn	
Def bdgt [b]	CAD	27.0bn	29.1bn	
	USD	20.1bn	23.2bn	
USD1= CAD		1.34	1.25	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs



Population 37,943,231

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.1%	2.7%	2.9%	3.4%	23.4%	8.9%
Female	7.7%	2.6%	2.7%	3.2%	23.7%	10.5%

Capabilities

Canada's armed forces are focused principally on territorial defence, as well as contributing important capabilities to international missions, principally through NATO. The 2017 defence review reaffirmed commitments to NATO, but also to modernising capabilities, including cyber power. The review promised to increase regular and reserve forces, with particular enhancements in the areas of cyber and intelligence. Canada's deployments, although relatively small scale, underscore a determination to maintain both international engagement and power-projection capability. Canada's leadership of a NATO battlegroup in Latvia highlights a continuing capability to deploy medium-sized land formations. It has also contributed to NATO's air-policing mission. Meanwhile, the deployments of frigates to the NATO theatre and the Pacific demonstrate continuing blue-water naval capabilities. It has recently extended its coalition contribution to military capacity-building in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon until March 2022. The 2017 review pledged to finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements. It raised the target for a new-generation fighter to 88 aircraft with the choice being between the F/A-18E/F *Super Hornet*, the F-35A *Lightning II* and the *Gripen E*, with a final contract award due in 2022. In the interim, Canada has been supplementing its existing fighter force with second-hand Australian F/A-18 *Hornets*. Despite continuing cost concerns, work has progressed on the future Canadian Surface Combatant programme, based on the UK Type-26 frigate design, with a construction contract expected in 2022 or 2023. In July 2021, the navy commissioned the first of six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships intended to enhance its Arctic operating capability – its first new warship in nearly 25 years. Canada maintains a well-developed range of mainly small and medium-sized defence firms. The strongest sector is in combat vehicles, though the government is using its latest naval procurements to establish a long-term national ship-building strategy.

ACTIVE 66,500 (Army 22,500 Navy 12,600 Air Force 12,100 Other 19,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500

RESERVE 34,400 (Army 26,800 Navy 4,100 Air 2,000 Other 1,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 *Sapphire*

Army 22,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

- (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)
- (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 engr regt
- 3 MP pl

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 SAM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 82: 42 *Leopard 2A4* (trg role); 20 *Leopard 2A4M* (upgraded); 20 *Leopard 2A6M* (52 *Leopard 1C2* in store)
 RECCE €120 LAV-25 *Coyote*
 IFV 550 LAV 6.0

APC 443

APC (T) 268: 235 M113; 33 M577 (CP)
 APC (W) 175 LAV *Bison* (incl 10 EW, 32 amb, 32 repair, 64 recovery)

AUV 507: 7 *Cougar*; 500 TAPV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 23: 5 *Buffalo*; 18 *Wisent 2*
 ARV 12 BPz-3 *Büffel*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS TOW-2

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 287

TOWED 163 105mm 126: 98 C3 (M101); 28 LG1 MkII;
 155mm 37 M777
 MOR 124: 81mm 100; SP 81mm 24 LAV *Bison*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 5 RQ-21A *Blackjack*

Reserve Organisations 26,800

Canadian Rangers 5,300 Reservists

Provide a limited military presence in Canada's northern, coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and surveillance roles

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

- 5 (patrol) ranger gp (209 patrols)

Army Reserves 21,500 Reservists

Most units have only coy-sized establishments

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

10 bde gp HQ

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

18 recce regt (sqn)

Light

51 inf regt (coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

16 fd arty regt (bty)

3 indep fd arty bty

10 cbt engr regt (coy)

1 EW regt (sqn)

4 int coy

10 sigs regt (coy)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

10 log bn (coy)

3 MP coy

Royal Canadian Navy 12,600**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 4**

SSK 4 *Victoria* (ex-UK *Upholder*) (of which 1 in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12

FFGHM 12 *Halifax* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 CH-148 *Cyclone* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1

PSOH 1 *Harry DeWolf* (capacity 1 CH-148 *Cyclone* ASW hel)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 12

MCO 12 *Kingston* (also used in patrol role)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10

AORH 1 *Asterix* (*Resolve*) (capacity 2 CH-148 *Cyclone* ASW hel)

AX 9: AXL 8 *Orca*; AXS 1 *Oriole*

Reserves 4,100 reservists

24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs, harbour defence & naval control of shipping

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 12,100**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

4 sqn with F/A-18A/B *Hornet* (CF-18AM/BM)

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 sqn with CH-148 *Cyclone*

MARITIME PATROL

2 sqn with P-3 *Orion* (CP-140M *Aurora*)

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

3 sqn with AW101 *Merlin* (CH-149 *Cormorant*); C-130H/H-30 (CC-130) *Hercules*

1 sqn with DHC-5 (CC-115) *Buffalo*

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T)

1 sqn with KC-130H

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) *Globemaster*

1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B)

1 sqn with C-130J-30 (CC-130) *Hercules*

1 (util) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) *Twin Otter*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B *Hornet* (CF-18AM/BM)

1 OCU sqn with C-130H/H-30/J (CC-130) *Hercules*

1 OCU sqn with CH-148 *Cyclone*

1 OCU sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*)

1 sqn with P-3 *Orion* (CP-140M *Aurora*)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*)

3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*)

1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon* – OPCODE Canadian Special Operations Command)

1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) *Chinook*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 110** combat capable

FGA 96: 71 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) *Hornet*; 25 F/A-18B (CF-18BM) *Hornet*

ASW 14 P-3 *Orion* (CP-140M *Aurora*)

SAR 7 C295W (CC-295)

TKR/TPT 5: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 3 KC-130H

TPT 48: **Heavy** 5 C-17A (CC-177) *Globemaster III*; **Medium**

26: 7 C-130H (CC-130) *Hercules*; 2 C-130H-30 (CC-130)

Hercules; 17 C-130J-30 (CC-130) *Hercules*; **Light** 10: 6

DHC-5 (CC-115) *Buffalo*; 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) *Twin Otter*;

PAX 7: 3 A310 (CC-150 *Polaris*); 4 CL-600 (CC-144B/C)

TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 22 CH-148 *Cyclone*

MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*)

TPT 29: **Heavy** 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) *Chinook*; **Medium**

14 AW101 *Merlin* (CH-149 *Cormorant*)

RADAR 53

AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47: 11 AN/

FPS-117 (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm)

STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*

ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM

BOMBS

Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12/GBU-16 *Paveway II*;

GBU-24 *Paveway III*

INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-

49 *Enhanced Paveway II*

NATO Flight Training Canada**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

TRG 45: 26 T-6A *Texan II* (CT-156 *Harvard II*); 19 *Hawk*

115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg)

Contracted Flying Services – Southport**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

TPT • **Light** 7 Beech C90B *King Air*

TRG 11 G-120A

HELICOPTERS

MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146)
TPT • Light 7 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (CH-139)

Canadian Special Operations Forces Command 1,500**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment)
1 SF unit (JTF 2)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit – CJIRU)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 (spec ops) sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon* – from the RCAF)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

NBC VEHICLES 4 LAV *Bison* NBC

HELICOPTERS • MRH 10 Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*)

Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 engr spt coy
1 (close protection) MP coy
1 (joint) sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (spt) log unit
1 (movement) log unit

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500**Canadian Coast Guard 4,500**

Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms are designated as non-combatant

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 71**

PSOH 1 *Leonard J Cowley*
PSO 1 *Sir Wilfred Grenfell* (with hel landing platform)
PCO 13: 2 *Cape Roger*; 1 *Gordon Reid*; 9 *Hero*; 1 *Tanu*
PBF 1 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M)
PB 55: 6 *Baie de Plaisance*; 1 *Laredo Sound*; 10 Type-300A;
36 Type-300B; 1 *S. Dudka*; 1 *Vakta*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4

UCAC 4 Type-400

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 33

ABU 7
AG 4
AGB 17
AGOS 5

HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 Bell 412EP • TPT 19: Medium
1 S-61; Light 18: 3 Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; 15 Bell 429

DEPLOYMENT

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP (*Operation Snowgoose*) 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO (*Operation Crocodile*) 8

EGYPT: MFO (*Operation Calumet*) 55; 1 MP team

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact)* 250; 1 SF trg gp;
1 hel flt with 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*) hel 1 med unit;
NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 17

KUWAIT: *Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact)* 2 C-130J-30
Hercules (CC-130J)

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (*Operation Reassurance*) 540; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy; LAV 6.0; M777

MALI: UN • MINUSMA (*Operation Presence*) 5

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (*Operation Jade*) 5

NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM

ROMANIA: NATO • Air Policing 135; 6 F/A-18A *Hornet* (CF-18)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • *Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold)* 5

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (*Operation Soprano*) 6

UKRAINE: *Operation Unifier* 200

FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 *Gazelle* AH1


United States 140

United States US

United States Dollar USD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD	20.9tr	22.9tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	63,358	69,375	
Growth	%	-3.4	6.0	
Inflation	%	1.2	4.3	
Def exp [a]	USD	785bn	811bn	
Def bdgt [b]	USD	775bn	754bn	768bn

[a] NATO figure

[b] National Defense Budget Function (50) Budget Authority. Includes DoD funding, as well as funds for nuclear-weapons-related activities undertaken by the Department of Energy. Excludes some military retirement and healthcare costs.



Population 334,998,398

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.4%	3.2%	3.3%	3.5%	22.1%	7.7%
Female	9.0%	3.1%	3.2%	3.4%	22.5%	9.5%

Capabilities

The United States remains the world's most capable military power, with a unique ability to project power on a global basis. In March 2021, the Biden administration issued an Interim National Security Strategic Guidance which heralded international re-engagement and the end of what it termed the US's 'forever wars'. It announced a new Global Posture Review that would mainly focus on the Indo-Pacific and Europe with more qualified attention on the Middle East. The manner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan led to concerns and unease among allies and partners about future US engagements. The US defence secretary has called for an 'integrated deterrence' strategy across the domains but also with allies and partners. The Biden administration has also begun a Nuclear Posture Review, after the previous Trump administration review in 2018 backed the development of low-yield warheads and a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. A Missile Defense Review was published in January 2019 envisaging a number of new programmes and technologies, including space-based systems. In August 2019 the Pentagon established a new Space Command followed by the establishment of a Space Force in December 2019, subsequently endorsed by the Biden administration. In June 2020 it also published a Defense Space Strategy. The US maintains an all-volunteer force, including significant reserves, with high levels of training throughout all commands and services. The Pentagon is trying to improve readiness. Modernisation priorities include a renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class of ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, and also improved naval capabilities that are likely to include both crewed and uninhabited platforms. In August 2019, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and three weeks later conducted a ground-launched cruise-missile test. Under President Biden, the US agreed to extend the New START treaty in February 2021 but in May 2021 confirmed it would not rejoin the Open Skies Treaty (from which the US had withdrawn in November 2020). The US also continues to actively

develop its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. The country has the world's most capable defence industry, active in all sectors and with a dominant position in the international defence market.

ACTIVE 1,395,350 (Army 489,050 Navy 349,600 Air Force 329,400 Space Force 6,400 US Marine Corps 179,250 US Coast Guard 41,650)

RESERVE 843,450 (Army 522,300 Navy 100,450 Air Force 178,600 Marine Corps Reserve 35,850 US Coast Guard 6,250)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

US Strategic Command

HQ at Offutt AFB (NE). Five missions: US nuclear deterrent; missile defence; global strike; info ops; ISR

US Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 *Ohio* with up to 20 UGM-133A *Trident* D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

US Air Force • Global Strike Command

FORCES BY ROLE

MISSILE

9 sqn with LGM-30G *Minuteman* III

BOMBER

5 sqn with B-52H *Stratofortress*

2 sqn with B-2A *Spirit* (+1 ANG sqn personnel only)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G *Minuteman* III (1 Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)

AIRCRAFT

BBR 66: 20 B-2A *Spirit*; 46 B-52H *Stratofortress*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B

Strategic Defenses – Early Warning

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) – a combined US–CAN organisation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RADAR

NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50: 14 AN/FPS-117; 36 AN/FPS-124

SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM (SSPARS) 5 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar located at Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod SFS (MA), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL) and RAF Fylingdales (UK)

SPACETRACK SYSTEM 7: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at Cavalier SFS (ND), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL), RAF Fylingdales (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod SFS (MA); 3 Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)

PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/FPQ-16 at Cavalier SFS (ND)

DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA)

GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS) Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)

STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES

SEA-BASED: *Aegis* engagement cruisers and destroyers

LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at Vandenburg SFB (CA)

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 142

COMMUNICATIONS 46: 6 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 *Milstar-I*; 3 *Milstar-II*; 5 MUOS; 1 PAN-1 (P360); 5 SDS-III; 2 SDS-IV; 6 UFO; 10 WGS SV2

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 30: 12 NAVSTAR Block IIF; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIR; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIRM; 4 NAVSTAR Block III

METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 6 DMSP-5

ISR 18: 5 *FIA Radar*; 6 *Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal* (visible and infrared imagery); 2 *Lacrosse (Onyx radar imaging satellite)*; 1 NRO L-71; 1 NRO L-76; 1 ORS-1; 1 *TacSat-4*; 1 *TacSat-6*

ELINT/SIGINT 27: 2 *Mentor (advanced Orion)*; 3 *Advanced Mentor*; 4 *Mercury*; 1 NRO L-67; 1 *Trumpet*; 4 *Improved Trumpet*; 12 SBWASS (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System; Naval Ocean Surveillance System)

SPACE SURVEILLANCE 6: 4 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5

EARLY WARNING 9: 4 DSP; 5 SBIRS *Geo-1*

COUNTERSPACE • **EW** Counter Communications System (CCS)

US Army 489,050

FORCES BY ROLE

Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized

COMMAND

4 (I, III, V & XVIII AB) corps HQ

1 (2nd) inf div HQ

1 (56th) arty comd

SPECIAL FORCES

(see USSOCOM)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 (1st Armd & 1st Cav) armd div (3 (1st–3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde)

1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)

1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 lt inf bn; 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)

Mechanised

1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (1st & 2nd SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde)

1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn))

1 (1st SBCT, 25th ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)

2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn)

Light

1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (1st–3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)

1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)

5 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (82nd) AB div (1 (1st AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 1 mech coy; 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (2nd & 3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)

1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)

1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)

1 (4th AB BCT, 25th ID) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)

Other

1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav sqn, 1 CSS bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn)

1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn (forming))

1 MRL bde (5 MRL bn)

4 engr bde

2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn)

10 int bde

2 int gp

4 MP bde

1 NBC bde

3 (strat) sigs bde

4 (tac) sigs bde

1 (1st MDTF) cbt spt bde (1 (I2CEWS) cbt spt bn)

1 (2nd MDTF) cbt spt bde(-)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 2 log bde
- 3 med bde
- 1 tpt bde

ISR

- 1 ISR avn bde

HELICOPTER

- 2 (cbt avn) hel bde
- 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ

AIR DEFENCE

- 5 SAM bde

Reserve Organisations**Army National Guard 337,150 reservists**

Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civil-emergency responses can be mobilised by state governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

- 8 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

(see USSOCOM)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

- 1 armd recce sqn

Armoured

- 5 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)

Mechanised

- 2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)

Light

- 14 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
- 6 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
- 1 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-)
- 4 inf bn

Air Manoeuvr

- 1 AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 8 arty bde
- 1 SP arty bn
- 8 engr bde
- 1 EOD regt
- 3 int bde
- 3 MP bde
- 1 NBC bde
- 2 (tac) sigs bde
- 17 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 10 log bde
- 17 (regional) log spt gp

HELICOPTER

- 8 (cbt avn) hel bde
- 5 (theatre avn) hel bde

AIR DEFENCE

- 3 SAM bde

Army Reserve 185,150 reservists

Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have state-emergency liability of Army National Guard

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

(see USSOCOM)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 4 engr bde
- 4 MP bde
- 2 NBC bde
- 2 sigs bde
- 3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 9 log bde
- 11 med bde

HELICOPTER

- 2 (exp cbt avn) hel bde

Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists

Trained individuals for mobilisation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 2,645: €650 M1A1 SA *Abrams*; 1,605 M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; €390 M1A2 SEPv3 *Abrams*; (€3,450 more M1A1/A2 *Abrams* in store)

ASLT €100 M1128 *Stryker* MGS (being divested 2022)

RECCE 1,745: €1,200 M3A2/A3 *Bradley*; 545 M1127 *Stryker* RV (€800 more M3 *Bradley* in store)

IFV 2,931: €14 LAV-25; €2,500 M2A2/A3 *Bradley*; 334 M7A3/SA BFIST (OP); 83 M1296 *Stryker Dragoon* (€2,000 more M2 *Bradley* in store)

APC 10,607

APC (T) 5,060: 60 AMPV (in test); €5,000 M113A2/A3 (€8,000 more in store)

APC (W) 2,613: 1,467 M1126 *Stryker* ICV; 296 M1130 *Stryker* CV (CP); 167 M1131 *Stryker* FSV (OP); 258 M1133 *Stryker* MEV (Amb); 21 M1251A1 *Stryker* FSV (OP); 46 M1254A1 *Stryker* MEV (Amb); 52 M1255A1 *Stryker* CV (CP); 306 M1256A1 *Stryker* ICV

PPV 2,934: 2,633 *MaxxPro Dash*; 301 *MaxxPro* LWB (Amb)

AUV 19,516+: 10,500+ JLTV; 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200 *Armored Knight* (OP); 5,651 M-ATV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 553: €135 M1150 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 152 M1132 *Stryker* ESV; 16 M1257A1 *Stryker* ESV

ARV 1,260+: 360 M88A1; €900 M88A2 (€1,000 more M88A1 in store); some M578

VLB 365: €230 M60 AVLB; 75 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge; 20 REBS; 40 *Wolverine* HAB

MW 3+: *Aardvark* JSFU Mk4; some *Husky* 2G; 3+ *Hydrema* 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; *Rhino*

NBC VEHICLES 234 M1135 *Stryker* NBCRV**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL**

SP 1,133: 120 M1134 *Stryker* ATGM; 13 M1253A1 *Stryker* ATGM; €1,000 M1167 HMMWV TOW

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 5,123

SP 155mm 689: ε514 M109A6; 175 M109A7 (ε850 more M109A6 in store)

TOWED 1,339: 105mm 821 M119A2/3; 155mm 518 M777A2

MRL 227mm 588: 363 M142 HIMARS; 225 M270A1 MLRS

MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/M1064A3; SP 120mm 441; 378 M1129 *Stryker* MC; 63 M1252A1 *Stryker* MC

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM-168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or M142 HIMARS MRLs)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 7

LSL 7 *Frank Besson* (capacity 24 *Abrams* MBT)

LANDING CRAFT 70

LCT 34 LCU 2000 (capacity 5 M1 *Abrams* MBT)

LCM 36 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 M1 *Abrams* MBT or 200 troops)

AIRCRAFT

ISR 47: 8 EMARSS-G; 4 EMARSS-V; 8 EMARSS-M; 19 RC-12X *Guardrail* (5 trg); 8 RO-6A ARL-E

SIGINT 2 CL-600 *Artemis*

ELINT 9: 4 EMARSS-S; 4 EO-5C ARL-M (COMINT/ELINT); 1 TO-5C (trg)

TPT 156: Light 152: 113 Beech A200 *King Air* (C-12 *Huron*); 28 Cessna 560 *Citation* (UC-35A/B); 11 SA-227 *Metro* (C-26E); PAX 4: 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20F); 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 1 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B)

TRG 4 T-6D *Texan* II

HELICOPTERS

ATK 740: ε310 AH-64D *Apache*; ε430 AH-64E *Apache*

SAR 306: 19 HH-60L *Black Hawk*; 287 HH-60M *Black Hawk* (medevac)

TPT 2,766: Heavy 450 CH-47F *Chinook*; Medium 1,794: ε50 UH-60A *Black Hawk*; ε900 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; 838 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; 6 UH-60V *Black Hawk*; Light 522: 457 UH-72A *Lakota*; 65 UH-1H/V *Iroquois*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 416

CISR • Heavy ε180 MQ-1C *Gray Eagle*

ISR • Medium 236 RQ-7B *Shadow*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 1,187+

Long-range 480 M902/M903 *Patriot* PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE

Short-range *Iron Dome*; NASAMS

Point-defence 457+: FIM-92 *Stinger*; 4 M-SHORAD; 453 M1097 *Avenger*

GUNS • Towed • 20mm *Phalanx* (LPWS)

MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 42 THAAD

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114K/L/M/N/R *Hellfire* II; AGM-179A JAGM; APKWS

US Navy 349,600

Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. 6 Fleets: 2nd – Atlantic; 3rd – Pacific; 4th – Caribbean, Central and South America; 5th – Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea; 6th – Mediterranean; 7th – Indian Ocean, East Asia, W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC); Naval Reserve Force (NRF). For Naval Special Warfare Command, see US Special Operations Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 67

STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 *Ohio* (opcon US STRATCOM) with up to 20 UGM-133A *Trident* D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

TACTICAL 53

SSGN 51:

4 *Ohio* (mod) with 22 7-cell MAC VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

6 *Los Angeles* Flight II with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

22 *Los Angeles* Flight III with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

10 *Virginia* Flight I/II with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

8 *Virginia* Flight III with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

1 *Virginia* Flight IV with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

SSN 2 *Seawolf* (one other non-operational after collision in 2021, extent of damage unclear) with 8 single 660mm TT with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 124

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11:

1 *Gerald R. Ford* with 2 octuple Mk 29 mod 5 GMLS with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 mod 3 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (typical capacity 75+ F/A-18E/F *Super Hornet* FGA ac; F-35C *Lightning* II FGA ac; E-2D *Hawkeye* AEW&C ac; EA-18G *Growler* EW ac; MH-60R *Seahawk* ASW hel; MH-60S *Knight Hawk* MRH hel)

10 *Nimitz* with 2 8-cell Mk29 GMLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (typical capacity 55 F/A-18E/F *Super Hornet* FGA ac; F-35C *Lightning* II FGA ac; 4 EA-18G *Growler* EW ac; 4 E-2C/D *Hawkeye* AEW ac; 6 MH-60R/S *Seahawk/Knight Hawk* hel)

CRUISERS • CGHM 24:

22 *Ticonderoga* (of which 5 in modernisation programme and 2 more at Reduced Readiness) with *Aegis* Baseline 5/6/8/9 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASM, 16 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of

which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R *Seahawk*/MH-60S *Knight Hawk* hel)

2 *Zumwalt* with 20 4-cell Mk 57 VLS with RGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/RIM-162 ESSM SAM/SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 155mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R *Seahawk* ASW hel or 1 MH-60R *Seahawk* ASW hel and 3 *Fire Scout* UAV)

DESTROYERS 68:

DDGHM 40:

5 *Arleigh Burke* Flight IIA with *Aegis* Baseline 5/9 C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R *Seahawk*/MH-60S *Knight Hawk* hel)

35 *Arleigh Burke* Flight IIA with *Aegis* Baseline 6/7/9 C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R *Seahawk*/MH-60S *Knight Hawk* hel) (of which 1 vessel also with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 and 2 vessels also with 1 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) LWS)

DDGM 28 *Arleigh Burke* Flight I/II with *Aegis* Baseline 5/9 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (of which 3 vessels with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B instead of 2 *Phalanx*), 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FRIGATES 21:

FFGHM 4 *Independence* with 2 quad Inchr with NSM (RGM-184A) AShM, 1 11-cell SeaRAM Inchr with RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S *Seahawk*/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 *Fire Scout* UAV)

FFHM 17:

9 *Freedom* with 1 21-cell Mk 49 Inchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S *Seahawk*/Knight Hawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 *Fire Scout* UAV)

8 *Independence* with 1 11-cell SeaRAM Inchr with RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S *Seahawk*/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 *Fire Scout* UAV)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 86

PCFG 10 *Cyclone* with 1 quad Mk 208 Inchr with BGM-176B *Griffin B* SSM

PBF 76: 12 Mk VI; 32 Combatant Craft Assault; 2 Combatant Craft Heavy; 30 Combatant Craft Medium Mk 1

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8

MCO 8 *Avenger*

COMMAND SHIPS

LCC 2 *Blue Ridge* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCPV; 700 troops; 1 med hel) (of which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military Sealift Command personnel)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 31:

LHA 2 *America* with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity up to 29 ac/hel incl: 6-13 F-35B *Lightning II* FGA ac (possible 20 as full '*Lightning* carrier'; 4 AH-1Z *Viper* atk hel; up to 12 MV-22B *Osprey* tpt ac; 2 MH-60S *Knight Hawk* MRH; 4 CH-53E *Sea Stallion* tpt hel; 2 UH-1Y *Iroquois* tpt hel; up to 1,800 troops)

LHD 7 *Wasp* with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity up to 23 ac/hel incl: 6 AV-8B *Harrier II* FGA or F-35B *Lightning II* FGA ac (possible 20 F-35B as full '*Lightning* carrier'; 4 AH-1Z *Viper* atk hel; 4 CH-53E *Sea Stallion* hel; up to 6 MV-22B *Osprey* tpt ac; 3 UH-1Y *Iroquois* tpt hel; 3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops)

LPD 11 *San Antonio* with 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM (1 vessel also fitted with 1 Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) LWS) (capacity 2 CH-53E *Sea Stallion* hel or 2 MV-22 *Osprey*; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAV; 720 troops)

LSD 11:

4 *Harpers Ferry* with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E *Sea Stallion* hel; 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops)

7 *Whidbey Island* with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E *Sea Stallion* hel; 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 143:

LCU 32 LCU 1610 (capacity either 1 M1 *Abrams* MBT or 350 troops)

LCM 8 LCM 8

LCP 33 Maritime Positioning Force Utility Boat (MPF-UB)

LCAC 70: 68 LCAC(L) (MLU ongoing) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops); 2 Ship To Shore Connector (SSC) (capacity 1 MBT or 145 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

AFDL 1 *Dynamic*

AGOR 6 (all leased out): 2 *Ocean*; 3 *Thomas G. Thompson*; 1 *Kilo Moana*

ARD 2

AX 1 *Prevail*

ESB 3 *Lewis B. Puller* (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel)

UUV (1 *Cutthroat* for testing)

MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3

Naval Reserve Forces 100,450**Selected Reserve 57,700****Individual Ready Reserve 42,750****Naval Inactive Fleet**

Notice for reactivation:

60–90 days minimum (still on naval-vessel register)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2**FFH 2: 1 *Freedom* with 1 57mm gun; 1 *Independence* with 1 57mm gun**AMPHIBIOUS 4**LHA 3 *Tarawa*LSD 1 *Whidbey Island***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4**AOE 2 *Supply*ARS 2 *Safeguard***Military Sealift Command (MSC)****Fleet Oiler (PM1)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15**AOR 15 *Henry J. Kaiser* with 1 hel landing platform**Special Mission (PM2)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21**AGM 3: 1 *Howard O. Lorenzen*; 1 *Invincible* (commercial operator); 1 Sea-based X-band radarAGOR 6 *Pathfinder*AGOS 5: 1 *Impeccable* (commercial operator); 4 *Victorious*AGS 1 *Waters*ARC 1 *Zeus*AS 5 (long-term chartered, of which 1 *Dominator*, 4 *Arrowhead*)**Prepositioning (PM3)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14**AG 2: 1 *V Adm K.R. Wheeler*; 1 *Fast Tempo*AKR 5: 2 *Bob Hope*; 1 *Stockham*; 2 *Watson*AKRH 5 2nd Lt *John P. Bobo*ESD 2 *Montford Point***Service Support (PM4)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12**AH 2 *Mercy* with 1 hel landing platformARS 2 *Safeguard*AS 4: 1 *Carolyn Chouest*; 2 *Emory S. Land*; 1 *Malama* (long-term chartered)ATF 4: 1 *Gary Chouest*; 3 *Powhatan***Sealift (PM5)**

(At a minimum of 4 days' readiness)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25**AOT 1 *Maersk Peary* (long-term chartered)AK 9: 3 Sgt *Matej Kocak*; 1 1st Lt *Harry L. Martin*;1 LCpl *Roy M. Wheat*; 2 LTC *John U.D. Page*; 1 Maj.*Bernard F. Fisher*; 1 CPT *David I. Lyon*AKR 15: 5 *Bob Hope*; 2 *Gordon*; 2 *Shughart*; 6 *Watson***Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16**AOE 2 *Supply*AKEH 14 *Lewis and Clark***Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14**AP 2 *Guam*EPF 12 *Spearhead***Dry Cargo and Tankers****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7**AK 3 (long-term chartered, of which 1 MV *Maersk Valencia*; 1 *Sea Eagle*; 1 SLNC *Corsica*)AOT 4 (long-term chartered, of which 2 *Empire State*; 1 SLNC *Pax*; 1 SLNC *Goodwill*)**US Maritime Administration (MARAD)****National Defense Reserve Fleet****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25**AGOS 2 *General Rudder*AGM 2: 1 *Pacific Collector*; 1 *Pacific Tracker*AK 11: 2 *Cape Ann* (breakbulk); 1 *Cape Chalmers* (breakbulk); 2 *Cape Farewell*; 1 *Cape Fear*; 2 *Cape Jacob*; 1 *Cape Nome* (breakbulk); 1 *Del Monte* (breakbulk); 1 *Savannah*AOT 4: 1 *Lawrence H. Gianella*; 3 *Paul Buck*AP 4: 1 *Empire State VI*; 1 *Golden Bear*; 1 *Kennedy*; 1 *State of Maine*AX 2: 1 *Freedom Star*; 1 *Kings Pointer***Ready Reserve Force**

Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42**ACS 6: 2 *Flickertail State*; 1 *Gopher State*; 3 *Keystone State*AK 2 *Wright* (breakbulk)AKR 33: 1 *Adm W.M. Callaghan*; 4 *Algol*; 4 *Cape Capella*; 1 *Cape Decision*; 4 *Cape Ducato*; 1 *Cape Edmont*; 1 *Cape Henry*; 2 *Cape Hudson*; 2 *Cape Knox*; 4 *Cape Island*; 1 *Cape Orlando*; 1 *Cape Race*; 1 *Cape Trinity*; 2 *Cape Trinity*; 2 *Cape Victory*; 2 *Cape Washington*AOT 1 *Petersburg***Naval Aviation 98,600**

10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A-18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with MH-60S

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

- 22 sqn with F/A-18E *Super Hornet*
- 10 sqn with F/A-18F *Super Hornet*
- 1 sqn with F-35C *Lightning II*
- 1 sqn (forming) with F-35C *Lightning II*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

- 12 sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*
- 3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*; MQ-8B *Fire Scout*

ELINT

- 1 sqn with EP-3E *Aries II*

ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE

- 13 sqn with EA-18G *Growler*

MARITIME PATROL

- 12 sqn with P-8A *Poseidon*
- 1 (special projects) sqn with P-8A *Poseidon*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

- 4 sqn with E-2C *Hawkeye*
- 5 sqn with E-2D *Hawkeye*

COMMAND & CONTROL

- 2 sqn with E-6B *Mercury*

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

- 2 sqn with MH-53E *Sea Dragon*

TRANSPORT

- 2 sqn with CMV-22B *Osprey* (forming)
- 2 sqn with C-2A *Greyhound*

TRAINING

- 1 (FRS) sqn with EA-18G *Growler*
- 1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A *Greyhound*; E-2C/D *Hawkeye*; TE-2C *Hawkeye*
- 1 sqn with E-6B *Mercury*
- 2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18E/F *Super Hornet*
- 1 (FRS) sqn with F-35C *Lightning II*
- 1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 *Sea Dragon*
- 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*; HH-60H *Seahawk*
- 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*
- 1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C *Orion*; P-8A *Poseidon*
- 6 sqn with T-6A/B *Texan II*
- 2 sqn with T-44C *Pegasus*
- 5 sqn with T-45C *Goshawk*
- 3 hel sqn with TH-57B/C *Sea Ranger*
- 1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B *Fire Scout*; MQ-8C *Fire Scout*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 13 sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*
- 2 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*; MQ-8B *Fire Scout*; MQ-8C *Fire Scout*

ISR UAV

- 1 sqn with MQ-4C *Triton*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 954 combat capable

- FGA 672: 10 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16B *Fighting Falcon*; 35 F-35C *Lightning II*; 5 F/A-18B *Hornet*; 16 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 4 F/A-18D *Hornet*; 319 F/A-18E *Super Hornet*; 279 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*
- ASW 124: 14 P-3C *Orion*; 110 P-8A *Poseidon*
- EW 158 EA-18G *Growler**
- ELINT 9 EP-3E *Aries II*
- AEW&C 74: 26 E-2C *Hawkeye*; 48 E-2D *Hawkeye*
- C2 16 E-6B *Mercury*

TKR/TPT 3: 1 KC-130R *Hercules*; 1 KC-130T *Hercules*; 1 KC-130J *Hercules*

TPT • **Light** 54: 4 Beech A200 *King Air* (C-12C *Huron*); 6 Beech A200 *King Air* (UC-12F *Huron*); 8 Beech A200 *King Air* (UC-12M *Huron*); 27 C-2A *Greyhound*; 2 DHC-2 *Beaver* (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC *Metro III* (C-26D)

TRG 577: 44 T-6A *Texan II*; 231 T-6B *Texan II*; 7 T-38C *Talon*; 55 T-44C *Pegasus*; 238 T-45C *Goshawk*; 2 TE-2C *Hawkeye*

TILTROTOR • TPT 15 CMV-22B *Osprey*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 271 MH-60R *Seahawk*

MRH 258 MH-60S *Knight Hawk* (Multi Mission Support)

MCM 28 MH-53E *Sea Dragon*

ISR 3 OH-58C *Kiowa*

TPT 13: **Heavy** 2 CH-53E *Sea Stallion*; **Medium** 3 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; **Light** 8: 5 UH-72A *Lakota*; 2 UH-1N *Iroquois*; 1 UH-1Y *Venom*

TRG 134: 43 TH-57B *Sea Ranger*; 76 TH-57C *Sea Ranger*; 15 TH-73A

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 113

Heavy 63: 5 MQ-4C *Triton*; 20 MQ-8B *Fire Scout*; 34 MQ-8C *Fire Scout*; 4 RQ-4A *Global Hawk* (evaluation and trials); **Medium** 35 RQ-2B *Pioneer*; **Light** 15 RQ-21A *Blackjack*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; SARH AIM-7 *Sparrow* (being withdrawn); ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65F *Maverick*; AGM-114B/K/M *Hellfire*; APKWS

ASHM AGM-84D *Harpoon*; AGM-119A *Penguin 3*; AGM-158C LRASM

ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM

ALCM • **Conventional** AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER

BOMBS

Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 *Paveway II*; GBU-24 *Paveway III*

INS/GPS guided: GBU-31/32/38 JDAM; Enhanced *Paveway II*; GBU-54 *Laser JDAM*; AGM-154A/C/C-1 JSOW

Naval Aviation Reserve**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

- 1 sqn with F/A-18E/F *Super Hornet*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

- 1 sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

- 1 sqn with EA-18G *Growler*

MARITIME PATROL

- 2 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

TRANSPORT

- 6 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A *Clipper*)
- 1 log spt sqn with Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B)
- 5 sqn with C-130T/KC-130T *Hercules*

TRAINING

- 2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N *Tiger II*
- 1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 67 combat capable

FTR 31: 2 F-5F *Tiger II*; 29 F-5N *Tiger II*

FGA 24: 10 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 2 F/A-18D *Hornet*; 10 F/A-18E *Super Hornet*; 2 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*

ASW 7 P-3C *Orion*

EW 5 EA-18G *Growler**

TKR/TPT 11 KC-130T *Hercules*

TPT 40: **Medium** 19 C-130T *Hercules*; **PAX** 21: 17 B-737-700 (C-40A *Clipper*); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 3 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 5 MH-60R *Seahawk*

MRH 12 MH-60S *Knight Hawk*

MCM 6 MH-53E *Sea Dragon*

US Marine Corps 179,250

3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce coy, 1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty, 1 cbt engr pl), an aviation combat element (1 medium-lift sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets) and a composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2,200 personnel. Composition varies with mission requirements

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

(see USSOCOM)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

3 (MEF) recce coy

Amphibious

1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (4 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)

1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)

1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 inf regt (3 inf bn), 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce coy, 1 amph aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 log gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

IFV 488 LAV-25

APC • **APC (W)** 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14 EW)

AAV 1,254: 1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles); 54 ACV (in test)

AUV 6,129+: 1,725 *Cougar*; 3,700+ *JLTV*; 704 M-ATV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 42 M1 ABV

ARV 105: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R

MW 38 *Buffalo*; some *Husky* 2G

VLB ε30 M60 AVLB

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 106 LAV-AT

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; FGM-172B SRAW-MPV; TOW

ARTILLERY 1,459

TOWED 812: **105mm**: 331 M101A1; **155mm** 481 M777A2

MRL **227mm** 47 M142 HIMARS

MOR 600: **81mm** 535 M252; **SP 81mm** 65 LAV-M; **120mm** (49 EFSS in store for trg)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Light** 100 BQM-147 *Exdrone*

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Point-defence** FIM-92 *Stinger*

Marine Corps Aviation 34,700

3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1 MCR MAW

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

1 sqn with F/A-18A++/C/C+ *Hornet*

3 sqn with F/A-18C *Hornet*

2 sqn with F/A-18D *Hornet*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with AV-8B *Harrier II*

5 sqn with F-35B *Lightning II*

1 sqn with F-35C *Lightning II*

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 *King Air* (UC-12F/M

Huron); Beech 350 *King Air* (UC-12W *Huron*); Cessna

560 *Citation Ultra/Encore* (UC-35C/D); Gulfstream IV (C-20G)

TANKER

3 sqn with KC-130J *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

16 sqn with MV-22B *Osprey*

TRAINING

1 sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

2 sqn with F-35B *Lightning II*

1 sqn with MV-22B *Osprey*

1 hel sqn with AH-1Z *Viper*; UH-1Y *Venom*

1 hel sqn with CH-53E *Sea Stallion*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

7 sqn with AH-1Z *Viper*; UH-1Y *Venom*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

8 sqn with CH-53E *Sea Stallion*

1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B *Osprey*; VH-3D *Sea King*;

VH-60N *White Hawk*

CISR UAV

1 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

ISR UAV

2 sqn with RQ-21A *Blackjack*

AIR DEFENCE

2 bn with M1097 *Avenger*; FIM-92 *Stinger*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 366 combat capable

FGA 366: 112 F-35B *Lightning II*; 15 F-35C *Lightning II*; 10 F/A-18A++ *Hornet*; 70 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 1 F/A-18C+ *Hornet*; 50 F/A-18D *Hornet*; 95 AV-8B *Harrier II*; 13 TAV-8B *Harrier*

TKR/TPT 44 KC-130J *Hercules*

TPT 17: **Light** 16: 5 Beech A200/B200 *King Air* (UC-12F/M *Huron*); 5 Beech 350 *King Air* (C-12W *Huron*); 6 Cessna 560 *Citation Encore* (UC-35D); **PAX** 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20G)

TRG 3 T-34C *Turbo Mentor*
TILTROTOR • TPT 309 MV-22B Osprey
HELICOPTERS

ATK 131 AH-1Z *Viper*
TPT 291: Heavy 140: 136 CH-53E *Sea Stallion*; 4 CH-53K *King Stallion* (in test); **Medium** 23: 11 VH-3D *Sea King* (VIP tpt); 8 VH-60N *White Hawk* (VIP tpt); 4 VH-92A (in test); **Light** 128 UH-1Y *Venom*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 2 MQ-9A *Reaper*
ISR • Light 80 RQ-21A *Blackjack*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*; M1097 *Avenger*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M *Sidewinder*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7P *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120C *AMRAAM*

ASM AGM-65E/F *IR Maverick*; AGM-114 *Hellfire*; AGM-176 *Griffin*; APKWS

ASHM AGM-84D *Harpoon*

ARM AGM-88 *HARM*

LACM AGM-84E/H/K *SLAM/SLAM-ER*

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-10/-12/-16 *Paveway II*
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 *JDAM*; AGM-154A/C/C-1 *JSOW*

Reserve Organisations

Marine Corps Reserve 35,850

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

2 MEF *recce coy*

Amphibious

1 (4th) *mne div* (1 *armd recce bn*, 1 *recce bn*, 2 *mne regt* (3 *mne bn*), 1 *amph aslt bn*, 1 *arty regt* (2 *arty bn*, 1 *MRL bn*), 1 *cbt engr bn*, 1 *int bn*, 1 *sigs bn*)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 *log gp*

Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 *sqn* with F/A-18A++/C+ *Hornet*

TANKER

2 *sqn* with KC-130J *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

2 *sqn* with MV-22B *Osprey*

TRAINING

1 *sqn* with F-5F/N *Tiger II*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 *sqn* with AH-1Z *Viper*; UH-1Y *Venom*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 *sqn* with CH-53E *Sea Stallion*

ISR UAV

1 *sqn* with RQ-21A *Blackjack*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 33 *combat capable*

FTR 12: 1 F-5F *Tiger II*; 11 F-5N *Tiger II*

FGA 21: 15 F/A-18A++ *Hornet*; 6 F/A-18C+ *Hornet*

TKR/TPT 14 KC-130J *Hercules*

TPT • Light 8: 2 *Beech 350 King Air* (UC-12W *Huron*); 2 *Cessna 560 Citation Ultra* (UC-35C); 4 *Cessna 560 Citation Encore* (UC-35D)

TILTROTOR • TPT 24 MV-22B Osprey

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 AH-1Z *Viper*

TPT 30: Heavy 8 CH-53E *Sea Stallion*; **Light** 22 UH-1Y *Venom*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light 20 RQ-21A *Blackjack*

Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists

Trained individuals available for mobilisation

US Coast Guard 41,650

9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 343

PSO 23: 1 *Alex Haley*; 13 *Famous*; 9 *Legend* with 1 *Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS*, 1 57mm *gun* (capacity 2 *MH-65 hel*)

PCO 59: 14 *Reliance* (with 1 *hel landing platform*); 45 *Sentinel* (Damen 4708)

PCC 17 *Island*

PBF 174 *Response Boat-Medium* (RB-M)

PBI 70 *Marine Protector*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 65

ABU 52: 16 *Juniper*; 4 *WLI*; 14 *Keeper*; 18 *WLR*

AGB 12: 9 *Bay*; 1 *Mackinaw*; 1 *Healy*; 1 *Polar* (1 *Polar* in *reserve*)

AXS 1 *Eagle*

US Coast Guard Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

SAR 42: 11 HC-130H *Hercules*; 13 HC-130J *Hercules*; 10 HC-144A; 8 HC-144B

TPT 16: **Medium** 14 C-27J *Spartan*; **PAX** 2 *Gulfstream V* (C-37A)

HELICOPTERS

SAR 146: 44 MH-60T *Jayhawk*; 102 AS366G1 (MH-65C/D) *Dauphin II*

US Air Force (USAF) 329,400

Almost the entire USAF (plus active-force ANG and AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000–15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role *fr* and *bbr ac*, 31 *intra-theatre* *refuelling aircraft* and 13 *aircraft* for *ISR* and *EW missions*

Global Strike Command (GSC)

2 *active air forces* (8th & 20th); 8 *wg*

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

9 *ICBM sqn* with LGM-30G *Minuteman III*

BOMBER

4 *sqn* with B-1B *Lancer*

2 *sqn* with B-2A *Spirit*

5 *sqn* (incl 1 *trg*) with B-52H *Stratofortress*

COMMAND & CONTROL

1 sqn with E-4B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 sqn with UH-1N *Iroquois*

Air Combat Command (ACC)

2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

3 sqn with F-22A *Raptor*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with F-15E *Strike Eagle*

3 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (+6 sqn personnel only)

3 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*

GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II* (+1 sqn personnel only)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EA-18G *Growler* (personnel only – USN aircraft)

2 sqn with EC-130H *Compass Call*

ISR

2 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (personnel only)

5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135

2 sqn with U-2S

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

5 sqn with E-3 *Sentry*

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

2 sqn with HC-130J *Combat King II*

1 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

1 sqn with HH-60W *Jolly Green II* (forming)

TRAINING

1 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

1 sqn with E-3 *Sentry*

2 sqn with F-15E *Strike Eagle*

1 sqn with F-22A *Raptor*

1 sqn with RQ-4A *Global Hawk*; TU-2S

1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

COMBAT/ISR UAV

9 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

ISR UAV

2 sqn with RQ-4B *Global Hawk*

2 sqn with RQ-170 *Sentinel*

1 sqn with RQ-180

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)

Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South Korea. 3 active air forces (5th, 7th, & 11th); 8 wg

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

2 sqn with F-15C/D *Eagle*

2 sqn with F-22A *Raptor* (+1 sqn personnel only)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

5 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

2 sqn with E-3 *Sentry*

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

TANKER

1 sqn with KC-135R (+1 sqn personnel only)

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A)

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* (+1 sqn personnel only)

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with Beech 1900C (C-12J); UH-1N *Huey*

TRAINING

1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

United States Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces in Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA)

Provides the air component to both EUCOM and AFRICOM. 1 active air force (3rd); 5 wg

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

1 sqn with F-15C/D *Eagle*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-15E *Strike Eagle*

3 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II* (forming)

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

TANKER

1 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

2 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Learjet 35A (C-21A); B-737-700 (C-40B)

Air Mobility Command (AMC)

Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 12 wg and 1 gp

FORCES BY ROLE**TANKER**

3 sqn with KC-10A *Extender*

1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus*

1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus* (forming)

8 sqn with KC-135R/T *Stratotanker* (+2 sqn with personnel only)

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A)

1 VIP sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Gulfstream 550 (C-37B)

1 VIP sqn with VC-25 *Air Force One*

2 sqn with C-5M *Super Galaxy*

8 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster III* (+1 sqn personnel only)

5 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules* (+1 sqn personnel only)

1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A)

Air Education and Training Command

1 active air force (2nd), 10 active air wg and 1 gp

FORCES BY ROLE

TRAINING

- 1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster III*
- 1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*
- 4 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*
- 5 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*
- 1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus*
- 1 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker*
- 5 (flying trg) sqn with T-1A *Jayhawk*
- 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-6A *Texan II*
- 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-38C *Talon*
- 5 UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G *Minuteman III* (1 Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)

AIRCRAFT 1,574 combat capable

BBR 123: 45 B-1B *Lancer*; 20 B-2A *Spirit*; 58 B-52H *Stratofortress* (46 nuclear capable)
FTR 261: 86 F-15C *Eagle*; 10 F-15D *Eagle*; 165 F-22A *Raptor*
FGA 1,055: 218 F-15E *Strike Eagle*; 2 F-15EX *Eagle II*; 439 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 111 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*; 285 F-35A *Lightning II*
ATK 135 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*
CSAR 16 HC-130J *Combat King II*
EW 13 EC-130H *Compass Call*
ISR 38: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 26 U-2S; 4 TU-2S; 2 WC-135 *Constant Phoenix*
ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V *Rivet Joint*; 9 RC-135W *Rivet Joint*; 3 RC-135S *Cobra Ball*; 2 RC-135U *Combat Sent*
AEW&C 31: 7 E-3B *Sentry*; 1 E-3C *Sentry*; 23 E-3G *Sentry*
C2 4 E-4B
TKR 156: 126 KC-135R *Stratotanker*; 30 KC-135T *Stratotanker*
TKR/TPT 82: 51 KC-10A *Extender*; 31 KC-46A *Pegasus*
TPT 333: **Heavy** 182: 36 C-5M *Super Galaxy*; 146 C-17A *Globemaster III*; **Medium** 105 C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 23: 4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 19 Learjet 35A (C-21A); **PAX** 23: 4 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 9 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 4 Gulfstream 550 (C-37B); 2 VC-25A *Air Force One*
TRG 1,126: 178 T-1A *Jayhawk*; 443 T-6A *Texan II*; 505 T-38A/C *Talon*

HELICOPTERS

CSAR 82: 74 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*; 8 HH-60W *Jolly Green II*
TPT • **Light** 62 UH-1N *Huey*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 261

CSAR • **Heavy** 210 MQ-9A *Reaper*
ISR • **Heavy** 47: 30 RQ-4B *Global Hawk*; ε10 RQ-170 *Sentinel*; ε7 RQ-180

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** FIM-92 *Stinger*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9M *Sidewinder*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7M *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120C/D *AMRAAM*
ASM AGM-65D/G *Maverick*; AGM-114K/M/N/R *Hellfire II*; AGM-130A; AGM-176 *Griffin*; APKWS

AShM AGM-158C *LRASM*

ALCM

Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM)

Conventional AGM-158A *JASSM*; AGM-158B *JASSM-ER*

ARM AGM-88B/C *HARM*

EW MALD/MALD-J

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU 10/12/16 *Paveway II*, GBU-24 *Paveway III*; GBU-28

INS/GPS guided GBU 31/32/38 *JDAM*; GBU-54 *Laser JDAM*; GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead or Mk84); GBU-39B *Small Diameter Bomb* (250lb); GBU-43B *MOAB*; GBU-53/B *Stormbreaker*; GBU-57A/B *MOP*; Enhanced *Paveway III*

Reserve Organisations Air National Guard

108,150 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

1 sqn with B-2A *Spirit* (personnel only)

FIGHTER

5 sqn with F-15C/D *Eagle*

1 sqn with F-22A *Raptor* (+1 sqn personnel only)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

10 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*

GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

ISR

1 sqn with E-8C *J-STARS*

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

3 sqn with HC-130J *Combat King II*

3 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

TANKER

1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus*

16 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker* (+1 sqn personnel only)

3 sqn with KC-135T *Stratotanker*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C)

6 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* (+2 sqn personnel only)

10 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H *Hercules*

4 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*

1 sqn with F-15C/D *Eagle*

4 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

COMBAT/ISR UAV

10 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 597 combat capable

FTR 157: 123 F-15C *Eagle*; 14 F-15D *Eagle*; 20 F-22A *Raptor*

FGA 355: 289 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 46 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*; 20 F-35A *Lightning II*

ATK 85 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

CSAR 12 HC-130J *Combat King II*

ISR 13 E-8C *J-STARS*

ELINT 11 RC-26B *Metroliner*
TKR 164: 140 KC-135R *Stratotanker*; 24 KC-135T *Stratotanker*
TKR/TPT 12 KC-46A *Pegasus*
TPT 194: **Heavy** 50 C-17A *Globemaster III*; **Medium** 141: 99 C-130H *Hercules*; 32 C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*; 10 LC-130H *Hercules*; **PAX** 3 B-737-700 (C-40C)
HELICOPTERS • **CSAR** 18 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*
UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • **CISR** • **Heavy** 24 MQ-9A *Reaper*

Air Force Reserve Command 70,450 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

1 sqn with B-52H *Stratofortress* (personnel only)

FIGHTER

2 sqn with F-22A *Raptor* (personnel only)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (+1 sqn personnel only)

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II* (personnel only)

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II* (+2 sqn personnel only)

ISR

1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130J *Hercules*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with E-3 *Sentry* (personnel only)

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with HC-130J *Combat King II*

2 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

TANKER

4 sqn with KC-10A *Extender* (personnel only)

1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus*

1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus* (personnel only)

6 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker* (+2 sqn personnel only)

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C)

2 sqn with C-5M *Super Galaxy* (+2 sqn personnel only)

3 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* (+9 sqn personnel only)

6 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 (aggressor) sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II*; F-15C/E *Eagle*; F-16 *Fighting Falcon*; F-22A *Raptor* (personnel only)

1 sqn with A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

1 sqn with B-52H *Stratofortress*

1 sqn with C-5M *Super Galaxy*

1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

5 (flying training) sqn with T-1A *Jayhawk*; T-6A *Texan II*; T-38C *Talon* (personnel only)

COMBAT/ISR UAV

2 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper* (personnel only)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with RQ-4B *Global Hawk* (personnel only)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 133 combat capable

BBR 18 B-52H *Stratofortress*

FGA 54: 52 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 2 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*

ATK 61 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*

CSAR 4 HC-130J *Combat King II*

ISR 10 WC-130J *Hercules* (Weather Recce)

TKR 62 KC-135R *Stratotanker*

TKR/TPT 7 KC-46A *Pegasus*

TPT 98: **Heavy** 42: 16 C-5M *Super Galaxy*; 26 C-17A *Globemaster III*; **Medium** 52: 42 C-130H *Hercules*; 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **PAX** 4 B-737-700 (C-40C)

HELICOPTERS • **CSAR** 16 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Commercial ac numbers fluctuate

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** 517 international (391 long-range and 126 short-range); 36 national

Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,850 reservists

Trained individuals for mobilisation

US Space Force 6,400

New service established December 2019, currently in the process of being stood up. Tasked with organising, training and equipping forces to protect US and allied space interests and to provide space capabilities to the joint Combatant Commands

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES see Space

COUNTERSPACE see Space

RADAR see Strategic Defenses – Early Warning

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 65,800

Commands all active, reserve and National Guard Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in CONUS

Joint Special Operations Command

Reported to comprise elite US SOF, including Special Forces Operations Detachment Delta ('Delta Force'), SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support

US Army Special Operations Command 35,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

5 SF gp (4 SF bn, 1 spt bn)

1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn; 1 cbt spt bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 civil affairs bde (5 civil affairs bn)

1 psyops gp (3 psyops bn)

1 psyops gp (4 psyops bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (sustainment) log bde (1 sigs bn)

HELICOPTER

1 (160th SOAR) hel regt (4 hel bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • **APC (W)** 28: 16 M1126 *Stryker* ICV; 12 *Pandur*

AUV 640 M-ATV

ARTILLERY 20

MOR • 120mm 20 XM905 EMTAS

AIRCRAFT

TPT 12: **Medium** 7 C-27J *Spartan* (parachute training);
Light 5 C-212 (parachute training)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 51 AH-6M/MH-6M *Little Bird*
 TPT 140: **Heavy** 67 MH-47G *Chinook*; **Medium** 73 MH-60M *Black Hawk*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 24 MQ-1C *Gray Eagle*
 ISR • **Light** 29: 15 XPV-1 *Tern*; 14 XPV-2 *Mako*
 TPT • **Heavy** 28 CQ-10 *Snowgoose*

Reserve Organisations

Army National Guard

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
 2 SF gp (3 SF bn)

Army Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
 2 psyops gp
 4 civil affairs comd HQ
 8 civil affairs bde HQ
 32 civil affairs bn (coy)

US Navy Special Warfare Command 10,500

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
 8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl)
 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team

Reserve Organisations

Naval Reserve Force

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
 8 SEAL det
 10 Naval Special Warfare det
 2 Special Boat sqn
 2 Special Boat unit
 1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det

US Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 3,500

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
 1 SF regt (3 SF bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
 1 int bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
 1 spt gp

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 16,800

FORCES BY ROLE
GROUND ATTACK
 2 sqn with AC-130J *Ghostrider*
 1 sqn with AC-130W *Stinger II*
TRANSPORT
 4 sqn with CV-22B *Osprey*

1 sqn with Do-328 (C-146A)
 1 sqn with MC-130H *Combat Talon*
 3 sqn with MC-130J *Commando II*
 3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A)

TRAINING

1 sqn with M-28 *Skytruck* (C-145A)
 1 sqn with CV-22A/B *Osprey*
 1 sqn with HC-130J *Combat King II*; MC-130J *Commando II*
 1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H *Iroquois*)
 1 sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*; UH-1N *Huey*

COMBAT/ISR UAV

3 sqn with MQ-9 *Reaper*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable
 ATK 33: 23 AC-130J *Ghostrider*; 10 AC-130W *Stinger II*
 ISR 22 MC-12 *Javaman*
 CSAR 3 HC-130J *Combat King II*
 TPT 114: **Medium** 54: 13 MC-130H *Combat Talon II*; 41 MC-130J *Commando II*; **Light** 60: 20 Do-328 (C-146A); 5 M-28 *Skytruck* (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A)

TILT-ROTOR 51 CV-22A/B *Osprey*

HELICOPTERS

CSAR 3 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*
 TPT • **Light** 34: 28 Bell 205 (TH-1H *Iroquois*); 6 UH-1N *Huey*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • **Heavy**
 50 MQ-9 *Reaper*

Reserve Organisations

Air National Guard

FORCES BY ROLE
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
 1 sqn with C-130J *Hercules*/EC-130J *Commando Solo*
ISR
 1 sqn with MC-12W *Liberty*
TRANSPORT
 1 flt with B-737-200 (C-32B)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT
 EW 7 EC-130J *Commando Solo*
 ISR 13 MC-12W *Liberty*
 TPT 5: **Medium** 3 C-130J *Hercules*; PAX 2 B-757-200 (C-32B)

Air Force Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING
 1 sqn with AC-130J *Ghostrider* (personnel only)
 1 sqn with M-28 *Skytruck* (C-145A) (personnel only)
COMBAT/ISR UAV
 1 sqn with MQ-9 *Reaper* (personnel only)

DEPLOYMENT

ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 1,100: 2 SSGN; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; **Combined Maritime Forces** • TF 53: 3 AKEH; 1 AOR

ARUBA: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location

ASCENSION ISLAND: US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Ascension Auxiliary Air Field

AUSTRALIA: US Pacific Command • 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap; **US Strategic Command** • 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt

BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW sqn with 2 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 EP-3E *Aries* II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot* PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE

BELGIUM: US European Command • 1,150

BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia

US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3 AKR; 1 AKEH; 1 ESD; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia

CANADA: US Northern Command • 140

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8

COLOMBIA: US Southern Command • 70

CUBA: US Southern Command • 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay

CURACAO: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 *Hercules*; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B *Osprey*; 2 KC-130J *Hercules*; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 naval air base

EGYPT: MFO 452; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn

EL SALVADOR: US Southern Command • 100; 1 ASW flt with 2 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 Forward Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel)

GERMANY: US Africa Command • 1 HQ at Stuttgart
US European Command • 36,950; 1 Combined Service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart–Vaihingen
US Army 22,650

FORCES BY ROLE

1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF)) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 spec ops gp; 1 recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 MRL bde (2 MRL bn); 1 fd arty bn; 1 (cvt avn) hel bde; 1 (cvt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt spt bde(-); 1 spt bde; 1 SAM bn; 1 ARNG SAM bde(-); 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

M1A2 SEPv2/v3 *Abrams*; M2A3/M3A3 *Bradley*; M1296 *Stryker Dragoon*, M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; AH-64D/E *Apache*; CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60M *Black*

Hawk; HH-60M *Black Hawk*; M902 *Patriot* PAC-3; M1097 *Avenger*; M-SHORAD

US Navy 450

USAF 13,300

FORCES BY ROLE

1 HQ (US Air Forces in Europe and Africa) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B)
USMC 550

GREECE: US European Command • 400; 1 EP-3E *Aries* II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion

GREENLAND (DNK): US Strategic Command • 150; 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Thule

GUAM: US Pacific Command • 9,000; 4 SSGN; 1 MPS sqn (MPS-3 with equipment for one MEB) with 2 AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD; 1 AKEH; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R *Stratotanker*; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S; 1 ISR UAV unit with 2 MQ-4C *Triton*; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 air base; 1 naval base

HONDURAS: US Southern Command • 400; 1 avn bn with CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60 *Black Hawk*

ICELAND: US European Command • 100; 1 ASW flt with 2 P-8A *Poseidon*

IRAQ: US Central Command • *Operation Inherent Resolve* 2,000; 1 ARNG inf bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E *Apache*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; **NATO** • **NATO Mission Iraq** 1

ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 100; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren

ITALY: US European Command • 12,900

US Army 4,100; 1 AB bde(-)
US Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 LCC; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon* at Sigonella
USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G *Pave Hawk* at Aviano); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper* at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV flt with RQ-4B *Global Hawk* at Sigonella
USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B *Osprey*; 2 KC-130J *Hercules*

JAPAN: US Pacific Command • 55,600

US Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 *Patriot* PAC-3 MSE
US Navy 20,000; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka

FORCES BY ROLE

3 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18E *Super Hornet*; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*; 2 ASW sqn at Misawa/Kadena with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 2 EW sqn at Iwakuni/Misawa with 5 EA-18G *Growler*; 1 ELINT flt at Okinawa – Kadena AB with 2 EP-3E *Aries*

II; 1 AEW&C sqn at Iwakuni with 5 E-2D *Hawkeye*; 2 ASW hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60R; 1 tpt hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60S

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD

USAF 13,000

FORCES BY ROLE

1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB with (2 FGA sqn with 22 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D *Eagle*; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R *Stratotanker*; 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B *Sentry*; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 Spec Ops gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J *Commando II*; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B *Osprey*); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 *Rivet Joint*; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A *Global Hawk*

USMC 20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18A+/C+ *Hornet*; 2 FGA sqn with 12 F-35B *Lightning II*; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-130J *Hercules*; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B *Osprey*

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki

JORDAN: US Central Command • *Operation Inherent Resolve* 2,000: 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 12 MQ-9A *Reaper*

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: US Pacific Command • 30,400

US Army 21,500

FORCES BY ROLE

1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde; 1 (cvt avn) hel bde; 1 MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; M2A3/M3A3 *Bradley*; M109A6; M270A1 MLRS; AH-64D/E *Apache*; CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60L/M *Black Hawk*; M902 *Patriot PAC-3*; THAAD; FIM-92A *Avenger*; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set

US Navy 350

USAF 8,350

FORCES BY ROLE

1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*; 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*); 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S

USMC 200

KUWAIT: US Central Command • 10,000; 1 ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cvt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B *Osprey*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set

LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL 1

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 8

MARSHALL ISLANDS: US Strategic Command • 20; 1 detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

NETHERLANDS: US European Command • 450

NIGER: US Africa Command • 800; 1 CISR sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

NORWAY: US European Command • 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set

PERSIAN GULF: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 3,000: 1 LHD; 1 DDGHM; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC

PHILIPPINES: US Pacific Command • *Operation Pacific Eagle – Philippines 200*

POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 691; 1 mech bn with M1296 *Stryker Dragoon*; M777A2

US European Command • 4,500; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 armd bde; M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; M3A3 *Bradley*; M2A3 *Bradley*; M109A7; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

PORTUGAL: US European Command • 500; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 spt facility at Lajes

QATAR: US Central Command • 10,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 *Rivet Joint*; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C *JSTARS*; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T *Stratotanker*; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A *Globemaster*; 4 C-130H/J-30 *Hercules*; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE*

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar

ROMANIA: US European Command • 120; 1 *Aegis Ashore* BMD unit with three 8-cell Mk 41 VLS launchers with SM-3

SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 1,800; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • *Joint Enterprise 660*; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60

SINGAPORE: US Pacific Command • 200; 1 log spt sqn; 1 spt facility

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7

SPAIN: US European Command • 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Morón; 1 naval base at Rota

SYRIA: US Central Command • *Operation Inherent Resolve* 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-)

THAILAND: US Pacific Command • 100

TURKEY: US European Command • 1,800; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik

UKRAINE: JMTG-U 150 (trg mission)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G *Sentry*; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 *Global Hawk*; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE*

UNITED KINGDOM: US European Command • 9,500

FORCES BY ROLE

1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with (1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D *Eagle*, 2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E *Strike Eagle*, 1 FGA sqn with F-35A *Lightning II* (forming)); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T *Stratotanker*; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B *Osprey*; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J *Commando II*)

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales Moor

FOREIGN FORCES

Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 *Talon*; 69 T-6A *Texan II*; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)

Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D *Apache*; CH-47D *Chinook*


Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D *Apache*; 6+ CH-47D *Chinook* hel

Chapter Four

Europe


- In 2021 Europe's defence expenditure grew at a faster rate than any other region, with real defence-spending growth reaching 4.8%. This was primarily driven by the United Kingdom's increased defence spending plan but there were also notable budget increases in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands.
- NATO is working on a new Strategic Concept, due to be endorsed by leaders in 2022. It is likely to mark the formal end of the post-2014 phase in which collective defence returned as the Alliance's defining mission. Meanwhile, the EU is scheduled to complete its Strategic Compass process by March 2022. This will likely provide guidance concerning how to increase defence capabilities and conduct joint expeditionary operations in a crisis.
- The Norwegian-led *Cold Response* exercise is due to take place in Spring 2022, involving up to 40,000 troops, including personnel from Norway and other NATO states. Planning indicates that it will be the largest Norwegian-led military exercise inside the Arctic Circle since the end of the Cold War. The exercise will test cold-weather capabilities and operations, including the reinforcement of northern Norway.
- There is continuing focus on the recapitalisation of Europe's combat air fleets. The F-35 has been linked with requirements in the Czech Republic, Greece and Spain, and existing customers include Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, while it has been selected in Belgium, Poland and Switzerland, and most recently in Finland to meet the HX requirement. Meanwhile, Croatia and Greece selected the *Rafale*.
- A number of European nations are elaborating their ambitions for a security role in the Indo-Pacific. France, Germany and the UK have all either produced strategies focused on the region or significantly referenced the region in other documents, and there has been increased military engagement. The EU also produced an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021. France maintains permanent forces in the region, and routinely deploys other naval vessels. The UK's Carrier Strike Group 21 deployment to the region included a Dutch frigate, and the UK has deployed two offshore-patrol vessels to the region. Germany, meanwhile, deployed a frigate for six months and is to step up exercise participation.

Europe defence spending, 2021 – top 5



Active military personnel – top 10


(15,000 per unit)




Global total
19,605,000

10%
Regional total
1,967,000

2021: selected European maritime deployments to the Indo-Pacific



Europe: F-35 operators, 2016–21



Europe

The 2020 election of Joe Biden as president of the United States provided a moment of relief and optimism for European leaders. It came at a time when they were adjusting to heightened great-power tension, while also dealing with sub-threshold security challenges, continued instability on Europe's southern and eastern periphery and the need to manage the implications of the coronavirus pandemic. After the Trump administration had tested NATO cohesion, and amid the EU's attempts to further develop its own global security role, Biden's election brought expectations for a return to transatlantic normalcy. In February 2021 Biden said 'America is back, the transatlantic alliance is back'. Ahead of the June 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, he reassured allies by saying that NATO's Article 5 collective-defence clause was 'a sacred commitment' and that 'NATO is as important to [US] security as we are to NATO'. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell explained at the end of 2020 that 'revitalizing multilateralism' would be a key priority for 2021.

However, optimism about a return to robust transatlantic cooperation diminished during the summer, indicating that underlying structural factors could still create division, despite unifying rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. The rapid collapse of Afghanistan's security forces following the withdrawal of US and allied forces from the country, the chaotic evacuation of international and local staff via Kabul airport, and the Taliban's return to power surprised and embarrassed many European governments. Some thought that they had been left exposed by Washington's lack of consultation when it negotiated in 2020 a withdrawal timetable with the Taliban. But fundamentally, these events demonstrated that Europeans lacked the military capability to do anything but follow the US decision to end the military presence in Afghanistan, whatever they thought about its wisdom or the way in which it was implemented.

With failure in Afghanistan still present in national debates, on 15 September Australia, the United Kingdom and the US announced a trilateral security arrangement known as AUKUS. According to the

agreement, the UK and US will support Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and deepen cooperation on a range of other technology developments. As a consequence, Australia cancelled a contract with France, signed in 2016, for the acquisition of conventionally powered submarines. Although the contract had been questioned for some time, French leaders initially reacted with anger, arguing that they had been surprised by the trilateral negotiations. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian accused the AUKUS signatories of 'duplicity, a major breach of trust and contempt'. French President Emmanuel Macron said 'Europeans must come out of their naivety' regarding international security and the motivations of others. A telephone call between Biden and Macron on 22 September took some of the sting out of the debate, and Macron extracted US support for 'a stronger and more capable European defense' complementary to NATO (organised in the EU) and for French-led counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel.

While additional fallout will likely be minimised by damage-limitation efforts and the wider interests of other Europeans, AUKUS has further dampened expectations for a transatlantic revival at the point when NATO and the EU are engaged in strategy debates over the new political guidance due for both in 2022. Strategic autonomy – the idea that the EU and its member states should give themselves the means to act on their own when necessary – is evolving from its origin in security and defence policy into an overall approach for the EU's international role in an age of great-power competition. However, the experiences of Afghanistan and AUKUS demonstrated once more not just how militarily dependent Europeans are on the US, but also that Washington's focus has clearly shifted to the Indo-Pacific. It is likely that these factors will be reflected in NATO's new Strategic Concept and in the EU's effort to develop political-strategic guidance in the form of the so-called 'Strategic Compass'.

Strategy and European security in NATO and the EU

In 2019, at NATO's London Summit, heads of state and government tasked Secretary-General Jens

Stoltenberg with developing recommendations for NATO's evolution over the coming decade. Stoltenberg argued that NATO 2030 – the label under which this conversation was organised – should be an organisation that is more political, more capable and more global. This agenda was driven by an evolving international environment, including the rise of China, diversifying security challenges and the corresponding requirement for further adaptation. It informed eight priorities that were adopted in the June 2021 summit communiqué as the 'transatlantic agenda for the future'.

Firstly, the Alliance would be strengthened as a forum for consultation on 'all matters related to our individual and collective security'. Secondly, its deterrence and defence posture would be reinforced by fully implementing the capability and readiness agenda adopted at previous summits. This reinforces the post-2014 emphasis on collective defence, relative to NATO's other two core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. Regarding readiness, the summit communiqué stated that NATO had 'sourced' all the combat forces required to fulfil the requirements of the NATO Readiness Initiative – the so-called Four Thirties plan agreed in 2018 – but confirmed that these forces are 'being organized and trained as larger combat formations for reinforcement and high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention' and thus were not yet ready. Leaders also agreed that they would, from 2023, aim to increase NATO common funding for the military budget, the civil budget and NATO's security investment programme. Meanwhile, both the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, reached full operating capability in 2021. Thirdly, NATO would improve resilience, aiming 'to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis, and conflict'. Resilience objectives will be developed to give governments a reference point for their national plans. Fourthly, NATO would set up a Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), as well as a NATO Innovation Fund to foster technological development, interoperability and the ability to integrate dual-use and emerging technologies into NATO thinking and forces. While NATO common budgets are likely to cover staffing costs, it will need to rely on national pledges to the innovation fund. Because of this, a question mark remains over the ultimate ambition of this new tool and how it relates

to the European Defence Fund (which is also trying to leverage national spending from some of the same nations). Points five and six on the agenda underlined NATO's commitment to a rules-based international order and suggested increased efforts to enable NATO partner nations through training and capacity-building measures where instability directly affects the Alliance. Next, NATO would aim to 'become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security'. And finally, the secretary-general was formally tasked with leading the development of a new Strategic Concept, to be endorsed in 2022.

Charting the course for a new Strategic Concept likely absorbed significant diplomatic capital in the run-up to the summit, but the collapse in Afghanistan and the fallout from the AUKUS security partnership later in the year put earlier challenges into perspective. At the very least, it is likely that the idea that NATO should develop its political side, and a more global outlook, will be harder to pursue after these two episodes highlighted (at least for some allies), a lack of political consultation and a failure of out-of-area operations. Others will likely argue that these problems underline precisely the deficits the new agenda is meant to address. Overall, the new Strategic Concept is likely to mark the formal end of the post-2014 phase in which collective defence returned as the Alliance's defining mission. This does not necessarily mean that other tasks will be abandoned or that new ones will not arise, but it indicates a clearer order of hierarchy than before.



The summit communiqué also stated that 'Russia's aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security' and that China's 'growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance'. 'We will engage China', NATO said, 'with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance.' Working towards a common position on China was seen by some as a measure of progress, but it also highlighted continued disagreement among allies on key security concerns.

While China has been Washington's 'pacing challenge' for some years, not all European allies think in such adversarial terms, even if they share misgivings about Beijing's international policies. For instance, Macron said that 'NATO is a military organisation, the subject of our relationship with China is not just military. NATO is an organisation ... which concerns the North Atlantic, China has little

▼ **Figure 5 Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT): major upgrades, 1979–2014**

The *Leopard 2* main battle tank (MBT) entered service in 1979 as the German army's successor to the mid-1960s *Leopard 1*. Manufactured by Krauss-Maffei (later Krauss-Maffei Wegmann), the tank represented a change in design philosophy and a generational leap from the earlier *Leopard 1*. Advances in composite armour technology gave the *Leopard 2* substantially better protection than the earlier model, while the switch from the venerable L7 series of 105mm rifled main guns to the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore gun offered a significant increase in firepower. The *Leopard 2* was the first production tank to mount this armament. Since then, this weapon, or derivatives of it, has become the standard armament for western MBTs. Having undergone several improvements since its introduction, the *Leopard 2* now serves, in its various configurations, with 19 armies worldwide and many of those have developed their own upgrades for the vehicle. While more upgrades may take place, including abroad, in German service the tank will eventually be replaced, likely by the platform developed under the Franco-German Major Ground Combat System programme.

Entry into service



Leopard 2 (1979)

Selected features


- 55 tonnes
- 1500hp diesel engine

Firepower:

- RH 120 L/44 120mm smoothbore gun
- Thermal gunner's optics (early production vehicles mounted image-intensification night optics)
- Commander's panoramic periscope

Protection:

- Composite armour in hull and turret



Leopard 2A4 (1985)

Selected features


- 55 tonnes

Firepower:

- Fully digital fire-control system

Protection:

- Improved composite armour in hull and turret



Leopard 2A5 (1995)

Selected features

- 62.5 tonnes


Firepower:

- Improved fire-control system and fully-electric turret drives
- Improved commander's periscope with integrated thermal imaging

Protection:

- Additional spaced armour modules fitted to turret front

Selected non-German variants



Leopard 2SG (2010) (Singapore)

Selected features


- Estimated 60 tonnes
- Based on the *Leopard 2A4*

Firepower:

- New commander's periscope with integrated thermal imaging

Protection:

- Additional Advanced Modular Armor Protection (AMAP) composite armour package



Leopard 2PL (2020) (Poland)

Selected features


- 59 tonnes
- Based on the *Leopard 2A4*

Firepower:

- Improved fire-control system with data-link allowing the use of programmable rounds
- Electric turret drives
- Modernised thermal imaging for commander's and gunner's sights

Protection:

- AMAP composite armour package




Leopard 2A6 (2001)

Selected features

- 62.5 tonnes

Firepower:

- Improved RH 120 L/55 120mm smoothbore gun enabling improved muzzle velocity



Leopard 2A7 (2014)

Selected features

- 64.5 tonnes
- Fitted with an auxiliary power unit which allows major systems to be operated when the engine is off

Firepower:

- Improved fire-control system with data-link allowing the use of programmable rounds
- Improved commander's thermal optics

Protection:

- Mounting points for additional side armour
- Fitted with additional belly armour

to do with the North Atlantic.’ While France has long tried to put the brakes on a more global role for NATO, many Central and Eastern European allies will also be keen to maintain NATO’s focus on Russia. It will be important for these states to also acknowledge US concerns over China, and perhaps demonstrate support if they can, though the underlying structural changes that are refocusing US attention on the Indo-Pacific are outside their control.

Another point for debate will be the NATO–EU relationship. There is a growing connection between the two organisations, albeit with different positions regarding the desirable division of labour between them. However, the approximate alignment of the strategic processes at the EU and NATO levels presents an opportunity to bring into line their defence planning and capability development priorities.

For its part, the EU is scheduled to complete its Strategic Compass process by March 2022, during the French EU presidency. The EU Strategic Compass will, in principle, provide the guidance missing from the 2016 EU Global Strategy concerning how to increase defence capabilities and conduct joint expeditionary operations in a crisis. The process started in 2020 with a classified shared-threat analysis. This was intended to generate common assumptions among EU governments, which the Strategic Compass would address by focusing on capability development, crisis management, partnerships and resilience. While work on all four ‘baskets’ was proceeding in 2021, the proposal to create a 5,000-strong initial entry force, able to mobilise and deploy at short notice for crisis-management purposes, received wider attention – not least in the context of Afghanistan – as a practical expression of European capacity to act. Borrell said that ‘the EU must be able to intervene to protect our interests when the Americans don’t want to be involved’.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen adopted a slightly different perspective in her annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament on 15 September: she focused on political will. Nations may have advanced armed forces, she said, but ‘what use are they’ without the will to use them. She continued, ‘what has held us back until now is not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.’ A week earlier, von der Leyen’s successor as German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, had said (on the occasion of the opening of the IISS–Europe office in Berlin), that institutions were not the first priority in strengthening

the role of the EU in security and defence matters, and that ‘it is the political will that is needed first’. As such, the responsibility lies with national capitals, not EU-level bodies. Von der Leyen also announced that she would, with President Macron, convene a summit on European defence in 2022.

Responding to Russia and tilting to the Indo-Pacific

The NATO 2021 summit communiqué describes Russia’s military capability developments, its ‘more assertive posture’ and its ‘provocative activities ... as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises’ as an increasing threat to Euro–Atlantic security, amplified by Moscow’s use of ‘hybrid actions ... including through proxies’. After the summit, Stoltenberg said that NATO’s relationship with Russia was at its ‘lowest point since the Cold War. And Moscow’s aggressive actions are a threat to our security.’ Borrell, meanwhile, visited Moscow for talks in February 2021 to explore areas for EU dialogue with Russia, only to learn during a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that Russia was expelling three European diplomats.

NATO defence planners are worried by Russia’s potential ability to create diverse challenges in multiple locations, taxing and possibly undermining the Alliance’s ability to swiftly form a coherent response. In the Arctic, Russian investment in infrastructure and relevant capabilities worries both NATO and non-NATO states alike, has refocused attention on capability development and led to increased exercise activity. The biennial exercise *Cold Response* in Norway is due to involve up to 40,000 troops in spring 2022. According to current plans, it will be the largest Norwegian-led military exercise inside the Arctic Circle since the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic, including the so-called Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap, remains of concern as a potential staging ground for Russian power projection and disruption of transatlantic reinforcement routes. NATO’s Joint Force Command, now at full operational capability, is dedicated to protecting these routes. Meanwhile, NATO’s air policing operations have operated at Quick Reaction Alert for some years, and NATO allies including Germany, Norway and the UK are investing in both anti-submarine warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The Baltic region has been a focal point for NATO, which agreed the Readiness Action Plan at the 2014 Wales Summit

and established the Enhanced Forward Presence at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. There was additional scrutiny on Russia's actions and intentions when it built up armed forces in Crimea and near the eastern border with Ukraine in April 2021 (and again in late 2021), concerning its September 2021 *Zapad* strategic exercise held with Belarus, as well as in relation to the late-2021 migrant crisis on the Belarusian–Polish border. Allies remain concerned by Russia's posture and activities in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Syria, and NATO has continued to develop its focus on Black Sea security. In 2021, the annual *Breeze* exercise included some 30 vessels and 2,000 troops from 12 NATO allies as well as Georgia and Ukraine.

A number of European nations have started to elaborate their ambitions for a security role in the Indo-Pacific. France's 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy document says that it aims to increase interoperability with regional partners, including Australia, India, Japan and the US, while also conducting deployments and exercises, though the effect of the September 2021 AUKUS arrangement on this plan remains to be seen. Germany published Indo-Pacific policy guidelines in 2020 and also intends to expand its footprint in regional exercises and deployments. In 2022 Germany intends to participate in the Australian-led exercise *Pitch Black*, and plans to strengthen bilateral defence partnerships with Australia and Japan in particular. The UK's 2021 Integrated Review, meanwhile, identified the Indo-Pacific as a region critical to the UK's economy and security.

To varying degrees, European countries, the UK included, maintain a degree of ambiguity regarding their Indo-Pacific posture, designed to mitigate tensions between their economic and their security interests, both of which centre on China. However, the nations that are frequently identified as priority partners for European nations – like Australia and Japan – may in future demand less hedging and more commitment as their own concerns over China's activities continue to deepen. In 2021 the UK was the European power most willing to embrace this logic and the US narrative of strategic competition with China. In its 2021 summit communiqué, NATO said that it maintained a 'constructive dialogue' with China, but that Beijing's 'stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security'. For its part, the EU, which published its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific on 16 September 2021, is explicitly inclusive in

its view of partnerships, including China while also suggesting it would be unwise to force nations to take sides in the US–China rivalry.


DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics

European economies were among the worst affected globally by the coronavirus pandemic. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the region's real GDP contracted by 5.0% in 2020 with a significant economic contraction in Western and Southern European countries somewhat offset by better performance in Eastern and Northern Europe. Spain and the UK were among the 20 worst performing economies globally in 2020, with real GDP growth rates of -10.8% and -9.8% respectively. France, Greece, Italy and Portugal were not far behind, with the contraction in their real GDP exceeding 8%. The reduction was more muted in the Nordic states and emerging economies in Eastern Europe, where reductions ranged between -1% and -4% in 2020.


The IMF expects regional GDP to grow by 5.4% in 2021, pointing to a swift recovery to pre-pandemic (2019) levels of output. This latest assessment is more positive than the IMF's October 2020 forecast, which expected Europe's GDP to contract by 7.0% in 2020 and grow by just 4.7% in 2021. The more positive figures result from a better-than-expected performance in the fourth quarter of 2020 and increased external demand for exports, as well as strengthening domestic demand due to extensive fiscal support packages and the knock-on effect of vaccination programmes. However, risks remain, particularly if new infection variants emerge or vaccination or revaccination programmes stall.

Extensive support packages, including the European Union's EUR750 billion (USD958bn) Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery plan and the UK's furlough scheme, have helped to avoid more severe economic contractions, but they have come at a cost to government finances. Of the USD16.5bn spent globally on fiscal-support measures (including additional public spending and liquidity support) between January 2020 and July 2021, almost one-third was spent by European countries. Fiscal deficits extended from a regional average of 0.2% of GDP in 2019 to 6.8% in 2020 and will persist into 2022 as countries continue to borrow to support their recovery. However, fiscal support packages have shifted from emergency measures to those aimed at



▲ Map 1 Europe: regional defence spending¹

Sub-regional groupings referred to in defence economics text: Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland), Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia) and Western Europe (Belgium, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2021

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▲ Figure 6 Western Europe: selected countries, fiscal balance (% of GDP), 2008–26

aiding economic recovery, including investment in public services, support for business and boosting employment and skills development.

The NGEU plan primarily aims to support the EU members hardest hit by the pandemic and with limited fiscal bandwidth to support their own recovery. Because of this, the IMF projects that the EU's emerging markets will suffer far less pandemic-related economic damage than countries around the world which do not receive similar support. Beyond helping the recovery, the NGEU also aims to support investment in green and digital transitions. The NGEU's Recovery and Resilience Facility, which will allocate most of the recovery plan's financing, requires that at least 37% of national allocations support the green transition, with at least 20% directed to digital transformation.

Similarly, regional debt levels grew from an average of 60.7% in 2019 to 72.5% in 2020, with levels set to persist at around 70% of GDP well into the 2020s, according to the IMF. Indeed, debt levels extend beyond 100% of GDP in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain and the UK. As economic support for the recovery continues, government spending will continue to exceed revenues and debt levels will remain high. This level of debt is sustainable while interest rates are low and borrowing is cheap. However, as inflationary pressures rise in some countries (as a result of higher commodity prices and increased wages due to higher labour demand), interest rates may begin to rise, making borrowing less sustainable.

Defence economics


Despite the sizeable economic contraction in 2020, European defence spending continued to grow and

2021 saw the seventh consecutive year of real growth. Indeed, in 2021 Europe's defence expenditure growth rate was higher than that of any other region, with real defence spending growth reaching 4.8%. This rise was primarily driven by the UK's increased spending plan for defence, announced in November 2020, but there were also notable budget increases in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, meaning that growth was spread across the region.

Total regional spending increased to USD351bn from USD314bn in 2020. Despite sustained growth since 2014, European defence spending had been static as a proportion of total global defence expenditure, hovering between 16.5% and 17.0% annually until 2020. The 2021 increase, combined with a drop in spending in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, means that European spending is now 18.7% of the global total.

Europe's NATO members have steadily increased their defence budgets as a proportion of GDP since 2014, from 1.26% to 1.52% in 2019. The figures for 2020 and 2021 are distorted by the economic impact of the pandemic, with European members now spending an average of 1.6% of GDP on defence. Using economic projections from the IMF's October 2019 World Economic Outlook (so, from before the pandemic), the IISS has determined that the proportion would have remained fairly static at 1.5% of GDP in 2020 and 2021 had economic growth continued as expected.

Sub-regional trends reflect this broader growth. Northern European spending grew by 7.1% in 2021, up from the 5.2% uplift in 2020. The main source of the increase was a 34.6% real-terms surge in Finland's defence budget as the country intended to make a final decision on the USD12.3bn HX fighter programme by the end of 2021. Sizeable growth was also evident in




Other Western Europe – Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg
Other Central Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland
Other Northern Europe – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania
Other Southern Europe – Cyprus, Malta, Portugal
The Balkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia
Other Southeastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania

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▲ **Figure 7 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021**

Sweden with a 7.5% real uplift in 2021 to bring the total defence budget to SEK71.2bn (USD8.40bn), including funding for crisis management and radiation safety. The country is pursuing an ambitious spending plan after its Total Defence 2021–25 bill was signed with unanimous political support in December 2020. The bill indicates that Sweden’s core defence budget will increase annually to reach SEK88.7bn (USD10.4bn) by 2025, bringing the total defence budget to an estimated SEK95.2bn (USD11.2bn). It calls for an enhanced and more resilient force structure and will mean the 2025 budget is 34% higher than 2021 levels and almost double the 2015 total in nominal terms.

Spending in Southern Europe surged by 9.2% in real terms in 2021 due to significant uplifts in Greece and Italy. Greek spending rose by 47.9% in real terms to reach EUR6.47bn (USD7.73bn) – including pensions – as the country funds the procurement of 18 *Rafale* F3R combat aircraft (six new and 12 second-hand from the French air force) in a deal valued at EUR2.5bn (USD3.07bn) including munitions, training and support. Greece’s 2022 budget is projected to be EUR6.15bn (USD7.5bn). This is lower than 2021 spending but well above the trend levels seen over the last decade. Italy’s budget increase comes as the



▲ **Figure 8 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)**

European Commission continues to waive the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and enables the country to enact significant uplifts to investment spending and to begin to allocate funding for the UK-led *Tempest* combat aircraft programme.

Western European spending is also set to rise by 7.6% in real terms, driven by the UK as it pursues the spending profile outlined in its Spending Review 2020, released in December. This announced additional funding totals GBP24bn (USD30.8bn) for defence over the four-year period to 2024–25. This is effectively ‘front-loaded’ with significant increases evident in 2021 and 2022 but only marginal nominal increases in 2023 and 2024, which translate to reductions in real terms. The UK Budget 2021, announced in October 2021, reaffirmed these increases. Meanwhile, France continues to enact increases in line with the *Loi de Programmation Militaire* (military programming law) 2019–2024, with real-terms increases averaging 1.8% between 2019 and 2021, bringing the total defence budget to EUR49.7bn (USD59.3bn) with a further 2.0% increase projected for 2022.

In Southeastern Europe, meanwhile, defence expenditure trends continue to be distorted by volatile movements in Bulgarian and Turkish defence budgets. Bulgaria’s budget continues to decline as spending returns to normal levels following the increase that accompanied the USD1.26bn purchase of eight F-16 *Fighting Falcon* combat aircraft in 2019. Turkey continues to implement sizeable nominal increases though these have been negated by the ongoing depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar and a persistently high inflation rate that has averaged 14% since 2017. The 2022–24 Medium Term Expenditure Framework sets out increases that

will translate to a real-terms uplift, though increased government expenditure will do little to curb inflation.

Defence industry

The pandemic affected several of the main players in Europe's defence-industrial base in 2020, particularly those that depend on revenues from commercial aviation, leading many governments to implement support packages or bring forward procurement programmes. In June 2020, France announced a EUR600 million (USD684m) programme of investment intended to accelerate key military aerospace programmes, including the light intelligence and surveillance aircraft (Avion Léger de Surveillance et de Renseignement) programme and the acquisition of three Airbus A330 aircraft and eight Airbus H225M *Caracal* helicopters for the air force. The investment programme was part of a wider EUR15bn (USD17.1bn) rescue package to support the national aviation sector.

Germany announced a EUR130bn (USD148bn) stimulus package in June 2020. EUR10bn (USD11.4bn) was earmarked to accelerate armaments programmes that included a high workshare for local firms.

The UK did not bring forward major programmes but instead ensured that cash flow was maintained and that the supply chain was supported by forward ordering and adjusting payment schedules. The UK also indicated a more protective industrial stance on future defence procurement in the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) published on 23 March 2021. The DSIS stated that UK defence-procurement policy will shift from one where there was open global competition 'by default' to a more 'flexible and nuanced approach' that balances the required capability with both national-security considerations and the potential impact on UK 'prosperity'.

The DSIS established two new categories of protected capability: 'strategic imperatives', which are to be sustained wholly onshore and include nuclear deterrence, cryptographic and offensive cyber capability; and those capabilities that are needed to retain 'operational independence'. For the latter, the UK should maintain key competencies onshore but full procurement independence is not required, thus allowing the UK to work with partners on wider defence programmes. These capabilities include complex weapons, novel (including directed-energy) weapons, test and evaluation, and chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities.

This approach brings the UK into alignment with continental Europe, where countries clearly distinguish between key areas that are to be protected domestically and those that are less strategically vital and can therefore be developed with, or procured from, international partners. This approach is, for instance, outlined in Germany's 2020 Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry.

However, despite the UK's spending increase, affordability concerns endure. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) estimates that the costs of the UK's 10-year Equipment Plan will be GBP7.3bn (USD10.2bn) higher than the budget between 2020 and 2030. The Public Accounts Committee stated in a November 2021 report that the MoD bears too much of the financial risk in UK defence procurement programmes, relying on 'a limited specialist supply base' and lacking at times 'the skilled personnel to effectively manage the performance of these suppliers'. The report also cited a net delay of 21 years across the 20 projects most recently examined by the National Audit Office.

Meanwhile, the UK's spending announcement indicated a focus on resilience and new technology, as funding for artificial intelligence, cyber, space development and research and development was ring-fenced. Similarly, the 2022 French defence budget allocated EUR1bn (USD1.4bn) to support innovation, with a particular emphasis on cyber defence, the space sector, defence CBRN and research funding for European cooperation programmes (principally the Franco-German-Spanish future combat air system).

The coronavirus pandemic caused delays to the acquisition process for Switzerland's fighter and ground-based air defence (GBAD) Air2030 programme, as well as Finland's HX fighter programme. In June 2021, it was announced that Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had won the bid in Switzerland, with F-35 *Lightning* II combat aircraft and *Patriot* GBAD selected respectively. Meanwhile, Finland received final offers for the HX programme in May 2021.

The impact of the pandemic on the defence industry largely depended on firms' exposure to commercial aviation and on the success of government support initiatives. Airbus reported a 29% drop in annual revenue in 2020 as the significant reduction in the commercial aviation sector was only slightly

tempered by an increase of 10% and 15% respectively in revenues for the considerably smaller business segments of Defence and Space and Helicopters. Similarly, Rolls-Royce reported a revenue reduction of 28% with losses reaching GBP4.8bn (USD6.62bn) as demand for engines fell as global commercial aviation ground to a halt.

SPAIN

Spanish defence policy has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, when it was focused on territorial defence tasks in the Balearic Islands, the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands. At that time, the armed forces mainly comprised conscripts, while the services were equipped with a mix of materiel largely provided by the United States. Since the country became a NATO member in 1982, its level of participation has developed incrementally. Greater involvement in working groups and committees and in military coordination processes followed a referendum in 1986, but it only began to participate in the Alliance's integrated military structure in January 1999. Spain is now fully integrated into NATO structures and has fully professional armed forces equipped with modern materiel, mainly sourced from manufacturers based in the European Union.

The armed forces are focused on projecting stability in Europe, the western Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean and the Sahel. Stability in the latter region is seen as vital to Spanish security; the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) referred to the Sahel as part of Spain's 'advanced border'. Meanwhile, since 2012 there has been renewed focus on Ceuta and Melilla because of continued Moroccan claims to these exclaves as well as concerns over border security. Other defence-policy drivers include maintaining credible capability for self-defence and the projection of security through multilateral organisations. Madrid is a key supporter of EU defence initiatives, though NATO and European-level defence initiatives are overall seen as essentially compatible.

Strategy and policy

The 2017 NSS consolidated the 'national security system' created by its 2013 predecessor (which led, among other initiatives, to the creation of a National Security Council), recommended improvements to Spain's crisis management system and indicated that disinformation was a risk to national security. It was

revised in light of the coronavirus pandemic, though the updated version had not been released at the time of writing.

Defence priorities are set by National Defence Directives (NDDs), signed by the prime minister. The current NDD, from June 2020, was shaped by factors including the coronavirus pandemic and the EU Global Strategy, as well as the new legislature and legislation (the 2017 NSS and the 2015 National Security Law). While the preceding NDD, in 2012, prioritised defence transformation and deterrence, the 2020 document reflects a more multilateral and security-based concept of defence, noting that military participation in security tasks or multilateral activities contributes to international peace and stability. However, both documents highlight the importance of reinforcing deterrence, Spain's role in security organisations and of defence investments (though the 2020 NDD highlights investments in improving conditions of service).

The 2020 NDD indicates that Spain will focus its deployments in its European neighbourhood, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean and the western Sahel through multilateral frameworks. European-level initiatives remain key, with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy being central to increasing stability and 'managing [Spain's] main security challenges', though NATO remains a key element of collective defence.

Some Spanish analysts have suggested that there is a disconnect between the political rhetoric around threats to security – as well as how these appear in defence documents – and the means allocated to address these challenges. This can in part be explained, they say, by the relatively low visibility of defence debates in political discourse (barring, perhaps, matters around budgeting), as well as by the effect of changes in government and resultant uncertainty over financial allocations. It means, analysts continue, that while there may be emphasis on the operational and capability planning that is needed to address potential challenges, these are less clearly reflected in the procurement portfolio.

Armed forces

Spain's current armed forces have been principally shaped by four documents. The Organic Law on defence (5/2005) and other regulations changed defence and military structures; an investment cycle from 1997–2008 modernised much military equipment; and Law 39/2007 established a maximum

strength of 130,000 personnel. Meanwhile, the 2003 Strategic Defence Review set out future force design, combining the transatlantic transformation agenda (including jointness, interoperability, power projection and improved equipment) with Spain's specific circumstances, such as its ongoing integration into NATO's military structure and professionalisation process.

In July 2020 a new division was created in the defence staff to assist force development, focusing on preparation and interoperability, strategic foresight, concept development and experimentation and doctrine. Together with changes to the planning division, intended to increase its role in capability development and transformation, these developments will support the implementation of the 2035 'Operational Environment' document (issued in 2019), intended to support transformation in line with NATO priorities. Royal Decree 521/2020, meanwhile, bolstered the Joint Staff, transformed the Joint Cyber Defence Command into the Joint Cyberspace Command and gave the chief of defence new responsibilities relating to the employment of the Emergencies Military Unit (which had an active role in Spain's coronavirus response and comes under the authority of the defence minister).

The 2007–08 financial crisis affected training and sustainment, and Madrid prioritised training and maintenance for operational units, those involved in external deployments or most relevant to deterrence and territorial defence. There are fears that the economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic will affect readiness, and the army chief of staff reflected these concerns when he discussed the potential effect of the pandemic on maintenance and training in a June 2020 interview. That said, the armed forces have benefited from the lessons of deployments to the Balkans, Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. There has also been a continued focus on personnel management. As part of the professionalisation process, Law 8/2006 established three types of engagement: an initial commitment of up to six years; a long-term commitment up to 45 years of age; or a permanent engagement (beyond the age of 45), to which service personnel could progress if already engaged in a 'long-term' commitment. At the end of a long-term contract, at the age of 45, personnel could leave with a pension of around EUR600 (USD717) per month and be free to find other work. However, there have been reports that some personnel are concerned about their employment prospects after leaving


military service, in light of the pandemic's effect on the broader employment market and with permanent posts remaining limited in number (and dependent on an examination and existing level of education). The air force, meanwhile, has in recent years lost pilots to civilian airlines, and it is unclear whether the disruption caused to the civil aviation sector by the pandemic will reverse this trend.

Equipment modernisation

A new defence investment programme began in 2018. Due to run until 2032, it intends to replace ageing platforms and boost local defence-industrial production. The programme has enabled new procurements and also unlocked long-running projects that had been delayed due to budget problems. Key acquisitions for the armed forces include five F-110 frigates, ordered in April 2019; 348 *Piranha V* armoured vehicles (of a total requirement of 998), ordered in September 2015; A330 MRTT aircraft; and NH90 helicopters. The first of the planned four S-80 Plus submarines was launched in April 2021. The first two boats will be retrofitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP) system once development is complete. The project's financial ceiling was earlier raised by EUR1.8 billion (USD2.13bn) (to EUR3.9bn or USD4.61bn) in November 2018. There are also plans to modernise CH-47 helicopters and Eurofighter combat aircraft (the latter at a cost of EUR906 million or USD1.07bn), as well as to purchase the right to use two communications satellites (for 19 years). In late 2020, Eurofighter submitted a proposal to sell an additional batch of 20 Eurofighters, likely part of Spain's *Project Halcón* programme, to replace the air force's F/A-18 *Hornets* based at Gran Canaria.

Defence economics

Spain's baseline defence budget – primarily covering core MoD funding, war pensions and allocations from 'autonomous agencies' – came to EUR11.5bn (USD13.8bn) in 2021, amounting to around 1% of GDP, similar to the levels seen since the end of the Cold War. Commitments made at NATO's Wales Summit in 2014 led defence ministers to pledge to progressively increase defence spending, first to 1.53% of GDP and then to 2% by 2024. (US exhortations that European nations spend more on defence were likely also important.) Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez restated this ambition at NATO's Brussels Summit in 2018, though Margarita Robles (defence minister since 2018) has reportedly cast doubt on whether



▲ Map 2 Spain: principal defence industrial manufacturing sites

these objectives will be reached. With post-pandemic economic factors likely important in this regard, some Spanish analysts also argue that this owes much to the relatively peripheral place they assert defence debates occupy in political discourse.

While the defence budget has remained relatively stable at around 1% of GDP, this does not include other allocations that raise defence expenditure to between 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP. These include funds for the Social Institute of the Armed Forces; military pensions; the corresponding part of the Guardia Civil responsible to the MoD; appropriations for research, development and innovation; the military contribution to NATO and the EU under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the costs of international missions. Nor does it include financial aid (in the form of credits) from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism. This is important because the defence budget increase seen in 2017 broadly corresponds with debt payments for Special Armament Programmes (SAPs) linked to the 1997–2008 modernisation cycle. Projects justified by strategic requirements, acquisition cost and

industrial implications were to be funded through an industrial pre-financing system, based on interest-free loans for system development, deferred payment to contractors with MoD funds and the repayment of advances to the Treasury. (These have since been renamed as Special Modernisation Projects.)

For instance, while EUR11bn (USD13.1bn) was allocated to modernisation projects from 1997–2008, contracts totalled EUR36.5bn (USD43.6bn), with EUR27bn (USD33.2bn) funded via the SAP mechanism (for which the Ministry of Industry advanced EUR15bn (USD17.9bn) to manufacturers for development and the MoD prepared a payment schedule that would be extended until 2025). This model made it possible to keep the core defence budget low and to meet the convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union. However, some platform deliveries coincided with the financial crisis, which meant that some instalments were not paid in 2010 and 2011, forcing a renegotiation of the payment schedule until 2031 and the approval of extraordinary credits to pay the accumulated debt. The Constitutional Court ruled against the extraordinary credits in 2016 and the MoD

announced in March 2017 that funding for the SAP would be incorporated into the core MoD budget going forward. To date, programmes worth some EUR14bn (USD16.7bn) have been approved under the 2018 modernisation cycle, but with payments delayed until the 2030s this has enabled actual military investment to exceed 20% of the defence budget.

In order to reduce the economic impact of the pandemic on the defence sector, guarantee spending commitments and support the defence-industrial base, the MoD proposed a plan called Ave Fénix in 2020. It not only included new military programmes – likely following the existing industrial pre-financing model – but also involved EU funding. A first step was taken after Airbus announced redundancies in Spain. To minimise job losses and support the sector, a plan was agreed that included the acquisition of three A330 MRTT, four C295 maritime patrol aircraft, the start of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) phase II, advance payments for the A400M and support for the development of *Tiger* MkIII helicopters and a medium-altitude long-endurance uninhabited aerial vehicle (MALE UAV).

These decisions reflect the importance of national industrial and social factors in defence investment decision-making. For instance, the modernisation of the Eurofighter fleet and the purchase of 20 additional aircraft would provide the Airbus factory in Getafe with work until at least 2030. But, analysts assert, politics is also an important factor. Spain is one of the prime advocates of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, but it only leads two of the 24 projects in which it participates.

Defence industry

Large firms, such as the state-owned Navantia shipyards, Santa Bárbara Sistemas (belonging to General Dynamics European Land Systems) and Airbus, comprise nearly one-quarter of Spain's defence industrial sector. For several years, the MoD has been trying to strengthen the national defence-industrial and technological base and improve the competitiveness of defence firms. Participation in PESCO projects may reflect this intent, though much remains to be decided about the level of Spanish industrial participation in project consortia. While defence exports are modest in global terms, they remain an important source of revenue, mainly deriving from sales of Airbus products (such as the A400M, A330 MRTT, C295 or CN235) and Navantia vessels (such as the *Canberra*-class LHD and *Hobart*-

class DDG for Australia, as well as corvettes for Saudi Arabia). Other small- and medium-sized companies, such as Urovesa, Escribano, Instalaza, Maxam and Rodman, are also active in the export market. There has been some debate over sales to Middle Eastern states, which led to Royal Decree 679/2014, approving the Regulation for the Control of Foreign Trade in Defence Material, Other Material and Dual-Use Products and Technologies. This is intended to reinforce controls over defence sales (including post-sale verification) to prevent weapons from being used outside the importing country. Military sales must also be authorised by the Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on External Trade in Defence and Dual-Use Material.

UNITED KINGDOM

In March 2021 the UK government unveiled its Integrated Review (IR) of security, defence, development and foreign policy, entitled 'Global Britain in a Competitive Age', which it had previously declared would be the largest review of its type carried out in the UK since the end of the Cold War. This was immediately followed by a Defence Command Paper, 'Defence in a Competitive Age', which set out in greater detail plans to modernise the armed forces, including some significant cuts to personnel and inventories of platforms, especially in the British Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF), to help pay for new equipment programmes and investment in emerging technologies.

This transition from obsolete 'sunset' to 'sunrise' capabilities is planned to involve networking, the exploitation of data, artificial intelligence, directed-energy weapons and robotic and autonomous systems. These plans include a reconnaissance satellite constellation for the new UK Space Command. Overall, the IR proposed a UK posture that would be more proactive in seeking to shape the international order and, critically, would integrate the key levers of government and national power and influence. To underpin all this, the government had previously announced in November 2020 an uplift of GBP16.5 billion (USD22.8bn) in the defence budget over four years.

The most attention-grabbing aspect of the IR was the announcement of an 'Indo-Pacific tilt', as well as increased focus on Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, the review suggested that the centre of gravity of the UK's defence commitments would

remain NATO and the Euro–Atlantic arena. Indeed, it identified Russia as posing the ‘most acute direct threat’ to the UK, while China was portrayed as a ‘systemic’ competitor.

Inevitably, this raised questions about whether the government can deliver on all these ambitions. Ministers and senior officers have sought to reconcile this apparent tension by arguing in part that the

Minilateral defence cooperation in Europe

Regional and minilateral defence cooperation in Europe accelerated during the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to enhanced interoperability, joint planning and cooperative capability development, initiatives to tackle the coronavirus pandemic, improve resilience and further both NATO’s and the EU’s green defence and innovation priorities all provided an impetus for regional and minilateral formats in 2020 and 2021.

The French-led **European Intervention Initiative** (EI2) focuses on tackling terrorism, improving resilience, anticipating future crises and on enhanced defence cooperation. EI2 activity is structured across eight working groups – four geographical (focusing on the Sahel, the Caribbean, the Baltic region and the Indian Ocean) and four thematic working groups (focusing on power projection, terrorism, external influence in Africa and legal affairs). On 22 June 2021 a conference on European defence cooperation outlined a requirement for European defence cooperation in fully-networked, optionally-crewed, collaborative combat-air capability and showcased the FCAS and Next-Generation Weapons System (NGWS). Earlier, on 25 September 2020, EI2 defence ministers met in Portugal for a third high-level meeting. Among other agenda points, they discussed enlargement, though no new members have been invited to join since 2019 despite reports of interest by Greece and others. This reignited criticism in some quarters over perceptions of the format’s exclusivity and perhaps reflects a lack of consensus on EI2 enlargement among its members.

The UK-led **Joint Expeditionary Force** (JEF) focused on increasing preparedness and interoperability. On 1 July 2021 JEF states adopted a new Policy Direction concerning operational and logistical guidance for rapid deployment and deterrence against hybrid security threats in Northern Europe. On 12 February 2020 the participating states signed a Readiness Declaration, committing the JEF to contribute to NATO’s Readiness Initiative, including with land, maritime and air capabilities, and military logistics. In March 2021 two Royal Navy ships participated alongside Baltic partners in the JEF’s first maritime security activity in the Baltic Sea. This prepared the ground for the JEF’s second large joint exercise, *Joint Protector 21*, which took place in Sweden in September 2021. Iceland became the tenth JEF member state on joining in April 2021.

The **Nordic Defence Cooperation** (NORDEF) grouping is focused on implementing its Vision 2025 priorities, notably tackling the pandemic; ‘green defence’; consolidating work on ‘total defence’, military logistics and capability development; and strengthening partnerships with the US and Baltic countries. In February 2020, member states activated the NORDEF Crisis Consultation Mechanism to collaborate on reducing the pandemic’s impact on the armed forces and resuming training and exercises. During 2020 a Danish-led working group on green defence was set up to discuss options for reducing CO₂ emissions by installations, equipment and operations. The National Armaments Directors of NORDEF countries met twice to review ongoing work on capability development in Space, Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Electronic Warfare as part of NORDEF’s new Long-Term Project Development model. The Military Coordination Committee authorised further action on five lines of effort: ammunition, strategic sea- and airlift, maintenance, joint warehousing and host-nation support within NORDEF’s Logistics Forum initiative. Discussions with US European Command in September 2020 focused on cooperation over military mobility, capability development, Arctic security and exercise coordination. In 2021 Finland, as chair, signalled that NORDEF will work on project bids for the European Defence Fund and on reducing the impact of the pandemic on security of supply issues, especially relating to defence projects and the Nordic defence industry and industrial base.

On 24 June 2020 the **Visegrad Four** (V4) ministers of defence signed the Long-Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on their Defence Cooperation, revising a document originally signed in 2014. The 2020 document increases V4 contributions to NATO and EU Common Security and Defence Policy operations and commits them to closer cooperative capability development, including through a joint ammunition project and European Defence Fund bids. Meeting in Krakow from 23–24 June 2021, V4 chiefs of defence updated the 2023 V4 EU Battlegroup preparation process and launched a joint initiative on V4 Training and Exercise Strategy. Improved cooperation against Russian ‘hybrid threats’ through strategic communications and cooperation on digitisation and technical innovation featured in V4 meetings throughout 2020 and 2021.

declared ambition of a greater and more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific region should not be seen solely, or indeed primarily, in defence terms. However, the prominence given during 2021 to the dispatch to the region of the UK's Carrier Strike Group on its first operational deployment appeared only to heighten expectations. The September 2021 Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) agreement, centred on cooperation to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine capability for the Royal Australian Navy, could help underpin increased UK commitment to the region, but the specific role of each signatory to the agreement remains unclear at the time of writing.

The IR also announced that the ceiling on the UK's nuclear-warhead stockpile would be raised to counter 'the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats' in other countries. This appeared to be a sign of renewed concern about the strength of the UK's deterrent posture in the face of developments in the nuclear and missile-defence capabilities and postures of Russia and, possibly, China. The budget implications of this move were unclear but could be significant.

Increasing maritime capability – reducing land and air capabilities

In October 2021 Prime Minister Boris Johnson appointed an admiral to the post of chief of the defence staff for the first time in two decades (and for only the third time since 1982), which some analysts understood to suggest a more maritime-centred focus. Johnson declared that his ambition for the Royal Navy was for it to be 'foremost in Europe'.

The navy appears to be a major beneficiary from the review. There will be a short-term dip in destroyer and frigate numbers (already reduced from 19 to 18). Navy chiefs argue that there will be compensation in increased numbers in the future (although the plan to rectify the unreliable propulsion of the Type-45 destroyers appears to be running behind schedule). The aim is to build up to a force of 24 escorts by the mid-2030s, including new Type-26, Type-31 and eventually Type-32 frigates, the last of which is still in the design phase. New autonomous mine-warfare capabilities will replace existing mine countermeasures vessels. Also critical to the navy's future operational plans is the new Fleet Solid Support ship programme.

Two new Littoral Response Groups – one in the Euro–Atlantic area and from late 2023 another in the Indo-Pacific and centred mainly on the Indian

Ocean – will carry Royal Marines as part of a transformed Future Commando Force. Forward presence will also include the latest offshore patrol vessels, to be replaced or supplemented later by some of the new-design frigates. Initial planning is also underway for a new-generation destroyer, the Type-83, and a successor nuclear-powered attack submarine. There are also increasing signs that the navy is looking to keep both of its aircraft carriers available for operations, although at present there are not sufficient assets for two carrier air groups. The UK says it will buy more than its current commitment of 48 F-35B *Lightning* II aircraft to fly from the ships, though it has not been specific about how many more or when; at the same time, there may be greater focus on developing uninhabited air capabilities to fly from the carriers.

The RAF will reduce airframe numbers, allowing a GBP2bn (USD2.8bn) investment in the concept and assessment phase of the FCAS programme, with the *Tempest* crewed combat aircraft project at its core, to potentially provide a replacement for the *Typhoon* after 2035. The RAF plans to continue fielding seven *Typhoon* operational squadrons, although 24 early model *Typhoons* are to be withdrawn by 2025, five years earlier than anticipated.

The 14 C-130J *Hercules* medium-transport aircraft that support special forces will be retired. The role will be assumed by the larger A400M *Atlas*. The last three E-3D airborne early-warning and control aircraft were retired in 2021, to be replaced from 2023 by three E-7 *Wedgetail* aircraft. The *Puma* HC2 medium-lift helicopter fleet will retire by 2025, to be replaced by an as-yet-unidentified type, while eight of the RAF's early-model *Chinook* heavy-lift helicopters are also to be withdrawn, though the UK agreed a contract for 14 H-47(ER) *Chinook* helicopters in May 2021.

A Global Response Force will combine the army's existing air-assault and combat-aviation brigades. The 3rd Division will remain optimised for high-intensity warfighting and will shift its capabilities in favour of both protection and deep battle. The plan is also for electronic-warfare and air-defence capabilities to double in size. The army will also reduce from three to two armoured Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), with a mixture of heavy and medium armour. Two-thirds of the current fleet of *Challenger* 2 main battle tanks will be upgraded, amounting to 148 vehicles. The *Warrior* infantry fighting vehicle will be retired and the armoured-infantry capability apparently abandoned. Instead, mechanised infantry will use the *Boxer*

wheeled armoured personnel carrier, meaning that the UK will be the only significant NATO member without armoured infantry. This and the reduction in tanks and ground-manoeuvre brigades by one-third will reduce close-combat capability, not least in urban terrain.

The army plans to increase capability for deep battle by attacking more targets with greater precision at longer range. The plan is for a new 'Deep Recce Strike' BCT to achieve this by using *Ajax* scout vehicles, electronic warfare and long-range precision artillery, including guided multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and *Spike*-NLOS missiles, supported by attack helicopters. The Army's *Future Soldier* document, released in November 2021, set out these plans, including the creation of a new 'Ranger' regiment designed to train, advise 'and if necessary accompany' partners, alongside more detail on the new Special Operations Brigade, announced in August 2021. However, the army's plans depend on the long-overdue replacement of the high proportion of its fighting equipment that is either obsolete or nearing obsolescence, such as the exchange of the *Scimitar* reconnaissance vehicles with the *Ajax*. But *Ajax* is suffering well-publicised problems that have inflicted a considerable delay and its survival remains

in some doubt, indicating that, despite many reforms, the process for procuring UK military equipment still has considerable weaknesses.

Unclear priorities

The review's analysis of developing challenges appears consistent with the thinking of the US and many of the UK's allies that are de-emphasising traditional assets – force size and materiel – in favour of emerging technological capabilities. However, there is a risk of too much combat capability being removed, particularly from the army and the RAF. Moreover, many of the new technologies promoted in the review depend on the existence of a secure backbone of digital communications. This has the potential to increase capability, but conversely could increase vulnerability to attack by cyber, electronic warfare or electromagnetic pulse weapons.


Meanwhile, reductions in the numbers of aircraft and armoured forces will make it more difficult to sustain the repeated deployments required by the IR. If the ambitions in the review are followed through, it is likely that forces will be spread more thinly, perhaps increasing risk in the move to reduce personnel in favour of technology, not least as the size of reserve forces is to remain static.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Europe

Significant events in 2021

JANUARY


FRENCH SHIPYARD SALE CALLED OFF



The 2018 agreement to sell the Chantiers de l'Atlantique shipyard in Saint-Nazaire to Italy's Fincantieri was called off, with both sides citing the significant economic challenges facing the cruise ship industry due to the pandemic. Chantiers de l'Atlantique – the only shipyard in France with enough capacity to build the country's next aircraft carrier – had been majority-owned by Korean firm STX from 2008 until the company's bankruptcy in 2016. The French government's subsequent nationalisation of the shipyard was described as a 'temporary' measure, with the sale to Fincantieri intended to secure the company's longer-term health.

FEBRUARY


RHEINMETALL RESTRUCTURING



Rheinmetall announced a restructuring that will dissolve its Automotive and Defence divisions and replace them with five new groups: Weapon & Ammunition, Electronic Solutions, Vehicle Systems, Sensors & Actuators and Materials & Trade. One of the reasons given for the move was to reduce the share of sales of automotive components, such as for internal combustion engines, while the firm also announced that its pistons business will be sold. Rheinmetall intends to focus more on the defence and security sector. Currently comprising 63% (EUR3.65bn (USD4.45bn)) of the firm's total sales of EUR5.8bn (USD7.06bn), the company expects that defence and security products will by 2025 reach 70% (EUR5.95bn (USD7.25bn)) of its projected total sales of EUR8.5bn (USD10.36bn).

JUNE

SWITZERLAND BUYS AMERICAN



The Swiss government announced the selection of the F-35A and *Patriot* for its new fighter and ground-based air-defence programmes, respectively. The choice of the former ends a saga that began in the late 2000s and included the rejection of the Swedish *Gripen* in a popular referendum in 2014, followed by the (narrow) approval of the programme in another referendum in 2020. The government stated that both systems were the lowest-priced offers in their respective competitions. The F-35 has recently begun to see its unit cost reduce as production edges closer to one-third of the number ordered globally so far.

AUGUST

FCAS/SCAF: SIX YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT AGREED



France, Germany and Spain agreed on a further six years of development work for the FCAS/SCAF programme, specifically the Next Generation Weapon System project that includes a fighter aircraft (led by Dassault), an uninhabited systems remote carrier and a combat cloud (both led by Airbus). In March the CEO of Dassault Aviation voiced concerns over workshare arrangements and project management. The addition of Spain as an equal partner in 2019 spreads the financial burden, but it also increases Airbus's share of the programme. In addition, both companies have concerns over intellectual property, as some technology that will be used in the programme has already been developed by them independently. The respective governments have so far managed to smooth over potential disagreements but their continued attention will be required as the companies negotiate the specifics of the next phase of work.

AUGUST

ULTRA ELECTRONICS: PROPOSED TAKEOVER PROBED
















The UK government announced that it would investigate the proposed GBP2.6bn (USD3.61bn) takeover of Ultra Electronics by Cobham Group. Ultra Electronics supplies several key subsystems to the UK and other close allies, and the deal is being assessed for its national security implications. Cobham was itself controversially taken over by US private-equity firm Advent International in December 2019 and has since divested a number of businesses, including its stake in the AirTanker consortium and its Mission Systems pilot-training business. Advent International and Cobham had earlier raised the possibility of acquiring Ultra to create a 'global defence electronics champion'. However, the UK government will be concerned about the potential implications of the takeover of a company that provides the UK with some of its most sensitive technology, most significantly hull-mounted sonars for frigates.

Table 5  **Hungary: defence procurement since 2010**

Launched in 2017, Hungary's ten-year Zrínyi 2026 programme aims to achieve the most significant modernisation of the armed forces since the end of the Cold War. There is particular focus on recapitalising equipment across the air and land domains and the development of the defence industry by facilitating offset agreements, local production deals and technology transfer. Over the last three years, Hungary has signed several contracts designed to boost its land capa-

bilities, largely with German companies; of 218 *Lynx* infantry fighting vehicles contracted from Rheinmetall, the plan is to manufacture 172 in Hungary. Aerospace procurement has focused on acquiring utility transport platforms. The two KC-390 medium transport aircraft ordered from Embraer will provide a significant capability upgrade following the retirement of the four An-26 *Curl* light transport aircraft in 2020. Construction of the first airframe began in late 2021.

Contract date	Equipment	Type	Quantity	Value	Prime contractor	Deliveries	Part of Zrínyi 2026?
Aug 2014	<i>Mistral</i> 3	Point-defence man-portable air defence system	73+	HUF3.68bn (USD15.83m)	 MBDA	2016–19	No
Jan 2017	Z-242L	Training aircraft	2	Approx. HUF363m (USD1.32m)		Mar 2017	Yes
	Z-143L		2			Mar 2018	Yes
Dec 2017	A319*	Passenger transport aircraft	2	€USD90m		Ceská Letecká Servisní (CLS)	Jan 2018 Yes
Jun 2018	H145M	Multi-role helicopter	20	Approx. HUF100bn (USD370.08m)		Airbus	Nov 2019– Dec 2021 Yes
Dec 2018	<i>Leopard</i> 2A4**	Main battle tank	12	Approx. EUR1.76bn (USD2.08bn)		Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW)	Jul–Dec 2020 Yes
	<i>Leopard</i> 2A7+	Main battle tank	44				Expected from 2023 Yes
	PzH 2000	155mm self-propelled artillery	24				Expected in 2021–25 Yes
Dec 2018	H225M	Heavy transport helicopter	16	HUF48bn (USD177.64m)		Airbus	Expected in 2023–25 Yes
Dec 2019	<i>Wisent</i> 2	Armoured recovery vehicle	5	n.k.		Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG)	Expected in 2023–25 Yes
Dec 2019	<i>Ejder Yalcin</i> 4x4	Protected patrol vehicle	10	€USD6.10m		Nurol Makina	Dec 2020 Yes
Sep 2020	<i>Lynx</i>	Infantry fighting vehicle	218***	EUR2bn (USD2.28bn)		Rheinmetall	Expected from 2023 Yes
	BPz-3 <i>Büffel</i>	Armoured recovery vehicle	9				Expected from 2023 Yes
Nov 2020	NASAMS III	Short-range surface-to-air missile system	n.k.	EUR410m (USD468.7m)		Raytheon Technologies	Expected in 2023 Yes
						Kongsberg	
Nov 2020	KC-390	Medium transport aircraft	2	Up to HUF75bn (USD243.51m)		Embraer	Expected in 2023–24 Yes
Dec 2020	<i>Ejder Yalcin</i> 4x4	Protected patrol vehicle	40 (320)****	€USD23m		Nurol Makina	n.k. Yes

*second-hand

**a second-hand lease agreement

***46 to be built in Germany by Rheinmetall; 172 to be built in Hungary by Rheinmetall Hungary

****40 to be built in Turkey by Nurol Makina; 280 to be built in Hungary by HT Division

 – multinational











▼ Figure 9  European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM)

In 2002, France and Italy agreed to jointly develop and acquire multi-mission frigates (FRégates Européennes Multi-Missions (FREMM)). The resulting vessels share a basic hull design, propulsion system and some weapons, but little else. Both France and Italy have large and well-established domestic manufacturers of sensors and combat systems, principally Thales and Leonardo, which have integrated equipment on each country's respective frigates. Italy's requirement has always been for ten vessels, but while France began with a plan to build 17 this was subsequently reduced to eight. In part because of these changes, French unit-cost estimates have

more than doubled; this is despite the export of two vessels to Morocco and Egypt. In contrast, the unit cost of Italy's vessels has remained broadly the same. More recently Italy has also exported two of its unfinished frigates to Egypt, with two replacements added to the shipbuilding plan. However, the most significant export was secured in 2020 when the US Navy (USN) selected a modified version of Italy's FREMM variant for its FFG(X) programme of up to 20 ships. If the USN does build up to 20 vessels, like the UK's Type-26 frigate the design will be operated in greater numbers by a foreign navy than by the domestic customer.


Europe

FREMM exports


Order date	Recipient	Variant	Quantity	Value (USD)	Deliveries
2007	 Morocco	 ASW	1	685.23m	2014
2015	 Egypt	 ASW	1	1.11bn	2016
2020*	 United States	 Constellation	2	2.33bn	2026–27
2020	 Egypt	 GP	2	1.37bn	2020–ongoing
2021	 Indonesia	 tbd	6	n.k.	n.k.

*Contract for first of class; 20 to be built under current Program of Record
ASW = Anti-Submarine Warfare; GP = General Purpose

France: planned quantity of purchase and government's estimated programme cost (EUR million)



Italy: planned quantity of purchase and government's estimated programme cost (EUR million)




Albania ALB

Albanian Lek ALL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ALL	1.61tr	1.72tr	
	USD	14.8bn	16.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,153	5,837	
Growth	%	-3.3	5.3	
Inflation	%	1.6	1.9	
Def exp [a]	ALL	20.4bn	34.5bn	
	USD	188m	336m	
Def bdtg [b]	ALL	24.1bn	25.2bn	32.2bn
	USD	222m	246m	
USD1=ALL		108.44	102.51	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Excludes military pensions



Population 3,088,385

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.3%	3.4%	4.2%	4.7%	21.5%	6.3%
Female	8.4%	3.0%	3.9%	4.5%	23.6%	7.3%

Capabilities

Principal missions for Albania's armed forces include territorial defence, internal security, disaster-relief tasks and small-scale peacekeeping or training deployments. Tirana is looking to improve the operational readiness and capability of its infantry battalion, including with new equipment closer to NATO standards. Other priorities include improving border management and information sharing to prevent transnational crime and terrorism, establishing a cyber-security unit and developing air capabilities, and creating an armed-forces academy styled on the US Military Academy. Greece and Italy police Albania's airspace. Albania contributes to NATO, UN and EU missions but does not possess an independent expeditionary capability. Most Soviet-era equipment has been sold. Limited defence modernisation under the Long-Term Development Plan 2016–25 is proceeding, including the purchase of helicopters and UAVs and the installation of an airspace-surveillance system. The navy is expected to receive upgrades to vessels that have been or still are deployed in the Aegean Sea. NATO support for the modernisation of Kucova air base is due to begin in 2022. Albania has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern military platforms. Nevertheless, the country has some publicly owned defence companies that are capable of producing small arms, explosives and ammunition.

ACTIVE 7,500 (Land Force 2,350 Naval Force 700 Air Force 650 Support Command 1,650 Other 2,150)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Land Force 2,350

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops regt (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn)

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 lt inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 mor bty

1 NBC coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV 40 *MaxxPro Plus*

ARTILLERY • MOR 32: 82mm 20; 120mm 12

Naval Force 700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

Coast Guard

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14

PB 9: 4 *Iliria* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 3 Mk3 *Sea*

Spectre; 2 *Shqypnia*

PBR 5: 2 Type-227; 1 Type-246; 2 Type-2010

Air Force 650

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

TPT 16: **Medium** 4 AS532AL *Cougar*; **Light** 12: 1 AW109;

3 Bell 205 (AB-205); 2 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 4 Bo-105; 2 H145

Military Police

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 8 IVECO LMV

Support Command 1,650

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

1 cbt spt bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (1 tpt bn, 1 log bn)

1 maint unit

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea*

1

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 21; 1 EOD

pl


SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 29

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Austria AUT

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	379bn	403bn	
	USD	433bn	481bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	48,593	53,793	
Growth	%	-6.2	3.9	
Inflation	%	1.4	2.5	
Def bdtg [a]	EUR	3.04bn	3.08bn	3.11bn
	USD	3.47bn	3.68bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 8,884,864

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.2%	2.4%	2.7%	3.3%	24.5%	8.8%
Female	6.8%	2.4%	2.6%	3.2%	24.7%	11.3%

Capabilities

Austria remains constitutionally non-aligned, but is an EU member and actively engaged in the CSDP. Defence-policy objectives are based on the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2014 Defence Strategy and the 2017 Military Strategy, including providing military capabilities to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, to enable military assistance to the civil authorities and to participate in crisis-management missions abroad. A 2017 defence plan included structural changes at the operational and tactical command-and-control level. Army brigades have specialised according to roles, such as rapid response, mechanised (heavy), air-mobile (light) and mountain warfare. In June 2021, organisational-reform plans were announced that envisage a streamlining of structures in the Ministry of Defence. These are supposed to be completed by April 2022. While not a NATO member, Austria joined NATO's Partnership for Peace framework in 1995. A September 2019 defence ministry report defined recapitalisation requirements until 2030. It warned that the gap between requirements and available resources was growing and would ultimately undermine the ability of the armed forces to implement its missions. The level of ambition for crisis response is to be able to deploy and sustain a minimum (on average) of 1,100 troops. The September 2019 report also called for the *Typhoon* fleet to be upgraded rather than replaced. In July 2020, the defence ministry confirmed that it would retain the *Typhoon* but in January 2021 the defence minister suggested they might be sold if the opportunity presented itself. There are plans to cooperate with Italy over helicopter procurement, and a letter of intent was signed in November 2020. Austria's defence-industrial base is comprised of some 100 companies with significant niche capabilities and international ties in the areas of weapons and ammunitions, communications equipment and vehicles.

ACTIVE 23,300 (Land Forces 13,000 Air 2,800 Support 7,500)

Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist refresher trg for volunteers; 120–150 days additional for officers, NCOs and specialists. Authorised maximum wartime strength of 55,000

RESERVE 115,950 (Joint structured 35,050; Joint unstructured 80,900)

Some 12,000 reservists a year undergo refresher trg in tranches

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Land Forces 13,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 spt bn)

Mechanised

1 (3rd) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)

Light

1 (7th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)

1 (6th) mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 56 *Leopard 2A4*

IFV 112 *Ulan*

APC 144

APC (T) 32 BvS-10

APC (W) 112: 78 *Pandur*; 34 *Pandur EVO*

AUV 216: 66 *Dingo 2*; 150 IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 49: 27 4KH7FA-SB *Greif* (11 more in store); 12

Dingo 2 ARV; 10 M88A1

NBC VEHICLES 12 *Dingo 2* AC NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Bill 2* (PAL 2000)

ARTILLERY 105

SP 155mm 48 M109A5ÖE

MOR 120mm 57 sGrW 86 (40 more in store)

Air Force 2,800

The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*

ISR

1 sqn with PC-6B *Turbo Porter*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130K *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 trg sqn with PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212)

1 sqn with OH-58B *Kiowa*

1 sqn with S-70A *Black Hawk*

2 sqn with SA316/SA319 *Alouette III*

AIR DEFENCE

2 bn

1 radar bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 15 combat capable

FTR 15 Eurofighter *Typhoon* (Tranche 1)
 TPT 11: **Medium** 3 C-130K *Hercules*; **Light** 8 PC-6B
Turbo Porter

TRG 16: 12 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*; 4 DA40NG

HELICOPTERS

MRH 18 SA316/SA319 *Alouette III*

ISR 10 OH-58B *Kiowa*

TPT 32: **Medium** 9 S-70A-42 *Black Hawk*; **Light** 23 Bell
 212 (AB-212)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** *Mistral*

GUNS 35mm 24 GDF-005 (6 more in store)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T**Special Operations Forces****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF gp

1 SF gp (reserve)

Support 7,500

Support forces comprise Joint Services Support Command and several agencies, academies and schools

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea*
 258; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 172; 1 log coy

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 21; UN • MINUSMA 2

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 338; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1
 log coy; UN • UNMIK 1


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Belgium BEL

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	451bn	487bn	
	USD	515bn	582bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	44,688	50,413	
Growth	%	-6.3	5.6	
Inflation	%	0.4	2.4	
Def exp [a]	EUR	4.76bn	5.34bn	
	USD	5.43bn	6.37bn	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	4.66bn	5.36bn	5.99bn
	USD	5.32bn	6.40bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 11,778,842

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.8%	2.8%	2.9%	3.2%	23.1%	8.5%
Female	8.4%	2.7%	2.8%	3.1%	22.9%	10.8%

Capabilities

In July 2016, the government published its Strategic Vision for Defence for 2030. This envisaged a reduced personnel component of around 25,000. However, a large number of impending service retirements means that a gradual increase in recruitment is planned. Belgium also continues to pursue high readiness levels and deployable niche capabilities. NATO, EU and UN membership are central to defence policy. Due to its limited force size, Belgium often collaborates with neighbours and has committed with Denmark and the Netherlands to form a composite combined special-operations command. Belgium can deploy forces for a small-scale overseas operation and maintains overseas deployments on EU and UN missions. It has withdrawn its aircraft from the Middle East. The six-year domestic deployment in support of the federal police officially ended in September 2021, though mid-year saw the armed forces deployed to assist in domestic flood responses. The government is investing in short-term requirements related to aircraft readiness, personal equipment and land-forces vehicles. As part of the defence plan, the government envisages launching five investment projects for fighter aircraft, frigates, mine-countermeasures vessels (being procured jointly with the Netherlands), UAVs and land-combat vehicles. The army has ordered French *Griffon* and *Jaguar* wheeled armoured vehicles for its mechanised brigade as well as the US JLTV. It is forming a multinational unit of A400M transport aircraft with Luxembourg. The air force has selected the F-35 to replace its F-16s and is procuring MQ-9B *Sky Guardian* UAVs. An upgraded, and re-sited, airspace monitoring centre began operations in October 2020. Belgium has an advanced, export-focused defence industry, focusing on components and subcontracting, though in FN Herstal it has one of the world's largest manufacturers of small arms.

ACTIVE 24,450 (Army 9,600 Navy 1,500 Air 4,950
 Medical Service 1,450 Joint Service 6,950)

RESERVE 5,900

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Land Component 9,600

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops regt (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs gp)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech bde (1 ISR bn; 3 mech bn; 2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn; 2 engr bn; 2 sigs gp; 2 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 CIMIC gp

1 EOD unit

1 MP coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

ASLT 18 *Piranha* III-C DF90

RECCE 30 *Pandur Recce*

IFV 19 *Piranha* III-C DF30

APC • APC (W) 78: 64 *Piranha* III-C; 14 *Piranha* III-PC (CP)

AUV 655: 219 *Dingo* 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 14: 6 *Pionierpanzer* 2 *Dachs*; 8 *Piranha* III-C

ARV 13: 4 *Pandur*; 9 *Piranha* III-C

VLB 4 *Leguan*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike-MR*

ARTILLERY 60

TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 MkII

MOR 46: 81mm 14 Expal; 120mm 32 RT-61

Naval Component 1,500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGHM 2 *Leopold* I (ex-NLD *Karel Doorman*) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

PCC 2 *Castor* (FRA *Kermorvan* mod)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES

MHC 5 *Flower* (*Tripartite*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AGOR 1 *Belgica* (owned by BELSPO, managed by RBINS)

AXS 1 *Zenobe Gramme*

Air Component 4,950

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

4 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with NH90 NFH

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *Falcon* 7X (VIP)

1 sqn (BEL/LUX) with A400M; C-130H *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with SF-260D/M

1 OCU unit with AW109

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with AW109 (ISR)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable

FTR 53: 44 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 9 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon*

TPT 10: **Heavy** 4 A400M; **Medium** 4 C-130H *Hercules*;

PAX 2 *Falcon* 7X (VIP, leased)

TRG 32: 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M

HELICOPTERS

ASW 4 NH90 NFH (opcon Navy)

TPT 11: **Medium** 4 NH90 TTH; **Light** 7 AW109 (ISR) (7 more in store)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder*

II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM

BOMBS

Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12 *Paveway* II; GBU-24 *Paveway* III

INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser JDAM (dual-mode)

Medical Service 1,450

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 med unit

1 fd hospital

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 10: 4 *Pandur* (amb); 6 *Piranha* III-C (amb)

AUV 10 *Dingo* 2 (amb)

DEPLOYMENT

BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 60

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 7

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 198; 1 mot inf coy

MALI: *Operation Barkhane* 3; EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 53

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1

NIGER: METT 130


NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM

FOREIGN FORCES

United States US European Command: 1,150

Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH

Convertible Mark BAM		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BAM	34.0bn	35.5bn	
	USD	19.8bn	21.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	6,035	6,648	
Growth	%	-4.3	2.8	
Inflation	%	-1.1	1.8	
Def bdgt	BAM	288m	318m	313m
	USD	168m	194m	
USD1=BAM		1.72	1.64	



Population 3,824,782

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	6.8%	2.4%	3.1%	3.2%	26.6%	6.7%
Female	6.4%	2.2%	2.9%	3.0%	26.9%	9.9%

Capabilities

The armed forces' primary goals are to defend territorial integrity and contribute to peacekeeping missions and civilian-support operations. Bosnia-Herzegovina joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and a Membership Action Plan was presented in 2010. Its aspiration to join NATO has been delayed due to unresolved defence-property issues, and continuing ethnic tensions have seen the ethnic Serb community threaten to withdraw from national structures including the armed forces. The country is reforming its armed forces and modernising its equipment in accordance with its Defence Review, Development and Modernisation Plan for 2017–27 and its NATO aspirations. The armed forces are professional and represent all three ethnic groups. However, low salaries may negatively affect recruitment and retention. Bosnia-Herzegovina contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions, but the armed forces have no capacity to deploy independently and self-sustain beyond national borders. The inventory comprises mainly ageing Soviet-era equipment, though some new helicopters have been procured from the US. Bosnia-Herzegovina has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with only the capability to produce small arms, ammunition and explosives.

ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500)

RESERVE 6,000 (Armed Forces 6,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Armed Forces 10,500

1 ops comd; 1 spt comd

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 inf bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bde (1 tk bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 int bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log comd (5 log bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 45 M60A3

APC • APC (T) 20 M113A2

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

VLB MTU

MW *Bozena*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 60: 8 9P122 *Malyutka*; 9 9P133 *Malyutka*; 32 BOV-1; 11 M-92

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); HJ-8; *Milan*

ARTILLERY 224

TOWED 122mm 100 D-30

MRL 122mm 24 APRA-40

MOR 120mm 100 M-75

Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800

FORCES BY ROLE

HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205; Mi-8MTV *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip* H

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; SA-341H/SA-342L *Gazelle* (HN-42/45M)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FGA (7 J-22 *Orao* in store)

ATK (6 J-1 (J-21) *Jastreb*; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) *Jastreb* all in store)

ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) *Jastreb** in store)

TRG (1 G-4 *Super Galeb* (N-62)* in store)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 13: 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 1 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 1 SA-341H *Gazelle* (HN-42); 7 SA-342L *Gazelle* (HN-45M)

TPT 21: **Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip* **Light** 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

TRG 1 Mi-34 *Hermit*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 20 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS • TOWED 40mm 47: 31 L/60, 16 L/70

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 3

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Part of EUFOR – *Operation Althea* unless otherwise stated

Albania 1

Austria 258; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit

Bulgaria	12
Chile	8
Czech Republic	2
Greece	6
Hungary	174; 1 inf coy
Ireland	5
Italy	50; 1 ISR coy
Macedonia, North	1
Poland	38
Romania	40
Slovakia	40
Slovenia	10
Spain	2
Switzerland	20
Turkey	242; 1 inf coy

Bulgaria BLG

Bulgarian Lev BGN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BGN	119bn	128bn	
	USD	69.2bn	77.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	10,006	11,332	
	Growth	%	-4.2	4.5
Inflation	%	1.2	2.1	
Def exp [a]	BGN	1.84bn	2.01bn	
	USD	1.08bn	1.23bn	
Def bdtg [b]	BGN	2.14bn	2.10bn	2.23bn
	USD	1.25bn	1.28bn	
FMA (US)	USD	5m	0m	0m
USD1=BGN		1.71	1.64	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Excludes military pensions



Population 6,919,180

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.4%	2.5%	2.4%	2.8%	25.5%	8.2%
Female	7.0%	2.3%	2.2%	2.5%	25.0%	12.1%

Capabilities

The armed forces' main priority is defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Following a strategic defence review in 2019-20, the national assembly in February 2021 endorsed the Programme 2032 long-term development plan involving significant re-equipment and modernisation and a focus on artificial intelligence and cyber capability. There is also a long-term commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Bulgaria signed a ten-year Defence Cooperation Roadmap with the US in 2020 to assist force development, including meeting NATO capability targets. There are several bilateral defence-cooperation agreements with regional states. Bulgaria's airspace is protected by NATO's Air Policing Mission, due to its limited numbers of combat aircraft. In an attempt to cope with personnel shortfalls, the mili-

tary retirement age and salaries have been increased. Training is prioritised for units intended for international operations and those with certain readiness levels declared to NATO and the EU. Bulgaria regularly trains and exercises with NATO partners and regional allies. The country contributes to NATO and EU missions but has little logistics-support capability. Despite long-term plans for reform, there is still much ageing Soviet-era equipment. In April 2020, a contract was signed for eight F-16 Block 70 fighter aircraft, to replace MiG-29s, with the intention also to acquire another eight. There are also plans for acquisitions to enable the formation of battalion battlegroups within its mechanised brigades. The navy is prioritising the procurement of a multi-purpose patrol vessel and the modernisation of its frigates to boost its presence in the Black Sea. However, there are concerns over the affordability of some of these ambitions. Bulgaria's defence industry exports small arms but has limited capacity to design and manufacture platforms.

ACTIVE 36,950 (Army 17,000 Navy 4,450 Air 8,500 Central Staff 7,000)

RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 17,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bn

Mechanised

2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 SAM bn)

Light

1 mtn inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn)

1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn)

1 NBC bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 90 T-72M1/M2+

IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23

APC 120

APC (T) 100 MT-LB

APC (W) 20 BTR-60

AUV 44: 17 M1117 ASV; 27 Plasan *SandCat*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB

VLB BLG67; TMM

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 29 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); (9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*) in store)

GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12

ARTILLERY 176

SP 122mm 48 2S1

TOWED 152mm 24 D-20

MRL 122mm 24 BM-21

MOR 120mm ε80 *Tundza/Tundza Sani*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 9K32 *Strela* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 24 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

GUNS 400

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Navy 4,450

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3

FFM 3 *Drazki* (ex-BEL *Wielingen*) (of which 2†) with 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with L5 mod 4 HWT, 1 sextuple Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (Fitted for but not with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Smeli* (ex-FSU *Koni*) with 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns

PCF 1 *Molnya*† (ex-FSU *Tarantula* II) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCT 2 *Reshitelni* (ex-FSU *Pauk* I) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 76mm gun

MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9

MHC 3: 2 *Mesta* (ex-NLD *Alkmaar*); 1 *Tsibar* (*Tripartite* – ex-BEL *Flower*)

MSC 3 *Briz* (ex-FSU *Sonya*) (of which 1†)

MSI 3 *Ol'ya* (ex-FSU) (3 more non-operational)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCM 1 *Vydrat* (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9: 3 AGS; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2 ATF; 1 AX

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ASW 2 AS565MB *Panther*

MRH 1 AS365N3+ *Dauphin* 2

Air Force 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/ISR

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-30 *Clank*; C-27J *Spartan*; L-410UVP-E; PC-12M

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39ZA *Albatros**

1 sqn with PC-9M

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24D/V *Hind* D/E

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS532AL *Cougar*; Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; Mi-17 *Hip* H

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable

FTR 14: 11 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 3 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*†

FGA (Some MiG-21bis *Fishbed*/MiG-21UM *Mongol* B in store)

ATK 3: 2 Su-25K *Frogfoot* K; 1 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot* B

ISR 1 An-30 *Clank*

TPT 7: **Medium** 3 C-27J *Spartan*; **Light** 4: 1 An-2T *Colt*; 2 L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M

TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA *Albatros**; 6 PC-9M (basic)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24V *Hind* E (6 Mi-24D *Hind* D in store)

MRH 5 Mi-17 *Hip* H

TPT 18: **Medium** 12 AS532AL *Cougar*; **Light** 6 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • EW *Yastreb*-25

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 20

Long-range 20: 12 S-200 (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 8 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

Short-range S-125M *Neva*-M (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)‡ R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 *Alamo* A)

ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*)

Special Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde (1 SF bn, 1 para bn)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 12

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4


SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 26

Croatia CRO

Croatian Kuna HRK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	HRK	372bn	398bn	
	USD	56.2bn	63.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	13,896	15,808	
Growth	%	-8.0	6.3	
Inflation	%	0.1	2.0	
Def exp [a]	HRK	6.70bn	11.1bn	
	USD	1.01bn	1.77bn	
Def bdgt [b]	HRK	6.59bn	6.72bn	6.77bn
	USD	997m	1.07bn	
USD1=HRK		6.61	6.27	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 4,208,973

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.3%	2.5%	2.9%	3.0%	23.7%	8.9%
Female	6.8%	2.3%	2.8%	2.9%	24.2%	12.7%

Capabilities

Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as tackling terrorism and contributing to international peacekeeping missions. Croatia joined NATO in 2009, having reformed its armed forces to create a small professional force. There have been recent moves to improve conditions of service. Despite economic challenges, the 2021 defence budget exceeded 2% of GDP, with a significant proportion of the budget going to equipment investment. Zagreb has defence-cooperation agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary and Romania, and personnel frequently train with regional and international allies. Croatia hosts the NATO Multi-national Special Aviation Programme and training centre and participates in EU and NATO missions, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland. The inventory is almost entirely composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Modernisation objectives include the acquisition of UH-60M helicopters from the US. In May 2021, Croatia announced the purchase of second-hand *Rafale* F3-R fighters from France, after earlier US objections to the proposed sale of second-hand, upgraded Israeli F-16s to replace Croatia's ageing MiG-21s. Croatia has a small defence industry, focused on small arms, ammunition, explosives and naval systems.

ACTIVE 16,700 (Army 11,100 Navy 1,650 Air 1,600 Joint 2,350) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000

Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks

RESERVE 21,000 (Army 21,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Joint 2,350 (General Staff)

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES

5 SF gp

Army 11,100

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)

Mechanised

1 mech bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)

Other

1 inf trg regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty/MRL bn

1 engr regt

1 NBC bn

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 75 M-84

IFV 100 M-80

APC 188

APC (T) 15: 11 BTR-50; 4 OT M-60

APC (W) 132: 6 BOV-VP; 126 Patria AMV (incl variants)

PPV 41: 21 *Maxxpro Plus*; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb)

AUV 172: 10 IVECO LMV; 162 M-ATV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 22: 12 JVBT-55A; 1 M-84AI; 1 WZT-2; 2 WZT-3; 6

Maxxpro Recovery

VLB 6 MT-55A

MW 4 MV-4

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 20 BOV-1

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111

Fagot (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5

Spandrel); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

ARTILLERY 168

SP 21: 122mm 8 2S1 *Gvozдика*; 155mm 13 PzH 2000

TOWED 122mm 20 D-30

MRL 122mm 27: 6 M91 *Vulkan*; 21 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 100: 82mm 54 LMB M96; 120mm 46 M-75/UBM 52

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9+: 9 9K35 *Strela-10M3* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS SP 20mm 10 BOV-3 SP

Navy 1,650

Navy HQ at Split

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PCFG 1 *Končar* with 2 twin Inchr with RBS15B Mk I

AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun

PCG 4:

- 2 *Kralj* with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun (with minelaying capability)
- 2 *Vukovar* (ex-FIN *Helsinki*) with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I ASHM, 1 57mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1MHI 1 *Korcula***AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5:**

- LCT 2 *Cetina* (with minelaying capability)
- LCVP 3: 2 Type-21; 1 Type-22

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKL 1 PDS 713**COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 3 RBS15K****Marines****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

- 1 indep mne coy

Coast Guard**FORCES BY ROLE**

Two divisions, headquartered in Split (1st div) and Pula (2nd div)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5: 4***Mirna*; 1 *Omiš***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3:**

- AAR 1 *Faust Vrancic* (YUG *Spasilac*)
- AKL 1 PT-71†
- AX 1 *Andrija Mohorovicic* (POL Project 861)

Air Force and Air Defence 1,600**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

- 1 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/UMD *Fishbed*

TRAINING

- 1 sqn with PC-9M; Z-242L

ISR HELICOPTER

- 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; OH-58D *Kiowa Warrior*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV *Hip H*; Mi-8T *Hip C*; Mi-171Sh

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable**

- FGA 8: 4 MiG-21bis *Fishbed*; 4 MiG-21UMD *Fishbed*
- TPT • Light (2 An-32 *Cline* in store)
- TRG 21: 17 PC-9M; 4 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

- MRH 25: 10 Mi-8MTV *Hip H*; 15 OH-58D *Kiowa Warrior*
- TPT 21: Medium 13: 3 Mi-8T *Hip C*; 10 Mi-171Sh; Light 8 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

- Point-defence 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

- AAM • IR R-60; R-60MK (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*)
- ASM AGM-114R *Hellfire*

Special Forces Command**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**


- 2 SF gp

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000

Police 3,000 armed

DEPLOYMENT**INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 8****IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 10****LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1****POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 80; 1 MRL bty with M91 *Vulkan*****SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 142; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit with Mi-8 *Hip*****WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9****Cyprus CYP**

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	20.8bn	22.2bn	
	USD	23.8bn	26.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	26,785	29,486	
Growth	%	-5.1	4.8	
Inflation	%	-1.1	1.7	
Def bdtgt	EUR	367m	438m	465m
	USD	419m	523m	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	



Population 1,281,506

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.0%	2.8%	3.7%	4.6%	26.3%	5.8%
Female	7.6%	2.4%	3.0%	3.8%	24.6%	7.5%

Capabilities

The National Guard is focused on protecting the island's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and safeguarding Cyprus's EEZ. Its main objective is to deter any Turkish incursion, and to provide enough opposition until military support can be provided by Greece, its primary ally. Cyprus has been enhancing its defence cooperation with Greece, including on cyber defence. Nicosia has also pledged deeper military ties with Israel, while France has renewed and enhanced its defence-cooperation agreement with Cyprus. In 2018 Cyprus also signed a memorandum of understanding on enhancing defence and security cooperation with the UK. Having reduced conscript liability in 2016, Nicosia began recruiting additional contract-service personnel, as part of the effort to modernise and professionalise its forces. Cyprus exercises with several international partners, most notably France, Greece and Israel. External deployments have been limited to some officers joining EU and

UN missions. Cyprus has little logistics capability to support operations abroad. Equipment comprises a mix of Soviet-era and modern European systems. The defence minister announced in 2019 the intention to introduce an eight-year military-modernisation programme that would also involve a higher defence budget. Cyprus has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment. However, the government is looking for opportunities to cooperate with defence firms in Greece.

ACTIVE 12,000 (National Guard 12,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750

Conscript liability 15 months

RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000)

Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; military doctors to age 60)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

National Guard 12,000 (incl conscripts)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn)

Mechanised

4 (1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th) mech bde

Light

1 (4th) lt inf bde

2 (2nd & 8th) lt inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty comd (8 arty bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (3rd) spt bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 134: 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2

RECCE 72 EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV 43 BMP-3

APC 295

APC (T) 168 *Leonidas*

APC (W) 127 VAB (incl variants)

AUV 8 BOV M16 *Milos*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 2+: 2 AMX-30D; BREM-80U

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 33: 15 EE-3 *Jararaca* with *Milan*; 18 VAB with HOT

MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 106mm 144 M40A1

GUNS • TOWED 100mm 20 M-1944

ARTILLERY 456

SP 155mm 48: 24 NORA B-52; 12 Mk F3; 12 *Zuzana*

TOWED 84: 105mm 72 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1

MRL 22: 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 *Plamen*

MOR 302: 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); 107mm

20 M2/M30; 120mm 112 RT61

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 22+

Medium-range 4 9K37M1 *Buk* M1-2 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 18: 12 *Aspide*; 6 9K331 *Tor*-M1 (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence *Mistral*

GUNS • TOWED 60: 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003 (with *Skyguard*)

Maritime Wing

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (coastal defence) AshM bty with MM40 *Exocet* AshM

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PCC 2: 1 *Alasia* (ex-OMN *Al Mabrukha*) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 OPV 62 (ISR *Sa'ar* 4.5 derivative)

PBF 4: 2 *Rodman* 55; 2 *Vittoria*

COASTAL DEFENCE • AshM 3 MM40 *Exocet*

Air Wing

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11 Mi-35P *Hind* E (offered for sale)

MRH 7: 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 *Gazelle* (with HOT for anti-armour role)

TPT • Light 2 Bell 206L3 *Long Ranger*

Paramilitary 750+

Armed Police 500+

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (rapid-reaction) paramilitary unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 2 VAB VTT

HELICOPTERS • MRH 4: 2 AW139; 2 Bell 412SP

Maritime Police 250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PBF 5: 2 *Poseidon*; 1 *Shaldag*; 2 *Vittoria*

PB 5 SAB-12

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Argentina UNFICYP 249; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt

Austria UNFICYP 3

Brazil UNFICYP 2

Canada UNFICYP 1

Chile UNFICYP 6

Ghana UNFICYP 1

Greece Army: 950

Hungary UNFICYP 12

India UNFICYP 1

Norway UNFICYP 2

Pakistan UNFICYP 2

Paraguay UNFICYP 12

Russia UNFICYP 4

Serbia UNFICYP 8

Slovakia UNFICYP 289; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl

United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412 *Twin Huey* • *Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader)* 500: 1 FGA sqn with 6 *Typhoon* FGR4; 1 *Sentinel* R1; 1 A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC3; 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules* • UNFICYP (*Operation Tosca*) 327: 2 inf coy

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern section of the island. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state.

Capabilities

ACTIVE 3,000 (Army 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 150

Conscript liability 15 months

RESERVE 15,000

Reserve liability to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

5 inf bn

7 inf bn (reserve)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

RCL • 106mm 36

ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Armed Police €150

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (police) SF unit

Coast Guard

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 *Rauf Denktash*; 2 US Mk 5

PB 1

FOREIGN FORCES

TURKEY

Army €33,800

FORCES BY ROLE

1 corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 287 M48A5T1

IFV 145 ACV AIFV

APC • APC (T) 488: 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); 418 M113 (incl variants)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 66 ACV TOW

MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 106mm 219 M40A1

ARTILLERY 656

SP 155mm 178: 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155 *Firtina*

TOWED 84: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 36 M114A2;

203mm 12 M115

MRL 122mm 18 T-122

MOR 376: 81mm 171; 107mm 70 M30; 120mm 135 HY-12

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 Cessna 185 (U-17)

HELICOPTERS • TPT 3: Medium 2 AS532UL *Cougar*

Light 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*

GUNS • TOWED 150: 20mm 122: 44 Rh 202; 78


GAI-D01; 35mm 28 GDF-003

Czech Republic CZE

Czech Koruna CZK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CZK	5.69tr	5.95tr	
	USD	245bn	277bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	22,943	25,806	
Growth	%	-5.8	3.8	
Inflation	%	3.2	2.7	
Def exp [a]	CZK	74.3bn	85.3bn	
	USD	3.20bn	3.97bn	
Def bdgt [b]	CZK	75.5bn	85.4bn	93.5bn
	USD	3.25bn	3.97bn	
USD1=CZK		23.21	21.49	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 10,702,596

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.8%	2.4%	2.4%	3.0%	25.1%	8.6%
Female	7.3%	2.3%	2.2%	2.8%	24.2%	11.9%

Capabilities

The 2015 national-security strategy states that NATO is central to Czech security, while the 2017 defence strategy points to Russian assertiveness, an arc of instability to the south and southeast of Europe and information warfare, including cyber attacks, as core security challenges. The evolving security environment is discussed in the 'Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035' and the 'Czech Armed Forces Development Concept 2030', both published in 2019. Modernisation priorities include infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), self-propelled howitzers, multi-role helicopters, transport aircraft, short-range air-defence systems and UAVs. With the lease agreement for the Czech Republic's *Gripen* fleet currently running through to 2027, the government began to explore follow-on solutions in 2020 and 2021. In September 2021, the defence ministry received final offers from three shortlisted companies for an IFV requirement. At the end of September 2021, the ministry signed a contract to procure CAESAR self-propelled howitzers. In February 2017, the Czech Republic signed a letter of intent with Germany to affiliate the 4th Czech Rapid Reaction Brigade with the 10th German Armoured Division under NATO's Framework Nations Concept. Recruitment and retention remains a challenge: in May 2020, the air-force chief outlined shortfalls in specialised trades such as engineers and pilots. The armed forces are able to deploy on a variety of international crisis-management operations, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, Baltic Air Policing and contributing to NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. There are plans to upgrade military training and simulation facilities by 2025. The government is trying to replace legacy equipment to modernise the armed forces and reduce dependence on foreign sources for spares for its Soviet-era systems. The defence-industrial base includes development and manufacturing capability, in particular small arms, vehicles, and training and light attack aircraft. The holding company Czechoslovak Group brings together several companies across the munitions, vehicles and aerospace sectors. In 2020, the government set up an agency to support the defence industry in government-to-government procurement activities.

ACTIVE 26,600 (Army 14,700 Air 5,850 Other 6,050)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 14,700

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn, 1 ISR UAV bn)

Armoured

1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn)

Mechanised

1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 AB bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn)

1 engr regt (2 engr bn, 1 EOD bn)

1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn)

Active Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

14 (territorial defence) comd

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd coy

Light

14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl, 1 log pl)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (89 T-72M1 in store)

RECCE 50: 34 BPzV *Svatava*; 8 *Pandur* II (KBV-PZ); 8 *Pandur* II (KBV-PZLOK)

IFV 227: 120 BMP-2; 107 *Pandur* II (incl 17 CP, 14 comms, 4 amb); (98 BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store)

APC • **PPV** 1 *Titus*

AUV 141: 21 *Dingo* 2; 120 IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 4 *Pandur* II (KOT-Z)

ARV 13+: 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store); VT-55A; 3 VT-72M4

VLB 6 MT-55A (3 more in store)

MW *Bozena* 5; UOS-155 *Belarty*

NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RCH

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*);

FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Spike*-LR

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 96

SP 152mm 48 M-77 *Dana* (38 more in store)

MOR 48: **81mm** *Expal*; **120mm** 40 M-1982; (45 more in store); **SP 120mm** 8 SPM-85

Air Force 5,850

Principal task is to secure Czech airspace. This mission is fulfilled within NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System (NATINADS) and, if necessary, by means of the Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Gripen* C/D

1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M/MW; CL-601 *Challenger*; L-410FG/UDP-E *Turbolet*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*; L-159T2*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind* D/E

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip* H; Mi-171Sh

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip* H; PZL W-3A *Sokol*

AIR DEFENCE

1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable

FGA 14: 12 *Gripen* C; 2 *Gripen* D

ATK 16 L-159 ALCA

TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 2 C295MW; 2 L-410FG Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP-E Turbolet; **PAX 3:** 2 A319CJ; 1 CL-601 Challenger

TRG 8: 5 L-159T1*; 3 L-159T2*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E

MRH 5: Mi-17 Hip H

TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL W3A Sokol

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2† (RS-SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70 gunners); RBS-70

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM

BOMBBS

Laser-guided: GBU Paveway

Other Forces 6,050

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF gp

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn)

1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 int gp

1 (central) MP comd

3 (regional) MP comd

1 (protection service) MP comd

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 2

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2

EGYPT: MFO 18; 1 C295M

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 30; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 56; 1 mor pl

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 35; 1 EW unit

MALI: *Operation Barkhane* 60; 1 SF unit; EU • EUTM Mali 120; UN • MINUSMA 4

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 9; UN • UNMIK 2


SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 3

Denmark DNK

Danish Krone DKK	2020	2021	2022
GDP	DKK 2.33tr	2.47tr	
	USD 356bn	397bn	
per capita	USD 61,154	67,920	
Growth	% -2.1	3.8	
Inflation	% 0.3	1.4	
Def exp [a]	DKK 32.6bn	33.9bn	
	USD 4.98bn	5.44bn	
Def bdgt [b]	DKK 32.2bn	33.8bn	34.5bn
	USD 4.92bn	5.42bn	
USD1=DKK	6.54	6.23	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 5,894,687

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.4%	3.0%	3.2%	3.5%	22.4%	9.3%
Female	8.0%	2.9%	3.1%	3.4%	22.1%	10.9%

Capabilities

Denmark maintains a compact but effective force, with a focus on contributing to larger NATO operations. Ties to NATO, NORDEFCO and other regional neighbours have increased. A joint declaration was signed in 2015 with other Nordic states, aimed at deterring Russia. Denmark has opted out of EU military cooperation under CSDP, but in late 2019 the government agreed an action plan to ensure the promotion of Danish interests in the EU's European Defence Fund, which launched in mid-2021. In the foreign- and security-policy strategy 2019-20, released at the end of 2018, the government expressed concerns about Russia, instability in the Middle East and cyber attacks. Current defence-modernisation priorities include the acquisition of the F-35A to replace the air force's F-16 fleet, and the upgrade of armoured vehicles within the mechanised brigades. Other acquisition priorities include EW equipment, UAVs and ASW capabilities. The defence agreement for 2018-23 envisages increased defence spending to deal with a deteriorating security environment. In particular, it is intended to strengthen deterrence, cyber defence and Denmark's role in international operations, as well as support to civilian authorities. The Danish armed forces consist primarily of professional personnel, supplemented by a substantial number of conscripts. The new defence agreement foresees retaining national service and that the annual conscript intake should rise modestly. Denmark is largely reliant on imported equipment for defence, but maintains a small defence industry focused on exports to Europe and North America. The Danish defence industry is mainly active in defence electronics and the design and manufacture of components and subsystems, including subcomponents for the F-35. The Danish armed forces have little ability to deploy independently but have contributed forces to a number of larger multinational deployments.

ACTIVE 15,400 (Army 8,000 Navy 2,250 Air 3,000 Joint 2,150)

Conscript liability 4–12 months, most voluntary

RESERVES 44,200 (Army 34,400 Navy 5,300 Air Force 4,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,000

Div and a bde HQ transforming into operational formations

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (MND-N) div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech bde (1 ISR bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log bn)

1 (2nd) mech bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 lt inf bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 CBRN/construction bn

1 EOD bn

1 int bn

1 MP bn

2 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

1 maint bn

1 spt bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 44: 18 *Leopard* 2A5 (to be upgraded to 2A7V); 26 *Leopard* 2A7V

IFV 44 CV9035 MkIII

APC 287

APC (T) 30 M113 (incl variants)

APC (W) 257: 83 *Piranha* III (incl variants); 174 *Piranha* V

AUV 140: 84 *Eagle* IV; 56 *Eagle* V

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 6 *Wisent*

ARV 10 BPZ-2

VLB 6 BRP-1 *Biber*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 50

SP 155mm 15 CAESAR 8×8

MOR 35: **TOWED 120mm** 20 Soltam K6B1; **SP 120mm** 15 *Piranha* V with *Cardom*-10

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*

Navy 2,250

Three naval squadrons, headquartered at naval bases in Frederikshavn and Korsør

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 *Iver Huitfeldt* with 4 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II AShM, 4 8-cell Mk

41 VLS (to be fitted with SAM), 2 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 *Millennium* CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity 1 med hel)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 *Absalon* (flexible support ships) with 4 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II AShM, 3 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 2 *Millennium* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 *Merlin*; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles; 130 troops)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PSOH 4 *Thetis* 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk*)
PSO 3 *Knud Rasmussen* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (ice-strengthened hull)

PCC 5 *Diana* (1 other non-operational)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6

MCI 4 MSF Mk I

MSD 2 *Holm*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12

ABU 2 *Gunnar Thorson* (primarily used for MARPOL duties)

AE 1 *Sleipner*

AGS 2 *Holm*

AKL 2 *Seatruck*

AX 1 *Soløven* (DNK *Flyvefisken*)

AXL 2 *Holm*

AXS 2 *Svanen*

Air Force 3,000

Tactical Air Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW101 *Merlin*

1 sqn with AS550 *Fennec* (ISR)

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*; CL-604 *Challenger* (MP/VIP)

TRAINING

1 unit with MFI-17 *Supporter* (T-17)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 48 combat capable

FTR 48: 34 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 10 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon* (30 operational)

FGA 4 F-35A *Lightning* II

TPT 8: **Medium** 4 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **PAX** 4 CL-604 *Challenger* (MP/VIP)

TRG 27 MFI-17 *Supporter* (T-17)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 9 MH-60R *Seahawk*

SAR 8 AW101 *Merlin*

MRH 8 AS550 *Fennec* (ISR) (4 more non-operational)

TPT • **Medium** 6 AW101 *Merlin*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; **ARH** AIM-120B AMRAAM

BOMBS

Laser-guided EGBU-12/GBU-24 *Paveway II/III*
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Control and Air Defence Group

1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites

Special Operations Command**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF unit
1 diving unit

Reserves

Home Guard (Army) 34,400 reservists (to age 50)
2 (local) def region

Home Guard (Navy) 5,300 reservists (to age 50)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30

PB 30: 18 MHV800; 12 MHV900

Home Guard (Air Force) 4,500 reservists (to age 50)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2A *Islander*

DEPLOYMENT

GULF OF GUNIEA: Navy 170; 1 FFGHM

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 210; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team

LITHUANIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 F-16AM
Fighting Falcon

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 10


SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35

Estonia EST

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	26.8bn	30.2bn	
	USD	30.6bn	36.0bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	23,036	27,101	
Growth	%	-3.0	8.5	
Inflation	%	-0.6	3.8	
Def Exp [a]	EUR	630m	646m	
	USD	719m	772m	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	627m	658m	738m
	USD	716m	786m	
FMA (US)	USD	8m	5m	9m
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 1,220,042

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.2%	2.5%	2.2%	2.6%	24.0%	7.5%
Female	7.9%	2.3%	2.0%	2.3%	24.6%	13.9%

Capabilities

Estonia has small active armed forces and is reliant on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Security policy is predicated on the goals of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is concern over Russian security policy and military activity. The government's 2017-26 National Defence Development Plan (NDDP) reflects the worsening security environment in the Baltic region. The MoD publishes medium-term development plans on an annual basis. Covering a four-year period, these are intended to ensure that the NDDP's goals will be achieved within the planned time frame. The active armed forces are supplemented by a reserve component. In June 2018, Estonia joined the French-inspired European Intervention Force. A NATO battlegroup based in Estonia became operational in mid-2017 as part of the Alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence. Amari air base hosts a NATO Baltic Air Policing detachment. Estonia is also a member of the UK-led multinational Joint Expeditionary Force. Tallinn hosts NATO's Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. The NDDP notes a desire to increase the annual conscript intake and active personnel numbers. There is limited organic capability to deploy beyond borders, though Estonian forces take part in EU, NATO and UN missions abroad on a small scale. The NDDP identifies the need for additional armoured mobility and armoured firepower, anti-armour weapons and increased munitions stocks. The country has a niche defence-industrial capability, including ship repair and digital systems.

ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,100 Navy 300 Air 500 Other 2,300)

Conscript liability 8 or 11 months (depending on specialisation; conscripts cannot be deployed)

RESERVE 17,500 (Joint 12,000; Territorial Defence 5,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,500; 2,600 conscript (total 4,100)

4 def region. All units except one inf bn are reserve based

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) bde (1 recce coy, 1 armd inf bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 AD bn)

Light

1 (2nd) inf bde (1 recce coy, 4 inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 AD bn)

4 (territorial) inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 44 CV9035EE (incl 2 CP)

APC • APC (W) 136: 56 XA-180 *Sisu*; 80 XA-188 *Sisu*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 2 Pionierpanzer 2 *Dachs*

ARV 2 BPz-2

VLB 2 *Biber*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; *Spike-LR*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 90mm PV-1110

ARTILLERY 192

SP 155mm 6 K9 *Thunder*

TOWED 60: 122mm 36 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 24 FH-70

MOR 126: 81mm 60 B455/NM 95/M252; 120mm 66 2B11/M/41D

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Mistral*

GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Navy 200; 100 conscript (total 300)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4:

MCCS 1 *Tasuja* (ex-DNK *Lindormen*)

MHC 3 *Admiral Cowan* (ex-UK *Sandown*) (1 in refit)

Air Force 500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with M-28 *Skytruck*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with R-44 *Raven II*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 2 M-28 *Skytruck*

TRG 1+ L-39C *Albatros* (leased)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 R-44 *Raven II*

Other 1,300; 800 conscript (total 2,100)

Includes Cyber Command, Support Command and Special Operations Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 MP coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Border Guard

Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PCO 1 *Kindral Kurvits* (FIN *Tursas* derivative)

PB 5: 1 *Pikker*; 1 *Raju* (Baltic 4500WP); 2 *Risto*; 1 *Valve*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2: 1 Beech 305ER *King Air*; 1 Cessna 172R

HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AW139

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light some S-100 *Camcopter*

DEPLOYMENT

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

MALI: *Operation Barkhane* 75; 1 SF unit; EU • EUTM Mali 10; UN • MINUSMA 2

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

FOREIGN FORCES

All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated

France 300; 1 tk sqn


Italy NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 Eurofighter *Typhoon*

United Kingdom 828; 1 armd regt HQ; 1 tk sqn; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy

Finland FIN

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	236bn	248bn	
	USD	270bn	296bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	48,786	53,523	
Growth	%	-2.9	3.0	
Inflation	%	0.4	1.9	
Def bdtg [a]	EUR	3.64bn	4.99bn	5.50bn
	USD	4.15bn	5.96bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 5,587,442

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.4%	2.8%	2.8%	3.2%	22.2%	9.9%
Female	8.0%	2.6%	2.7%	3.1%	21.7%	12.7%

Capabilities

Finland's armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. The country's long border with Russia has focused attention on Russia's military capabilities and plans. The 2021 Defence Report notes that financial constraints have presented challenges to maintaining operational readiness. In October 2020, the government's report on foreign and security policy assessed a security environment that is rapidly changing and deteriorating. An EU member state, Finland's principal multilateral defence relationships include NORDEFCO and the Northern Group, as well as strong bilateral cooperation with Sweden and the US; it is building close ties with NATO short of membership. The country participates in UN peacekeeping missions and contributes to NATO operations. Legislation limits the number of personnel deployed on international crisis-management operations to an upper ceiling of 2,000 troops. Finland maintains a largely conscript-based force and intends to increase the number of personnel in the defence forces over the coming years. In 2015, the air force launched the HX Fighter Program to replace its F/A-18s. A request for quotations was issued in April 2018 and the selection was expected to be announced in 2021. Under the Squadron 2020 programme, the navy will replace patrol boats and minelayers with corvette-sized vessels. Finland's defence industry consists largely of privately owned SMEs, concentrating on niche products for international markets, but it also features some internationally competitive larger companies producing wheeled armoured vehicles and turreted mortar systems.

ACTIVE 19,250 (Army 13,400 Navy 3,150 Air 2,700)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,700

Conscript liability 165, 255 or 347 days (latter for NCOs, officers or those on 'especially demanding' duties)

RESERVE 238,000 (Army 185,000 Navy 24,000 Air 29,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000

18,000 reservists a year conduct refresher training: total obligation 80 days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between conscript service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 4,400; 9,000 conscript (total 13,400)

FORCES BY ROLE

Finland's army maintains a mobilisation strength of about 285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription cycles, each for about 9,000 conscripts, take place each year. After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of 60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local geographical area. All service appointments or deployments outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the armed services. All brigades are reserve based

Reserve Organisations 185,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd BG (regt)

Mechanised

2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde

Light

3 (Jaeger) bde

6 lt inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 AD regt

7 engr regt

3 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 log regt

HELICOPTER

1 hel bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 100 *Leopard 2A6*; (100 *Leopard 2A4* in store)

IFV 212: 110 BMP-2/-2MD; 102 CV9030FIN

APC 613

APC (T) 142: 40 MT-LBu; 102 MT-LBV

APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 *Sisu*; 101 XA-202 *Sisu* (CP); 48 XA-203 *Sisu*; 62 AMV (XA-360)

AUV 6 SISU GTP (in test)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 5 *Dachs*

ARV 36: 9 BPz-2; 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A

VLB 27: 12 BLG-60M2; 6 *Leopard 2S*; 9 SISU *Leguan*

MW 6+: *Aardvark* Mk 2; KMT T-55; 6 *Leopard 2R* CEV; RA-140 DS

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS NLAW; *Spike-MR*; *Spike-LR*

ARTILLERY 672

SP 122mm 49: 13 K9 *Thunder*; 36 2S1 *Gvozdika* (PsH 74)

TOWED 288: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 54 K 83/GH-52 (K 98)

MRL 56: 122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS

MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm 18 XA-361 AMOS

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E

TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**ISR**

Medium 11 ADS-95 *Ranger*

AIR DEFENCE**SAM 60+**

Short-range 44: 20 *Crotale* NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS II FIN (ITO 12)

Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 *Stinger* (ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M)

GUNS 407+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm GDF-005 (ItK 88); SP 35mm 7 *Leopard* 2 ITK *Marksman*

Navy 1,400; 1,750 conscript (total 3,150)**FORCES BY ROLE**

Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20**

PCGM 4 *Hamina* with 4 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) ASHM, 1 8-cell VLS with *Umkhonto*-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 1 57mm gun

PBG 4 *Rauma* with 6 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) ASHM

PBF 12 *Jehu* (U-700) (capacity 24 troops)

MINE WARFARE 8**MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3**

MCC 3 *Katanpää* (ITA *Gaeta* mod)

MINELAYERS • ML 5:

2 *Hameenmaa* with 1 8-cell VLS with *Umkhonto*-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 1 57mm gun (can carry up to 120 mines)

3 *Pansio* with 50 mines

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 51

LCM 1 *Kampela*

LCP ε50

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7

AG 3: 1 *Louhi*; 2 *Hylje*

AX 4: 3 *Fabian Wrede*; 1 *Lokki*

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 mne bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bde (1 ASHM bty)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE**

ASHM 4 RBS15K

ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike* (used in ASHM role)

Air Force 2,050; 1,000 conscript (total 3,050)

3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland (North)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

ISR

1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A

TRANSPORT

1 flt with C295M

4 (liaison) flt with PC-12NG

TRAINING

1 sqn with *Hawk* Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and ground-attack trg)

1 unit with G-115EA; L-70 *Vinka*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable

FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 7 F/A-18D *Hornet*

ELINT 1 C295M

TPT • Light 11: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM trg; tgt-tow); 6 PC-12NG

TRG 99: 28 G-115EA; 29 *Hawk* Mk50/51A*; 16 *Hawk* Mk66*; 26 L-70 *Vinka*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder*

ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM

LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM

BOMBS

INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary**Border Guard 2,700**

Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast Guard Districts

FORCES BY ROLE**MARITIME PATROL**

1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 *Super Puma*;

Bell 412 (AB-412) *Twin Huey*; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP)

Twin Huey; AW119KE *Koala*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43**

PSO 1 *Turva* with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 2 *Tursas*

PB 40

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 6

UCAC 6

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228**HELICOPTERS**

MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 (AB-412) *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) *Twin Huey*

TPT 9: Medium 5 AS332 *Super Puma*; Light 4

AW119KE *Koala*

Reserve 12,000 reservists on mobilisation**DEPLOYMENT**

IRAQ: Operation *Inherent Resolve* 75; 1 trg team; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 162; 1 inf coy

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 4

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 15

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 20


SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 10

France FRA

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	2.30tr	2.46tr	
	USD	2.62tr	2.94tr	
per capita	USD	40,299	45,028	
Growth	%	-8.0	6.3	
Inflation	%	0.5	2.0	
Def exp [a]	EUR	46.2bn	48.2bn	
	USD	52.7bn	57.6bn	
Def bdtg [b]	EUR	48.1bn	49.7bn	51.5bn
	USD	54.9bn	59.3bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes pensions



Population 68,084,217

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.3%	3.1%	3.0%	2.9%	21.6%	9.1%
Female	8.9%	3.0%	2.9%	2.8%	21.7%	11.7%

Capabilities

France maintains globally deployed forces that are also engaged on enduring operations in Africa. The 2017 Strategic Review reiterated operational commitments in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, as well as a continued presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Programme Budget Law for 2019–25 set out defence-budget increases to support these goals. France plays a leading military role in the EU, NATO and the UN. In 2018, Paris launched the European Intervention Initiative, joined by 11 other European countries, intended to foster a common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises. France is also expanding its capabilities in non-traditional domains, having set up a space command, developed a space strategy and formalised an offensive cyber doctrine. Deployments abroad have demonstrated the ability to support expeditionary forces independently. In mid-2020, the army issued a strategy document, 'Operational Superiority 2030', which called for improved readiness in light of the risk of high-intensity conflict. Domestic deployments persist under *Opération Sentinelle*, with troops deployed on high-visibility patrols. Some strategic military air-transport requirements are dependent on allies and external contractors. The high operational tempo has increased the stress on equipment. The Programme Budget Law seeks to remedy this with a budget increase for maintenance and accelerated modernisation of multi-role tanker-transport and refuelling aircraft. France is also in the process of reducing its footprint in the Sahel and scaling down *Opération Barkhane*; it will focus on the *Takuba* task force. France has a sophisticated defence industry, exemplified by companies such as Dassault, MBDA and Nexter. Most French defence procurements are addressed by domestic firms, and many of these firms export globally. France has called for increased European defence-industrial cooperation and aims to increase its exports to Europe. It is also seeking to invest in future technologies and supports start-ups and innovation in the defence domain.

ACTIVE 203,250 (Army 114,700 Navy 34,700 Air 40,450, Other Staffs 13,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500

RESERVE 41,050 (Army 24,900 Navy 6,250 Air 5,750 Other Staffs 4,150) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,300

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Nuclear Forces

Navy 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 4

SSBN 4 *Le Triomphant* with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/F17 mod 2 HWT

AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 *Rafale* M F3 with ASMPA msl

Air Force 1,800

Air Strategic Forces Command

FORCES BY ROLE

STRIKE

1 sqn with *Rafale* B with ASMPA msl
1 sqn with *Rafale* B with ASMPA msl (forming)

TANKER

2 sqn with A330 MRTT; C-135FR; KC-135 *Stratotanker*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable

FGA 20 *Rafale* B

TKR/TPT 15: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR

TKR 3 KC-135 *Stratotanker*

Paramilitary

Gendarmerie 40

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 13

COMMUNICATIONS 4: 2 *Syracuse-3* (designed to integrate with UK *Skynet* & ITA *Sicral*); 1 *Syracuse-4*; 1 *Athena-Fidus* (also used by ITA)

ISR 6: 1 CSO-1; 1 CSO-2; 1 *Helios 2A*; 1 *Helios 2B*; 2 *Pleiades*

ELINT/SIGINT 3 CERES

Army 114,700

Regt and BG normally bn size

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ (CRR-FR)

2 div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce regt

Armoured

- 1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
- 1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
- 1 armd BG HQ (UAE)

Mechanised

- 1 (6th) lt armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
- 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)
- 1 mech regt HQ (Djibouti)

Light

- 1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt)
- 3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies)
- 1 inf regt HQ (New Caledonia)
- 2 inf bn HQ (Côte d'Ivoire & Gabon)

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt, 1 spt regt)
- 1 AB regt (La Réunion)

Amphibious

- 1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)

Other

- 4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & Indian Ocean)
- 3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 MRL regt
- 2 engr regt
- 2 EW regt
- 1 int bn
- 1 CBRN regt
- 5 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 5 tpt regt
- 1 log regt
- 1 med regt
- 3 trg regt

HELICOPTER

- 1 (4th) hel bde (3 hel regt)

ISR UAV

- 1 UAV regt

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 SAM regt

Special Operation Forces 2,200**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

- 2 SF regt

HELICOPTER

- 1 hel regt

Reserves 22,750 reservists

Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of about 75 to 152 troops, for 'Proterre' – combined land projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

- MBT 222 *Leclerc*
- ASLT 245 AMX-10RC
- RECCE 1,456: 40 ERC-90D *Sagaie*; 1,416 VBL/VB2L
- IFV 706: 599 VBCI VCI; 107 VBCI VPC (CP)
- APC 2,616
 - APC (T) 49 BvS-10
 - APC (W) 2,547: 339 VBMR *Griffon*; 2,151 VAB; 57 VAB VOA (OP)
 - PPV 20 *Aravis*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- AEV 110: 38 AMX-30EBG; 72 VAB GE
- ARV 44: 27 AMX-30D; 17 *Leclerc* DNG; VAB-EHC
- VLB 48: 20 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT
- MW 16+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 *Buffalo*; 12 *Minotaure*

NBC VEHICLES 26 VAB NRBC**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL**

- SP 177: 64 VAB *Milan*; 113 VAB with MMP
- MANPATS *Eryx*; FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; MMP

ARTILLERY 265+

- SP 155mm 108: 32 AU-F-1; 76 CAESAR
- TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1
- MRL 227mm 13 M270 MLRS

- MOR 132+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 132 RT-F-1

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B *Turbo Porter*; 5 TBM-700; 3 TBM-700B**HELICOPTERS**

- ATK 67: 29 *Tiger* HAP; 38 *Tiger* HAD
- MRH 104: 18 AS555UN *Fennec*; 86 SA341F/342M *Gazelle* (all variants)
- TPT 154: **Heavy** 8 H225M *Caracal* (CSAR); **Medium** 111: 24 AS532UL *Cougar*; 2 EC225LP *Super Puma*; 39 NH90 TTH; 46 SA330 *Puma*; **Light** 35 H120 *Colibri* (leased)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Mistral***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

- ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire* II; HOT

Navy 35,100**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 8**

- STRATEGIC • SSBN** 4 *Le Triomphant* opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/F17 mod 2 HWT

- TACTICAL • SSN** 4 *Rubis* (1 more severely damaged by fire) with 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/F17 mod 2 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 22

- AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN** 1 *Charles de Gaulle* with 4 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 sextuple *Sadral Inchr* with *Mistral* SAM (capacity 30 *Rafale* M FGA ac, 2 E-2C *Hawkeye* AEW&C ac, 8 AS365 *Dauphin*/NH90 NFH hel)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3

- 1 *Aquitaine* (FREMM FRED A) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 4 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM/*Aster* 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)

2 *Forbin* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 4 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 30 SAM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)

FRIGATES 18**FFGHM 12:**

4 *Aquitaine* (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell *Sylver* A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)

2 *Aquitaine* (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell *Sylver* A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM/*Aster* 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)

1 *Georges Leygues* (mod) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with *Crotale* SAM, 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 single 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 hel)

4 *La Fayette* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with *Crotale* SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* hel)

1 *La Fayette* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 sextuple *Sadral* Inchr with *Mistral* 3 SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* hel)

FFH 6 *Floreal* with 1 100mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20

FSM 6 *D'Estienne d'Orves* with 1 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 100mm gun

PSO 4 *d'Entrecasteaux* (BSAOM) with 1 hel landing platform

PCO 6: 3 *La Con fiance*, 1 *Lapérouse*; 1 *Le Malin*; 1 *Fulmar*

PCC 4: 1 *L'Audacieuse*; 3 *Flamant*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17

MCD 4 *Vulcain*

MHC 3 *Antarès*

MHO 10 *Éridan*

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3**

LHD 3 *Mistral* with 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM (capacity up to 16 NH90/SA330 *Puma*/AS532 *Cougar*/*Tiger* hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 40

LCT 4 EDA-R

LCM 11 CTM

LCVP 25

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 33

ABU 1 *Telem Mor*

AG 2 *Chamois*

AGB 1 *Astrolabe* with 1 hel landing platform

AGE 2: 1 *Corraline*; 1 *Thetis* (*Lapérouse* mod) (used as trials ships for mines and divers)

AGI 1 *Dupuy de Lome*

AGM 1 *Monge*

AGOR 2: 1 *Pourquoi pas?* (used 150 days per year by Ministry of Defence; operated by Ministry of Research and Education otherwise); 1 *Beautemps-beaupré*

AGS 3 *Lapérouse*

AORH 2 *Durance* with 3 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM (capacity 1 SA319 *Alouette* III/AS365 *Dauphin*/*Lynx*)

ATS 4 *Loire* (BSAM)

AXL 10: 8 *Léopard*; 2 *Glycine*

AXS 4: 2 *La Belle Poule*; 1 *La Grand Hermine*; 1 *Mutin*

Naval Aviation 6,500**FORCES BY ROLE****STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with *Rafale* M F3

1 sqn with *Rafale* M F3/F3-R

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE

1 sqn with AS565SA *Panther*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 sqn with NH90 NFH

MARITIME PATROL

2 sqn with *Atlantique* 2

1 sqn with *Falcon* 20H *Gardian*

1 sqn with *Falcon* 50MI

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with E-2C *Hawkeye*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with AS365N/F *Dauphin* 2

TRAINING

1 sqn with EMB 121 *Xingu*

1 unit with SA319B *Alouette* III

1 unit with *Falcon* 10MER

1 unit with CAP 10M

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable

FGA 42 *Rafale* M F3-R

ASW 12 *Atlantique-2* (10 more in store)

AEW&C 3 E-2C *Hawkeye*

SAR 4 *Falcon* 50MS

TPT 25: **Light** 10 EMB-121 *Xingu*; **PAX** 15: 6 *Falcon*

10MER; 5 *Falcon* 20H *Gardian*; 4 *Falcon* 50MI

TRG 6 CAP 10M

HELICOPTERS

ASW 26 NH90 NFH

MRH 39: 3 AS365F *Dauphin* 2; 6 AS365N *Dauphin* 2; 2

AS365N3; 16 AS565SA *Panther*; 12 SA319B *Alouette* III

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light 4 S-100 *Camcopter*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IIR *Mica* IR; **ARH** *Mica* RF

ASM AASM

AShM AM39 *Exocet*

LACM **Nuclear** ASMPA

BOMBS

Laser-guided: GBU-12/16 *Paveway* II

Marines 2,200**Commando Units 750****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

1 recce gp

Amphibious

2 aslt gp

1 atk swimmer gp

1 raiding gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt gp

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt gp

Fusiliers-Marin 1,450**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

2 sy gp

7 sy coy

Reserves 6,000 reservists**Air and Space Force 40,450****FORCES BY ROLE****STRIKE**1 sqn with *Rafale* B with ASMPA msl1 sqn with *Rafale* B with ASMPA msl (forming)**SPACE**

1 (satellite obs) sqn

FIGHTER1 sqn with *Mirage* 2000-51 sqn with *Mirage* 2000B/C**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**3 sqn with *Mirage* 2000D1 (composite) sqn with *Mirage* 2000-5/D (Djibouti)2 sqn with *Rafale* B/C1 sqn with *Rafale* B/C (UAE)**ELECTRONIC WARFARE**1 flt with C-160G *Gabriel* (ESM); Beech 350ER *King Air***AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL**1 (Surveillance & Control) sqn with E-3F *Sentry***SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT**5 sqn with CN235M; SA330 *Puma*; AS555 *Fennec* (Djibouti, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia)**TANKER**

1 sqn with A330 MRTT

TANKER/TRANSPORT1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 *Stratotanker***TRANSPORT**

1 VIP sqn with A310-300; A330

2 sqn with A400M

1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; C-160R *Transall*1 sqn with C-130H/H-30J-30 *Hercules*; KC-130J *Hercules*

2 sqn with CN235M

1 sqn with *Falcon* 7X (VIP); *Falcon* 900 (VIP); *Falcon* 2000

3 flt with TBM-700A

1 (mixed) gp with C-160 *Transall*; DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter***TRAINING**1 OCU sqn with *Mirage* 2000D1 OCU sqn with *Rafale* B/C1 OCU sqn with SA330 *Puma*; AS555 *Fennec*1 OCU unit with C-160 *Transall*1 (aggressor) sqn with *Alpha Jet**4 sqn with *Alpha Jet**

1 sqn with Grob G120A-F

2 sqn with Grob G120A-F; PC-21

1 sqn with EMB-121

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER2 sqn with AS555 *Fennec*2 sqn with AS332C/L *Super Puma*; SA330 *Puma*; H225M**ISR UAV**1 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper***AIR DEFENCE**3 sqn with *Crotale* NG; SAMP/T

1 sqn with SAMP/T

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SATELLITES** see Space**AIRCRAFT** 280 combat capableFTR 47: 12 *Mirage* 2000-5; 28 *Mirage* 2000C; 7 *Mirage* 2000BFGA 161: 65 *Mirage* 2000D; 53 *Rafale* B; 43 *Rafale* C (*Rafale* being upgraded to F3-R standard)ISR 2 Beech 350ER *King Air*ELINT 2 C-160G *Gabriel* (ESM)AEW&C 4 E-3F *Sentry*TKR 3 KC-135 *Stratotanker*TKR/TPT 17: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR; 2 KC-130J *Hercules*TPT 119: **Heavy** 18 A400M; **Medium** 22: 5 C-130H*Hercules*; 9 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*;6 C-160R *Transall*; **Light** 70: 1 Beech 350i *King Air*; 19CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter*;22 EMB-121 *Xingu*; 15 TBM-700; **PAX** 9: 2 A310-300; 1A330; 2 *Falcon* 7X; 2 *Falcon* 900 (VIP); 2 *Falcon* 2000 (2

A340-200 in store)

TRG 127: 72 *Alpha Jet**; 18 Grob G120A-F (leased); 17

PC-21; 13 SR20 (leased); 7 SR22 (leased)

HELICOPTERSMRH 37 AS555 *Fennec*TPT 35: **Heavy** 10 H225M *Caracal*; **Medium** 25: 1AS332C *Super Puma*; 4 AS332L *Super Puma*; 20 SA330B*Puma***UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR • **Heavy** 8 MQ-9A *Reaper***AIR DEFENCE • SAM** 64: **Long-range** 40 SAMP/T;**Short-range** 24 *Crotale* NG**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-550 *Magic* 2; IIR *Mica* IR; ARH *Meteor*;*Mica* RFASM AASM; *Apache***LACM****Nuclear** ASMPA**Conventional** SCALP EG**BOMBS • Laser-guided**: GBU-12/-16 *Paveway* II; GBU-49Enhanced *Paveway* II

Security and Intervention Brigade

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

3 SF gp

MANOEUVRE

Other

24 protection units

30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit

Reserves 5,700 reservists

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500

Gendarmerie 100,500; 30,300 reservists

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 80: 60 VXB-170 (VBRG-170); 20 VAB

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm some

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 39

PB 39: 2 *Athos*; 4 *Géranium*; 24 VCSM; 9 VSMP

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA *Ecureuil*;

20 H135; 15 H145

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 5

BURKINA FASO: *Operation Barkhane* 400; 1 SF gp; 1 C-130H; 1 DHC-6-300; 2 *Tiger*; 3 AS532UL *Cougar*; 2 H225M; 2 SA342 *Gazelle*

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: 160; EU • EUTM RCA 100 UN • MINUSCA 8

CHAD: *Operation Barkhane* 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 4 *Mirage* 2000D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M

CÔTE D'IVOIRE: 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 1 hel unit with 1 AS555 *Fennec*; 2 SA330 *Puma*; 2 SA342 *Gazelle*

CYPRUS: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 30: 1 *Atlantique-2*

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2

DJIBOUTI: 1,450; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt with (2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 *Puma*; 2 SA342 *Gazelle*; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with 4 *Mirage* 2000-5; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 1 CN235M; 2 SA330 *Puma*

EGYPT: MFO 1

ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (*Operation Lynx*) 300; 1 tk sqn

FRENCH GUIANA: 2,100: 1 (Foreign Legion) inf regt; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 1 SMA regt; 2 PCO; 1 tpt sqn with 3 CN235M; 5 SA330 *Puma*; 4 AS555 *Fennec*; 3 gendarmerie coy; 1 AS350BA *Ecureuil*; 1 H145

FRENCH POLYNESIA: 900: 1 inf bn; 1 SMA coy; 1 naval HQ at Papeete; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 AFS; 3 *Falcon* 200 *Gardian*; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M

FRENCH WEST INDIES: 1,000; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 2 SMA regt; 2 FFGHM; 1 AS565SA *Panther*; 1 SA319 *Alouette* III; 1

naval base at Fort de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie coy; 1 PCO; 1 PB; 2 AS350BA *Ecureuil*

GABON: 350; 1 inf bn

GERMANY: 2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde); 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)

GULF OF GUINEA: *Operation Corymbe* 1 FFH

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 3

JORDAN: *Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal)* 300: 4 *Rafale* F3

LA REUNION/MAYOTTE: 1,700; 1 (Marine) para regt; 1 (Foreign Legion) inf coy; 1 SMA regt; 1 SMA coy; 2 FFGHM; 1 PCO; 1 LCM; 1 naval HQ at Port-des-Galets (La Réunion); 1 naval base at Dzaoudzi (Mayotte); 1 *Falcon* 50M; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 5 gendarmerie coy; 1 SA319 *Alouette* III

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 567; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 maint coy; 1 tpt coy; VBL; VBCI; VAB; *Mistral*

MALI: *Operation Barkhane* 2,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log bn; 1 tpt unit with 1 CN235M; 1 PC-6B; 1 hel unit with 5 *Tiger*; 2 AS532 UL *Cougar*; 5 NH90 TTH; 4 SA342 *Gazelle*; EU • EUTM Mali 13; UN • MINUSMA 21

MEDITERRANEAN: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 100: 1 DDGHM

NEW CALEDONIA: 1,450; 1 (Marine) mech inf regt; 1 SMA coy; 6 ERC-90F1 *Lynx*; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 base with 2 *Falcon* 200 *Gardian* at Nouméa; 1 tpt unit with 2 CN235 MPA; 2 SA330 *Puma*; 4 gendarmerie coy; 2 AS350BA *Ecureuil*

NIGER: *Operation Barkhane* 1,000; 1 FGA det with 4 *Mirage* 2000C/D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 1 UAV det with 6 MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 ISR det with 1 *Atlantique-2*

PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 100; 1 DDGHM

QATAR: *Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal)* 70; 1 E-3F *Sentry*

SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det)

SENEGAL: 350; 1 *Falcon* 50MI

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 arty bty); *Leclerc*; CAESAR; • *Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal)*; 1 FGA sqn with 7 *Rafale* F3 • EMASOH; 1 *Atlantique-2* Western Sahara: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps)


Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 *Master*

Germany GER

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	3.37tr	3.54tr	
	USD	3.84tr	4.23tr	
per capita	USD	46,216	50,788	
Growth	%	-4.6	3.1	
Inflation	%	0.4	2.9	
Def exp [a]	EUR	51.6bn	53.2bn	
	USD	58.9bn	63.5bn	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	45.6bn	46.9bn	50.3bn
	USD	52.1bn	56.1bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 79,903,481

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	6.6%	2.3%	2.6%	2.8%	24.3%	10.3%
Female	6.3%	2.2%	2.6%	2.7%	24.2%	12.9%

Capabilities

The 2016 defence White Paper committed Germany to a leadership role in European defence. It also emphasised the importance of NATO and the need for the armed forces to contribute to collective-defence tasks. The 2018 *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* underlines that collective- and territorial-defence tasks will drive military-modernisation efforts and are of equal standing with international crisis-management operations. The key implication for defence modernisation is that Germany will need to invest in readiness and return to fully equipping operational units, after having experimented in recent years with rotating equipment among units depending on their deployment or training demands. In May 2021, the Federal Ministry of Defence published a paper entitled 'Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future', which outlined organisational measures intended to strengthen the modernisation agenda. Germany is aligning its defence-planning process with capability goals derived from multinational guidance. Berlin has been a key sponsor of the NATO Framework Nations Concept and led the drive to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence in the EU. Close military cooperation has been established with the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands and Romania, including the affiliation of units. The defence ministry has announced its objective to increase authorised active force numbers. In July 2020, the government launched a new voluntary conscript initiative focused on homeland-security tasks with 1,000 posts. Volunteers will serve for seven months plus five months as reservists over the course of six years. The first recruits, part of a one-year pilot phase, started training in April 2021. This is in addition to the existing voluntary conscript model that requires between seven and 23 months of military service, and which has seen declining numbers of applications in recent years. The armed forces are struggling to improve readiness levels in light of increasing demands on NATO's eastern flank. In 2019, Germany was the lead nation for NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force land

component and is scheduled to provide this role again in 2023, with the earmarked units prioritised for modernisation and upgrades. Shortages of spare parts and maintenance problems are reported in all three services. Germany's defence-industrial base is able to design and manufacture equipment to meet requirements across all military domains, with strengths in land and naval systems. The government is pursuing a policy of closer defence-industrial cooperation in Europe.

ACTIVE 183,400 (Army 62,650 Navy 16,250 Air 27,100 Joint Support Service 27,600 Joint Medical Service 19,950 Cyber 14,350 Other 15,500)

Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary conscripts can serve up to 23 months

RESERVE 30,050 (Army 6,850 Navy 1,200 Air 3,400 Joint Support Service 11,950 Joint Medical Service 3,650 Cyber 1,150 Other 1,850)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 7

COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2)

ISR 5 SAR-Lupe

Army 62,650

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

elm 2 (1 GNC & MNC NE) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (1st) armd div (1 (9th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (21st) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (41st) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 tk bn (for NLD 43rd Bde); 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs coy)

1 (10th) armd div (1 (12th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (37th) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (23rd) mtn inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SP arty bn; 1 SP arty trg bn; 2 mech inf bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 cbt engr coy (GER/FRA bde); 1 spt bn (GER/FRA bde))

Air Manoeuvre

1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (3 SOF bn); 1 AB bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn(-) (Joint GER-UK unit)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 284: 225 *Leopard* 2A5/A6; 59 *Leopard* 2A7/2A7V (55 *Leopard* 2A4 in store)

RECCE 169 *Fennek* (incl 14 engr recce, 14 fires spt)

IFV 674: 253 *Marder* 1A3/A4; 71 *Marder* 1A5; 350 *Puma*

APC 728

APC (T) 112: 75 Bv-206S; 37 M113 (inc variants)

APC (W) 616: 257 *Boxer* (inc variants); 359 TPz-1 *Fuchs* (inc variants)

AUV 683: 247 *Dingo 2*; 363 *Eagle IV/V*; 73 *Wiesel 1 Mk20* (with 20mm gun)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 51 *Dachs*

ARV 170: 95 BPz-2 1; 75 BPz-3 *Büffel*

VLB 59: 22 *Biber*; 7 *Leopard 2* with *Leguan*; 30 M3

MW 30: 6 *Fuchs KAI*; 24 *Keiler*

NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL**

SP 102 *Wiesel* ATGM with TOW or MELLS

MANPATS *Milan*; *Spike-LR* (MELLS)

ARTILLERY 296

SP 155mm 121 PzH 2000

MRL 227mm 41 M270 MLRS

MOR 134: **120mm** 94 *Tampella*; **SP 120mm** 40 M113 with *Tampella*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 51 *Tiger*

TPT 101: **Medium** 81 NH90; **Light** 20: 13 H135; 7 H145 (SAR)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 127: **Medium** 39 KZO; **Light** 87 LUNA

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT; PARS 3 LR**Navy 16,250****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 6**

SSK 6 Type-212A (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with DM2A4 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11

DESTROYERS • DDGDM 3 *Sachsen* (F124) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Sea Lynx* Mk88A hel)

FRIGATES • FFGM 8:

3 *Baden-Württemberg* (F125) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 NH90 hel)

4 *Brandenburg* (F123) with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Sea Lynx* Mk88A hel)

1 *Bremen* (F122) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Sea Lynx* Mk88A hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • CORVETTES 5

FSGM 5 *Braunschweig* (K130) with 2 twin Inchr with RBS15 Mk3 ASHM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 23

MHO 10: 7 *Frankenthal* (2 used as diving support); 3 *Frankenthal* (mod. MJ332CL)

MSO 1 *Ensdorf*

MSD 12 *Seehund*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1

LCU 1 Type-520

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23

AG 4: 2 *Schwedeneck* (Type-748); 2 *Stollergrund* (Type-745)

AGI 3 *Oste* (Type-423)

AGOR 1 *Planet* (Type-751)

AOR 2 *Rhön* (Type-704)

AORH 3 *Berlin* (Type-702) (fitted for but not with RIM-116 RAM SAM) (capacity 2 *Sea King* Mk41 hel)

AORL 6 *Elbe* (Type-404) with 1 hel landing platform (2 specified for PFM support; 1 specified for SSK support; 3 specified for MHO/MSO support);

ATF 3: 1 *Helgoland*; 2 *Wangerooge*

AXS 1 *Gorch Fock*

Naval Aviation 2,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable

ASW 8 AP-3C *Orion*

TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 22 *Lynx* Mk88A

SAR 21: 11 *Sea King* Mk41; 10 NH90 NFH (*Sea Lion*)

Naval Special Forces Command**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF coy

Sea Battalion**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Air Force 27,100**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

3 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 wg (2 sqn with *Tornado* IDS)

1 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon* (multi-role))

ISR

1 wg (1 ISR sqn with *Tornado* ECR/IDS; 2 UAV sqn with *Heron*)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 (special air mission) wg (3 sqn with A310 MRTT;

A319; A321; A340; A350; AS532U2 *Cougar* II; *Global* 5000; *Global* 6000)

TRANSPORT

1 wg (total: 1 sqn with C-160D *Transall*)

1 wg (3 sqn (forming) with A400M *Atlas*)

TRAINING

1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with *Tornado* IDS

1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with T-6A *Texan II*; T-38C *Talon*
1 hel unit located at Fassberg

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 tpt hel wg (3 sqn with CH-53G/GA/GE/GS *Stallion*; 1 sqn with H145M)

AIR DEFENCE

1 wg (3 SAM gp) with M902 *Patriot PAC-3*
1 AD gp with ASRAD *Ozelot*; C-RAM *Mantis* and trg unit
1 AD trg unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with MIM-104C/F *Patriot PAC-2/3*
3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp

Air Force Regiment

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 sy regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 226 combat capable

FTR 138 Eurofighter *Typhoon*
ATK 68 *Tornado IDS*
ATK/EW 20 *Tornado ECR**
ISR 1 A319CJ (Open Skies)
TKR/TPT 3 A310 MRTT
TPT 56: **Heavy** 35 A400M; **Medium** 8 C-160D *Transall*;
PAX 13: 1 A321; 2 A340 (VIP); 1 A350 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 *Global 5000*; 3 *Global 6000*
TRG 109: 69 T-6A *Texan II*, 40 T-38C *Talon*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15 H145M
TPT 73: **Heavy** 70 CH-53G/GA/GE *Stallion*; **Medium** 3 AS532U2 *Cougar II* (VIP)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 6 *Heron 1*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 50

Long-range 30 M902 *Patriot PAC-3*
Point-defence 20 ASRAD *Ozelot* (with FIM-92 *Stinger*)

GUNS 35mm 12 C-RAM *Mantis*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li *Sidewinder*; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
LACM Taurus KEPD 350
ARM AGM-88B HARM

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-24 *Paveway III*; GBU-48 Enhanced *Paveway II*; GBU-54 JDAM

Joint Support Service 27,600

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 MP regt
2 NBC bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

6 log bn
1 spt regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 451: 206 *Dingo 2*; 245 *Eagle IV/V*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 35: 23 BPz-2; 12 BPz-3 *Büffel*
NBC VEHICLES 35 TPz-1 *Fuchs A6/A7/A8 NBC*

Joint Medical Services 19,950

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 med regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 109: 72 *Boxer* (amb); 37 TPz-1 *Fuchs* (amb)
AUV 42 *Eagle IV/V* (amb)

Cyber & Information Command 14,350

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 EW bn
6 sigs bn

DEPLOYMENT

BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO; 1 AOR

FRANCE: 400 (incl GER elm Eurocorps)

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 80; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 10

JORDAN: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 1 A400M

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 103; 1 FFGM

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 558; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+) with *Leopard 2A6*; *Marder 1A3*

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 120; UN • MINUSMA 426; 1 sy coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EU NAVFOR MED • *Operation Iriini* 1 AORH; NATO • SNMG 2: 1 AOT

POLAND: 95 (GER elm MNC-NE)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 70

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14

UNITED STATES: Trg units with 40 T-38 *Talon*; 69 T-6A *Texan II* at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB (TX); NAS Pensacola (FL); Fort Rucker (AL); Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

FOREIGN FORCES

France 2,000; 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)

United Kingdom 185

United States

US Africa Command: **Army**; 1 HQ at Stuttgart

US European Command: 36,950; 1 combined service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen

Army 22,650; 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 SF gp; 1 recee bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bde (2 MRL bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt

spt bde(-); 1 SAM bn; 1 ARNG SAM bde(-); 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; M1A2 SEPv2/v3 *Abrams*; M3A3 *Bradley*; M2A3 *Bradley*; M1296 *Stryker Dragoon*; M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; AH-64D/E *Apache*; CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60L/M *Black Hawk*; HH-60M *Black Hawk*; M902 *Patriot PAC-3*; M1097 *Avenger*; M-SHORAD Navy 450


USAF 13,300; 1 HQ (US Air Forces Europe & Africa (USAFE)) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) USMC 550

Greece GRC

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	166bn	177bn	
	USD	189bn	212bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	17,657	19,827	
Growth	%	-8.2	6.5	
Inflation	%	-1.3	-0.1	
Def exp [a]	EUR	4.40bn	6.58bn	
	USD	5.02bn	7.86bn	
Def bdtg [b]	EUR	4.36bn	6.47bn	6.15bn
	USD	4.98bn	7.73bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 10,569,703

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.4%	2.7%	2.8%	2.7%	23.0%	10.1%
Female	7.0%	2.4%	2.5%	2.5%	24.2%	12.6%

Capabilities

Greece's 2014 National Military Strategy identifies safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity as principal defence objectives. The armed forces would also be expected to support Cyprus in the event of a conflict. The Force Structure 2013-27 document set out plans to make the armed forces more flexible, rapidly deployable and cost-effective. Greece is a NATO member and has led the EU's Balkan Battlegroup. In recent years, defence-cooperation agreements have been signed with Cyprus, Egypt and Israel while ties are developing with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. There is close cooperation with the US. The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement is the cornerstone of US-Greece defence cooperation and provides for a naval-support facility and an airfield at Souda Bay in Crete. The armed forces still contain conscripts but most personnel are regulars and Athens is looking to move to a fully professional force. A force-structure review (2020-34) was approved by the National Security Council in April 2021. Training levels are reportedly good, with a focus on joint operational training. Greece's

deployments involve limited numbers of personnel and focus on the near abroad, although the country contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions. Athens is now in the process of acquiring *Rafale* combat aircraft and frigates from France as part of a newly announced strategic partnership that includes a mutual-assistance clause. Greece has an extensive defence industry focused on the domestic market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels, subsystems, ammunition and small arms.

ACTIVE 143,300 (Army 93,500 Navy 16,400 Air 21,800 Joint 11,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,000

Conscript liability 9 months for all services

RESERVE 221,350 (Army 181,500 Navy 5,850 Air 34,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 48,500; 45,000 conscripts (total 93,500)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 2 corps HQ (incl NRDC-GR)
- 1 armd div HQ
- 3 mech inf div HQ
- 1 inf div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF comd
- 1 cdo/para bde

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

- 4 recce bn

Armoured

- 4 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Mechanised

- 10 mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Light

- 2 inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 air mob bde

- 1 air aslt bde

Amphibious

- 1 mne bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 2 MRL bn
- 3 AD bn (2 with *I-Hawk*, 1 with *Tor M1*)
- 3 engr regt
- 2 engr bn
- 1 EW regt
- 10 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 1 log corps HQ
- 1 log div (3 log bde)

HELICOPTER

- 1 hel bde (1 hel regt with (2 atk hel bn), 2 tpt hel bn, 4 hel bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 1,228: 170 *Leopard 2A6HEL*; 183 *Leopard 2A4*; 500 *Leopard 1A4/5*; 375 *M48A5*

RECCE 242 VBL

IFV 169 *BMP-1*

APC • APC (T) 2,130: 91 *Leonidas Mk1/2*; 1,852 *M113A1/A2*; 187 *M577 (CP)*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 262: 12 *Büffel*; 43 BPz-2; 94 M88A1; 113 M578

VLB 52: 34 M48/M60 AVLB; 10 *Biber*; 8 *Leopard 1* with *Leguan*

MW *Giant Viper*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 558: 195 HMMWV with 9K135 *Kornet-E* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); 363 M901

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); *Milan*; TOW RCL 687+: 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 90mm EM-67; SP 106mm 687 M40A1

ARTILLERY 3,518

SP 594: 155mm 442: 418 M109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5; 24 PzH 2000; 175mm 12 M107; 203mm 140 M110A2

TOWED 459: 105mm 229: 211 M101; 18 M-56; 155mm 230 M114

MRL 145: 122mm 109 RM-70; 227mm 36 M270 MLRS

MOR 2,320: 81mm 1,700; 107mm 620 M30 (incl 231 SP)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 200 *King Air* (C-12C)

2 Beech 200 *King Air* (C-12R/AP *Huron*); 15 Cessna 185 (U-17A/B)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 28: 19 AH-64A *Apache*; 9 AH-64D *Apache*

MRH 60 OH-58D *Kiowa Warrior*

TPT 135: **Heavy** 25: 19 CH-47D *Chinook*; 6 CH-47SD *Chinook*; **Medium** 14 NH90 TTH; **Light** 96: 84 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 4 *Sperver*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 155+

Medium-range 42 MIM-23B *I-Hawk*

Short-range 21 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-range 92+: 38 9K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*); 54 ASRAD HMMWV; FIM-92 *Stinger*

GUINS • TOWED 727: 20mm 204 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU-23-2

National Guard 38,000 reservists

Internal security role

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 inf div

Air Manoeuvr

1 para regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

8 arty bn

4 AD bn

HELICOPTER

1 hel bn

Navy 14,100; 2,300 conscript (total 16,400)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES • SSK 11:**

3 *Poseidon* (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT

1 *Poseidon* (GER Type-209/1200) (fitted with AIP technology) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/SUT HWT

3 *Glavkos* (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/SUT HWT

4 *Papanikolis* (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/SUT HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13**FRIGATES • FFGHM 13:**

4 *Elli* Batch I (ex-NLD *Kortenaer* Batch 2) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C/G *Harpoon* Block 1B/G ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B *Seahawk* hel)

2 *Elli* Batch II (ex-NLD *Kortenaer* Batch 2) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C/G *Harpoon* Block 1B/G ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B *Seahawk* hel)

3 *Elli* Batch III (ex-NLD *Kortenaer* Batch 2) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C/G *Harpoon* Block 1B/G ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

4 *Hydra* (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84G *Harpoon* Block 1G ASHM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37

PCGM 6 *Roussen* (*Super Vita*) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM (of which 2 still fitted with Block 2), 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 8:

3 *Kavaloudis* (FRA *La Combattante* IIIB) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun

4 *Laskos* (FRA *La Combattante* III) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun

1 *Votsis* (ex-GER *Tiger*) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PCF 4 *Votsis* (ex-GER *Tiger*) with 1 76mm gun

PCO 8:

2 *Armatolos* (DNK *Osprey*) with 1 76mm gun

2 *Kasos* (DNK *Osprey* derivative) with 1 76mm gun

4 *Machitis* with 1 76mm gun

PBF 4 *Aeolos* (ex-US Mk V FPB)

PB 7: 4 *Andromeda* (NOR *Nasty*); 2 *Stamou*; 1 *Tolmi*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3

MHO 3: 1 *Evropi* (ex-UK *Hunt*); 2 *Evniki* (ex-US *Osprey*)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 5 *Chios* (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

LANDING CRAFT 15

LCU 5

LCA 7

LCAC 3 *Kefallinia (Zubr)* with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28**

ABU 2

AG 5: 3 *Atlas I*; 2 *Pandora*AGOR 1 *Naftilos*AGS 2: 1 *Stravon*; 1 *Pytheas*AORH 1 *Prometheus (ITA Etna)* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWSAORL 2 *Axios* (ex-GER *Lunenburg*)AOT 4 *Ouranos*AWT 6 *Kerkini*

AXS 5

Coastal Defence**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 *Exocet***Naval Aviation****FORCES BY ROLE****ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**1 div with S-70B *Seahawk*; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable

ASW 1 P-3B *Orion* (4 P-3B *Orion* in store undergoing modernisation)**HELICOPTERS**ASW 18: 7 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B *Seahawk***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*AShM AGM-119 *Penguin***Air Force 18,800; 3,000 conscripts (total 21,800)****Tactical Air Force****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-4E *Phantom II*3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 *Fighting Falcon*3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ *Fighting Falcon*2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with *Mirage* 2000-5EG/BG Mk21 sqn with *Mirage* 2000EG/BG**AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING**1 sqn with EMB-145H *Erieye***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 231 combat capable

FGA 231: 34 F-4E *Phantom II*; 69 F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 *Fighting Falcon*; 55 F-16CG/DG Block 52+; 30 F-16 C/D Block 52+ ADV *Fighting Falcon*; 19 *Mirage* 2000-5EG Mk2; 5 *Mirage* 2000-5BG Mk2; 16 *Mirage* 2000EG; 2 *Mirage* 2000BG; 1 *Rafale* F3-RAEW 4 EMB-145AEW (EMB-145H) *Erieye***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9L/P *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic 2*;IIR IRIS-T; *Mica* IR; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM;*Mica* RFASM AGM-65A/B/G *Maverick*

LACM SCALP EG

AShM AM39 *Exocet*

ARM AGM-88 HARM

BOMBS**Electro-optical guided:** GBU-8B HOBOS**Laser-guided:** GBU-10/12/16 *Paveway II*; GBU-24*Paveway III*; GBU-50 Enhanced *Paveway II***INS/GPS-guided** GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW**Air Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**6 sqn/bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-22 sqn/bty with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)12 bty with *Skyguard*/RIM-7 *Sparrow*/guns; *Crotale* NG/GR; *Tor*-M1 (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 81

Long-range 48: 36 M901 *Patriot* PAC-2; 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)**Short-range** 33: 9 *Crotale* NG/GR; 4 9K331 *Tor*-M1 (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 20 RIM-7M *Sparrow* with *Skyguard***GUNS** 59: **20mm** some Rh-202; **30mm** 35+ *Artemis*-30; **35mm** 24 GDF-005 with *Skyguard***Air Support Command****FORCES BY ROLE****SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with AS332C *Super Puma* (SAR/CSAR)

1 sqn with AW109; Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); Bell 212 (AB-212 - VIP, tpt)

TRANSPORT1 sqn with C-27J *Spartan*1 sqn with C-130B/H *Hercules*1 sqn with EMB-135BJ *Legacy*; ERJ-135LR; *Falcon* 7X; Gulfstream V**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT 27: **Medium** 23: 8 C-27J *Spartan*; 5 C-130B *Hercules*;10 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 2: 1 EMB-135BJ *Legacy*; 1ERJ-135LR; **PAX** 2: 1 *Falcon* 7X (VIP); 1 Gulfstream V**HELICOPTERS**TPT 31: **Medium** 12 AS332C *Super Puma*; **Light** 19: 12

Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); 4 Bell 212 (AB-212) (VIP, Tpt); 3 AW109

Air Training Command**FORCES BY ROLE****TRAINING**2 sqn with T-2C/E *Buckeye*2 sqn with T-6A/B *Texan II*

1 sqn with P2002JF; T-41D

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** • TRG 103: 12 P2002JF; 28 T-2C/E *Buckeye*;20 T-6A *Texan II*; 25 T-6B *Texan II*; 18 T-41D**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary****Coast Guard and Customs 4,000**

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 124**PCO 1 *Gavdos* (Damen 5009)

PCC 3

PBF 54

PB 66


AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 Cessna 172RG *Cutlass*; 2 TB-20 *Trinidad***HELICOPTERS • SAR 3** AS365N3**DEPLOYMENT****BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:** EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 6**CYPRUS:** Army 950; 1 mech bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn); 61 M48A5 MOLF MBT; 80 *Leonidas* APC; 12 M114 arty; 6 M110A2 arty**IRAQ:** NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 111; 1 FFGHM**MALI:** EU • EUTM Mali 2**MEDITERRANEAN SEA:** EU • EUNAVFOR MED • *Operation Irini*; 1 FFGHM**SAUDI ARABIA:** Air Force 100; 1 SAM bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-2**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 114; 1 inf coy**FOREIGN FORCES****United States** US European Command: 400; 1 ELINT flt with 1 EP-3E *Aries* II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion**Hungary HUN**

Hungarian Forint HUF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	HUF	47.7tr	53.5tr	
	USD	155bn	181bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	15,866	18,528	
Growth	%	-5.0	7.6	
Inflation	%	3.3	4.5	
Def exp [a]	HUF	853bn	842bn	
	USD	2.77bn	2.85bn	
Def bdgt [b]	HUF	616bn	778bn	1.00tr
	USD	2.00bn	2.63bn	
USD1=HUF		308.00	295.53	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 9,728,337

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.4%	2.7%	2.7%	3.1%	23.6%	8.1%
Female	7.0%	2.5%	2.5%	3.0%	24.3%	13.0%

Capabilities

Hungary published a new National Security Strategy in April 2020 and a new National Military Strategy in June 2021. The strategy documents speak of a deteriorating security environment, marked by great-power competition and an increasing military component. The security strategy also characterises mass migration as a key concern for Hungary. Hungary is implementing the Zrínyi 2026 national-defence and armed-forces modernisation plan. Hungary coordinates policy with the other member states of the Visegrád Group, including on defence, and hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine. The armed forces participate in international crisis-management missions, notably in the Balkans and Iraq, but have very limited organic capacity to deploy forces beyond national borders. Increasing migration pressure has involved the armed forces in internal border-control operations, assisting national police forces. Announced equipment-modernisation priorities focus on individual-soldier equipment and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. In 2019, the government announced that it had raised the level of ambition for the maximum number of Hungarian soldiers deployed on international missions from 1,000 to 1,200. While the air-force-related elements of Zrínyi 2026 had been a focus of attention, at the end of 2018 the ministry also initiated land procurements, including for main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery. In September 2020, a contract for KF41 *Lynx* infantry fighting vehicles was signed and delivery is scheduled to begin in 2022. Hungary's defence-industrial base is limited, though the defence ministry has set up an inter-ministerial working group to boost domestic capacity in the small-arms sector. In 2020, a new defence procurement agency, reporting to the national armaments director, began its work and is intended to coordinate defence and security acquisitions.

ACTIVE 34,200 (Army 11,900 Air 5,950 Joint 16,350) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000**RESERVE 20,000****ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

Hungary's armed forces have reorganised into a joint force

Land Component 10,450 (incl riverine element)**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde (1 SF bn; 1 AB bn)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 ISR regt

Mechanised

1 (5th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT bn, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr regt

1 EOD/rvn regt

1 CBRN bn

1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regtN

EQUIPMENT NBY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**MBT 48: 4 *Leopard* 2A4HU; 44 T-72M1

IFV 120 BTR-80A/AM
 APC 282
 APC (W) 260 BTR-80
 PPV 22: 10 *Ejder Yalcin* 4x4 (*Gidran*); 12 *MaxxPro Plus*
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
 AEV 5 BAT-2
 ARV 8 VT-55A
 VLB 8 BLG-60; MTU; TMM
 NBC VEHICLES 14 BTR-80M-NBC
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
 MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)
ARTILLERY 31
 TOWED 152mm 31 D-20
 MOR 82mm
 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2
 MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 3 *Nestin*

Air Component 5,750

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Gripen C/D*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A319; *Falcon 7X*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Z-143LSi; Z-242L; AS350 *Ecureuil*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24V/P *Hind E/F*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; H145M

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt (9 bty with *Mistral*; 3 bty with 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*))
 1 radar regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable

FGA 14: 12 *Gripen C*; 2 *Gripen D*
 TPT • PAX 4: 2 A319; 2 *Falcon 7X*
 TRG 8: 2 Z-143LSi; 6 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8: 6 Mi-24V *Hind E*; 2 Mi-24P *Hind F*
 MRH 25: 20 H145M (incl 2 SAR); 5 Mi-17 *Hip H*
 TPT 5: **Medium** 3 Mi-8 *Hip* (10 in store); **Light** 2 AS350 *Ecureuil*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 16 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); *Mistral*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo A*); ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
 ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; 3M11 *Falanga* (RS-AT-2 *Swatter*); 9K114 *Shturm-V* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)

BOMBS • Laser-guided *Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000

Border Guards 12,000 (to reduce)

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (Budapest) paramilitary district (7 rapid reaction coy)
 11 (regt/district) paramilitary regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 68 BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • *Operation Althea* 174; 1 inf coy

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 138; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 19

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 16

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20


SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 472; 1 inf coy (KTM)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Iceland ISL

Icelandic Krona ISK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ISK	2.94tr	3.20tr	
	USD	21.7bn	25.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	59,643	68,844	
Growth	%	-6.5	3.7	
Inflation	%	2.9	4.3	
Sy Bdgt [a]	ISK	7.07bn	5.53bn	
	USD	52.2m	44.0m	
USD1=ISK		135.42	125.71	

[a] Coast Guard budget



Population 354,234

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.3%	3.2%	3.3%	3.5%	22.4%	7.5%
Female	9.9%	3.1%	3.2%	3.4%	21.9%	8.3%

Capabilities

Iceland is a NATO member but maintains only a coastguard service. In 2016, the country established a National Security Council to implement and monitor security policy. The coastguard controls the NATO Iceland Air Defence System, as well as a NATO Control and Reporting Centre that feeds into NATO air- and missile defence and air-operations centres. Increased Russian air and naval activities in the Atlantic and close to NATO airspace have led to complaints from Iceland. Iceland considers its bilateral defence agreement with the US as an important pillar of its security policy and also participates in the security-policy dialogue of NORDEFECO. Iceland joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force in 2021. Iceland hosts

NATO and regional partners for exercises, transits and naval task groups, as well as the Icelandic Air Policing mission. Despite there being no standing armed forces, Iceland makes financial contributions and on occasion deploys civilian personnel to NATO missions. In late 2016, following a joint declaration in June that year, the US Navy began operating P-8 *Poseidon* maritime-patrol aircraft from Keflavik air base. In summer 2019, it was reported that upgrades would include accommodation, dangerous-cargo handling facilities and runway extensions to enable tanker operations. The work is due to be completed in 2023.

ACTIVE NIL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Iceland Coast Guard 250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3

PSOH 2 *Aegir*

PSO 1 *Thor*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 *Baldur*

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300 (MP)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 3 H225 (leased)

FOREIGN FORCES


Icelandic Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from various NATO members on a rotating basis

United States 100; 2 P-8A *Poseidon*

Ireland IRL

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	373bn	432bn	
	USD	426bn	516bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	85,206	102,394	
Growth	%	5.9	13.0	
Inflation	%	-0.5	1.9	
Def bdg [a]	EUR	1.04bn	1.07bn	1.11bn
	USD	1.19bn	1.28bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] Includes military pensions and capital expenditure



Population 5,224,884

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.7%	3.2%	3.0%	2.9%	23.6%	6.5%
Female	10.2%	3.1%	2.9%	2.9%	23.4%	7.5%

Capabilities

The armed forces' core mission is defending the state against armed aggression, although a 2015 white paper broadened the scope of the national-security risk assessment beyond tra-

ditional military and paramilitary threats. It listed inter- and intra-state conflict, cyber attacks, terrorism, emergencies and natural disasters, among others. The army maintains substantial EOD capabilities. Ireland is active in EU defence cooperation and continues to contribute to multinational operations. Its forces are well trained for their roles. Ireland is also working to establish a specialist reserve with relevant professional qualifications. It has sufficient logistic capability to sustain its UN deployments but has no strategic-airlift capacity. After the 2015 white paper, Dublin identified a large number of defence projects to be completed over a ten-year period. Key priorities include a mid-life upgrade for the army's *Piranha* armoured personnel carriers, EOD robots and UAVs. Other stated priorities include new armoured vehicles, new aircraft, naval-vessel refits, training facilities and upgrades to military facilities. A 3% rise in the 2020 defence budget is intended to boost military staffing by improving pay and allowances, bases and infrastructure. Ireland has a small, specialist defence industry focused on areas including drivetrain technologies for land systems.

ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 6,950 Navy 900 Air 700)

RESERVE 1,150 (Army 1,400 Navy 150)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,950

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 ranger coy

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd recce sqn

Mechanised

1 mech inf coy

Light

1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 tpt coy)

1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 tpt coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 6 *Piranha* IIIH 30mm

APC 101

APC (W) 74: 56 *Piranha* III; 18 *Piranha* IIIH

PPV 27 RG-32M

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 131

TOWED • 105mm 23: 17 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119 Light Gun

MOR 108: 81mm 84 Brandt; 120mm 24 Ruag M87

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence RBS-70

Reserves 1,400 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 (integrated) armd recce sqn

2 (integrated) cav sqn

Mechanised

1 (integrated) mech inf coy

Light

14 (integrated) inf coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 (integrated) arty bty

2 engr gp

2 MP coy

3 sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 med det

2 tpt coy

Naval Service 900**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7**PSOH 1 *Eithne* with 1 57mm gunPSO 6: 2 *Roisin* (of which 1 in refit) with 1 76mm gun; 4 *Samuel Beckett* with 1 76mm gunPCO (2 *Orla* (ex-UK *Peacock*) (in reserve since mid-2019 due to crew shortage) with 1 76mm gun)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 2****Air Corps 700**

2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

MP 2 CN235 MPA

TPT • **Light** 5: 1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 4 PC-12NG

TRG 8 PC-9M

HELICOPTERS:


MRH 6 AW139

TPT • **Light** 2 H135 (incl trg/medevac)**DEPLOYMENT****BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:** EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 5**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 3**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 338; 1 mech inf bn(-)**MALI:** EU • EUTM Mali 20; UN • MINUSMA 12**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 11**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 13**SYRIA/ISRAEL:** UN • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy**Italy ITA**

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	1.65tr	1.78tr	
	USD	1.88tr	2.12tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	31,604	35,585	
Growth	%	-8.9	5.8	
Inflation	%	-0.1	1.7	
Def exp [a]	EUR	22.8bn	24.4bn	
	USD	26.1bn	29.2bn	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	26.0bn	28.3bn	28.6bn
	USD	29.7bn	33.8bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 62,390,364

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	6.8%	2.4%	2.4%	2.6%	24.3%	9.6%
Female	6.5%	2.4%	2.4%	2.7%	25.2%	12.6%

Capabilities

Italy is concerned by security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic environment, as well as from Europe's southern flank. A defence white paper was issued in 2015. The latest three-year defence plan for 2020-22 outlined modernisation goals. The 2012 law governing personnel structures will remain but a changed strategic environment meant it needed to be updated. For instance, more personnel were needed in the defence industry. Italy has taken part in NATO's air-policing missions in the Baltic states, Iceland and Romania and since early 2017 has deployed to Latvia as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence. The EUNAVFOR-MED force is headquartered in Rome, while the US Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. The country takes part in and hosts NATO and other multinational exercises and continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad. However, Italy is planning to gradually reduce its presence overseas to focus on Europe's southern flank. Italy's logistics capability is enabled by a fleet of medium transport aircraft and tankers. The white paper detailed capability-enhancement programmes including upgrades to main battle tanks and procurement of armoured fighting vehicles, counter-UAV systems and electronic-warfare capabilities. The expected retirement of much of the naval fleet has triggered a long-term replacement plan which includes the potential acquisition of two next-generation destroyers to replace the ageing *Luigi Durand de la Penne*-class vessels. F-35As have been ordered for the air force (and F-35Bs for both the air force and naval aviation). Italy has an advanced defence industry, producing equipment across all the domains, with particular strengths in shipbuilding and aircraft and helicopter manufacturing. The country hosts Europe's F-35 final assembly and check-out facility at Cameri. Italy takes part in European defence-industrial cooperation activities, including PESCO projects.

ACTIVE 161,550 (Army 93,600 Navy 28,700 Air 39,250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,350

RESERVES 17,900 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 9

COMMUNICATIONS 4: 1 *Athena-Fidus* (also used by FRA); 3 *Sicral*

ISR 5: 4 *Cosmo* (*Skymed*); 1 OPTSAT-3000

Army 96,700

Regt are bn sized

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt regt)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (*Vittorio Veneto*) div (1 (*Ariete*) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Pozzuolo del Friuli*) cav bde (1 cav regt, 1 amph regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Folgore*) AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Friuli*) air mob bde (1 air mob regt, 2 atk hel regt))

1 (*Acqui*) div (1 (*Pinerolo*) mech bde (1 cav regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Granatieri*) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 mech inf regt); 1 (*Garibaldi Bersaglieri*) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Aosta*) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (*Sassari*) lt mech bde (1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt))

Mountain

1 (*Tridentina*) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 log regt))

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty comd (1 arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 NBC regt)

1 AD comd (3 SAM regt)

1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 ptn br regt, 1 CIMIC regt)

1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 EW regt, 1 int regt, 1 STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt))

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log comd (3 log regt, 4 med unit)

HELICOPTER

1 hel bde (3 hel regt)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 150 C1 *Ariete*

ASLT 255 B1 *Centaurio*

IFV 426: 165 VCC-80 *Dardo*; 261 VBM 8x8 *Freccia* (incl 20 CP and 36 with *Spike-LR*)

APC 379

APC (T) 148 Bv-206S

APC (W) 198 *Puma* 6x6

PPV 33 VTMM *Orso* (incl 16 amb)

AUV 1,824: 10 *Cougar*; 1,798 IVECO LMV (incl 82 amb); 16 IVECO LMV 2

AAV 15: 14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 25 *Dachs*; M113

ARV 70: 69 BPz-2; 1 AAVR-7

VLB 30 *Biber*

MW 34: 6 *Buffalo*; 3 *Miniflail*; 25 VTMM *Orso*

NBC VEHICLES 14: 5 VBR NBC; 9 VBR NBC Plus

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike*

ARTILLERY 959

SP 155mm 70 PzH 2000

TOWED 188: 105mm 25 Oto Melara Mod 56; 155mm 163 FH-70

MRL 227mm 22 MLRS

MOR 679: 81mm 283 Expal; 120mm 325: 183 Brandt; 142

RT-61 (RT-F1) **SP 120mm** 71: 50 M106A1; 21 VBM 8x8 *Freccia*

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 3 P.180 *Avanti*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 35 AW129CBT *Mangusta*

MRH 14 Bell 412 (AB-412) *Twin Huey*

TPT 141: **Heavy** 16 CH-47F *Chinook* (1 CH-47C *Chinook* in store); **Medium** 53 NH90 TTH (UH-90); **Light** 72: 2 AW169LUH (UH-169B); 29 Bell 205 (AB-205); 28 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); 13 Bell 212 (AB-212)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 52+

Long-range 20 SAMP/T

Short-range 32 *Aspide* with *Skyguard*

Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM *Spike-ER*

Navy 28,700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK 8:

4 *Pelosi* (imp *Sauro*, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single 533mm TT with A184 mod 3 HWT

4 *Salvatore Todaro* (Type-212A) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with *Black Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 17

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2:

1 *Cavour* with 4 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20 AV-8B *Harrier* II; F-35B *Lightning* II; AW101 *Merlin*; NH90; Bell 212)

1 G. *Garibaldi* with 2 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B *Harrier* II; AW101 *Merlin*; NH90; Bell 212)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4:

2 *Andrea Doria* with 2 quad Inchr with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2A ASHM, 6 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/*Aster* 30 SAM, 2 single 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 AW101 *Merlin*/NH90 hel)

2 *Luigi Durand de la Penne* (ex-*Animoso*) with 2 quad Inchr with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2A ASHM/*Milas* A/S msl, 1 Mk 13 mod 4 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2

triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 11:

4 *Bergamini* (GP) with 2 quad Inchr with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2A ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/*Aster* 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)

4 *Bergamini* (ASW) with 2 twin Inchr with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2A ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with MILAS A/S msl, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/*Aster* 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)

3 *Maestrale* with 4 single Inchr with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16

PSOH 10:

4 *Cassiopea* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

4 *Comandante Cigala Fuligosi* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel)

2 *Sirio* (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) or NH90 hel)

PB 6: 2 *Angelo Cabrini*; 4 *Esploratore*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10

MHO 10: 8 *Gaeta*; 2 *Lerici*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3:

2 *San Giorgio* (capacity 3-4 AW101/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops)

1 *San Giusto* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 *Merlin*/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 24: 15 LCVP; 9 LCM

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 53

ABU 5 *Ponza*

AFD 9

AGE 3: 1 *Leonardo* (coastal); 1 *Raffaele Rosseti*; 1 *Vincenzo Martellota*

AGI 1 *Elettra*

AGOR 1 *Alliance*

AGS 3: 1 *Ammiraglio Magnaghi* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Aretusa* (coastal)

AKSL 6 *Gorgona*

AORH 1 *Etna* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/NH90/Bell 212 hel)

AORL 2 *Stromboli* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/NH90 hel)

AOT 4 *Panarea*

ARSH 1 *Anteo* (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

ATS 6 *Ciclope*

AWT 3: 1 *Bormida*; 2 *Simeto*

AXS 8: 1 *Amerigo Vespucci*; 5 *Caroly*; 1 *Italia*; 1 *Palinuro*

Naval Aviation 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with AV-8B *Harrier* II; TAV-8B *Harrier* II

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/TRANSPORT

5 sqn with AW101 ASW *Merlin*; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212AS); Bell 212 (AB-212); NH90 NFH

MARITIME PATROL

1 flt with P-180

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 flt with AW101 AEW *Merlin*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable

FGA 13: 9 AV-8B *Harrier* II; 1 TAV-8B *Harrier* II; 3 F-35B *Lightning* II

MP 3 P.180 *Avanti*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 55: 10 AW101 ASW *Merlin*; 7 Bell 212 ASW; 38 NH90 NFH (SH-90)

AEW 4 AW101 AEW *Merlin*

TPT 20: **Medium** 18: 8 AW101 *Merlin*; 10 NH90 MITT (MH-90); **Light** 2 Bell 212 (AB-212)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*

AShM *Marte* Mk 2/S

Marines 3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne regt (1 recce coy, 2 mne bn, 1 log bn)

1 (boarding) mne regt (2 mne bn)

1 landing craft gp

Other

1 sy regt (3 sy bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AAV 17: 15 AAVP-7; 2 AAVC-7

AUV 70 IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 1 AAVR-7

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike*

ARTILLERY

MOR 32: 81mm 10 Expal; 120mm 22 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*

Air Force 39,950

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

4 sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 (SEAD/EW) sqn with *Tornado* ECR

1 sqn with *Tornado* IDS

1 sqn with F-35A/B *Lightning* II

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with AMX *Ghibli*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn (opcon Navy) with ATR-72MP (P-72A)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with KC-767A

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with AB-212 ICO; AW101 SAR (HH-101A)

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 wg with AW139 (HH-139A); Bell 212 (HH-212)

TRANSPORT

2 (VIP) sqn with A319CJ; AW139 (VH-139A); *Falcon 50*;
Falcon 900 Easy; *Falcon 900EX*

2 sqn with C-130J/C-130J-30/KC-130J *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-27J *Spartan*

1 (calibration) sqn with P-180 *Avanti*/Gulfstream G550
CAEW

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*

1 sqn with MB-339PAN (aerobatic team)

1 sqn with MD-500D/E (NH-500D/E)

1 OCU sqn with *Tornado*

1 OCU sqn with AMX-T *Ghibli*

1 sqn with MB-339A

1 sqn with M-346

1 sqn with SF-260EA; 3 P2006T (T-2006A)

1 sqn with AW101 SAR (HH-101A); Bell 212 (HH-212)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; RQ-1B *Predator*

AIR DEFENCE

2 bty with *Spada*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 225 combat capable

FTR 94 Eurofighter *Typhoon*

FGA 54: 31 AMX *Ghibli*; 8 AMX-T *Ghibli*; 14 F-35A

Lightning II; 1 F-35B *Lightning II*

ATK 34 *Tornado IDS*

ATK/EW 15 *Tornado ECR**

MP 4 ATR-72MP (P-72A)

SIGINT 1 Beech 350 *King Air*

AEW&C 2 Gulfstream G550 CAEW

TKR/TPT 4 KC-767A

TPT 78: **Medium** 33: 11 C-130J *Hercules* (5+ KC-130J
tanker pods); 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 12 C-27J *Spartan*;

Light 37: 17 P-180 *Avanti*; 20 S-208 (liaison); PAX 8: 3
A319CJ; 2 *Falcon 50* (VIP); 2 *Falcon 900 Easy*; 1 *Falcon*
900EX (VIP)

TRG 115: 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 16 MB-339PAN
(aerobatics); 2+ M-345; 22 M-346; 26 SF-260EA

HELICOPTERS

MRH 54: 13 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D
(NH-500D); 39 MD-500E (NH-500E)

CSAR 12 AW101 (HH-101A)

SAR 14 AW139 (HH-139B)

TPT • **Light** 29 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 12: 6

MQ-9A *Reaper*; 6 RQ-1B *Predator*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range SPADA**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-
120C AMRAAM; *Meteor*

ARM AGM-88 HARM

LACM SCALP EG/*Storm Shadow*

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM; *Lizard 2*

Laser-guided/GPS Enhanced *Paveway II*; GBU-31/32/38
JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Joint Special Forces Command (COFS)**Army****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF regt (9th *Assalto paracadutisti*)

1 STA regt

1 ranger regt (4th *Alpini paracadutisti*)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 psyops regt

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 spec ops hel regt

Navy (COMSUBIN)**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF gp (GOI)

1 diving gp (GOS)

Air Force**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 wg (sqn) (17th *Stormo Incursori*)

Paramilitary**Carabinieri****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops gp (GIS)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,350**Carabinieri 108,250**

The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD. They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces as well as a police force with judicial competence

Mobile and Specialised Branch**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with (1
horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with
(1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt))

HELICOPTER

1 hel gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2

AUV 30 IVECO LMV

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 69

AIRCRAFT • TPT • **Light**: 1 P.180 *Avanti*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 24 Bell 412 (AB-412)

TPT • **Light** 19 AW109

Customs 68,100

(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 166**

PCO 2 *Monti* (Damen Stan Patrol 5509)

PCF 1 Antonio Zara

PBF 140: 19 Bigliani; 5 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 79 V-2000; 12 V-5000; 6 V-6000; 10 V-7000

PB 23 Buratti

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio Cini
AIRCRAFT

MP 7: 4 ATR-42-500MP; 3 ATR-72-600 (P-72B)

TPT • Light 2 P.180 Avanti

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light 53: 10 AW109N; 17 AW139; 6 AW169M; 8 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 4 MD-500MC (NH-500MC); 8 MD-500MD (NH-500MD)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 50; 1 ISR coy

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2

DJIBOUTI: 147

EGYPT: MFO 75; 3 PB

ESTONIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing: 150; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon

GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta 150; 1 FFGHM

GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 150; 1 FFGHM

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1

IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 600; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90; **NATO** • NATO Mission Iraq 280

KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 300; 4 Tornado ECR; 1 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC-767A; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Baltic Guardian) 200; 1 armd inf coy with C1 Ariete; Centauro B1; VCC-80 Dardo

LEBANON: MIBIL 315; UN • UNIFIL 906; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel sqn

LIBYA: MIASIT 400; 1 inf coy; 1 CRBN unit; 1 trg unit

MALI: Operation Barkhane 100; EU • EUTM Mali 14; UN • MINUSMA 2

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 1 PSOH; **NATO** • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM; **NATO** • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO

NIGER: MISIN 295; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CRBN unit; 1 med coy; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit

PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 150; 1 FFGHM

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 638; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit

SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 154

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES

United States US European Command: 12,900
Army 4,100; 1 AB bde(-)

Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF)/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 ASW Sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella

USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV flt with RQ-4B Global Hawk at Sigonella


USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules

Latvia LVA

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	29.3bn	31.1bn	
	USD	33.5bn	37.2bn	
per capita	USD	17,549	19,539	
Growth	%	-3.6	4.5	
Inflation	%	0.1	2.6	
Def exp [a]	EUR	651m	699m	
	USD	743m	835m	
Def bdtg [b]	EUR	663m	699m	738m
	USD	757m	835m	
FMA (US)	USD	8m	5m	9m
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 1,862,687

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	2.5%	2.2%	2.8%	23.9%	7.0%
Female	7.4%	2.3%	2.1%	2.6%	25.4%	13.8%

Capabilities

Latvia has small armed forces focused on maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity but the country depends on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Russia is Latvia's overriding security concern. A National Armed Forces Development plan 2016-28 illustrated a capabilities-based planning process. Principal tasks were to improve early warning, detection and situational awareness, to increase combat readiness and to improve the ability to counter hybrid threats. An update to the State Defence Concept was announced in June 2020 to reflect shifts in Latvia's strategic environment. It identified challenges including new technologies, and low military spending in Europe and the consequent effect on capabilities and crisis response. It emphasised the importance of societal resilience and comprehensive defence as well as the significance of a NATO presence in the region. Latvia has no requirement and therefore no capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond its national boundaries, although the armed forces have taken part in a range of NATO and EU missions. Capability-development projects include engineering, special operations, mechanised infantry, air defence, air surveillance and the National

Guard. Acquisition requirements include self-propelled howitzers, CVR(T) and ATGW systems. Latvia has only a niche defence-industrial capability, with cyber security a focus.

ACTIVE 8,750 (Army 1,700 Navy 550 Air 550 Joint Staff 400 National Guard 1,100 Other 4,450)

RESERVE 11,200 (National Guard 7,200 Other 4,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Joint 1,900

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn

Army 1,700

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn HQ, 1 CSS bn HQ)

National Guard 1,100; 7,200 part-time (8,300 total)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 (2nd) inf bde (4 inf bn; 1 engr bn)
3 (1st, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn; 1 sy bn; 1 spt bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cyber unit

1 NBC coy

1 psyops pl

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 3 T-55 (trg)

RECCE 170 FV107 *Scimitar* (incl variants)

APC • APC(W) 4 Patria 6×6

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MANPATS *Spike-LR*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 90mm Pvpj 1110

ARTILLERY 100

SP 155mm 47 M109A5ÖE

TOWED 100mm (23 K-53 in store)

MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120

Navy 550 (incl Coast Guard)

Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation contributes 1–2 MCMVs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PB 5 *Skrunda* (GER *Swath*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5

MCCS 1 *Vidar* (ex-NOR)

MHO 4 *Imanta* (ex-NLD *Alkmaar/Tripartite*) (3 used in MCM role, 1 used for other duties)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1

AXL 1 *Varonis* (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD)

Coast Guard

Under command of the Latvian Naval Forces

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PB 6: 1 *Astra*; 5 KBV 236 (ex-SWE)

Air Force 550

Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and land SAR and air transportation

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 *Colt*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 *Colt*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 4 Mi-17 *Hip H*

TPT • Light 2 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*; RBS-70

GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

State Border Guard

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3

PB 3: 1 *Valpas* (ex-FIN); 1 *Lokki* (ex-FIN); 1 *Randa*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206B (AB-206B) *Jet Ranger II*; 2

AW109E *Power*

DEPLOYMENT

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 1

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4; UN • MINUSMA 1

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 133; 1 inf coy

FOREIGN FORCES

All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated

Albania 21; 1 EOD pl

Canada 540; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy

Czech Republic 56; 1 mor pl

Italy 200; 1 armd inf coy

Montenegro 10

Poland 175; 1 tk coy

Slovakia 97; 1 arty bty

Slovenia 40; 1 engr pl


Spain 346; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy

Lithuania LTU

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	48.9bn	52.4bn	
	USD	55.8bn	62.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	19,981	22,412	
Growth	%	-0.9	4.7	
Inflation	%	1.1	3.0	
Def exp [a]	EUR	1.03bn	1.05bn	
	USD	1.18bn	1.25bn	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	1.02bn	1.05bn	1.12bn
	USD	1.16bn	1.25bn	
FMA (US)	USD	8m	5m	9m
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 2,711,566

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	2.4%	2.8%	3.1%	22.9%	7.1%
Female	7.5%	2.3%	2.6%	2.8%	25.0%	13.6%

Capabilities

Lithuania's small armed forces focus on maintaining territorial integrity and national sovereignty but the country relies on NATO membership for its security. Like the other Baltic states, it is reliant on NATO's air-policing deployment for a combat-aircraft capacity. Russia is the country's predominant security concern, and this shapes Lithuanian defence policy. In January 2017, Lithuania adopted a new National Security Strategy, reflecting the worsening regional security environment. Better combat readiness is an objective and the mobilisation system is being reformed. The government began a security and defence policy review in 2021, which will be reflected in a new national security strategy. Compulsory military service was reintroduced in 2015. Reforms to defence planning and acquisition management came into force in 2018. There is increased attention to communications security. Lithuania has a limited medium-airlift capability, for use in supporting its forces on multinational deployed operations. It takes an active part in NATO and EU operations. The country is taking delivery of the NASAMS SAM system to improve its ground-based air defences. A Regional Cyber Defence Center was set up in 2021, with US cooperation, encompassing defence but also broader resilience concerns. Lithuania has a small defence-industrial base, with niche capabilities, for instance in helicopter support and maintenance.

ACTIVE 23,000 (Army 14,500 Navy 700 Air 1,500 Other 6,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150

Conscript liability 9 months, 18–23 years

RESERVE 7,100 (Army 7,100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,850; 5,650 active reserves (total 14,500)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)

Light

1 (2nd) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 trg regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 30 *Boxer* (*Vilkas*) (in test; incl 2 trg)

APC • APC (T) 256: 234 M113A1; 22 M577 (CP)

APC 50 JLTV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 8 MT-LB AEV

ARV 6: 2 BPz-2; 4 M113

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 10 M1025A2 HMMWV with FGM-148 *Javelin*

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 91

SP 16 PzH 2000

TOWED 105mm 18 M101

MOR 57: 120mm 42: 20 2B11; 22 M/41D; SP 120mm 15

M113 with Tampella

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence GROM

Reserves

National Defence Voluntary Forces 5,650 active reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

6 (territorial) def unit

Navy 700

LVA, EST and LTU established a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventpils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PCC 4 *Zemaitis* (ex-DNK *Flyvefisker*) with 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MHC 2 *Skalvis* (ex-UK *Hunt*)

MCCS 1 *Jotvingis* (ex-NOR *Vidar*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 1 *Šakiai*

Air Force 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

TPT 6: Medium 3 C-27J *Spartan*; **Light 3:** 1 Cessna 172RG; 2 L-410 *Turbolet*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 3 AS365M3 *Dauphin* (SAR)
TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 *Hip* (tpt/SAR)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 4+

Short-range 4 NASAMS III
Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*; RBS-70

Special Operation Force**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 Jaeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit)

Logistics Support Command 1,400**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 log bn

Training and Doctrine Command 1,500**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 trg regt

Other Units 2,600**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 MP bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150**Riflemen Union 10,600****State Border Guard Service 3,550**

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1 *Lokki* (ex-FIN); 1 KBV 041 (ex-SWE); 1 *Bakauskas* (Baltic Patrol 2700)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2 *Christina* (*Griffon* 2000)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172RG

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 1 BK-117 (SAR); 2 H120 *Colibri*; 2 H135

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2; UN • MINUSMA 45

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 1

UKRAINE: JMTG-U 30

FOREIGN FORCES

All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Belgium 198; 1 mot inf coy

Czech Republic 36; 1 EW unit

Denmark NATO Baltic Air Policing; 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon

Germany 558; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+)

Luxembourg 4

Netherlands 270; 1 armd inf coy


Norway 195; 1 armd inf coy

Portugal NATO Baltic Air Policing; 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon

Luxembourg LUX

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	64.1bn	70.1bn	
	USD	73.2bn	83.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	116,921	131,302	
Growth	%	-1.3	5.5	
Inflation	%	0.0	2.7	
Def exp [a]	EUR	356m	389m	
	USD	406m	465m	
Def bdgt	EUR	341m	348m	420m
	USD	390m	416m	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure



Population 639,589

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.6%	2.8%	3.2%	3.6%	25.2%	7.0%
Female	8.1%	2.7%	3.0%	3.5%	23.9%	8.5%

Capabilities

Luxembourg maintains a limited military capability to participate in European collective security and crisis management. The 'Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond' were published at the end of 2017. They contain strong statements of support for NATO and EU security policy and contributions to international missions. They also outline ambitious modernisation plans, including a reorganisation of the army, which will take on joint responsibilities, including for ISR, a new air component and a military-cyber cell. Luxembourg has contributed troops to the multinational battlegroup in Lithuania as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. It is part of the European Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet programme, partially funding one A330 MRTT, and has contributed its A400M to a multinational airlift squadron formed jointly with Belgium. The Belgian and Dutch air forces are responsible for policing Luxembourg's airspace. Sustaining the army's personnel strength depends on better recruiting and retention. A review is examining a specialised reserve of civilian experts. The defence guidelines envisage considerable equipment improvements and cooperative development of UAV capabilities with Belgium and the Netherlands. Ambitions for the new air component include tactical-airlift and medical-evacuation capabilities. There is a small but advanced space industry and some foreign defence firms have

a presence, but the country is otherwise reliant on imports. A strategy for defence industry, innovation and research is to be developed as part of the new defence guidelines.

ACTIVE 410 (Army 410) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 410

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of deployable forces)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 48 *Dingo* 2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS NLAW; TOW

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6+

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 1 A400M

HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 H145M (jointly operated with Police)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600

Gendarmerie 600

DEPLOYMENT

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1

LITHUANIA: NATO • *Enhanced Forward Presence* 4


MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 2

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 *Merlin* IIC (leased)

Macedonia, North MKD

Macedonian Denar MKD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MKD	664bn	717bn	
	USD	12.3bn	13.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,939	6,712	
Growth	%	-4.5	4.0	
Inflation	%	1.2	3.1	
Def exp [a]	EUR	8.30bn	11.1bn	
	USD	154m	214m	
Def bdgt	MKD	10.1bn	10.8bn	13.3bn
	USD	188m	209m	
FMA (US)	USD	5m	0m	0m
USD1=MKD		54.04	51.64	

[a] NATO figure



Population 2,128,262

Age	0 – 14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.8%	3.5%	3.7%	25.1%	6.4%
Female	7.8%	2.7%	3.2%	3.5%	24.8%	8.1%

Capabilities

The armed forces' primary goals are safeguarding the state's territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as contributing to operations under the EU, NATO and UN umbrellas. North Macedonia formally became NATO's 30th member on 27 March 2020. In the same month, it enacted a new Defence Strategy with a focus on capability development, and improved planning based on NATO and EU standards, among other areas. A 2019–2028 Defence Capability Development Plan (DCDP) consolidated long-term development goals aimed at developing collective defence, cooperative security and crisis-management capabilities. A Mid-Term Defence Capabilities Development Plan, adopted in January 2020, is intended to help implement the DCDP. Work on MoD restructuring is under way. The armed forces are fully professional and the country aims to train all units, particularly those with deployable capability, to NATO standards. A number of units are earmarked for participation in NATO-led operations, and troops were deployed to KFOR in November 2020. The armed forces have increased their participation in NATO joint exercises since joining the Alliance. Participation in international peacekeeping missions has increased logistics capability. The country has modest maritime and air wings, and relies on Soviet-era equipment. Acquisition priorities include indirect fire-support, light armoured vehicles, cyber defence and multi-role helicopters. There is little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment.

ACTIVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600

RESERVE 4,850

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt (1 SF bn, 1 ranger bn)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

1 MP bn

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (3 log bn)

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE Light

1 inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 31 T-72A

IFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP)

APC 200

APC (T) 46: 9 *Leonidas*; 27 M113; 10 MT-LB

APC (W) 154: 56 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 2 *Cobra*; 84 TM-170 *Hermelin*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 82mm M60A

ARTILLERY 131

TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938

MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11

MOR 44: 120mm 44

Marine Wing

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2

PB 2 *Boticat*

Aviation Brigade

FORCES BY ROLE

TRAINING

1 flt with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 206B

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24V *Hind E*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8MTV *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 1 An-2 *Colt*

TRG 5 Z-242

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-24V *Hind E* (8: 2 Mi-24K *Hind G2*; 6 Mi-24V *Hind E* in store)

MRH 6: 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 2 Mi-17 *Hip H*

TPT • Light 6: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 4 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 8+: 8 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 40mm 36 L/60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600

Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed)

incl 2 SF units

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (T) M113; APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170

Heimlin

AUV *Ze'ev*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-171; Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB-206B) *Jet Ranger II*; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 1

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3


SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 64

Malta MLT

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	13.1bn	14.0bn	
	USD	14.9bn	16.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	28,955	31,997	
Growth	%	-8.3	5.7	
Inflation	%	0.8	0.7	
Def bdgt [a]	EUR	70.7m	71.8m	82.7m
	USD	80.7m	85.8m	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] Excludes military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 460,891

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.4%	2.3%	2.8%	3.6%	24.2%	10.0%
Female	7.0%	2.2%	2.6%	3.2%	22.9%	11.8%

Capabilities

The principal roles for the armed forces are maintaining external security and support for civil emergencies and the police. There is also focus on maritime security in the Mediterranean. The Armed

Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016–2026 laid out defence-policy objectives, including operational and organisational reforms. Malta is neutral but is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. The country also participates in bilateral and multi-lateral exercises. Although deployment capacity is limited, Malta has contributed to European missions. Italy has assisted Malta in meeting some security requirements, including air surveillance, while the European Internal Security Fund is funding some modernisation. Although there is some shipbuilding and ship-repair activity and a small aviation-maintenance industry, these are not defence-specific and Malta relies on imports to equip its armed forces.

ACTIVE 1,700 (Armed Forces 1,700)

RESERVE 260 (Volunteer Reserve Force 110 Individual Reserve 150)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Armed Forces of Malta 1,700

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint sqn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm L16

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 1 ZPU-4

Maritime Squadron 500

Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore patrol; rapid deployment and training; marine engineering; and logistics

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8

PCO 1 *Emer*

PCC 1 *Diciotti* (ITA *Saettia* mod) with 1 hel landing platform

PB 6: 4 *Austal 21m*; 2 *Marine Protector*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 2 *Cantiere Vittoria*

Air Wing

1 base party. 1 flt ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log div; 1 rescue section

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 *King Air* (maritime patrol);

2 BN-2B *Islander*

TRG 3 *Bulldog* T MK1

HELICOPTERS MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B

Alouette III

DEPLOYMENT


LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 11

Montenegro MNE

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	4.19bn	4.60bn	
	USD	4.79bn	5.49bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,703	8,838	
Growth	%	-15.2	7.0	
Inflation	%	-0.2	2.0	
Def exp [a]	EUR	72.0m	79.0m	
	USD	82.0m	94.0m	
Def bdtg [b]	EUR	64.7m	72.5m	
	USD	73.8m	86.6m	
FMA (US)	USD	5m	0m	0m
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 607,414

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.4%	3.2%	3.3%	3.1%	23.1%	7.2%
Female	8.7%	2.9%	3.1%	3.0%	23.7%	9.3%

Capabilities

According to its defence strategy, Montenegro intends to develop an integrated defence system, capable of defending and preserving independence, sovereignty and national territory. However, the principal concern of the authorities is integrating Montenegro into the collective security system of NATO as well as the EU. A NATO member since 2017, Montenegro has accepted NATO's capability targets and has been aligning its defence-planning process with NATO standards. Reform and professionalisation of the armed forces have been slow, and developments have been focused on structural issues around improving recruitment, outflow and professional development. The armed forces are not designed to have an expeditionary capability, and as such have little logistics capability to support deployments beyond national borders. Personnel have deployed to EU-, UN- and NATO-led operations, although a planned increase in Montenegro's small contribution to KFOR stalled due to internal opposition. Podgorica intends to replace ageing Soviet-era equipment. Procurement priorities include light and medium helicopters and light armoured vehicles, as well as improved communications capacities in accordance with NATO standards. Future plans include the formation of a special-forces unit and an intelligence unit in the land forces. The country's defence industry is capable of producing small arms and ammunition.

ACTIVE 2,350 (Army 1,275 Navy 350 Air Force 225 Other 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,100

RESERVE 2,800

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,275

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce coy

Light

1 mot inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bn

1 sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

1 spt bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86

AUV 20 JLTV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP 9 BOV-1

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);

9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

ARTILLERY 135

TOWED 122mm 12 D-30

MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 *Plamen*

MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32

Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

Navy 350

1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR) with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of decommissioning

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PCF 2 *Rade Končar†*

PB 2 *Mirna* (Type-140) (Police units)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1

AXS 1 *Jadrant†*

Air Force 225

Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command

FORCES BY ROLE

TRAINING

1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 *Super Galeb*; Utva-75 (none operational)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA341/SA342L *Gazelle*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 *Super Galeb* non-operational; 4 Utva-75 non-operational)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 16: 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412EPI *Twin Huey*; 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) *Gazelle*

TPT • Light 2 Bell 505 *Jet Ranger X*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €10,100

Montenegrin Ministry of Interior Personnel
€6,000

Special Police Units €4,100

DEPLOYMENT

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 10

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1

Multinational Organisations

Capabilities

The following represent shared capabilities held by contributors collectively rather than as part of national inventories

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

NATO AEW&C Force

Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). Original participating countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR, PRT, TUR, US) have been subsequently joined by five more (CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM)

FORCES BY ROLE

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A *Sentry* (NATO standard)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

AEW&C 16 E-3A *Sentry* (NATO standard)

TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg)

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance

Based at Sigonella (ITA)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Heavy 5 RQ-4D *Phoenix*

NATO Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF)

Based at Eindhoven (NLD). Six participating countries (BEL, CZE, GER, NLD, NOR & LUX)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TKR/TPT 5 A330 MRTT

Strategic Airlift Capability

Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12 participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD, NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, US)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 3 C-17A *Globemaster III*

Strategic Airlift Interim Solution

Intended to provide strategic-airlift capacity pending the delivery of A400M aircraft by leasing An-124s. 11 participating countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, FRA, GER, HUN, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, SWE)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE


AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 2 An-124-100 (3 more available on 6–9 days' notice)

Netherlands NLD

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	800bn	844bn	
	USD	913bn	1.01tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	52,456	57,715	
Growth	%	-3.8	3.8	
Inflation	%	1.1	1.9	
Def exp [a]	EUR	11.5bn	11.8bn	
	USD	13.1bn	14.1bn	
Def bdtg [b]	EUR	11.0bn	12.4bn	12.2bn
	USD	12.6bn	14.8bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 17,337,403

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.2%	2.9%	3.1%	3.2%	22.8%	9.2%
Female	7.9%	2.8%	3.0%	3.1%	22.8%	11.0%

Capabilities

The 2018 defence review tasks the armed forces with territorial defence and supporting national civil authorities with law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The Defence Vision 2035 document was published in October 2020. It assessed the future security environment and highlighted ten principles to guide the armed forces' development until 2035. Dutch forces are increasingly integrated with NATO allies, particularly Germany. The army contributes to a Dutch–German tank battalion and its mechanised and air-mobile brigades are integral formations within German divisions. There is also cooperation and integration with the German armed forces in the air and naval domains. The Netherlands has air-policing agreements with France, Belgium and Luxembourg and is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. In October 2021, the government announced that it would deploy a C-130 plus support personnel to Mali (to the UN mission)

from November 2021 to May 2022. The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have committed to forming a composite special-operations command. Dutch forces are fully professional and well trained and the Netherlands can deploy and sustain a medium-scale force for a single operation, or a small-scale joint force for an extended period. The Netherlands makes significant contributions to NATO and EU military operations globally. The country has a modern European- and US-sourced equipment inventory. An agreement is in place with Belgium on the joint acquisition of new frigates and minehunters, while the air force is upgrading its *Patriot* missiles and *Apache* helicopters and acquiring F-35 combat aircraft and MQ-9 *Reaper* UAVs. The Netherlands is part of the programme for a multinational NATO unit of A330 transport/tanker aircraft. The country has an advanced domestic defence industry focusing on armoured vehicles, naval ships and air-defence systems, but also hosts a range of subsidiaries of international aerospace firms. Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding exports frigates, corvettes and fast-attack craft, while DutchAero manufactures engine components for the F-35. The country also collaborates with Germany on the *Boxer* and *Fennek* armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 33,600 (Army 15,350 Navy 7,350 Air 6,400 Other 4,500) Military Constabulary 6,500

RESERVE 6,000 (Army 3,900 Navy 1,100 Air 800 Other 200) Military Constabulary 300

Reserve liability to age 35 for soldiers/sailors, 40 for NCOs, 45 for officers

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 15,350

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

elm 1 (1 GNC) corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

4 SF coy

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 ISR bn (2 armd recce sqn, 1 EW coy, 2 int sqn, 1 UAV bty)

Mechanised

1 (43rd) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)

1 (13th) mech bde (1 recce sqn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (11th) air mob bde (3 air mob inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 med coy, 1 supply coy, 1 maint coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 SP arty bn (3 SP arty bty)

1 AD comd (1 AD sqn; 1 AD bty)

1 CIMIC bn

1 engr bn

2 EOD coy 1 (CIS) sigs bn 1 CBRN coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

5 fd hospital

3 maint coy

2 tpt bn

Reserves 3,900 reservists**National Command**

Cadre bde and corps tps completed by call-up of reservists (incl Territorial Comd)

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE Light**

3 inf bn (could be mobilised for territorial def)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 197 *Fennek*

IFV 117 CV9035NL (32 more in store)

APC • APC (W) 200 *Boxer* (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 36 CP; 92 engr; 12 log)

AUV 248: 98 *Bushmaster* IMV; 150 *Fennek*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 10+: *Dachs*; 10 *Kodiak*

ARV 25+: BPz-2; 25 BPz-3 *Büffel*

VLB 22: 16 *Leopard 1* with *Legaun*; 2 *Leopard 2* with *Leguan*; 4 MLC70 with *Leguan*

MW *Bozena*

NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

MSL • MANPATS *Spike-MR*

ARTILLERY 119:

SP 155mm 18 PzH 2000 (38 more in store)

MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 42+

Long-range 18 M902 *Patriot* PAC-3 (TMD capable)

Short-range 6 NASAMS II

Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 *Stinger*; 18 *Fennek* with FIM-92 *Stinger*

Navy 7,350 (incl Marines)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 4**

SSK 4 *Walrus* with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6**DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4:**

3 *De Zeven Provinciën* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

1 *De Zeven Provinciën* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 *Karel Doorman* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

PSOH 4 *Holland* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6

MHO 6 *Alkmaar (Tripartite)*

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2:**

1 *Rotterdam* with 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/AS532 *Cougar* hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 538 troops)

1 *Johan de Witt* with 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS (capacity 6 NH90 hel or 4 AS532 *Cougar* hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 700 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 17

LCU 5 LCU Mk II

LCVP 12 Mk5

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

AGS 3: 1 *Hydrograaf*; 2 *Snellius*

AK 1 *Pelikaan*

AORH 1 *Karel Doorman* with 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/AS532 *Cougar* or 2 CH-47F *Chinook* hel; 2 LCVP)

AS 1 *Mercur*

AXL 1 *Van Kingsbergen*

AXS 1 *Urania*

Marines 2,650**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn)

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

2 mne bn

1 amph aslt gp

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt gp (coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (T) 65 BvS-10 *Viking* (incl 20 CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 8: 4 BvS-10; 4 BPz-2

MED 4 BvS-10

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike-MR*

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1**AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*****Air Force 6,400****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*; F-35A *Lightning* II

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with NH90 NFH

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with *Gulfstream IV*

TRAINING

1 OEU sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

1 sqn with PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*

1 hel sqn with AH-64D *Apache*; CH-47D *Chinook* (based at Fort Hood, TX)

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AH-64D *Apache*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS532U2 *Cougar II*; NH90 NFH

1 sqn with CH-47D/F *Chinook*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 82 combat capable

FTR 61 F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

FGA 21 F-35A *Lightning II*

TPT 5; **Medium** 4; 2 C-130H *Hercules*; 2 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; PAX 1 Gulfstream IV

TRG 13 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 28 AH-64D *Apache*

ASW 19 NH90 NFH (of which 8 not fitted with sonar)

TPT 33: **Heavy** 25: up to 8 CH-47D *Chinook* (of which 3 to be upgraded to CH-47F, remainder to be retired); 17 CH-47F *Chinook*; **Medium** 8 AS532U2 *Cougar II*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/M *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X

Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM

ASM AGM-114K *Hellfire*; AGM-65D/G *Maverick*

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 *Paveway II*; GBU-24

Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN)

INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,500

Royal Military Constabulary 6,500

Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, but performs most of its work under the authority of other ministries

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 paramilitary comd (total: 28 paramilitary unit)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 24 YPR-KMar

DEPLOYMENT

BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 2 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 270; 1 mech inf coy

MALI: *Operation Barkhane* 4; EU • EUTM Mali 6; UN • MINUSMA 5

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 11

NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 1

UNITED STATES: 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D *Apache*; CH-47D *Chinook* based at Fort Hood (TX)

FOREIGN FORCES


United States US European Command: 450

Norway NOR

Norwegian Kroner NOK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NOK	3.41tr	3.85tr	
	USD	363bn	446bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	67,326	82,244	
Growth	%	-0.8	3.0	
Inflation	%	1.3	2.6	
Def exp [a]	NOK	68.5bn	70.9bn	
	USD	7.27bn	8.20bn	
Def bdgt [b]	NOK	61.0bn	64.5bn	69.0bn
	USD	6.48bn	7.46bn	
USD1=NOK		9.42	8.64	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 5,509,591

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.2%	2.9%	3.1%	3.5%	23.6%	8.2%
Female	8.7%	2.8%	3.0%	3.3%	22.2%	9.4%

Capabilities

Norway sustains small but well-equipped and highly trained armed forces. Territorial defence is at the heart of security policy. A new Long Term Defence Plan was published in October 2020, arguing that the security environment had deteriorated faster than expected. It envisages a gradual increase in personnel numbers and further measures to strengthen readiness and capability in the High North. A US Marine Corps contingent has deployed to Vaernes, on a rotational basis, since January 2017. In August 2018, this was extended for up to five years and a second location added at Setermoen. In April 2021 Norway and the US signed a Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement which, among other things, provides authority for US forces to access specific Norwegian facilities and conduct mutual defence activities. Four locations were mentioned as 'focal points' for increased cooperation: Evenes, Rygge and Sola air stations and Ramsund naval station. Norway is not an EU member, but signed a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency in 2006. At any one time, around one-third of troops are conscripts. Senior officers reportedly expressed concerns in 2019 that Norway's force structure was too small for defence requirements. A report by the Norwegian chief of defence published in October 2019 argued that in order to address the challenging security situation, the number of combat units in all services should increase. Norway maintains a small presence in a range of international crisis-management missions. Equipment recapitalisation is ongoing. In 2017, the government announced that it would procure four submarines as part of a strategic partnership with Germany. Large procurements will stretch budgets, with the F-35 alone reportedly taking up 27% of all procurement spending between 2019 and 2026. Norway's first P-8 maritime

patrol aircraft flew in 2021; deliveries are expected from 2022. In June 2018, it was announced that a planned upgrade to Norway's main-battle-tank fleet would be pushed to the mid-2020s; current budget forecasts foresee funding being made available for this purpose in 2025–26. Norway has an advanced and diverse defence-industrial base with a high percentage of SMEs and a mix of private and state-owned companies.

ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 8,300 Navy 4,600 Air 4,300 Central Support 7,400 Home Guard 800)

Conscript liability 19 months maximum. Conscripts first serve 12 months from 19–28, and then up to 4–5 refresher training periods until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. Conscriptio was extended to women in 2015

RESERVE 40,000 (Home Guard 40,000)

Readiness varies from a few hours to several days

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 3,900; 4,400 conscript (total 8,300)

The armoured infantry brigade – Brigade North – trains new personnel of all categories and provides units for international operations. At any time around one-third of the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations. The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat-support and combat-service-support units on high readiness

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd recce bn (forming)

1 ISR bn

1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy, 1 trg coy)

Armoured

1 armd inf bde (2 armd bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn)

Light

1 lt inf bn (His Majesty The King's Guards)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 36 *Leopard* 2A4 (16 more in store)

RECCE 46: 21 CV9030; 25 HMT *Extenda*

IFV 91: 76 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP)

APC 390

APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants)

APC (W) 75 XA-186 *Sisu*/XA-200 *Sisu*/XA-203 (amb)

AUV 140: 20 *Dingo* 2; 120 IVECO LMV (50 more in store)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 27+: 16 CV90 STING; 8 M113 AEV; NM109; 3 *Wisent*-2

ARV 12: 6 BPz-2; 6 *Wisent*-2

VLB 36: 26 *Leguan*; 1 *Leopard* 2 with *Leguan*; 9 *Leopard* 1

MW 9 910 MCV-2

NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 191

SP 155mm 48: 24 K9 *Thunder*; 24 M109A3GN (being withdrawn)

MOR 143: **81mm** 115 L16; **SP 81mm** 28: 16 CV9030; 12 M125A2

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III

Navy 2,350; 2,250 conscripts (total 4,600)

Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into five elements under the command of the Chief of the Navy: the fleet (*Marinen*), the Coast Guard (*Kystvakten*), the recruit training school (KNM *Harald Haarfagre*), the naval medical branch and the naval bases (*Haakonsværn* and *Ramsund*)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 EOD pl

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 6

SSK 6 *Ula* with 8 single 533mm TT with *SeaHake* (DM2A3) HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4

FFGHM 4 *Fridtjof Nansen* with *Aegis* C2 (mod), 2 quad Inchr with NSM ASHM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with *Sting Ray* mod 1 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PCFG 6 *Skjold* with 8 single Inchr with NSM ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PBF 6 CB90N (capacity 20 troops)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MSC 2 *Alta* with 1 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM

MHC 2 *Oksoy* with 1 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6

AGI 1 *Marjata* IV

AGS 2: 1 *HU Sverdrup* II; 1 *Eger* (*Marjata* III) with 1 hel landing platform

AORH 1 *Maud* (BMT *Aegir*) (capacity 2 med hel)

AXL 2 *Reine*

Coast Guard

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13

PSOH 3 *Nordkapp* with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel)

PSO 5: 3 *Barentshav*; 1 *Harstad*; 1 *Svalbard* with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCC 5 *Nornen*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ATF 2 *Jarl* (leased)

Air Force 2,900; 1,400 conscript (total 4,300)

Joint Command – Norwegian National HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with P-3C *Orion*; P-3N *Orion* (pilot trg)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with *Falcon 20C* (EW, Flight Inspection Service)

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with *Sea King Mk43B*; AW101

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with MFI-15 *Safari*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*

1 sqn with NH90 (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

2 bn with NASAMS III

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 71 combat capable

FTR 35: 30 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 5 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon* (F-16AM/BM to be retired end of 2021)

FGA 31 F-35A *Lightning II*

ASW 5: 4 P-3C *Orion*; 1 P-3N *Orion* (pilot trg)

EW 2 *Falcon 20C*

TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 *Hercules*

TRG 16 MFI-15 *Safari*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 12 NH90 NFH

SAR 19: 9 AW101; 10 *Sea King Mk43B*

MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*;

IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C AMRAAM

BOMBS

Laser-guided EGBU-12 *Paveway II*

INS/GPS guided JDAM

Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM)**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp)

1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp)

Central Support, Administration and Command 5,850; 1,550 conscripts (total 7,400)

Central Support, Administration and Command includes military personnel in all joint elements and they are responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in Norway and abroad

Home Guard 400; 400 conscripts (40,000 reserves)

The Home Guard is a separate organisation, but closely cooperates with all services. The Home Guard is organised in 11 Districts with mobile Rapid Reaction Forces (3,000 troops in total) as well as reinforcements and follow-on forces (37,000 troops in total)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 4 *Harek*; 2 *Gyda*; 5 *Alusafe* 1290

DEPLOYMENT

BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 AXL

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2

EGYPT: MFO 3

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 60; 1 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

JORDAN: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 20

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 195; 1 armd inf coy; CV9030

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 13; 1 tpt flt with C-130J-30

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12

BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 AORH

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14

FOREIGN FORCES


United States US European Command: 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt set

Poland POL

Polish Zloty PLN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PLN	2.32tr	2.53tr	
	USD	596bn	655bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	15,699	17,319	
Growth	%	-2.7	5.1	
Inflation	%	3.4	4.4	
Def exp [a]	PLN	53.0bn	51.8bn	
	USD	13.6bn	13.4bn	
Def bdtg [b]	PLN	49.8bn	51.8bn	57.8bn
	USD	12.8bn	13.4bn	
USD1=PLN		3.90	3.86	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 38,185,913

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.6%	2.4%	2.6%	3.1%	24.9%	7.8%
Female	7.2%	2.2%	2.5%	3.0%	25.2%	11.6%

Capabilities

Territorial defence and NATO membership are central pillars of Poland's defence policy. The primary focus of the 2017-32 defence concept is to prepare the armed forces to deter Russian aggression. Russia is characterised as a direct threat to Poland and to a stable international order. The government continues to pursue a goal of permanently stationing US troops in the country. A bilateral defence cooperation agreement signed with the US in August 2020 provides for an increased enduring rotational presence of about 1,000 US personnel. The US Army's V Corps Headquarters

(Forward) was established in Poznań at the end of 2020. Security and defence cooperation also takes place through the Visegrad Group. There are also defence ties through the Bucharest Nine, which brings together NATO's eastern-flank countries. The 2017–32 defence concept defines an ambition to restore divisions as tactical combat units, rather than administrative units. Recruitment is under way for the Territorial Defence Force, which was launched in 2017 and is intended to reach an end-strength of 53,000 by 2026. Poland has some capacity to independently deploy forces beyond national borders. Defence-acquisition reform has been under way for some time and a central armaments agency is due to begin operating in 2022. Poland intends to build up its own anti-access/area-denial capacity and in the 2017 Defence Concept expressed an interest in research into emerging technologies. A technical-modernisation plan, covering the period 2021–35, was released in October 2019, which extended the planning horizon from ten to 15 years. Warsaw continues plans to strengthen its domestic defence-industrial base, much of which is now consolidated in the state-owned holding company PGZ, using technology transfers and international partnering. Beyond PGZ, several international defence primes have subsidiaries in Poland.

ACTIVE 114,050 (Army 58,500 Navy 6,000 Air Force 14,300 Special Forces 3,150 Territorial 3,800 Joint 28,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 58,500

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 rece regt

Armoured

1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty regt)

Mechanised

1 (12th) mech div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1 arty regt)

1 (16th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt, 1 AT regt)

1 (18th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 log regt)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (6th) AB bde (3 para bn)

1 (25th) air cav bde (2 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac) med unit)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 engr regt

2 ptn br regt

2 chem def regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 log bde

HELICOPTER

1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V *Hind* D/E, 1 CSAR sqn with Mi-24V *Hind* E; PZL W-3PL *Gluszec*; 2 ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2)

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 797: 126 *Leopard* 2A4 (being upgraded to 2PL); 105 *Leopard* 2A5; 16 *Leopard* 2PL (in test); 232 PT-91 *Twardy*; 318 T-72A/T-72M1/MIR

RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR-1 (being upgraded); 87 BRDM-2 R5

IFV 1,611: 1,252 BMP-1; 359 *Rosomak* IFV

APC 372

APC (T) 6 WDSz (OP)

APC (W) 336: 300 *Rosomak* APC (incl variants); 36

AWD RAK (arty CP)

PPV 30 *Maxxpro*

AUV 85: 40 *Cougar* (on loan from US); 45 M-ATV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 94+: IWT; 65 MT-LB AEV; 21 *Rosomak* WRT; 8 MID *Bizon*

ARV 122: 28 BPz-2; 68 MT-LB ARV; 26 WZT-3M

VLB 119: 4 *Biber*; 103 BLG67M2; 12 MS-20 *Daglezja*

MW 27: 17 *Bozena* 4; 6 ISM *Kroton*; 4 *Kalina* SUM

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); *Spike*-LR

ARTILLERY 751

SP 410: **122mm** 227 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 111 M-77 *Dana*; **155mm** 72 *Krab*

MRL **122mm** 179: 75 BM-21; 29 RM-70; 75 WR-40 *Langusta*

MOR 162: **120mm** 80: 15 2B11; 65 M120; **SP** **120mm** 82 SMK120 RAK

HELICOPTERS

ATK 28 Mi-24D/V *Hind* D/E

MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT *Hip*; 3 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 1 Mi-17AE *Hip* (aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-1V *Hip*; 16 PZL Mi-2URP *Hoplite*; 24 PZL W-3W/WA *Sokol*; 8 PZL W-3PL *Gluszec* (CSAR)

TPT 37: **Medium** 12: 6 Mi-8T *Hip*; 2 PZL W-3AE *Sokol* (aeromedical); 4 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 25 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 248+

Short-range 20 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 228+: 64 9K33 *Osa*-AK (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*);

20 ZSU-23-4MP *Biala*; GROM; 75 ZUR-23-2KG *Jodek*-G; 6 *Pilica*; *Piorun*; 63 *Poprad*

GUNS 270

SP **23mm** 2 ZSU-23-4

TOWED **23mm** 268 ZU-23-2

Navy 6,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • **SSK** 1 *Orzeł* (ex-FSU *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT each with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFH 2 *Pulaski* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) (of which 1 used as training ship) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G *Super Seasprite* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

CORVETTES • **FSM** 1 *Kaszub* with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm

ASTT with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
 PSO 1 *Ślązak* (MEKO A-100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
 PCFGM 3 *Orkan* (ex-GDR *Sassnitz*) with 1 quad Inchr with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20

MCCS 1 *Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki*
 MCO 1 *Kormoran II*
 MHO 1 *Krogulec*
 MSI 17: 1 *Gopto*; 12 *Gardno*; 4 *Mamry*

AMPHIBIOUS 8

LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 *Lublin* (capacity 9 tanks; 135 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 *Deba* (capacity 50 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26

AGL 2 *Moma*
 AGS 8: 2 *Heweliusz*; 4 *Wildcat* 40; 2 (coastal)
 AORL 1 *Bałtyk*
 AOL 1 *Moskit*
 ARS 4: 2 *Piast*; 2 *Zbyszko*
 ATF 8: 6 *Bolko* (B860); 2 H960
 AX 1 *Wodnik* with 1 twin AK230 CIWS
 AXS 1 *Iskra*

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHm 12 NSM**Naval Aviation 1,300****FORCES BY ROLE****ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE**

1 sqn with Mi-14PL *Haze A*; Mi-14PL/R *Haze C*
 1 sqn with PZL W-3RM *Anakonda*; SH-2G *Super Seasprite*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with An-28E/RM *Bryza*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD *Bryza*
 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; PZL W-3T/A

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

MP 10: 8 An-28RM *Bryza*; 2 An-28E *Bryza*
 TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD *Bryza*; 2 M-28B TD *Bryza*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 8: 6 Mi-14PL *Haze*; 2 SH-2G *Super Seasprite*
 SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R *Haze C*; 4 PZL W-3RM *Anakonda*; 2 PZL W-3WA RM *Anakonda*
 TPT • Light 7: 4 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZL W-3T

Air Force 14,300**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ *Fighting Falcon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

2 sqn with Su-22M-4 *Fitter*

SEARCH AND RESCUE

1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 *Sokol*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130E; M-28 *Bryza*
 1 sqn with C295M; M-28 *Bryza*

TRAINING

1 sqn with PZL-130 *Orlik*
 1 sqn with M-346
 1 hel sqn with SW-4 *Puszczczyk*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*
 1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; W-3WA *Sokol*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bde with S-125 *Newa SC*; S-200C *Vega* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 94 combat capable**

FTR 28: 22 MiG-29A *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*
 FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ *Fighting Falcon*; 12 F-16D Block 52+ *Fighting Falcon*; 12 Su-22M4 *Fitter*; 6 Su-22UM3K *Fitter*
 TPT 48: Medium 5 C-130E *Hercules*; Light 39: 16 C295M; 10 M-28 *Bryza* TD; 13 M-28 *Bryza* PT; PAX 4: 2 Gulfstream G550; 2 B-737-800 (VIP)
 TRG 40: 12 M-346; 28 PZL-130 *Orlik*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 8 Mi-17 *Hip H*
 TPT 65: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 *Hip*; 10 PZL W-3 *Sokol*; 10 PZL W-3WA *Sokol* (VIP); Light 36: 14 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; 22 SW-4 *Puszczczyk* (trg)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18

Long-range 1 S-200C *Vega* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)
 Short-range 17 S-125 *Newa SC*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-27T (RS-AA-10B *Alamo*); IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
 ASM AGM-65J/G *Maverick*; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)
 LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM

Special Forces 3,150**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo)

COMBAT SUPPORT/

1 cbt spt unit (AGAT)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt unit (NIL)

Territorial Defence Forces 3,800 (plus 20,000 reservists)**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Other
 15 sy bde
 2 sy bde (forming)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,400**Border Guards 14,300**

Ministry of Interior

Maritime Border Guard 2,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18**PCC 2 *Kaper*PBF 6: 2 *Strażnik*; 4 IC16MPB 10: 2 *Wisłoka*; 2 *Baltic 24*; 1 Project MI-6**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT**UCAC 2 *Griffon 2000TDX***Prevention Units (Police) 61,100****Anti-terrorist Operations Bureau n.k.**

Ministry of Interior


DEPLOYMENT**BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:** EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 38**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** EU • EUTM RCA 1**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 2**IRAQ:** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 30**LATVIA:** NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 175; 1 tk coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 192; 1 mech inf coy**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 3**ROMANIA:** NATO • MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; *Rosomak***SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 230; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 1**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 1**UKRAINE:** JMTG-U 40**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 1**FOREIGN FORCES**

All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated

Croatia 80; 1 MRL bty with M91 *Vulkan***Germany** MNC-NE corps HQ: 95**Romania** 102; 1 SP ADA bty**United Kingdom** 140; 1 recce sqn**United States:** 691; 1 mech bn with M1296 *Stryker Dragoon*; M777A2 • *Operation Atlantic Resolve* 4,500; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 armd bde; M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; M3A3 *Bradley*; M2A3 *Bradley*; M109A7; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper***Portugal PRT**

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	200bn	211bn	
	USD	228bn	252bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	22,149	24,457	
Growth	%	-8.4	4.4	
Inflation	%	-0.1	1.2	
Def exp [a]	EUR	2.90bn	3.26bn	
	USD	3.31bn	3.90bn	
Def bdgt	EUR	2.50bn	2.48bn	2.45bn
	USD	2.85bn	2.96bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure



Population 10,263,850

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	6.8%	2.8%	2.9%	2.7%	23.7%	8.5%
Female	6.5%	2.6%	2.7%	2.7%	25.4%	12.8%

Capabilities

Principal tasks for Portugal's all-volunteer armed forces are homeland defence, maritime security, multinational operations and responding to humanitarian disasters. The 2013 strategic review set out key defence tasks and envisaged a reduction in army strength and organisational changes to divide the services into immediate reaction forces, permanent defence forces and modular forces. Investment plans support Portugal's ambition to field rapid-reaction and maritime-surveillance capabilities for territorial defence and multinational operations. A new military programme law for 2019-30 was approved by parliament, funding the acquisition of five KC-390 aircraft, six offshore-patrol vessels, a replenishment tanker and a multi-purpose logistics ship, as well as cyber-defence and soldier-combat systems. Portugal hosts NATO's cyber-security academy and the country also contributes to EU military structures. There is a close relationship with former dependencies and with the US, which operates out of Lajes air base. All three services have programmes to modernise and sustain existing equipment platforms. There is an active defence industry, though principally in relation to shipbuilding, broader maintenance tasks and the manufacture of components, and small arms and light weapons.

ACTIVE 27,250 (Army 13,700 Navy 7,650 Air 5,900)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700**RESERVE 211,700 (Army 210,000 Navy 1,000, Air Force 700)**

Reserve obligation to age 35

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 13,700**

5 territorial comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

1 mech bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)

1 (intervention) bde (1 recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cdo bn, 1 ISR bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)

Other

1 (Azores) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty)

1 (Madeira) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 STA bty

1 engr bn (1 construction coy; 1 EOD unit; 1 ptn br coy; 1 CBRN coy)

1 EW coy

1 MP bn

1 psyops unit

1 CIMIC coy (joint)

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 maint coy

1 log coy

1 tpt coy

1 med unit

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Reserves 210,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**MBT 37 *Leopard* 2A6

RECCE 16 VBL

IFV 30 *Pandur* II MK 30mm

APC 406

APC (T) 239: 176 M113A1; 14 M113A2; 49 M577A2 (CP)

APC (W) 167: 9 V-150 *Commando*; 12 V-200 *Chaimite*; 146 *Pandur* II (incl variants)**ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**

AEV M728

ARV 13: 6 M88A1, 7 *Pandur* II ARV

VLB M48

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**SP 26: 17 M113 with TOW; 4 M901 with TOW; 5 *Pandur* II with TOWMANPATS *Milan*; TOWRCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm 45 M40A1**ARTILLERY 320**

SP 155mm 24: 6 M109A2; 18 M109A5

TOWED 62: 105mm 39: 17 L119 Light Gun; 21 M101A1; 155mm 24 M114A1

MOR 234: 81mm 143; SP 81mm 12: 2 M125A1; 10 M125A2; 107mm 11 M30; SP 107mm 18: 3 M106A1; 15 M106A2; 120mm 50 Tampella

AIR DEFENCESAM • Point-defence 20+: 1 M48A2 *Chaparral*; 19 M48A3 *Chaparral*; FIM-92 *Stinger*

GUNS • TOWED 20mm 20 Rh 202

Navy 7,600 (incl 950 Marines)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 2**SSK 2 *Tridente* (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 533mm TT with UGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM/Black Shark HWT**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5****FFGHM 5:**1 *Bartolomeu Dias* (ex-NLD *Karel Doorman*) (MLU ongoing) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk95 (*Super Lynx*) hel)1 *Bartolomeu Dias* (ex-NLD *Karel Doorman*) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk95 (*Super Lynx*) hel)3 *Vasco Da Gama* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 *Lynx* Mk95 (*Super Lynx*) hel)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21****CORVETTES • FS 2:**1 *Baptista de Andrade* with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform1 *Joao Coutinho* with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platformPSO 4 *Viana do Castelo* with 1 hel landing platformPCC 5: 1 *Cacine*; 4 *Tejo* (ex-DNK *Flyvisken*)PBR 10: 5 *Argos*; 4 *Centauro*; 1 *Rio Minho***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10**AGS 4: 2 *D Carlos I* (ex-US *Stalwart*); 2 *Andromeda*AXS 6: 1 *Sagres*; 1 *Creoula*; 1 *Polar*; 2 *Belatrix*; 1 *Zarco***Marines 950****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF det

MANOEUVRE**Light**

1 lt inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 mor coy

1 MP coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL • MANPATS *Milan*; TOWRCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY • MOR 30+: 81mm some; 120mm 30

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS • ASW 5: 4 *Lynx* Mk95 (*Super Lynx*); 1 *Lynx* Mk95A (*Super Lynx*)**Air Force 5,900****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon***MARITIME PATROL**1 sqn with P-3C *Orion***ISR/TRANSPORT**

1 sqn with C295M

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE1 sqn with with AW101 *Merlin***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 *Hercules*1 sqn with *Falcon 50***TRAINING**1 sqn with AW119 *Koala*1 sqn with TB-30 *Epsilon***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 35 combat capable**FTR 30: 26 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon*ASW 5 P-3C *Orion*

ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M (photo recce)

TPT 13: **Medium** 5: 2 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules* (tpt/SAR); **Light** 5 C295M; **PAX** 3 *Falcon 50* (tpt/VIP)TRG 16 TB-30 *Epsilon***HELICOPTERS**TPT 17: **Medium** 12 AW101 *Merlin* (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2 fishery protection); **Light** 5 AW119 *Koala***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9L/I *Sidewinder*; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAMASM AGM-65A *Maverick*AShM AGM-84A *Harpoon***BOMBS**Laser-guided/GPS GBU-49 Enhanced *Paveway II*

INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700**National Republican Guard 24,700****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32**

PBF 12


PB 20

HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 *Lama***DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** EU • EUTM RCA 55; UN • MINUSCA 189; 1 AB coy**IRAQ:** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 30**LITHUANIA:** NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon***MALI:** *Operation Barkhane* 2; EU • EUTM Mali 11; UN • MINUSMA 67; 1 tpt flt with 1 C295M**MOZAMBIQUE:** EU • EUTM Mozambique 120**NORTH SEA:** NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM**SOMALIA:** EU • EUTM Somalia 2**FOREIGN FORCES****United States** US European Command: 500; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 spt facility at Lajes**Romania ROM**

Romanian Leu RON		2020	2021	2022
GDP	RON	1.06tr	1.18tr	
	USD	249bn	287bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	12,868	14,864	
Growth	%	-3.9	7.0	
Inflation	%	2.6	4.3	
Def exp [a]	RON	21.4bn	23.1bn	
	USD	5.05bn	5.61bn	
Def bdtg [b]	RON	22.0bn	23.1bn	24.3bn
	USD	5.18bn	5.61bn	
FMA (US)	USD	5.6m	0m	0m
USD1=RON		4.24	4.12	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions



Population 21,230,362

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.2%	2.6%	2.7%	2.9%	26.0%	7.4%
Female	6.8%	2.4%	2.6%	2.7%	26.1%	10.7%

Capabilities

Romania's armed forces are structured around territorial defence, support to NATO and EU missions, and contributing to regional and global stability and security. According to the National Defence Strategy 2020-2024, principal security threats include Russia's increased presence in the Black Sea, hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, terrorism and the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The 2021 Military Strategy highlights the need to improve readiness and to focus on strike capability and manoeuvrability. The government has stated the intention to strengthen operational capabilities and improve cooperation with other NATO

and EU members. There is an ongoing programme to modernise and upgrade the armed forces to NATO standards. Bucharest has signed defence-cooperation agreements with regional allies. There is a strategic partnership with the US. Romania hosts the *Aegis Ashore* ballistic-missile-defence system at Deveselu. There is broad training with NATO and regional allies, and Romania contributes to EU and NATO missions. The inventory is mainly composed of Soviet-era equipment, which is seen as a factor limiting capability. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, air-defence radars, surface-to-air missiles (including an upgraded version of *Patriot* from 2022) and corvettes. The Naval Strike Missile will be procured for coastal defence from 2024, while Bucharest has received the first elements of the HIMARS system ordered in 2018. Romania has received second-hand F-16 fighters from Portugal and is considering the acquisition of up to 48 more from the US. The country's defence industry has struggled since 1989. Current production focuses on small arms and ammunition. However, Bucharest is looking to boost the industry through offset agreements and technology transfers.

ACTIVE 71,500 (Army 35,500 Navy 6,800 Air 11,700 Joint 17,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 57,000

RESERVE 55,000 (Joint 55,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 35,500

Readiness is reported as 70–90% for NATO-designated forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde) and 40–70% for other forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 2 div HQ (2nd & 4th)
- elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE)

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn)

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

- 1 recce bde
- 2 recce regt

Mechanised

- 5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn)

Light

- 1 (MNB-SE) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn)
- 2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn)
- 2 arty regt
- 1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn)
- 2 engr bn
- 3 sigs bn
- 1 CIMIC bn
- 1 MP bn
- 3 CBRN bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 3 spt bn

AIR DEFENCE

- 3 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 377: 220 T-55AM; 103 TR-85; 54 TR-85 M1
IFV 191: 41 MLI-84 (incl CP); 101 MLI-84M *Jderul*; 49

Piranha V

APC 785

APC (T) 76 MLVM

APC (W) 649: 69 B33 TAB *Zimbru*; 37 *Piranha* IIIC; 354 TAB-71 (incl variants); 153 TAB-77 (incl variants)

PPV 60 *Maxxpro*

AUV 480 TABC-79 (incl variants)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 55: 3 MLI-84M TEHEVAC; 8 TERA-71L; 44 TERA-77L

VLB 43 BLG-67

NBC VEHICLES 109 RCH-84

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 158: 12 9P122 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 98 9P133 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 48 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

MANPATS *Spike-LR*

GUNS

SP 100mm (23 SU-100 in store)

TOWED 100mm 218 M-1977

ARTILLERY 1,118

SP 122mm 40: 6 2S1 *Gvodzika*; 34 Model 89

TOWED 447: 122mm 96 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); **152mm** 351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985

MRL 188: **122mm** 170: 134 APR-40; 36 LAROM; **227mm** 18 M142 HIMARS

MOR 443: **SP 82mm** 177: 92 TAB-71AR; 85 TABC-79AR; **120mm** 266 M-1982

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 96

Short-range 48: 32 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 16 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

Point-defence 48 CA-95

GUNS 65+

SP 35mm 41 *Gepard*

TOWED 24+: **14.5mm** ZPU-2; **35mm** 24 GDF-003;

57mm S-60

Navy 6,800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3

FFGH 1 *Marasesti* with 4 twin Inchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C *Styx*) ASHM, 2 triple 533mm ASTT with 53–65 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316) *Alouette* III hel) **FFH** 2 *Regele Ferdinand* (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple STWS Mk.2 324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330 (IAR-330) *Puma*)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24

CORVETTES 4

FSH 2 *Tetal* II with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) *Alouette* III hel)

FS 2 *Tetal I* with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M HWT, 2 RBU 2500 *Smerch 1 A/S* mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns
PCFG 3 *Zborul* with 2 twin Inchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C *Styx*) ASHM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PCFT 3 *Naluca* with 4 single 533mm ASTT
PCR 8: 5 *Brutar II* with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun; 3 *Kogalniceanu* with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns
PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol)

MINE WARFARE 11

MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10

MSO 4 *Musca* with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 2 AK230 CIWS
MSR 6 VD141

MINELAYERS • ML 1 *Corsar* with up to 120 mines, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 2 AK230 CIWS

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

AE 2 *Constanta* with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns
AGOR 1 *Corsar*
AGS 2: 1 *Emil Racovita*; 1 *Catuneanu*
AOL 1 *Tulcea*
ATF 1 *Grozavu*
AXS 1 *Mircea*

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 naval inf regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 14: 11 ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M

Air Force 11,700

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with MiG-21 *Lancer C*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with IAR-99 *Soim**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-30 *Clank*; C-27J *Spartan*

1 sqn with C-130B/H *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with IAR-99 *Soim**

1 sqn with SA316B *Alouette III* (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak-52)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 *SOCAT Puma*

2 sqn with SA330L/M *Puma* (IAR-330L/M)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 engr spt regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable

FTR 16: 13 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 3 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon*

FGA 23: 6 MiG-21 *Lancer B*; 17 MiG-21 *Lancer C*

ISR 2 An-30 *Clank*

TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J *Spartan*; 4 C-130B *Hercules*; 1 C-130H *Hercules*

TRG 32: 10 IAR-99*; 10 IAR-99C *Soim**; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 30: 22 IAR-330 *SOCAT Puma*; 8 SA316B *Alouette III* (IAR-316B)

TPT • Medium 24: 12 SA330L *Puma* (IAR-330L); 12 SA330M *Puma* (IAR-330M)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 17

Long-range 4 MIM-104E/F *Patriot* PAC-2 GEM-T/PAC-3 MSE

Medium-range 13: 5 S-75M3 *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); 8 MIM-23 *Hawk* PIP III

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-550 *Magic 2*; *Python 3* **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **ARH** AIM-120C *AMRAAM*

ASM *Spike-ER*

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-12 *Paveway*; GBU-54 *Laser JDAM*

INS/GPS guided GBU-38 *JDAM*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €57,000

Gendarmerie €57,000

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 40

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 13

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 1; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1; UN • MINUSMA 5

MEDITERRANEAN: EU • EU NAVFOR MED • *Operation Iriini* 1 ML

POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 102; 1 SP ADA bty with *Gepard*

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 63; UN • UNMIK 1

SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6

FOREIGN FORCES


Canada NATO Air Policing: 135; 6 F/A-18A *Hornet* (CF-18)

Poland NATO MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; *Rosomak*

United States US European Command: 120; 1 *Aegis Ashore* BMD unit with 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3

Serbia SER

Serbian Dinar RSD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	RSD	5.46tr	5.99tr	
	USD	53.0bn	60.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,646	8,794	
Growth	%	-1.0	6.5	
Inflation	%	1.6	3.0	
Def bdgt	RSD	92.4bn	103bn	
	USD	896m	1.04bn	
USD1=RSD		103.16	98.67	



Population 6,974,289

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.2%	2.8%	2.8%	3.2%	24.3%	8.5%
Female	6.8%	2.6%	2.6%	3.0%	24.4%	11.8%

Capabilities

Serbia's armed forces focus on territorial defence, internal security and limited support to peacekeeping missions. According to the 2019 national-security strategy, key threats include separatism, ethnic and religious extremism, climate change and further international recognition of Kosovo. The armed forces are modernising to address long-term capability shortfalls and personnel shortages. Priorities include procurements; improving availability, maintenance and readiness levels; and bolstering air-defence systems. Serbia has agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan. Belgrade aspires to join the EU but not NATO. Serbia also maintains a close relationship with Russia, from which it has received transfers of military equipment in recent years. The armed forces have reduced in size over the last decade, though annual recruitment goals are not met. The armed forces also lack skilled technicians to operate and maintain advanced systems and suffer from a shortage of pilots. However, a number of items of new equipment were on display in its *Lightning Strike 2021* exercise, including new or improved versions of various armoured vehicles. Serbia mostly trains with its Balkan neighbours, Russia and NATO countries. It contributes to EU, OSCE and UN peacekeeping missions. Serbia's defence industry focuses on missile and artillery systems, and small arms and ammunition, but the country is reliant on external suppliers for major platforms. Serbia continues to develop its defence industry, with a focus on the aerospace industry.

ACTIVE 28,150 (Army 13,250 Air Force and Air Defence 5,100 Training Command 3,000 Guards 1,600 Other MoD 5,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700

Conscript liability 6 months (voluntary)

RESERVE 50,150

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 13,250

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (1 CT bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)

3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (mixed) arty bde (4 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 spt bn)

2 ptn bridging bn

1 NBC bn

1 sigs bn

2 MP bn

Reserve Organisations

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

8 (territorial) inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 229: 199 M-84; 30 T-72MS

RECCE 76: 46 BRDM-2; 30 BRDM-2M

IFV 335: 320 M-80; 3 M80AB1; 12 Lazar-3 IFV

APC 95

APC(T) 44: 12 BTR-50 (CP); 32 MT-LB (CP)

APC (W) 51: 39 BOV-VP M-86; 12 Lazar-3 APC

AUV 25 BOV M16 *Milos*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IWT

ARV M84A1; T-54/T-55

VLB MT-55; TMM

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 48 BOV-1 (M-83) with 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*)

RCL 90mm M-79

ARTILLERY 449

SP 73+: 122mm 67 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 155mm 6+ B-52 NORA

TOWED 132: 122mm 78 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm 36 M-84 NORA-A

MRL 81: 128mm 78: 18 M-63 *Plamen*; 60 M-77 *Organj*;

262mm 3 M-87 *Orkan*

MOR 163: 82mm 106 M-69; 120mm 57 M-74/M-75

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 94+

Short-range 77 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*);

Point-defence 17+: 12 9K31M *Strela-1M* (RS-SA-9

Gaskin); 5 9K35M *Strela-10M*; 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7B *Grail*); Šilo (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

SP 40mm 8+ *Pasars-16*

TOWED 40mm 36 Bofors L/70

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Medium 6 CH-92A

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM FT-8C

River Flotilla

The Serbian–Montenegrin navy was transferred to Montenegro upon independence in 2006, but the Danube flotilla remained in Serbian control. The flotilla is subordinate to the Land Forces

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PBR 5: 3 Type-20; 2 *Jadar*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MSI 4 *Nestin* with 1 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCVP 4 Type-22 (1 more non-operational)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3

AG 1 *Šabac* (degussing vessel also used for patrol and troop transport) (capacity 80 troops)

AGF 1 *Kozara*

AOL 1

Air Force and Air Defence 5,100

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*; MiG-29SE *Fulcrum C*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with IJ-22 *Orao 1**; J-22 *Orao 1*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-2; An-26; Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 *Seneca V*

TRAINING

1 sqn with G-4 *Super Galeb** (adv trg/light atk); SA341/342 *Gazelle*; *Lasta 95*; *Utva-75* (basic trg)

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA341H/342L *Gazelle*; (HN-42/45); Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-35M *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with H145M; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bde (5 bn (2 msl, 3 SP msl) with S-125M *Neva-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*))

2 radar bn (for early warning and reporting)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 maint bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable

FTR 14: 3 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 3 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*; 8 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum C*

FGA 17 J-22 *Orao 1*

ISR 10 IJ-22R *Orao 1**

TPT • **Light** 8: 1 An-2 *Colt*; 4 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 *Seneca V*

TRG 44: 19 G-4 *Super Galeb**; 11 *Utva-75*; 14 *Lasta 95*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6: 2 Mi-24 *Hind†*; 4 Mi-35M *Hind*

MRH 52: 5 H145M; 1 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 5 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 2 SA341H *Gazelle* (HI-42); 26 SA341H *Gazelle* (HN-42)

SA342L *Gazelle* (HN-45); 13 SA341H *Gazelle* (HO-42)/

SA342L1 *Gazelle* (HO-45)

TPT • **Medium** 8 Mi-8T *Hip* (HT-40)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 21+

Short-range 21: 6 S-125M *Neva-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 9 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 6 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors L/70

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*)

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; A-77 *Thunder*

Guards 1,600

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (ceremonial) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700

Gendarmerie 3,700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 18: 6 *Lazar-3*; 12 BOV-VP M-86

AUV BOV M16 *Milos*

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 7; UN • MINUSCA 76; 1 med coy

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 8

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 3

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1

SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 6

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

In February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent. Serbia remains opposed to this, and while Kosovo has not been admitted to the United Nations, a number of states have recognised Kosovo's self-declared status.

Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was formed in January 2009 as a non-military organisation with responsibility for crisis response, civil protection and EOD. The new president has reaffirmed the ambition to develop a regular army following NATO standards and to join the Alliance, although NATO members are divided on this and the Alliance is formally against such a development. The KSF has been upgrading its capabilities to some extent, includ-

ing the acquisition of light armoured security vehicles from the United States starting in 2021. NATO has said that should the KSF's mandate evolve, it would have to examine its level of engagement with the force. The KSF is armed with small arms and light vehicles only. The NATO peace-support mission, KFOR, continues to maintain a presence in Kosovo. In March 2021 Kosovo deployed a platoon to Kuwait, where it will reportedly be under the command of the US Iowa National Guard.

Data here represents the de facto situation in Kosovo. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state.

FOREIGN FORCES

All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless otherwise specified

Albania 29

Armenia 40

Austria 338; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy • UNMIK 1 obs

Bulgaria 26

Canada 5

Croatia 142; 1 inf coy; 1 hel flt with Mi-8

Czech Republic 9 • UNMIK 2 obs

Denmark 35

Finland 20

Germany 70

Greece 114; 1 inf coy

Hungary 472; 1 inf coy (KTM)

Ireland 13

Italy 638; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit

Latvia 133; 1 inf coy

Lithuania 1

Moldova 41 • UNMIK 1 obs

Montenegro 2

Poland 230; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs

Romania 63 • UNMIK 1 obs

Slovenia 219; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit

Sweden 2

Switzerland 165; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332

Turkey 321; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs

Ukraine 40 • UNMIK 2 obs


United Kingdom 35

United States 660; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60

Slovakia SVK

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	91.6bn	97.8bn	
	USD	104bn	117bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	19,145	21,383	
Growth	%	-4.8	4.4	
Inflation	%	2.0	2.4	
Def exp [a]	EUR	1.80bn	1.68bn	
	USD	2.05bn	2.00bn	
Def bdgt	EUR	1.62bn	1.68bn	1.86bn
	USD	1.85bn	2.01bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure



Population 5,436,066

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.7%	2.5%	2.6%	3.2%	25.5%	7.0%
Female	7.3%	2.3%	2.5%	3.0%	25.7%	10.6%

Capabilities

Slovakia is trying to modernise its armed forces and replace obsolete equipment while contributing to international crisis-management missions. A defence white paper in September 2016 set out security priorities and a plan to increase defence capabilities. In 2017, the government approved a new defence strategy, a military strategy and a Long-Term Defence Development Plan. Work on a new security strategy and a new defence strategy began in July 2020 and was due to be completed by the end of the year. A NATO and EU member state, Slovakia cooperates closely with the Visegrád Group framework. Bratislava has signed an agreement to enable air policing and closer integration of air-defence capabilities. After amending the law on conscription in 2017, Slovakia began to implement its Active Reserves pilot project in order to help address shortfalls in specialist capacities, including in engineering. Results of the pilot project fell short of expectations, and Slovakia passed legislation in early 2018 to improve the training conditions for active reservists from mid-2018 onwards. Slovakia has committed to deploying a company-sized unit to NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, serving with the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia, and has also contributed to EU operations and UN peacekeeping missions. Bratislava has begun to replace its small fighter and rotary-wing-transport fleets. Coinciding with the July 2018 NATO summit, the government announced it had selected the F-16, with delivery due between 2022 and 2024. There are also ambitions to replace land equipment and improve the level of technology in the armed forces. Part of Slovakia's defence-industrial base is organised within the state-controlled holding company DMD Group, including KONSTRUKTA Defence, which produces land systems. Other companies focus on maintenance, repair and overhaul services.

ACTIVE 17,950 (Army 10,300 Air 4,000 Central Staff 3,650)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Central Staff 3,650

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (5th) spec ops bn

Army 10,300

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mixed SP arty bn)

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, 1 NBC bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 30 T-72M

RECCE 18 BPsVI

IFV 256: 148 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2; 17 BVP-M

APC 101+

APC (T) 72 OT-90

APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 *Tatrapan* (6×6)

PPV 7+ RG-32M

AUV IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS

VLB AM-50; MT-55A

MW *Bozena*; UOS-155 *Belarty*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP 9S428 with *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*) on BMP-1;

9P135 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*) on BMP-2; 9P148 *Konkurs*

(RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*) on BRDM-2

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111-1

Konkurs (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 57

SP 27: 152mm 3 M-77 *Dana*; 155mm 24: 16 M-2000 *Zuzana*; 8 *Zuzana-2*

MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85

MODULAR

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

Air Force 4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS *Fulcrum*

TRANSPORT

1 flt with C-27J *Spartan*

1 flt with L-410FG/T *Turbolet*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*

1 sqn with UH-60M *Black Hawk*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39CM/ZAM *Albatros**

AIR DEFENCE

1 bde with 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable

FTR 11: 9 MiG-29AS *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UBS *Fulcrum*;

TPT 5: **Medium** 2 C-27J *Spartan*; **Light** 3: 1 L-410FG *Turbolet*; 2 L-410T *Turbolet*; (4 L-410UVP *Turbolet* in store)

TRG 8: 6 L-39CM *Albatros**; 2 L-39ZAM *Albatros** (1 more in store)

HELICOPTERS

ATK (15: 5 Mi-24D *Hind D*; 10 Mi-24V *Hind E* all in store)

MRH 13 Mi-17 *Hip H* (incl 4 SAR)

TPT • **Medium** 9 UH-60M *Black Hawk*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A *Alamo*)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 40

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 289; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 97; 1 arty bty with M-2000 *Zuzana*

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3


Slovenia SVN

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	46.9bn	51.0bn	
	USD	53.5bn	60.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	25,549	28,939	
Growth	%	-4.2	6.3	
Inflation	%	-0.1	1.4	
Def exp [a]	EUR	498m	624m	
	USD	568m	745m	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	530m	561m	688m
	USD	605m	670m	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 2,102,106

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.6%	2.3%	2.4%	2.6%	25.6%	9.4%
Female	7.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.4%	23.8%	12.3%

Capabilities

Since joining NATO and the EU in 2004, territorial defence and the ability to take part in peace-support operations have been central to Slovenia's defence strategy. In January 2020, the defence ministry published a white paper that built on the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2016 and the 2019 national-security strategy and acknowledged a deteriorating security environment in Europe. The white paper described mechanised battalion-sized battle groups as the core of Slovenia's future combat capabilities, with the goal of forming the first of these by 2027 and a second by 2030. The 2016 SDR had already defined the formation and equipping of two battalion-sized battlegroups by 2023 as its main goal. By 2035, active forces and the contract reserve are to grow to 8,000 and 2,000 personnel respectively. The white paper indicated that a higher level of defence expenditure would be required to meet modernisation goals. Procurement priorities were defined as wheeled armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, short- and medium-range air defence, and helicopters. In January 2021, Slovenia announced that it would procure up to two C-27J *Spartan* transport aircraft. Slovenia acts as the framework nation for the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence. Because its small air wing is not equipped to provide air policing, Italy and Hungary currently provide this capability under NATO arrangements. The country contributes to EU, NATO and UN operations and exercises with other member states. Recruitment and retention continue to be a challenge. Slovenia participates in NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, where it contributes to the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia. Its defence industry relies heavily on exports for its revenue and focuses on personal equipment, small arms and ammunition, and CBRN protection and detection.

ACTIVE 6,950 (Army 6,950)**RESERVE 1,200 (Army 1,200)**

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,950

FORCES BY ROLE

Regt are bn sized

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))

1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 EW coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt)

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mountain

2 inf regt (territorial – 1 allocated to each inf bde)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store)

APC 115+:

APC (W) 115: 85 *Pandur* 6x6 (*Valuk*); 30 *Patria* 8x8 (*Svarun*)PPV *Cougar* 6x6 JERRV

AUV 24 JLTV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV VT-55A

VLB MT-55A

NBC VEHICLES 10 *Cobra* CBRN

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike* MR/LR

ARTILLERY 68

TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90

MOR 50+: 82mm M-69; 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

Army Maritime Element 130

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2

PCC 1 *Triglav* III (RUS *Svetlyak*)PBF 1 *Super Dvora* MkII

Air Element 590

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *Falcon* 2000EX; L-410 *Turbolet*; PC-6B *Turbo Porter*

TRAINING

1 unit with Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); PC-9M*; Z-143L; Z-242L

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS532AL *Cougar*; Bell 412 *Twin Huey*

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 maint sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable

TPT 4: Light 3: 1 L-410 *Turbolet*; 2 PC-6B *Turbo Porter*

PAX 1 *Falcon 2000EX*

TRG 19: 9 PC-9M*; 2 Z-143L; 8 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412HP *Twin Huey*; 1 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey* (some armed)

TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL *Cougar*; **Light 4** Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 10

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 40; 1 engr pl

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 8

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 219; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit


Spain ESP

Euro EUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EUR	1.12tr	1.21tr	
	USD	1.28tr	1.44tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	27,179	30,537	
Growth	%	-10.8	5.7	
Inflation	%	-0.3	2.2	
Def exp [a]	EUR	11.2bn	12.2bn	
	USD	12.8bn	14.6bn	
Def bdgt [b]	EUR	11.2bn	11.5bn	
	USD	12.7bn	13.8bn	
USD1=EUR		0.88	0.84	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 47,260,584

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.5%	2.6%	2.4%	2.5%	25.9%	8.4%
Female	7.1%	2.5%	2.3%	2.3%	25.3%	11.1%

Capabilities

The 2017 National Security Strategy indicated that Spain's defence policy was global in scope, though concerned with threats emanating from the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. The army reviewed its force structure in 2015, which resulted in a reorganisation into multipurpose brigades with heavy, medium and light capabilities, optimised for deployable operations. Spain is a member of NATO, continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad, and hosts one of NATO's two Combined Air Operations Centres. The armed forces are well trained and there is a routine exercise programme for both domestic and multinational exercises. The country's equipment and logistic-support capability appears to be sufficient to meet its national commitments and contribution to NATO operations and exercises. In early 2018, Spain launched an equipment-modernisation plan, with funding for the modernisation of army *Chinook* helicopters, for the S-80 submarine programme and for military-communications satellites. Spain's defence industry manufactures across all domains and exports globally. Navantia is the principal, state-owned, shipbuilding firm. The industry is largely integrated within the European defence-industrial manufacturing base.

ACTIVE 122,850 (Army 71,300 Navy 20,350 Air 19,750 Joint 11,450) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800

RESERVE 14,900 (Army 8,800 Navy 3,150 Air 2,350 Other 600)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Space****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

SATELLITES 3

COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 *Spainsat*; 1 *Xtar-Eur*

ISR 1 *Paz*

Army 71,300

The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP)

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn)

2 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 comd (3 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn)

Mechanised

2 (10th & 11th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 mtn inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn), 1 mtn inf

bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
 2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) Lt mech bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Other

1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 lt inf bde (2 mech inf regt (1 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf regt (1 lt inf bn), 1 fd arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn); 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt)
 1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt)
 2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt)
 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt)
 1 EW/sigs bde (2 EW regt, 3 sigs regt)
 1 NBC regt
 1 info ops regt (1 CIMIC bn; 1 Psyops bn)
 1 int regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (5 log regt; 1 tpt regt; 1 med gp (1 log unit, 2 med regt, 1 fd hospital unit))

HELICOPTER

1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy))

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 327: 108 *Leopard* 2A4; 219 *Leopard* 2E

ASLT 84 B1 *Centauro*

RECCE 187 VEC-M1

IFV 225: 204 *Pizarro*; 21 *Pizarro* (CP)

APC 903

APC (T) 473: 20 Bv-206S; 453 M113 (incl variants)

APC (W) 320 BMR-600/BMR-600M1

PPV 110 RG-31

AUV 260 IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 27 CZ-10/25E; 1 *Pizarro* CEV (*Castor*) (in test)

ARV 51: 16 *Leopard* REC; 5 BMR REC; 4 *Centauro* REC; 14 *Maxxpro* MRV; 12 M113

VLB 15 M60 AVLB

MW 6 *Husky* 2G

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike*-LR; TOW

ARTILLERY 1,571

SP 155mm 95 M109A5

TOWED 287: 105mm 223: 56 L118 Light Gun; 167 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT 155/52 SIAC

MOR 1,189: 81mm 777; SP 81mm 10 VAMTAC with *Cardom* 81mm; 120mm 402

COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU SBT V07

HELICOPTERS

ATK 24: 6 *Tiger* HAP-E; 18 *Tiger* HAD-E

TPT 85: **Heavy** 17 CH-47D *Chinook* (HT-17D); **Medium** 47: 16 AS332B *Super Puma* (HU-21); 12 AS532UL *Cougar*; 6 AS532AL *Cougar*; 13 NH90 TTH; **Light** 21: 5 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26)

UAV • ISR • **Medium** 6: 2 *Searcher* MkII-J (PASI); 4 *Searcher* MkIII (PASI)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 77+

Long-range 18 M901 *Patriot* PAC-2

Medium-range 38 MIM-23B I-*Hawk* Phase III

Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 *Skyguard/Aspide*

Point-defence *Mistral*

GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67: 19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM *Spike*-ER

Navy 20,350 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** 2

SSK 2 *Galerna* with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 mod 2 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5 *Alvaro de Bazan* with *Aegis* Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84F *Harpoon* Block 1D AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60B *Seahawk* ASW hel)

FRIGATES • FFGH 6 *Santa Maria* with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 *Meroka* mod 2B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-60B *Seahawk* ASW hel)

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS** 3:

LHD 1 *Juan Carlos I* (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops)

LPD 2 *Galicia* (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D *Sea King* hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT; 540 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM 1E

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AORH 2: 1 *Patino* (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D *Sea King* hel); 1 *Cantabria* (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D *Sea King* hel)

Maritime Action Force**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 23

PSOH 6 *Meteoro* (*Buques de Accion Maritima*) with 1 76mm gun

PSO 5: 3 *Alboran* each with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Descubierta* with 1 76mm gun

PCO 4 *Serviola* with 1 76mm gun

PCC 3 *Anaga* with 1 76mm gun

PB 4: 2 P-101; 2 *Toralla*

PBR 1 *Cabo Fradera*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6

MHO 6 *Segura*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30

AGI 1 *Alerta*
AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research duties in Antarctica)
AGS 3: 2 *Malaspina*; 1 *Castor*
AKR 1 *Ysabel*
AP 1 *Contramaestre Casado* with 1 hel landing platform
ASR 1 *Neptuno*
ATF 3: 1 *Mar Caribe*; 1 *Mahon*; 1 *La Grana*
AXL 10: 6 *Contramaestre*; 4 *Guardiamarina*
AXS 8

Naval Aviation 850**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with AV-8B *Harrier II Plus*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with SH-60B/F *Seahawk*

TRANSPORT

1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation II*; Cessna 650 *Citation VII*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8
 1 ft with TAV-8B *Harrier*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18)
 1 sqn with SH-3D *Sea King*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 13 combat capable

FGA 13: 12 AV-8B *Harrier II Plus*; 1 TAV-8B *Harrier* (on lease from USMC)

TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 *Citation II*; 1 Cessna 650 *Citation VII*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 20: 4 SH-3D *Sea King* (tpt); 12 SH-60B *Seahawk*; 4 SH-60F *Seahawk*

MRH 9 Hughes 500MD

TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; **ARH** AIM-120 *AMRAAM*

ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*; **AGM-114K/R** *Hellfire II*

AShM AGM-119 *Penguin*

Marines 5,350**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops bn

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)

Other

1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) 34: 32 *Piranha IIIIC*; 1 *Piranha IIIIC* (amb); 1 *Piranha IIIIC EW* (EW)

AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 4 *Piranha IIIIC*

ARV 3: 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 M88; 1 *Piranha IIIIC*

ARTILLERY 30

SP 155mm 6 M109A2

TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike-LR*; **TOW-2**

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Mistral*

Air Force 19,750

The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands – General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary Islands Air Command

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

2 sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU *Hornet* (EF-18A/B MLU)

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with P-3A/M *Orion*

ISR

1 sqn with Beech C90 *King Air*

1 sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation V*; CN235 (TR-19A)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar*; *Falcon 20D*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with AS332B/B1 *Super Puma*; CN235 *VIGMA*

1 sqn with AS332B *Super Puma*; CN235 *VIGMA*; H215 (AS332C1) *Super Puma*

1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar*; CN235 *VIGMA*

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A400M

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with A310; *Falcon 900*

1 sqn with A400M

1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar*

2 sqn with C295

1 sqn with CN235

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter *Typhoon*

1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) *Hornet*

1 sqn with Beech F33C *Bonanza*

2 sqn with C-101 *Aviojet*

1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar*

1 sqn with PC-21

1 sqn with T-35 *Pillan* (E-26)

2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B *Freedom Fighter*

1 hel sqn with H120 *Colibri*

1 hel sqn with S-76C

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS332M1 *Super Puma*; AS532UL *Cougar* (VIP)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper* (forming)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 175 combat capable

FTR 88: 69 Eurofighter *Typhoon*; 19 F-5B *Freedom Fighter*

FGA 84: 20 F/A-18A *Hornet* (EF-18A); 52 EF-18A MLU; 12 EF-18B MLU

ASW 3 P-3M *Orion*

MP 8 CN235 VIGMA
 ISR 2 CN235 (TR-19A)
 EW 3: 1 C-212 *Aviocar* (TM.12D); 2 *Falcon* 20D
 TPT 69: **Heavy** 10 A400M; **Light** 51: 3 Beech C90 *King Air*; 15 Beech F33C *Bonanza*; 10 C-212 *Aviocar* (incl 9 trg); 12 C295; 8 CN235; 3 Cessna 560 *Citation V* (ISR); **PAX** 8: 2 A310; 1 A330 (to be converted to MRTT tkt/tpt configuration); 5 *Falcon* 900 (VIP)
 TRG 97: 59 C-101 *Aviojet*; 2 PC-21; 36 T-35 *Pillan* (E-26)

HELICOPTERS

TPT 41: **Medium** 19: 5 AS332B/B1 *Super Puma*; 4 AS332M1 *Super Puma*; 4 H215 (AS332C1) *Super Puma*; 2 AS532UL *Cougar* (VIP); 4 NH90 TTH; **Light** 22: 14 H120 *Colibri*; 8 S-76C

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 4

MQ-9A *Reaper* (unarmed)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Short-range *Skyguard/Aspide*

Point-defence *Mistral*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/JULI *Sidewinder*; **IIR** IRIS-T; **SARH**

AIM-7P *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120B/C AMRAAM

ARM AGM-88B HARM

ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*

AShM AGM-84D *Harpoon*

LACM Taurus KEPD 350

BOMBS

Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 *Paveway II*; GBU-24

Paveway III; EGBU-16 *Paveway II*; BPG-2000

INS/GPS guided: GBU-38 JDAM

Emergencies Military Unit (UME) 3,500**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

1 div HQ

MANOEUVRE**Other**

5 Emergency Intervention bn

1 Emergency Support and Intervention regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 sigs bn

HELICOPTER

1 hel bn opcon Army

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800**Guardia Civil 75,800**

17 regions, 54 Rural Comds

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

8 (rural) gp

MANOEUVRE**Other**

15 (traffic) sy gp

1 (Special) sy bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 64**

PSO 1 with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 2

PBF 34

PB 27

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 CN235-300; 1 King Air 350i

HELICOPTERS

MRH 20: 2 AS653N3 *Dauphin*; 18 Bo-105ATH

TPT • Light 21: 8 BK-117; 13 H135

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 2

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 8

DJIBOUTI: EU • *Operation Atalanta* 1 P-3M Orion

GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • *Operation Atalanta* 1 FFGHM

GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 50; 1 PCO

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 1 trg unit; 1 hel unit with CH-47D *Chinook*; AS532 *Cougar*; **NATO • NATO** Mission Iraq 115

LATVIA: **NATO •** Enhanced Forward Presence 346; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 625; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 540; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH; UN • MINUSMA 1

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: **NATO •** SNMCMG 2: 1 PSOH

NORTH SEA: **NATO •** SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM

SENEGAL: *Operation Barkhane* 65; 2 C295M

SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 20

TURKEY: **NATO •** *Operation Active Fence* 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-2


FOREIGN FORCES

United States US European Command: 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Morón; 1 naval base at Rota

Sweden SWE

Swedish Krona SEK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SEK	4.98tr	5.30tr	
	USD	541bn	622bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	52,129	58,639	
Growth	%	-2.8	4.0	
Inflation	%	0.7	2.0	
Def bdtg	SEK	64.8bn	71.2bn	76.5bn
	USD	7.04bn	8.36bn	
USD1=SEK		9.21	8.51	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 10,261,767

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.1%	2.8%	2.7%	3.4%	22.3%	9.6%
Female	8.6%	2.7%	2.6%	3.2%	21.9%	11.1%

Capabilities

Sweden's armed forces remain configured for territorial defence and there has been growing concern at Russian military activity in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing cooperation with neighbours and NATO in recent years. The 2021–25 defence bill, presented in October 2020, envisages increased spending and an expanded force structure with the re-establishment of five regiments and one air wing. Sweden has also announced measures to enhance societal resilience and the ability to deal with civil emergencies. There are plans to increase defence ties with the UK and the US. In July 2019, Sweden joined the UK-led *Tempest* future-combat-aircraft programme. Concerns over readiness levels have led to greater cooperation with NATO and NORDEFECO. In May 2018, Sweden, Finland and the US signed a statement of intent to develop closer cooperation on exercises and interoperability. Readiness, exercises and training, as well as cyber defence, are spending priorities. Amid recruitment challenges, Sweden announced in March 2017 that it would reinstate conscription from January 2018. Sweden has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland. Readiness challenges in the air force triggered a discussion about extending the service life of the JAS-39C *Gripens* beyond their intended 2026 retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to receive a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. In August 2018, Sweden proceeded with the acquisition of the *Patriot* air-defence system. The country's export-oriented defence industry is privately owned and capable of meeting most of the armed forces' equipment needs, including for advanced combat aircraft and conventional submarines.

ACTIVE 14,600 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,100 Air 2,700

Other 2,950) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations

21,200

Conscript liability 4–11 months, depending on branch (selective conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral)

RESERVE 10,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,850

The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized task forces depending on the operational requirement

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 bde HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bn

Armoured

5 armd bn

1 armd BG

Mechanised

1 mech bn

Light

1 mot inf bn

1 lt inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

Other

1 sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

2 engr bn

2 MP coy

1 CBRN coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 tpt coy

AIR DEFENCE

2 AD bn

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

40 Home Guard bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 120 *Leopard* 2A5 (Strv 122)

IFV 411: 369 CV9040 (Strf 9040; incl 54 CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP)

APC 1,064

APC (T) 389: 239 Pbv 302 (incl variants); 150 BvS-10 MkII

APC (W) 315+: some *Bastion* APC; 34 XA-180 *Sisu* (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 *Sisu* (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 *Sisu* (Patgb 203); 113 Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360)

PPV 360 RG-32M

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 6 Pionierpanzer-3 *Kodiak* (Ingbv 120)

ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90

VLB 3 Brobv 120

MW 33+: *Aardvark* Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 357SP 155mm 35 *Archer*MOR 322: 81mm 201 M/86; 120mm 81 M/41D SP 120mm 40 CV90 *Mjöltnir* (Gkpbv 90)**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 11+

Long-range 3 M903 *Patriot* PAC-3 MSEMedium-range MIM-23B *Hawk* (RBS-97)

Short-range 8 IRIS-T SLS (RBS-98); RBS-23 BAMSE

Point-defence RBS-70

GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Lvkv 90

Navy 1,250; 850 Amphibious (total 2,100)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINE • SSK 5:**1 *Gotland* (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT2 *Gotland* mod (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT2 *Södermanland* (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 6 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 150**CORVETTES • FSG 5 *Visby* with 8 RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCGT 4:

2 *Göteborg* with 4 twin Inchr with RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun2 *Stockholm* with 4 twin Inchr with RBS15 Mk2 ASHM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun

PBF 133: 100+ Combat Boat 90H (capacity 18 troops); 27 Combat Boat HS (capacity 18 troops); 6 Combat Boat 90HSM (capacity 18 troops)

PB 8 *Tapper* (Type 80)**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7**MCC 5 *Koster* (SWE *Landsort* mod)MCD 2 *Spårö* (*Styrsö* mod)**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11**LCVP 8 *Trossbat*LCAC 3 *Griffon* 8100TD**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15**AG 2: 1 *Carlskrona* with 1 hel landing platform (former ML); 1 *Trosso* (spt ship for corvettes and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship)AGF 2 *Ledningsbåt* 2000AGI 1 *Orion*AKL 1 *Loke*ARS 2: 1 *Belos* III; 1 *Furusund* (former ML)AX 5 *Altair*AXS 2: 1 *Falken*; 1 *Gladan***Amphibious 850****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 amph bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 8 RBS-17 *Hellfire***Coastal Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

1 ASHM bty with RBS-15

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM RBS-15

Air Force 2,700**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR**6 sqn with JAS 39C/D *Gripen***TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C**1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); KC-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D *Argus***TRAINING**

1 unit with Sk-60

AIR DEFENCE

1 (fighter control and air surv) bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 96 combat capable

FGA 96 JAS 39C/D *Gripen*

ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B)

AEW&C 3: 1 S-100B *Argus*; 2 S-100D *Argus*TKR/TPT 1 KC-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84)TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H *Hercules* (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab 340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp-102D)

TRG 67 Sk-60W

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLESISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 *Shadow* (AUV 3 *Örnen*)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**ASM AGM-65 *Maverick* (RB-75)

ASHM RB-15F

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder* (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T (RB-98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); *Meteor***BOMBS**Laser-Guided GBU-12 *Paveway* II

INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Armed Forces Hel Wing**FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B); NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M *Black Hawk* (Hkp-16)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**TPT 53: Medium 33: 15 UH-60M *Black Hawk* (Hkp-16); 18 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (of which 9 configured for ASW); Light 20: 12 AW109 (Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B)**Special Forces****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt gp


Other 2,950

Includes staff, logistics and intelligence personnel

FORCES BY ROLE**COMBAT SUPPORT**1 EW bn
1 psyops unit**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**2 log bn
1 maint bn
4 med coy
1 tpt coy**DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** EU • EUTM RCA 9**INDIA/PAKISTAN:** UN • UNMOGIP 4**IRAQ:** *Operation Inherent Resolve 2*; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1**KOREA, REPUBLIC OF:** NNSC • 5**MALI:** *Operation Barkhane 150*; 1 SF unit; 1 hel unit with 3 UH-60M; EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA 187; 1 int coy**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 6**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 2**SOMALIA:** EU • EUTM Somalia 9**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 2**Switzerland CHE**

Swiss Franc CHF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CHF	706bn	737bn	
	USD	752bn	811bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	87,367	93,515	
Growth	%	-2.5	3.7	
Inflation	%	-0.7	0.4	
Def bdgt [a]	CHF	5.37bn	5.20bn	5.33bn
	USD	5.72bn	5.72bn	
USD1=CHF		0.94	0.91	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 8,453,550

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	2.5%	2.8%	3.1%	24.7%	8.4%
Female	7.5%	2.4%	2.7%	3.1%	24.6%	10.4%

Capabilities

The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial defence and limited participation in international peace-support operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces, reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all personnel would realistically be available for active service. With permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, Switzerland is not a member of any alliances, although it joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in 1996 and on occasion contributes to NATO- and EU-led operations alongside its engagement in UN or OSCE missions. Switzerland does not participate in combat operations for peace-enforcement purposes and its deployments are limited in size. The 2016 armed-forces development plan emphasises improvements in readiness, training and equipment, and is meant to be implemented by the end of 2022. The approach to readiness is changing to a flexible model in which different units are called up for active service gradually and on different timelines. Plans to replace F-5 *Tiger II* combat aircraft with the *Gripen* were scrapped after a national referendum rejected the proposal in May 2014. With Switzerland's air-policing capabilities diminished, in July 2018 the government relaunched its attempt to procure a new combat aircraft to now also replace the F/A-18 *Hornet*, which will have its life extended until 2030. The multi-stage selection process was completed in June 2021 and the F-35A was chosen. Parliamentary approval is planned for 2022. The fighter-acquisition programme was capped at CHF6 billion in May 2019 and has been separated from the ground-based air-defence procurement. Previously both programmes were linked. Other priorities include upgrades to Switzerland's air-surveillance systems and to transport helicopters. Switzerland's defence industry has limited design and manufacturing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-vehicles sector, which has links to North American firms.

ACTIVE 19,550 (Armed Forces 19,550)

Conscript liability 260-600 compulsory service days depending on rank. 18 or 23 weeks' training (depending on branch) generally at age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alternative service available

RESERVE 123,450**Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)****ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Armed Forces 3,100 active; 16,450 conscript (19,550 total)****Operations Command 72,600 on mobilisation**

4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military police all units are non-active

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

4 regional comd

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn)

Mechanised

1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn)

Light

10 inf bn
7 mtn inf bn
1 mtn inf unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 engr bn
4 MP bn
1 NBC bn
1 int unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 engr rescue bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 134 *Leopard 2* (Pz-87 *Leo*)
IFV 186: 154 CV9030CH; 32 CV9030 (CP)
APC 1,235
 APC (T) 311 M113A2 (incl variants)
 APC (W) 924 *Piranha I/II/IIIC*
AUV 441 *Eagle I/II/III* (incl 119 CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 12 *Kodiak*
ARV 25 *Büffel*
VLB 9 *Leopard 2* with *Leguan*
MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2

NBC VEHICLES 12 *Piranha IIIC CBRN***ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

MSL • **SP** 106 *Piranha I TOW-2*

ARTILLERY 355

SP 155mm 133 M109 KAWEST
MOR • **81mm** 222 Mw-72

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14

PB 14 *Watercat* 1250

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Point-defence** FIM-92 *Stinger***Air Force 18,900 on mobilisation****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air*; DHC-6 *Twin Otter*;
PC-6 *Turbo Porter*; PC-12
1 VIP Flt with Beech 1900D; Cessna 560XL *Citation*;
CL-604 *Challenger*; Falcon 900EX; PC-24

TRAINING

1 sqn with PC-7CH *Turbo Trainer*; PC-21
1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing)
1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with AS332M *Super Puma*; AS532UL *Cougar*;
H135M

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Hermes 900*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 55 combat capable

FTR 25: 20 F-5E *Tiger II*; 5 F-5F *Tiger II*
FGA 30: 25 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 5 F/A-18D *Hornet*
TPT 24: **Light** 20: 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 Beech
1900D; 1 Cessna 560XL *Citation*; 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*;
14 PC-6 *Turbo Porter*; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse,
civil registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse,

civil registration); **PAX** 4: 2 CL-604 *Challenger*; 1 Falcon
900EX; 1 PC-24 (VIP)

TRG 40: 27 PC-7CH *Turbo Trainer*; 5 PC-9; 8 PC-21

HELICOPTERS

MRH 20 H135M

TPT • **Medium** 25: 15 AS332M *Super Puma*; 10
AS532UL *Cougar*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 1 *Hermes 900*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **AAM** • **IR** AIM-9P

Sidewinder; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **ARH** AIM-
120B/C-7 AMRAAM

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)

GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be
deployed independently as task forces within Swiss
territory

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM • **Point-defence** 56+: 56 *Rapier*; FIM-92 *Stinger*
GUNS 35mm 27 GDF-003/-005 with *Skyguard*

**Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,650
on mobilisation****FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 log bde (6 log bn; 1 tpt bn; 6 med bn)

**Command Support Organisation 11,150 on
mobilisation****FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 spt bde

Training Command 37,350 on mobilisation**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

5 trg unit

Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)

(not part of armed forces)

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea*
20

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 1

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 165 (military volunteers); 1 inf
coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332M *Super Puma*

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Turkey TUR

Turkish Lira TRY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TRY	5.05tr	6.63tr	
	USD	720bn	796bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	8,610	9,407	
Growth	%	1.8	9.0	
Inflation	%	12.3	17.0	
Def exp [a]	TRY	93.9bn	99.0bn	
	USD	13.4bn	11.9bn	
Def bdgt [b]	TRY	76.3bn	84.6bn	104bn
	USD	10.9bn	10.2bn	
USD1=TRY		7.01	8.33	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries; Defence Industry Support Fund; TUBITAK Defense Industries R&D Institute (SAGE); and military pensions



Population 82,482,383

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.7%	4.1%	3.9%	3.8%	22.9%	3.9%
Female	11.2%	3.9%	3.7%	3.6%	22.5%	4.8%

Capabilities

Turkey has large, generally well-equipped armed forces that are primarily structured for national defence. Much recent activity has focused on internal security and cross-border operations in response to the continuing wars in Syria and Libya. The conflict with Kurdish armed groups continues. The armed forces' 2033 strategic plan aims to modernise military equipment and force structures. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. However, relationships with NATO allies have come under pressure after Ankara's decision to procure the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system, its operations in northern Syria, rising tensions with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, its role in Libya and its position regarding the late-2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Following an attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers of officers from the armed forces. The armed forces train regularly, including with NATO allies. While key subcomponents are still often imported, a number of locally developed equipment designs are in production. Efforts are under way to increase military exports and Turkey has secured markets in Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Ukraine, successfully offering cost-effective assets in specific sectors. Deliveries on the S-400 contract began in 2019, and as a result the US government terminated Turkey's participation in the F-35 programme. Turkey is also developing a domestic fighter aircraft but is dependent on collaboration with external defence companies. The president has authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey's top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-cooperation agreements with a focus on exports and technology transfer, in an effort to boost its national defence industry and achieve defence-industrial autonomy.

ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,000 Air 50,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800

Conscript liability 12 months (5.5 months for university graduates; 21 days for graduates with exemption) (reducing to 6 months)

RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air 65,000)

Reserve service to age 41 for all services

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 2 *Gokturk-1/2*

Army €260,200 (incl conscripts)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 army HQ

9 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

8 cdo bde

1 mtn cdo bde

1 cdo regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde)

7 armd bde

Mechanised

2 (28th & 29th) mech div

14 mech inf bde

Light

1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt)

7 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 trg arty bde

6 arty regt

2 engr regt

AVIATION

4 avn regt

4 avn bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,378: 316 *Leopard* 2A4; 170 *Leopard* 1A4; 227 *Leopard* 1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3 TTS; 165 M60TM *Firat*; 750 M48A5 T2 (2,000 M48A5 T1 in store)

RECCE €250 *Akrep*

IFV 645 ACV AIFV

APC 5,266

APC (T) 3,636: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/M113A2

PPV 1,630: 360 *Edjer Yalcin* 4x4; €650 *Kirpi*; 320 *Kirpi-II*; €300 *Vuran*

AUV 1,200: 800+ *Cobra*; €400 *Cobra II*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48 AEV; M113A2T2

ARV 150: 12 BPz-2; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1

VLB 88: 36 *Leguan*; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge

MW 4+: 4 *Husky* 2G; *Tamkar*; *Bozena*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 415: 365 ACV TOW; ε50 *Kaplan* STA; *Pars* STA 4×4
MANPATS 9K135 *Kornet-E* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); *Eryx*;
 FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; OMTAS

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 7,836+

SP 1,080: **155mm** 828: ε150 M44T1; 365 M52T (mod); ε310
 T-155 *Firtina*; 3 T-155 *Firtina* II; **175mm** 36 M107; **203mm**
 219 M110A2

TOWED 794+: **105mm** 75+ M101A1; **155mm** 557: 517
 M114A1/M114A2; 40 *Panther*; **203mm** 162 M115

MRL 146+: **107mm** 48; **122mm** ε36 T-122; **227mm** 12
 M270 MLRS; **302mm** 50+ TR-300 *Kasirga* (WS-1)

MOR 5,813+

SP 1,443+: **81mm**; **107mm** 1,264 M106; **120mm** 179

TOWED 4,370: **81mm** 3,792; **120mm** 578

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** *Bora*; MGM-140A ATACMS
 (launched from M270 MLRS); J-600T *Yildirim* (B-611/CH-
 SS-9 mod 1)

AIRCRAFT

ISR 5 Beech 350 *King Air*

TPT • **Light** 8: 5 Beech 200 *King Air*; 3 Cessna 421

TRG 49: 45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A *Cochise*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 94: 18 AH-1P *Cobra*; 12 AH-1S *Cobra*; 5 AH-1W
Cobra; 4 TAH-1P *Cobra*; 9 T129A; 46 T129B

MRH 28 Hughes 300C

TPT 226+: **Heavy** 11 CH-47F *Chinook*; **Medium** 76+: 28
 AS532UL *Cougar*; 48+ S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 139: 12
 Bell 204B (AB-204B); ε43 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 64
 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** 33 *Bayraktar* TB2

ISR • **Heavy** *Falcon* 600/*Firebee*; **Medium** CL-89; *Gnat*

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harpy***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

ASM *Mizrak-U* (UMTAS)

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Short-range HISAR-A/A+; HISAR-O

Point-defence 148+: 70 *Altigan* PMADS octuple *Stinger*
 Inchr, 78 *Zipkin* PMADS quad *Stinger* Inchr; FIM-92
Stinger

GUNS 1,402

SP 35mm ε40 *Korkut*

TOWED 1,362: **20mm** 439 GAI-D01/Rh-202; **35mm** 120
 GDF-001/-003; **40mm** 803 L/60/L/70

Navy ε45,000 (incl conscripts)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** • SSK 12

4 *Atilay* (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT
 with SST-4 HWT

4 *Gür* (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
 UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/Mk 24 *Tigerfish* mod 2 HWT/
SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

4 *Preveze* (GER Type-209/1400) (MLU ongoing) with 8
 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/Mk 24
Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 16
FFGHM 16:

4 *Barbaros* (GER MEKO 200 mod) with 2 quad Inchr
 with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 2 8-cell Mk
 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm
 SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 *Sea Zenith*
 CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)
 hel)

4 *Gabya* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS
 with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/SM-1MR
 Block VI SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B
 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
 Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm
 gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk*/AB-212 ASW hel)

4 *Gabya* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13
 GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/SM-
 1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B
 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk*/AB-
 212 ASW hel)

4 *Yavuz* (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad Inchr with
 RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk
 29 GMLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple
 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 *Sea*
Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
 212) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45**CORVETTES** 10:

FSGHM 4 *Ada* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C
Harpoon Block 1B ASHM, 1 Mk 49 21-cell Inchr with
 RIM-116 SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
 Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Seahawk* hel)
FSG 6 *Burak* (ex-FRA *d'Estienne d'Orves*) with 2 single
 Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 4 single 324mm ASTT
 with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Creusot-Loire* Mk 54 A/S mor, 1
 100mm gun (1 vessel with 1 76mm gun instead)

PCFG 19:

4 *Dogan* (GER *Lurssen-57*) with 2 quad Inchr with
 RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 76mm gun
 9 *Kilic* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block
 1B ASHM, 1 76mm gun

4 *Rüzgar* (GER *Lurssen-57*) with 2 quad Inchr with
 RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 76mm gun
 2 *Yildiz* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon*
 Block 1B ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PCC 16 *Tuzla***MINE WARFARE** • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15

MHO 11: 5 *Engin* (FRA *Circe*); 6 *Aydin*

MSC 4 *Seydi* (US *Adjutant*)

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS** • LST 5:

2 *Bayraktar* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 hel
 landing platform (capacity 20 MBT; 250 troops)

1 *Osmangazi* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 4
 LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops; 1 hel landing platform)

2 *Sarucabey* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 11
 tanks; 600 troops; 1 hel landing platform)

LANDING CRAFT 30

LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151

LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 LCM 8

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35

ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun

AGS 2: 1 *Cesme* (ex-US *Silas Bent*); 1 *Cubuklu*AOR 2 *Akar* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 hel landing platformAOT 2 *Burak*AOL 1 *Gurcan*AP 1 *Iskenderun*ASR 3: 1 *Alemdar* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Isin II*ATF 9: 1 *Akbas*; 1 *Degirmendere*; 1 *Gazal*; 1 *Inebolu*; 5 *Onder*AWT 3 *Sogut*

AXL 8

AX 2 *Pasa* (ex-GER *Rhein*)**Marines 3,000****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn)

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B *Seahawk*1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 *Trinidad***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

ASW 4 ATR-72-600

MP 6 CN235M-100

TPT • **Light** 7: 2 ATR-72-600; 5 TB-20 *Trinidad***HELICOPTERS**ASW 29: 11 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 18 S-70B *Seahawk***UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 7**CISR 8: **Heavy** 4: 1 *Aksungur*; 3 ANKA-S; **Medium** 4 *Bayraktar* TB2**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire II***Air Force €50,000**

2 tac air forces (divided between east and west)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-4E *Phantom 2020*8 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon***ISR**1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*1 unit with *King Air 350***AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL**

1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C

EW

1 unit with CN235M EW

SEARCH & RESCUE1 sqn with AS532AL/UL *Cougar***TANKER**1 sqn with KC-135R *Stratotanker***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with A400M; C-160D *Transall*1 sqn with C-130B/E *Hercules*1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation II* (UC-35); Cessna 650 *Citation VII*; CN235M; Gulfstream 550

3 sqn with CN235M

10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); CN235M**TRAINING**1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*1 sqn with F-5A/B *Freedom Fighter*; NF-5A/B *Freedom Fighter*

1 sqn with SF-260D

1 sqn with *Hurkus-B*; KT-IT1 sqn with T-38A/M *Talon*1 sqn with T-41D *Mescalero***AIR DEFENCE**4 bn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)4 sqn with MIM-14 *Nike Hercules*2 sqn with *Rapier*8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 *Hawk***MANOEUVRE****Air Manoeuvre**

1 AB bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 306 combat capable

FTR 27: 17 NF-5A *Freedom Fighter*; 10 NF-5B *Freedom Fighter* (48 F-5s being upgraded as LIFT)FGA 279: 19 F-4E *Phantom 2020*; 27 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 30; 162 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 50; 14 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 *Fighting Falcon*; 33 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* Block 50; 16 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* Block 50+ISR 9: 5 Beech 350 *King Air*; 3 C-160D *Transall*; 1 CN235M (Open Skies)EW 2 C-160D *Transall*

SIGINT 3 CN235M

AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C

TKR 7 KC-135R *Stratotanker*TPT 83: **Heavy** 9 A400M; **Medium** 24: 6 C-130B *Hercules*; 13 C-130E *Hercules*; 5 C-160D *Transall*; **Light** 49: 2 Cessna 550 *Citation II* (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna 650 *Citation VII*; 45 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550TRG 171: 4 *Hurkus-B*; 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M *Talon*; 25 T-41D *Mescalero*; 39 KT-IT**HELICOPTERS**TPT 35: **Medium** 20: 6 AS532AL *Cougar* (CSAR); 14 AS532UL *Cougar* (SAR); **Light** 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR • **Heavy** 19 ANKA-SISR 27: **Heavy** 9: 9 *Heron*; **Medium** 18 *Gnat* 750**AIR DEFENCE • SAM 32+****Long-range** 32+: MIM-14 *Nike Hercules*; 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)**Medium-range** MIM-23 *Hawk***Point-defence** *Rapier***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9S *Sidewinder*; *Shafir* 2(±); IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; SARH AIM-7E *Sparrow*; ARH AIM-120A/B AMRAAM

ARM AGM-88A HARM

ASM AGM-65A/G *Maverick*; *Popeye I*
LACM Coventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER

BOMBS

Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15)
INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW
Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L; *Paveway I*; *Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800**Gendarmerie 152,100**

Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 cdo bde

MANOEUVRE**Other**

1 (border) paramilitary div

2 paramilitary bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 57+: *Akrep*; 57 *Ates*

APC 760+

APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 *Condor*

PPV 200+: *Edjer Yaclin* 4x4; *Kirpi*; 200 *Kirpi II*

AUV *Cobra*; *Cobra II*; *Otokar Ural*

AIRCRAFT

ISR Some O-1E *Bird Dog*

TPT • **Light** 2 Do-28D

HELICOPTERS

ATK 9 T129B

MRH 19 Mi-17 *Hip H*

TPT 35: **Medium** 12 S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 23: 8 Bell 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A (AB-206A) *Jet Ranger*; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR 24: **Heavy** 6 ANKA-S; **Medium** 18 *Bayraktar TB2*

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

Coast Guard 4,700**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 108**

PSOH 4 *Dost*

PBF 60

PB 44

AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA

HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP – SAR)

DEPLOYMENT

AZERBAIJAN: Army 170; 1 EOD unit

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • *Operation Althea* 242; 1 inf coy

CYPRUS (NORTHERN): €33,800; 1 army corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd; 287 M48A5T2; 145 ACV AIFV; 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); 418 M113 (incl variants); 36 M101A1; 36 M114A2; 12 M115; 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155; 18 T-122; 171 81mm mor; 70 M30; 135 HY-12; *Milan*; 66 ACV TOW; 219 M40A1; FIM-92 *Stinger*; 44 Rh 202; 78

GAI-D01; 16 GDF-003; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 2 AS532UL *Cougar*; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 PB

IRAQ: Army: 1,000; 1 cdo unit; **NATO** • NATO Mission Iraq 86

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 112; 1 PCFG

LIBYA: €500; ACV-AAPC; *Kirpi*; 1 arty unit with T-155 *Firtina*; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B *Hawk*; *Korkut*; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with *Bayraktar TB2*

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 PCC • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO

QATAR: Army: 300 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit; 12+ ACV AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 *Firtina*

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 321; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 1

SOMALIA: 200 (trg team)

SYRIA: €3,000; some cdo units; 3 armd BG; 1 SAM unit; 1 gendarmerie unit

FOREIGN FORCES

Spain *Active Fence*: 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-2

United States US European Command: 1,800; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 spt facility at Izmir; 1 spt facility at Ankara; 1 air base at Incirlik • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik

United Kingdom UK

Pound Sterling GBP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GBP	2.11tr	2.24tr	
	USD	2.71tr	3.11tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	40,394	46,200	
Growth	%	-9.8	6.8	
Inflation	%	0.9	2.2	
Def exp [a]	GBP	48.3bn	52.3bn	
	USD	61.9bn	72.8bn	
Def bdtg [b]	GBP	47.9bn	51.5bn	53.4bn
	USD	61.5bn	71.6bn	
USD1=GBP		0.78	0.72	

[a] NATO figure

[b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of military operations; Armed Forces Pension Service; and external income earned by the MoD



Population 66,052,076

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.0%	2.8%	3.0%	3.3%	23.2%	8.4%
Female	8.6%	2.7%	2.9%	3.2%	22.6%	10.2%

Capabilities

UK defence policy is based on the armed forces providing credible nuclear and conventional deterrence. The armed forces are relatively well trained with a strong combat ethos and a wide range of combat, combat-support and logistic capabilities. They also have a role in supporting the management of domestic civil emergencies. Defence activity includes maintaining the nuclear force, sustaining a broad range of conventional capabilities, counter-terrorism and contributing to the counter-ISIS coalition and to NATO tasks, including in Eastern Europe, as well as international missions in Africa. In March 2021, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy was followed by a Defence Command Paper that set out modernisation and restructuring plans. Russia is seen as the greatest direct threat to the UK and Europe. The documents underscored the intent to still play a leading role in NATO but with an increased focus also on the Indo-Pacific. The UK's Carrier Strike Group carried out a series of exercises in the Indo-Pacific in mid-year and in September the UK signed the AUKUS defence and security partnership with Australia and the US. The government has indicated it will raise the ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads for the *Trident* submarine-launched ballistic missile. Base and support facilities in Germany, Cyprus, Kenya and Oman are to be expanded, with more forces using them as hubs. The Defence Command Paper indicated that frigate numbers will increase, while platform numbers will reduce in the army and air force. All three services' personnel strength will be reduced, while reserves will remain at their current size. Strategic Command comprises key joint-force elements, such as special forces, defence intelligence and the military component of the civil/military National Cyber Force. A new Space Command was set up within the air force in early 2021 and spending on military space capabilities is increasing. Expeditionary logistic capability meets policy requirements, but peacetime logistic support within the UK is dependent on contractors. A new Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, issued in March 2021, set out naval-but not air- or land-procurement policy. Weaknesses in defence procurement persist. The UK's sophisticated defence industry is globally competitive in some areas of defence exports but cannot meet all of the UK's requirements.

ACTIVE 153,200 (Army 85,800 Navy 34,050 Air 33,350)

RESERVE 75,450 (Regular Reserve 36,050 (Army 23,950, Navy 5,600, Air 6,500); Volunteer Reserve 37,350 (Army 29,900, Navy 4,150, Air 3,300); Sponsored Reserve 2,050)

Includes both trained and those currently under training within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces 1,000

Royal Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC

SSBN 4 *Vanguard* with 16 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5/ D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with *Spearfish* HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could

carry up to 12 MIRV; some *Trident* D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role)

MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5 (fewer than 160 declared operational warheads)

Royal Air Force

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 8: 1 NATO-4B; 3 *Skynet-4*; 4 *Skynet-5*

Army 81,800; 4,000 Gurkhas (total 85,800)

Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn have reservist sub-units

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (ARRC) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (3rd) armd div (3 armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn); 1 arty bde (2 SP arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 2 fd arty regt); 3 cbt engr regt; 1 sigs regt; 1 log bde (3 MP regt; 5 log regt; 3 maint regt; 3 med regt); 2 AD regt)

Light

1 (1st) Lt inf div (2 (4th & 51st) inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 Lt mech inf bn; 1 Lt inf bn); 1 (7th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 Lt inf bn); 1 (11th) inf bde (2 Lt inf bn); 1 engr bde (1 cbt engr regt, 1 CBRN regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn; 1 med regt); 1 med bde (3 fd hospital))

1 (38th) inf bde (1 Lt inf bn)

1 (160th) inf bde (2 Lt inf bn)

2 inf bn (London)

1 inf bn (Brunei)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 air aslt bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (6th) cbt spt div (1 (Spec Inf Gp) inf bde(-) (4 inf bn(-)); 1 ISR bde (1 STA regt, 2 EW regt, 3 int bn, 1 ISR UAV regt); 1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/log gp); 1 sigs bde (6 sigs regt))

1 (geographic) engr regt

1 engr bn(-) (joint GER-UK unit)

1 sigs bde (2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) sigs bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt)

Reserves

Army Reserve 26,550 reservists

The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units and some full units. The majority of units are subordinate to regular-formation headquarters and paired with one or more regular units

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 recce regt

Armoured

1 armd regt

Light

15 lt inf bn

Air Manoeuvr

1 para bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty regt

1 STA regt

1 MRL regt

3 engr regt

1 EOD regt

4 int bn

4 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

11 log regt

3 maint regt

3 med regt

9 fd hospital

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 227 *Challenger 2*

RECCE 613: 197 *Jackal*; 110 *Jackal 2*; 130 *Jackal 2A*; 145 *FV107 Scimitar*; 31 *Scimitar Mk2*

IFV 388+: 388 *FV510 Warrior*; *FV511 Warrior (CP)*; *FV514 Warrior (OP)*; *FV515 Warrior (CP)*

APC 805

APC (T) 409 *FV430 Bulldog* (incl variants)

PPV 396 *Mastiff* (6x6)

AUV 1,238: 399 *Foxhound*; 252 *FV103 Spartan* (incl variants); 23 *Spartan Mk2* (incl variants); 396 *Panther CLV*; 168 *Ridgback*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 88: 56 *Terrier*; 32 *Trojan*

ARV 284: 80 *Challenger ARR*V; 30 *FV106 Samson*; 28 *Samson Mk2*; 105 *FV512 Warrior*; 41 *FV513 Warrior*

MW 64 *Aardvark*

VLB 68: 35 *M3*; 33 *Titan*

NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP *Exactor-2* (*Spike* NLOS)

MANPATS *FGM-148 Javelin*; *NLAW*

ARTILLERY 598

SP 155mm 89 *AS90*

TOWED 105mm 114 *L118 Light Gun*

MRL 227mm 35 *M270B1 MLRS*

MOR 81mm 360 *L16A1*

AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 *Ramped Craft Logistic*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 74+

Short-range *Land Ceptor*

Point-defence 74: 60 *FV433 Stormer* with *Starstreak*; 14 *Rapier FSC*; *Starstreak (LML)*

Joint Helicopter Command

Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army and RAF units

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

HELICOPTER

1 bde (1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*; 1 trg sqn with *AH-64D Apache*); 1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*); 1 regt (2 sqn with *AW159 Wildcat AH1*; 1 trg sqn with *AW159 Wildcat AH1*); 1 regt (1 sqn with *SA341B Gazelle AH1*); 1 (spec ops) sqn with *AS365N3*; *SA341B Gazelle AH1*; 1 sqn with *Bell 212* (Brunei); 1 flt with *SA341B Gazelle AH1* (Canada); 1 *ISR UAV* regt; 1 maint regt)

TRAINING

1 hel regt (1 sqn with *AH-64D Apache*; 1 sqn with *AS350B Ecureuil*; 1 sqn with *Bell 212*; *Lynx AH9A*; *SA341B Gazelle AH1*)

Army Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

HELICOPTER

1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only)

Royal Navy

FORCES BY ROLE

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 lt sqn with *AW159 Wildcat AH1*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with *AW101 Merlin HC4/4A*

Royal Air Force

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 sqn with *CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6*

2 sqn with *SA330 Puma HC2*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with *CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6*; *SA330 Puma HC2*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ATK 50: 40 *AH-64D Apache*; 10 *AH-64E Apache*;

MRH 66: 5 *AS365N3*; 34 *AW159 Wildcat AH1*; 27

SA341B Gazelle AH1

TPT 122: Heavy 60: 38 *CH-47D Chinook HC6A*; 8 *CH-*

47SD Chinook HC5; 14 *CH-47F Chinook HC6*; Medium

48: 25 *AW101 Merlin HC4/4A*; 23 *SA330 Puma HC2*;

Light 14: 9 *AS350B Ecureuil*; 5 *Bell 212*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 7

Watchkeeper (37+ more in store)

Royal Navy 34,050

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 10

STRATEGIC • **SSBN** 4 *Vanguard*, opcon Strategic Forces with 16 UGM-133A *Trident* II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with *Spearfish* HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some *Trident* D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role)

TACTICAL • **SSN** 6

2 *Trafalgar* with 5 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/*Spearfish* HWT

4 *Astute* with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E *Tomahawk* Block IV LACM/*Spearfish* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2:

CV 2 *Queen Elizabeth* with up to 3 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (future capacity 24 F-35B *Lightning* II, 14 *Merlin* HM2/*Wildcat* HMA2/CH-47 *Chinook* hel)

DESTROYERS 6:

DDGHM 3 *Daring* (Type-45) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 6 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/30 (*Sea Viper*) SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

DDHM 3 *Daring* (Type-45) with 6 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/30 (*Sea Viper*) SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

FRIGATES • **FFGHM** 12:

6 *Duke* (Type-23) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 1 32-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with *Sting Ray* LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 *Wildcat* or 1 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

6 *Duke* (Type-23) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84D *Harpoon* Block 1C ASHM, 1 32-cell VLS with *Sea Ceptor* SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with *Sting Ray* LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 *Wildcat* or 1 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26

PSO 8: 3 *River* Batch 1; 5 *River* Batch 2 with 1 hel landing platform

PBI 18: 16 *Archer* (14 in trg role, 2 deployed to Gibraltar sqn); 2 *Scimitar*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11

MCO 6 *Hunt* (incl 4 mod *Hunt*)

MHC 5 *Sandown*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2

LPD 2 *Albion* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5

AGB 1 *Protector* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 4: 1 *Scott*; 2 *Echo* (all with 1 hel landing platform); 1 *Magpie*

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has approximately 1,900 personnel with type comd under Fleet Commander

AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3:

LSD 3 *Bay* (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 CR2 *Challenger* 2 MBT; 350 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12

AOEH 4 *Tide* (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*/AW101 *Merlin* hel)

AORH 3: 2 *Wave*; 1 *Fort Victoria* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS

AG 1 *Argus* (primary casualty-receiving ship with secondary aviation trg ship role)

AKR 4 *Point* (not RFA manned)

Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,900

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

3 sqn with AW101 ASW *Merlin* HM2

2 sqn with AW159 *Wildcat* HMA2

TRAINING

1 sqn with Beech 350ER *King Air*

1 sqn with G-115

1 sqn with *Hawk* T1

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • **Light** 4 Beech 350ER *King Air* (*Avenger*)

TRG 16: 5 G-115; 11 *Hawk* T1

HELICOPTERS

ASW 58: 28 AW159 *Wildcat* HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW *Merlin* HM2

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **ASM** *Martlet*

Royal Marines 6,600

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (2 mne bn; 2 sy bn; 1 amph gp; 1 amph aslt sqn; 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt)

2 amph sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 *Viking* (incl 19 cabs with 81mm mor)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** FGM-148 *Javelin*

ARTILLERY 39

TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun

MOR 81mm 27 L16A1

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • **PB** 2 *Island*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 26

LCU 10 LCU Mk10 (capacity 4 *Viking* APC or 120 troops)

LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops)

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Point-defence** *Starstreak*

Royal Air Force 33,350**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3 (including one joint QTR-UK sqn)

1 sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3 (aggressor)

1 sqn with F-35B *Lightning* II

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with P-8A *Poseidon* (MRA Mk1)

ISR

1 sqn with *Shadow* R1

ELINT

1 sqn with RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with Bell 412EP *Griffin* HAR-2

TANKER/TRANSPORT

2 sqn with A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC2/3

TRANSPORT

1 (comms) sqn with AW109E/SP; BAe-146

2 sqn with A400M *Atlas*

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster*

1 sqn with C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with A400M *Atlas*; C-17A *Globemaster*; C-130J/J-30 *Hercules*

1 OCU sqn with F-35B *Lightning* II (forming)

1 OCU sqn with *Typhoon* FGR4/T3

1 OCU sqn with RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

1 sqn with EMB-500 *Phenom* 100

1 sqn with *Hawk* T1/1A/1W*

2 sqn with *Hawk* T2

1 sqn with T-6C *Texan* II

2 sqn with G-115E *Tutor*

COMBAT/ISR UAV

2 sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 234 combat capable

FGA 167: 23 F-35B *Lightning* II; 138 *Typhoon* FGR4; 6 *Typhoon* T3

ASW 8 P-8A *Poseidon* (MRA Mk1)

ISR 6 *Shadow* R1

ELINT 3 RC-135W *Rivet Joint*

AEW&C 3 E-3D *Sentry*

TKR/TPT 10: 3 A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC2; 7 A330 MRTT *Voyager* KC3

TPT 46: **Heavy** 28: 20 A400M *Atlas*; 8 C-17A *Globemaster*;

Medium 14: 1 C-130J *Hercules*; 13 C-130J-30 *Hercules*;

PAX 4 BAe-146 CC2/C3

TRG 164: 5 EMB-500 *Phenom* 100; 86 G-115E *Tutor*; 28 *Hawk* T2*; 31 *Hawk* T1/1A/1W* (€34 more in store); 14 T-6C *Texan* II

HELICOPTERS

MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Bell 412EP *Griffin* HAR-2

TPT • **Light** 3: 2 AW109E; 1 AW109SP

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 10 MQ-9A *Reaper*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) *Sidewinder*; IIR ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM; *Meteor*

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*; *Brimstone*; *Dual-Mode Brimstone*; *Brimstone* II

LACM *Storm Shadow*

BOMBS

Laser/GPS-guided GBU-10 *Paveway* II; GBU-24 *Paveway* III; Enhanced *Paveway* II/III; *Paveway* IV

Royal Air Force Regiment**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

6 sy sqn

Tri-Service Defence Helicopter School**FORCES BY ROLE****TRAINING**

1 hel sqn with Bell 412EP *Griffin* HT1

2 hel sqn with AS350B *Ecureuil*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS**

MRH 3 Bell 412EP *Griffin* HT1

TPT • **Light** 27: 25 AS350B *Ecureuil*; 2 AW109E

Volunteer Reserve Air Forces

(Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve)

MANOEUVRE**Other**

5 sy sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 int sqn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med sqn

1 (air movements) sqn

1 (HQ augmentation) sqn

1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt

UK Special Forces

Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (SAS) SF regt

1 (SBS) SF regt

1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt

1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn)

AVIATION

1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1

RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 sigs regt

Reserve**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

2 (SAS) SF regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**AUV 24 *Bushmaster* IMV**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL**MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; NLAW

DEPLOYMENT

ASCENSION ISLAND: 20**ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN:** 1 PSO; 1 AORH**ATLANTIC (SOUTH):** 1 PSO**BAHRAIN:** *Operation Kipton* 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD 1 naval base**BELIZE:** BATSUB 12**BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY:** 40; 1 navy/marine det**BRUNEI:** 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212**CANADA:** BATUS 370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 *Gazelle* AH1**CYPRUS:** 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 *Griffin* HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); *Operation Shader* 450; 1 FGA sqn with 6 *Typhoon* FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT *Voyager*; 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; UN • UNFICYP (*Operation Tosca*) 327; 1 inf coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 3**EGYPT:** MFO 2**ESTONIA:** NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (*Operation Cabrit*) 828; 1 armd regt HQ; 1 tk sqn; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy**FALKLAND ISLANDS:** 1,200; 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD det with *Land Ceptor*; 1 PSO; 1 frt flt with 4 *Typhoon* FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt flt with 1 A330 MRTT *Voyager*; 1 A400M; 1 hel flt with 2 *Chinook***GERMANY:** 185**GIBRALTAR:** 570 (incl Royal Gibraltar regt); 2 PBI**GULF OF GUINEA:** 40; 1 PSO**IRAQ:** *Operation Shader*/NATO Mission Iraq 100**KENYA:** BATUK 350; 1 trg unit**KUWAIT:** *Operation Shader* 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A *Reaper***LIBYA:** UN • UNSMIL (*Operation Tramal*) 1**MALI:** *Operation Barkhane* 90; 1 hel flt with 3 *Chinook* HC5; UN • MINUSMA (*Operation Newcombe*) 256; 1 recce sqn**NEPAL:** 60 (Gurkha trg org)**NIGERIA:** 80 (trg team)**OMAN:** 90**PACIFIC OCEAN:** 2 PSO**POLAND:** NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 140; 1 recce sqn**SAUDI ARABIA:** 50 (radar det)**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 35**SOMALIA:** 65 (trg team); UN • UNSOM (*Operation Praiser*) 2; UN • UNSOS (*Operation Catan*) 10**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS (*Operation Vogul*) 4**UKRAINE:** *Operation Orbital* 53 (trg team)**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:** 200; 1 tpt/tnr flt with C-17A *Globemaster*; A400M *Atlas*; A330 MRTT *Voyager* (on rotation)

FOREIGN FORCES

United StatesUS European Command: 9,500; 1 frt wg at RAF Lakenheath (1 frt sqn with 24 F-15C/D *Eagle*, 2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E *Strike Eagle*, 1 FGA sqn with F-35 *Lightning* II (forming); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T *Stratotanker*; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B *Osprey*; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J *Commando* II) • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 *Spacetrack* radar at Fylingdales Moor


Russia and Eurasia

- Russia's core defence budget saw a mild nominal increase in 2021 but fell by 1.8% in real terms as the inflation rate reached 5.9%. Similarly, while total military expenditure is estimated to have reached RUB4.59 trillion (USD62.2 billion) in 2021, up from RUB4.46trn (USD61.6bn) the year before, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% down to USD55.7bn (constant 2015 USD).
- In late 2021, attention was again focused on Russia's build-up of forces on the border with Ukraine and in Crimea. Russia's April 2021 deployments in the same areas, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, involved between 25% and 33% of Russia's total deployable ground forces. The November build-up again highlighted not just the resources Moscow could mobilise as part of its deployments, but also the supporting civilian – as well as military – infrastructure that enabled it to do so.
- Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new *Armata*, *Kurganets-25* and *Bumerang* platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-

vehicle fleet. The MoD signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M main battle tanks; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As.


- There was particular attention on the Airborne Forces (VDV) in exercise *Zapad* 2021. For the first time, the VDV practised a full battalion landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault.
- The navy continued testing sea-launched 3M22 *Tsirkon* hypersonic missiles, including the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the *Yasen* (Project 885) vessel *Severodvinsk*, in October. The first serial-production *Tsirkon* weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022.
- The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 *Fullback* bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons and reconnaissance pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR *Fencer* E.

Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2011–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)



Active military personnel – top 10


(25,000 per unit)




Russia's Military Districts



Russia: Self-propelled gun/howitzers, 2007–21



Russia: Su-34 and Su-35 numbers, 2014–21



Russia and Eurasia

Policy and strategy

In July 2021, President Vladimir Putin approved Russia's revised National Security Strategy (NSS), updating the previous document from December 2015. The principal changes in the new version do not relate only to military issues, with attention paid to what some Russian analysts have termed 'ideological issues' concerned with confronting Western influence. The argument offered is that some states were apparently looking to 'isolate Russia' and 'destroy its internal unity'. Indeed, there was a greater focus on Russia itself than before. Among the main non-military threats mentioned in the strategy was alleged activity in the information and psychological space directed at Russia from abroad, which aims to undermine traditional customs and beliefs and includes the 'westernisation' of Russian culture, indicating a concern about population security. Information security, meanwhile, was identified as a 'separate national strategic priority', according to Interfax (reporting after the NSS emerged) due to 'growing threats in the digital environment'. If anything, these factors reinforce the view that one of the strategy's key features was that it served to highlight Russia's persistently broad conception of security.

The United States is the only country named in the document within the context of military challenges to Russia (under the 'National Defence' section), notably the prospect of the US deploying medium- and short-range missiles to Europe and the Asia-Pacific – which were considered a 'threat to strategic stability and international security' – and also, as in previous strategies, US missile defence.

The NSS also criticised the 'build-up' of NATO military infrastructure near Russia's borders. Reflecting the general state of relations, in October 2021 Moscow said that it would suspend Russia's mission to NATO and withdraw the accreditation of the NATO Information Office in Moscow and the Alliance's liaison mission at the Belgian embassy. Earlier that month, NATO had withdrawn the accreditation of eight members of Russia's NATO mission, asserting that they were undeclared intelligence officers. The NATO–Russia Council remains, though this body has

not met since 2019. The NSS indicated, according to Interfax, Moscow's view that 'the desire of Western states to retain their hegemony' increases 'inter-state differences ... and makes the global security system less efficient'. The document reflected, according to some Western analysts, a 'more transactional view of international relations'.

Russia's new Defence Plan until 2025 also came into force in 2021 (it was signed by the president in November 2020). As before, this document – which sets out threat perceptions and outlines force dispositions and weapons programmes – is classified but, while there is little information available on its content, analysts understand that it addresses non-military as well as military threats.

Structural changes

On 1 January 2021, the Northern Fleet became Russia's fifth military district. However, the Fleet has for several years held an independent status only slightly lower than that of a district, meaning that its reclassification did not bring significant structural changes.

This upgrade nonetheless reflects the increased prominence given to the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route in Russia's strategic plans. There has for some time been an aspiration to improve Russia's military infrastructure and deployments in the Arctic. The region featured in the NSS, with the document indicating that Moscow considered that efforts focused on climate change and environmental factors could be used as an excuse to hinder Russian development of the Arctic. January 2021 saw MiG-31BM *Foxhound* C fighters begin patrols over the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya (flying from Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemlya).

Aircraft also conducted a test landing on Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago, even further north. The hard-surface airfield, opened in 2020 at Nagurskoye air base on Alexandra Land, is intended to enable the year-round deployment of aircraft. There are also plans to build heated hangars for storing and servicing aircraft. In March 2021 a pair of MiG-31BMs conducted a demonstration flight from Nagurskoye to the North Pole and back.

This was part of the ‘integrated Arctic expedition’ *Umka 2021*, which featured three ballistic missile submarines surfacing from under the ice in close proximity and also, according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an exercise involving elements of a motor-rifle brigade. Subsequently, some of the Northern Fleet’s Su-33 *Flanker D* fighters were also sent on rotation to the Arctic islands. The group of forces in northeastern Russia is another reflection of Moscow’s military focus on the region; these troops are mainly drawn from the Pacific Fleet and operate to the east of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago up to the Kamchatka Peninsula. To the east, a flight of navy MiG-31BM fighters from Kamchatka was despatched to Anadyr on the Chukotka Peninsula bordering Alaska; the plan was to ultimately deploy Su-35S *Flanker M* fighters to Kamchatka.

Aerospace and Ground Forces air-defence units have been moved to islands in the Russian Far East. The 1724th SAM Regiment of the Eastern Military District was redeployed to Sakhalin in 2021, and one of its two battalions was re-equipped with the S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*) as part of the move. At the end of 2020, an S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) battalion from the Eastern Military District’s Ground Forces was noted on the Kuril Islands.

In European Russia, while changes continue to take place in the Southern Military District, there has been emphasis also on structural reforms in the west and northwest. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that threats to Russia from NATO in the west had intensified and that the plan was to create 20 new formations and military units in the Western Military District by the end of 2021.

Kaliningrad has been a focus of these moves. In late 2020, the 18th Motor-Rifle Division was stood up there as part of the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps, formed out of the Corps’ existing tank regiment and motor-rifle brigade. Although the 18th Division was therefore initially drawn from personnel already deployed in Kaliningrad, fully staffing the division will have the effect of increasing the number of military personnel permanently stationed in the Russian exclave. It has already begun receiving new equipment, such as T-72B3M main battle tanks (MBTs).

Two more divisions are also now being established in the Southern Military District. The 19th Motor-Rifle Division and the 20th Motor-Rifle Division were created in 2020 and 2021 respectively by converting the existing 19th and 20th Motor-Rifle Brigades.

Unlike previous Southern Military District divisions, which were formed near to Russia’s borders with Georgia and Ukraine, the 20th is currently based deep inside the country in the Volga region, though it is understood to be assigned to the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) based at Novocherkassk. The long-held ambition to permanently base an additional Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment in Crimea seems to have been achieved and is in effect the re-scaling of the former 56th Air Assault Brigade to regimental size and its posting to Crimea under the 7th Air Assault Division. That such a move ultimately required the cannibalisation of an important existing formation suggests that tension remains between Russia’s ambitions in terms of force structure and the personnel available to meet them.

Having in recent years established a permanent set of forces near the borders of Ukraine, with 28 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) under the command of the 8th and 20th CAAs and the 22nd Army Corps, in April 2021 Russia demonstrated that these could be further strengthened. To exert political pressure on Ukraine, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, around 20 additional BTGs from the Ground Forces and the VDV with 15,000–18,000 personnel deployed from across the country to its borders and to Crimea. These reinforcements were primarily drawn from formations of the 58th CAA from the North Caucasus (Southern Military District) and the 41st CAA from the Central Military District, as well as elements from the VDV’s 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions and were further bolstered when elements of the 98th Air Assault Division participated in a parachute drop in the exercises. Forces began to pull back a month later, though an increased presence was maintained at the border in field camps in the summer, supporting the elements of the 41st CAA later deployed in the *Zapad 2021* exercise. In August, Shoigu announced that there was a total of 168 BTGs distributed between the Ground Forces, Naval Infantry and Airborne Forces, suggesting that the Ukraine build-up involved between 25% and 33% of Russia’s total deployable ground forces. A subsequent build-up in November aroused concern over Russia’s intentions, with some US sources positing that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine. However, this again highlighted not just the resources Russia could mobilise in its deployments but also the supporting civilian and military facilities and structures that enabled it to do so, not least the infrastructure it has in recent years built up in areas close to the border with Ukraine.

Personnel

According to the MoD, in the spring of 2021 the proportion of conscripts had fallen to about 30% of force strength. In the spring conscription campaign, 134,000 people were recruited and the plan was to call up 128,500 people in autumn. These figures have remained virtually unchanged for three years, though of course not all of these conscripts go to the armed forces, with some assigned to other organisations such as the National Guard or the Emergencies Ministry.

A year earlier, it was reported that, in total, 405,000 contract soldiers and 225,000 conscripts were serving in the armed forces and, with the MoD claiming in January 2021 that the ratio of contract to conscript personnel was 1.8 to 1, these figures were still, officially, broadly accurate. At that time, the MoD said that contractors had increased by 30,000 in 2020 and had more than doubled in number since 2012 (the year Shoigu was appointed).

A trial began in August, in the Southern Military District, to create a high-readiness mobilisation reserve force, called the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS). Civilians are being encouraged to sign a contract for three years as reserve soldiers, sergeants and officers, and they are then posted to a specific military unit and to a position within it. Once a year, the reservists will attend military-training camps for three weeks with two to three training days per month. In total, it is planned to recruit 38,000 of these reservists in the Southern Military District. The overall intent would seem to be not only to bolster overall reserve numbers but also to create a mobilisation reserve that addresses one of the concerns relating to skill fade that accompanied the old mobilisation model.

Ground and Airborne forces

Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new *Armata*, *Kurganets-25* and *Bumerang* platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-vehicle fleet. It signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M MBTs; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As.

Based on experience of the war in Syria, the army's most numerous tank – the T-72B3 – has started to receive additional protection for urban operations. For the first time, this includes removable cage or lattice armour covering the top part of the turret, likely intended to protect not only against fire directed from the upper floors of buildings, but

also against top attack from some types of anti-tank missile or uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). It was announced at the Army 2021 exhibition that BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles would also receive cage armour sets and explosive reactive armour during a modernisation programme.

In early 2021, the Ground Forces received the first batch of 20 *Uran-9* uninhabited ground vehicles (UGVs). The 13-tonne armoured vehicles are equipped with a 30mm autocannon, an anti-tank guided-missile system and a launcher capable of firing thermobaric grenades. The contract has been ongoing for several years, though Russian analysts report that tests in urban combat in Syria left mixed impressions and that a final decision has yet to be made on the programme's future. Meanwhile, a contract was signed for an experimental batch of *Shturm* UGVs. These have been developed from the T-72B3 main battle tank and are intended for urban-combat operations. It is understood that they will receive a shortened 125mm main gun and secondary weapons such as autocannons and unguided rockets. The Ground Forces are developing several small armed UAVs and have tested some on exercise. Russian analysts also report that a range of guided munitions has been developed (weights of 100kg, 50kg and 20kg were noted), and that loitering munitions were under development.

Small UAVs with laser designators were tested during the *Zapad* 2021 exercise as well as in Syria. Although they do not carry weapons themselves, they illuminate targets that are then engaged by artillery units firing guided 152mm artillery shells and 120mm mortar rounds. There was particular attention on the VDV in *Zapad* 2021. For the first time, they practised a full battalion-landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault with associated equipment; the troops were equipped with night vision devices. Meanwhile, the Railway Troops have begun building a 340 km-section of the second line of the Baikal–Amur railway in Eastern Siberia; this is scheduled for completion in 2024.

Aerospace Forces

Several multi-year contracts were completed in 2020, which meant that there were fewer deliveries of new combat aircraft and helicopters in 2021 than in recent years. That said, Russia's defence industry continues to experience problems in the serial production of new types of aircraft.

The first series-production Su-57 *Felon* joined the flight-test programme in December 2020. However, it was not delivered to a front-line unit, but was instead sent to the 929th State Flight Test Centre at Akhtubinsk. Perhaps up to three more of these aircraft are planned to be delivered by the end of 2021, with entry into service still some way off. According to the procurement plan, the first deliveries of the 'tranche two' Su-57, with a new, more powerful engine and improved avionics, will begin no earlier than 2024.

One new system has attracted publicity but no interest so far from customers, the *Checkmate* single-engine fighter, a full-scale model of which was exhibited in July 2021 and shown to the president. However, as a number of journalists observed, he was not accompanied by armed forces personnel, perhaps indicating not just that there may be little MoD interest in the project, but also that it may be aimed at export markets.

The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 *Fullback* bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons- and reconnaissance-pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR *Fencer E*.

The fatal crash of the prototype of the Il-112V light military transport aircraft in August 2021 dealt a serious blow to plans to update the Aerospace Forces' transport aviation. The Il-112V is intended to replace the ageing An-26 *Curl*. The MoD admitted that the crash was a further setback in its effort to replace the An-26. Delivery of an upgraded version of the Il-76 *Candid*, the Il-76MD-90A, is also progressing more slowly than desired, which has prompted a new production line to be developed for the aircraft at Ulyanovsk. The aim is to be able to manufacture 10–12 aircraft a year.

There has been some progress in army aviation. Even though tests of the upgraded Ka-52M *Hokum* were not complete, a contract was signed in August 2021 for the supply of 30 production aircraft in 2022–23. The Ka-52M and the Mi-28NM *Havoc* (which was combat tested in Syria) will be able to carry the KBM Item 305 air-to-surface missile, providing both types with a longer-range air-to-surface weapon. The missile has a range of 15 km.

UAV progress

Up to 21 *Inokhodets* (also known as *Orion*) medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs are planned to be

delivered to the defence ministry by the end of 2023. Each system consists of three air vehicles and ground station and datalink equipment. The UAV is intended for air-to-surface attack as well as for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. Until *Inokhodets* enters service, Russia's most capable UAV remains the *Forpost*, a version of the Israel Aircraft Industries' *Searcher II*. An improved UAV, the *Forpost-R*, has been developed domestically and is reportedly capable of carrying small munitions.

The most ambitious project remains in development: Sukhoi's S-70 *Okhotnik* uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. In order to complete development work, the prototype will be joined by three more airframes that are under construction. The MoD has asked industry to accelerate development and start delivery of pre-production vehicles in 2024 rather than 2025.

After a long delay, the first radar-equipped *Pion-NKS* satellite for the *Liana* space-reconnaissance system was launched in June 2021. The system is designed to detect warships and provide targeting information for long-range anti-ship missiles. The system already has three satellites in orbit for passive electronic reconnaissance. To provide global coverage, it will be necessary to significantly expand the number of satellites in the constellation, particularly those with active radars. A key development in air defence remains the roll-out of the S-500 ballistic-missile-defence surface-to-air missile system. Meanwhile, deliveries of S-400 systems continue. Four regiments were delivered in 2020, and two more were due before the end of 2021.

Navy

In 2021, the Caspian Sea Flotilla finished relocating its ships and headquarters from Astrakhan on the Volga River to newly built ice-free bases on the Caspian Sea in the cities of Makhachkala and Kaspiysk. This transfer was agreed in 2018, and the Flotilla now has much quicker access to the Caspian Sea than before.


Despite industry presenting the MoD with several versions of the proposed *Lider* nuclear-powered destroyer, and an aircraft carrier, the navy remains sceptical about the capacity of Russia's defence industry to build such large and complex warship designs. As a result, Russian analysts consider that the MoD is in no hurry to order larger units and that no major announcements can be expected before the adoption of the State Armament Programme (SAP) for 2024–33.

▼ Figure 10 Russia *Yasen/Yasen-M* (Project 885/08851 (*Severodvinsk* I/II)) SSGN


The *Yasen/Yasen-M* Project 885/08851 (*Severodvinsk* I/II)) SSGN class heralds a long-awaited capability increase for Russia's nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet. Hailed as a 'multi-role platform', the class is able to engage land targets in addition to surface and sub-surface vessels. Key to this is the inclusion of a vertical launch system (VLS) – a first for a Russian submarine not designed to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles – likely permitting a greater number of embarked guided missiles than previous designs. Designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau, these boats are a further significant departure from Soviet-era design convention, featuring a spherical sonar array in the bow – common in US boats from the 1960s – instead of cylindrical array, and a 'one-and-a-half' hull design as opposed to the double hull seen in earlier Russian boats. Construction of the lead *Yasen* (Project 885 (*Severodvinsk* I)) was hampered by financial constraints, but procurement of subsequent *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk* II)) boats is now proceeding at a steady tempo. These slightly shortened 'serial production' submarines are believed to incorporate further design improvements and refinements, with US officials describing them as now 'on par' with their current *Virginia*-class SSGN in terms of acoustic detectability. Despite the *Yasen-M*'s greater displacement, when compared to the *Virginia*-class, it reportedly requires less than half the crew complement with only 64 personnel – suggesting reliance on a much higher degree of automation.

In 2019, Malakhit showed a model of what could be a successor design, designated *Laika* (Project 545). The model indicated that this may be a slightly smaller design, with an apparent reversion to a cylindrical bow sonar, though accompanied by what appeared to be a conformal array running along almost the entire flank of the hull.

Procurement timeline



Yasen-M (*Severodvinsk* II)



Vertical launch system (VLS)

The VLS is dedicated to launching a range of guided cruise missiles, with eight payload tubes each typically configured as a 4-cell launcher allowing up to 32 *Kalibr*-family missiles to be carried or an unknown unconfirmed number *Oniks* or *Tsirkon* missiles.

LACM	ASHM
<p>3M14K <i>Kalibr</i>-PL (SS-N-30A <i>Sagaris</i>) Dual Capable</p>	<p>3M55 <i>Oniks</i> (SS-N-26 <i>Strobile</i>)</p>
<p>3M54K1 (SS-N-27)</p>	<p>3M54K (SS-N-27B <i>Sizzler</i>)</p>
<p>3M22 <i>Tsirkon</i>⁺ (in test)⁽¹⁾</p>	
<p>Not to scale *dimensions unknown</p> <p>Kalibr Complex</p>	

Bow configuration

The *Yasen* is Russia's first operational nuclear submarine class to feature a spherical bow sonar array which can provide a wider field of view particularly in the vertical (depth) axis compared to previous cylindrical arrays. Its comparatively larger size led to the repositioning of the torpedo tubes aft of the sonar, slanted outwards either side of the centreline.

Exact position, size and number remains unconfirmed

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Sources: IISS; *Izvestia*
 [1] *Novosibirsk* reportedly to be commissioned by end 2021 [2] *Arkhangelsk* reportedly to be launched by end 2021 [3] Some sources indicate torpedo tubes reduced to 8 for *Yasen-M* [4] Initial surface and subsurface test launches of 3M22 *Tsirkon* conducted from *Kazan* in October 2021

Due to delays in the supply of propulsion components, the completion of repairs to the aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* has been postponed to 2023. For similar reasons, the long-running overhaul and modernisation of the *Admiral Nakhimov* nuclear-powered cruiser has also been further delayed.

Otherwise, much attention was focused on the navy's continued testing of sea-launched 3M22 *Tsirkon* hypersonic missiles, including in October the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the *Yasen* (Project 885) vessel *Severodvinsk*. The special-mission submarine *Belgorod*, designed among other reasons to deploy the *Poseidon* nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle, also began sea trials in June. In August 2021, contracts were signed for the delivery of the final version of *Tsirkon* and an additional batch of air-launched *Kinzhal* (RS-AS-24 *Killjoy*) missiles. The quantity was not disclosed. The first serial-production *Tsirkon* weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022.

On 23 August, two Project 955A *Borey-A* nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) were laid down – the ninth and tenth so far of the type, including the original three Project 955 *Borey*-class (*Dolgorukiy*) SSBNs. They are scheduled to be commissioned in 2026 and 2027. The plan is that by that time all versions of the Soviet-era *Kalmar* (*Delta III*) and *Delfin* (*Delta IV*) SSBNs will be withdrawn from service. It is possible that a decision will be made to build additional *Boreys* or upgraded versions of them. There are continued reports that design work has started on a fifth-generation SSBN, but there is no information on the proposed design.

The third improved *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk II*)) nuclear-powered submarine, *Krasnoyarsk*, was launched at the end of July. These boats have been developed from the prototype, the *Severodvinsk*. The first submarine of the improved design, the *Kazan*, was accepted in May 2021 after lengthy sea trials and weapons tests. In March 2021, the launch took place of the third of six non-nuclear submarines of the *Varshavyanka*-class (Project 06363 (*Improved Kilo*)) intended for the Pacific Fleet. Construction of all this batch is planned to end in 2024. There are reports of plans to equip the Baltic Fleet with a further improved version of the design.

Serious problems continue to trouble the alternative *Lada* (Project 677 (*Petersburg*)) non-nuclear submarine design. Completion is more than three years overdue, according to the latest schedule revi-

sion, and difficulty in developing an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system has meant plans to fit AIP to this class have so far been abortive. Nonetheless, it has been announced that two more of these submarines are expected to be laid down – the fourth and fifth so far, with a sixth reportedly also on order – although whether any of these will receive AIP remains uncertain. At the time of writing, only the prototype of the class was in service.

Procurement continues of the Project 22350 (*Gorshkov*) frigates that will be the mainstay of the navy's modern blue-water surface capability for the foreseeable future. The third vessel, the *Admiral Golovko*, is being fitted out and has received the first Russian-made gas turbines intended for the class in place of Ukrainian engines; these supply problems contributed to delays in the programme. According to Russian media reports, a further substantially more modified and enlarged design, the Project 22350M, is planned, with the first vessel to be laid down in 2023. Full-load displacement would increase from some 5,400 to 8,000 tonnes.

At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet accepted the third small missile corvette of the *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) class, the *Odintsovo*, which is capable of carrying the 3M14 *Kalibr* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) land-attack cruise missile and the 3M55 *Onyx* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) anti-ship missile. Unlike its predecessors, which had only rudimentary defence against aerial threats, this ship has been fitted with the *Pantsir-M* air-defence missile system. Subsequent ships in the series will also be equipped with *Pantsir-M*.

Construction has started on two Project 23900 'universal landing ships' or large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs) at the Kerch shipyard in Crimea. The first of these LHDs is expected to be built and handed over to the navy by 2028. At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet received the second Project 11711 (*Gren*) tank landing ship (LST), the *Pyotr Morgunov*. Two more ships are under construction as part of this project, with a much-modified landing platform dock (LPD) design. These LPDs are expected to have increased displacement and improved amphibious landing capability.

Strategic Rocket Forces

According to the MoD, the share of new technology in the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) has grown from 40% to 83% over the past six years. Most progress has been made in recapitalising the mobile RS-12PM *Topol* and RS-12PM2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27

mod 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles with the new RS-24 *Yars* and RS-24 *Yars-S*. Four of the seven road-mobile intercontinental ballistic-missile divisions, the 14th, 29th, 39th and 42nd, have fully converted to *Yars/Yars-S*, while one more division (35th) should complete conversion to *Yars-S* by the end of 2021. Of the other two divisions, the 54th is operating a mix of *Yars* and *Topol-M* and only the 7th is still operating the original *Topol* systems. The plan is to retire both *Topol* and *Topol-M* in 2024.

It has proven more difficult for the RVSN to replace its silo-based heavy liquid-propellant missiles. The silo version of *Yars* is being delivered to the 28th Missile Division in the Kaluga region. The rearmament of regiments equipped with the ageing RS-18 and RS-20 designs in three other missile divisions is still on hold due to the delay in testing the RS-28 *Sarmat* (RS-SS-X-29) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). None of the three scheduled *Sarmat* test launches had taken place by the beginning of October 2021, which means the plan to put into service the first of these missiles in 2022 will likely not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, work to re-equip silos and auxiliary infrastructure for them is already underway at the 62nd Missile Division in Krasnoyarsk Territory. Meanwhile, the 13th Missile Division plans to finish rearming its first silo regiment with the *Avangard* hypersonic boost-glide vehicle system by the end of 2021. It has already converted four silos to house the interim modified RS-18 launch vehicle, and a final two are expected to be complete by the end of the year. A second regiment of the same type is planned to achieve initial capability by the end of 2023.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics and defence spending

The Russian economy faced severe headwinds in the wake of the 2014–16 oil-price crash, with economic growth averaging just 0.94% between 2014 and 2019. Military spending grew rapidly from 2012–15, with a surge in spending on the State Armament Programme (SAP), but it declined in both nominal and real terms during 2016–18, and then recovered modestly in 2019, as shown in Table 6. However, the coronavirus pandemic derailed this mild recovery, as the 2020 drop in oil prices, reduction in global economic activity and domestic lockdown restrictions resulted in a 3.1% contraction in real GDP. Despite this, Russia's core 'National Defence' budget increased in 2020 and rose sharply as a percentage of GDP,

from 2.7% to 3.0%. Total military expenditure, which includes elements such as military housing and pensions that are sourced from other budget areas, increased from 3.9% of GDP in 2019 to 4.2% in 2020.


The federal budget for 2021 was based on a forecast real GDP growth rate of 3.3% and proposed a mild nominal reduction in defence funding from RUB3.17 trillion (USD43.8 billion) in 2020 to RUB3.12tr (USD42.3bn). However, as the economic outlook improved – the IMF estimate is that 2021 real GDP growth will reach 4.7% in Russia – the budget was amended upwards to RUB3.38tr (USD58.8bn) which meant that it constituted a 0.3 percentage point increase over 2020.


In real terms, however, the core budget fell from USD41.7bn to USD41.0bn (constant 2021 USD). Similarly, while total military expenditure is estimated to have reached RUB4.59tr (USD66.1bn) in 2021, up from RUB4.46tr (USD61.6bn) in 2020, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% because of Russia's 5.9% inflation rate in 2021. The 2021 budget also fell as a proportion of GDP to 3.8%.

In 2020 the MoD indicated that the main target of the SAP for 2011–20 – that the inventory of military equipment at the end of this period comprise 70% of 'modern military equipment and other military equipment' – had been reached. The growth rate of military spending started to moderate, and this trend is expected to continue to 2024. The budget law for 2022–24 provides for nominal increases for defence, though as a percentage of GDP, total military spending would fall from 4.2% in 2021 to less than 3.4% by 2024.

The scale of the annual state defence budget for 2021 has not been revealed but analysts

▼ Figure 11 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP





▲ Map 3 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending¹

that it will be approximately RUB1.5tr (USD20.3bn), similar to that of 2020. This means that in real terms it is now declining.

Although the coronavirus pandemic has had a serious impact on Russia's economic performance, defence-industrial output has not been significantly

affected. The recovery in the first nine months of 2021 was aided by an increase in oil price. This boosted budget revenues because, while the 2021 budget was based on a forecast of USD45.3 per barrel, the actual price from January–August averaged USD65 per barrel.

Table 6 Russia: defence expenditure, 2011–21

Year	'National Defence'			Annual state defence order (SDO)		Total military expenditure ¹			
	RUB (trillion)	USD ² (billion)	% of GDP ³	RUB (trillion) ⁴	As % 'ND'	RUB (trillion)	USD ² (billion)	% of GDP ³	% change real terms
2021 ⁵	3.381	41.0	2.78	1.500	48.1	4.590 ⁶	55.7	3.77	-5.2
2020	3.169	41.7	2.96	1.500	47.3	4.460	58.8	4.17	5.0
2019	2.997	39.8	2.74	1.500	50.1	4.211	56.0	3.85	4.0
2018	2.827	38.8	2.72	1.450	51.3	3.928	53.8	3.78	-3.6
2017	2.666 ⁷	40.2	2.90	1.400	52.5	3.704 ⁷	55.8	4.03	-8.2
2016	2.982 ⁷	47.3	3.48	1.600	53.7	3.831 ⁷	60.8	4.47	-7.5
2015	3.181	51.9	3.83	1.800	56.6	4.026	65.7	4.85	16.4
2014	2.479	43.4	3.14	1.450	58.5	3.224	56.5	4.08	7.6
2013	2.104	39.6	2.89	0.894	42.5	2.787	52.5	3.82	5.6
2012	1.812	35.9	2.66	0.677	37.4	2.505	49.7	3.68	13.4
2011	1.516	32.7	2.52	0.575	37.9	2.029	43.8	3.38	3.6

1. According to the NATO definition. 2. Constant 2015 USD. 3. GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2021. 4. Approximate; the annual SDO is classified but every few years an approximate total is released. 5. As budget listing, 1 September 2021. 6. Estimate based on higher 2021 'National Defence' budget listing on 1 September 2021. 7. Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits. If this debt payment is included, the total GDP share in 2016 rises to 5.4%, and 4.2% in 2017.

However, one issue for the defence industry is that the cost of some weapons has increased, including a 25% increase in the cost of naval ships arising from increased metals prices. Without compensation by the MoD from budget sources, rising costs could further undermine the profitability of many companies, exacerbating the problem of large accumulated debts experienced during recent years.

Weapons procurement

The key objective of SAP 2020 was to increase the share of modern weapons in the inventory to 70%. By the end of 2020 it is reported to have reached 70.1% and 71.9% is forecast for the end of 2021, with a goal to reach 72.9% at the end of 2023.

Within the framework of SAP 2020, the rate at which the annual SDO delivery targets have been met has proven to be uneven, with signs that it moderated over time – notably for combat aircraft, with deliveries dipping after 2016. Meanwhile, surface ships saw uneven delivery rates after 2015, though this reflected the problem of replacing power units previously obtained from Ukraine with domestically-sourced alternatives. Unfortunately (and perhaps to conceal the extent of the slowdown) there has been reduced transparency, with less reliable information published on both SDO plans and on its implementation.

The annual SDO is now based on the SAP to 2027, which was signed off by President Vladimir Putin in early 2018. Total funding of approximately RUB19tr (USD257bn) is to be allocated over the course of SAP 2027, plus an additional RUB1tr (USD13.5bn) for infrastructure relating to the deployment of new systems. Work has begun on the next SAP, for the years 2024–33, although this is hampered to some extent by the lack of a new long-term economic forecast on which firm funding decisions can be based. Provisionally it is expected to get at least RUB21–22tr (USD284–298bn) – in monetary terms much the same as earlier programmes – but in real terms much less. In preparation, the MoD will produce a document called ‘Basic Directions of Development of Armaments, Military and Special Equipment to 2038’ (‘special equipment’ being the term used for systems intended for the security services). There will also be a report to the president with an analysis and evaluation of security threats out to the year 2053.

Defence industry

The Ministry of Industry and Trade confirmed that defence-industrial output in 2020 was affected by the coronavirus pandemic, contracting by 7.7% compared with a growth of 1.7% in 2019. Output intended for exports, meanwhile, fell by almost 15% in 2020, following a 13.5% increase in 2019. Total employment across the sector remains relatively stable, with around two million working at almost 1,900 enterprises and research and development establishments.

There have been no significant new organisational changes across the sector since the United Aviation Corporation (UAC) was absorbed into the Rostec state corporation. UAC is still undergoing internal restructuring, and there is a plan to merge the administrative and management functions of UAC subsidiaries into two new organisations dealing with aircraft manufacturers and design bureaux. However, the Sukhoi and MiG design bureaux will remain independent. The head office of the United Shipbuilding Corporation has now been relocated to St Petersburg, leaving in Moscow some departments that require regular direct contact with central government agencies.

In 2017, when it became clear that the rate of growth of the annual SDO was going to moderate, authorities set an ambition for defence industries to diversify into the field of civil-sector high-technology. This process is progressing gradually, but is not without its problems. In 2020, the civil-sector share of total defence-industrial output reached 25.6% compared with 24% in 2019. Efforts are now focused on reaching the 2025 target of 30%. Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, who is responsible for the defence industry, said at a meeting with Putin in July 2021 that the peak of deliveries under the SDO had been passed, making attention to diversification more important, and that prospects for increasing weapons exports were not favourable. A large role is being played by the main bank serving the defence industry, Promsvyazbank, which has established a separate division to fund the development of new civilian projects and to give advice to companies. According to its head, Anton Drozdov, about one-third of enterprises have a civilian-focused output of less than 5%. In his view, at least RUB2tr (US27.1bn) will be required to finance the diversification programme, but there is a problem in that many of the proposed projects are of low quality, and the top managers of the defence companies are insufficiently motivated

to focus on issues other than the implementation of military contracts under the SDO and for export. There is now interest in developing closer relations between companies in the defence sector and civilian firms, encouraging the latter to take on some defence work. There has, for instance, been growing interest in China's experiences in the area of 'military-civil fusion'. Overall, according to Minister for Industry and Trade Denis Manturov, defence-industrial output has increased by 38% and labour productivity by almost 40% since 2014. He forecasts, notwithstanding the pandemic, that output will have increased by 5–6% in 2020.

Defence exports

The value of Russian arms exports has in recent years been relatively stable, notwithstanding the imposition of sanctions on some countries that have bought weapons from Russia and also the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, the volume of sales increased in 2020. Export volumes are measured as 'military-industrial cooperation', which includes the sale of weapons and other military equipment, components, licence sales, repairs, servicing and training. The annual volume reported by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is shown in Table 7. The increase may relate to revenues earned by the widening network of repair facilities organised in recipient countries by Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company responsible for managing over three-quarters of all sales.

In June 2021, the director of the FSVTS, Dmitri Shugaev, forecast that total exports in 2021 would reach about USD15bn, with a portfolio of orders at the beginning of the year of more than USD50bn. In July 2021, Aleksandr Mikheev, the general director of Rosoboronexport, claimed that most transactions are not in dollars but in roubles or the currencies of purchasing countries, with the increasing use of offset agreements. However, reaching agreements on terms can be problematic. It has been claimed,

for example, that Indonesia's purchase of 11 Su-35s, agreed in 2018, has still not been implemented as Jakarta wants to make payment in goods such as palm oil, but the terms offered have not been acceptable to Moscow. But the principle accords with a concerted effort by Russia to reduce the use of dollars in foreign trade in order to minimise the impact of US sanctions.

ARMENIA

After its defeat in the 44-day war with Azerbaijan in September–November 2020, Armenia was faced with the task of rebuilding and reforming its armed forces in light of the conflict and a changed strategic environment. There is, according to some Armenian analysts, a perception in the country that Armenia's lack of a sufficient quantity and quality of attack and reconnaissance uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the armed forces, and Azerbaijan's extensive use of these, played a decisive role in the defeat.

UAVs did play an important role, but this can be overstated. The war revealed other significant problems in Armenia's armed forces, including poor mobility as well as ageing communications and command-and-control and reconnaissance systems. Institutional challenges were also highlighted, including in the threat assessment process, the provision of supplies and logistics support during combat, political management during wartime and staffing decisions in the army, as well as in the mobilisation system. For example, according to several high-ranking officers, by the time hostilities began, many units had not been withdrawn from their permanent bases in a timely manner and deployed.

Martial law and mobilisation were declared on 27 September 2020 but the call-up of reservists during hostilities raised questions even at the time. For example, on 21 October, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan urged citizens to organise them-

Table 7 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
FSVTS military-technical cooperation	14.5	15.0	15.3	16.0	15.2	15.0
Rosoboronexport	13.0	13.0	13.4	13.7	11.0	13.0
TsAMTO arms sales	11.2	11.4	12.5	15.1	14.1	
% of world arms sales	15.0	14.0	14.4	17.8	15.4	

FSVTS: Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. TsAMTO: Centre for the Analysis of the World Trade in Arms, Moscow. The centre measures all arms exports in terms of current USD.

selves into volunteer platoons of 30 men each, select a commander and apply to the military enlistment office. There was a mobilisation plan, but Armenian sources report that reservist call-ups had faced problems in recent years, with many call-up notices ignored and administrative challenges in posting reservist officers to the right occupation (such as artillery officers being mobilised as motorised infantry officers). Combined with low numbers of major call-up drills, these factors meant that the mobilisation system suffered significant problems during the conflict. Indeed, some Armenian analysts judge that during the war, the country was unable to significantly increase its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, neither through regular army units nor through mobilised reservists, while questions were raised about the organisation, preparedness and management of those forces that were mobilised. Pashinyan's administration was heavily criticised in a letter published by the General Staff in February. It demanded his resignation and was described by Pashinyan as a 'coup attempt'. (Pashinyan subsequently resigned, prompting a June election, perhaps intended to regain legitimacy in the army.)

Meanwhile, it was not clear whether in the aftermath of the war there was significant progress on a lessons-learned process, or a meaningful public or expert debate on this or on the future shape of the armed forces; indeed, it took until August 2021 for reform proposals to be laid before parliament. However, the authorities in Yerevan argue that military reform had already started, as was said by Deputy Minister of Defence Arman Sargsyan on 16 March 2021, when speaking at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues. He said the priority was to create a more capable and professional army.

A month later Pashinyan confirmed, during his election campaign, a plan to transition to a professional army. He also said that 'the conscription system should be changed completely, the period of service should be shortened: there is an idea that every five years there should be a three-month service, so that young people learn basic combat skills'.

This was also reflected in his party's electoral programme for the June elections. It mentioned the ambition to professionalise Armenia's armed forces. It also said that the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army should become fully professional and that the Russian peacekeeping force located in Nagorno-

Karabakh and in the Lachin corridor constituted a security guarantee for Nagorno-Karabakh.

The party's programme also envisaged replacing army units on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border with border guards from Armenia's National Security Service. Later, on 22 August, Armenia's Chief of General Staff (CGS) Artak Davtyan confirmed that the army was being replaced by border guards in some areas. (At the same time, Davtyan stressed that the armed forces carry out the tasks set by the political leadership of the country, perhaps with an eye to the events of earlier in 2021.) There have also been references in the Armenian press to the possibility that Russian border guards could be involved in border duties, as well as statements by officials, such as those in June 2021 by the Governor of Gegharkunik region Gnel Sanosyan, the First Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan and CGS Davtyan.

Later, on 30 June, Andranik Kocharyan, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues and a member of the ruling party, said in an interview that the reforms underway involve 'new armaments; new, intelligent command and control; and a professional army'. According to Kocharyan, the professionalisation process will reduce personnel numbers while citizens of conscription age will undergo a training programme leading to recruitment into the army. While Kocharyan did not confirm the duration of this training, analysts consider that this was the same as that mentioned by Pashinyan when he spoke about a three-month period of service once every five years.

After months of uncertainty, on 18 August Pashinyan announced the government's programme for 2021–26. This was later submitted to parliament and approved. The 90-page document devotes three pages to defence. It confirmed the intention to cease conscription and gradually shift to a contract-based army, and also said that a new military doctrine and a national defence plan would be developed. Other plans included the intention to introduce an automated command-and-control system; to establish territorial defence, active reserve and militia training systems; to generate mobile formations and units with heavy weapons and the ability to conduct independent combat operations; and to improve military-technical cooperation with Russia to help the recapitalisation process.

Some practical steps emerged in August. The government amended the regulations of the General Staff, adding to its structure a Territorial Defence

and Reserve Forces Command and an Armed Forces Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Department. In addition, plans appeared to set up a new Special Army Corps, which, according to Armenian specialists, included the remnants of the 1st Army Corps (which suffered heavy losses in the conflict) and the 4th Army Corps. The new corps appears to be engaged on border protection tasks. Meanwhile, the creation of a territorial-defence system was envisaged in a pre-war draft law that was submitted for public discussion on 24 August 2020 but was not adopted. Nevertheless, the creation of the separate UAV directorate seems to reflect the view that UAVs played a decisive role in the defeat. However, it is not clear how a separate UAV directorate will cooperate with the air force and air defence forces, not least as these forces already faced challenges in cooperating during the conflict, exemplified by reported 'friendly-fire' incidents that led to the loss of some aircraft.

Nevertheless, the published programme indicates that while there may have been little discussion in public, there has been an internal debate within Armenian military circles, not least about the importance of mobility and the problems with mobilisation and command and control. But

other questions remain. One concerns the degree to which a downsized army, even if it is composed of contract personnel, can control a front line with Azerbaijan which has increased in length because of the war. Another relates to whether the envisaged three-month training system would be capable of producing an adequate combat-ready reserve and what reforms will be needed to produce an effective training regime for professional personnel.

There are also questions about planned procurements. Some contracts were signed with Russia at the Army 2021 show at Kubinka, near Moscow, but there was no information on these contracts at the time of writing. Prior to the 2018 revolution, Armenia adopted a seven-year procurement programme. This was later revised by Pashinyan's government and its fate is now unclear. It is likely that military defeat and equipment losses will change Yerevan's priorities and that a new procurement programme will be developed. Russia will be Armenia's principal partner in this process and on 11 August, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu – while hosting his Armenian counterpart Arshak Karapetyan in Moscow – said that Russia is ready to continue assisting the modernisation of Armenia's armed forces.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia

Significant events in 2021

MARCH

UKRAINE SEIZES CONTROL OF MOTOR SICH



A Ukrainian court ruled that 100% of Motor Sich shares would be transferred to the state in a move that the head of the Security Service said concerned protecting 'national security'. For several years previously, the privately owned company had been seeking Chinese investment. This caused concern in the US, because Motor Sich produces engines for cruise missiles, large transport aircraft and helicopters. In September 2021, President Zelensky spoke about the need for 'state control' rather than 'state ownership', suggesting that a 'golden share' arrangement might be the ultimate outcome. Media reports in Ukraine have suggested that the government may be looking for Turkish investment in Motor Sich.

MARCH

UAC REORGANISATION



Rostec announced that it planned to merge the administrative and management functions of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) subsidiaries into two new organisations. The first will deal with aircraft manufacturers and the second, which will be based in Moscow, design bureaux. The company hopes that the move, which is expected to take several years, will achieve RUB130bn (USD1.87bn) in efficiency savings and transform the prospects of some of its companies, some of which are close to bankruptcy. Although it has often been suggested that Sukhoi and MiG would be merged, not least after Sukhoi won most of the recent large combat-aircraft deals in Russia, the plan so far seems to have had a limited impact on them, as these firms' design bureaux will remain independent and engineering jobs will not be relocated. Several companies in UAC have recently experienced financial difficulties to fulfil some Russian aerospace programmes as they look to balance the economic viability of deals with affordability for the armed forces. Whether this restructure will be sufficient to improve the situation remains to be seen.

JULY


UKRAINE TO CONSOLIDATE DEFENCE INDUSTRY



Following plans announced in 2020, the Ukrainian parliament approved the reform of UkrOboronProm. This will see UkrOboronProm and its 137 subsidiaries split into six divisions (missiles, aviation, aircraft repair, armoured vehicles, radar and marine systems), while some enterprises will be privatised or wound up. A number of anti-corruption measures were also included in the second reading of the bill. Twenty-eight of the 137 firms generate 98% of UkrOboronProm's revenue and the government hopes that the reorganisation, due to be completed by the end of 2022, will improve efficiency and competitiveness. UkrOboronProm performed above expectations in 2020, with a 74% increase in profits over 2019, but suffered in 2021 due to the pandemic and problems in securing funding for contracted work.

JULY

SUKHOI UNVEILS CHECKMATE DESIGN



Sukhoi unveiled what appeared to be an engineering mock-up of a fighter called *The Checkmate* at the MAKS air show outside Moscow. A single-engine model that shares some design characteristics with the larger Su-57, the aircraft is intended 'primarily' for export, according to local media. The Su-30, Sukhoi's greatest export success of the past two decades, has seen over 260 Su-30MKI variants sold to India alone, while a domestic variant is also in service in significant numbers. It is unclear whether *Checkmate* will be able to emulate the Su-30's success. Its development timeline is ambitious, with a first flight slated for 2023 and production in 2026, at a time when generally the international marketplace for combat aircraft is becoming increasingly crowded. As of November 2021, no customers had been announced for the project.

Table 8  **Belarus: defence procurement since 2010**

The defence industry in Belarus is oriented more to providing subsystems to Russia's defence industry, and maintenance and overhaul services for a range of customers, than it is towards developing and building complete platforms. Because of this, and the close political and political-military relationship between the two countries, Belarus acquires the vast majority of its defence equipment from Russia; this enables members of its industry to benefit from their position as subcontractors. At the same time, Minsk mostly procures

equipment that is already being acquired for the Russian armed forces. This has the advantages of ensuring relatively rapid delivery (for instance the first batch of Yak-130 *Mitten* training aircraft was delivered within 12 months) and greater interoperability with its neighbour's forces. However, budget pressures mean that equipment is typically acquired in small batches. This has had the effect of limiting recapitalisation, with the majority of the inventory still consisting of platforms from the Cold War era.


Contract date	Equipment	Type	Quantity	Prime contractor	Deliveries	Notes
c. 2010	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	8	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2011–12	
Dec 2012	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2015	
Jan 2013	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	4	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2014	
c. 2014	<i>Tigr</i>	Armoured utility vehicle	5+	 Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant (MZKT)	2015	
Jul 2014	S-300PS (RS-SA-10B <i>Grumble</i>)	Long-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	32	 Russian government surplus	2015–16	Donation
c. 2015	<i>Polonez</i>	300mm multiple-rocket launcher	6	 Precision Electromechanics Plant (ZDEM)	2016	
Jun 2015	Mi-8MTV-5 <i>Hip</i>	Medium transport helicopter	12	 Kazan Helicopter Plant (KVZ)	2016–17	
Aug 2015	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2016	
Aug 2015	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	5	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2016	
c. 2016	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	5	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2017	
c. 2016	CS/VN3B mod	Armoured utility vehicle	8	 Chongqing Dajiang Industrial Company	2017–ongoing	Donation
c. 2017	BTR-70MB1	Armoured personnel carrier (wheeled) upgrade	€64	 140 Repair Plant	2018–19	
May 2017	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	10	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2018	
Jun 2017	Su-30SM <i>Flanker H</i>	Fighter ground-attack aircraft	12	 Irkut Corporation	2019–ongoing	
Oct 2017	9K331ME <i>Tor-M2E</i> (RS-SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system	4	 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'	2018	
c. 2018	<i>Cayman</i> BRDM	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle	€18	 140 Repair Plant	2019	
c. 2018	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	10	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	2020–ongoing	
c. 2018	Yak-130 <i>Mitten</i>	Training aircraft	4	 Irkut Corporation	2019	
Jun 2019	T-73B3 mod	Main battle tank upgrade	11	 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)	n.k.	
c. 2018	BTR-82A	Infantry fighting vehicle	31+	 Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (AMZ)	2021–ongoing	

Figure 12  **Russia: Airborne Forces (VDV) armoured-vehicle modernisation**

Russia's Airborne Forces (VDV) has been spared organisational upheavals of the kind experienced by the Ground Forces since 2008. Divided into Airborne and Air Assault forces, the VDV has kept its largely division-based structure. It fulfils several traditional airborne roles and is also earmarked for rapid-reaction tasks. It is with this last role in mind that several Air Assault formations have now been equipped with at least a company, and in some cases a battalion, of T-72B3 main battle tanks. While this limits the overall formations' air deployability, the recent Russian practice of deploying Battalion Tactical Groups may mean this is less of an issue in reality. Meanwhile, at least 11 battalion sets of BMD-4M/

BTR-MDM airborne combat vehicles (ABCV) have now been delivered to replace BMD-1s and BMD-2s. These have been designed with significant commonality with the Ground Forces' and Naval Infantry's BMP-3 to reduce maintenance and production costs. BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicles, widely utilised across the Russian armed forces, are being delivered to VDV reconnaissance units. BMD-2s are still being upgraded, however, perhaps as a budgetary compromise similar to the Ground Forces' choice to modernise T-72s instead of mass producing new-build T-90s. Meanwhile, a new light tank, the *Sprut-SDM1*, is based on the BMD-4M chassis and is expected to complete state trials in 2022.

T-72B3 main battle tank



Prime contractor:


Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

Replacing:

New capability.

Since 2016, most of the air-assault divisions and brigades have been equipped with at least a company set.

BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicle



Prime contractor:

Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (AMZ)


Key subcontractors:

KAMAZ
Tulamashzavod
Zavod Korpusov

Replacing:

BMD-2 and BTR-D.
Batches delivered to reconnaissance units of at least four brigades.

BMD-4M airborne combat vehicle




Prime contractor:

Kurganmashzavod (KMZ)

Key subcontractors:

Barnaultransmash
Motovilikha Plants (MZ)
Tulamashzavod
Volgograd Tractor Plant (VgTZ)

BTR-MDM tracked armoured personnel carrier



Replacing:

BMD-4M: BMD-2


BTR-MDM: BTR-D

At least 11 battalion sets delivered since production began in 2015 as well as batches to training centres.

Armenia ARM

Armenian Dram AMD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AMD	6.18tr	7.03tr	
	USD	12.6bn	13.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,267	4,595	
Growth	%	-7.4	6.5	
Inflation	%	1.2	6.9	
Def bdgt [a]	AMD	307bn	312bn	
	USD	628m	603m	
USD1=AMD		489.02	516.54	

[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions



Population 3,011,609

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.7%	2.9%	3.1%	3.6%	24.1%	5.4%
Female	8.7%	2.6%	2.8%	3.6%	25.7%	7.8%

Capabilities

The armed forces' main focus is territorial defence, and a resumption of armed conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh after September 2020 saw forces mobilised and losses of both personnel and equipment. A government plan for 2021-26, approved in August, indicated an aspiration to move to a contract-based force, improve reserve structures and produce new defence plans and doctrines. A new UAV department was created in August. In the wake of the 2020 conflict, Armenia is looking to improve its UAV inventory, and likely its ground-based air defence. Coordination between the services reportedly remains a problem. Armenia is a member of the CSTO and maintains close defence ties with Russia, centred on equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel-training programmes. Military doctrine remains influenced by Russian thinking. Relations with Iran are also developing. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Conscription continues, but there is a growing cohort of professional officers. Personnel train regularly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and in bilateral drills with Russia. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have been reached in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems, though only in small quantities to date. Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for other equipment platforms and military systems.

ACTIVE 42,900 (Army 40,000 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,800) Paramilitary 4,300

Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE

Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €40,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (Special) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn(-), 5 MR regt, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)

1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 5 MR regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (5th) corps (2 MR regt)

Other

1 indep MR trg bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 AD bde

2 AD regt

2 (radiotech) AD regt

1 engr regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Available estimates should be treated with caution following losses suffered in the fighting in late 2020 in Nagorno-Karabakh

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; €100 T-72A/B; 1 T-90A

RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 140: 100 BMP-1; 25 BMP-1K (CP); 15 BMP-2

APC 150

APC (T) 20 MT-LB

APC (W) 130: 108 BTR-60 (incl variants); 18 BTR-70;

4 BTR-80

AUV *Tigr*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 13

9P149 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K129 *Kornet-E* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggen*)

ARTILLERY 225

SP 37: 122mm 9 2S1 *Gvozhdika*; 152mm 28 2S3 *Akatsiya*

TOWED 122: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36

Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20

MRL 54: 122mm up to 50 BM-21 *Grad*; 273mm 2 WM-80;

300mm 2 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 120mm 12 M120

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 14: 7+ 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C

Scud B); 3+ 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*); 4 9K720

Iskander-E

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLESISR • **Light** *Krunk***AIR DEFENCE****SAM**

Medium-range 2K11 *Krug* (RS-SA-4 *Ganef*); S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K37M *Buk-M1* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-125 *Pechora* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 9K331MKM *Tor-M2KM*

Point-defence 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K35M *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNSSP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

FORCES BY ROLE**GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable

FGA 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*ATK 13: up to 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 1 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*TPT 4: **Heavy** 3 Il-76 *Candid*; **PAX** 1 A319CJTRG 14: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; 10 Yak-52**HELICOPTERS**ATK 7 Mi-24P *Hind*ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K *Hind*; 2 Mi-24R *Hind* (cbt spt)

MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)

C2 2 Mi-9 *Hip G* (cbt spt)TPT • **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Long-range** S-300PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,300****Police****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

4 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP)

APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

ABCV 5 BMD-1

Border Troops

Ministry of National Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 35 BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

ABCV 5 BMD-1


DEPLOYMENT**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 32**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 1**SERBIA:** NATO • KFOR 40**FOREIGN FORCES**

Russia 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 SAM bty with *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Azerbaijan AZE

Azerbaijani Manat AZN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AZN	72.4bn	89.5bn	
	USD	42.6bn	52.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,232	5,167	
Growth	%	-4.3	3.0	
Inflation	%	2.8	4.4	
Def bdtg [a]	AZN	3.85bn	4.59bn	
	USD	2.27bn	2.70bn	
USD1=AZN		1.70	1.70	

[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of procurement outlays.



Population 10,282,283

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.9%	3.5%	3.5%	4.4%	23.3%	3.0%
Female	10.6%	3.0%	3.1%	4.1%	24.9%	4.7%

Capabilities

The armed forces' principal focus is territorial defence, and there was a resumption of armed conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh after September 2020. This ended in Baku's favour after six weeks, though tensions between the two remain, with sporadic exchanges of fire continuing in late 2020 and in 2021. Defence cooperation persists with Russia and has developed more recently with Turkey. In June 2021 Baku and Ankara signed the 'Shusha Declaration', including what appears to be a mutual defence accord. Azerbaijan maintains a defence relationship with NATO, concluding in 2019 a fifth cycle of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Readiness within Azerbaijan's conscript-based armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part in multilateral exercises and its forces have trained with Turkish troops in bilateral drills including 2021's 'Indestructible Brotherhood'. The armed forces have little expeditionary capability, though they contributed to NATO's Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. Defence modernisation and procurement has been a focus in the past decade, intended to replace the ageing inventory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. Recent orders include for air-

defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. In recent years there has been significant procurement and industrial cooperation with Israel, focused on UAVs and guided weapons, and increasingly with Turkey as a key defence partner. Azerbaijan's limited but growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Ministry of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the production of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms and systems, some defence companies have started to export to foreign markets.

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)

RESERVE 300,000

Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 56,850

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 MR bde

Light

19 MR bde

Other

1 sy bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 arty trg bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020 resulted in some combat losses as well as the capture of some equipment from Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 437: 95 T-55; 244 T-72A/AV/B/SIM2; 98 T-90S

RECCE 15 BRM-1

IFV 215: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 44+ BTR-82A

APC 568

APC (T) 336 MT-LB

APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70

PPV 90: 45 *Marauder*; 45 *Matador*

AUV 64+: 35 *Cobra*; 29+ *Sand Cat*

ABCV 20 BMD-1

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IMR-2; MT-LB

ARV BREM-L *Brelianka*

MW *Bozena*; GW-3 (minelayer)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 10 9P157-2 *Khrizantema-S* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*); *Cobra* with *Skif*; *Sand Cat* with *Spike-ER*

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*) (reported); *Spike-LR*

GUNS • TOWED 85mm some D-44

ARTILLERY 630

SP 102: **122mm** 46 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 39: 6 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 18 2S19 *Msta-S*; 15 *Dana*-MIM; **155mm** 5 ATMOS 2000; **203mm** 12 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 233: **122mm** 129 D-30; **130mm** 36 M-46; **152mm** 68: 44 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 24 D-20

GUN/MOR **120mm** 36: 18 2S9 *NONA-S*; 18 2S31 *Vena Grad*; 9+ IMI *Lynx*; 8 RM-70 *Vampir*; **128mm** 12 RAK-12; **220mm** 18 TOS-1A; **300mm** 36: 30 9A52 *Smerch*; 6+ *Polonez*; **302mm** 21 T-300 *Kasirga*

MOR **120mm** 112: 5 *Cardom*; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) **SP** **120mm** *Sand Cat* with *Spear*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 6: 2 IAI LORA; ε4 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K33-1T *Osa-1T* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

Point-defence 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K32 *Strela* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4

TOWED **23mm** ZU-23-2

Navy 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Kusar* (ex-FSU *Petya* II) with 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun

PSO 1 *Luga* (*Wodnik* 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role)

PCC 3: 2 *Petrushka* (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 *Shelon* (ex-FSU Project 1388M)

PB 3: 1 *Araz* (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 *Bryza* (ex-FSU Project 722); 1 *Poluchat* (ex-FSU Project 368)

PBF 3 *Stenka*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MHC 4: 2 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgeniya*)); 2 *Yakhont* (FSU *Sonya*)

AMPHIBIOUS 6

LSM 3: 1 Project 770 (FSU *Polnochny* A) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 2 Project 771 (*Polnochny* B) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 *Vydrat* (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3

AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)

ATF 2 *Neftgaz* (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard)

Marines

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24 *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-25UB *Frogfoot B*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Yak-40 *Codling*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-32 *Helix C*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 36 combat capable

FTR 15: 13 MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

ATK 21: 2 Su-24 *Fencer*; 16 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 3 Su-25UB *Frogfoot B*

TPT 4: **Medium** 1 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 3 Yak-40 *Codling*

TRG 15: 12 L-39 *Albatros*; 3+ *Super Mushshak*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 26 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV *Hip*

TPT 24: **Medium** 17: 1 Bell 412; 3 Ka-32 *Helix C*; 13 Mi-8 *Hip* **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** *Bayraktar TB2*

ISR 7+: **Heavy** 3+ *Heron*; **Medium** 4+ *Aerostar*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-200 *Vega* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); **Medium-range** S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K37M *Buk-M1* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); *Buk-MB*; ε24 S-125-2TM *Pechora-2TM*; *Barak-LRAD*

Short-range *Abisr* (*Barak-MRAD*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

ASM *Barrier-V*

BOMBS

Laser-guided MAM-L

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €15,000

State Border Service €5,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2

APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80

ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122

AIRCRAFT • TPT • **Light** 40 An-2 *Colt* (modified for use as decoys)

HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M *Hind*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 7+: 4+ *Hermes* 450; 3+ *Hermes* 900

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harop*; *Skystriker* (two variants)

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19

PCG 6 *Sa'ar* 62 with 1 8-cell *Typhoon* MLS-NLOS

Inchr with *Spike* NLOS SSM, 1 hel landing platform

PBF 9: 1 Project 205 (FSU *Osa II*); 6 *Shaldag V*; 2

Silver Ships 48ft

PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 *Point* (US); 1 *Grif* (FSU *Zhuk*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4

ARS 1 *Iva* (FSU *Vikhr*)

ATF 3 *Neftegaz* (Project B-92) (also used for patrol duties)

Internal Troops 10,000+

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Turkey 170; 1 EOD unit

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since then, Armenia controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh. While Armenia provides political, economic and military support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared itself independent – although this has not been recognised by any other state, including Armenia. Baku claims Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of Azerbaijan. Following a period of sustained fighting in September–November 2020, Azerbaijani forces regained most of the territory lost prior to the 1994 ceasefire. Data presented here represents an assessment of the de facto situation. Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be treated with caution due to the heavy levels of attrition in the 2020 conflict. Some of the equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.

Nagorno-Karabakh €5,000

Available estimates of military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh have to be treated with caution due to the heavy level of attrition in the 2020 conflict

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR div(-)

1 mtn div(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 22: €20 T-72AV/B; 1 T-72 SIM2; 1 T-90S

RECCE BRDM-2

IFV 150: €50 BMP-1; €100 BMP-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm some D-30

MRL 122mm some BM-21 *Grad*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet)

Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1

(RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2


FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping)

Belarus BLR

Belarusian Ruble BYN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BYN	147bn	168bn	
	USD	60.2bn	65.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	6,398	7,032	
Growth	%	-0.9	2.1	
Inflation	%	5.5	9.2	
Def bdtg	BYN	1.47bn	1.63bn	
	USD	601m	638m	
USD1=BYN		2.44	2.55	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 9,441,842

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.4%	2.5%	3.1%	24.9%	5.4%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	2.4%	2.9%	27.2%	10.9%

Capabilities

Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main task of Belarus's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, though army units were visible in the government's curbing

of widespread civil protests during the latter part of 2020. The country's latest military doctrine was approved in July 2016 and identified as security challenges 'hybrid methods' and 'colour revolutions'. A new plan for the development of the armed forces until 2030 was approved in late 2019. Belarus is a member of the CSTO. Russia remains the country's principal defence partner, with the relations growing closer during 2021, including setting up joint training centres for air-force and air-defence personnel. The forces remain conscript-based and train regularly with other CSTO partners. There has been increased emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow them to better operate with the regular forces. There is a small heavy-airlift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy and sustain the armed forces, but it could be possible for elements assigned to the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk's main defence-equipment supplier. There is a renewed emphasis on air defence, with Minsk expressing interest in 2021 in acquiring additional systems from Russia. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equipment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work for foreign customers.

ACTIVE 47,950 (Army 11,700 Air 11,300 Special Operations Forces 6,150 Joint 18,800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000

Conscript liability 18 months; 12 months for graduates (alternative service option)

RESERVE 289,500

(Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 11,700

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 comd HQ (West & North West)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 mech bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 engr regt

2 sigs regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 497: 477 T-72B; 20 T-72B3 mod

RECCE 132 BRM-1

IFV 957: 926 BMP-2; 31+ BTR-82A

APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB

AUV Tigr

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB

ARV 2 BREM-K

VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A

MW UR-77

NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; Cayman NRBC Chimera; RKhM-4; RKhM-K

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 160: 75 9P148 *Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel)*; 85 9P149 *Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral)*

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

ARTILLERY 583

SP 333: **122mm** 125 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 208: 125 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 *Msta-S*

TOWED **152mm** 72 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL 164: **122mm** 128 BM-21 *Grad*; **220mm** 36 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR **120mm** 14 2S12

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Point-defence 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*)

GUNS • SP **23mm** ZU-23-2 (tch)

Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,300**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B*

TRANSPORT

1 base with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some (cvt spt) sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable**

FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 *Fulcrum A*/MiG-29S *Fulcrum C*; 6 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

FGA 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; (21 Su-27/UB *Flanker B/C* non-operational/stored)

ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B*

TPT 8: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid* (+9 civ Il-76 available for mil use); **Light** 6: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 4 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 11+: Some L-39 *Albatros*; 11 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT 26: **Heavy** 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 20: 8 Mi-8 *Hip*; 12 Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A

Archer) SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 *Alamo A*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)

ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*) (likely WFU)

Air Defence

AD data from Uzal Baranovich EW radar

FORCES BY ROLE**AIR DEFENCE**

1 bde S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

3 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 bde with 9K37 *Buk* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

1 regt with 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

2 regt with 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE • SAM**

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

Medium-range 9K37 *Buk* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 21 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

Special Operations Command 6,150**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 mech bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 13+ *Cayman* BRDM

APC • APC (W) 217: ε64 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80

AUV 12 CS/VN3B mod

ARTILLERY 114

TOWED **122mm** 24 D-30

GUN/MOR • TOWED **120mm** 18 2B23 NONA-M1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

Joint 18,800 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)**FORCES BY ROLE****SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE**

1 SRBM bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

2 engr bde

1 EW unit

1 NBC regt

1 ptn bridging regt

2 sigs bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB

NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K**ARTILLERY 112**

SP **152mm** 36 2S5 *Giatsint-S*

TOWED **152mm** 36 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL **300mm** 42: 36 9A52 *Smerch*; 6 *Polonez*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** 96: 36 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*); 60 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud B*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000**State Border Troops 12,000**

Ministry of Interior

Militia 87,000

Ministry of Interior

Internal Troops 11,000

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9

Georgia GEO

Georgian Lari GEL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GEL	49.4bn	57.5bn	
	USD	15.9bn	17.8bn	
per capita	USD	4,275	4,808	
Growth	%	-6.2	7.7	
Inflation	%	5.2	9.3	
Def bdtg	GEL	880m	900m	918m
	USD	283m	279m	
FMA (US)	USD	40m	20m	25m
USD1=GEL		3.11	3.22	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 4,933,674

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.6%	2.7%	3.0%	3.6%	22.2%	6.8%
Female	8.9%	2.4%	2.6%	3.4%	24.5%	10.4%

Capabilities

Georgia's main security preoccupations concern Russian military deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was published in April 2017. This aimed at improving personnel structures, training facilities and equipment, and stressed a 'total defence' approach. It highlighted the importance of Georgia's reserves, and a ministerial document in 2020 indicated there may be more reliance on active and mobilised reserves. A National Security Strategy 2020–30 has been drafted. Security cooperation with the US includes the Georgia Defence Readiness Program (due to end in 2021). A combat training centre is being developed under the NATO–Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre. Conscription was reinstated with revised terms and increased pay in early 2017. Forces take part in several NATO multinational exercises. Georgia's armed forces have limited expeditionary logistic capability. The backbone of the armed forces' military equipment is legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019–25 outlines efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, though funding availability will be key to meeting aspirations. There were plans to boost special-forces capacity in 2020 and there is a focus on boosting anti-armour and air-defence capability. The country has begun to develop a defence-industrial base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the production of light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (4th) mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Light

1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech inf bn, 3 inf bn)

1 (2nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 fd arty bn)

1 (3rd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)

Amphibious

2 mne bn (1 cadre)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (5th) arty bde (1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bn)

1 (6th) arty bde (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn)

1 engr bde

1 engr bn

1 sigs bn

1 SIGINT bn

1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1

RECCE 41: 1 BRM-1K; 40+ *Didgori-2*

IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2

APC 221

APC (T) 69+: 3+ *Lazika*; 66 MT-LB

APC (W) 152+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 40+ *Didgori-1*; 3+

Didgori-3; 65 *Ejder*

AUV 10+: ATF *Dingo*; *Cobra*; 10 *Cougar*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV IMR-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);

9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); FGM-148 *Javelin*

GUNS • TOWED €40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12

ARTILLERY 240

SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 46: 32 M-77

Dana; 13 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 1 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 1 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36

Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 *Msta-B*

MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 *Grad*; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70

MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 *Sani*; 33 M-75; 18 M120

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Short-range *Spyder-SR*

Point-defence *Grom*; *Mistral-2*; 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7

Grail); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K36 *Strela-3*

(RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300
(incl 300 conscript)

1 avn base, 1 hel air base

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

ATK 3 Su-25KM *Frogfoot* (6 Su-25 *Frogfoot* in store)

TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Tu-134A *Crusty* (VIP); 2 Yak-40 *Codling*
TRG 9 L-29 *Delfin*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24 *Hind*
TPT 29: **Medium** 17 Mi-8T *Hip*; **Light** 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 1+ *Hermes* 450

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Medium-range 9K37 *Buk-M1* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*) (1-2 bn)
Point-defence 8 9K33 *Osa-AK* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*) (two bty); 9K33 *Osa-AKM* (6-10 updated SAM systems)

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Light
2 inf bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Border Police 5,400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS**

TPT • **Medium** 3 Mi-8MTV-1 *Hip*

Coast Guard

HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24

PCC 2 *Ochamchira* (ex-US *Island*)

PBF 7: 4 *Ares* 43m; 1 *Kaan* 33; 1 *Kaan* 20; 1 Project 205P (*Stenka*)

PB 15: 1 *Akhmeta*; 2 *Dauntless*; 2 *Dilos* (ex-GRC); 1 *Kutaisi* (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 *Point*; 7 *Zhuk* (3 ex-UKR)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL


Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; 16 S-300PS); 1 mil base at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

Kazakhstan KAZ

Kazakhstani Tenge KZT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KZT	70.7tr	82.5tr	
	USD	171bn	194bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	9,071	10,145	
Growth	%	-2.6	3.3	
Inflation	%	6.8	7.5	
Def bdtg	KZT	591bn	655bn	
	USD	1.43bn	1.54bn	
USD1=KZT		412.95	425.44	



Population 19,245,793

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	3.4%	3.2%	3.9%	21.3%	3.1%
Female	13.3%	3.3%	3.0%	3.8%	23.4%	5.7%

Capabilities

Kazakhstan's October 2017 military doctrine indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats. A military agreement was signed with Uzbekistan in September 2017 for cooperation on training and education and countering violent extremism. In late 2021, the bilateral relationship has focused on jointly addressing security challenges from Afghanistan after the Taliban's return to power. There is a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO and SCO membership, and Moscow operates a radar station at Balkash. Kazakhstan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror drills. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Kazakhstan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. By regional standards, the armed forces are relatively sizeable and well equipped. In the army, air-mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness. Significant amounts of new and upgraded materiel have been acquired in recent years, primarily from Russia. Russia has supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boosting its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is expanding its indigenous defence industry, and joint ventures and the production of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged with European companies. In 2021, following a two-day summit of the CSTO and in light of instability in Taliban-led Afghanistan, it was announced that Kazakhstan's defence-industrial base will be used to help expand the CSTO's defence capabilities.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500

Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 20,000**

4 regional cmd: Astana, East, West and Southern

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 tk bde
2 mech bde
1 aslt bde

Mechanised

1 naval inf bde
1 (peacekeeping) inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

4 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde
1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 350 T-72BA
RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1
IFV 413: 280 BMP-2; 70 BTR-80A; 63 BTR-82A
APC 303
APC (T) 50 MT-LB
APC (W) 152: 2 BTR-3E; 150 BTR-80
PPV 101 Arlan
AUV 11+: 11 *Cobra*; *SandCat*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 9+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 6 9P149 *Shturm* (MT-LB with RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)
MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

GUNS 100mm 20 MT-12

ARTILLERY 490

SP 126: 122mm 66: 60 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 6 *Semser*; 152mm 60 2S3M *Akatsiya*
TOWED 194: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 94: 70 2A65 *Msta-B*; 24 D-20
MRL 107: 122mm 80 BM-21 *Grad*; 220mm 3 TOS-1A; 300mm 24: 6 BM-30 *Smerch*; 18 IMI *Lynx* (with 50 msl)
MOR 63+: 82mm some; SP 120mm 18 *Cardom*; 120mm 45 2B11 *Sani*/M120

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)

Navy 3,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14**

PCGM 3 *Kazakhstan* with 1 4-cell Inchr with 4 *Barrier-VK* SSM, 1 *Arbalet-K* Inchr with 4 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)
PCC 1 *Kazakhstan* with 1 122mm MRL
PBF 3 *Sea Dolphin*
PB 7: 3 *Archangel*; 1 *Dauntless*; 1 *Lashyn*; 1 *Turk* (AB 25); 1 Other

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1

MCC 1 *Alatau* (Project 10750E)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik**Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B
2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM *Foxhound* A/C

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-27 *Flogger* D; MiG-23UB *Flogger* C
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker* B/C
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM *Flanker* B/H

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*
1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*, An-26 *Curl*, An-30 *Clank*, An-72 *Coaler*, C295M

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

5 sqn with Mi-24V *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); H145; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; Mi-171Sh *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

1 bty with 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)
2 bty with S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
1 bty with S-125-1T
1 bty with S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)
10 bty with S-300PS (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)
Some regt with 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 120 combat capable**

FTR 45: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* A; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B; 31 MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*
FGA 61: 12 MiG-27 *Flogger* D; 2 MiG-23UB *Flogger* C; 20 Su-27 *Flanker*; 4 Su-27UB *Flanker*; 23 Su-30SM *Flanker* H
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*
ISR 1 An-30 *Clank*
TPT 21: **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 18: 6 An-26 *Curl*, 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 8 C295; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 1 Tu-154 *Careless*
TRG 19: 17 L-39 *Albatros*; 2 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

ATK 32: 20 Mi-24V *Hind* (some upgraded); 12 Mi-35M *Hind*
MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 6 Mi-171Sh *Hip*
TPT 16: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Light** 12: 4 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 8 H145

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 2 *Wing Loong* (GJ-1)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 43+: 3 S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 40+ S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)
Medium-range 15: 3 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); 12 S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
Short-range 3+: some 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 3 S-125-1T
Point-defence 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder* – on MiG-31BM)
ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)
ARM Kh-27 (RS-AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500**National Guard** €20,000

Ministry of Interior

AIRCRAFTTPT • **Medium** 1 Y-8F-200WA**State Security Service 2,500****Border Service** €9,000

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 6: **Light** 5: 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 An-74T; 1 An-74TK; **PAX** 1 SSJ-100**HELICOPTERS** • **TPT** • **Medium** 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-171Sh**Coast Guard****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 22PBF 11: 1 *Aibar* (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 *Saygak*PB 11: 4 *Almaty*; 5 *Sardar*; 2 *Zhuk* (of which 1 may be non-operational)**DEPLOYMENT****LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 37**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 7**Kyrgyzstan KGZ**

Kyrgyzstani Som KGS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KGS	598bn	690bn	
	USD	7.75bn	8.15bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,189	1,225	
Growth	%	-8.6	2.1	
Inflation	%	6.3	13.0	
Def bdgt	KGS	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=KGS		77.24	84.70	

Population 6,018,789

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.5%	4.1%	3.8%	4.3%	19.0%	2.3%
Female	14.7%	3.9%	3.7%	4.2%	20.8%	3.7%

Capabilities

Kyrgyzstan is increasing its ties with neighbouring countries on issues including defence-industrial cooperation, though it remains generally dependent on Russian assistance. Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow maintains

a military presence, including a squadron of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003. In 2020, plans were reported to add air-defence systems and UAVs to Russia's air base. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan increased its annual fees, reportedly because Russian forces are using more land than outlined in the 2003 agreement. Talks are ongoing over a possible second Russian base. Joint training is held with regional countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness remains an issue. In 2021, Indian and Kyrgyz special forces held the eighth iteration of bilateral *Khanjar* exercises, focusing on mountain warfare in the broader context of counter-terrorism missions. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy externally, and personnel have been deployed to OSCE and UN missions. The armed forces possess generally ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local defence industry. Defence ties with India have increased and a joint working group has been formed on defence cooperation. Reports in 2020 indicated discussions with Russia over the transfer of air-defence equipment and helicopters.

ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500*Conscript liability* 18 months**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 8,500****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 MR bde

1 (mtn) MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****MBT** 150 T-72**RECCE** 39: 30 BRDM-2; 9 BRDM-2M**IFV** 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2**APC** • **APC (W)** 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL** • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111*Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)**RCL** 73mm SPG-9**GUNS** 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944**ARTILLERY 228****SP** 122mm 18 2S1 *Gvozdika***TOWED** 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938);


152mm 16 D-1

GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S**MRL** 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 *Uragan***MOR** 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120**AIR DEFENCE****SAM** • **Point-defence** 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*);9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)**GUNS** 48**SP** 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4**TOWED** 57mm 24 S-60

Air Force 2,400**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 regt with L-39 *Albatros****TRANSPORT**1 regt with An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE**2 bty with S-125 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)1 bty with S-75M3 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 4 combat capable**TPT** • **Light** 6: 4 An-2 *Colt*; 2 An-26 *Curl***TRG** 4 L-39 *Albatros****HELICOPTERS****ATK** 2 Mi-24 *Hind***MRH** 4 Mi-8MT *Hip***TPT** • **Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Medium-range** 6 S-75M3 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)**Short-range** 8 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500****Border Guards** 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)**Internal Troops** 3,500**National Guard** 1,000**DEPLOYMENT****SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 2**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 1**FOREIGN FORCES****Russia** €500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip***Moldova MDA**

Moldovan Leu MDL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MDL	206bn	223bn	
	USD	11.9bn	12.4bn	
per capita	USD	4,523	4,792	
Growth	%	-7.0	4.5	
Inflation	%	4.4	3.0	
Def bdtg	MDL	770m	914m	
	USD	44.4m	50.8m	
USD1=MDL		17.32	18.00	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

**Population** 3,323,875

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.4%	2.9%	2.9%	3.5%	24.5%	5.7%
Female	8.9%	2.7%	2.7%	3.2%	24.9%	8.7%

Capabilities

The primary role of Moldova's armed forces is to maintain territorial integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer more than token resistance to a determined adversary. The forces are constitutionally neutral. A National Defence Strategy for 2017–21 included plans to strengthen border defence and air-space control and protection, and to improve the military-training system. Moldova continues to build relations with European states and with NATO. Relations with Russia deteriorated following the election of a pro-European Union president in November 2020. The armed forces are receiving modest amounts of equipment as part of NATO's Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The country signed up to the NATO initiative in September 2014. With NATO support, a Moldovan cyber incident response capability was set up in January 2021. Moldova is aiming to end mandatory conscription and develop professional armed forces. The Professional Army 2018–2021 programme was approved in June 2018. A draft government action plan (2019–20), circulated in August 2019, reportedly included closer ties with NATO and a continuing emphasis on professionalisation. A Long-Term Military Capabilities Development Plan was approved in March 2020, covering the period to 2030. The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no requirement or capability to independently deploy and support its forces overseas. However, service members continued to deploy as part of KFOR in 2021. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment. A solution to the issue of the breakaway region of Transdniestria has yet to be agreed.

ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support 1,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900*Conscript liability* 12 months (3 months for university graduates)**RESERVE 58,000** (Joint 58,000)**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army** 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Light**

3 mot inf bde

1 lt inf bn

Other

1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 NBC coy

1 sigs bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC 153

APC (T) 61: 9 BTR-D; 52 MT-LB (variants)

APC (W) 92: 12 BTR-80; 80 TAB-71

ABCV 44 BMD-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTUREMSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm 31 MT-12

ARTILLERY 219

TOWED 67: 122mm 16 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 51: 20

2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 31 D-20

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 220mm 11 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7

PM-38


AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60**Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)****FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**1 sqn with An-2 *Colt*; Mi-8MTV-1/PS *Hip*; Yak-18**AIR DEFENCE**1 regt with S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Yak-18 *Max***HELICOPTERS**TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)****Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900****OPON 900 (riot police)**

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4****MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1****SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; UN • UNMIK 1****SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5****FOREIGN FORCES****Russia** €1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 7 Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-8 *Hip***Ukraine** 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)**Russia RUS**

Russian Rouble RUB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	RUB	107tr	122tr	
	USD	1.48tr	1.65tr	
per capita	USD	10,115	11,273	
Growth	%	-3.0	4.7	
Inflation	%	3.4	5.9	
Def exp [a]	RUB	4.46tr	4.59tr	
	USD	61.6bn	62.2bn	
Def bdgt	RUB	3.17tr	3.38tr	3.51tr
	USD	43.8bn	45.8bn	
USD1=RUB		72.35	73.82	

[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of defence expenditure

**Population** 142,320,790

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.8%	2.6%	2.3%	2.7%	24.6%	5.3%
Female	8.3%	2.5%	2.2%	2.6%	27.2%	10.9%

Capabilities

Russia supports capable conventional military forces and retains the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal. The armed forces underpin an assertive foreign policy. Military aims are guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintaining and increasing Russia's influence in its near abroad and further afield. An updated National Security Policy was adopted in June 2021 extending beyond core military concerns to include countering the influence of the US and its allies. The 2021-2025 Defence Plan was also agreed, though this remains classified. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Volunteers now outweigh conscripts in the armed forces. Defence reforms launched in 2008 emphasised the shift from a conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more professional ground forces. Morale has improved because of better pay, terms and conditions, and greater prestige associated with military service. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain forces on a global scale, although likely only in modest size at extended distances. Its air-led intervention in Syria indicated that Russia was able to deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational tempo for a fixed- and rotary-wing air component, along with the required force-protection package for its main operating base. Russia continues to modernise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The 2020 State Armament Programme (SAP) has been broadly successful, although several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met. The follow-on programme, SAP 2027, continues the emphasis on modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear and conventional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base suffered

from a lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from the loss of access to Ukrainian components. The defence-aerospace sector has been notably successful in terms of exports, particularly of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.

ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway Forces 29,000 Command and Support 180,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 554,000

Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract)

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces €80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Aerospace Forces)

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11:

- 1 *Kalmar* (Project 667BDR (*Delta III*)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 *Stantsia-02* (RS-SS-N-18 *Stingray*) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 6 *Delfin* (Project 667BDRM (*Delta IV*)) with 16 R-29RMU2 *Sineva*/R-29RMU2.1 *Layner* (RS-SS-N-23 *Skiff*) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 3 *Borey* (Project 955 (*Dolgorukiy*)) with 16 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT
- 1 *Borey-A* (Project 955A) with 6 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT
- (1 *Akula* (Project 941UM (*Typhoon*)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT)

Strategic Rocket Forces 50,000

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 6 to 10 silos or 9 mobile launchers, and one control centre

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 2 ICBM regt with RS-12M *Topol* (RS-SS-25 *Sickle*)
- 8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1)
- 2 ICBM regt with RS-18 (RS-SS-19 *Stiletto*)
- 1 ICBM regt with RS-18 with *Avangard* HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 *Stiletto*)
- 8 ICBM regt with RS-20 (RS-SS-18 *Satan*)
- 14 ICBM regt with RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2)
- 6 ICBM regt with *Yars-S*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM • Nuclear 339: 18 RS-12M *Topol* (RS-SS-25 *Sickle*) (mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (RS-SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); up to 20 RS-18 (RS-SS-19 *Stiletto*) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl) (being withdrawn); €6 RS-18 with *Avangard* HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 *Stiletto*); 46 RS-20 (RS-SS-18 *Satan*) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); €99 RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2; €3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; €18 RS-24 *Yars* (RS-SS-27 mod 2; €3 MIRV per msl) silo-based; €54 *Yars-S* (€3 MIRV per msl) road mobile

COUNTERSPACE • DE • Laser *Peresvet*

Long-Range Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

- 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*
- 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod *Bear*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 76: 9 Tu-160 *Blackjack* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear LACM; 7 Tu-160 mod *Blackjack* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*) nuclear LACM; 42 Tu-95MS *Bear H* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear LACM; 18 Tu-95MS mod *Bear H* with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*) nuclear LACM

Space Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 113

COMMUNICATIONS 64: 4 *Blagovest*; 2 *Garpun*; 21 *Gonets-M/M1* (dual-use); 3 Mod *Globus* (*Raduga-1M*); 5 *Meridian*; 21 *Rodnik* (*Strela-3M*); 8 *Strela-3*

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 26: 24

GLONASS; 2 *Parus*

ISR 11: 2 *Bars-M*; 2 GEO-*IK-2*; 1 *Kondor*; 1 *Kosmos-2519*; 2 *Persona*; 3 *Resurs-P*

ELINT/SIGINT 7: 5 *Lotos-S*; 1 *Pion-NKS*; 1 *Tselina-2*

EARLY WARNING 5 *Tundra*

MISSILE DEFENCE

some S-500 (entering service)
RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi (St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk (Murmansk); Mischelevka (Irkutsk); Kaliningrad; Pechora (Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Orsk (Orenburg); and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH)

Aerospace Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

- 2 AD div HQ
- 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
- 5 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222**

Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20

Gargoyle); 96 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 36 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (RS-AB-4A *Gazelle*)

RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow)

Army €280,000 (incl conscripts)

4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk)), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

12 army HQ

1 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

2 recce bde

Armoured

1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

2 (3rd & 144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (19th) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (20th) MR div (1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (127th) MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

11 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

Mechanised

1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

8 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)

2 MR bde (4-5 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn)

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn)

1 (18th) MGA div (1 tk bn, 2 MGA regt, 1 arty regt, 2 AD bn)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

12 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*/RS-SSC-7 *Southpaw*) (3+ brigades also with 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 *Screwdriver*))

COMBAT SUPPORT

9 arty bde

1 hy arty bde

4 MRL bde

4 engr bde

7 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

5 EW bde

5 NBC bde

10 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

11 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

15 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 2,927: 650 T-72B/BA; 850 T-72B3; 530 T-72B3M; 310 T-80BV/U; 170 T-80BVM; 350 T-90A; 67 T-90M; (10,200 in store: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)

RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; 700 BRM-1K (CP); (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

IFV 5,180: 450 BMP-1; €20 BMP-1AM; 2,900 BMP-2; 70+ BMP-2M; 640 BMP-3/-3M; 100 BTR-80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/AM; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

APC 6,050+

APC (T) 3,550+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB; 50+ MT-LB VM1K; (2,000 MT-LB in store)

APC (W) 2,500: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70 (all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

PPV *Typhoon-K* 4x4; *Typhoon-K* 6x6

AUV IVECO LMV; *Linza*; *Tigr*; *Tigr-M*; *Tigr-M* SpN; *Vystrel*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB

ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A

VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2

MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2; UR-77

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 9+: €9 BMP-T with 9K120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral* 2); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P149M with 9K132 *Shturm-SM* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral*-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrizantema* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*); 9P163-3 with 9M133 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); 9K128-1 *Kornet-T* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

MANPATS 9K111M *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K115-2 *Metis-M1* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

ARTILLERY 4,894+

SP 1,968: **122mm** 150 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 1,758: 800 2S3/2S3M *Akatsiya*; 100 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 500 2S19/2S19M1 *Msta-S*; 350 2S19M2/2S33 *Msta-SM*; 8 2S35 *Koalitsiya-SV* (in test); **203mm** 60 2S7M *Malka* (4,260 in store: **122mm** 2,000 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 2,000: 1,000 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 850 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 150 2S19 *Msta-S*; **203mm** 260 2S7 *Pion*)

TOWED 150: **152mm** 150 2A65 *Msta-B* (12,415 in store: **122mm** 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,575: 1,100 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 600 2A65

Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML-20); **203mm** 40 B-4M)

GUN/MOR 180+

SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34

TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 1,056: **122mm** 730: 550 BM-21 *Grad*; 180 9K51M *Tornado-G*; **220mm** 206+: 200 9P140 *Uragan*; 6 9K512 *Uragan-1M*; some TOS-1A; **300mm** 120: 100 9A52 *Smerch*; 20 9K515 *Tornado-S*; (3,220 in store: **122mm** 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 *Grad*; 420 9P138; **132mm** 100 BM-13; **220mm** 700 9P140 *Uragan*)

MOR 1,540+: **82mm** 800+ 2B14; **120mm** 700 2S12 *Sani*; **240mm** 40 2S4 *Tulpan* (2,590 in store: **120mm** 1,900: 1,000 2S12 *Sani*; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); **160mm** 300 M-160; **SP 240mm** 390 2S4 *Tulpan*)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM 150:

Dual-capable 150 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*)

GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 *Southpaw*); some 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 *Screwdriver*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Heavy Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys D* (service status unclear); **Light** BLA-07; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 1,520+

Long-range S-300V (RS-SA-12A/B *Gladiator/Giant*); S-300V4 (RS-SA-23)

Medium-range 350: ε200 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); ε90 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); ε60 9K317M *Buk-M3* (RS-SA-27)

Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K331M/9K331MU *Tor-M1/M2/M2U* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*) (9M338 msl entering service)

Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*); 400 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*); 400 9K35M3 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60

Reserves

Cadre formations

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

13 MR bde

Navy ε150,000 (incl conscripts)

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 49

STRATEGIC • SSBN 11:

1 *Kalmar* (Project 667BDR (*Delta III*)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 *Stantsia-02* (RS-SS-N-18 *Stingray*) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT,

4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

6 *Delfin* (Project 667BDRM (*Delta IV*)) with 16 R-29RMU2 *Sineva*/R-29RMU2.1 *Layner* (RS-SS-N-23 *Skiff*) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

3 *Borey* (Project 955 (*Dolgorukiy*)) with 16 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

1 *Borey-A* (Project 955A) with 6 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

(1 *Akula* (Project 941UM (*Typhoon*)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT)

TACTICAL 38

SSGN 8:

6 *Antey* (Project 949A (*Oscar II*)) (2 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 24 single SM-225A *Inchr* with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) dual-capable ASHM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT

1 *Yasen* (Project 885 (*Severodvinsk I*)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K *Keramika* HWT/UGST *Fizik* HWT

1 *Yasen-M* (Project 08851 (*Severodvinsk II*)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); up to 10 single 533mm TT with UGST *Fizik* HWT

SSN 10:

2 *Kondor* (Project 945A (*Sierra II*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT

3 *Schuka* (Project 671RTMK (*Victor III*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 2 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT

3 *Schuka-B* (Project 971 (*Akula I*)) (5 more non-operational, return to service significantly delayed) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*))

nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl

- 2 *Schuka-B* (Project 971/09711 (*Akula II*)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASW msl
- (1 *Barracuda* (Project 945 (*Sierra I*)) (in reserve) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) has replaced 3M10 *Granat* (RS-SS-N-21 *Sampson*) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; ASHM capability unconfirmed))

SSK 20:

- 10 *Paltus* (Project 877 (*Kilo*)) (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT
- 9 *Varshavyanka* (Project 06363 (*Improved Kilo*)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K *Kalibr-PL* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear)
- 1 *Lada* (Project 677 (*Petersburg*)) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K *Kalibr-PL* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/USET-80K *Keramika* HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 32

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Admiral Kuznetsov* (in extended refit) with 12 single SM-233A Inchr with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 *Udov* 1 A/S mor, 8 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 6 AK630M CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 *Flanker D*/MiG-29KR/KUBR Ftr/FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R *Helix* AEW hel)

CRUISERS 4:

CGHMN 1 *Orlan* (Project 11442 (*Kirov I*)) (1 other non-operational; undergoing extensive refit and planned to return to service in 2023) with 20 single SM-233 Inchr with 3M45 *Granit* (RS-SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300F *Fort* (RS-SA-N-6 *Grumble*) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300FM *Fort-M* (RS-SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 16 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT with RPK-6M *Vodopad-NK* (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch 3* A/S mor, 6 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

CGHM 3 *Atlant* (Project 1164 (*Slava*)) with 8 twin SM-248 Inchr with 3M70 *Vulkan* (RS-SS-N-12 mod 2

Sandbox) ASHM, 8 octuple VLS with S-300F *Fort* (RS-SA-N-6 *Grumble*) SAM/S-300FM *Fort M* (RS-SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm PTA-53-1164 ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11:

3 *Sarych* (Project 956 (*Sovremenny I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 twin 3S90 Inchr with 9M317 *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-956 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch 3* A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

6 *Fregat* (Project 1155 (*Udaloy I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub-B* (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Fregat* (Project 1155 (*Udaloy I*)) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with with 3M14T *Kalibr-NK* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Fregat* (Project 11551 (*Udaloy II*)) (in refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 3M87 *Kortik* CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

FRIGATES 16

FFGHM 14:

3 Project 11356 (*Grigorovich*) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr-NK* (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) ASHM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM/91RT2 A/S msl (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 12-cell 3S90.1 VLS with 9M317 *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM/9M317M *Yezh* (RS-SA-N-7C) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-11356 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Jastreb* (Project 11540 (*Neustrashimyy*)) (1 other non-operational, in long-term refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 4 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 *Kinzhal* (RS-SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*), 6 single 533mm ASTT with RPK-6M *Vodopad-NK* (RS-SS-N-16 *Stallion*) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* A/S mor, 2 3M87 *Kortik*

CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

- 1 Project 20380 (*Steregushchiy* I) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 1 3M87 *Kortik*-M CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 6 Project 20380 (*Steregushchiy* II) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 3 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 *Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 1 Project 20385 (*Gremyashchiy*) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 *Poliment-Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 2 Project 22350 (*Gorshkov*) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 8-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 *Poliment-Redut* (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 3M89 *Palash* CIWS (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

FFGM 2:

- 1 *Burevestnik* (Project 1135 (*Krivak* I))† with 1 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub*-B (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns
- 1 *Burevestnik* M (Project 1135M (*Krivak* II)) with 1 quad Inchr with URK-5 *Rastrub*-B (RS-SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 2 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm guns

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 129

CORVETTES 42

FFGM 14

- 9 *Buyan*-M (Project 21631 (*Sviyazhskii*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 sextuple 3M47 *Gibka* Inchr with *Igla*-1M (RS-SA-N-10 *Grouse*) SAM, 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
- 1 *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B

Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 *Pantsir*-M with 57E6 SAM, 1 76mm gun

- 1 Project 11661K (*Gepard* I) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 Project 11661K (*Gepard* II) with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 1 3M89 *Palash* CIWS with 9M337 *Sosna*-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 76mm gun
- 2 *Sivuch* (Project 1239 (*Dergach*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33AM *Osa*-MA2 (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- FFSG 2 *Karakurt* (Project 22800 (*Uragan*)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 VLS with 3M14T *Kalibr*-NK (RS-SS-N-30A *Sagaris*) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 *Oniks* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- FFSM 26:
 - 2 *Albatros* (Project 1124 (*Grisha* III)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
 - 18 *Albatros* (Project 1124M (*Grisha* V)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
 - 6 Project 1331M (*Parchim* II) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PSOH 3 Project 22160 (*Bykov*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

PCGM 10:

- 9 *Ovod*-1 (Project 1234.1 (*Nanuchka* III)) with 2 triple Inchr with P-120 *Malakhit* (RS-SS-N-9 *Siren*) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 *Ovod*-1 (Project 1234.1 (*Nanuchka* III)) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 1 twin Inchr with 4K33 *Osa*-M (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 23:

- 5 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* II) with 2 twin Inchr with P-22 *Termit*-R (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 17 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

1 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 3K89 *Palash* (RS-CADS-N-2) CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCM 3 *Buyan* (Project 21630 (*Astrakhan*)) with 1 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 *Gibka* Inchr with *Igla*-1M (RS-SA-N-10 *Grouse*) SAM, 1 A-215 *Grad*-M 122mm MRL, 1 100mm gun

PCF 1 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBF 19: 17 *Raptor* (capacity 20 troops); 2 *Mangust*

PBR 4 *Shmel* with 1 17-cell BM-14 MRL, 1 76mm gun

PB 24 *Grachonok*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 42

MCC 5 *Alexandrit* (Project 12700)

MHI 7 *Sapfir* (Project 10750 (*Lida*)) with 1 AK630 CIWS

MHO 2 *Rubin* (Project 12660 (*Gorya*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MSC 20: 19 *Yakhont* (Project 1265 (*Sonya*)) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM); 1 *Korund*-E (Project 1258E (*Yevgenya*))

MSO 8: 7 *Akvamaren*-M (Project 266M (*Natya*)); 1 *Agat* (Project 02668 (*Natya* II)) (all with 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 21:

12 Project 775 (*Ropucha* I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

3 Project 775M (*Ropucha* III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

4 *Tapir* (Project 1171 (*Alligator*)) with at least 2 twin Inchr with 9K32 *Strela*-2 (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

2 Project 11711 (*Gren*) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 *Helix* B hel; 13 MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 28

LCM 26: 9 *Akula* (Project 1176 (*Ondatra*)) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 *Dyugon* (Project 21820) (capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 12 *Serna* (Project 11770) (capacity 2 APC or 100 troops)

LCAC 2 *Zubr* (Project 12322 (*Pomornik*)) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 *Ogon'* MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC(T))

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 278

SSAN 8:

2 *Halibut* (Project 18511 (*Paltus*))

3 *Kashalot* (Project 1910 (*Uniform*))

1 *Nelma* (Project 1851 (*X-Ray*))

1 *Orenburg* (*Delta* III Stretch)

1 *Podmoskovye* (Project 09787)

(1 non-operational *Losharik* (Project 10831 (*Norsub*-5)) reportedly damaged by fire in 2019)

SSA 1 *Sarov* (Project 20120)

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 Project 419 (*Sura*)

AE 9: 6 *Muna*; 1 *Dubnyak*; 2 *Akademik Kovalev* (Project 20181) with 1 hel landing platform

AEM 2: 1 *Kalma*-3 (Project 1791R); 1 *Lama*

AFS 2 *Longvinik* (Project 23120)

AG 1 *Potok*

AGB 5: 1 *Dobrynya Mikitich*; 1 *Ilya Muromets*; 2 *Ivan Susanin*; 1 *Vladimir Kavraysky*

AGE 3: 2 *Seliger*; 1 *Tchusovoy*

AGHS 4 Project 23040G

AGI 14: 2 *Alpinist*; 2 *Dubridium* (Project 1826); 1 *Moma*; 7 *Vishnya*; 2 *Yuri Ivanov*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGOR 7: 1 *Akademik Alexandrov* (Project 20183); 1 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Sibiriyakov*; 2 *Vinograd*; 1 *Yantar*

AGS 67: 8 *Biya*; 16+ *Finik*; 7 *Kamenka*; 5 *Moma*; 8+ *Omega*; 6 *Baklan* (Project 19920); 4 *Baklan* (Project 19920B); 4 *Vaygach*; 9+ *Yug*

AGSH 1 *Samara*

AH 3 *Obt*

AK 3: 2 *Irgiz*; 1 *Pevek*

AOL 8: 2+ *Dubna*; 3 *Uda*; 3+ *Altay* (mod)

AOR 4: 3 *Boris Chilikin*; 1 *Akademik Pashin* (Project 23130)

AORL 2: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 1 *Olekma*

AOS 1 *Luza*

AOTL 1 *Platforma-Arktika* (Project 03182) with 1 hel landing platform

AR ε7 *Amur*

ARC 5: 4 *Emba*; 1 Improved *Klasma*

ARS 33: 1 *Kommuna*; 5 *Goryn*; 4 *Mikhail Rudnitsky*; 22 Project 23040; 1 *Zvezdochka* (Project 20180)

AS 3 Project 2020 (*Malina*)

ASR 2: 1 *Elbrus*; 1 *Igor Belousov*

ATF 53: 1 *Okhotsk*; 1 *Baklan*; ε3 *Katun*; 3 *Ingul*; 1 *Neftgaz*; 10 *Okhtensky*; 13 *Prometey*; 2 Project 23470 with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Prut*; 4 *Sliva*; 14 *Sorum*

ATS 6 Project 22870

AWT 1 *Manych*

AXL 9: 7 *Petrushka*; 2 *Smolny* with 2 RBU 2500 *Smerch* 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns

Naval Aviation ε31,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM *Foxhound*

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

1 regt with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR *Fulcrum*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound*; Su-24M/M2/MR *Fencer*

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

2 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N *May**; Il-18D; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-22 *Coot B*

2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N *May**; Il-18D; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-22 *Coot B*

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J**

1 unit with Ka-31R *Helix*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-26 *Curl*; Be-12 *Mail**; Ka-27 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12PS *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-24RV *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*; An-140

2 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 *May*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD div HQ

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 219 combat capable

FTR 67: 10 MiG-31B/BS *Foxhound*; 22 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; 17 Su-33 *Flanker D*; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

FGA 44: 19 MiG-29KR *Fulcrum*; 3 MiG-29KUBR *Fulcrum*; 22 Su-30SM

ATK 46: 41 Su-24M *Fencer*; 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* (trg role)

ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ *Bear F*; 10 Tu-142MR *Bear J* (comms); 15 Il-38 *May*; 7 Il-38N *May*

MP 7: 6 Be-12PS *Mail**; 1 Il-18D

ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E**

SAR 4: 3 An-12PS *Cub*; 1 Be-200ES

ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 2 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 49: **Medium** 2 An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 45: 1 An-24RV *Coke*; 24 An-26 *Curl*; 6 An-72 *Coaler*; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134; 1 Tu-134UBL; **PAX** 2 Tu-154M *Careless*

TRG 4 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 Mi-24P *Hind*

ASW 52: 30 Ka-27PL *Helix*; 22 Ka-27M *Helix*

EW 8 Mi-8 *Hip J*

AEW 2 Ka-31R *Helix*

SAR 16 Ka-27PS *Helix D*

TPT 41: **Medium** 35: 27 Ka-29 *Helix*; 4 Mi-8T *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; **Light** 6 Ka-226T

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 200: 56 S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 40 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); 104 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 30 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-74M (RS-AA-11B *Archer*); **ARH** R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B *Adder*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

ASM Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*)

AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)

Naval Infantry (Marines) €35,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

3 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

4 (OMRP) SF unit

11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 recce bde

Mechanised

1 MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 SAM regt)

2 MR bde

1 MR regt

6 naval inf bde

1 naval inf regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26 *Stone*/RS-SSC-7 *Southpaw*)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

2 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); *Strela-1*/*Strela-10* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*/RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 330: 50 T-72B; 150 T-72B3; 30 T-72B3M; 50 T-80BV; 50 T-80BVM

IFV 1,260: 400 BMP-2; 80 BMP-3; 40 BMP-3F; 740 BTR-82A

APC 400

APC (T) 300 MT-LB

APC (W) 100 BTR-80

AUV *Vystrel*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 60+: 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrisantema* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*)

MANPATS 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

GUNS 100mm T-12

ARTILLERY 405

SP 181: 122mm 95 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 86: 50 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 36 2S19M1 *Msta-S*

TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 50 2A65 *Msta-B*

GUN/MOR 66

SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 58: 122mm 36 BM-21 *Grad/Tornado-G*; 220mm 18
9P140 *Uragan*; 300mm 4+ 9A52 *Smerch*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER

SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 *Iskander-M* (RS-SS-26
Stone)

GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7
Southpaw)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Short-range 12+ *Tor-M2DT*

Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*);
50 9K31 *Strela-1/9K35 Strela-10* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin/RS-*
SA-13 Gopher); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS • SP 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces 2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

5 ASHM bde

1 ASHM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE**

ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 *Bereg*

ASHM 96+: 40 3K60 *Bal* (RS-SSC-6 *Sennight*); 56 3K55
Bastion (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*); some 4K44 *Redut* (RS-SSC-1
Sepal); some 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*)

Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)

A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM,
BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB

FORCES BY ROLE**BOMBER**

3 regt with Tu-22M3 *Backfire C*

3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod *Bear*

1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* (Armenia)

2 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB *Flanker B/J/C*; Su-
30M2 *Flanker G*

2 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-27SM *Flanker J*;
Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*; Su-35S *Flanker*
M

1 regt with Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-35S *Flanker M*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 regt with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; Su-34 *Fullback*

1 regt with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with Su-25SM *Frogfoot* (Kyrgyzstan)

3 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

ISR

3 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer*

1 flt with An-30 *Clank*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with A-50/A-50U *Mainstay*

TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*

TRANSPORT

6 regt/sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-148-100E; An-26 *Curl*;
Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with An-124 *Condor*; Il-76MD *Candid*

1 regt with An-124 *Condor*; Il-76MD *Candid*; Il-76MD-
90A *Candid*

1 regt with An-12BK *Cub*; Il-76MD *Candid*

1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*

3 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 bde with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*;
Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8MTPR-1
Hip; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*;
Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

2 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

9 AD div HQ

4 regt with 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*);
9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300V (RS-SA-12
Gladiator/Giant)

1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

2 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)

6 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

12 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1*
(RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1,172 combat capable

BBR 137: 60 Tu-22M3 *Backfire C*; 1 Tu-22MR *Backfire†* (1 in
overhaul); 42 Tu-95MS *Bear*; 18 Tu-95MS mod *Bear*; 7 Tu-
160 *Blackjack*; 7 Tu-160 mod *Blackjack*; 2 Tu-160M *Blackjack*
(in test)

FTR 185: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 85 MiG-31BM
Foxhound C; 12 Su-27 *Flanker B*; 18 Su-27UB *Flanker C*

FGA 427+: 15 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UBT
Fulcrum; 6 MiG-35S/UB *Fulcrum* (in test); 47 Su-27SM
Flanker J; 24 Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; 19 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*;
91 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 124 Su-34 *Fullback*; 1+ Su-34 mod
Fullback; 97 Su-35S *Flanker M*; 1 Su-57 *Felón* (in test)

ATK 264: 70 Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; 40 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 139 Su-
25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*; 15 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

ISR 58: 4 An-30 *Clank*; up to 50 Su-24MR *Fencer**; 2 Tu-
214ON; 2 Tu-214R

EW 3 Il-22PP Mute

ELINT 31: 14 Il-20M *Coot A*; 5 Il-22 *Coot B*; 12 Il-22M *Coot B*

AEW&C 9: 3 A-50 *Mainstay*; 6 A-50U *Mainstay*

C2 8: 2 Il-80 *Maxdome*; 1 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PU-SBUS

TKR 15: 5 Il-78 *Midas*; 10 Il-78M *Midas*

TPT 448: **Heavy** 126: 11 An-124 *Condor*; 4 An-22 *Cock*; 99 Il-76MD *Candid*; 3 Il-76MD-M *Candid*; 9 Il-76MD-90A *Candid*; **Medium** 65 An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 225: 114 An-26 *Curl*; 25 An-72 *Coaler*; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 32: 15 An-148-100E; 17 Tu-154 *Careless*

TRG 262: 35 DA42T; 118 L-39 *Albatros*; 109 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 399+: 133 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 100 Mi-24D/V/P *Hind*; 90+ Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 13 Mi-28UB *Havoc*; 63+ Mi-35 *Hind*

EW €20 Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 333: **Heavy** 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T *Halo*; **Medium** 300: 100 Mi-8/Mi-8MT *Hip*; 60 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 5 Mi-8AMTSh-VA *Hip*; 135 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*

TRG 69: 19 Ka-226U; 50 *Ansats-U*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** some *Inokhodets*

ISR • **Medium** *Forpost (Searcher II)*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 714:

Long-range 584: 160 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); 150 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 20 S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 6 S-350 *Vityaz* (RS-SA-28); 248 S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 80 9K37M1-2 *Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*/RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

Short-range 50 96K6 *Pantsir-S1/S2* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-74M (RS-AA-11B *Archer*); R-60T (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33 (RS-AA-9A *Amos*); **ARH** R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B *Adder*); R-37M (RS-AA-13A *Axehead*); **PRH** R-27P/EP (RS-AA-10E/F *Alamo*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-25M (RS-AS-12B *Kegler*); Kh-31P/PM (RS-AS-17A/C *Krypton*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-38; Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*) Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); *Kinzhal* (RS-AS-24 *Killjoy*); 9M114 *Kokon* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); 9M120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9 *Spiral 2*); 9M120-1 *Vikhr* (RS-AT-16 *Scallion*)

AShM Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 *Kitchen*); Kh-31A/AM (RS-AS-17B/D *Krypton*); Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod); Kh-35U (RS-AS-20 *Kayak*)

LACM

Nuclear Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B *Kent*); Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B *Kodiak*)

Conventional Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A *Kodiak*); Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 *Kluge*)

BOMBS

Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L

TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500

INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S

Airborne Forces €45,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (AB *Recce*) SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Air Manoeuvre**

2 AB div (1 tk bn, 3 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 indep AB bde

2 air aslt bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 160: 150 T-72B3; 10 T-72B3M

IFV 130 BTR-82AM

APC 822+

APC (T) 822: 700 BTR-D; 122 BTR-MDM

PPV *Typhoon*-VDV

ABCV 1,351: 1,000 BMD-2; 351 BMD-4M

AUV *GAZ Tigr*; *UAMZ Toros*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 100 BTR-RD

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS • **SP** 125mm 36+ 2S25 *Sprut*-SD

ARTILLERY 600+

TOWED 122mm 150 D-30

GUN/MOR • **SP** 120mm 250: 220 2S9 *NONA-S*; 30 2S9 *NONA-SM*; (500 2S9 *NONA-S* in store)

MOR • **TOWED** 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23 *NONA-M1*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 30+: 30 *Strela*-10MN (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla*-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba* (RS-SA-29 *Gizmo*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*); 9K34 *Strela*-3 (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*)

GUNS • **SP** 23mm 150 BTR-ZD

Special Operations Forces €1,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF unit

Railway Forces €29,000

4 regional commands

FORCES BY ROLE**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

10 (railway) tpt bde

Russian Military Districts

Western Military District

HQ at St Petersburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

3 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bde

Armoured

1 tk div

1 tk bde

3 MR div

Mechanised

1 MR div

3 MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

3 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 (hy) arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

3 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

1 EW bde

1 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

Northern Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 27

STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 2 in refit) (1 additional in reserve)

TACTICAL 19: 5 SSGN; 9 SSN; 5 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV (in refit); 1 CGHMN; 1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM (1 more in reserve); 2 FFGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16: 6

FSM; 2 PCGM; 8 PB

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8: 1 MHO; 1 MSO; 6 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 8: 6 LST; 2 LCM

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-24M/M2/*MR Fencer*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N *May*; Il-20RT *Coot A*; Tu-134

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

AIR DEFENCE

5 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR *Fulcrum*; 4 MiG-29KUBR *Fulcrum*; 2 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 18: 13 Su-24M *Fencer*; 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* (trg role)

ASW 17: 5 Il-38 *May*; 1 Il-38N *May*; 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer*

ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 1 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 9: 8 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix A* TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

COMMAND

1 engr regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 AShM bde

Baltic Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 1

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 DDGHM; 5 FFGHM (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 34: 3 FSGM; 2 FSG; 6 FSM; 4 PCGM; 7 PCFG; 11 PBF; 1 PB
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
11: 1 MCC; 4 MSC; 6 MHI
AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-27 *Flanker B*

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker B/C*

FGA 8 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 10 Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer*

TPT 8: 6 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS

ATK Mi-24P *Hind*

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR div

1 MR regt

1 naval inf bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 ASHM regt

Military Air Force

6th Air Force & Air Defence Army

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

1 regt with Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-35S *Flanker M*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

ISR

1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*; An-30 *Clank*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-24P/Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-8PPA *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

3 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 30 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*

FGA 98: 12 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 24 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 24 Su-34 *Fullback*; 38 Su-35S *Flanker M*

ISR 19: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 15 Su-24MR *Fencer E**

TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ATK 76+: 24 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 16 Mi-24P *Hind*; 24 Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 12+ Mi-35 *Hind*

EW 8 Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT • **Medium** 50 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Long-range S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (AB Recce) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr

3 AB div

Central Military District

HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk div

3 MR bde

Mechanised

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE2 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M***COMBAT SUPPORT**

2 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

3 engr regt

1 EW bde

2 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

3 MR bde

Military Air Force**14th Air Force & Air Defence Army****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**2 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C***GROUND ATTACK**1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*1 sqn with Su-25SM *Frogfoot* (Kyrgyzstan)**ISR**1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E***TRANSPORT**1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*;Tu-154; Mi-8 *Hip***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 bde with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip* (Tajikistan)**AIR DEFENCE**1 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*)1 regt with S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)4 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**FTR 40 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*FGA 25: 24 Su-34 *Fullback*; 1+ Su-34 mod *Fullback*ATK 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*ISR 9 Su-24MR *Fencer E*TPT 36 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless***HELICOPTERS**ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; 40 Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE****SAM****Long-range** S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)**Short-range** 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)**Airborne Troops****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Air Manoeuvre**

1 AB bde

Southern Military District

HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

3 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 rece bde

Armoured

3 MR div

1 MR bde

1 MR bde (Armenia)

1 MR bde (South Ossetia)

Mechanised

1 MR div

1 MR bde

1 MR bde (Abkhazia)

1 (lt/mtn) MR bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE3 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M***COMBAT SUPPORT**

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 engr bde

1 EW bde

1 NBC bde

2 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaia Bay

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 6 SSK****PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6:** 1 CGHM;

3 FFGHM; 2 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 36: 8

FSGM; 6 FSM; 3 PSOH; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 8 PBF

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES

10: 3 MCC; 1 MHO; 5 MSO; 1 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 3 LCM

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 regt with Ka-27 *Helix*; An-26 *Curl*; Be-12PS *Mail*; Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FGA 12 Su-30SM *Flanker H*

ATK 13 Su-24M *Fencer D*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

MP 3 Be-12PS *Mail*

TPT 6 An-26

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 naval inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

1 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

2 ASHM bde

Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15: 3

FSGM; 1 PCFG; 3 PCM; 3 PB; 1 PBF; 4 PBR

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3:

2 MSC; 1 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 naval inf regt

Military Air Force

4th Air Force & Air Defence Army

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with Su-30SM *Flanker H*

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-30SM *Flanker H* (Armenia)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM *Flanker B/J*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

1 regt with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer D/E*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*/Mi-8 *Hip*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

1 regt with Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

2 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*;

Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*

1 sqn with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip* (Armenia)

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

3 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 26: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 14 Su-27 *Flanker B*

FGA 95: 12 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 24 Su-27SM3

Flanker; 14 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; 21 Su-30SM *Flanker*

H; 24 Su-34 *Fullback*

ATK 109: 24 Su-24M *Fencer D*; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 *Frogfoot*

ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TPT 12 An-12 *Cub*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 44 Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 8 Mi-24P *Hind*; 40 Mi-35 *Hind*

EW 3+ Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 72: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 62 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB div

Eastern Military District

HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 tk bde
1 MR div
6 MR bde

Mechanised

2 MR bde
1 MGA div

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

4 SRBM/GLCM bde with *Iskander-M*

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 engr bde
1 EW bde
1 NBC bde
4 NBC regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 log bde

AIR DEFENCE

5 AD bde

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
8 MR bde

Pacific Fleet**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 15****STRATEGIC 3 SSBN**

TACTICAL 12: 3 SSGN (2 more non-operational in long-term refit); 1 SSN (3 more non-operational in long-term refit); 8 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CGHM;**5 DDGHM; 4 FFGHM****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28: 8****FSM; 4 PCGM; 10 PCFG; 6 PB****MINE WARFARE 10: 1 MCC; 2 MSO; 7 MSC****AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 5 LCM****Naval Aviation****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-31BS/BM *Foxhound A/C*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*
2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N *May*; Il-18D; Il-22 *Coot B*
1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS/BM *Foxhound A/C*
ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR *Bear F/J*; 8 Il-38 *May*; 4 Il-38N *May*

MP 1 Il-18D

EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 *Coot B*
TPT 6: 2 An-12BK *Cub*; 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*
TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)
Short-range 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Naval Infantry**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
2 naval inf bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

2 AShM bde

Military Air Force**11th Air Force & Air Defence Army****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*; Su-27SM *Flanker J*; Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*; Su-35S *Flanker M*
1 regt with Su-35S *Flanker M*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*
1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM *Flanker H*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer D/D mod*; Su-34 *Fullback*
1 regt with Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

ISR

1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty/*
Tu-154 *Careless*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*
1 regt with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*
1 regt with Mi-24P *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

1 regt with 9K37M *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*);
1 regt with S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*);
S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)
4 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-400
(RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22
Greyhound)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 20 MiG-31BM *Foxhound C*
FGA 120: 23 Su-27SM *Flanker J*; 6 Su-30M2 *Flanker G*; 31 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 26 Su-34 *Fullback*; 34
Su-35S *Flanker M*
ATK 102: 20 Su-24M *Fencer D*; 10 Su-24M2 *Fencer*;
72 Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*
ISR 12 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TPT 24: 22 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 12 Mi-24P *Hind*

EW 2+ Mi-8MTPR-1 *Hip*

TPT 60: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 56 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B *Grumble*); S-300V (RS-SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*)

Medium-range 9K317 *Buk-M1-2* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range 9K6K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

2 air aslt bde

Gendarmierie & Paramilitary 554,000

Border Guard Service €160,000

Subordinate to Federal Security Service

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates

MANOEUVRE

Other

7 frontier gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR/

AUV BPM-97

ARTILLERY 90

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S

MOR 120mm 2S12 *Sani*

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 201

PSOHM 2 *Nerey* (*Kriyak III*) with 1 twin ZIF-122 Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad PTA-53-1135 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel)

PSO 6: 4 *Komandor*; 2 *Okean* (Project 22100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCO 27: 8 *Alpinist* (Project 503); 1 *Sprut*; 12 *Okhotnik* (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Purga* with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 33: 4 *Molnya II* (*Pauk II*); 6 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410); 13 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 *Svetlyak* (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS; 1 *Yakhont*

PCR 1 *Slepen* (*Yaz*) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns

PBF 87: 57 *Mangust*; 3 *Mirazh* (Project 14310); 4 *Mustang-2* (Project 18623); 21 *Sobol*; 2 *Sokzhoi*

PBR 27: 4 *Ogonek*; 8 *Piyavka* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 15 *Moskit* (*Vosh*) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun

PB 18: 6 *Guyys* (Project 03050); 2 *Morzh* (Project 1496M; 10 *Lamantin* (Project 1496M1)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34

AE 1 *Muna*

AGB 2 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

AK 8 *Pevek*

AKSL 5 *Kanin*

AO 3: 1 *Ishim* (Project 15010); 2 *Envoron*

ATF 15: 14 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK230M CIWS; 1 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ship)

AIRCRAFT • TPT €86: 70 An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-72 *Coaler*/Il-76 *Candid*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Yak-40 *Codling*; 16 SM-92

HELICOPTERS: €200 Ka-27PS *Helix*/Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-26 *Halo*/Mi-8 *Hip*

Federal Guard Service €40,000–50,000

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB regt

Other

1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service Special Purpose Centre €4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF unit (*Alfa* and *Vypel* units)

National Guard €340,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

10 paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)

17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)

36 indep paramilitary grt

90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units)

Aviation

8 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE some BRDM-2A

IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR-82A/BTR-82AM

PPV *Ural-VV*

AUV *Patrol-A*; *Tigr*

ARTILLERY 35

TOWED 122mm 20 D-30

MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PBF 3 BK-16 (Project 02510)

PB 2+ *Grachonok*

AIRCRAFT

TPT 29: **Heavy** 9 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*;

Light 18: 12 An-26 *Curl*; 6 An-72 *Coaler*

HELICOPTERS

TPT 71: Heavy 10 Mi-26 *Halo*; Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8 *Hip*; some Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; Light 1 Ka-226T

DEPLOYMENT

ARMENIA: 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 fr sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 4 Su-30SM *Flanker H*; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MT *Hip*; 2 AD bty with S-300V; 1 AD bty with Buk-M1-2)

AZERBAIJAN: 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping)

BELARUS: 1 radar station at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased); 1 naval comms site

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 4

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10

GEORGIA: 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; 16 S-300PS); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (*Dnepr* system; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN: €500; 13 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip*

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

MOLDOVA/TRANSNIESTR: €1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 7 Mi-24 *Hind*; some Mi-8 *Hip*

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

SYRIA: 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; €10 T-72B3; €20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; *Typhoon-K*; *Tigr*; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 *Smerch*; 10 Su-24M *Fencer D*; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S *Flanker M*; 1 A-50U *Mainstay*; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 1 ASHM bty with 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with *Pantsir-S1/S2*; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN: 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; *Tigr*; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 *Uragan*); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS


UKRAINE: Crimea: 30,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM-21; 8 9P140 *Uragan*; 1 ASHM bde with 3K60 *Bal*; 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt with S-400; *Pantsir-S1*; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system); Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10

Tajikistan TJK

Tajikistani Somoni TJS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TJS	82.5bn	92.1bn	
	USD	8.00bn	8.10bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	844	839	
Growth	%	4.5	5.0	
Inflation	%	8.6	8.0	
Def bdgt [a]	TJS	€917m	€1.06bn	
	USD	€88.8m	€93.5m	
USD1=TJS		10.32	11.37	

[a] Excludes budget for law enforcement



Population 8,990,874

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.7%	4.7%	4.5%	4.3%	18.9%	1.6%
Female	15.1%	4.5%	4.4%	4.2%	19.7%	2.2%

Capabilities

The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet-era origin. Regional security and terrorism remain key security concerns, given the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan has been building its capability by hosting CSTO counter-terrorism exercises and by taking part in exercises, organised by US CENTCOM, focused on scenarios including counter-terrorism. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and the SCO, and the armed forces also conduct exercises with Russian troops based at Russia's 201st military base. In 2021, bilateral military exercises and CSTO joint drills concerned scenarios focused on the border with Afghanistan. Reports in early 2019 indicated that there may be a Chinese military facility in eastern Tajikistan, though this remains unconfirmed by either Beijing or Dushanbe. In 2021, reports indicated that China was to fund an outpost for Tajikistan's police special forces near to the border with Afghanistan. Though the pre-existing base is still officially denied by Beijing and Dushanbe, there were reports that full control of the facility would be transferred to Beijing and future rent will be waived in exchange for military aid from China. In 2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence cooperation, in particular on counter-terrorism, and there were reports in 2021 of agreements on security cooperation with Iran. Border deployments have been stepped up in response to concerns about regional and border security and terrorism. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some personal equipment has been donated by the US. Barring maintenance facilities, Tajikistan only has minimal defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE 20,000 (Army 20,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,300

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 40: 30 T-72 Ural/T-72A/T-72AV/T-72B; 3 T-72B1; 7

T-62/T-62AV/T-62AM

RECCE 31: 9 BRDM-2; 22 BRDM-2M

IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2

APC 36

APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

PPV 13 VP11

AUV 24 CS/VN3B mod; *Tigr*

ARTILLERY 41

SP 122mm 3 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 122mm 13 D-30

MRL 122mm 15 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 10+: SP 82mm CS/SS4; 120mm 10

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range 3 S-125 *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)

Short-range 5 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS

SP 23mm 8 BTR-ZD

TOWED 23mm ZU-23M1

Air Force/Air Defence 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Tu-134A *Crusty*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17TM *Hip H*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A *Crusty*

TRG 4+: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; some Yak-52

HELICOPTERS

ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17TM *Hip H*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Internal Troops 3,800

National Guard 1,200

Emergencies Ministry 2,500

Border Guards

FOREIGN FORCES

China €300 (trg)

Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; *Tigr*; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 *Uragan*); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-8MTV *Hip*; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 *Hip*; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS

Turkmenistan TKM

Turkmen New Manat TMT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TMT	160bn	186bn	
	USD	45.6bn	53.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,674	8,844	
Growth	%	-3.4	4.5	
Inflation	%	7.6	12.5	
Def bdtg	TMT	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=TMT		3.50	3.50	

Population 5,579,889

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	3.9%	4.1%	4.7%	21.6%	2.6%
Female	12.3%	3.8%	4.1%	4.7%	22.3%	3.3%

Capabilities

Turkmenistan has concerns over potential spillover from security challenges in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack significant capabilities and equipment. Ashgabat has maintained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this commitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the armed forces' defensive capability in order to safeguard national interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO or the SCO. Progress remains slow in changing from a Soviet-era divisional structure to a brigade structure. The armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has participated in multinational exercises and is reported to have restarted joint exercises with Russia and Uzbekistan, but has limited capacity to deploy externally. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Turkmenistan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. There are plans to strengthen the border guard's equipment and facilities. Plans to bolster naval capabilities have resulted in some procurements, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in the Caspian Sea. UAVs have been acquired, including from China. In 2021, Turkmenistan confirmed the procurement of the *Bayraktar* TB2 UAV from Turkey in its Independence Day parade. The parade also featured new military equipment including the A-29 *Super Tucano*, C-27J *Spartan* and M-346 jet trainer. Apart from maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol vessels of Turkish design under licence.

ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 33,000

5 Mil Districts

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops regt

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 tk bde

Mechanised

1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

4 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

Other

1 MR trg div

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE1 SRBM bde with 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud B*)**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 (mixed) arty/AT regt

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG

RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr *Ajban*

IFV 1,050: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 4 BMP-1UM; 430 BMP-2;

4 BMP-2D; 4 BMP-3; 4 BTR-80A; 4 BTR-80 *Grom*

APC 907+

APC (W) 870+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70; 450 BTR-80

PPV 37+: 28+ *Kirpi*; 9+ *Titan-DS*; some *Typhoon-K*AUV 12+: 8 Nimr *Ajban* 440A; 4+ *Cobra*

ABCV 8 BMD-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**SP 58+: 8 9P122 *Malyutka-M* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger* on BRDM-2); 8 9P133 *Malyutka-P* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger* on BRDM-2); 2 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel* on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral* on MT-LB); 4+ *Baryer* (on *Karakal*)MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12

ARTILLERY 769

SP 122mm 40 2S1

TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 *Giatsint-B*; 6 2A65 *Msta-B*

GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 158: 122mm 92: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 *Grad*; 4 BM-21A; RM-70; 220mm 60 9P140 *Uragan*; 300mm 6 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERSSRBM • **Conventional** 16 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud B*)**AIR DEFENCE****SAM****Short-range:** FM-90 (CH-SA-4); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)**Point-defence** 53+: 40 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 13 9K35 *Strela-10* mod (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K34 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); *Mistral* (reported); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)**GUNS 70**

SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM CM-502KG; AR-1

Navy 500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5****CORVETTES** • FSGM 1 *Deñiz Han* with 4 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 *Gokdeniz* CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PCFG 2 *Edermen* (RUS *Molnya*) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gunPCGM 2 *Arkadag* (TUR *Tuzla*) with 2 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad-RC* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m)**

Air Force 3,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**2 sqn with MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum***GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*1 sqn with Su-25MK *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with M346FA*

TRANSPORT1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind***TRAINING**1 unit with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**1 unit with L-39 *Albatros***AIR DEFENCE**

1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

1 bty with KS-1C (CH-SA-12)

3 bty with S-125 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)1 bty with S-125 *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)2 bty with S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 66** combat capableFTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*ATK 31: 19 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 12 Su-25MK *Frogfoot*TPT 5: **Medium** 2 C-27J *Spartan Light* 3: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-74TK *Coaler*TRG 13: 5 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 6 M346FA*; 2 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERSATK 10 Mi-24P *Hind F*

MRH 2+ AW139

TPT 11+: **Medium** 8: 6 Mi-8 *Hip*; 2 Mi-17V-V *Hip*; **Light** 3+ AW109**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR 3+: **Heavy** CH-3A; WJ-600; **Medium** 3+ *Bayraktar TB2*ISR 3+: **Medium** 3+ *Falco Light Orbiter-2***LOITERING MUNITIONS** *Skystriker***AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Long-range** 18: 2 2K11 *Krug* (RS-SA-4 *Ganeff*); 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9); 12 S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*);**Medium-range** 8: 4 S-125 *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26); 4 KS-1A (CH-SA-12)**Short-range** 12: 12 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); some S-125-2BM *Pechora***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*)**BOMBS**

Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000**Internal Troops €15,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**IFV 2+ *Lazar-3*APC • PPV 9: 4+ *Survivor II*; 5 *Titan-DS*AUV 4+ *Plasan Stormrider***Federal Border Guard Service €5,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • PPV 8: 4+ *Kirpi*; 4+ *Survivor II*AUV 6+ *Cobra***ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 4 BM-21A****AIR DEFENCE**

GUNS • TOWED • 23mm ZU-23-2


PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33PCGM 8 *Arkadag* (TUR *Tuzla*) with 2 twin Inchr with *Otomat* ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad-RC* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 *Roketsan* ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S morPBFG 6 *Nazya* (Dearsan 33) with 2 single Inchr with *Marte* Mk2/N ASHMPBF 18: 10 *Bars-12*; 5 *Grif-T*; 3 *Sobol*PB 1 *Point***AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1****HELICOPTERS**

MRH 2 AW139

TPT 3+: **Medium** some Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 3 AW109**Ukraine UKR**

Ukrainian Hryvnia UAH		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UAH	4.19tr	4.98tr	
	USD	155bn	181bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,741	4,384	
Growth	%	-4.0	3.5	
Inflation	%	2.7	9.5	
Def bdtg [a]	UAH	118bn	118bn	131bn
	USD	4.35bn	4.27bn	
FMA (US)	USD	20m	115m	115m
USD1=UAH		26.99	27.52	

[a] Including military pensions



Population 43,745,640

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.4%	2.3%	3.0%	24.4%	5.9%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	2.2%	2.9%	26.9%	11.5%

Capabilities

Ukraine's overriding security concern is Russia's support for separatists in the east of the country and occupation of Crimea. During 2021 exchanges of fire continued along the line of contact, with a marked increase in the second quarter of the year. Defence policy is based on maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. The country continues to aspire to membership of NATO, with an ongoing reform programme intended to align its armed forces with Alliance standards. In line with these aims it replaced its Military Doctrine in 2021 with a new Military Security Strategy which built on the 2020 National Security Strategy. Part of the reform programme included separating the position of chief of the general staff from that of commander in chief of the armed forces, and establishing several new commands, including a Joint Forces Command. The armed forces participate in bilateral and multinational exercises. The equipment inventory still consists predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry. Sustaining and in some cases upgrading these systems is a near-term concern, and equipment replacements will be required over the coming decade in order to forestall potential problems with obsolescence. Alongside an aspiration to re-equip the air force with Western combat aircraft by the mid-2030s, there is now a near-term focus on improving its limited naval capability. This includes the acquisition of ex-UK minehunters in 2022 as well as two new-build corvettes on order from Turkey, the first of which is due for delivery by the end of 2023. The country has a broad defence industrial base, operating in all sectors, though its capability remains shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage. Ukraine was a key provider of guided-weapons technologies in the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to build Soviet-era land systems and can maintain and modestly upgrade Soviet-era tactical combat aircraft.

ACTIVE 196,600 (Army 125,600 Navy 15,000 Air Force 35,000 Airborne 20,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000

Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015

RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000)

Military service within 5 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army** €125,600

4 regional HQ

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

5 recce bn

Armoured

4 tk bde

Mechanised

9 mech bde

2 mtn bde

Light

4 mot inf bde

1 lt inf bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

1 SSM bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bde

1 MRL bde

2 MRL regt

1 engr regt

1 EW regt

1 EW bn

2 EW coy

1 CBRN regt

4 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 maint regt

1 maint coy

HELICOPTERS

4 avn bde

AIR DEFENCE

4 AD regt

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 tk bde

Mechanised

2 mech bde

Other

23 (territorial def) sy bde(-)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 858: 385 T-64BV; 235 T-64BV mod 2017; 100

T-64BM *Bulat*; 82 T-72AV/B1; 4 T-72AV mod 2021; 47T-72AMT; 5 T-84 *Oplot*; (34 T-80; 500 T-72; 578 T-64; 20

T-55 all in store)

RECCE 547: 327 BRDM-2; 80 BRDM-2L1; 25 BRDM-2T;

115 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 1,212: 213 BMP-1/BMP-1AK; 890 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3;

54+ BTR-3DA; 6+ BTR-3E1; 45 BTR-4E

APC 622

APC (T) 60: 15 BTR-D; 45 MT-LB

APC (W) 322: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 102 BTR-80

PPV 240: 40 *Kozak-2* /-2M; 200 Varta

ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2

AUV 40 *Novator***ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**

AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB

ARV 34+: 10 BREM-1; 2 BREM-M; BREM-2; BREM-64;

22+ BTS-4

VLB MTU-20

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**SP 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*)MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113*Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); FGM-148 *Javelin*;*Stugna-P*; *Corsar***GUNS 100mm** €500 MT-12/T-12**ARTILLERY 1,818**SP 607+: **122mm** 292 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 302: 249 2S3*Akatsiya*; 18 2S5 *Giatsint-S*; 35 2S19 *Msta-S*; **203mm** 13+2S7 *Pion* (up to 83 2S7 *Pion* in store)**TOWED 515+**: **122mm** 75 D-30; **152mm** 440: 180 2A36*Giatsint-B*; 130 2A65 *Msta-B*; 130+ D-20**GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K****MRL 354: 122mm** 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 *Grad*;**220mm** 70 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 81+: *Adler*; 81 9A52*Smerch***MOR 120mm** 340: 190 2S12 *Sani*; 30 M-1938 (PM-38);

120 M120-15

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS**SRBM • Conventional** 90 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*)**HELICOPTERS**ATK €35 Mi-24 *Hind*MRH 1 *Lev-1***TPT • Medium** €23 Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 81+

Long-range Some S-300V (RS-SA-12A *Gladiator*)**Short-range** 6 9K330 *Tor-M* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)**Point-defence** 75+: 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*);9K33 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 75 2K22 *Tunguska*(RS-SA-19 *Grison*)**GUNS**SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4 *Shilka***TOWED 23mm** ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM** *Barrier-V***Navv** €15,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa. Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in Crimea

2 Regional HQ

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1**FFHM 1 *Hetman Sagaidachny* (RUS *Krivak* III) with 1 twinInchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad

533mm ASST with SET-65 HWT/53-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Albatros* (Project 1124P (*Grisha* II)) with 2 twin 533mm ASST with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 57mm guns

PCC 2 *Slavyansk* (ex-US *Island*)

PHG 1 *Vekhr* (FSU *Matka*) with 2 single Inchr with P-15M/R *Termit*-M/R (RS-SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) AShM, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBG 7 *Gyurza*-M (Project 51855) with 2 *Katran*-M RWS with *Barrier* SSM

PB 1 *Grif*-M (FSU *Zhuk*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1

MHI 1 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*))

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Project 773I (*Polnochny* C) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 *Akula* (*Ondatra*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

ABU 1 Project 419 (*Sura*)

AG 1 *Bereza*

AGI 1 *Muna*

AKL 1

AWT 1 *Sudak*

AXL 3 *Petrushka*

Naval Aviation €1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

ASW (2 Be-12 *Mail* non-operational)

TPT • **Light** (2 An-26 *Curl* in store)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 *Helix* A; 1 Mi-14PS *Haze* A; 2 Mi-14PL *Haze* C

TPT • **Medium** 1 Ka-29 *Helix*-B

TRG 1 Ka-226

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** 1+ *Bayraktar* TB2

Naval Infantry €6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recee bn

Light

2 nav inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 69: 41 T-64BV; 28 T-80BV mod

IFV BMP-1

APC

APC (T) MT-LB

APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-80

PPV *Varta*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

GUNS 100mm MT-12

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 152mm 2A36 *Giatsint*-B

AIR DEFENCE

GUNS • SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence €1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 arty bde

1 MRL regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY

TOWED 152mm some D-20

MRL 220mm some 9P140 *Uragan*

COASTAL DEFENCE

AShM 1 RK-360MC *Neptun*

Air Forces 45,000

3 Regional HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

4 bde with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker* B; L-39 *Albatros*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 bde with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer* E*

TRANSPORT

3 bde with An-24 *Curl*; An-26 *Coke*; An-30 *Clank*; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-9 *Hip*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

6 bde with 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

4 regt with 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11); S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT €124 combat capable

FTR 70: €36 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; €34 Su-27 *Flanker* B

FGA €14 Su-24M *Fencer* D

ATK €31 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 12: 3 An-30 *Clank*; €9 Su-24MR *Fencer* E*

TPT 29: **Heavy** 5 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 1 An-70; **Light**

€23: 3 An-24 *Coke*; €19 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG €31 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

C2 €14 Mi-9 *Hip*

TPT 32: **Medium** €30 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 2 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** 6 *Bayraktar* TB2

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 322+:

Long-range 250 S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*)

Medium-range 72 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*)

Short-range some S-125 *Pechora* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

GUNS • TOWED 23mm some ZU-23-2

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10A *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*);
MAM-L
ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11
Killer); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*) (likely WFU)

Airborne Assault Troops €20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB bde
5 air aslt bde
1 air mob bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 SP arty bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 60 T-80BV mod
IFV some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4 *Bucephalus*
APC 187+

APC (T) 25 BTR-D

APC (W) 162+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 10
Dozor-B; 27+ *Oncilla*

ABCV 75: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2

AUV 30+: some KrAZ *Spartan*; €30 *Novator*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*);
9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

ARTILLERY 142

SP 18+: 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 18 2S3 *Akatsiya*
TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 *Grad*
GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S
MOR 120mm 24 2S12 *Sani*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K35M *Strela-10M*
GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Special Operations Forces €1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000

National Guard €60,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

Some tk bn

Mechanised

Some mech bn

Light

Some lt inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72
IFV 93: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; €50 BTR-4 *Bucephalus*;
10+ BTR-4E; 1 BMP-2

APC 22+

APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80

PPV 22+: *Streit Cougar*; *Streit Spartan*; 22 *Kozak-2*;
Varta

AUV *Novator*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 73mm some SPG-9

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm some D-30

MOR 120mm some

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 2 Tu-
134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS • TPT 14: Medium 11: 4 H225M; 7

Mi-8 *Hip*; Light 3: 2 H125; 1 Mi-2MSB

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Border Guard €42,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

some mot inf gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV 17 *Kozak-2*

Maritime Border Guard

The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21

PCT 1 *Molnya* (*Pauk I*) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2

RBV 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 1 76mm gun

PCC 4 *Tarantul* (*Stenka*)

PB 12: 11 *Zhuk*; 1 *Orlan*

PBR 4 *Shmel* with 1 76mm gun

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1

AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 *Camp*; Light An-24

Coke; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*

HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 *Helix A*

DEPLOYMENT

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 260; 1 atk hel sqn

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 12

MOLDOVA: 10 (Joint Peacekeeping Force)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40; UN • UNMIK 2

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 6

FOREIGN FORCES

Canada *Operation Unifier* 200

Lithuania JMTG-U 30

Poland JMTG-U 40

United Kingdom *Operation Orbital* 53

United States JMTG-U 150

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

In late February 2014, Russian forces occupied Crimea. The region then requested to join the Russian Federation after a referendum in March, regarded as unconstitutional by the government in Kyiv. Following the annexation, fighting broke out in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with separatist forces receiving support from Russia. The conflict has continued since 2014, with a July 2020 ceasefire being broken repeatedly during 2021. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition.

EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Donetsk People's Republic €20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 rece bn

Armoured

1 tk bn

Light

6 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr coy

1 EW coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Luhansk People's Republic €14,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 rece bn

Armoured

1 tk bn

Light

4 mot inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr coy

1 EW coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM+; T-72B1; T-72BA

RECCE BDRM-2

IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4

APC

APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU

APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80

ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm MT-12

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozдика*; 152mm 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 2S19 *Msta-S*; 203mm 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 *Msta-B*

GUN/MOR

SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S

TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 122mm BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 *Sani*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 9K331M *Tor-M2* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*);

9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7B *Grail*); 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8

Gecko); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K38 *Igla*

(RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); GROM

GUNS

SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB)

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia Crimea: 30,000; 1 rece bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM-21; 8 9P140; 1 ASHM bde with 3K60 *Bal*; 3K55 *Bastion*; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system) • Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported)

Uzbekistan UZB

Uzbekistani Som UZS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UZS	603tr	703tr	
	USD	59.9bn	65.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,767	1,901	
Growth	%	1.7	6.1	
Inflation	%	12.9	11.0	
Def exp	UZS	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USS1=UZS		10054.59	10736.33	

Population 30,842,796

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.7%	4.0%	4.3%	4.9%	22.2%	2.7%
Female	11.2%	3.7%	4.1%	4.9%	22.9%	3.5%

Capabilities

Uzbekistan introduced a new military doctrine in early 2018, which highlighted increased concern over terrorism and the potential impact of conflicts including in Afghanistan. It noted a requirement for military modernisation. The doctrine also focuses on border security and hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. Uzbekistan maintains bilateral defence ties with Russia and in late 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was reported with India. Military cooperation is developing with Turkey, and exercises were held in 2021. The armed forces are army-dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity to deploy its forces externally. A sizeable air fleet was inherited from the Soviet Union, but minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substantially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced military equipment; military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers were procured from Russia in 2019. Meetings took place with India in 2020 to advance defence cooperation (three defence-related MOUs were signed in 2019) and in 2021 the leaders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on defence cooperation. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence orders. The 2018 doctrine calls for improvements to the domestic defence industry. In recent years, Uzbekistan's defence industry has showcased domestically produced light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 24,500

4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

11 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

1 AB bde

Mountain

1 lt mtn inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde 1 MRL bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64B/MV; 170 T-62

RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1

IFV 370: 270 BMP-2; ε100 BTR-82A

APC 388

APC (T) 50 BTR-D

APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80

PPV 79: 50 *Maxxpro+*; 24 *Ejder Yalcin*; 5 *Typhoon-K* 4x4

ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2

AUV 11+: 7 *Cougar*; 4+ M-ATV; some *Tigr-M*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 20 *Maxxpro* ARV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*)

GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12

ARTILLERY 487+

SP 83+: **122mm** 18 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 17+: 17 2S3

Akatsiya; 2S5 *Giatsint-S* (reported); **203mm** 48 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 200: **122mm** 60 D-30; **152mm** 140 2A36 *Giatsint-B*

GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 108: **122mm** 60: 36 BM-21 *Grad*; 24 9P138; **220mm**

48 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 *Sani*; 19 2S12 *Sani*; 18 M-120

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11)

Air Force 7,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 regt with Il-76 *Candid*; An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; C295W;

Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-35M *Hind*; Mi-8

Hip

AIR DEFENCE

1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

1 bty with S-125-2M *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

2 bty with S-125M1 *Neva*-M1 (RA-SA-3 *Goa*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable

FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* A/B; (18 more in store); (26 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker* B/C in store)

ATK 12: 12 Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*; (15 Su-24 *Fencer* in store)

TPT 11: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*;

Light 7: 2 An-26 *Curl*; 4 C295W; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 6 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 41: 29 Mi-24 *Hind*; 12 Mi-35M *Hind*

TPT 69: **Heavy** 9: 8 H225M *Caracal*; 1 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium**

52 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 8 AS350 *Ecureuil*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18

Long-range 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9)

Medium-range 4 S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)

Short-range 10 S-125M1 *Neva-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*)

ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 20,000

Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

Ministry of Interior


National Guard 1,000

Ministry of Defence


Asia

- Regional defence spending maintained momentum in 2021 with real growth reaching 2.8%. This indicates the resilience of defence spending against wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488 billion in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021 with a defence budget of USD207bn. Using a PPP rate brings China's 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn.
- The revelation by analysts, using open-source satellite imagery, that several large apparent ICBM silo fields were under construction in northwestern China, focused attention on the scale and pace of Beijing's nuclear force expansion and modernisation. The Pentagon's allegation that China has tested hypersonic boost-glide systems in 2021 further highlighted not just the scale of Beijing's military efforts, but also the technical sophistication it appears to have achieved in some areas.
- While there remains much attention on Chinese military activity near Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries are also feeling Chinese military pressure. From late 2019, Indonesia's government and armed forces have become increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna Islands. Meanwhile, in June Malaysia's government issued a tender for a new long-range air-surveillance radar, intended to improve coverage of east Malaysia, a month after the air force intercepted a formation of PLA transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state.
- The AUKUS partnership, signed in September, is not only related to the development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia, but also concerns broader collaboration with the UK and US on cyber, AI, quantum and 'additional undersea' capabilities. Australia has also announced plans to establish a 'sovereign guided weapons enterprise'.
- The Quad remains an informal arrangement, introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) regional security architecture. While there is much focus on the annual *Malabar* naval exercises, arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and information-sharing between its members which could smooth interoperability and coordinated military activities.


Asia defence spending, 2021 – top 5




Active military personnel – top 10



The Quad: selected 'cross-bracing' arrangements



Conventionally-powered attack submarines, by country, 2014–21



Asia

Many governments in Asia continued to use their armed forces in support of efforts to control the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. In September 2020, Indonesia's government increased the armed forces' role alongside that of the police, in attempts to enforce compliance with health protocols in badly afflicted provinces. In February 2021, Malaysia's armed forces – which had been helping to enforce the country's Movement Control Order (MCO) restricting domestic travel – were granted police powers so that they could arrest MCO offenders. During August, the Vietnam People's Army was deployed to deliver food supplies in heavily infected areas of Ho Chi Minh City, where a strict lockdown was in force. In May, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) established two large-scale vaccination centres to support efforts to vaccinate the general population against COVID-19. In late June, Bangladesh's government again deployed troops, this time to back up police enforcement of a lockdown intended to control the spread of the highly infectious Delta variant. The Australian government took similar measures in July, with up to 300 unarmed troops patrolling the streets of Sydney as part of the Australian Defence Force's *Operation COVID-19 Assist*. Armed forces also participated in some regional states' efforts to assist others: for example, in July, two Singapore air force C-130 aircraft transported medical supplies including ventilators and personal protective equipment to Indonesia. On a larger scale, during 2021, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) organised deliveries to friendly countries to bolster their pandemic responses. Notably, at the start of the year, the PLA provided its military counterparts in Cambodia and Pakistan with early access to vaccines.

Strategic tensions: China, Japan, Taiwan

Although military resources continued to be employed to respond to the pandemic, it was evident that this would not seriously affect the region's overall security landscape. While the need for governments to prioritise COVID-19 responses continued to affect defence budgets in some Asian countries (for example, Thailand, where defence spending for the 2022 financial year starting in October 2021 was

reduced by 5% in real terms compared with the previous year), in most cases it had no more than a marginal impact. Meanwhile, strategic tensions continued to confront governments across the region, leading to increased spending on their armed forces and focused efforts to improve military capabilities. China's continued drive to improve its capabilities, combined with Beijing's assertive foreign policy, provided grounds for other Asian governments' defence establishments to maintain or step-up efforts to improve their military capabilities. Taiwan emerged more strongly than ever as a potential flashpoint. In March, the outgoing Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that China might attempt to take control of Taiwan 'in the next six years' using force. In the meantime, the PLA Air Force continued to probe Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone with mixed formations of fast-jet, bomber and special-mission aircraft. During August, the PLA staged live-fire exercises south of Taiwan involving warships, fast jets and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, supposedly in response to 'external interference and provocations by Taiwan independence forces'. Reflecting a shared perception of the growing military challenge, the US and Taiwan moved towards closer defence coordination. Delivering an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore in July, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that his country would 'stay focused on helping Taiwan to defend itself'. In early August, the Biden administration approved its first defence-equipment sale to Taiwan. The package, reportedly valued at USD750 million, included 40 M109A6 self-propelled howitzers and nearly 1,700 kits for converting artillery shells into GPS-guided projectiles. Other major procurements from the US included M142 HIMARS launchers with ATACMs and RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II coastal-defence systems. In late August, Taiwan's Executive Yuan proposed a slightly higher defence budget for 2022, including the 'special budget' to support the acquisition of 66 F-16V combat aircraft for delivery from 2023–28. Meanwhile, in November 2020, Taiwan's CSBC Corporation began building the first of eight indigenously designed

Studies in capability generation

Japan's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade

In the post-war period, Japan's Self Defense Force (JSDF) eschewed the development of amphibious capabilities. The association with past power-projection efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy meant that this type of capability was seen to transgress Japan's 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy and was deemed unacceptable domestically and internationally. Moreover, the fact that national defence posture was predicated on denying a Soviet land invasion of the Japanese mainland, rather than retaking territory, also meant an amphibious capability was deemed unnecessary in practice.

The Japanese defence establishment expressed a renewed interest in amphibious capabilities as the regional security environment and US–Japan alliance cooperation started to transform. The 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security and the revision of the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation in 1997 initiated the first serious efforts for bilateral contingency planning and military-to-military cooperation, thus raising questions about how the JSDF could engage with the US Marine Corps (USMC), with which it had limited interaction during the Cold War, and how it might consider acquiring its own amphibious capability to complement those operated by US forces. In the late 1990s, the JSDF chief of staff subsequently authorised the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) staff office to begin dialogue with the USMC. For their part, the US side welcomed deeper cooperation with the Japanese and was prepared to share its expertise.

Serious impetus was given to Japanese thinking by the increasingly evident rise of China and its expansion of maritime activities in the early 2000s, especially around Japan's remote southwestern islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China. In 2002, the GSDF established (under the Western Army) the 640-strong Western Army Infantry Regiment at Camp Ainoura in the city of Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture. This unit was to specialise in amphibious operations and to become the core of the eventual Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB).

The GSDF then ventured to undertake joint bilateral amphibious training with the USMC in *Exercise Iron Fist*, first held off the coast of California in 2006 with the aim of practising amphibious assault operations. Japan's recognition of the potential value of amphibious capabilities was further reinforced by the events of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. The USMC's role in assisting domestic Japanese disaster-relief activities, and the JSDF's own amphibious limitations by comparison, not only pointed to the need for Japan to fill this operational gap, but also enhanced the legitimacy of procuring these capabilities in the name of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Japan further advanced its plans for amphibious capabilities by participating, from 2013, in the USMC's *Dawn Blitz* exercise series, this time involving not just the GSDF and USMC, but also the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as part of a plan to develop true inter-service joint amphibious capability. The JSDF acquired further accumulated expertise and confidence in joint amphibious operations first through the domestic HADR mission in 2013 to relieve storm damage on Izu-Oshima, in essence a remote island, and then through the HADR mission in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, which required cooperation with the USMC and Philippines armed forces.

These activities prepared the way for Japan's 2013 National Defense Programme Guidelines to mandate the establishment of the ARDB in March 2018. The unit is planned to eventually reach a total strength of 3,000 personnel, with an order of battle of two amphibious regiments, one amphibious assault battalion, one field artillery battalion, one reconnaissance company, a signal company, an engineer company and a logistics support battalion. The ARDB has procured from the US a total of 52 Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV-7); for air transport it deploys the fixed-rotor CH-47JA and has started to procure 17 MV-22B *Osprey* tilt-rotor aircraft from the US. The MSDF's *Osumi*-class LHDs can function as ship-to-shore connectors with amphibious landing capabilities and LCACs, and *Hyuga*-class and *Izumo*-class helicopter carriers can serve as command-and-control platforms for amphibious operations and for helicopter and tilt-rotor air-support operations. The *Izumo*-class, once converted to operate Air Self-Defense F-35Bs, will be able to offer fixed-wing air-strike support.

Exercises have also taken place with other countries, including France and Australia, but the ARDB is still in its early stages and has a number of shortcomings to overcome. The GSDF has improved its own joint operation capabilities with the formation in March 2018 of the Ground Component Command which is able to direct the ARDB and regional forces. However, the JSDF's three services have limited experience of joint amphibious operations and, according to analysts, the GSDF does not yet share data link capabilities with the MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force. The MSDF's current ships may require further modifications to better operate AAVs and the MSDF is likely to need more purpose-built ships for amphibious assault operations incorporating internal docks. The GSDF will also likely be examining what modifications it still needs to make to its helicopter force to improve operational capability from MSDF ships, including better weather-proofing its helicopters for maritime use. Finally, as the GSDF has indicated, the ARDB is designed purely for retaking Japanese islands and tasks such as HADR; it is not a fully-fledged marine force and as such cannot fulfil the same types of multi-role operations as the USMC.

attack submarines, with a prototype vessel scheduled for delivery by 2025.

Tokyo's Defense of Japan 2021 white paper, released in July, emphasised concerns over China's growing military capabilities, the expanded remit of the China Coast Guard (CCG) under new legislation that took effect in February and intensive CCG operations near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (administered by Japan, but claimed by China). However, the white paper assigned unprecedented importance to 'stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan'. A joint statement by Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and US President Joe Biden in April had underscored their countries' common interest in maintaining 'peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait'. However, Suga later stressed that in the event of a Taiwan conflict, Japan would provide only logistical support to US forces and would not deploy its own combat units. In May, Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo said that Japan should increase its military strength at a 'radically different pace' in response to China's

growing military spending and capabilities. Kishi stressed that Japan had a vital stake in Taiwan's security and asserted that his government would 'allocate the funding we need to protect our nation'. While it seemed likely that Tokyo's defence posture would only change incrementally, it was clear that Japan was strengthening its military capabilities. There was continuing emphasis on measures to enhance the security of the remote Senkakus and other southern islands. These measures include acquiring new transport vessels, establishing a new electronic warfare (EW) unit for the region and a decision announced in July to base the Japan Air Self-Defense Force's (JASDF's) F-35B combat aircraft at the country's southernmost air base. Japan's defence establishment also prioritised the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and EW capabilities, exemplified by the planned procurement of new EW aircraft for stand-off jamming and interest in contributing to the US National Defense Space Architecture's 'tracking layer' of satellites

Studies in capability generation

Vietnam's procurement of *Kilo*-class submarines

With an inventory of six *Hanoi*-class (Project 636.1 (*Improved Kilo*)) submarines, Vietnam currently ranks joint sixth in the region, alongside Australia, in terms of numbers of conventionally-powered attack submarines. The introduction into service of these submarines, and their associated weapons systems, has provided a significant boost to Vietnam's maritime capabilities.

Before acquiring the *Kilos*, Vietnam already operated two ageing *Yugo*-class midget submarines, acquired from North Korea (reportedly in a barter deal) in the 1990s. Indeed, Vietnam's subsurface ambitions predate even this. In 1973, some personnel were sent by the then-North Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence (MND) to the Soviet Union for training as submarine officers. Analysts have highlighted further Vietnamese interest in acquiring Soviet submarines in the late 1970s, as well as in the mid-to-late 1980s (when some crew were reportedly sent for training in the Soviet Union), but there was little concrete progress until 2006. That year saw the MND begin a strategic-planning process for the modernisation of the navy and air force, with the procurement of submarines once more in focus as Vietnam was coming to terms with an increasingly complex security situation in the South China Sea, within the context of growing Chinese assertiveness and Beijing's evident intent to improve its own military capabilities.

The plan to procure submarines from Russia was

approved by Vietnam's Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 2006. Russia had long been a key source of Vietnam's weapons, and the two countries' longstanding defence relationship included the Russian presence from the 1970s to the early 1990s at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base. The CMC (headed by the Communist Party of Vietnam's General Secretary) is the body that approves the MND's defence procurement plans. The CMC's Executive Board includes the party's general secretary, the prime minister, state president and defence minister, with the defence minister as its deputy head. The National Assembly approved the budget, which comprised a loan from Russia.

In 2007, the MND's weapons import firm, Vaxuco, started negotiations with Russia's Rosoboronexport over the acquisition of six submarines. Moscow offered six Project 636.1 (*Improved Kilo*)-class submarines and, after reports of delays in negotiations associated with the price tag (which analysts report at USD4.3bn), an agreement was reached in summer 2009 after a special envoy of Vietnam's prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, deputy public security minister Bui Van Nam, flew to Moscow to meet Russia's prime minister Vladimir Putin to discuss the price of the submarines and other issues.

A contract was subsequently signed in Moscow on 15 December 2009 by Rosoboronexport's CEO Anatoly Isaykin and Vietnam's navy chief, Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, witnessed by the prime ministers of both countries. Reports indicated that the final agreed price was around

intended to detect and track missile threats. Offensive systems also increasingly featured in Japan's defence ambitions: modifications that will eventually allow the helicopter carriers *Izumo* and *Kaga* to operate F-35Bs began during the 2020 financial year, and US Marine Corps F-35Bs conducted trial landings on the *Izumo* in October; deliveries of an extended-range version of the air-launched ASM-3 anti-ship missile will begin in the middle of the decade; in December 2020, the Japan Ministry of Defense ordered a third batch of Kongsberg long-range, precision-guided joint strike missiles (JSM) for the JASDF's F-35As; and in October 2020, the first of the new *Taigei*-class attack submarines was launched, equipped with lithium-ion batteries allowing extended operations.

Southeast Asia: challenges and responses

Southeast Asian countries also felt Chinese military pressure. On 31 May, Malaysia's air force intercepted a formation of 16 PLA Il-76 and Y-20 transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state in

an incident that it said posed 'a serious threat to national security and flight safety'. Although Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein's claim on 1 June that the Chinese aircraft had breached 'Malaysian airspace and sovereignty' (rather than airspace over Malaysia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) was inaccurate, and China dismissed the incident as 'a routine training operation' that 'strictly abided by international law', the Malaysian government and armed forces nonetheless viewed it as disconcerting and unfriendly, particularly because of the number of aircraft involved. It gave almost immediate impetus to the defence ministry's plans to improve Malaysia's air defences, which had been delayed by budgetary constraints. In early June, it issued a tender for a single new long-range air-surveillance radar for the air force, intended to improve the coverage of east Malaysia, including Sarawak. Later in the month, it was reported that Japan's Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was likely to bid for the tender with its J/FPS-3 system, which in August 2020 had been chosen to fulfil a

USD2bn. Russia provided Vietnam with a defence loan for the purchase of these six submarines, including equipment, weapons, maintenance and logistics support, personnel training, base construction and basic rescue facilities.

Admiralty Shipyards, based in St Petersburg, was contracted to build the submarines. At the same time, the two countries embarked on the other supporting developments, such as crew training, needed to bring the systems into service. Construction of the first boat began in 2010, and after submarine selection and basic language training in Vietnam, the first batch of 53 officers and sailors travelled to Russia at the end of August 2011 to train in St Petersburg, with this training reported as lasting one and a half years. Vietnamese personnel have also been trained at the Indian Navy's submarine training centre (reportedly on tactical aspects of underwater warfare), but advanced technical training generally still takes place in Russia.

In June 2011, the MND established the navy's 189th Submarine Brigade to operate the *Improved Kilo*-class boats. This unit has been focused not only on training, maintenance and weapons-integration, but has looked to develop the necessary supporting infrastructure in Vietnam and, alongside naval command and the MND, will also have been engaged on strategy and doctrinal matters designed to help Vietnam integrate this improved submarine capability into its military plans.

A base for the six submarines was built at the Cam Ranh naval base, under the supervision of Russian military engineers, though there is an alternative base at Da Nang.

The first submarine arrived at Cam Ranh on 1 January 2014 and was commissioned two weeks later on 15 January 2014. The last two boats were commissioned in Vietnam on 28 February 2017. According to the navy, when a new boat arrived, the crew was seeded by posting in experienced personnel from earlier boats, and training was also directed by the 189th Brigade's submarine training centre. There is a support and maintenance agreement between the navy and Russia's defence industry, but Vietnam has looked to improve domestic maintenance capabilities, providing for complex maintenance at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base and other shipyards. At the same time, Vietnam has begun to develop a submarine-rescue capability, with a domestically built submarine-rescue vessel handed over to the navy in July 2021. A submarine-rescue agreement had earlier been signed with Singapore's navy in September 2013.

A series of exercises have been employed as part of this integration process, developing from navigation and day-to-day submarine operations and weapons drills, such as torpedo and missile launches (the first missile launch by the first *Kilo* was reportedly conducted without Russian assistance in mid-2017), to exercises more closely focused on improving overall capability, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and joint drills with other services. The live-fire drills in 2017 were reported in the media with images of the weapons associated with the platforms, which now include not only torpedoes but also 3M14E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-30B) land-attack cruise missiles and, most recently, 3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) long-range anti-ship missiles.

similar requirement in the Philippines (making it the most important Japanese defence export since Tokyo ended its ban on international military sales in 2014). While the Malaysian tender announced in June is likely to only partially fulfil a requirement, stated in 2019, for three such systems, the US government's prospective donation – announced in June 2020 – of up to three long-range radars (possibly AN/TPS-77 systems) to Indonesia and Malaysia could potentially fill the gap.

From late 2019, Indonesia's government and armed forces became increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna islands; Jakarta strengthened its military presence in the area and in November 2020 naval Chief of Staff Admiral Yudo Margono revealed that the first fleet command's operational headquarters would move permanently from Jakarta to the Natunas. In May, Indonesia's presidential office revealed the draft of a new long-term military modernisation plan costed at USD125 billion. Covering the period to 2044, the draft plan was subdivided into five-year segments, the first covering 2020–24 and coinciding with the final phase of the current Minimum Essential Force programme. The main emphasis of the new plan is on developing external defence capabilities, particularly those of the air force and navy. Expanding the existing small submarine force will be central to enhancing naval capability, but Indonesia's plans to possess a force of eight submarines by 2024 suffered a major setback in April when one of the Indonesian Navy's two 40-year-old Type-209/1300 *Cakra*-class boats, KRI *Nanggala*, was lost with all hands 100 kilometres north of Bali during an exercise. The submarine's age was widely presumed to have played a part in the accident, and Indonesian parliamentarians subsequently called for the immediate retirement of its equally old sister vessel. That would leave in service just three Type 209/1400 *Nagapasa*-class submarines, supplied by the South Korean company DSME, the third of which was finished locally and commissioned only two weeks before *Nanggala* was lost. In 2019, Indonesia had signed a contract with DSME for a second batch of three Type 209/1400 boats. However, after Prabowo Subianto replaced Ryamizard Ryacudu as defence minister in October 2019, Indonesia's defence ministry began reassessing whether the requirement for additional boats would be fulfilled best by DSME or an alternative supplier; this inevitably slowed down the procurement process. The loss of *Nanggala*, however, provided

new impetus for the government to enhance the submarine force. In August, President Joko Widodo approved a USD89m funding boost for the state-owned naval shipbuilder, PT PAL Indonesia, with the specific aim of providing the infrastructure necessary for the domestic construction of submarines. Then, in September, British firm Babcock signed a contract with PT PAL, under which the Indonesian firm will build two *Arrowhead* 140 frigates, with local design modifications.

Other Southeast Asian states maintained efforts to improve their capabilities to the extent they could afford to do so. Vietnam is facing pressure from China's activities in the South China Sea and, while Hanoi is constrained from making major equipment purchases by the available budget, it continued to incrementally enhance its maritime forces. In March, a shipyard in Da Nang launched a fourth Dutch-designed roll-on/roll-off cargo ship for the navy. In April, the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company launched the first of the second batch of 12 high-speed patrol vessels ordered for the Vietnam Coast Guard; deliveries of the first Indian-built tranche (vessels 1–5) are reported to have started. In July, the coast guard brought into service a second ex-US Coast Guard *Hamilton*-class cutter for use in maritime resource protection. Meanwhile, acquiring new training aircraft promised to help Vietnam's air force develop more sophisticated capabilities. In February, the Czech defence exporter Omnipol announced the sale of 12 L-39NG advanced trainers to Vietnam, for delivery in 2023–24. In February, the US Air Force issued a request for information relating to a new contract to provide three (and possibly more) training aircraft to Vietnam as part of a wider package also including logistical and technical support. In June, the US Pacific Air Forces command indicated that these would be T-6 basic trainers. This will be Hanoi's most important military procurement from the US since 2016, when the latter lifted its embargo on arms sales to Vietnam. But Vietnam is also planning to procure more of its military equipment from domestic suppliers. In July, it was reported that the defence ministry's General Department of Defence Industry was developing a plan for the next decade, envisaging the expansion of national defence-industrial capacity, with particular emphasis on developing uninhabited systems and artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes.

Myanmar's armed forces, the Tatmadaw, were a focus of international attention following their seizure

of state power and installation of their commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as head of state on 1 February, and their subsequent violent suppression of widespread popular demonstrations in support of the deposed elected government led by state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the following months, the new military government also faced an upsurge in attacks by ethnic-minority insurgent groups, notably the Kachin Independence

Army and the Karen National Liberation Army. In April, seven armed groups that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 announced that they would join the self-styled National Unity Government in opposition to the military seizure of power. The following month, this umbrella opposition movement announced the establishment of its armed wing, the People's Defence Force (PDF), as a first step towards a 'federal union army'. PDF

Afghanistan – the Taliban's military victory

The collapse of the government of Afghanistan led by President Ashraf Ghani in August 2021, and the subsequent assumption of power by the Taliban, was a significant shock – particularly for countries in the West and elsewhere that had since 2001 supported attempts to develop governance and security and defence capabilities in Afghanistan. During the war, the Taliban's offering to the Afghan people in the districts that its forces controlled was twofold: providing security and facilitating dispute resolution in its Sharia courts. It did not pledge to improve agriculture, health, education or infrastructure in the way that international stabilisation efforts did.

Since the 2014 withdrawal of US and NATO forces from combat roles, the Taliban had steadily isolated provincial capitals by capturing surrounding rural districts. Up to 2018, this was constrained by the presence of small numbers of US troops, acting as advisers, and by US air support. But concurrently Afghan government forces were weakened by corruption, 'ghost soldiers' on payrolls and political disunity in the Kabul government. The 2018 Doha Agreement between the US government and the Taliban was widely interpreted by Afghans as a withdrawal agreement that did not protect the interests of the Kabul government. And new US president Joe Biden's early 2021 announcement that the US would withdraw by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a blow to the morale of government forces.

In early 2021, the US had urged Ghani to withdraw Afghan troops and police from isolated checkpoints dispersed across rural areas surrounding provincial capitals. They also recommended that Afghan forces concentrate on the defence of key towns, cities and Kabul. This way they hoped that the government could fight the Taliban to a stalemate. However, it is likely that Taliban forces were pre-positioned across the country ready to begin offensive operations in spring 2021. Their opening move was to seize border crossing points in western Afghanistan; attacks then shifted to eastern Afghanistan, rapidly followed by attacks in the north. These offensives pre-empted any attempts by the warlords of the

former Northern Alliance to mobilise their militias. The subsequent fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan's second city, decisively weakened the government's position; Kabul fell on 15 August.

Lessons for the future

Factors contributing to the outcome of the war included weaknesses in intelligence and understanding of the country as well as in reconstruction efforts, political strategies, military strategy, operational concepts, tactics and equipment. Combined with failures across government and armed forces to adapt quickly enough to unforeseen circumstances, these provided opportunities that were exploited by insurgents and militias. And the US decision to attack Iraq drew off resources and government energy that could have been applied in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the collapse the US stressed that it remained concerned about the threat from terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan, though President Biden said 'we just don't need to fight a ground war to do it. We have what's called over-the-horizon capabilities, which means we can strike terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground – or very few, if needed.' However, effectively implementing such a strategy has its challenges, not least around basing and targeting. The collapse of government forces led to fears about the fate of the military equipment that had in recent years been transferred to the former-government's security and defence forces, but many of the modern aircraft left the country (with their pilots) while others were disabled. More broadly, keeping modern Western-origin equipment in service will depend on maintenance capability, including the provision of spare parts, neither of which will be straightforward. Perhaps apart from small arms, this means that the Taliban's ability to effectively operate this equipment may diminish in short order, but the picture may be different for older Soviet-era equipment, while the Taliban will likely persist with capabilities that served them well during the war – the pickups, motorbikes and such like effectively suitable for a 'light infantry' force.

units, many of them highly autonomous, were soon employing attacks using improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations aimed at the Tatmadaw and its supporters in major cities as well as in the countryside. In one major clash in the eastern Kayah State in late May, the Tatmadaw called in substantial close air support from armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft after sustaining substantial casualties. Meanwhile, the ramifications of the military takeover – a substantial economic contraction (owing to the pandemic as well as the coup) and a renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency – called into question the future of the Tatmadaw's efforts to enhance conventional military capabilities, particularly in the naval sphere. At the time of the coup, Myanmar's navy had been amidst a major expansion programme aimed at enhancing its surface and subsurface combat capabilities: satellite imagery

in December 2020 had revealed domestic construction of a new frigate-sized vessel probably possessing a vertical launch system for air-defence missiles, as well as the second of a new class of offshore patrol vessels. The navy's capability improvement efforts were evident when the service commissioned its first submarine (a refurbished former Indian Navy *Sindhughosh*-class (*Kilo*) boat) in December 2020, and again in February 2021 when a task force comprising the LPD *Moattama*, a frigate and an auxiliary vessel repatriated 1,000 illegal immigrants from Malaysia back to Myanmar.

India's expanding defence horizons

Clashes on India's disputed Himalayan border with China in 2019–20 accentuated perceptions in New Delhi of a growing threat from China. Despite the two sides announcing in February 2021 their agreement to a simultaneous but limited military disengagement in

The Quad

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or 'Quad', is a forum for promoting intergovernmental security cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is not an alliance or dedicated defence grouping and has no formal agenda or meeting schedule. The Quad has recently begun moving into wider policy areas than defence, including pandemic mitigation, cyber and climate change. Originally established in 2007, it was abruptly discontinued in 2008 under diplomatic pressure from China, which branded it as 'containment'. The decision to revive the Quad, in 2017, and to elevate its meetings to summit-level in 2021 (virtually in March and in-person in September), signifies a closer alignment of its members' threat perceptions towards China and a shared, though not necessarily equal, desire to cross-brace defence and security ties among key US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. While it remains an informal arrangement, the Quad can optimally be conceived of as introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, in recognition that the regional balance of power has shifted in China's favour and requires an adjustment. Its future development is contingent in large part on China's external behaviour: if Beijing pushes more aggressively, the Quad's drawstrings are likely to tighten further. At a minimum, the Quad provides a channel for information-sharing, coordination and deconfliction among its members. More ambitiously, it has the potential to serve as the foundation of a countervailing coalition, including in the military domain.

The Quad is symbolically associated with the annual *Malabar* naval exercises, which were reconstituted in quadripartite format in 2020 following a long hiatus triggered by Australia's decision to withdraw from the drills in 2008 because of concerns about retaliation by China. Arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and information-sharing between its members. These could do much to smooth inter-operability and coordinated military activities under crisis or wartime conditions, as well as during military exercises in peacetime. A wide range of bilateral and trilateral defence cooperative arrangements and exercises were already in place before the Quad was revived, especially between the US and its treaty allies Australia and Japan. Canberra and Tokyo concluded an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2013, which was upgraded in 2017, but have yet to finalise a bilateral visiting forces agreement which has been long under negotiation. India's willingness to strengthen its Quad military connections is more open to question given its history of non-alignment. None of India's Quad partners has a visiting forces agreement with it, but all have ACSAs or other logistics-support arrangements, which have been concluded at a conspicuously quickening pace. A Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation was signed between New Delhi and Washington in late 2020, marking the last of four key bilateral defence agreements now in place. Japan and India concluded an ACSA in 2020, the same year that Australia and India negotiated a Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement.

one of the four areas where their forces continued to confront each other, India continued to plan stronger defences along its northern border. India also continued a major effort to strengthen its maritime forces. Having commissioned the third from a batch of six locally built *Kalvari*-class (*Scorpène*) diesel-electric attack submarines in March, in July India's Defence Acquisition Council authorised a request for proposals for the local construction of a further six submarines, potentially of a different design. These would support the Indian Navy's long-term plan to operate 18 conventionally powered as well as six nuclear-powered boats. During August, India's first locally built aircraft carrier – the future INS *Vikrant* – began sea trials. It is scheduled to enter service in 2022, six years later than originally expected. In May, the US government approved the sale of an additional six P-8I maritime patrol aircraft to India, opening the way for a likely order from New Delhi. Such defence equipment transfers formed an important element of India's burgeoning bilateral security relations, in light of New Delhi's drive to improve its military capabilities and Washington's intent to enhance the interoperability of Indian and US forces. That said, India has largely been unable to realise the technology transfers and joint ventures promised in the 2012 India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, which cast a cloud over the future of US military sales to the country. Another potential obstacle was the prospect of the US imposing sanctions on India if New Delhi proceeded with a planned purchase of S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*) air-defence systems from Russia, an issue raised by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin when he met Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in New Delhi in March.

Australia steps up

Following the publication of the Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan in July 2020, efforts to upgrade the Australian Defence Force's capabilities continued apace, largely in response to Canberra's perception of a rising threat from China. Important developments included the announcement in May of the Australian defence department's intent to inaugurate in early 2022 a dedicated tri-service Space Division, led by the air force and tasked with the management, acquisition and operation of relevant capabilities. In March, the government announced plans for Australia to establish a 'sovereign guided weapons enterprise' that would allow the country to manufacture its own missiles, and subsequently set

AUKUS: the Indo-Pacific's new regional security grouping

Announced on 15 September in a joint statement by the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US (which are already connected as allies through the UKUSA or 'Five Eyes' intelligence-sharing treaty, as well as through NATO in the case of the UK and US, and by ANZUS in the case of Australia and the US), AUKUS is a major new regional security development. Although it is not a treaty alliance, its establishment potentially has significant ramifications for the Indo-Pacific distribution of power. The new arrangement between the three longstanding partners is intended to provide a trilateral intergovernmental context for wider activities, summarised in the three leaders' statement as a 'diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region' including 'deeper information and technology sharing' and 'deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains'; with particular cooperation 'on a range of security and defense capabilities'. In the first instance, AUKUS will support Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. However, it is possible that the new arrangement may also facilitate the expanded use of Australian facilities by UK and US forces.

up the Australian Missile Corporation to facilitate cooperation between industrial partners and other potential stakeholders. In a related development, in August Australia formalised its cooperation with the US Precision Strike Missile programme, potentially to fulfil the requirement for an Australian Army long-range precision strike capability. In July, the revelation that Australia would explore options for developing a ground-based EW capability intended to prevent attempts to interfere with or attack its use of space underlined Canberra's acute interest in the domain. Australia also continued to enhance its amphibious warfare capabilities. These efforts broadly paralleled Japan's, in Australia's case building towards the capacity to deploy up to a 1,500-strong Amphibious Ready Group. In June, Exercise *Sea Explorer* saw troops practise amphibious landings in northern Queensland from the LHD *Canberra* and LSD *Choules*, with air support from embarked army CH-47F, NH90 and *Tiger* helicopters.

Australia's single most important defence procurement programme faced major challenges, but Canberra resolved these decisively. In March,

Canberra set a September deadline for France's Naval Group to submit acceptable revised costings for the next part of the design phase of the Future Submarine Program, which involved building 12 *Attack*-class boats. However, by mid-2021 the Australian Navy was examining other possible solutions amid questions about the viability of the *Attack*-class (not due to start entering service until the mid-2030s) and about the risks associated with the proposed life-extension programme that would see the navy's current six *Collins*-class submarines rebuilt from 2026 onwards to provide an interim improved capability. In mid-September, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US issued a joint statement announcing they were establishing 'an enhanced trilateral partnership' called AUKUS, the first initiative of which would be 'to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines' using UK and US expertise. Simultaneously, Australia cancelled its submarine agreement with France. Nuclear-powered attack submarines, perhaps equipped with land-attack missiles, promised a significant capability boost, though for the time being it was unclear whether Australia's new boats would be based on the UK *Astute*-class, the US *Virginia*-class

or on a future design. However, the three AUKUS governments immediately started 'a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway' to Australia's new submarine capability. Within days, Australia also announced orders for US-made *Tomahawk* land-attack cruise missiles to equip its *Hobart*-class destroyers and AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles for its air force, further highlighting Canberra's emphasis on developing offensive capabilities in the face of what was perceived to be a deteriorating regional security environment.

Korean Peninsula developments

Against the backdrop of deadlocked denuclearisation talks with the US, North Korea continued programmes to develop missiles and nuclear weapons. In October 2020, a military parade displayed what Pyongyang claimed to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – possibly with the designation *Hwasong-17* – which was notably larger than earlier long-range missiles and may be capable of carrying multiple warheads. The *Pukguksong-4*, which could be a new and possibly longer-range version of the *Pukguksong-3* submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), was displayed in the same parade. In January 2021, a

North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021

North Korea conducted six ballistic missile test-launches in 2021, all at relatively short ranges of up to 800 km. The tests all highlighted apparent efforts to develop systems that would be potentially less vulnerable than existing systems to 'left-of-launch' attack, or to missile defences. Measures included greater mobility and/or presenting a more challenging intercept environment by employing quasi-ballistic trajectories (in the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) series). Pyongyang also claimed an initial test of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

In addition to a rail-mobile KN-23 SRBM, North Korea also launched an apparently modified KN-23 from a submarine – a contrast to the *Pukguksong* series of larger medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) also under development. Beyond ballistic missiles, in September 2021 North Korea also conducted tests of what Pyongyang claimed was a land-attack cruise missile with a range of 1,500km, demonstrating further diversification of its potential delivery systems.

Table 9 North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021

Date (local)	Type	Classification	Alt	Distance	Assessed Outcome	Comments
19 Oct	KN-23 (mod 2)	SLBM / SRBM	60 km	590 km*	Successful	Apparent KN-23 modified for submarine-launch
28 Sep	<i>Hwasong-8</i> with HGV	Unconfirmed	60 km	200 km	Unconfirmed	Claimed HGV with sealed liquid-fuel booster
15 Sep	KN-23	SRBM	60 km	800 km*	Successful	Rail-mobile KN-23
	KN-23	SRBM	60 km	800 km*	Successful	
21 Mar	KN-23 (mod 1)	SRBM	50 km	600 km*	Successful	Modified KN-23 with claimed 2.5t warhead
	KN-23 (mod 1)	SRBM			Successful	


*Reportedly flew a quasi-ballistic trajectory with 'pull-up' manoeuvre

new missile, the *Pukguksong-5*, was displayed at a parade and in late March, after reportedly testing two cruise missiles, North Korea resumed ballistic missile tests following a year-long hiatus, launching two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), each of which travelled approximately 600 km. In April, South Korea's joint chiefs of staff said they were closely monitoring activity at the North's Sinpo shipyard, amid speculation that Pyongyang might shortly launch a new submarine, test a new SLBM, or both. In August, an International Atomic Energy Agency report revealed 'deeply troubling' signs that Pyongyang had restarted a reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex during the previous month. Amid these ominous signs, South Korea's Moon administration maintained its emphasis on the desirability of dialogue with Pyongyang, but simultaneously continued to strengthen its military deterrence. In May, following a summit between President Moon Jae-in and Biden, the US agreed to end 'missile guidelines' that, among other things, had prevented Seoul from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles with ranges longer than 800 km. Launching its 2022–26 Mid-Term Defense Plan in September, Seoul's defence ministry said that it would develop new surface-to-surface missiles with 'significantly enhanced destructive power'. This suggested that a reported missile able to deliver a three-ton conventional warhead to North Korean targets, such as underground missile facilities, might be fully-tested and operational by 2026. The defence ministry also said that it would reinforce surveillance capabilities with extra radars and 'sharply increase' its deployment of interceptor missiles to protect South Korea against a North Korean missile attack; it would also expand its space-related activities. Enhanced naval capabilities would include additional *Chang Bogo* III submarines. These will be larger than the *Chang Bogo* III Batch I boats that were commissioned in 2021, and like the Batch I vessels could carry SLBMs. In September it was reported that Seoul had test-launched, from a *Chang Bogo* III submarine, an SLBM based on the *Hyunmoo-2B* ballistic missile.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics

Economic expansion was a key factor permitting increased military spending in Asia in recent decades, and the global economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic has posed perhaps the biggest



Note: analysis excludes North Korea and Laos due to insufficient data.


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▲ Figure 13 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021

obstacle to further defence budget growth since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Regional real GDP contracted by 1.5% in 2020 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was a strong performance when compared to the global drop of 3.1%, but masks a divergence in economic performance across the region. Buoyed by a 2.3% rise in real GDP growth in China, the region's emerging economies only contracted by 0.9% in 2020 compared to the 2.9% and 8.9% reduction in the region's advanced economies (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea) and Pacific Island states respectively.

Similarly, there have been variable economic recoveries, with emerging regional economies rebounding by 8.5% in 2021, faster than in any other region in the world. While the growth rate for the region's advanced economies is lower – 3.8% in 2021 – it is sufficient to ensure that the region's economy ends 2021 larger than it was before the pandemic began. Nevertheless, sporadic outbreaks of the virus and the emergence of new, more infectious variants have highlighted the fragility of the recovery and the speed at which conditions can shift. New lockdowns were imposed in Australia in August 2021 while regional air travel – a useful proxy for wider economic restrictions – declined steadily between April and September 2021.

Furthermore, aggregates do not tell the full story, and economic and fiscal conditions have varied significantly from country to country. According to



[1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.


▲ Map 4 Asia: regional defence spending¹

IMF figures, GDP in certain regional economies such as Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand is expected to be lower at the end of 2021 than it was before the pandemic and, while growth continued in other countries such as India, Indonesia and Korea, it slowed over the past 24 months. Only Bangladesh, China, Taiwan and Vietnam have seen robust economic activity continue throughout the crisis, with real GDP growth of between 4% and 8%.

The knock-on fiscal effects of the crisis have had an equally profound impact on the region, as governments across Asia have been forced to reassess their spending priorities. In the face of burgeoning budget deficits, austerity has so far been eschewed by most governments, and resources have been

redirected towards alternative policy areas. Spending on healthcare and economic stimulus have become priorities as regional states have sought to minimise both the human and the economic consequences of the pandemic.

The trend was perhaps most pronounced in South Asia where India announced a 137% increase in expenditure on ‘health and wellbeing’ in February – long before the pandemic reached its peak in the country – as the government looked to rapidly expand access to healthcare. In Pakistan, spending on ‘health affairs and services’ rose from PKR12.0 billion (USD87.2 million) under the pre-pandemic 2019–20 budget to PKR28.4bn (USD179m) for fiscal year 2021–22.



▲ **Figure 14 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)**


Defence spending


Despite this constrained fiscal backdrop, Asian defence budgets have proved resilient, with little evidence to suggest the pandemic has derailed planned investments in the defence sector. Regional defence spending growth slowed from 5.3% in 2019 to 3.4% in 2020, but crucially only a handful of countries implemented cuts, with others choosing to rein in spending plans instead. Indeed, defence budget increases were maintained in 2021, with real growth reaching 2.8%. This is still far below the average 4.9% rate of growth seen between 2008 and 2018 but is an indication of the resilience of defence spending to wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn.

With a defence budget of USD207bn (including local militia funding), China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021. As such, Chinese movements dominate regional trends, but growth in other important markets also influences the overall market. China's 2021 defence budget is more than double the 2011 budget in nominal terms. Cheaper production in China makes it useful to consider the value of the budget using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates. Using this rate rather than the market exchange rate brings China's 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn. Australia has continued to increase spending in line with the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update. The 2021 budget of AUD45.5bn (USD34.3bn) means that Australian defence spending has increased by 26.3% since 2015. The most recent budget also met the equally ambitious target of increasing investment spending from 29% of the budget to 35% by 2021/22, ensuring that the boost to equipment spending announced five years ago materialises as planned.

Japan approved a 0.5% nominal increase in its 2021 defence budget, broadly in line with trends over the last decade. More significantly, the new budget increased spending on equipment acquisition by 7.5% to USD8.6bn, representing a new record high with the share of the budget dedicated to procurement reaching its highest level since 2007. Given the challenging economic and fiscal environment in Japan, the rebalancing of existing resources has been important for the modernisation and expansion of the Japan Self Defense Force's capabilities. To this end, the Ministry of Defense has also continued attempts to streamline

▼ **Figure 15 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008–21, USDbn, constant 2015**





▲ Figure 16 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2020–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)

procurement and contracting processes and to foster competition among local suppliers to create a more efficient environment for equipment acquisition.

In Taiwan, where the pandemic's impact has been muted compared to that in many Asian countries, defence spending increased at its fastest rate for a decade in 2021 as funding for the country's new F-16 purchase ramped up significantly. In 2020, Taipei approved a special TWD247bn (USD7.99bn) budget for the purchase of 66 F-16V combat aircraft, with 2021's allocation rising from TWD5bn (USD17.9m) to TWD29bn (USD1.03bn). As a result, total defence spending increased by 7.7% to TWD391bn (USD14.0bn). With the Ministry of National Defence's (MND's) core budget remaining largely static, an important development in Taiwan has been the return of special budgets to finance major defence procurement projects. In the 1990s and early 2000s this extra-budgetary financing represented a crucial element of Taiwan's defence spending. However, fiscal constraints and the reluctance of foreign suppliers to approve transfers of military equipment to Taiwan saw such funding largely discontinued. Budget plans for 2022 show the special budget increasing further to TWD40.1bn (USD1.49bn) which will further expand the MND budget.

In India, where the pandemic exacerbated existing fiscal constraints, the government has sought to protect modernisation spending. While the defence budget as a whole for 2021–22 saw a marginal cut compared to the previous year, its capital component increased by 18.8% compared to the initial 2020–21 budget – the highest rate of growth for a decade and well above the average 6.8% increase seen over the last ten years. Given the Indian government's tendency to reduce the capital budget at times of fiscal stress, the

move may mark a recognition that modernisation has been delayed too long – particularly in light of border skirmishes with China in 2020. New Delhi's approval of a long-delayed USD2.54bn purchase of 56 Airbus C295MW medium transport aircraft in September, some six years after the aircraft was selected, further supports this potential shift in stance.

While Indonesia moved to cut its 2021 defence budget from IDR137 trillion (USD9.58bn) to IDR120tr (USD8.39bn) during the course of the fiscal year – a reduction of some 12% – draft legislation proposed by the presidential office in May simultaneously outlined planned investments of almost USD125bn on military modernisation over the next 25 years, including USD79bn on the acquisition of new equipment, to be financed largely through foreign loans. If approved and fully implemented, the plan would ostensibly see an average of USD3.2bn spent on procurement each year over the course of the programme, compared to around USD1.8bn over the last decade.

Defence industry

While security concerns undoubtedly influence some of the region's military modernisation drives, trends over the past year also suggest that military spending is being protected as states look to utilise their defence budgets as a means of investing in national economic development. Regional states are seeking to increase national self-sufficiency in defence production and focus more defence investment spending on domestic firms. There is nothing inherently new in this, but an increased focus on providing economic stimuli in the wake of the pandemic has seen governments look to increase their efforts in this area.

In August, South Korea announced measures designed to incentivise the use of local suppliers,

with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announcing that foreign-manufactured equipment will become up to 1.5 times more expensive than similar locally produced products. Furthermore, under the new proposals, in instances where foreign imports are deemed necessary, overseas suppliers will be required to partner with local firms. Ultimately, Seoul's objective is to ensure that by 2026, 80% of the country's military modernisation budget – some USD14.4bn in 2021 – is spent within the domestic defence sector compared to around 65% at present.

Industrial policy measures like these have become so central to wider defence strategy in Asia that measures to develop the local defence sector are now routinely included in wider defence and security policy papers. A cornerstone of Taiwan's 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review is technological self-reliance, both in terms of providing direct financial support through increased investment in research and development (R&D), and through using offset requirements linked to defence procurement deals to enhance the capabilities of local suppliers. Similarly, Japan's 2021 defence white paper emphasised the need to increase local capacity in relation to the development of advanced military technologies. To this end, in fiscal year 2021, a Future Capabilities Development Centre and a Technology Collaboration Support Division were set up within the Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency in order to prioritise and coordinate efforts in this area.

Similar measures are also being pursued in countries with less developed defence sectors. The economic and budgetary challenges posed by the pandemic prompted Malaysia's Technology Depository Agency to initiate a series of measures linked to procurement in strategic sectors (including defence) in order to support the economy. The new initiatives will reinforce existing policies designed to ensure that foreign military suppliers work closely with domestic companies in order to enhance the capabilities of the local defence sector and to engage with the country's wider Economic Enhancement Programme. Similar measures to expand existing industrial collaboration policies are also under review in Indonesia, with the aim of increasing domestic content in major defence projects.

In Vietnam, where local defence-industrial capabilities remain relatively limited, the General Department of Defence Industry within the MND announced plans to reform the country's primarily

state-owned defence sector. The new plan, covering 2021–30, aims to leverage dual-use technologies in key sectors like telecommunications to drive development of the local defence sector. Ultimately, the government hopes that the new strategy will enhance self-sufficiency, increase employment, enable increased defence exports and support wider economic development in the high-tech sector.

From the perspective of defence exporters, the key challenge created by the coronavirus pandemic therefore is not that there is a lack of funding for defence investment in the short term, but rather that it has sharpened focus on the role of local suppliers and local industrial development. The requirement for such measures will inevitably increase the complexity of operating in what is likely to remain a high-growth market for defence exports, but holds the promise of ultimately increasing regional self-sufficiency and lowering dependence upon foreign suppliers. However, much depends on the ability of regional defence R&D organisations to keep pace with defence equipment requirements both regionally and perhaps also globally. Nonetheless, in the longer term, the industrial policy measures that are being implemented across the region are likely to accelerate Asia's shift from being predominantly an importer of defence equipment to being a net exporter.

CHINA

China's Communist Party marked its centenary in July 2021 with a lavish celebration in Beijing and a fly-past of military helicopters and the air force's latest combat aircraft. The Chinese government had previously set out its intent for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve basic mechanisation and make progress towards informatisation by 2020 and by 2035, to 'basically achieve' defence and armed forces modernisation. The communiqué issued at the Chinese Communist Party's Fifth Plenum, in October 2020, continued calls to 'accelerate mechanisation, informationisation and intelligent integration'. Mechanisation is generally held to refer to ambitions to replace legacy equipment; informationisation to efforts at improving technical sophistication (likened by the Pentagon to 'net-centric' capability); while intelligent integration likely refers to the premise that military systems will be improved by the integration of automation, big data and artificial intelligence.

Statements have indicated that the 2020 goal has not yet been fully realised, but Beijing is nonetheless

pushing ahead with the 2035 target. This was reinforced by the release in early 2021 of the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which laid out the broad 2035 goal of creating a ‘peaceful and secure China’, but also indicated that defence modernisation would be accelerated. It again mentioned the plan to build a modernised army by 2027 (the centenary of the founding of the PLA’s antecedent) but provided little detail as to how these goals were to be achieved over the next 15 years, or of any shorter-term goals. However, the 2027 objective effectively adds a midway point for military modernisation in the run-up to the 2035 goal and does not replace the timeline set out by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Introducing new laws and amending others

This year began with the passing of two new defence-related laws. On 22 January, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the China Coast Guard Law. Though the law is new, the China Coast Guard (CCG) was earlier brought into the Central Military Commission’s chain of command. Importantly, Article 83 stipulates that the CCG will ‘carry out defense operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China ... and other relevant laws, military regulations and orders from the Central Military Commission’. Article 20 authorises the CCG to order or force the suspension or demolition of illegal activities by foreign organisations and individuals, including installing facilities, buildings or fixed or floating devices in the sea areas, islands and reefs under Chinese jurisdiction. Article 17 allows the CCG to expel any ship it encounters within its territorial seas and ‘internal maritime area’ (a term that is probably intentionally vague) through detention, forced removal or forced towing. Meanwhile, Article 25 provides it with the authority to create temporary exclusion zones as needed to stop vessels or personnel from entering. Articles 22, 47 and 48 provide the CCG with the specific authority to use force. The former stipulates that ‘when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed by foreign organizations and individuals at sea or are facing an imminent danger of illegal infringement, the CCG has the right to take measures including: use all necessary measures including weapons to stop the infringement and eliminate danger’. Articles 47 and 48 specify the circumstances under which the CCG

can use personal weapons, or weapons mounted on ships or carried by an aircraft. Under this law, the CCG is allowed to use weapons mounted on ships in circumstances where CCG forces perform maritime anti-terrorism missions, deal with serious incidents of violence at sea, or face attack by weapons or other ‘dangerous methods’ – though the latter is not defined.

Earlier, amendments to China’s National Defense Law were rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress in late December 2020; these were the first amendments since the last revision in 2009, which predated Xi’s rise to power. In explanatory notes submitted to the 22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on 13 October 2020, the amendments were justified due to the fact that the existing defence law at that time did not ‘fully adapt to the new tasks and requirements of building national defence and the army’ in light of developments and changes in global security as well as in China, the Party and the military. The most significant change is to the National Defense Law’s Article 50. In the latest version, the Central Military Commission is listed as being in charge of war powers and defence mobilisation, whereas previously the State Council and Central Military Commission jointly led mobilisation preparation and implementation. While Premier Li Keqiang remains the chairman of the State National Defense Mobilisation Commission, the State Council is in fact an implementation rather than a defence-related decision-making agency. Xi, as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, now fully holds the reins over the PLA. Another change to the National Defense Law is evident in [Chapter 3](#), Article 2, wherein greater emphasis is now placed on the use of force to protect China’s core interests, including for the purposes of ‘separatism’ and ‘development interests’, which were absent from earlier versions.

Training and exercises

The scale and nature of the PLA’s training and exercises have been closely studied in recent years for signs that they are being used to more directly improve military capability, such as through increased realism and interoperability. At the same time, they can be used for other purposes, such as political signalling. Like other armed forces, the pandemic had an effect in restricting some drills in 2020, but the PLA returned to active training and exercise activity into 2021. From January to November 2021, the PLA conducted 230


▼ Figure 17 People's Liberation Army (PLA) incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone

Between January and November 2021, the PLA increased the scale and number of air incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), conducting 230 incursions involving 886 aircraft of various types. Just under half involved just one type of aircraft, either flying solo or accompanied by other aircraft of the same type. The remainder involved multiple flights by special-mission aircraft, H-6 bombers and combat aircraft, including Su-30s, J-16s, J-11s, J-10s and JH-7s. Most of the aircraft have been fixed-wing types belonging to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy Aviation (PLANAF), but in August and November 2021 three separate incursions included WZ-10 attack helicopters (accompanied by a Mi-17 multi-role helicopter) and Z-8 heavy transport helicopters from the PLA Army.

Most flights in 2021 were conducted during the day, but there were also night-flights. The flight paths have tended to follow a similar pattern, entering from the west and routing

eastwards between Pratas Island and the southernmost point of Taiwan, though some sorties have followed a longer route, around the southern tip of the island and northward along Taiwan's southeastern coast.

The PLA likely uses these flights to train in areas of current weakness, such as anti-submarine warfare, and also to learn about Taiwan's responses. Frequent scrambles in response to PLA incursions have placed a heavy financial and maintenance burden on Taiwan's armed forces. Most sorties have avoided the politically sensitive Taiwan Strait Median Line but the incursions have also peaked around politically sensitive dates, signalling political messages to Taiwan and the US, as well as Chinese audiences. The largest incursion to date occurred on 4 October 2021, between the national days marked by Beijing and Taipei, when the PLA flew 56 aircraft on a single day in two sorties.



incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone, carried out by 886 PLA aircraft of various types. Although these flights included fighters and bombers, most also included special mission aircraft, particularly KQ-200 ASW aircraft and, in September 2021, ASW helicopters. In official 'reflections', it appears that the PLA recognises that ASW remains a significant area of weakness. Moreover, it is likely that these exercises – which Beijing now calls 'routine' – are not only intended to develop PLA capability, but also to signal displeasure politically to Taiwan and countries friendly to it. Responding to these sorties has come at high financial and equipment cost to Taiwan's armed forces, while it has also had the effect of normalising flights (sometimes at high tempo) by PLA aircraft around Taiwan.

In addition to incursions around Taiwan, the PLA has continued both single-service and multi-service drills across theatre commands, with a focus on joint operations. In 2021, particular attention was paid to exercises that practised skills related to naval warfare and amphibious assault, such as a month-long series of exercises in the South China Sea in March. However, there seems to be closer attention to information-security relating to the public discussion of exercises and military matters more broadly. For instance, while large-scale annual exercises, such as *Stride*, are still held, they feature less prominently in Chinese media coverage than in previous years. Moreover, there is less frequent reporting of the outcomes and analysis of such exercises by PLA leaders. In addition to a shift in official media reporting, a number of Chinese 'PLA-watcher' social media accounts have been censored.

PLA Rocket Force

In mid-2021, open-source satellite imagery showed several large ICBM silo fields under construction in northwestern China, focusing attention on the scale and pace of Beijing's nuclear force expansion and modernisation. When complete, these fields could (if fully filled) accommodate hundreds of ICBMs and bring the number of China's operationally deployed land-based strategic nuclear launchers much closer to parity with those of Russia and the US.

Although the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) was previously understood to be modernising the small number of silos it currently maintains for its liquid-fuelled DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM systems and testing a silo-launched version of its solid-fuelled DF-41 (CH-SS-20) ICBM design, the

scale of this new construction effort surprised many international observers. (The DF-41 itself entered operational service with the PLARF in 2020, although the configuration paraded in 2019 suggests that this is more likely to have been a road-mobile, rather than silo-based, version.)

This potential large-scale expansion in ICBM-launcher numbers comes at a time when concern is rising about the potential for China to exploit its civil nuclear sector as a source of fissile material to support an expanding nuclear arsenal. The two fast neutron reactors currently under construction, as well as a new reprocessing plant, could potentially allow the PLA to recover large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium should it wish. The Pentagon's 2021 'China military power' report estimated that this expansion could enable the PLA to have at least 1,000 new nuclear warheads by 2030.

It is possible, as some analysts have suggested, that the PLA does not intend to fill all of the silos it has under construction, and instead may only occupy a small percentage of the sites (a strategy colloquially known as a 'shell game'). This approach could still leverage uncertainty over the precise number and location of deployed missiles within the fields to significantly increase targeting complications for adversaries, but with a much smaller outlay of force. Beijing itself has not yet publicly offered an official explanation of the silo-field imagery and maintains that its nuclear-power programme is solely for civilian use. Nonetheless, the combination of the two developments has renewed concerns in some quarters about China's nuclear ambitions, and there have been questions raised over whether they may indicate a change in China's previously avowed policies of nuclear no first use and a minimum credible deterrent.

In addition to force structure and fissile material, the technical capabilities of Chinese strategic nuclear delivery systems have begun to receive greater public scrutiny. The US alleged that hypersonic boost glide vehicle tests during 2021 had included placing a glide vehicle into a low Earth orbit and then de-orbiting the vehicle into the upper atmosphere where it flew to the target area. Such a development, should it be introduced into service, would complicate the task for defensive forces in that identifying the intended target and the trajectory of the threat system would be more challenging than for a ballistic missile, given the flight characteristics of a glide vehicle. Media reporting suggested that one such delivery system,

utilising a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), had been tested in July 2021. Beijing, however, maintained that this was a misidentification of an earlier reusable 'space vehicle' mission.

As well as the DF-41, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile/HGV combination (CH-SS-22) is also believed to have begun operational fielding now with the PLARF's 61 Base opposite Taiwan. Some reports suggest that the reported test of a 'new type missile' by the Shangrao-based 613 Brigade in summer 2021 was DF-17 related. The 613 Brigade retains the historical honorific of China's first conventional missile brigade; this honorific was associated with the DF-17 at the 2019 parade. By contrast, however, the precise service status of the other new conventional system displayed at that parade, the CJ-100 cruise missile (CH-SSC-X-13), remains unclear.

PLA Army

In early 2021, after a year's delay as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, the PLA switched its induction of conscript personnel from a single annual intake in August to two smaller intakes in March and September. The PLA generally, and the PLA Army (PLAA) specifically, remain dependent on conscript personnel – estimates suggest that conscripts, each serving a two-year term of enlistment, currently comprise approximately one-third of all active-duty PLA personnel. Under the previous recruitment system, conscript-heavy units and departments across the force effectively experienced a cyclical growth and reduction in unit strength and readiness every year, peaking in late summer before dropping off as conscripts completing their second year of service were demobilised. The revised process is intended to mitigate this somewhat by splitting mobilisation and demobilisation across two windows. This will allow the PLA to retain units at high levels of training and readiness across larger parts of the year, resulting in greater operational flexibility.

The army began re-equipping multiple combined arms regiments in the Xinjiang military region in late 2020/early 2021 with modern light and medium armoured vehicles, including the ZBL-08 IFV family and ZTQ-15 light tanks. At the same time, the region's artillery regiments began receiving new PCL-181 155-millimetre truck-mounted artillery. Xinjiang has long been a relative backwater in terms of army equipment modernisation, and this focused effort probably reflects both the increasing tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, as well as

the relative success of the re-equipment programme elsewhere in the army. Given the long distances they are expected to cover, and the tough and inhospitable local terrain, the emphasis on medium- or light-weight equipment for these formations is logical. However, the decision also suggests growing confidence amongst army leaders in their strategy of reinforcing crisis points from a distance – illustrated by the appearance of ZTZ-99A main battle tanks, most likely drawn from the 76th Group Army, in southern Ladakh.

Although India has clearly risen up the army's list of priorities in recent years, Taiwan remains its key capability driver. During the summer and autumn of 2021, multiple PLA Army and Marine Corps manoeuvre brigades took part in amphibious exercises using civilian 'ro-ro' transport vessels. Despite the considerable number of landing craft and ships held by both the PLA Army and Navy, the PLA would probably still depend on a considerable number of requisitioned civilian vessels for a major Taiwan amphibious operation, given the scale of the forces involved. While most of these requisitioned vessels would be expected to transport follow-on waves of forces and supplies to an established lodgement ashore, some appear to have been modified to launch and recover amphibious assault vehicles, suggesting that the PLA may also expect them to take part in any initial landing operations.

In addition to recapitalising its traditional combat platforms, such as armoured vehicles and artillery, the army continues to invest in new capabilities. While it has already made considerable use of unarmed small- and medium-sized UAVs for reconnaissance and target acquisition, Army Aviation Brigades have now also reportedly begun using larger CH-4 combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs – a capability previously restricted to the navy and air force. It is possible that the PLAA is experimenting with pairing the CH-4 with its WZ-10 attack helicopters, in a manner similar to the MQ-1C UAVs and AH-64 attack helicopter pairing seen in US Army attack reconnaissance battalions. The army also continues to experiment with uninhabited ground vehicle (UGV) systems, including in EOD, engineering, patrol and reconnaissance roles.

PLA Navy

During 2021, speculation mounted regarding the likely imminent launch (either by the end of the year or in 2022) of China's third aircraft carrier, the second

▼ Figure 18 China Coast Guard (CCG): patrol ships, 2021


The introduction in 2021 of a new China Coast Guard (CCG) Law appears to further reinforce the development of the coast guard as a major arm of Chinese maritime law enforcement and also of power projection to assert maritime influence in China's near seas and in pursuit of its maritime claims. In this it serves as one component in a three-layered maritime capability alongside the PLA Navy (PLAN) and China's maritime militia.

In 2013, Beijing began consolidating several civilian maritime law-enforcement agencies into a single CCG under the State Ocean Administration (SOA). In 2018, there was a further transformation when the SOA was dissolved and the CCG was transferred to the People's Armed Police under the country's Central Military Commission.


The CCG's capabilities have also transformed, not least in its ability to deploy increased numbers of oceangoing assets at greater range and for longer periods than before. The introduction of two 12,000+-tonne full-load displacement *Zhaotou*-class

cutters was particularly noteworthy; these are the largest such coast guard vessels in the world. The CCG has also introduced cutters armed with weapons including 76mm guns and other smaller deck-mounted weapons, high-powered water cannons and embarked rotary-wing aircraft. These include former PLAN frigates with reduced armament, or vessels based on PLAN frigate designs. The US Coast Guard, in particular, also employs frigate-sized cutters, and deploys on forward-presence missions in the Indo-Pacific, including transits of the Taiwan Strait. However, the CCG is by far the largest coast guard in the world, with 524 patrol and coastal craft overall, compared to 343 and 383 respectively in the US and Japan, 136 for India, 84 for South Korea and 73 for Vietnam. Beijing's employment of the CCG in conjunction with the other arms of its maritime power in an incremental, sub-threshold approach to pursuing its maritime ambitions has been presenting an increasing challenge to China's neighbours and competitors.

Selected Asian nations, Russia and US: coastguard and other maritime gendarmerie patrol ships*



China Coast Guard: patrol ships*



* Vessels with a full-load displacement of over 1,500 tonnes; ** Fitted with a naval gun with a calibre of 57mm or more, or a close-in weapons system

US designation:						
Length (meters):	175	129	99	138	101	112
Built:	2014–15	2014–15	2013–14	2016–ongoing	Late 2010s–ongoing	1990–92
Weaponry:	1 76mm gun	-	-	1 76mm gun	1 76mm gun	-
Capacity:	Hangar for 2 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Hangar for 1 hel	Landing platform for 1 hel	Hangar for 1 hel

Notes: Based on navy Type-054A (*Jiangkai II*) frigate design Ex-Navy, delivered to CCG 2016

to be built domestically. The primary focus of attention has been the greater size and potential capability of the vessel, designated Type-003, compared to its predecessors.

Its full-load displacement is estimated at around 80,000-tonnes, with capacity for more than 40 fixed-wing aircraft plus helicopters. More significantly, it appears to be equipped with three (apparently electromagnetic) catapult launch systems plus arrester gear, as opposed to the ski-jump ramps which equip the first two ships. This will enable the operation of a greater range of aircraft, including a fixed-wing airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, greater endurance and payload for the combat aircraft, and a higher tempo for air operations.

Nevertheless, the challenge of integrating these systems and capabilities, as well as generating a full carrier group based on such a vessel with enhanced features, suggests that the Type-003 is still several years away from being fully operational. Generating an air group for the new ship will present challenges. However, a new batch of the carrier-capable J-15 aircraft appears to be in production; a new fifth-generation naval fighter based on the FC-31 has begun flight tests; and flight development is said to be continuing on the KJ-600 carrier-borne AEW&C aircraft.

The Type-003 represents an overall capability closer to, but still somewhat behind, that of the latest US carriers. Even so, its progress, the expectation that the fourth Chinese carrier (which may already be under construction) will also feature nuclear power, and the indication that further such vessels are still planned, all suggest that China's carrier power continues to develop and mature and that more ambitious longer-range deployments by existing People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, which have long been anticipated, may happen sooner rather than later.

Likewise, the commissioning in April 2021 of the first Type-075 (*Yushen*) large-deck amphibious assault ship with floodable well deck (LHD) suggests that a step-change in China's amphibious capacity is also under way. With the construction in rapid succession of two more of these LHDs, all three could be in service by the end of 2022 or early 2023.

The building of follow-on vessels remains uncertain, but two more Type-071 (*Yuzhao*) landing platform docks (LPDs) apparently joined the fleet in 2021, to make a total of eight. Despite the

power-projection potential of these new platforms, generating and integrating the necessary level of aviation and other specialist requirements will again be a major challenge.

The second and third Type-055 (*Renhai*) cruisers were commissioned in 2021. The lead ship of the class, *Nanchang*, also took part in several notable deployments, including for the first time joining a carrier strike group deployment (based around the prototype Chinese carrier *Liaoning*), providing the centrepiece for a deployment off Alaska, and in October joining a high-profile exercise with the Russian Navy. These deployments underscored the probable centrality of these potent vessels to future PLAN blue-water task group deployments.

Among other new arrivals during 2021 – adding to the considerable list of modern-design surface combatants – were two Type-052D mod (*Luyang III* mod) destroyers, making six of this variant now in commission. The number of Type-056A corvettes has now reached 50, with the prospect of more to follow. Among other significant specialist vessels, the PLAN added a fourth *Dongjian* surveillance vessel. Meanwhile, the retirement of legacy platforms continued, with the only Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*) frigate remaining in service likely to soon decommission as well.

Even the US Department of Defense, perhaps for its own reasons, now regularly refers to China's navy as the largest in the world. That depends on a particular approach and perspective to counting hull numbers. By most other yardsticks, the US Navy remains superior in scale and capability, if significantly overstretched relative to its global commitments.

Nevertheless, the Chinese navy's transformation in recent years has, by any measure, been remarkable and rapid, and it continues. It may also be at an important stage in its development of a full range of capabilities. This may be true in Beijing's eyes as well, a point perhaps highlighted by the unusual high-profile triple commissioning, on 23 April 2021 at Yulin naval base on Hainan Island – and in the presence of Xi – of the first LHD, the third Type-055 cruiser, and a Type-094 (*Jin*) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, of which six are believed to be in service.

PLA Air Force

The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) continued to take delivery of a range of modern multi-role combat aircraft during 2021, with Chengdu J-10C

Firebird, J-20A, and possibly J-20B and Shenyang J-16 *Flanker* aircraft all handed over. PLAAF activity in Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone also increased.

The PLAAF is also returning to the nuclear role it lost around 1995, with the Xian H-6N designed to carry the CH-AS-X-13 air-launched ballistic missile fitted with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Work is also continuing on a successor to the H-6, the Xian H-20, and a low-observable flying wing design is in development. In addition, Xian appears to be working on a smaller tactical strike aircraft.

A two-seat variant of the J-20 entered flight testing in the fourth quarter of 2021. While the aircraft could be the conversion trainer equivalent of the J-10S, it is also possible that it is intended for a combat role, with the second seat designed for a weapons system operator. It appears that one brigade is re-equipping with the J-20 approximately every 12 months, suggesting a production rate of at least 24 aircraft per year. A number of J-20s apparently fitted with the domestically-produced WS-10C turbofan have been seen, and this aircraft may be known as the J-20B. Along with the aircraft's current air-to-air armament of the PL-10 (CH-AA-09) short-range imaging infrared guided missile, and the PL-15 (CH-AA-10) active radar-guided medium- to long-range missile, development work is believed to be continuing on the PL-16. This is in a similar performance class to the PL-15, but six rather than only four can be carried in the J-20's main internal weapons bay.

The PL-15 uses a boost-sustain solid motor configuration, combined with what may well be a high fly-out speed, for medium- to long-range performance and, since introduction into service in 2018, has been a key threat driver for the air arms of the US and its regional allies. Beijing has yet to show the PL-16 design, but it is unlikely to be one of the rocket-ramjet missile configurations that it has also been developing. Given the carriage constraints of a weapons bay and the design requirement to provide air inlets for a rocket-ramjet missile, packaging any more than four of this type of weapon with a performance similar to the PL-15 into the J-20 would appear to be challenging.

A dedicated electronic warfare variant of the J-16, the J-16D, was shown in PLAAF colours at the Air Show China 2021 in late September/early October, suggesting that this variant is entering service. The J-16D displayed had wingtip electronic sensing pods and four jamming pods on wing stations.

While Chengdu and Shenyang have been delivering batches of combat aircraft to the PLAAF during 2021, it is harder to discern whether and when these types are being used to replace ageing types, to form new units, or to increase airframe numbers in existing formations (the latter would raise questions over whether the PLAAF may be moving to a larger brigade-size for some of its tactical combat aircraft types).

The PLAAF's airlift capacity continues to benefit from the delivery of the four-engined Xian Y-20, with at least 31 of the A-model of the heavy transport aircraft now in service with two brigades. A tanker variant, possibly designated Y-20U, is now in active service and may in time replace the H-6U. The Y-20A is fitted with the Saturn D-30KP-2 turbofan engine, while a re-engined variant, likely the Y-20B, is fitted with the domestically-produced WS-20 turbofan. Flight testing of the Y-20B began in 2020, with a small number of the re-engined variant visible at the Xian Yanliang manufacturing site by the fourth quarter of 2021.

In addition to its aviation branch, the PLAAF has also focused considerable resources on modernising its surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces in recent years. The absorption of the former air defence artillery branch after 2012 has enabled the PLAAF to increase the size of its existing SAM brigades as well as forming new ones. The last of the old HQ-2 systems appear to have been phased out and the bulk of the PLAAF's long-range SAM inventory is now comprised of a mix of Russian S-300 and S-400 systems, and comparable domestic designs such as HQ-9/-9B and HQ-22.

Defence economics

An ambitious new chapter in China's defence and national security development planning cycle began in 2021. The goal appears to be to ramp up the construction of a broad and capable defence economic and innovation base amid escalating political, military and economic rivalry with the United States and its allies. In the 2021–25 14th FYP, launched in March 2021, this takes the form not only of focus on the defence and strategic spheres, but also on the rest of the domestic economy and society. The importance of comprehensive securitisation is highlighted in other official plans and policies that have come out in the past several years, such as the 2020 'dual circulation' initiative.

This approach is anchored in a steadily worsening assessment of the country's external threat environ-

ment. The 14th FYP points to ‘profound and complex changes’ that China is facing in the international environment.

While the plan does not explicitly identify the chief cause for China’s predicament, speeches given by President Xi Jinping as the 14th FYP was being drafted make clear that the US is the main adversary. In internal remarks to Communist Party officials to explain the geostrategic reasoning behind the 14th FYP, Xi said that ‘the biggest source of chaos in the world today is the United States’ and ‘the United States is the biggest threat to China’s development and security’.

The 14th FYP also pointed to other major trends that would profoundly impact China’s development and security in the near to medium term. The most noteworthy is a science and technology revolution happening alongside an industrial transformation and a far-reaching adjustment in the balance of international forces. This has made the existing international order increasingly complex, unstable and uncertain, and brought in an era of ‘turbulent change, unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism that poses threats to world peace and development’.

Security imperatives of the 14th FYP

Several major security-related themes are apparent in the 14th FYP. Economic securitisation at both the macro- and micro-levels received prominent attention. Macro-level economic securitisation is set out in the ‘dual circulation’ concept in which ‘China will form a formidably large domestic market and create a new development framework’. Using a combination of supply- and demand-side policies, the intention is to reconfigure and unblock domestic supply chains so they are protected from international disruptions.

The plan also stresses the urgent need to achieve technological self-reliance. The rapid tightening of US-led export controls has forced the Chinese authorities into concerted action to prevent what they describe as technological ‘strangulation’. The developmental response has been to place science, technology and innovation at the ‘commanding heights’ of the 14th FYP’s policy agenda. The plan points to the critical importance of ‘adhering to the core position of innovation in China’s modernisation drive’ and taking ‘science and technology independence and self-reliance as the strategic support for national development’.

This is being carried out in several areas:

- **Resource allocations:** the plan calls for a significant boost in basic research spending from around 6% at the end of the 13th FYP to 8% by 2025. This is still around half of what advanced economies such as the US and Japan spend on basic research (17% and 13% respectively in 2017), but in absolute terms means doubling the size of Chinese basic research outlays by the mid-2020s. Moreover, the plan calls for increasing annual R&D expenditures by 7%. No mention is made of defence R&D allocations, but the defence R&D system will likely enjoy growth rates of a similar if not higher level.
- **Structural reforms:** a long-awaited establishment of large-scale national laboratories is finally taking place, with the plan calling for these to be set up in the areas of quantum information, photonics and micro-nanoelectronics, network communications, AI, biomedicine, and modern energy systems.
- **Prioritisation of select technology domains:** seven areas are expressly identified in the plan: AI; quantum information; integrated circuits; genetics and biotechnology; neuroscience; advanced clinical medicine; and deep space, deep sea and polar exploration.

Military civil fusion

While military civil fusion (MCF) as a term appears to be less prominent in official discourse, the pursuit of the convergence between the civilian and defence economies remains a pressing priority. The general objective outlined in the 14th FYP is to build an overarching integrated strategic system in which the civilian, defence and national security sectors are closely aligned and coordinated. An extensive list of goals has been put forward:

- Expand efforts to share resources, which means allowing the defence-industrial sector to increase access to the financial markets through fundraising initiatives such as asset securitisation and government guidance funds.
- Encourage the coordinated civil–military development of key regions. A top priority of the 14th FYP is regional and infrastructure development, especially the construction of

high-speed transportation networks and the building of major urban clusters around the country. Military requirements will feature prominently in these projects.

- Deepen civil–military research collaboration. The civilian research and development system will be increasingly leveraged for defence requirements.
- Strengthen civil-military joint development in maritime, space, cyber, biotechnology, new energy, AI and quantum technology.
- Improve the development of the national defence mobilisation system to ensure that the national economy can be rapidly and effectively repurposed for defence and national security in crisis and wartime conditions. The coronavirus pandemic in 2020 is an example of activating the defence mobilisation system to deal with a health crisis.

MCF will become even more important under the new economic securitisation concept, with the emphasis on domestic economic and technological self-sufficiency and safeguarding against external economic threats.

2035 vision and the long-term science and technology plan

A 15-year vision that declares that China will ‘basically realize socialist modernization’ by 2035 is briefly outlined in the 14th FYP. This means that the country’s national strength, of which economic, scientific and technological capabilities are central components, is intended to ‘rise sharply’. Major breakthroughs are planned in key core technologies and China will become a global innovator. A modern economic system will be built that will allow China to reach the per capita income levels of a moderately developed country. China will also reach a higher level of security and stability, of which a key contributing factor is the ‘basic realization’ of defence modernisation.

A new 15-year Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (MLP) should have started alongside the 14th FYP, following the conclusion of the 2006–20 MLP. In sharp contrast to its predecessor – which was made public – the Chinese authorities have been tight-lipped about whether to openly disclose the details of the new plan because of foreign, especially US, scrutiny of China’s technological advancements.

Defence industry

China’s defence industry entered 2021 with robust growth momentum, and it looks well placed to capitalise on the pivot to securitisation over the next few years. The impact of the coronavirus pandemic proved to be short lived and appears to have only affected the defence industry in the first half of 2020. Prime contractors in the defence sector posted strong double-digit growth in profits and revenues from the second half of 2020 and into the first half of 2021. Total revenue of the Chinese defence industry for the first six months of 2021 increased by 22.4% over the same period for 2020, while net profits grew by 19.8%.

The Chinese government launched a three-year action plan at the end of 2020, intended to overhaul the entire state-owned enterprise system, of which the defence-industrial sector is an important part. A key reform measure is the promotion of mixed private-public ownership and defence research institutes, which is the focus of the initial restructuring phase, due for completion in 2023.

Defence-industrial enterprises have been given permission to implement an important reform that would enable the establishment of equity incentive mechanisms to allow high-achieving personnel to be rewarded at levels comparable to private-sector counterparts. This will improve the ability of defence enterprises to retain and better incentivise employees; they have to date been hampered from effectively doing this because of restrictions arising from their state-owned status.

Another effort is being made to overhaul the pricing system for military products, but deeply entrenched and competing interests between the defence industry and the PLA have meant this issue has proven highly resistant to reform. The existing pricing system dates back to the central planning era of the 1950s and 1960s that was based on a formula of cost plus 5% profit. A chronic lack of market competition for defence products has meant that military procurement officials have found it difficult to obtain accurate pricing information.

The consolidation and remaking of the country’s primes (which has been proceeding at a glacial pace) finally reached the defence-electronics sector in 2021. In June, the State Council approved the merger of China Electronics Technology Corp. (CETC) and China Potevio Corp., with the latter becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of CETC. China Potevio Corp. is a central government-owned enterprise specialising in information and communications

technology. This merger significantly increased the size of CETC, which now has a workforce of more than 200,000 employees.

A move towards more closely integrating the defence-electronics industry and the space and missile sector took place in August 2021 with an announcement by China Electronics Corp. (CEC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC) of a strategic cooperation agreement on the joint development of projects in the industrial internet and network security sectors, as well as personnel exchanges. In 2020, CASIC had also entered into a strategic cooperation arrangement with China Aerospace Science Corp. (CASC). This leaves the ordnance sector as the last remaining holdout to corporate consolidation and integration.

Defence spending and investment

The growing importance of defence and national security priorities in leadership pronouncements and policies – such as in the 14th FYP – is not yet reflected in the official core defence budget, which came to CNY1.355 trillion (USD202 billion) in 2021, a 6.8% nominal increase over 2020 levels. While this growth rate is marginally higher than the 6.6% increase seen in 2020, both fall considerably below the 7.6% growth seen during the first four years of the 2016–20 13th FYP.

The coronavirus pandemic appears to be principally responsible for this reduced pace of

growth. How long lasting this modest but not inconsequential fall in defence expenditure growth rates will be depends on how quickly China's economy emerges from the pandemic: increasingly this looks to be sooner rather than later.

Total Chinese defence expenditure is estimated to be much higher if foreign-weapons purchases, military R&D funding and the People's Armed Police central budget are included. Including local militia funding, the 2021 budget is estimated to have reached CNY1.388tr (USD207bn), while total expenditure is likely closer to CNY1.810tr (USD270bn). The official Chinese defence budget is therefore a relatively poor guide for measuring trends and inputs into military research, development and acquisition activities, as it does not contain much of the funding for defence R&D, which is located in other parts of the state budget, extra-budgetary funding allocations, and investment funds raised from the capital markets.

A useful proxy indicator of Chinese defence R&D investment is the securitisation of the corporate assets of the country's principal state-owned defence contractors through stock market listings. These defence primes have raised a combined total of CNY2.55tr (USD370bn) between 2012 and 2020, including CNY143bn (USD20.7bn) in 2020 alone. The reform effort to increase the ratio of private ownership in the defence industry over the next few years could see the rate of asset securitisation of the defence primes increase yet further.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Asia

Significant events in 2021



FEBRUARY

CHINA CUTS DEFENCE-INDUSTRY RED TAPE


China's defence procurement agency relaxed administrative regulations for dual-use equipment to encourage companies into the defence industry, in line with the government's 'military-civil fusion (MCF)' strategy. Under the new measure, which is still in a trial period, a contractor will undergo a simpler evaluation and licensing process, reducing registration time from months to weeks. In October 2017, the number of licences and certificates that defence contractors required before submitting a defence tender was reduced from four to three. Launched in 2015, the MCF strategy aims to 'reinvigorate' the country's defence-technology industrial base by 2049.



SEPTEMBER

HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES & CONSTRUCTION SOLD


Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC) became majority privately-owned. Initially, 83.45% of shares were put up for sale, though this was later reduced to a 66.85% stake in April 2021, when the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and 11 other major Korean and Filipino shareholders signed a share purchase agreement with a consortium led by the Dongbu Corporation, a Korean civil-engineering and construction group. HHIC has been responsible for several key naval shipbuilding programmes (including the *Dokdo/Marado* amphibious assault ships) with defence-related revenue accounting for 23.66% of its total revenue in 2020 (down from 29.08% in 2019 and 30.75% in 2018).



SEPTEMBER

INDONESIA DEFENCE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATIONS

Indonesia announced that before the end of 2021 it will have brought together five state-owned defence companies under a new parent company called industri pertahanan (Defence Industry). The new firm will consist of Dirgantara Indonesia (aerospace), Pindad (armoured vehicles), Dahana (munitions) and Penataran Angkatan Laut (PAL) Indonesia (maritime), with the industry cluster led by Len Industri (electronics). The new company will aim to better support Indonesia's increasingly ambitious procurement plans. In 2019, the aforementioned five companies had an estimated revenue of IDR5.6tr (USD396.16m) in the defence sector out of a combined estimated revenue of IDR14.47tr (USD1.02bn) and comprised around 8,000 employees.



SEPTEMBER

AUKUS PARTNERSHIP

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced a trilateral security partnership, called AUKUS. Its first objective is, over a period of 18 months, to devise the best way to equip Australia with at least eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). The Australian government has said it intends to build the submarines in Adelaide. As a consequence, Australia cancelled the 2016 contract with France's Naval Group for 12 conventionally powered submarines based on the *Barracuda* SSN design. This programme had attracted criticism over cost increases. The initial production cost estimate of more than AUD50bn (USD37.19bn) had almost doubled by 2019 to AUD80bn (USD55.63bn), according to testimony given to a parliamentary committee in November 2019. The move damaged relations between the AUKUS nations and France, and also further delays the replacement of Australia's six *Collins*-class submarines, which were built in the late 1990s and early 2000s.



OCTOBER










INDIA'S ORDNANCE FACTORY BOARD IS DISSOLVED

The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), India's oldest state-owned defence manufacturer, was dissolved, three months after a corporatisation plan was authorised by the government. OFB's 41 factories across 24 states have been restructured into seven limited companies with around 70,000 staff distributed across these new firms: Munitions India (ammunition and explosives); Armoured Vehicles Nigam (vehicles); Advanced Weapons and Equipment India (weapons and equipment); Troop Comforts (clothing and general stores); Yantra India (ancillary products, such as cartridge cases); India Optel (opto-electronics); and Gliders India (parachutes). The reforms are intended to redress underperformance and inefficiencies but also to promote the exports of OFB companies, which recently accounted for under 4% of India's defence exports. Although the Indian government has said it has no plans to privatise the new companies, media reports indicate that this may be an option.

Figure 19  Vietnam: indigenous naval shipbuilding capability






Selected Vietnamese military and paramilitary maritime procurement from Vietnamese shipyards since 2000

Company	Ownership type	Contract date	Equipment	Type	Service Qty	Value (USD)	Deliveries	Offset agreement?
189 Shipbuilding Company	State-owned	2001	TT-120	Patrol boat	14	44.72m	2000s	
		2010	Truong Sa (K122)	Transport ship	1	12.4m	2012	
		2010	Khanh Hoa (Truong Sa mod) (K123)	Hospital ship	1	13.09m	2013	
		c.2018	Yei Kieu (Damen RGS 9316)	Submarine rescue craft	1	n.k.	2021	
Ba Son Corporation	State-owned	2006	Project 12418 (Tarantul/V)	Fast patrol craft with surface-to-surface missiles	8**	Approx. 1bn	2007-17	
Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company	State-owned	2006	TT-400TP (RUS MTD FC54)	Oceangoing patrol craft	6	n.k.	2012-15	
		2010s	TT-200	Patrol boat	14	€160m	2010s	
		n.k.	TT400TP	Oceangoing patrol craft	9	n.k.	2012-16	
		2016	High Speed Patrol Vessel	Fast patrol boat	12***	99.7m	2020-22*	
James Boat Technology	Privately-owned	2014	MS-50S	Fast patrol boat	26	€15m	2014-17	
Song Thu Corporation	State-owned	2007	Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613)	Survey ship	1	n.k.	2011	
		n.k.	Damen Salvage Tug	Oceangoing tug	4	n.k.	2007-15	
		2012	DN2000 (Damen 9014)	Offshore patrol ship	4	n.k.	2013-16	
		n.k.	Damen Stan Lander 5612	Roll-on/Roll-off cargo ship	4	n.k.	2021-ongoing	
		Pending*	DN4000	Offshore patrol ship	2	n.k.	-	

* Planned, ** Six built by Ba Son Corporation; two built by Russia's Vimpel Shipyard
 *** Seven to be built by Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company; five built by India's Larsen & Toubro

Figure 20 Republic of Korea: K2 Black Panther main battle tank

In the early 1990s, the K2 Black Panther programme was launched to develop a 3.5 generation main battle tank (MBT), intended to replace South Korea's ageing M-series MBTs (the M47 and the M48 Patton). The Agency of Defense Development (ADD), the government's defence research centre, and Rotem (now Hyundai Rotem) have led the *Black Panther* programme, based on technology acquired from the 1970s M48A5 upgrade programme and the successful development of the K1. This was South Korea's first indigenous MBT with a 1,200-horsepower engine, and was developed through the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) programme, based on Chrysler's M1 Abrams design in 1987. It was projected that KRW4.22tr (USD5.47bn) would be spent on a research and development phase that lasted 14 years with a ten-year production contract with the plan to introduce the first K2 into service from 2011. However, production has suffered delays due to a series of contract modifications related to the powerpack (engine and transmission system). After 1992, the plan was that the first batch, of 100 vehicles, would be fitted with foreign-supplied powerpacks due to the inability of local industry to produce a suitable engine with 1,500-horsepower and a transmission system. This was changed in June 2003. Local industry was tasked with developing an indigenous powerpack (expected to be completed after five years of R&D). However, significant development delays led to this decision being reversed in 2012, with plans for the local system being pushed to batch 2, which was contracted in December 2014. However, further delays led to another change on the powerpack question in 2018. This time a German transmission was to be imported; the plan remains that local industry develops the powerpack.




Afghanistan AFG

Afghan Afghani AFN		2020	2021	2022
GDP [a]	AFN	1.55tr	n.k	
	USD	20.1bn	n.k	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	611	n.k	
Growth	%	-2.4	n.k	
Inflation	%	5.6	n/a	
Def bdgt [b]	AFN	155bn	€172bn	
	USD	2.01bn	€1.88bn	
USD1=AFN		76.84	€91.43	

[a] IMF economic data unavailable for Afghanistan in 2021

[b] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security. Also includes donor funding.



Population 37,466,414

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.4%	5.2%	5.4%	4.5%	13.8%	1.3%
Female	19.8%	5.1%	5.2%	4.3%	13.5%	1.5%

Capabilities

In August 2021, all government forces and the government itself collapsed under the pressure of the Taliban offensive. The Taliban administration has publicly committed to the undertaking they made to the US in the 2020 Doha Agreement to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorist attacks against the US and its interests. Nonetheless, terrorist groups remain active in the country. ISIS has continued to mount attacks on Taliban fighters and Afghan civilians, while ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda may result in the Taliban tolerating the latter's presence in the country. The United States has indicated that an 'over the horizon' counter-terrorism capability is being developed, but this faces a host of challenges including basing and target selection. Taliban fighters are widely deployed across Afghanistan, particularly in key towns and cities. The Taliban have acquired many foreign-supplied vehicles, weapons and small arms. Some captured aircraft have been flown, though many were taken out of the country or disabled. Although the Taliban has appealed for specialist personnel from the previous government's forces to join them so that the group can operate such systems, evidence of Taliban revenge killings of former members of the security forces will limit take-up. Moreover, many complex platforms were previously maintained by (now departed) foreign contractors, while spare-parts availability will also limit the ability to operate Western-origin systems. The Taliban's ability to employ and support the large amount of captured material is unlikely to be high. Moreover, the freezing of the former Afghan government's funds held overseas has precipitated a fiscal crisis. Although the G20 have agreed to fund humanitarian relief, the rapid release of frozen funds appears very unlikely. These factors are expected to limit the Taliban's military capability. Its defence priorities are likely to remain internal security, border control and countering ISIS.

ACTIVE 165,000 (Taliban 165,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Taliban 165,000

The Taliban's military strength is believed to consist of approximately 75,000 full time fighters and 90,000 local militia

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm D-30

MOR 82mm 2B14

AIRCRAFT • TPT 1 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*

HELICOPTERS


ATK 1 Mi-35 *Hind*

MRH 2 Mi-17 *Hip H*

Australia AUS

Australian Dollar AUD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AUD	1.97tr	2.13tr	
	USD	1.36tr	1.61tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	52,905	62,619	
Growth	%	-2.4	3.5	
Inflation	%	0.9	2.5	
Def bdgt [a]	AUD	45.5bn	45.5bn	47.8bn
	USD	31.4bn	34.3bn	
USD1=AUD		1.45	1.33	

[a] Includes pensions



Population 25,809,973

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.6%	3.1%	3.6%	3.8%	22.1%	7.5%
Female	9.0%	2.9%	3.2%	3.6%	22.8%	8.7%

Capabilities

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and well equipped. It also has considerable recent operational experience. In March 2016, the government published Australia's third defence white paper in seven years. This identified China's growing regional role, regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as among the influences shaping defence policy. A 'Strategic Update' to the white paper, published in July 2020, outlined plans to adjust Australia's defence posture in order to develop a more powerful and self-reliant military deterrent. The document pointed to an increased prospect of war in Australia's region, claimed that a ten-year 'strategic warning time' could no longer be assumed, and highlighted potential threats from 'grey-zone activities'. The country's primary ally is the US, but it is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan, South Korea and the UK, while remaining committed to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and to its close defence relations with New Zealand. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September 2021, will see the UK and US assist Australia in developing a nuclear-powered submarine capability and other defence and security technologies. It led to the cancellation of the existing contract with France for conventionally-powered boats.

The plan is to build the nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide. Australia is also building frigates and patrol ships, based on European designs. Strategic air- and sea-lift platforms give the ADF considerable capability to move and sustain deployments overseas. Combat-air, maritime-patrol and armoured-vehicle capabilities are also being boosted, and more closely integrating Australia's armed forces – and their modern platforms – is a priority. Australia imports most of its significant defence equipment but possesses an increasingly capable defence industry. Its largest naval ship-builders are ASC and Austal, whose US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds vessels for the US Navy.

ACTIVE 59,600 (Army 29,400 Navy 15,300 Air 14,900)

RESERVE 29,750 (Army 20,100 Navy 3,950 Air 5,700)

Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular personnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 *Optus* C1 (dual use for civil/mil comms)

Army 29,400

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS bn)

Amphibious

1 (2nd RAR) amph bn

Aviation

1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn))

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 2 UAV bty, 1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt (2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)

Special Operations Command

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (SAS) SF regt

1 (SF Engr) SF regt

2 cdo regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 CSS sqn

Reserve Organisations 20,100 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 (2nd) div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated)

Light

1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn)

1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 spt bn)

1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)

1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn)

1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 trg bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 59 M1A1 *Abrams*

RECCE 25 *Boxer* CRV (incl variant)

IFV 253 ASLAV-25 (all variants)

APC • APC (T) 431 M113A5A

AUV 1,120: 1,020 *Bushmaster* IMV; 100 *Hawkei*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 51: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 19 M88A2

VLB 5 *Biber*

MW 20: 12 *Husky*; 8 MV-10

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 239

TOWED 155mm 54 M777A2

MOR 81mm 185

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70

AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 22 *Tiger*

MRH 2 AW139 (leased)

TPT 87: **Heavy** 12 CH-47F *Chinook*; **Medium** 75: 41 NH90

TTH (MRH90); 34 S-70A *Black Hawk*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B *Shadow* 200

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire*

Navy 15,300

Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Naval Strategic Comd HQ located at Canberra

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 6

SSK 6 *Collins* with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C

Harpoon Block 1B ASHM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 *Hobart* with *Aegis* Baseline

8.1 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM,

6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIB SAM/RIM-162A

ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with

MU90 LWT/Mk 54 LWT, 1 MK 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS,

1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk*)

FRIGATES • FFGHM 8 *Anzac* (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14

PCO 14: 12 *Armidale* (Bay mod); 2 *Cape* (leased)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MHC 4 *Huon*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3

LHD 2 *Canberra* (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCM-1E; 110 veh; 12 M1 *Abrams* MBT; 1,000 troops)

LSD 1 *Choules* (ex-UK *Bay*) (capacity 1 med hel; 24 MBT; 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM-1E

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

AGHS 2 *Leeuwin* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 4 *Paluma*

AORH 2 *Supply* (ESP *Cantabria*) (capacity 1 MH-60R *Seahawk*)

AX 1 *Sycamore* (capacity 1 med hel) (operated by private company, Teekay Shipping; multi-role aviation training vessel)

AXS 1 *Young Endeavour*

The following vessels are operated by a private company, DMS Maritime:

ASR 2: 1 *Besant*; 1 *Stoker*

AXL 1 *Seahorse Mercator*

Naval Aviation 1,450

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with NH90 TTH (MRH90)

1 sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with MH-60R *Seahawk*

1 sqn with H135

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ASW 24 MH-60R *Seahawk*

TPT 21: **Medium** 6 NH90 TTH (MRH90) (operated on rotational basis); **Light** 15 H135

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114M *Hellfire*

Clearance Diving Branch

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

2 diving unit

Air Force 14,900

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F/A-18F *Super Hornet*

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

1 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II (forming)

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with P-8A *Poseidon*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EA-18G *Growler*

ISR

1 (FAC) sqn with PC-21

1 sqn with AP-3C *Orion*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with B-737-700 *Wedgetail* (E-7A)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A)

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; *Falcon* 7X

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* III

1 sqn with C-27J *Spartan*

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU with F-35A *Lightning* II

1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air*

2 sqn with PC-21

2 (LIFT) sqn with *Hawk* MK127*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 124 combat capable

FGA 68: 24 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*; 44 F-35A *Lightning* II

ASW 12 P-8A *Poseidon*

EW 13: 2 AP-3C *Orion* mod; 11 EA-18G *Growler**

AEW&C 6 B-737-700 *Wedgetail* (E-7A)

TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)

TPT 47: **Heavy** 8 C-17A *Globemaster* III; **Medium** 22: 10

C-27J *Spartan*; 12 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 12 Beech 350

King Air; **PAX** 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 *Falcon* 7X (VIP)

TRG 82: 33 *Hawk* Mk127*; 49 PC-21

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM

ARM AGM-88B HARM; AGM-88E AARGM

AShM AGM-84A *Harpoon*

LACM **Conventional** AGM-158A JASSM

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Paveway* II/IV; Laser JDAM

INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER

DEPLOYMENT

EGYPT: MFO (*Operation Mazurka*) 27

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* (*Okra*) 110; 1 SF gp;

NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1

MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A *Poseidon* (on rotation)

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (*Operation Paladin*) 13

PHILIPPINES: *Operation Augury* 100 (trg team)

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (*Operation Aslan*) 13

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: *Operation Accordion* 400: 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*

FOREIGN FORCES


Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 *Super Puma*; AS532 *Cougar*

United States US Pacific Command: 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap

• US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt

Bangladesh BGD

Bangladeshi Taka BDT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BDT	27.4tr	30.2tr	
	USD	323bn	356bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,962	2,139	
Growth	%	3.5	4.6	
Inflation	%	5.6	5.6	
Def bdgt	BDT	321bn	344bn	373bn
	USD	3.79bn	4.06bn	
FMA (US)	USD	1.5m	0.0m	0.0m
USD1=BDT		84.79	84.81	



Population 164,098,818

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.2%	4.5%	4.6%	4.2%	19.2%	3.3%
Female	12.8%	4.4%	4.6%	4.4%	20.9%	3.8%

Capabilities

Bangladesh has limited military capability, which is optimised for border and domestic security, including domestic disaster relief. A defence-modernisation plan is under way, called Forces 2030, although acquisitions have been limited. Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased defence collaboration with India. The country has a long record of UN peacekeeping deployments. A major naval-recapitalisation and -expansion programme, including local manufacture of patrol boats, is under way to better protect the country's large EEZ. Airlift capability has improved with the addition of ex-UK C-130Js. Substantial efforts have also been made to strengthen the shipbuilding industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility. The armed forces reportedly retain extensive commercial interests, including in real estate, banks and other businesses.

ACTIVE 163,050 (Army 132,150 Navy 16,900 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 132,150

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

10 inf div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo bde (2 cdo bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde

3 indep armd regt

Light

25 inf bde

2 (composite) bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

10 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

AVIATION

1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 276: 174 Type-59/-59G(BD); 58 Type-69/-69G; 44 Type-90-II (MBT-2000)

LT TK 8 Type-62

RECCE 8+ BOV M11

APC 545

APC (T) 134 MT-LB

APC (W) 330 BTR-80

PPV 81+ *Maxxpro*

AUV 17 *Cobra*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654

VLB MTU

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 *Metis* M1 (RS-AT-13)

RCL 106mm 238 M40A1

ARTILLERY 895+

SP 155mm 18 NORA B-52

TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer;

122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54

Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46)

MRL 42: 122mm 36+ WS-22; 302mm 6 T-300

MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type-87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA-31T *Cheyenne*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 AS365N3 *Dauphin*

TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4)

Point-defence FN-16 (CH-SA-14); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS • TOWED 174: 35mm 8 GDF-009 (with *Skyguard*-3); 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 Type-59 (S-60)

Navy 16,900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 2

SSK 2 *Nabajatra* (ex-PRC Type-035G (*Ming*)) with 8 single 533mm TT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6

FFGHM 3:

1 *Bangabandhu* (ROK modified *Ulsan*) with 2 twin

Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple FM-90N

(CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm

TT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1

AW109E hel)

2 *Umar Farooq* (ex-PRC Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei II*)) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple GMLS with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 hel)

FFG 3:

2 *Abu Bakr* (ex-PRC Type-053H2 (*Jianghu III*)) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

1 *Osman* (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 46**CORVETTES 6**

FSGM 4 *Shadhinota* (PRC C13B) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with FL-3000N (HHQ-10) (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSG 2 *Bijoy* (ex-UK *Castle*) (of which 1 damaged in 2020 Beirut port explosion) with 2 twin Inchr with C-704 ASHM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PSOH 2 *Somudra Joy* (ex-US *Hero*) with 1 76mm gun, hel landing platform

PCFG 4 *Durdarsha* (ex-PRC *Huangfeng*) with 4 single Inchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 *Safflower*) ASHM

PCG 2 *Durjoy* with 2 twin Inchr with C-704 ASHM, 1 76MM gun

PCO 8: 1 *Madhumati* (*Sea Dragon*) with 1 57mm gun; 5 *Kapatakhaya* (ex-UK *Island*); 2 *Durjoy* with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun

PCC 8: 2 *Meghna* with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection); 1 *Nirbhoy* (ex-PRC *Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor; 2 twin 57mm gun; 5 *Padma*

PBFG 5 *Durbar* (PRC *Hegu*) with 2 single Inchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 *Scrubbrush*) ASHM

PBF 4 *Titas* (ROK *Sea Dolphin*)

PB 7: 1 *Barkat* (ex-PRC *Shanghai III*); 2 *Karnaphuli*; 1 *Salam* (ex-PRC *Huangfen*); 3 *Shaheed Daulat* (PRC *Shanghai II*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5

MSO 5: 1 *Sagar*; 4 *Shapla* (ex-UK *River*)

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1****LANDING CRAFT 14**

LCU 4 (of which 2+)

LCT 2

LCM 5 *Darshak* (*Yuchin*)

LCVP 3+

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11

AG 1

AGHS 2: 1 *Agradoot*; 1 *Anushandhan*

AGS 2 *Darshak*

AOR 2 (coastal)

AOT 1 *Khan Jahangir Ali*

AR 1+

ATF 1+

AX 1 *Shaheed Ruhul Amin*

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E *Power*

Special Warfare and Diving Command 300**Air Force 14,000****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B *Airguard*

1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG *Airguard*

1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI *Airguard*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Yak-130 *Mitten**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-32 *Cline*

1 sqn with C-130B/J *Hercules*

1 sqn with L-410UVP

TRAINING

1 sqn with K-8W *Karakorum**; L-39ZA *Albatros**

1 sqn with PT-6

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; Mi-171Sh

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; Mi-171Sh

1 sqn with Bell 212

1 trg sqn with Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; AW119 *Koala*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 88** combat capable

FTR 53: 9 F-7MB *Airguard*; 11 F-7BG *Airguard*; 12 F-7BGI *Airguard*; 5 FT-7B *Airguard*; 4 FT-7BG *Airguard*; 4 FT-7BGI *Airguard*; 6 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*

TPT 14: Medium 7: 4 C-130B *Hercules*; 3 C-130J *Hercules*;

Light 7: 3 An-32 *Clinet*; 3 L-410UVP; 1 C295W

TRG 65: 15 K-8W *Karakorum**; 7 L-39ZA *Albatros**; 30+ PT-6; 13 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 2 Mi-17-1V *Hip H* (VIP)

TPT 19: Medium 11 Mi-171Sh; **Light 8:** 2 Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 *Koala*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5; PL-7; **SARH R-27R** (RS-AA-10A *Alamo*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900**Ansars 20,000+**

Security Guards

Rapid Action Battalions 5,000

Ministry of Home Affairs

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Other

14 paramilitary bn

Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious


1 rvn coy

Other

54 paramilitary bn

Coast Guard 900**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23**PSO 4 *Syed Nazrul* (ex-ITA *Minerva*) with 1 hel landing platformPCC 5 *Sobuj Bangla* (*Padma* mod)PB 9: 1 *Ruposhi Bangla*; 4 *Shaheed Daulat*; 2 *Shetgang*; 2 *Sonadia*PBR 5 *Pabna***DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 1,301; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 1,632; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn sqn; 1 hel coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 229; 1 FSGM**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 1,118; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 1,623; 1 inf bn; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 3**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 27; 1 fd hospital**Brunei BRN**

Brunei Dollar BND		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BND	16.6bn	21.0bn	
	USD	12.0bn	15.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	26,061	33,979	
Growth	%	1.1	2.0	
Inflation	%	1.9	2.5	
Def bdgt	BND	606m	610m	
	USD	439m	457m	
USD1=BND		1.38	1.34	



Population 471,103

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.4%	3.7%	4.2%	4.5%	22.0%	3.1%
Female	10.7%	3.6%	4.3%	4.8%	24.4%	3.2%

Capabilities

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are professional and well trained. In March 2021, the government's budget statement set out an acquisition plan including uninhabited aerial and undersea vehicles and tracked armoured reconnaissance platforms. In May 2021, the government published Brunei's fourth defence white paper in 17 years. C4ISR capabilities are being improved to offset the forces'

relatively small size, and the white paper advocates procurements to strengthen airspace control and harden C4 systems. There are also plans to develop a fully mechanised battalion. Under a long-standing bilateral arrangement, which currently extends to 2025, Brunei continues to host a British military presence including a Gurkha infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron and a jungle-warfare school. Brunei has a close defence relationship with Singapore and hosts a permanent Singapore Armed Forces training facility. There are regular bilateral exercises with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. The armed forces also take part in multinational exercises organised by the ADMM-Plus. Brunei has limited capacity to deploy forces abroad without assistance, but has nevertheless maintained a small deployment to the IMT in southern Philippines since 2004 and to UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2008. Brunei has no domestic defence industry and imports all its military equipment. In 2010, the Centre of Science and Technology Research and Development was established to conduct defence-technology research, and provide engineering and support services to the armed forces.

ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,400 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100 Special Forces 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400-500

RESERVE 700 (Army 700)**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 4,400****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Light

3 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn)

Reserves 700**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Light

1 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**LT TK 20 FV101 *Scorpion* (incl FV105 *Sultan* CP)

APC • APC (W) 45 VAB

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLESARV 2 *Samson***ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24****Navy 1,200****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9**CORVETTES • FSG 4 *Darussalam* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platformPCC 4 *Ijtihad*PBF 1 *Mustaed*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4: 2 *Teraban*; 2 *Cheverton Loadmaster*

Air Force 1,100

FORCES BY ROLE

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with CN235M

TRAINING

1 sqn with Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR)

1 sqn with Bo-105

1 sqn with S-70i *Black Hawk*

AIR DEFENCE

1 sqn with *Rapier*

1 sqn with *Mistral*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 1 CN235M

HELICOPTERS

TPT 21: **Medium** 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 8: 2 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; 6 Bo-105 (armed, 81mm rockets)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Rapier*; *Mistral*

Special Forces Regiment €500

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400–500

Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn(-)

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 31

PHILIPPINES: IMT 8

FOREIGN FORCES


Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg school; 1 hel det with AS332 *Super Puma*

United Kingdom 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212

Cambodia CAM

Cambodian Riel KHR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KHR	104tr	108tr	
	USD	25.2bn	26.1bn	
per capita	USD	1,607	1,647	
Growth	%	-3.1	1.9	
Inflation	%	2.9	2.5	
Def bdtg [a]	KHR	4.24tr	4.25tr	
	USD	1.03bn	1.02bn	
USD1=KHR		4108.91	4154.20	

[a] Defence and security budget



Population 17,304,363

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.0%	4.5%	4.1%	4.5%	18.9%	1.7%
Female	14.7%	4.5%	4.2%	4.7%	20.3%	3.0%

Capabilities

Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia's formal status as a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the former People's Republic of Kampuchea, and were established in 1979 following Vietnam's invasion. Cambodia faces no direct external military threats, besides border clashes with Thailand which last occurred in 2011. Internally, security concerns include civil unrest and transnational threats that can generate instability, such as drug trafficking. Cambodia's most important international defence links are with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, while relations with Russia also remain strong. Training ties have developed with China in recent years and exercises have grown in scale. Skirmishes on the border with Thailand since 2008 have provided little indication of capacity for high-intensity combat. However, Cambodia has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, including UNMISS in South Sudan. Cambodia lacks significant resources for personnel training, which is partly financed by Chinese military assistance. The RCAF has a large number of senior officers, while many formations and units appear to be of only nominal status. Funds for equipment purchases are limited, and most recent procurement has been from China. There is no domestic defence industry, with Cambodia possessing no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment for its armed forces.

ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 Provincial Forces 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000

Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not implemented since 1993

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €75,000

6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (Spec Ops Comd) AB/SF Bde

MANOEUVRE**Light**

2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde)

5 (Intervention) indep inf bde

8 indep inf bde

Other

1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn)

17 (border) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

4 fd engr regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (construction) engr regt

2 tpt bde

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55

LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63

RECCE 20+ BRDM-2

IFV 70 BMP-1

APC 230+

APC (T) M113

APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64

APC 15 *Tiger* 4x4

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

MW *Bozena*; RA-140 DS

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11

ARTILLERY 468+

TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/
122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I

MRL 68+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 48: 8 BM-21; ε20

PHL-81; 20 RM-70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20

BM-14-16 (BM-14)

MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10); FN-16 (CH-SA-14) (reported)

GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Navy €2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13**

PBF 4 Project 205P (*Stenka*)

PB 7: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m)

PBR 2 *Kaoh Chhlam*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1

LCU 1 Type-067 (*Yunnan*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1**Naval Infantry 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 (31st) nav inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

Air Force 1,500**FORCES BY ROLE****ISR/TRAINING**

1 sqn with P-92 *Echo*

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An-24RV *Coke*; AS350 *Ecureuil*; AS355F2 *Ecureuil II*

1 sqn with BN-2 *Islander*; Y-12 (II)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Z-9

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

TPT • Light 9: 2 MA60; 5 P-92 *Echo* (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) (2 An-24RV *Coke*; 1 BN-2 *Islander* in store)

TRG (5 L-39C *Albatros** in store)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 11 Z-9

TPT 4: Heavy (2 Mi-26 *Halo* in store); Light 4: 2 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 2 AS355F2 *Ecureuil II*

Provincial Forces 45,000+

Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000

Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 210; 1 engr coy

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 179; 1 EOD coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 289; 2 engr coy(-); 1 EOD coy


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 86; 1 MP coy

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

China, People's Republic of PRC

Chinese Yuan Renminbi CNY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CNY	103tr	113tr	
	USD	14.9tr	16.9tr	
per capita	USD	10,511	11,891	
Growth	%	2.3	8.0	
Inflation	%	2.4	1.1	
Def exp	CNY	€1.72tr	€1.81tr	
	USD	€256bn	€270bn	
Def bdgt [a]	CNY	1.30tr	1.39tr	
	USD	189bn	207bn	
USD1=CNY		6.90	6.70	

[a] Central Expenditure budget including local militia funding



Population 1,405,791,350

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.2%	2.9%	3.1%	3.7%	26.3%	6.1%
Female	8.0%	2.4%	2.7%	3.3%	25.5%	6.8%

Capabilities

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the world's largest armed force, with an increasingly advanced equipment inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training and doctrine issues. China's 2019 defence white paper did not significantly alter the strategic direction laid out in the 2015 edition and was focused more on updating the progress of PLA modernisation efforts. In 2021, amendments to the National Defence Law were passed, which handed decision-making powers fully to the Central Military Commission and removed the role of the State Council. A major restructuring process is now mostly complete and the Strategic Support Force continues to develop China's cyber, space and information-dominance capabilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does have a number of key defence relationships with regional states and through its membership of the SCO. In 2021, Xi emphasised that the SCO should play a special role in Afghanistan following the United States' withdrawal, though a military role for the PLA remains unlikely. China has also worked to develop defence ties with several African and Middle Eastern states. In 2021, the PLA's conscription pattern changed from once to twice a year, with a particular focus of recruiting university graduates and those skilled in science and engineering. Improving readiness for combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged and possibly being addressed, it is unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capabilities. In the short term, changes to roles and requirements for officers may have had a detrimental effect on morale within the PLA, as well as on its overall level of readiness. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its

support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs. The reduction in overall force size as part of the restructuring process has seen some older equipment designs withdrawn from service. China has an extensive defence-industrial base, capable of producing advanced equipment across all domains, although questions persist over quality and reliability.

ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 965,000 Navy 260,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces 120,000 Strategic Support Force 145,000 Other 150,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000

Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months

RESERVE €510,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Force) organises and commands its own troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic missiles and to conduct operations with conventional missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6 army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 ICBM bde with DF-4
- 3 ICBM bde with DF-5A/B
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-31
- 1 ICBM bde with DF-31A
- 3 ICBM bde with DF-31A(G)
- 2 ICBM bde with DF-41 (forming)
- 6 IRBM bde with DF-26
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-16
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-17 with HGV (forming)
- 6 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E
- 2 MRBM bde with DF-21C/D
- 3 SRBM bde with DF-11A/DF-15B
- 2 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A/CJ-100
- 5 SSM bde (forming)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

- ICBM • Nuclear** 116: €10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); €20 DF-5A/B (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); €8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); €24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); €30 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10 Mod 3); €24 DF-41 (CH-SS-20)
- IRBM • Dual-capable** 110+ DF-26 (CH-SS-18)
- MRBM 194: Nuclear** €80 DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6); **Conventional** 114: €36 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod 1/2); €24 DF-17 with HGV (CH-SS-22); €24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4); €30 DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM)
- SRBM • Conventional** 189: €108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7 Mod 2); €81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3)
- GLCM • Conventional** 108: €54 CJ-10/CJ-10A (CH-SS-9 mod 1/2); €54 CJ-100 (CH-SS-X-13 *Splinter*) (entering service)

Navy**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 6**

SSBN 6 Type-094 (*Jin*) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

Defensive**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars; some detection and tracking radars

Space**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SATELLITES 161**

COMMUNICATIONS 9: 2 *Shen Tong-1*; 3 *Shen Tong-2*; 2 *Feng Huo-1*; 2 *Feng Huo-2*

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 45: 3 *Beidou-2(M)*; 5 *Beidou-2(G)*; 7 *Beidou-2(IGSO)*; 24 *Beidou-3(M)*; 3 *Beidou-3(G)*; 3 *Beidou-3(IGSO)*

METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 8: 2 *Yunhai-1*; 6 *Yunhai-2*

ISR 32: 2 *Jianbing-5*; 4 *Jianbing-6*; 3 *Jianbing-7*; 5 *Jianbing-9*; 4 *Jianbing-10*; 3 *Jianbing-11/-12*; 4 LKW; 2 *Tianhui-2*; 2 *Yaogan-29*; 1 *Yaogan-34*; 2 ZY-1

ELINT/SIGINT 67: 30 *Chuangxin-5 (Yaogan-30)*; 18 *Jianbing-8*; 8 *Shijian-6* (4 pairs – reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 7 *Shijian-11* (reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 4 *Yaogan-32*

COUNTERSPACE • MSL SC-19 (reported)

Army €965,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

13 (Group) army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

15 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

34 (cbd arms) armd bde

Mechanised

3 (high alt) mech inf div (3 (cbd arms) mech regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

16 (cbd arms) mech inf bde

2 indep mech inf regt

Light

1 (high alt) inf div (3 (cbd arms) inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

25 (cbd arms) inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

2 air aslt bde

Amphibious

6 amph aslt bde

Other

1 (OPFOR) armd bde

1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt)

1 sy gd div (4 sy regt)

16 (border) sy bde

15 (border) sy regt

1 (border) sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

15 arty bde

9 engr/NBC bde

5 engr bde

5 NBC bde

1 engr regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

13 spt bde

COASTAL DEFENCE

19 coastal arty/AShM bde

AVIATION

1 mixed avn bde

HELICOPTER

12 hel bde

TRAINING

4 hel trg bde

AIR DEFENCE

15 AD bde

Reserves

The People's Liberation Army Reserve Force is being restructured, and the army component reduced. As a result some of the units below may have been re-rolled or disbanded

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 armd regt

Light

18 inf div

4 inf bde

3 indep inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty div

7 arty bde

15 engr regt

1 ptn br bde

3 ptn br regt

10 chem regt

10 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

9 log bde

1 log regt

AIR DEFENCE

17 AD div

8 AD bde

8 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 5,400: 600 ZTZ-59/-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; 200 ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A; 600 ZTZ-99; 600 ZTZ-99A

LT TK 750: 250 ZTD-05; 400 ZTQ-15; 100 ZTS-63A

ASLT 1,000 ZTL-11

IFV 7,200: 400 ZBD-04; 1,900 ZBD-04A; 2,500 ZBL-08; 600 ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B

APC 4,350

APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63; 200 ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD-89

APC (W) 1,650: 700 ZSL-92A; 900 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93

AAV 900 ZBD-05

AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; *Tiger 4*×4

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654

VLB MTU; TMM; GQL-110A (Type-84A); GQL-111 (HZQL75); GQL-321 (HZQL22); GQL-410; High Altitude VLB; HZQL-18; ZGQ-84

MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 1,100: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 200 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-02B

MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11; HJ-12

RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78; 105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98

GUNS 1,788

SP 480: 100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89

TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86

ARTILLERY 9,834+

SP 2,910: 122mm 2,140: 500 PLZ-89; 550 PLZ-07A; 150 PLZ-07B; 300 PCL-09; 550 PLL-09; 30 PCL-161; 60+ PCL-171; 152mm 150 PLZ-83A/B; 155mm 620: 320 PLZ-05; 300 PCL-181; (400 in store: 122mm 200 PLZ-89; 152mm 200 PLZ-83A)

TOWED 1,234: 122mm 500 PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 234 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I; 152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20); (4,400 in store: 122mm 2,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D-74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,600 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20))

GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10

MRL 1,640+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,415: 550 PHL-81/PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 100 PHZ-11; 30 PHL-20; 10+ PHL-21; 300mm 175 PHL-03; 370mm 50+ PHL-19; (700 in store: 122mm 700 PHL-81)

MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP 82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89

COASTAL DEFENCE

AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 *Silkworm*); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 *Seersucker*); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 *Sadsack*); YJ-62

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25

PB 25: 9 *Huzong*; 16 *Shenyang*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 255: 3+ *Yugong*; 50+ *Yunnan II*; 100+ *Yupen*; 2+ *Yutu*; approx. 100 *Yuwei*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22

AK 6+ *Leizhuang*

AKR 1 *Yunsong* (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel)

ARC 1

AOT 11: 1 *Fuzhong*; 8 *Fubing*; 2 *Fulei ATF 2 Huntao*

AX 1 *Haixun III*

AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 Y-8; 2 Y-9; Light 2 Y-7

HELICOPTERS

ATK 300+: 180 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19

MRH 208: 22 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 3 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 38 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*; 25 Mi-17V-7 *Hip H*; ε120 Z-9WZ

TPT 398: Heavy 111: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; 6 Z-8L; Medium 219: 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) *Black Hawk*; ε60 Z-20; Light 68: 15 H120 *Colibri*; 53 Z-11

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 5+ CH-4B

ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium BZK-006 (incl variants); BZK-007; BZK-008

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harpy*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 614+

Medium-range 200 HQ-16A/B (CH-SA-16)

Short-range 414: 24 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 30 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6); 200 HQ-7A/B (CH-SA-4); 140 HQ-17 (CH-SA-15); 20+ HQ-17A (CH-SA-15)

Point-defence HN-5A/B (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-1 (CH-SA-7); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS 7,396+

SP 396: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A; 30mm some PGL-19; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm 6 PGZ-88

TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR TY-90

ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10

Navy ε260,000

The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are three fleets, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Northern theatre commands

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 59

STRATEGIC • SSBN 6 Type-094 (*Jin*) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

TACTICAL 53

SSN 6:

2 Type-093 (*Shang I*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

4 Type-093A (*Shang II*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

(3 Type-091 (*Han*) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM/Yu-3 HWT)

SSK 46:

2 Project 877 (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

2 Project 636 (Improved *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT

8 Project 636M (Improved *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) AShM

4 Type-035B (*Ming*) with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT

12 Type-039(G) (*Song*) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

4 Type-039A (*Yuan*) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

14 Type-039B (*Yuan*) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

(10 Type-035(G) (*Ming*) in reserve with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT)

SSB 1 Type-032 (*Qing*) (SLBM trials)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 86

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2:

- 1 Type-001 (*Kuznetsov*) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)
- 1 Type-002 (*Kuznetsov* mod) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 32 J-15 ac; 12 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)

CRUISERS • CGHM 3 Type-055 (*Renhai*) with 14 8-cell VLS (8 fore, 6 aft) with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)

DESTROYERS 36

DDGHM 34:

- 1 *Hangzhou* (Project 956E (*Sovremenny* I)) (in refit) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80E *Moskit-E* (RS-SS-N-22A *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 2 *Hangzhou* (Project 956EM (*Sovremenny* II)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80MVE *Moskit-E* (RS-SS-N-22B *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3 A/S mor, 2 *Kashtan* (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 1 *Hangzhou* (Project 956E (*Sovremenny* III)) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-12A ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 1 Type-051B (*Luhai*) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-12A ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 2 Type-052 (*Luhu*) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)
- 2 Type-052B (*Luyang*) (of which 1 in refit) with 4 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil*-1 (SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)
- 6 Type-052C (*Luyang* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-62 ASHM, 8 8-cell VLS with HHQ-9 (CH-SA-N-9) SAM (CH-SA-N-9), 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7

LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

10 Type-052D (*Luyang* III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

3 Type-052D (*Luyang* III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

6 Type-052D mod (*Luyang* III mod) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) ASHM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9/Z-20 hel)

DDGM 2 Type-051C (*Luzhou*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM; 6 6-cell B-204 VLS with S-300FM *Rif-M* (SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FRIGATES 45

FFGHM 40:

- 4 Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 4 Type-053H3 (*Jiangwei* II Upgrade) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 1 Type-054 (*Jiangkai*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 1 Type-054 (*Jiangkai*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 16 Type-054A (*Jiangkai* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)
- 14 Type-054A (*Jiangkai* II) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A/Z-9C hel)

FFG 5:

- 1 Type-053H1 (*Jianghu* I) with 2 twin Inchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 *Safflower*) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
- 4 Type-053H1G (*Jianghu* I Upgrade) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS €196**CORVETTES • FSGM 72:**

22 Type-056 (*Jiangdao*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

50 Type-056A (*Jiangdao*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG €60 Type-022 (*Houbei*) with 2 quad Inchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS

PCG 24: 6 Type-037-II (*Houjian*) with 2 triple Inchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM; 18 Type-037-IG (*Houxin*) with 2 twin Inchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM

PCC 8+:

some Type-037 (*Hainan*) with €4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

some Type-037-I (*Haijiu*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun

€8 Type-037-IS (*Haiqing*) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor

PB €32 Type-062-1 (*Shanghai III*)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 57:

MCO 20: 4 Type-081 (*Wochi*); 9+ Type-081A (*Wochi* mod); 7+ Type-082II (*Wozang*)

MSC 16: 4 Type-082 (*Wosao I*); 12 Type-082-II (*Wosao II*)

MSD 21 Type-529 (*Wonang*) (operated by *Wozang MCO*)

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 9:**

LHD 1 Type-075 (*Yushen*) with 2 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 3 *Yuyi* LCAC; 800 troops; at least 60 AFVs; 28 hel)

LPD 8 Type-071 (*Yuzhao*) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 4 *Yuyi* LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 armoured vehs; 4 hel)

LANDING SHIPS 49**LST 28:**

4 Type-072-II (*Yukan*) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200 troops)

9 Type-072-II/III (*Yuting I*) (capacity 10 tk; 250 troops; 2 hel)

9 Type-072A (*Yuting II*) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)

6 Type-072B (*Yuting II*) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops)

LSM 21:

1 Type-073-II (*Yudeng*) with 1 twin 57mm gun (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops)

10 Type-073A (*Yunshu*) (capacity 6 tk)

7 Type-074 (*Yuhai*) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)

3 Type-074 (mod)

LANDING CRAFT 60

LCU 11 Type-074A (*Yubei*) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 troops)

LCM €30 Type-067A (*Yunnan*)

LCAC 19: 15+ Type-726 (*Yuyi*); 4 *Zubr*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 157

ABU 1 Type-744A

AFS 2: 1 Type-904 (*Dayun*); 1 Type-904A (*Danyao I*)

AFSH 2 Type-904B (*Danyao II*)

AG 7: 6 *Kanhai*; 1 *Kanwu*

AGB 2 Type-272 (*Yanrao*) with 1 hel landing platform

AGE 7: 2 Type-909 (*Dahua*) with 1 hel landing platform (weapons test platform); 1 *Kantan*; 3 Type-636 (*Shupang*); 1 *Yuting I* (naval rail gun test ship)

AGI 19: 1 *Dadie*; 1 Type-815 (*Dongdiao*) with 1 hel landing platform; 9 Type-815A (*Dongdiao*) with 1 hel landing platform; 8 FT-14

AGM 4 Type-718 (*Yuan Wang*) (space and missile tracking)

AGOR 2 *Dahua*

AGOS 4 *Dongjian*

AGS 8 Type-636A (*Shupang*) with 1 hel landing platform

AH 8: 5 *Ankang*; 1 Type-920 (*Anwei*); 2 *Anshen*

AOEH 2 Type-901 (*Fuyu*) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS

AORH 10: 2 Type-903 (*Fuchi*); 7 Type-903A (*Fuchi* mod); 1 *Fusu*

AOT 22: 4 *Fubai*; 16 Type-632 (*Fujian*); 2 *Fuxiao*

AP 4: 2 *Daguan*; 2 *Darong*

ARC 2 *Youlan*

ARS 18: 1 *Dadao*; 1 *Dadong*; 1 Type-922III (*Dalang II*); 3 Type-922III (*Dalang III*); 3 *Dasan*; 4 *Datuo*; 2 *Dazhou*; 3 *Hai Jiu 101* with 1 hel landing platform

ASR 6: 3 Type-926 (*Dalao*); 3 Type-925 (*Dajiang*) (capacity 2 Z-8)

ATF 14: €11 *Hujiu*; 3 *Tuqiang*

AWT 8: 4 *Fujian*; 3 *Fushi*; 1 *Jinyou*

AX 4:

1 Type-0891A (*Dashi*) with 2 hel landing platforms

1 *Daxin* with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 Type-927 (*Qi Ji Guang*) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 *Yudao*

ESD 1 *Donghaidao*

COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt)

Naval Aviation 26,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted brigade structure in 2017

BOMBER

2 regt with H-6DU/G/J

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with J-10A/S *Firebird*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*

1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*; JH-7A *Flounder*

1 bde with J-8F *Finback*; JH-7A *Flounder*

2 regt with J-15 *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK

1 bde with JH-7 *Flounder*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 regt with KQ-200

ELINT/ISR/ASW

1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; KQ-200

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500

TRANSPORT

1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700

TRAINING

1 regt with CJ-6A
 1 regt with HY-7
 2 regt with JL-8
 1 regt with JL-9G
 1 regt with JL-9
 1 regt with JL-10
 1 regt with Z-9C

HELICOPTER

1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31
 1 regt with AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH
 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D

AIR DEFENCE

2 SAM bde with HQ-9; HQ-9B; HQ-6A

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 446 combat capable

BBR 45: 27 H-6G/G mod; 18 H-6J
FTR 24 J-8F *Finback*
FGA 169: 16 J-10A *Firebird*; 7 J-10S *Firebird*; 72 J-11B/
 BS *Flanker L*; ε50 J-15 *Flanker*; 24 Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*
ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A *Flounder*
ASW 20+ KQ-200
ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB *High New 2*; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ
AEW&C 24: 6 KJ-200 *Moth*; 14+ KJ-500; 4 Y-8J *Mask*
TKR 5 H-6DU
TPT 38: **Medium** 6 Y-8C; **Light** 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6
 Y-7H; **PAX** 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700
TRG 118: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*;
 12 JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 32: 14 Ka-28 *Helix A*; 14 Z-9C; 4 Z-18F
AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31; 1+ Z-18 AEW
MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D
SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S
TPT 38: **Heavy** 30: 8 SA321 *Super Frelon*; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J;
Medium 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR Heavy BZK-005; **Medium** BZK-007

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Long-range 32: 16 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 16 HQ-9B (CH-
 SA-21)
Short-range HQ-6A (CH-SA-6)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*);
IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** PL-11; **ARH**
 R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*); PL-12 (CH-AA-7)
ASM KD-88
AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ-
 8K; YJ-83K; YJ-9
ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); YJ-91

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Marines €35,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised
 3 mne bde

Amphibious

3 mne bde

HELICOPTER

1 bde (forming) with Z-8C

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK 80+: ε80 ZTD-05; some ZTQ-15
ASLT ε50 ZTL-11
IFV ε150 ZBL-08
AAV ε240 ZBD-05

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8

RCL 120mm Type-98

ARTILLERY 40+

SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89
MRL 107mm PH-63
MOR 82mmε

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Heavy 5 Z-8C

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 (CH-
 SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

Air Force 395,000**FORCES BY ROLE****BOMBER**

1 regt with H-6M
 2 regt with H-6H
 4 regt with H-6K
 1 bde with H-6N (forming)

FIGHTER

2 bde with J-7 *Fishcan*
 5 bde with J-7E *Fishcan*
 5 bde with J-7G *Fishcan*
 2 bde with J-8F/H *Finback*
 2 bde with J-11A/Su-27UBK *Flanker*
 4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK *Flanker*
 2 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

6 bde with J-10A/S *Firebird*
 1 bde with J-10A/C/S *Firebird*
 2 bde with J-10B/S *Firebird*
 5 bde with J-10C/S *Firebird*
 1 bde with Su-35 *Flanker M*; Su-30MKK *Flanker G*
 5 bde with J-16 *Flanker*
 2 bde with Su-30MKK *Flanker G*
 1 bde with J-20A
 1 bde with J-11B/BS *Flanker L*; J-20A

GROUND ATTACK

6 bde with JH-7A *Flounder*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

4 regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ

ISR

1 regt with JZ-8F *Finback**
 1 bde with JZ-8F *Finback**

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 regt with KJ-500
 1 regt with KJ-200 *Moth*; KJ-2000; Y-8T

SEARCH & RESCUE

4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8
 1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8

TANKER

1 bde with H-6U

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) regt with A319; B-737; CRJ-200/700

1 (VIP) regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D

1 regt with Il-76MD/TD *Candid*

1 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*; Il-78 *Midas*

1 regt with Y-7

2 regt with Y-9

2 regt with Y-20/Y-20U

TRAINING

5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5

6 bde with J-7; JJ-7A

13 bde with JL-8; JL-9; JL-10

1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8C

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 (VIP) regt with AS332 *Super Puma*; H225

ISR UAV

2 bde with GJ-1; GJ-2

1 regt with WZ-7

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM div (3 SAM regt)

24 SAM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 2,475 combat capable

BBR 176: ε12 H-6A (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε100 H-6K; 4+ H-6N

FTR 517: 100 J-7 *Fishcan*; 120 J-7E *Fishcan*; 120 J-7G *Fishcan*; 50 J-8F/H *Finback*; 95 J-11; 32 Su-27UBK *Flanker*

FGA 972+: 220 J-10A *Firebird*; 55 J-10B *Firebird*; 180+ J-10C *Firebird*; 70 J-10S *Firebird*; 130 J-11B/BS *Flanker L*; 170+ J-16 *Flanker*; ε50 J-20A; 73 Su-30MKK *Flanker G*; 24 Su-35 *Flanker M*

ATK 140 JH-7A *Flounder*

EW 21: 2+ J-16D *Flanker**; 4 Y-8CB *High New 1*; 2 Y-8DZ; 6 Y-8G *High New 3*; 2 Y-8XZ *High New 7*; 3 Y-9G; 2 Y-9XZ

ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D *Careless*

ISR 48: 24 JZ-8 *Finback**; 24 JZ-8F *Finback**

AEW&C 19: 4 KJ-200 *Moth*; 11 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000

C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T *High New 4*

TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 *Midas*

TKR/TPT 3 Y-20U

TPT 247+ **Heavy** 51+: 20 Il-76MD/TD *Candid*; 31+ Y-20;

Medium 55+: 30 Y-8C; 25+ Y-9; **Light** 111: 70 Y-5; 41 Y-7/ Y-7H; **PAX** 30: 3 A319; 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-200; 5 CRJ-700; 8 Tu-154M *Careless*

TRG 1,012+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ-7A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 40+ JL-10*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT 31+: **Heavy** 18+ Z-8; **Medium** 13+: 6+ AS332 *Super Puma* (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** 12+ GJ-1; GJ-2; GJ-11 (in test)

ISR • **Heavy** 14+: 12+ WZ-7; 2+ WZ-8

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 832+

Long-range 608+: 180 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 80 HQ-9B (CH-SA-21); 100+ HQ-22; 32 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 *Grumble*); 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B *Growler*)

Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12)

Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6)

GUNS • **TOWED** • 57mm PG-59 (S-60)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IIR**

PL-10; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** PL-11;

ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*); R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (RS-AA-12B *Adder*)

ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*);

Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

AShM YJ-12

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*); YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant)

ALCM • **Conventional** CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63

BOMBS

Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2

TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Airborne Corps**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre

6 AB bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bde

TRANSPORT

1 bde with Y-5; Y-7; Y-8; Y-12

HELICOPTER

1 regt with WZ-10K; Z-8KA; Z-9WZ

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

ABCV 180 ZBD-03

APC • **APC (T)** 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)

AUV CS/VN3 mod

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP some HJ-9

ARTILLERY 162+

TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30)

MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63

MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** 40: **Medium** 6 Y-8; **Light** 34: 20 Y-5;

2 Y-7; 12 Y-12D

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 WZ-10K

CSAR 8 Z-8KA

MRH 12 Z-9WZ

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** QW-1 (CH-SA-7)

GUNS • **TOWED** 25mm 54 PG-87

Strategic Support Force ε175,000

At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was established by drawing upon capabilities previously exercised by the PLA's 3rd and 4th departments and other central functions. It reports to the Central Military Commission and is responsible for the PLA's space and cyber capabilities

Theatre Commands

In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were consolidated into five new theatre commands

Eastern Theatre Command

Eastern Theatre Ground Forces

71st Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

72nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

73rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Eastern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx. 35°10'N to 23°30'N), and to seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian, Zhoushan, Ningbo

18 SSK; 13 DDGHM; 17 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 30 FSGM; ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 3 LPD; ε22 LST/M

Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation

1st Naval Aviation Division

(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 ASW regt with KQ-200)

Other Forces

(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2; J-10A; 1 hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)

Eastern Theatre Air Force

10th Bomber Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6M)

26th Special Mission Division

(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-2000/Y-8T)

Fuzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde)

Shanghai Base

(1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 SAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)

Other Forces

Marines

(2 mne bde)

Southern Theatre Command

Southern Theatre Ground Forces

74th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

75th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))

Southern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30'N) to VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou

6 SSBN; 2 SSN; 13 SSK; 1 CV; 1 CGHM; 11 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; 1 FFG; 27 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; ε16 MCMV; 1 LHD; 5 LPD; ε21 LST/M

Southern Theatre Navy Aviation

3rd Naval Aviation Division

(1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500)

Other Forces

(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D; 1 SAM bde)

Southern Theatre Air Force

8th Bomber Division

(2 bbr regt with H-6K)

20th Special Mission Division

(3 EW regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ)

Kunming Base

(1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)

Nanning Base

(1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Other Forces

(1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 SAR bde; 1 UAV bde)

Other Forces

Marines

(1 spec ops bde; 2 mne bde)

Western Theatre Command

Western Theatre Ground Forces

76th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

77th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Xinjiang Military District

(1 spec ops bde, 3 (high alt) mech div, 1 (high alt) inf div, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 hel bde)
Xizang Military District
 (1 spec ops bde; 1 mech inf bde; 2 inf bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 hel bde)

Western Theatre Air Force**4th Transport Division**

(2 tpt regt with Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-20A)

Lanzhou Base

(1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde)

Urumqi Base

(1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Lhasa Base

(1 SAM bde)

Xi'an Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9A; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8)

Other Forces

(1 SAR regt)

Northern Theatre Command**Northern Theatre Ground Forces****78th Group Army**

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

79th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

80th Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Northern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10'N), and to seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao.

4 SSN; 16 SSK; 1 CV; 2 CGHM; 10 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 11 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 15 FSGM; 18 PCFG/PCG; 18 MCMV; 7 LST/M

Northern Theatre Navy Aviation**2nd Naval Air Division**

(1 EW/ISR/ASW regt with KQ-200; Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; 1 AEW&C regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500)

Other Forces

(1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; ; 1 hel regt with AS365N; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10)

Northern Theatre Air Force**16th Special Mission Division**

(1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 UAV regt with WZ-7)

Dalian Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7; 2 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A/C; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-11B/J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Jinan Base

(1 ftr bde with J-7G; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)

Harbin Flying Academy

(1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9)

Other Forces

(1 SAR bde)

Other Forces**Marines**

(2 mne bde; 1 hel bde)

Central Theatre Command**Central Theatre Ground Forces****81st Group Army**

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 (OPFOR) armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde)

82nd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

83rd Group Army

(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)

Other Forces

(2 (Beijing) gd div)

Central Theatre Air Force**13th Transport Division**

(1 tpt regt with Y-20A; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD; Il-78)

34th VIP Transport Division

(1 tpt regt with A319; B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel regt with AS332; H225)

36th Bomber Division

(1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H)

Datong Base

(3 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde)

Wuhan Base

(2 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde)

Shijiazhuang Flying Academy

(3 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-8; JL-10)

Airborne Corps

(6 AB bde; 1 tpt bde; 1 hel regt)

Other Forces

(1 bbr bde with H-6N; 1 SAR bde)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000+ active**People's Armed Police 500,000**

In 2018 the People's Armed Police (PAP) divested its border-defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower

and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with one or more mobile units

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

China Coast Guard (CCG)

In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the State Oceanic Administration to that of the People's Armed Police. The CCG is currently reorganising its pennant-number system, making it problematic to assess the number of vessels that entered service since 2019.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 524

PSOH 42:

2 *Zhaotou* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)

7 Type-054 mod (*Zhaoduan*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

3 Type-053H2G (*Jiangwei I*) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-PLAN)

4 *Shuoshi II* (capacity 1 med hel)

2 *Shucha I* (capacity 1 med hel)

10 *Shucha II* (capacity 1 med hel)

12 *Zhaoyu* (capacity 1 med hel)

1 *Zhaochang* (capacity 1 med hel)

1 *Zhongyang* (capacity 1 med hel)

PSO 49:

9 Type-718B (*Zhaojun*) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 Type-922 (*Dalang I*) (ex-PLAN)

1 Type-625C (*Hai Yang*) (ex-PLAN)

1 Type-053H (*Jianghu I*) (ex-PLAN)

1 Type-636A (*Kanjie*) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-PLAN)

6 *Shusheng* with 1 hel landing platform

3 *Shuwu*

3 *Tuzhong* (ex-PLAN)

4 Type-056 mod (*Zhaogao*) with 1 hel landing platform

1 Type-918 (*Wolei*) (ex-PLAN)

1 *Xiang Yang Hong 9* (ex-PLAN)

4 *Zhaolai* with 1 hel landing platform

14 *Zhaotim*

PCO 29: 1 *Shuke I*; 4 *Shuke II*; 14 *Shuke III*; 3 *Shuyou*; 4 *Zhaodai*; 3 *Zhaoming*

PCC 104: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 *Hailin I/II*; 1 *Shuzao II*; 14 *Shuzao III*; 10 *Zhongeng*; 2 *Zhongmel*; 7 *Zhongsui PB/PBF 300+*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 2

LST 2 Type-072-II (*Yuting I*) (ex-PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27

AG 6: 5+ *Kaobo*; 1 *Shutu*

AGB 1 Type-210 (*Yanbing*) (ex-PLAN)

AGOR 9: 4 *Haijian*; 3 *Shuguang 04* (ex-PLAN); 2 *Xiang Yang Hong 9*

ATF 11

AIRCRAFT

MP 1+ MA60H

TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role)

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light Z-9

Maritime Militia

Composed of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers.

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO 232; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD

GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 419; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 426; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 86; 1 hel flt


TAJIKISTAN: €300 (trg)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11

Fiji FJI

Fijian Dollar FJD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	FJD	9.75bn	9.46bn	
	USD	4.49bn	4.64bn	
per capita	USD	4,995	5,127	
Growth	%	-15.7	-4.0	
Inflation	%	-2.6	1.1	
Def bdgt	FJD	112m	94.9m	94.2m
	USD	51.8m	46.5m	
USD1=FJD		2.17	2.04	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 939,535

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.4%	4.0%	3.8%	3.9%	22.0%	3.6%
Female	12.8%	3.9%	3.6%	3.8%	20.9%	4.2%

Capabilities

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-dominated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has intervened heavily in Fiji's domestic politics and after a third coup in 2006, democracy was effectively suspended until 2014. Guidelines issued in 2018 emphasised the need to confront non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism and transnational crime. The RFMF is developing a deployable-force headquarters, funded by Australia, which will also administer and train personnel for peacekeeping and HADR roles. Engagement in international peacekeeping operations is an important source of revenue for the government. Fiji's principal defence relationships are with Australia and New Zealand, with which the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime patrols. Defence relations with China, South Korea and the US are growing, with all three countries providing training or donating equipment. The RFMF is attempting to improve the quality of senior NCOs and to raise standards across the rest of the force. Fiji has no significant defence industry and is only able to carry out basic equipment maintenance domestically. Significant upgrade and maintenance work is usually conducted in Australia.

ACTIVE 4,040 (Army 3,700 Navy 340)

RESERVE €6,000

(to age 45)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 3,700 (incl 300 recalled reserves)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops coy

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bty

1 engr bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 log bn

Reserves 6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

5 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 10 *Bushmaster* IMV

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12

Navy 340

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4:

PCO 1 *Guardian* (AUS *Bay* mod)

PB 3: 1 *Kula* (AUS *Pacific*); 2 *Levuka*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AGHS 2: 1 *Kacau*; 1 *Volasiga*

DEPLOYMENT

EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn

IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4


SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 151; 1 inf coy

India IND

Indian Rupee INR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	INR	197tr	225tr	
	USD	2.66tr	2.95tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,930	2,116	
Growth	%	-7.3	9.5	
Inflation	%	6.2	5.6	
Def bdtg [a]	INR	4.71tr	4.96tr	
	USD	63.5bn	65.1bn	
USD1=INR		74.23	76.24	

[a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military pensions

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 1,339,330,514

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.6%	4.6%	4.6%	4.4%	21.4%	3.3%
Female	12.1%	4.1%	4.0%	3.9%	20.3%	3.7%

Capabilities

India continues to modernise its armed forces, though progress in some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against both Pakistan and China, and violence on the western frontier with China in 2020 raised tensions. India is looking to improve military infrastructure on its northern border. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. New Delhi considers the Taliban victory in Afghanistan as increasing the threat from violent extremists. There is growing focus on Indian Ocean security. Large numbers of paramilitary forces remain employed in the internal-security role. Army doctrine issued in late 2018 identified requirements including for 'integrated battle groups' and improved cyber, information-warfare and electronic-warfare capabilities. A Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017, much of which was consistent with similar US and NATO doctrines. It set out doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and envisaged an 'emerging triad' of space, cyber and special-operations capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air capabilities. India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief of Defence Staff was appointed, which may improve

high-level coordination of military planning. India continues to operate significant quantities of equipment of Soviet as well as Russian origin, though recent imports of foreign equipment have primarily been from the US and France. Nonetheless, India is also interested in acquiring new Russian equipment, such as air-defence systems, and continues to develop the *Brahmos* supersonic cruise missile as a joint venture with a Russian missile design bureau. Indian personnel participate in numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. However, the overall capability of India's large conventional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance personnel. Though modernisation continues, many equipment projects have seen delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems. The government's 'Make in India' policy aims to strengthen the defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 1,460,350 (Army 1,237,000 Navy 70,900
Air 139,850 Coast Guard 12,600) **Gendarmerie &
Paramilitary 1,608,150**

RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air
140,000) **Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 941,000**

Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full-time service, further 500,000 have commitment to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces Command

Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a senior three-star military officer, manages and administers all strategic forces through army, navy and air-force chains of command

FORCES BY ROLE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 SRBM bde with *Agni* I
- 1 IRBM bde with *Agni* II/III
- 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 *Prithvi* II

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54

- ICBM • Nuclear *Agni* V (in test)
- IRBM • Nuclear ε4 *Agni* III; *Agni* IV (in test)
- MRBM • Nuclear ε8 *Agni* II
- SRBM • Nuclear 54: ε12 *Agni* I; ε42 SS-250 *Prithvi* II; some SS-350 *Dhanush* (naval testbed)

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 *Arihant* with 4

1-cell VLS with K-15 *Sagarika* SLBM, 6 533mm TT

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ALCM • Nuclear *Nirbhay*

(likely nuclear capable; in development)

Some Indian Air Force assets (such as *Mirage* 2000H or Su-30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 21

NAVIGATION, POSITIONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS

COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT-7/-7A

ISR 11: 8 *Cartosat*; 3 RISAT

ELINT/SIGINT 1 EMISAT

Army 1,237,000

6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, Southern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 4 (strike) corps HQ
- 10 (holding) corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 8 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 2 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt))
- 1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 SP arty bde (2 SP arty regt))
- 8 indep armd bde

Mechanised

- 6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 2 indep mech bde

Light

- 15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 1 inf div (forming)
- 7 indep inf bde
- 12 mtn div (3–4 mtn inf bde, 1 arty bde)
- 2 indep mtn bde

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 para bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 SRBM bde with *Agni* I
- 1 IRBM bde with *Agni* II/III
- 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 *Prithvi* II
- 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 *Brahmos*

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde)
- 2 indep arty bde
- 4 engr bde

HELICOPTER

- 25 hel sqn

AIR DEFENCE

- 8 AD bde

Reserve Organisations

Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000)

Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000 regular establishment)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

- 42 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 6 (Railway) engr regt
- 2 engr regt
- 1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 6 ecological bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 3,690: 122 *Arjun*; 2,418 T-72M1; €1,150 T-90S (€1,100 various models in store)

RECCE *Ferret* (used for internal-security duties along with some indigenously built armd cars)

IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 *Sarath* (incl some BMP-2K CP)

APC 336+

APC (W) 157+ OT-64

PPV 179: 165 *Casspir*; 14+ *Yukthirath* MPV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV BMP-2; FV180

ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT-3

VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; *Kartik*; MTU-20; MT-55; *Sarvatra*

MW 24 910 MCV-2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 110 9P148 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

MANPATS 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); *Milan* 2

RCL 3,000+: **84mm** *Carl Gustaf*; **106mm** 3,000+ M40A1 (10 per inf bn)

ARTILLERY 9,859+

SP **155mm** 100 K9 *Vajra-T*

TOWED 3,011+: **105mm** 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/Mk3; up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; **122mm** 520 D-30; **130mm** €600 M-46 (500 in store) **155mm** 541: €300 FH-77B; €200 M-46 (mod); 41 M777A2

MRL 228: **122mm** €150 BM-21/LRAR **214mm** 36 *Pinaka*;

300mm 42 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 6,520+: **81mm** 5,000+ E1; **120mm** €1,500 AM-50/E1;

SP **120mm** E1; **160mm** 20 M-58 *Tampella*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

IRBM • **Nuclear** some *Agni-III* (entering service)

MRBM • **Nuclear** €12 *Agni-II*

SRBM • **Nuclear** 42: €12 *Agni-I*; €30 250 *Prithvi II*

GLCM • **Conventional** 15 PJ-10 *Brahmos*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 343: 79 *Dhruv*; 12 *Lancer*; 74 *Rudra*; 118 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 60 SA316B *Alouette III* (*Chetak*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 25: 13 *Nishant*; 12 *Searcher* Mk I/II

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 748+

Medium-range €48 *Akash*

Short-range 180 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 520+: 20-80 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*); 50+ 9K33AKM *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 200 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*); 250 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS 2,315+

SP **23mm** 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted);

TOWED 2,240+: **20mm** Oerlikon (reported); **23mm** 320 ZU-23-2; **40mm** 1,920 L40/70

Navy 70,900 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200 Marines)

Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 17

STRATEGIC • **SSBN** 1 *Arihant* with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 *Sagarika* SLBM, 6 533mm TT

TACTICAL 16

SSK 16:

4 *Shishumar* (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT mod 1 HWT

1 *Sindhughosh* (FSU *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT

7 *Sindhughosh* (FSU *Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) (*Klub-S* ASHM variant unclear) ASHM/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT

4 *Kalvari* (FRA *Scorpène*) with 6 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • **CV** 1 *Vikramaditya* (ex-FSU *Kiev* mod) with 3 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 4 AK630M CIWS (capacity: 12 MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum* FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 *Helix A* ASW hel/Ka-31 *Helix B* AEW hel)

DESTROYERS 10

DDGHM 7:

2 *Delhi* (Project 15) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 *Dhruv* hel/*Sea King* Mk42A ASW hel)

1 *Delhi* (Project 15) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M38E M-22E *Shtil* (RS-SA-N-7 *Gadfly*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 *Dhruv* hel/*Sea King* Mk42A ASW hel)

3 *Kolkata* (Project 15A) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-8* SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Dhruv*/*Sea King* Mk42B hel)

1 *Visakhapatnam* (Project 15B) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-8* SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with *Varunastra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 *Dhruv*/*Sea King* Mk42B hel)

DDGM 3:

1 *Rajput* (FSU *Kashin*) with 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin ZIF-101 Inchr with 4K91 M-1 *Volnya* (RS-SA-N-1 *Goa*)

SAM, 5 single 533mm PTA-51-61ME ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varanustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

- 2 *Rajput* (FSU *Kashin*) with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 1 twin ZIF-101 Inchr with 4K91 M-1 *Volnya* (RS-SA-N-1 *Goa*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varanustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 *Helix* A hel)

FRIGATES 17

FFGHM 13:

- 3 *Brahmaputra* (Project 16A) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 3 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)/*Sea King* Mk42 ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational)
- 1 *Godavari* (Project 16) with 4 single Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)/*Sea King* Mk42 ASW hel)
- 3 *Shivalik* (Project 17) with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE *Klub-N* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM/*Brahmos* ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Sea King* Mk42B ASW hel)
- 3 *Talwar* I with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE *Klub-N* (RS-SS-N-27B *Sizzler*) ASHM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 *Kashtan* (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix* A ASW hel)
- 3 *Talwar* II with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with *Brahmos* ASHM, 1 single 3S90E Inchr with 9M317E *Shtil-1* (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/*Varunustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix* A ASW hel)

FFH 4 *Kamorta* (Project 28) with 2 twin 533mm ITTL ASTT with *Varunustra* HWT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*/Ka-28 *Helix* A ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 169

CORVETTES • FSGM 8:

- 4 *Khukri* (Project 25) with 2 twin Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for *Dhruv*/SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

4 *Kora* (Project 25A) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for *Dhruv*/SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

PSOH 10: 4 *Saryu* with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Dhruv*); 6 *Sukanya* with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor (capacity 1 SA316 *Alouette* III (*Chetak*))

PCFGM 8:

- 6 *Veer* (FSU *Tarantul*) with 4 single Inchr with P-27 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 2 *Prabal* (mod *Veer*) each with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCMT 3 *Abhay* (FSU *Pauk* II) with 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53 ASTT with SET-65E, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCC 15: 4 *Bangaram*; 10 *Car Nicobar*; 1 *Trinkat* (SDB Mk5)

PCF 4 *Tarmugli* (*Car Nicobar* mod)

PBF 121: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78); 13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa 1300 (SPB); 5 *Super Dvora*; 79 Solas Marine Interceptor

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1

Jalashwa (ex-US *Austin*) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVF; 930 troops)

LANDING SHIPS 8

LSM 3 *Kumbhir* (FSU *Polnochny* C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 APC; 160 troops)

LST 5: 2 *Magar* (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops); 3 *Magar* mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 12

LCT 8 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 *Arjun* MBT/2 T-90 MBT/4 IFV/160 troops)

LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in *Jalashwa*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43

AFD 2: 1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2

AGOR 1 *Sagardhwani* with 1 hel landing platform

AGHS 8: 1 *Makar*; 7 *Sandhayak*

AGM 1 *Dhruv*

AO 4 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge

AOL 10: 1 *Ambika*; 2 *Poshak*; 7 *Purak*

AOR 1 *Jyoti* with 1 hel landing platform

AORH 3: 1 *Aditya* (based on *Deepak* (1967) Bremer Vulkan design); 2 *Deepak* with 4 AK630M CIWS

AP 3 *Nicobar* with 1 hel landing platform

ASR 1

ATF 1

AWT 3 *Ambuda*

AX 1 *Tir*

AXS 4: 2 *Mhadei*; 2 *Tarangini*

Naval Aviation 7,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-28 *Helix A*

1 sqn with *Sea King* Mk42B

MARITIME PATROL

4 sqn with BN-2 *Islander*; Do-228-101

1 sqn with Do-228

1 sqn with Il-38SD *May*

1 sqn with P-8I *Neptune*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Ka-31 *Helix B*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*; *Sea King* Mk42C

1 sqn with *Dhruv*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M)

TRAINING

1 sqn with Do-228

1 sqn with HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI/II, *Hawk* Mk132*

1 hel sqn with *Sea King* Mk42B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with UH-3H *Sea King*

ISR UAV

3 sqn with *Heron*; *Searcher* MkII

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 76 combat capable

FTR 43 MiG-29K/KUB *Fulcrum*

ASW 16: 5 Il-38SD *May*; 11 P-8I *Neptune*

MP 13+ Do-228-101

TPT 37:

Light 27: 17 BN-2 *Islander*; 10 Do-228

PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M)

TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI; 6 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkII; 17 *Hawk* Mk132*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 32: 12 Ka-28 *Helix A*; 2 MH-60R *Seahawk*; 18 *Sea King* Mk42B

MRH 57: 10 *Dhruv*; 24 SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*; 23

SA319 *Alouette III*

AEW 11 Ka-31 *Helix B*

TPT • Medium 11: 5 *Sea King* Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H *Sea King*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 10: **Heavy** 4 *Heron*; **Medium** 6 *Searcher* Mk II

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-550 *Magic/Magic 2*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **ARH**: R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)

AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon* (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (RS-AS-20 *Kayak*; on *May* ac); *Sea Eagle* (possibly WFU)

Marines €1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB duties)

After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime infrastructure

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (marine) cdo force

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 amph bde

Air Force 139,850

5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern (Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance (Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

3 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with *Jaguar* IB/IS

6 sqn with MiG-21 *Bison*

3 sqn with *Mirage* 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – secondary ECM role)

2 sqn with *Rafale* DH/EH

11 sqn with Su-30MKI *Flanker*

2 sqn with *Tejas*

ANTI SURFACE WARFARE

1 sqn with *Jaguar* IM

ISR

1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Il-76TD *Phalcon*

TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78 *Midas*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster III*

5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE *Cline*

1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ

4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748

1 sqn with Il-76MD *Candid*

1 flt with HS-748

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI *Flanker*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-25 *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*

1 sqn with Mi-25 *Hind*; Mi-35 *Hind*; AH-64E *Apache Guardian*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

5 sqn with *Dhruv*

7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V *Hip H*

12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

2 sqn with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*

1 flt with Mi-26 *Halo*

2 flt with SA315B *Lama (Cheetah)*

2 flt with SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*

ISR UAV

5 sqn with *Heron*; *Searcher* MkII

AIR DEFENCE

25 sqn with S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3B *Goa*)

6 sqn with 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*)

2 sqn with *Akash*

10 flt with 9K38 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 777 combat capable

FTR 61: 54 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum B*
FGA 500: 109 MiG-21 *Bison*; 38 MiG-21U/UM *Mongol*; 38 *Mirage* 2000E/I (2000H); 10 *Mirage* 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 8 *Rafale* DH; 18 *Rafale* EH; 263 Su-30MKI *Flanker H*; 16 *Tejas* ATK 115: 28 *Jaguar* IB; 79 *Jaguar* IS; 8 *Jaguar* IM
ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
AEW&C 5: 2 EMB-145AEW *Netra* (1 more in test); 3 Il-76TD *Phalcon*
TKR 6 Il-78 *Midas*
TPT 243: **Heavy** 28: 11 C-17A *Globemaster* III; 17 Il-76MD *Candid*; **Medium** 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 141: 47 An-32; 55 An-32RE *Cline*; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; **PAX** 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
TRG 308: 101 *Hawk* Mk132*; 90 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkI/IA; 42 HJT-16 *Kiran* MkII; 75 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer* MkII

HELICOPTERS

ATK 39: 22 AH-64E *Apache Guardian*; 17 Mi-25/Mi-35 *Hind*
MRH 402: 60 *Dhruv*; 35 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 45 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 148 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*; 59 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 39 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*); 16 *Rudra*
TPT • **Heavy** 16: 15 CH-47F *Chinook*; 1+ Mi-26 *Halo*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Heavy** 9 *Heron*; **Medium** some *Searcher* MkII

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harop***AIR DEFENCE** • **SAM**

Medium-range 68: ε64 *Akash*; 4 MRSAM
Short-range S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3B *Goa*); *Spyder-SR*
Point-defence 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*) R-550 *Magic*; **IIR** *Mica IR*; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** Super 530D **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*); *Mica RF*
AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon*; AM39 *Exocet*; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); *Sea Eagle*†
ASM AGM-114L/R *Hellfire*; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); AS-30; *Popeye* II (*Crystal Maze*)
ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)
ALCM • **Nuclear** *Nirbhay* (likely nuclear capable; in development)

BOMBS

INS/SAT guided *Spice*
Laser-guided *Paveway* II

Coast Guard 12,600**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 136

PSOH 25: 2 *Sankalp* (capacity 1 *Chetak/Dhruv* hel); 4 *Samar* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Chetak/Dhruv* hel); 9 *Samarth*; 7 *Vikram* (capacity 1 *Dhruv* hel); 3 *Vishwast* (capacity 1 *Dhruv* hel)
PSO 3 *Samudra Prahari* with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 44: 20 *Aadesh*; 8 *Rajshree* (Flight I); 4 *Rajshree* (Flight II) 5 *Rani Abbakka*; 7 *Sarojini Naidu*

PBF 63: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 44 C-401

PB 1 *Priyadarshini*

AMPHIBIOUS • **UCAC** 18: 6 H-181 (*Griffon* 8000TD); 12 H-187 (*Griffon* 8000TD)

AIRCRAFT • **MP** 23 Do-228-101

HELICOPTERS • **MRH** 21: 4 *Dhruv*; 17 SA316B *Alouette* III (*Chetak*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150**Rashtriya Rifles** 65,000

Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

65 paramilitary bn

Assam Rifles 65,150

Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF

FORCES BY ROLE

Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn

COMMAND

7 HQ

MANOEUVRE**Other**

46 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • **MOR** 81mm 252

Border Security Force 263,900

Ministry of Home Affairs

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

192 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons

ARTILLERY • **MOR** 81mm 942+

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** some (air spt)

HELICOPTERS • **MRH** 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

Central Industrial Security Force 144,400
(lightly armed security guards)

Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations

Central Reserve Police Force 324,800

Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only lightly armed, deployable throughout the country

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

215 paramilitary bn

15 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn

10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn

6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female)

2 sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 sigs bn

Defence Security Corps 31,000

Provides security at Defence Ministry sites

Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450

Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/ guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

56 paramilitary bn

National Security Guards 12,000

Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, comprising elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border Security Force

Railway Protection Forces 70,000**Sashastra Seema Bal 79,450**

Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

73 paramilitary bn

Special Frontier Force 10,000

Mainly ethnic Tibetans

Special Protection Group 3,000

Protection of ministers and senior officials

State Armed Police 450,000

For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard infantry weapons and equipment

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn

Reserve Organisations**Civil Defence 500,000 reservists**

Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units for NBC defence

Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000 authorised str)

In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in Assam)

DEPLOYMENT

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,858; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 867; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,372; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl, 1 MP pl, 1 log coy(-)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES

Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan

Argentina 2

Croatia 8

Italy 1

Korea, Republic of 7

Mexico 1

Philippines 6

Romania 1

Sweden 4

Switzerland 3


Thailand 5

Uruguay 3

Indonesia IDN

Indonesian Rupiah IDR	2020	2021	2022
GDP	IDR 15434tr	16456tr	
	USD 1.06tr	1.15tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD 3,922	4,225	
Growth	% -2.1	3.2	
Inflation	% 2.0	1.6	
Def bdgt	IDR 118tr	120tr	134tr
	USD 8.10bn	8.40bn	
FMA (US)	USD 14m	0m	14m
USD1=IDR	14565.47	14306.19	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 275,122,131

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.8%	4.3%	4.1%	3.9%	21.6%	3.3%
Female	12.3%	4.1%	3.9%	3.7%	22.1%	3.8%

Capabilities

The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces – TNI) are the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia. They have traditionally been concerned primarily with internal security and counter-insurgency. The army remains the dominant service and is deployed operationally for counter-insurgency in West Papua and in a counter-terrorist role in central Sulawesi. A modernisation plan adopted in 2010 called for establishing a 'Minimum Essential Force' including strengthened naval and air forces by 2024. The

2015 defence white paper outlined Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' policy and advocated building up maritime, satellite and UAV capabilities. Some of these objectives were reflected in the 2020 State Defence Policy document. In 2018, Indonesia expanded its forces in the country's east and established a third naval fleet command and a third air-force regional command in that region. A new army reserve division and a third marine corps group were also established in the east. Indonesia has no formal defence alliances but there are a number of defence-cooperation agreements with regional and extra-regional partners. China has supplied some military equipment, including armed UAVs. The armed forces have contributed to UN and other international peacekeeping operations and exercise regularly with Australian and US armed forces and those of other Southeast Asian states. The TNI's inventory comprises equipment from diverse international sources, and the country uses technology-transfer agreements to develop its national defence industry which has significant capabilities in specific areas, including naval construction and the manufacture of transport aircraft and helicopters.

ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air 30,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000

Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised (not required by law)

RESERVE 400,000

Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for officers

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €300,400

Mil Area Commands (KODAM)

15 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Jaya & Iskandar Muda)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 armd cav bn

8 cav bn

1 mech inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 mech inf bn)

1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)

3 indep mech inf bn

Light

1 inf bde (3 cdo bn)

1 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn)

1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn)

2 inf bde (3 inf bn)

3 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 1 inf bn)

3 inf bde (2 inf bn)

24 indep inf bn

20 indep cdo bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

11 fd arty bn

11 cbt engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 construction bn

AVIATION

1 composite avn sqn

HELICOPTER

1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; Bell 412EPI

Twin Huey; AH-64E *Apache Guardian*

1 hel sqn Mi-35P *Hind*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit)

8 ADA bn

3 SAM unit

Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)

Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

3 div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 tk bn

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)

Light

2 inf bde (3 cdo bn)

1 inf bde (2 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

3 AB bde (3 AB bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 fd arty bn)

1 fd arty bn

2 cbt engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 103: 42 *Leopard* 2A4; 61 *Leopard* 2RI

LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76;

60 FV101 *Scorpion*-90

RECCE 142: 55 *Ferret* (13 upgraded); 69 *Saladin* (16 upgraded); 18 VBL

IFV 64: 22 *Black Fox*; 42 *Marder* 1A3

APC 834+

APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333 *Stormer*; 143 M113A1-B

APC (W) 567+: 350 *Anoa*; some *Barracuda*; 40 BTR-40; 45 FV603 *Saracen* (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150 *Commando*; 32 VAB-VTT

PPV some *Casspir*

AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 *Bushmaster*; 22 *Commando Ranger*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 4: 3 PiPz-2RI *Dachs*; 1 M113A1-B-GN

ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3 *Buffel*; *Stormer*; T-54/T-55

VLB 19: 10 AMX-13; 3 BPR *Biber*-1; 4 M3; 2 *Stormer*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; SS.11; *Milan*; 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

RL 89mm LRAC

ARTILLERY 1,238+

SP 87: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 67: 49 CAESAR; 18 M109A4

TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50 M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179

MRL 127mm 63 ASTROS II Mk6

MOR 955: **81mm** 800; **120mm** 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • **LST** 2 ADRI LI with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 8 MBT; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • **LCU** 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII; 1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2 ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 9: 1 BN-2A *Islander*; 6 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 2 *Turbo Commander* 680

HELICOPTERS

ATK 14: 8 AH-64E *Apache Guardian*; 6 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 51: 12 H125M *Fennec*; 17 Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (NB-412); 6 Bell 412EPI *Twin Huey*; 16 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT • **Light** 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120 *Colibri*

TRG up to 19 Hughes 300C

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 95+: 2 *Kobra* (with 125 GROM-2 msl); *Starstreak*; TD-2000B (*Giant Bow II*); 51 *Rapier*; 42 RBS-70; QW-3

GUNS • **TOWED** 411: **20mm** 121 Rh 202; **23mm** *Giant Bow*; **40mm** 90 L/70; **57mm** 200 S-60

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*

Navy €65,000 (including Marines and Aviation)

Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK 4:

1 *Cakra* (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT

3 *Nagapasa* (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with *Black Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7

FRIGATES 7:

FFGHM 5:

1 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin-cell VLS with 3M55E *Yakhont* (RS-SS-N-26 *Strobile*) ASHM; 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

2 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

2 *R.E. Martadinata* (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 *Millennium* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFHM 2 *Ahmad Yani* (ex-NLD *Van Speijk*) with 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr (manual) with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 136

CORVETTES 24

FSGM 7:

3 *Bung Tomo* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 18-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Bo-105 hel)

4 *Diponegoro* (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 quad *Tetral* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSGH 1 *Nala* with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 twin Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun (capacity 1 lt hel)

FS 16:

2 *Fatahillah* with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun

14 *Kapitan Pattimura* (GDR *Parchim I*) with 4 single 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun

PCFG 3 *Mandau* with 4 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 57mm gun

PCG 4:

2 *Sampari* (KCR-60M) with 2 twin Inchr for C-705 ASHM
2 *Todak* with 2 single Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 57mm gun

PCT 2 *Andau* with 2 single 533mm TT with SUT, 1 57mm gun

PCC 13: 4 *Kakap* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Pandrong*; 3 *Pari*; 2 *Sampari* (KCR-60M) with 1 NG-18 CIWS; 2 *Todak* with 1 57mm gun

PBG 8: 2 *Clurit* with 2 single Inchr with C-705 ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 6 *Clurit* with 2 single Inchr with C-705 ASHM

PBF 4 *Combat Boat AL D-18*

PB 78: 2 *Badau* (ex-BRN *Waspada*); 9 *Boa*; 1 *Cucut* (ex-SGP *Jupiter*); 4 *Kobra*; 1 *Krait*; 8 *Sibarau*; 32 *Sinabang* (KAL 28); 4 *Tarihu*; 13 *Tatihu* (PC-40); 4 *Viper*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8

MCO 2 *Pulau Rengat*

MSC 6 *Pulau Rote* (ex-GDR *Wolgast*)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 6:

1 *Dr Soeharso* (ex-Tanjung *Dalpele*) (capacity 2 LCU/LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L *Super Puma*) (used in AH role)

4 *Makassar* (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L *Super Puma*)

1 *Semarang* (IDN *Makassar* mod) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hel; 28 vehs; 650 troops) (used in AH role)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 23

1 *Teluk Amboina* (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops)

2 *Teluk Bintuni* (capacity 10 MBT)

2 *Teluk Cirebon* (ex-GDR *Frosch II*)

9 *Teluk Gilimanuk* (ex-GDR *Frosch*)

5 *Teluk Lada* with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCVP; 470 troops; 15 APC; 10 MBT)

4 *Teluk Semangka* (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 54

LCM 20
LCU 4
LCVP 30

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18

AGF 1 *Multatuli* with 1 hel landing platform
AGOR 2 *Rigel* (OSV 190)
AGOS 1 *Leuser*
AGHS 1 *Dewa Kembar* (ex-UK *Hecla*)
AGS 1 *Pulau Rote* (ex-GDR *Wolgast*)
AKSL 1
AORLH (1 *Arun* (ex-UK *Rover*) damaged at sea 2018, non-operational and in repair)
AOR 2: 1 *Bontang* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tarakan* with 1 hel landing platform
AOT 1 *Sorong*
AP 2: 1 *Tanjung Kambani* (troop transport) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Karang Pilang* (troop transport)
ATF 1 *Soputan*
AX 2 *Kadet*
AXS 3: 1 *Arung Samudera*; 1 *Bima Suci*; 1 *Dewaruci*

Naval Aviation €1,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

MP 28: 3 C212-200; 5 CN235-220 (MPA); 14 N-22B *Searchmaster* B; 6 N-22SL *Searchmaster* L
TPT • **Light** 33: 1 Beech 350i *King Air* (VIP transport); 8 Beech G36 *Bonanza*; 2 Beech G38 *Baron*; 17 C-212-200 *Aviocar*; 3 TB-9 *Tampico*; 2 TB-10

HELICOPTERS

ASW 11 AS565MBe *Panther*
MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) *Twin Huey*
CSAR 4 H225M *Caracal*
TPT 15: **Medium** 3 AS332L *Super Puma* (NAS322L); **Light** 12: 3 H120 *Colibri*; 9 Bo-105 (NBo-105)

Marines €20,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt regt, 1 CSS regt)
1 mne gp (forming)
1 mne bde (3 mne bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK 65: 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76†
RECCE 21 BRDM-2
IFV 114: 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4; 12 BTR-80A
APC 103: APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M
AAV 15: 10 LVTP-7A1; 5 M113 *Arisgator*

ARTILLERY 71+

TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38
MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 *Vampir*
MOR 81mm some

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; **57mm** S-60

Air Force 30,100

3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D *Fighting Falcon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*
1 sqn with Su-27SK *Flanker*; Su-30MK *Flanker*
1 sqn with Su-27SKM *Flanker*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker*
2 sqn with *Hawk* Mk109*/Mk209*
1 sqn with T-50i *Golden Eagle**

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) *Super Tucano**

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with B-737-200
1 sqn with CN235M-220 MPA; CN235M-110

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30; F-27-400M *Troopship*; F-28-1000/3000
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30
1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*
1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212/NC-212i)
1 sqn with C295M

TRAINING

1 sqn with Grob 120TP
1 sqn with KT-1B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with H225M; AS332L *Super Puma* (NAS332L); NAS332 C1+ *Super Puma*; SA330J/L *Puma* (NAS330J/L)
1 VIP sqn with AS332L *Super Puma* (NAS332L); SA330SM *Puma* (NAS330SM)
1 sqn with H120 *Colibri*

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Aerostar*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Only 45% of ac op

AIRCRAFT 108 combat capable

FTR 9: 7 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*; 2 F-16B *Fighting Falcon* (8 F-5E *Tiger* II; 4 F-5F *Tiger* II non-operational)
FGA 40: 19 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 5 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*; 2 Su-27SK *Flanker*; 3 Su-27SKM *Flanker*; 2 Su-30MK *Flanker* F; 9 Su-30MK2 *Flanker* G
MP 8: 3 B-737-200; 2 CN235M-220 MPA

ISR 1 C295M

TKR/TPT 1 KC-130B *Hercules*

TPT 53: **Medium** 19: 4 C-130B *Hercules*; 7 C-130H *Hercules*; 6 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 L-100-30; **Light** 25: 9 C295; 9 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212i); 5 CN235M-110; **PAX** 9: 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1 B-737-500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000

TRG 103: 15 EMB-314 (A-29) *Super Tucano**; 30 Grob 120TP; 7 *Hawk* Mk109*; 22 *Hawk* Mk209*; 14 KT-1B; 15 T-50i *Golden Eagle**

HELICOPTERS

TPT 37: **Heavy** 6 H225M (CSAR); **Medium** 19: 9 AS332 *Super Puma* (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 NAS332 C1+ *Super Puma*; 1 SA330SM *Puma* (NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J *Puma* (NAS330J); 4 SA330L *Puma* (NAS330L); **Light** 12 H120 *Colibri*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLESCISR • **Heavy** CH-4B (in test)ISR • **Medium** *Aerostar***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9P *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*);IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*; AR-2; Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-59T (RS-AS-14B *Kedge*)ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)**Special Forces (Paskhasau)****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn)

4 indep SF coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**SAM • **Point** *Chiron*; QW-3GUNS • **TOWED 35mm** 6 Oerlikon *Skysield***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000+**

Police €280,000 (including 14,000 police 'mobile bde' (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT unit (Gegana))

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC (W) 34 *Tactica*AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 6: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212); 1 C295; 1 *Turbo Commander* 680**HELICOPTERS**

MRH 1 Bell 412EP

TPT • **Light** 22: 3 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105)**KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence Command)**

Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency


EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37**PCO 7: 1 *Arda Dedali*; 3 *Chundamani*; 1 *Kalimasada*; 2 *Trisula*PB 30: 4 *Golok* (SAR); 5 *Kujang*; 6 *Rantos*; 15 (various)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** • ABU 1 *Jadayat***Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10**PSO 4: 3 *Pulau Nipah* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tanjung Datu* with 1 hel landing platformPB 6 *Bintang Laut* (KCR-40 mod)**Reserve Organisations****Kamra People's Security** €40,000

Report for 3 weeks' basic training each year; part-time police auxiliary

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 230; 1 engr coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 1,035; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 1,229; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 9**PHILIPPINES:** IMT 9**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 4**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 3**Japan JPN**

Japanese Yen JPY		2020	2021	2022
GDP	JPY	539tr	553tr	
	USD	5.05tr	5.10tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	40,089	40,704	
Growth	%	-4.6	2.4	
Inflation	%	-0.0	-0.2	
Def bdgt	JPY	5.31tr	5.34tr	5.45tr
	USD	49.8bn	49.3bn	
USD1=JPY		106.77	108.46	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

**Population** 124,687,293

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	6.5%	2.4%	2.5%	2.6%	21.9%	12.7%
Female	6.1%	2.2%	2.3%	2.4%	22.3%	16.1%

Capabilities

Japan's concerns over its regional security environment have heightened, as evidenced in its 2021 Defense White Paper. These principally relate to security challenges posed by a more assertive China and continued concern over North Korea. As a result, there have been defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative reforms designed to enable Japan to play a more active international security role and strengthen the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. While the JSDF's offensive capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-submarine warfare and air defence. In 2018, a Ground Component Command was created. An Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade has also been established, tasked mainly with the defence of remote islands. The *Izumo* helicopter carrier has completed the first stage of modifications to embark and operate fixed-wing aircraft, and in October 2021, F-35B aircraft from the US Marine Corps successfully landed on and took off from its flight deck. Final conversion work will take place in FY 2025, while JS *Kaga* will be fully modified in FY 2022. Japan is developing capabilities in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to develop a 'multi-domain defence force', based on the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2019-23

Mid-Term Defense Program. In 2020, a Space Operations Squadron was set up, with the aim of enhancing space situational-awareness capabilities. The Cyber Defense Group is to expand. Enhancing ballistic-missile defence remains a key priority. In December 2020, the cabinet announced that two vessels equipped with *Aegis* ballistic-missile-defence systems would be developed as alternatives to the cancelled land-based *Aegis* Ashore. Japan's alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by continued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all three services and regular training with US forces. Meanwhile, meetings with Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK have indicated efforts to expand security relations. Following a joint statement in March 2021 by the 'Quad' (Australia, India, Japan and the US), in which they reaffirmed their 'commitment to quadrilateral cooperation', the first-ever Leaders' Summit was held in September 2021. In November 2020, Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a Reciprocal Access Agreement, while India and Japan inked an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in September 2020. In September 2021, negotiations for a Reciprocal Access Agreement began with the UK. Japan has an advanced defence-industrial base. Defence exports have mainly consisted of components, though there are ambitions to secure more significant export deals; a notable development was the August 2020 contract to supply air-surveillance radars to the Philippines Air Force. Japan's ongoing military-procurement drive is focused on power projection, mobility and ISR. Budget documents also note research on a hypersonic glide body, new anti-ship missiles and research on advanced radar technology.

ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,200 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350)

RESERVE 55,900 (General Reserve Army (GSDF) 46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,000 Navy 1,100 Air 800)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 11

COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 *Kirameki-1*; 1 *Kirameki-2*
ISR 9 IGS

Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 army HQ (regional comd)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops unit (bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 indep tk bn

Mechanised

1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 hel sqn, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (6th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 mech inf regt; 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (5th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)

1 (11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)

Light

2 (1st & 3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Amphibious

1 amph bde (1 recce coy, 2 amph regt, 1 amph aslt bn, 1 log bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (1st) arty bde (1 SP arty regt (2 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 1 SP arty regt (1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 3 ASHM regt)

1 (Northwestern Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 ASHM regt)

1 (Western Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 MRL bn; 1 ASHM regt)

1 (Central Army) fd arty bn

4 engr bde

1 engr unit

1 EW bn

5 int bn

1 MP bde

1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

5 log unit (bde)

5 trg bde

HELICOPTER

2 sqn with MV-22B *Osprey* (forming)

HELICOPTER

- 1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn)
- 5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn)

AIR DEFENCE

- 2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp)
- 2 SAM gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

- MBT 579: 99 Type-10; 145 Type-74; 335 Type-90
- ASLT 123 Type-16 MCV
- RECCE 111 Type-87
- IFV 68 Type-89
- APC 804
 - APC (T) 226 Type-73
 - APC (W) 578: 197 Type-82; 381 Type-96
- AAV 52 AAV-7
- AUV 8 *Bushmaster*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- ARV 63: 5 Type-11; 28 Type-78; 30 Type-90
- VLB 22 Type-91

NBC VEHICLES 55: 34 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 21 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

- SP 37 Type-96 MPMS
- MANPATS Type-79 *Jyu-MAT*; Type-87 *Chu-MAT*; Type-01 LMAT
- RCL • 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 1,582

- SP 166: 155mm 135 Type-99; 203mm 31 M110A2
- TOWED 155mm 229 FH-70
- MRL 227mm 54 M270 MLRS
- MOR 1,133: 81mm 656 L16 120mm 453 RT-61; SP 120mm 24 Type-96

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 92: 30 Type-12; 62 Type-88

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8 Beech 350 *King Air* (LR-2)

TILTROTOR • TPT 7+ MV-22B *Osprey*

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 99: 50 AH-1S *Cobra*; 12 AH-64D *Apache*; 37 OH-1
- TPT 249: Heavy 53: 18 CH-47D *Chinook* (CH-47J); 35 CH-47JA *Chinook*; Medium 43: 3 H225 *Super Puma* MkII+ (VIP); 40 UH-60L *Black Hawk* (UH-60JA); Light 153: 123 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM 311+**

- Medium-range 130: 48 Type-03 *Chu-SAM*; 4 Type-03 *Chu-SAM Kai*; 78 MIM-23B *I-Hawk*
- Short-range ε44 Type-11 *Tan-SAM*
- Point-defence 137+: 46 Type-81 *Tan-SAM*; 91 Type-93 *Kin-SAM*; Type-91 *Kei-SAM*

GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87

Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300

Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES • SSK 22:**

- 11 *Oyashio* (of which 2 in trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/Type-89 HWT
- 11 *Soryu* (of which 9 fitted with AIP and 2 fitted with lithium-ion fuel battery; 1 other AIP-fitted boat non-operational following 2021 collision) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/Type-89 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 49**AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4:**

- 2 *Hyuga* with 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46/Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 3 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 *Seahawk* or 7 MCH-101)
- 2 *Izumo* (being converted to CVS) with 2 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM Inchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 7 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 *Seahawk*/MCH-101 hel)

CRUISERS • CGHM 4:

- 2 *Atago* with *Aegis* Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 2 *Maya* (*Atago* mod) with *Aegis* Baseline 9 C2, w quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS 35**DDGHM 29:**

- 8 *Asagiri* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 4 *Akizuki* with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 2 *Asahi* (*Akizuki* mod) with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 1 *Hatsuyuki* (trg role) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7F/M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112

- Inchr with ASROC A/S msl, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 9 *Murasame* with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)
- 5 *Takanami* (improved *Murasame*) with 2 quad Inchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* ASW hel)

DDGM 6:

- 2 *Hatakaze* (trg role) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 4 *Kongou* with *Aegis* Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun

FRIGATES • FFG 6 *Abukuma* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 Inchr with ASROC A/S msl, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6

PBFG 6 *Hayabusa* with 4 SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 22**MCCS 2:**

- 1 *Uraga* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101 hel)
- 1 *Uraga* with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101)

MSC 17: 3 *Hirashima*; 11 *Sugashima*; 3 *Enoshima*

MSO 3 *Awaji*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 *Osumi* with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 8

LCM 2 LCU-2001

LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24

AGBH 1 *Shirase* (capacity 2 AW101 *Merlin* hel)

AGEH 1 *Asuka* (wpn trials) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (capacity 1 SH-60 *Seahawk* hel)

AGOS 3 *Hibiki* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 3: 1 *Futami*; 1 *Nichinan*; 1 *Shonan*

AOE 5: 2 *Mashu* (capacity 1 med hel); 3 *Towada* with 1 hel landing platform

ARC 1 *Muroto*

ASR 2: 1 *Chihaya* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda with 1 hel landing platform

ATF 5 *Hiuchi*

AX 3:

- 1 *Kashima* with 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 1 *Kurobe* with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship)
- 1 *Tenryu* (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 med hel)

Naval Aviation €9,800

7 Air Groups

FORCES BY ROLE**ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE**

5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K *Seahawk*

MARITIME PATROL

2 sqn with P-1

2 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EP-3 *Orion*

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

1 sqn with MCH-101

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with *Shin Meiuwa* US-2

2 sqn with UH-60J *Black Hawk*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with AW101 *Merlin* (CH-101); Beech 90 *King Air* (LC-90); KC-130R *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Beech 90 *King Air* (TC-90)

1 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

1 sqn with T-5J

1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); SH-60K *Seahawk*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 73 combat capable

ASW 73: 29 P-1; 44 P-3C *Orion*

ELINT 5 EP-3C *Orion*

SAR 6 *Shin Meiuwa* US-2

TPT 24: **Medium 6** C-130R *Hercules*; **Light 18:** 5 Beech 90 *King Air* (LC-90); 13 Beech 90 *King Air* (TC-90) (trg)

TRG 30 T-5J

HELICOPTERS

ASW 83: 14 SH-60B *Seahawk* (SH-60J); 69 SH-60K *Seahawk*

MCM 10 MCH-101

SAR 9 UH-60J *Black Hawk*

TPT 18: **Medium 3** AW101 *Merlin* (CH-101); **Light 15** H135 (TH-135) (trg)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AShM ASM-1C (Type-90)

Air Self-Defense Force 46,950

7 cbt wg

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

7 sqn with F-15J *Eagle*

3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning II*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11EA

ELINT

1 sqn with RC-2; YS-11EB

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL2 sqn with E-2C/D *Hawkeye*

1 sqn with E-767

SEARCH & RESCUE1 wg with U-125A *Peace Krypton*; UH-60J *Black Hawk***TANKER**1 sqn with KC-46A *Pegasus* (forming)

1 sqn with KC-767J

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) sqn with B-777-300ER

1 sqn with C-1; Gulfstream IV (U-4)

1 sqn with C-2

1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; KC-130H *Hercules*

Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4*

TRAINING1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J *Eagle***TEST**1 wg with F-15J *Eagle*; T-4***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**4 flt with CH-47JA *Chinook***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 514 combat capable**FTR** 201: 156 F-15J *Eagle*; 45 F-15DJ *Eagle***FGA** 116: 64 F-2A; 27 F-2B; 25 F-35A *Lightning II***EW** 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA**SIGINT** 4: 1 RC-2; 3 YS-11EB**AEW&C** 18: 10 E-2C *Hawkeye*; 4 E-2D *Hawkeye*; 4 E-767**SAR** 26 U-125A *Peace Krypton***TKR/TPT** 7: 1 KC-46A *Pegasus*; 2 KC-130H *Hercules*; 4 KC-767J**TPT** 54: **Medium** 34: 14 C-130H *Hercules*; 8 C-1; 12 C-2; **PAX** 20: 2 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4)**TRG** 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7**HELICOPTERS****SAR** 39 UH-60J *Black Hawk***TPT** • **Heavy** 15 CH-47JA *Chinook***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM** • **IR** AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; **IIR**AAM-5 (Type-04); **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM-120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers)**AShM** ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93)**BOMBS****INS/SAT** **guided** GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser JDAM**Air Defence**

Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites

FORCES BY ROLE**AIR DEFENCE**6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3)1 AD gp with Type-81 *Tan-SAM*; M167 *Vulcan***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIR DEFENCE****SAM** 146+**Long-range** 120 M902 *Patriot* PAC-3**Short-range** 26 Air Base Defense SAM**Point-defence** Type-81 *Tan-SAM***GUNS** • **TOWED 20mm** M167 *Vulcan***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350****Coast Guard 14,350**

Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (no cbt role)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 383**PSOH** 18: 2 *Mizuho* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Mizuho II* (capacity 2 hel); 4 *Shikishima* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Shunko* (capacity 2 hel); 1 *Soya* (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking capability); 9 *Tsugaru* (*Soya* mod) (capacity 1 hel)**PSO** 48: 9 *Hateruma* with 1 hel landing platform; 3 *Hida* with 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Iwami*; 1 *Izu* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Kojima* (trg) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Kunigami* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Miura* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Miyako* with 1 hel landing platform; 6 *Ojika* with 1 hel landing platform; 18 *Taketomi* with 1 hel landing platform**PCO** 16: 3 *Aso*; 8 *Katori*; 5 *Teshio***PCC** 26: 4 *Amami*; 22 *Tokara***PBF** 50: 24 *Hayagumo*; 3 *Mihashi*; 15 *Raizan*; 2 *Takatsuki*; 6 *Tsuruugi***PB** 55: 4 *Asogiri*; 4 *Hamagumo*; 11 *Hayanami*; 15 *Katonami*; 1 *Matsunami*; 10 *Shimoji*; 10 *Yodo***PBI** 170: 2 *Hakubai*; 1 *Hayagiku*; 167 *Himegiku***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** 18**ABU** 1 *Teshio***AGS** 14: 6 *Hamashio*; 1 *Jinbei*; 2 *Meiyo*; 2 *Peiyo*; 1 *Shoyo*; 1 *Takuyo*; 1 *Tenyo***AX** 3**AIRCRAFT****MP** 4 *Falcon* 2000MSA**SAR** 4 Saab 340B**TPT** 26: **Light** 24: 5 Cessna 172; 10 Beech 350 *King Air* (LR-2); 9 DHC *Dash-7* (Bombardier 300) (MP); **PAX** 2 Gulfstream V (MP)**HELICOPTERS****MRH** 4 Bell 412 *Twin Huey***SAR** 12 S-76D**TPT** 37: **Medium** 12: 2 AS332 *Super Puma*; 10 H225 *Super Puma*; **Light** 25: 18 AW139; 4 Bell 505 *Jet Ranger* X; 3 S-76C**DEPLOYMENT****ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN:** MSDF: 1 DDGHM;**Combined Maritime Forces** • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM**DJIBOUTI:** 180; 2 P-3C *Orion***SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**FOREIGN FORCES****United States**

US Pacific Command: 55,600

Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 *Patriot* PAC MSE**Navy** 20,000; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18E *Super Hornet*; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F *Super Hornet*; 2 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 ELINT flt

with 2 EP-3E *Aries II*; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G *Growler*; 1 AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D *Hawkeye*; 2 ASW hel sqn with 12 MH-60R *Seahawk*; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S *Knight Hawk*; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka

USAF: 13,000; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena AB (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D *Eagle*; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R *Stratotanker*); 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B *Sentry*; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G *Pave Hawk*; 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa–Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J *Commando II*; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B *Osprey*); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 *Rivet Joint*; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A *Global Hawk*

USMC 20,000; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18A++/C+ *Hornet*; 2 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F-35B *Lightning II*; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC-130J *Hercules*; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B *Osprey*

US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of DPRK

North Korean Won KPW	2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD		
<i>per capita</i>	USD		
Def exp	KPW		
	USD		

USD1=KPW

*definitive economic data not available

Population	25,831,360					
Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.4%	3.5%	3.7%	4.0%	23.6%	3.4%
Female	10.0%	3.4%	3.7%	3.9%	24.0%	6.3%

Capabilities

Renewed diplomacy reduced overall tensions on the Korean Peninsula after 2018, though North Korea's observed actions remain inconsistent with de-nuclearisation. Aware of the qualitative inferiority of its conventional forces, North Korea continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery systems. A self-imposed 2018 moratorium covering nuclear- and long-range-missile tests technically remains unbroken, though the resumption of launch testing since 2019 has included several potentially dual-capable shorter-range missiles together with a medium-range SLBM. Pyongyang's ambitions to further diversify delivery systems were also indicated in September 2021 with flight tests of an apparent Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), its first known rail-based ballistic missile and what Pyongyang claimed was a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). Other new designs have been shown but as yet remain untested, including ICBM and additional SLBM designs. North Korea remains diplomatically isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by international pressure and sanctions,

Pyeongyang has nonetheless often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely. Training is focused on fighting a short, intense war on the peninsula, but the armed forces' overall effectiveness in a modern conflict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal exercises are conducted regularly, but those publicised are staged and are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability. North Korea's conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin equipment supplemented by a growing number of indigenous designs and upgrades, though the precise capability of some remains unclear. Overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equipment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile systems. North Korea has exported weaponry in the past. It is unclear whether the country would have had the capability to indigenously develop some of the technical advances it has demonstrated, including in rocket propulsion.

ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000

Conscript liability Army 5–12 years, Navy 5–10 years, Air Force 3–4 years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. Thereafter service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60

RESERVE €600,000 (Armed Forces €600,000), Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,700,000

Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces €10,000

North Korea describes its ballistic missile force as nuclear capable, although there is no conclusive evidence to verify the successful integration of a warhead with any of these systems

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (€)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

ICBM 10+: 6+ *Hwasong-14* (in test)/*Hwasong-15* (in test); 4+ *Hwasong-17* (under development); (Earlier *Hwasong-13/-13* mod designs untested and presumed cancelled)

IRBM 10+ *Hwasong-10* (*Musudan*) (status uncertain)/*Hwasong-12* (in test)

MRBM 17+: €10 *Nodong* mod 1/mod 2 (€90+ msl); some *Scud-ER*; 7+ *Pukgusong-2* (in test)

SBRM 69+: 30+ *Hwasong-5/-6* (RS-SS-1C/D *Scud-B/C*) (€200+ msl); 1+ *Hwasong-8* with HGV (in test); 9+ *Hwasong-11* mod (in test); 6+ *Scud* (mod) (in test); 17+ KN-23 (road & rail mobile variants); 6+ KN-23 mod 1 (in test)

GLCM some M-2021 (in test)

Army €1,100,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

10 inf corps HQ

1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 armd div
15 armd bde

Mechanised

6 mech div

Light

27 inf div
14 inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty div
21 arty bde
9 MRL bde
5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt
1 engr river crossing bde

Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

17 recce bn

Light

9 lt inf bde
6 sniper bde

Air Manoeuvr

3 AB bde

1 AB bn

2 sniper bde

Amphibious

2 sniper bde

Reserves 600,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

40 inf div
18 inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (€)**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

The Korean People's Army displayed a number of new armoured-vehicle designs at a parade in 2020, but it is unclear if any of them have entered operational service

MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/*Chonma*/*Pokpoong/Songun*

LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985

IFV 32 BTR-80A

APC 2,500+

APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323

APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/
M-2010 (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); M-2010 ATGM

MANPATS 2K15 *Shmel* (RS-AT-1 *Snapper*); 9K111 *Fagot*
(RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10

ARTILLERY 21,600+

SP/TOWED 8,600:

SP 122mm M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; **130mm**
M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; **152mm** M-1974; M-1977;
M-2018; **170mm** M-1978; M-1989

TOWED 122mm D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; **130mm** M-46;
152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943

GUN/MOR 120mm (reported)

MRL 5,500: **107mm** Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; **122mm**
BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-
323 122mm; **200mm** BMD-20; **240mm** BM-24; M-1985;
M-1989; M-1991; **300mm** some M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (in
test); **600mm** some M-2019 (in test)

MOR 7,500: **82mm** M-37; **120mm** M-43; **160mm** M-43

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SBRM 24+: 24 FROG-3/5/7; some *Toksa* (RS-SS-21B *Scarab*
mod)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Point-defence 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310
Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS 11,000+

SP 14.5mm M-1984; **23mm** M-1992; **37mm** M-1992;
57mm M-1985

TOWED 11,000: **14.5mm** ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; **23mm**
ZU-23; **37mm** M-1939; **57mm** S-60; **85mm** M-1939 KS-
12; **100mm** KS-19

Navy €60,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** 71

SSB 1 8.24 *Yongung* (*Gorae* (*Sinpo-B*)) (SLBM trials) with 1
Pukgukson-1 SLBM (status unclear)/KN-23 Mod 2 SLBM
(in test)

SSK €20 Type-033 (*Romeo*) with 8 single 533mm TT with
SAET-60 HWT

SSC €40 (some *Sang-O* some with 2 single 533mm TT
with 53–65E HWT; some *Sang-O* II with 4 single 533mm
TT with 53–65E HWT)

SSW €10† (some *Yugo* some with 2 single 406mm TT;
some *Yeono* some with 2 single 533mm TT)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2**FRIGATES** • FFG 2:

1 *Najin* with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*)
AShM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 100mm gun,
2 twin 57mm gun

1 *Najin* with 2 twin Inchr with *Kumsong*-3 (KN-SS-N-2
Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2
100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status
unclear)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 372+

CORVETTES • FS 5: 4 *Sariwon* with 2 twin 57mm gun;
1 *Tral* with 1 85mm gun (Two *Tuman*- and two *Amnok*-
class corvettes constructed since early 2010s; operational
status unknown)

PCG 10 *Soju* (FSU Project 205 mod (*Osa*)) with 4 single
Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) AShM

PCC 18:

6 Type-037 (*Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin
57mm gun

7 *Taechong* I with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 85mm
gun, 1 twin 57mm gun

5 *Taechong* II with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun

PBFG 31+:

4 *Huangfeng* (Type-021) with 4 single Inchr with P-15

Termit (RS-SS-N-2 *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

6 *Komar* with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM

8 Project 205 (*Osa* I) with 4 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

6 *Sohung* (*Komar* mod) with 2 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHM

1+ *Nongo* with 2 single Inchr with P-15 *Termit* (RS-SS-N-2 *Styx*) ASHM (operational status unknown)

6+ *Nongo* with 2 twin Inchr with *Kumsong-3* (KN-SS-N-2 *Stormpetrel*) ASHM (operational status unknown)

PBF 222: approx. 50 *Chong-Jin* with 1 85mm gun; 142 *Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung* (mod); approx. 30 *Sinpo*

PB 86: approx. 50 *Chaho*; 6 *Chong-Ju* with 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 85mm gun; 12 Type-062 (*Shanghai* II); 18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20

MSC 20: 15 *Yukto* I; 5 *Yukto* II

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 *Hantae* (capacity 3 tanks; 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 255

LCM 25

LCPL approx. 95 *Nampo* (capacity 35 troops)

UCAC 135 *Kongbang* (capacity 50 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23:

AGI 14 (converted fishing vessels)

AS 8 (converted cargo ships)

ASR 1 *Kowan*

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

2 ASHM regt with HY-1/*Kumsong-3* (6 sites, some mobile launchers)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE**

ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1

AShM HY-1; *Kumsong-3*

ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; **152mm** M-1937

Air Force 110,000

4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N, E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg) responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national airline

FORCES BY ROLE**BOMBER**

3 lt regt with H-5; Il-28 *Beagle*

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-15 *Fagot*

6 regt with J-5; MiG-17 *Fresco*

4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 *Farmer*

5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM *Fishbed*

1 regt with MiG-21bis *Fishbed*

1 regt with MiG-23ML/P *Flogger*

1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

Some regt with An-2 *Colt/Y-5* (to infiltrate 2 air-force sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); Il-62M *Classic*

TRAINING

Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mil-26 *Halo*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; Mi-4 *Hound*; Z-5

AIR DEFENCE

19 bde with S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 545** combat capable

BBR 80 Il-28 *Beagle/H-5*‡ (includes some Il-28 for ISR)

FTR 401+: MiG-15 *Fagot*‡; 107 MiG-17 *Fresco/J-5*‡; 100

MiG-19 *Farmer/J-6*; 120 MiG-21F-13 *Fishbed/J-7*; MiG-

21PFM *Fishbed*; 46 MiG-23ML *Flogger*; 10 MiG-23P *Flogger*; 18+ MiG-29A/S/UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 30 MiG-21bis *Fishbed* (18 Su-7 *Fitter* in store)

ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot*

TPT 205: **Heavy 3** Il-76 (operated by state airline); **Light**

ε200 An-2 *Colt/Y-5*; **PAX 2** Il-62M *Classic* (VIP)

TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM

HELICOPTERS

MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E (some armed)

TPT 206: **Heavy 4** Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium 63:** 15 Mi-8 *Hip*/

Mi-17 *Hip H*; 48 Mi-4 *Hound/Z-5*; **Light 139** PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type);

Light *Pchela-1* (*Shmel*) (reported)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 209+

Long-range 10 S-200 *Angara*‡ (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*)

Medium-range 179+: some *Pongae-5* (KN-SA-X-01) (status unknown); 179+ S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)

Short-range ε20 S-125M1 *Pechora-M1*‡ (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5; PL-7; **SARH R-23/24**

(RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10 A/C *Alamo*)

ASM Kh-23 (RS-AS-7 *Kerry*)‡; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*);

Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A *Kedge*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 active

Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, public-safety personnel)


Ministry of Public Security

Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 reservists

Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns (but many units unarmed)

Korea, Republic of ROK

South Korean Won KRW		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KRW	1933tr	2069tr	
	USD	1.64tr	1.82tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	31,638	35,196	
Growth	%	-0.9	4.3	
Inflation	%	0.5	2.2	
Def bdtg	KRW	48.4tr	52.9tr	55.2tr
	USD	41.0bn	46.7bn	
USD1=KRW		1180.00	1134.35	



Population 51,715,162

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	6.2%	2.4%	3.2%	3.8%	27.2%	7.3%
Female	5.8%	2.2%	3.0%	3.3%	26.1%	9.5%

Capabilities

South Korea's forces are some of the best equipped and trained in the region. Defence policy remains focused on North Korea, and Seoul continues to prioritise developing new capabilities to respond to the nuclear and conventional threat from the DPRK. The Defense Reform 2.0 project announced in 2018 sets out ambitions to modernise, restructure and re-equip the armed forces, placing emphasis on new technologies. In early 2019, the three-axis defence strategy comprising 'Kill Chain', 'Korea Air and Missile Defense' and 'Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation' components was reportedly rebranded. The 2020 defence white paper, released in February 2021, detailed plans to tackle North Korea's missile threats through a 'four-Ds strategy' of detect, disrupt, destroy and defend. The long-established alliance with the US is a central element of defence strategy. The planned transfer of wartime operational control of forces to Seoul is now 'conditions based' with no firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equipment remain stationed in South Korea, along with THAAD missile-defence systems. South Korea has demonstrated the capacity to support small international deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The equipment inventory increasingly comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a substantial domestic defence industry which supplies a large proportion of equipment requirements, although some equipment – notably the F-35 combat aircraft – is still procured from the US. Local defence companies are finding growing export success.

ACTIVE 555,000 (Army 420,000 Navy 70,000 Air 65,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500

Conscript liability Service period reducing from Oct 2018, by three months for the army and marines (now 18 months), and the navy (now 20 months); and by two months for the air force (now 22 months)

RESERVE 3,100,000

Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Home-land Defence Forces) to age 33

Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000

Being reorganised

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 *Anasis*

Army 420,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

8 corps HQ
1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Special Warfare) SF comd (1 SF gp; 6 spec ops bde)
6 cdo regt
2 indep cdo bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

7 armd bde
1 (Capital) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 2 armd bde, 1 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)
1 (8th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)
1 (11th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 3 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn)

2 tk bn

Light

15 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)
2 indep inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air mob div (2 cdo bde)
1 air aslt bde

Other

5 sy regt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

3 SSM bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

6 arty bde
1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn)
6 engr bde
5 engr gp
1 CBRN defence bde
8 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 log spt comd

HELICOPTER

1 (army avn) comd

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA bde
5 ADA bn

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 army HQ

MANOEUVRE**Light**

24 inf div

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 2,074: 1,000 K1/K1E1; 484 K1A1/K1A2; ε150 K2; ε400 M48A5; 40 T-80U

IFV 540: ε500 K21; 40 BMP-3

APC 2,490

APC (T) 2,260: 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140 M577 (CP)

APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 K806/K808

PPV 10 *MaxxPro*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 207 M9

ARV 238+: 200 K1; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1

VLB 56 K1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP *Hyeongung*

MANPATS 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); *Hyeongung*; TOW-2A

RCL 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2

GUNS 58

SP 90mm 50 M36

TOWED 76mm 8 M18 *Hellcat* (AT gun)

ARTILLERY 12,128+

SP 2,330: 105mm ε50 K105A1; 155mm 2,280: ε1,240 K9/K9A1 *Thunder*; 1,040 M109A2 (K55/K55A1)

TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178; 155mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114

MRL 298: 130mm ε40 K136 *Kooryong*; 227mm 58: 48 M270

MLRS; 10 M270A1 **MLRS**; 239mm ε200 K239 *Cheonmu*

MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 30+: 30 *Hyonmu* IIA/IIB; MGM-140A/B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 **MLRS**)

GLCM • Conventional *Hyonmu* III

HELICOPTERS

ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J *Cobra*; 36 AH-64E *Apache*

MRH 175: 130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500

TPT 236+: **Heavy** 37: 31 CH-47D *Chinook*; 6 MH-47E *Chinook*; **Medium** 187+: 100+ KUH-1 *Surion*; 87 UH-60P *Black Hawk*; **Light** 12 Bo-105

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Chiron*; *Chun Ma* (*Pegasus*); FIM-92 *Stinger*; *Javelin*; *Mistral*; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 477+

SP 317: 20mm ε150 KIFV *Vulcan* SPAAG; 30mm 167 K30 *Biho*

TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 *Vulcan*; 35mm 20 GDF-003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114R1 *Hellfire*

Navy 70,000 (incl marines)

Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); 3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF,

mine-warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 19

SSB 1 *Chang Bogo* III (Batch I (GER Type-214 mod; KSS-III)) (fitted with AIP) with 6 SLBM (likely based on *Hyeonmu-II*B), 8 single 533mm TT with K731 *White Shark*

SSK 18:

6 *Chang Bogo* I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

3 *Chang Bogo* I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

9 *Chang Bogo* II (GER Type-214; KSS-2) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with *Hae Sung* III LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASHM/SUT HWT/K731 *White Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26**CRUISERS • CGHM** 3:

3 *Sejong* (KDD-III) with *Aegis* Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 4 quad Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 10 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (6 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6 *Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin* (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/*Hae Sung* I ASHM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

FRIGATES 17**FFGHM** 13:

3 *Gwanggaeto Daewang* (KDD-I) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMK. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

6 *Incheon* with 2 quad Inchr with TSLM LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASHM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 Inchr with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMK. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127 mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

4 *Daegu* (*Incheon* Batch II)† (limited serviceability due to faulty propulsion system) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with *Hae Sung* II LACM/TSLM LACM/*Haegung* (K-SAAM) SAM/*Red Shark* A/S msl, 2 quad Inchr with TSLM LACM/*Hae Sung* I ASHM, 2 triple 324mm KMK. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Lynx* Mk99/AW159 *Wildcat* hel)

FFG 4 *Ulsan* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS €78**CORVETTES • FSG 10:**

- 5 *Po Hang* (Flight IV) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun
- 5 *Po Hang* (Flight V) with 2 twin Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 2 76mm gun

PCFG 22: 18 *Gumdoksuri* with 2 twin Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 1 76mm gun; 4 *Chamsuri* II with 1 12-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun

PBF €46 *Sea Dolphin*

MINE WARFARE 11**MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9**

MHO 6 *Kan Kyeong*

MSO 3 *Yang Yang*

MINELAYERS • ML 2:

- 1 *Won San* with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT/K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
- 1 *Nampo* (MLS-II) with 1 4-cell K-VLS VLS with *Haegung* (K-SAAM) SAM, 2 triple KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

AMPHIBIOUS**PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 6****LHD 2:**

- 1 *Dokdo* with 1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 *Goalkeeper* CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700 troops; 10 UH-60 hel)
- 1 *Marado* (*Dokdo* mod) with 1 4-cell K-VLS with K-SAAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 6 MBT, 7 AAV-7A1, 720 troops; 7-12 hels)

LPD 4 *Cheonwangbong* (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8 AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 *Go Jun Bong* with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 25

LCU 7+ *Mulgae* I

LCT 3 *Mulgae* II

LCM 10 LCM-8

LCAC 5: 3 *Tsaphya* (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-II (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11

AG 1 *Sunjin* (trials spt)

AOEH 1 *Soyangham* (AOE-II) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS (capacity 1 med hel)

AORH 3 *Chun Jee*

ARS 1 *Cheong Hae Jin*

ATS 2 *Tongyeong*

AX 3: 1 *Hansando* with 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 *Blue Shark* LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with K-VLS) (capacity 2 med hels; 300 students); 2 MTB

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable

ASW 16: 8 P-3C *Orion*; 8 P-3CK *Orion*

TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 *Caravan* II

HELICOPTERS

ASW 31: 11 *Lynx* Mk99; 12 *Lynx* Mk99A; 8 AW159 *Wildcat*

TPT 15: **Medium** 8 UH-60P *Black Hawk* **Light** 7 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

Marines 29,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne bde, 1 amph bn, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn)

1 mne bde (1 recce coy, 4 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)

1 mne bde (3 mne bn, 1 fd arty bn)

1 mne BG (1 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 100: 50 K1A1; 50 M48A3

AAV 166 AAV-7A1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP *Spike* NLOS

MANPATS *Hyeongung*

ARTILLERY 238

SP • 155mm 80: €40 K9 *Thunder*; €20 K9A1 *Thunder*; €20 M109A2 (K55/K55A1)

TOWED 140: **105mm** €20 M101; **155mm** €120 KH-179

MRL • 239mm 18 K239 *Cheonmu*

MOR 81mm KM29 (M29)

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM RGM-84A *Harpoon* (truck mounted)

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 5+ MUH-1 *Surion*

AIR DEFENCE

GUNS • Towed • 20mm M167 *Vulcan* (direct fire role)

Naval Special Warfare Flotilla**Air Force 65,000**

4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with F-4E *Phantom* II

5 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger* II

3 sqn with F-15K *Eagle*

8 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C/D)

2 sqn with F-35A *Lightning* II

3 sqn with FA-50 *Fighting Eagle*

ISR

1 wg with KO-1

1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C/D)

SIGINT

1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with B-737 AEW

SEARCH & RESCUE

2 sqn with AS332L *Super Puma*; Bell 412EP; HH-47D *Chinook*; HH-60P *Black Hawk*; Ka-32 *Helix* C

TANKER

1 sqn with A330 MRTT

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN235-220; S-92A *Superhawk*; VH-60P *Black Hawk* (VIP)
3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 *Hercules*
2 sqn with CN235M-100/220

TRAINING

1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*
1 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*
4 sqn with KT-1
1 sqn with KT-100
3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 *Golden Eagle**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with UH-60P *Black Hawk* (Spec Ops)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with RQ-4B *Global Hawk* (forming)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF sqn

AIR DEFENCE

3 AD bde (total: 6 SAM bn with *Chunggung*; 2 SAM bn with M902 *Patriot PAC-3 CRI*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 601 combat capable

FTR 174: 142 F-5E *Tiger II*; 32 F-5F *Tiger II*
FGA 347: 30 F-4E *Phantom II*; 59 F-15K *Eagle*; 118 F-16C *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16C); 44 F-16D *Fighting Falcon* (KF-16D); 36 F-35A *Lightning II*; 60 FA-50 *Fighting Eagle*
AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW
ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1
SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 *Falcon* 2000 (COMINT/SIGINT)

TKR/TPT 4 A330 MRTT

TPT 38: **Medium** 16: 8 C-130H *Hercules*; 4 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 4 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 20: 12 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-220 (incl 2 VIP); **PAX** 2: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-747-400

TRG 183: 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 *Golden Eagle**; 9 T-50B *Black Eagle** (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 *Golden Eagle**; ε20 KT-100

HELICOPTERS

SAR 16: 5 HH-47D *Chinook*; 11 HH-60P *Black Hawk*

MRH 3 Bell 412EP

TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L *Super Puma*; 8 Ka-32 *Helix* C; 3 S-92A *Super Hawk*; 7 UH-60P *Black Hawk*; 10 VH-60P *Black Hawk* (VIP)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 7+: **Heavy** 4 RQ-4B *Global Hawk*; **Medium** 3+: some *Night Intruder*; 3 *Searcher*

LOITERING MUNITIONS 100 *Harpy***AIR DEFENCE • SAM** 120

Long-range 48 M902 *Patriot PAC-3 CRI*

Medium-range 72 *Chunggung* (KM-SAM)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120B/C-5/7

AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65A *Maverick*; AGM-130

AShM AGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II; AGM-142 *Popeye*

ARM AGM-88 **HARM**

ALCM AGM-84H **SLAM-ER**; KEPD-350 *Taurus*

BOMBS • Laser-guided *Paveway II***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** 13,500 active**Civilian Defence Corps** 3,000,000 reservists (to age 50)**Coast Guard** 13,500

Part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Five regional headquarters with 19 coastguard stations and one guard unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 111

PSOH 16: 1 *Lee Cheong-ho* with 1 76mm gun; 1 *Sambongho*; 14 *Tae Pung Yang* with 1 med hel

PSO 21: 3 *Han Kang* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 5 *Han Kang II* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 12 *Jaemin* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Sumjinkang*

PCO 23 *Tae Geuk*

PCC 21: 4 *Hae Uri*; 15 *Hae Uri II*; 2 *Hae Uri III*

PB 30: 26 *Haenuri*; ε4 (various)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8

UCAC 8: 1 BHT-150; 4 *Griffon* 470TD; 3 *Griffon* 8000TD

AIRCRAFT

MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA

TPT • PAX 1 CL-604

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7: 5 AS565MB *Panther*; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP

SAR 2 S-92

TPT • Medium 10: 8 Ka-32 *Helix* C; 2 KUH-1 *Surion*

DEPLOYMENT

ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 255; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 274; 1 engr coy

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School)

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

FOREIGN FORCES

Sweden NNSC: 5

Switzerland NNSC: 5

United States US Pacific Command: 30,400

Army 21,500; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 *Abrams*; M2A3/M3A3 *Bradley*; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64D/E *Apache*; CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60L/M *Black Hawk*; 1 MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with M902 *Patriot PAC-3/FIM-92A Avenger*; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set

Navy 350

USAF 8,350; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*); 1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D *Fighting*

Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C *Thunderbolt II*); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S
USMC 200

Laos LAO

Lao Kip LAK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LAK	170tr	183tr	
	USD	18.8bn	19.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,587	2,626	
Growth	%	-0.4	2.1	
Inflation	%	5.1	4.9	
Def exp	LAK	n.k.	n.k.	
	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
USD1=LAK		9058.06	9421.03	

Population 7,574,356

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.6%	5.1%	5.0%	4.5%	17.4%	2.0%
Female	15.3%	5.1%	5.1%	4.6%	17.9%	2.4%

Capabilities

The Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) are closely linked to the ruling Communist Party and their primary role is internal security. Their main operational experience dates from the Second Indo-China War and the 1988 border war with Thailand. Defence spending and military procurement have been constrained for the last two decades. Contacts continue with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, and there is defence cooperation with Russia. Training support has been provided by Russia and Vietnam. The LPAF have participated in exercises, including those organised by the ADMM-Plus, with other regional countries and international partners. However, they have made no international deployments and have little capacity for sustained operations. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment and relies on Russian supplies, as illustrated by ongoing deliveries of training aircraft, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and main battle tanks. The country lacks a traditional defence-industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited, reflected in a support contract with a Russian firm for helicopter maintenance in 2016.

ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000

Conscript liability 18 months minimum

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1

Army 25,600

FORCES BY ROLE

4 mil regions

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

5 inf div

7 indep inf regt

65 indep inf coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bn

1 engr regt

2 (construction) engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

9 ADA bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72B1

LT TK 10 PT-76

RECCE BRDM-2M

IFV 10+ BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152

AUV Dongfeng Mengshi 4x4; ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

VLB MTU

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm

M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11

ARTILLERY 62+

TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30

M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114

MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm

M-43

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 6+: 6 S-125M *Pechora-M+* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); some *Yitian* (CH-SA-13)

Point-defence 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm

M-1939; 57mm S-60

Army Marine Section €600

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some

AMPHIBIOUS • LCM some

Air Force 3,500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 *Hip H*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

TPT • Light 5: 1 An-74TK *Coaler*; 2 MA60; 2 MA600

TRG 4 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 5 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 4 Z-9A

TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T *Helix C*; Light 3 SA360 *Dauphin*


Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+

Village 'home guard' or local defence

Malaysia MYS

Malaysian Ringgit MYR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MYR	1.42tr	1.51tr	
	USD	337bn	371bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	10,231	11,125	
Growth	%	-5.6	3.5	
Inflation	%	-1.1	2.5	
Def bdgt	MYR	15.6bn	15.9bn	
	USD	3.71bn	3.90bn	
USD1=MYR		4.20	4.06	



Population 33,519,406

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.8%	4.1%	4.6%	4.7%	22.4%	3.7%
Female	11.1%	3.9%	4.4%	4.4%	21.1%	3.9%

Capabilities

Modernisation programmes over the past 30 years have provided the Malaysian armed forces with a limited capacity for external defence. However, the army has continued to be the dominant service, reflecting a longstanding but now outdated focus on counter-insurgency. In December 2019, the then-government tabled its first-ever defence white paper, which identified the 'three pillars' of Malaysia's defence strategy as 'concentric deterrence' (the armed forces' protection of national interests in 'core', 'extended' and 'forward' zones); 'comprehensive defence' (involving whole-of-government and whole-of-society support for the national-defence effort); and 'credible partnerships' (involving engagement in regional and wider international defence cooperation). While the paper identified new defence challenges, including tensions in the South China Sea and cyber threats, it provided no detailed insights into future resource allocation or capability development. However, it is likely that budgetary constraints will continue to limit defence resources. Malaysian forces regularly participate in ADMM-Plus, Five Power Defence Arrangements and other exercises with regional and international partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested in synthetic military-training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint maritime patrols and joint Sulu-Sulawesi seas air patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines. Much of Malaysia's military equipment is ageing and there are important capability gaps, particularly in air defence and maritime surveillance. New equipment brought into service since 2015 includes A400M transport aircraft, and there are plans to acquire new light combat aircraft. An air force squadron was established in 2021 to operate new UAVs. Malaysia's defence industry focuses mainly on providing maintenance, repair and overhaul services, and on naval shipbuilding.

ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 22,500

RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air Force 600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 244,700

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 80,000

2 mil region

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

5 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (3 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk regt

Mechanised

4 armd regt

1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn)

Light

1 inf bde (6 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

4 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

2 inf bde (3 inf bn)

1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt)

1 inf bde (2 inf bn)

1 inf bde (forming)

Air Manoeuvre

1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 4 AB bn, 1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn)

Other

2 (border) sy bde (5 bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

9 arty regt

1 STA regt

1 MRL regt

1 cbt engr sqn

3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn)

1 construction regt

1 int unit

4 MP regt

1 sigs regt

HELICOPTER

1 hel sqn

1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 *Nuri* (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

3 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 48 PT-91M *Twardy*

LT TK 21 *Scorpion-90*

RECCE 98: 74 SIBMAS (somet); 24 AV8 *Gempita*

IFV 212: 31 ACV300 *Adnan* (25mm *Bushmaster*); 13

ACV300 *Adnan* AGL; 46 AV8 *Gempita* IFV25; 122 AV8

Gempita IFV30 (incl 54 with *Ingwe* ATGM)

APC 629

APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 *Adnan* (incl 69 variants);

13 FV4333 *Stormer* (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1

APC (W) 335: 35 AV8 *Gempita* APC (incl 13 CP; 3 sigs; 9

amb); 300 *Condor* (incl variants)

PPV 29: 9 IAG *Guardian*; 20 *Lipanbara*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 3 MID-M

ARV 65+: *Condor*; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 WZT-4; 18 AV8 *Gempita* ARV

VLB 5+: *Leguan*; 5 PMCz-90

NBC VEHICLES 4+: 4 AV8 *Gempita*; K216A1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 8 ACV300 *Baktar Shikan*

MANPATS 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-2 *Metis-M1* (RS-AT-13); *Eryx*; *Baktar Shihan* (HJ-8); SS.11

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 438

TOWED 140: 105mm 118: 18 LG1 MkIII; 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22 G-5

MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30)

MOR 262: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10 ACV300-S; SP 120mm 16: 8 ACV-S; 8 AV8 *Gempita*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)

HELICOPTERS • TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 *Nuri*; Light 10 AW109

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 *Jernas* (*Rapier* 2000); *Anza-II*; HY-6 (FN-6) (CH-SA-10); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); *Starstreak*

GUNS 52+

SP 20mm K263

TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70

Reserves

Territorial Army

Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a reorganised territorial organisation

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

4 armd sqn

Light

16 inf regt (3 inf bn)

Other

5 (highway) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bty

2 fd engr regt

1 int unit

3 sigs sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 med coy

5 tpt coy

Navy 18,000

3 Regional Commands: MAWILLA 1 (Kuantan), MAWILLA 2 (Sabah) and MAWILLA 3 (Langkawi). A fourth is being formed (Bintulu)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 2

SSK 2 *Tunku Abdul Rahman* (FRA *Scorpène*) with 6 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/*Black Shark* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGHM 2 *Lekiu* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 16-cell VLS with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 triple

324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* 300 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 63

CORVETTES 8

FSG 2 *Kasturi* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSH 6 *Kedah* (GER MEKO 100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (fitted for but not with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM & RAM SAM)

PCFM 4 *Laksamana* with 1 *Albatros* quad Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCF 4 *Perdana* (FRA *Combattante* II) with 1 57mm gun

PCC 3 *Keris* (Littoral Mission Ship)

PB 4 *Handalan* (SWE *Spica-M*) with 1 57mm gun

PBF 23: 6 *Gading* Marine FIC; 17 *Tempur* (SWE CB90)

PB 17: 6 *Jerong* (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 9 *Sipadan Steel*; 2 *Sri Perlis*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MCO 4 *Mahamiru* (ITA *Lerici*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14

AFS 2: 1 *Mahawangsa* with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Sri Indera Sakti* with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

AG 3: 2 *Bunga Mas Lima* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Tun Azizan*

AGS 2: 1 *Dayang Sari*; 1 *Perantau*

AP 2 *Sri Gaya*

ASR 1 *Mega Bakti*

ATF 1

AX 2 *Gagah Samudera* with 1 hel landing platform

AXS 1 *Tunas Samudera*

AXS 1 *Tunas Samudera*

AXS 1 *Tunas Samudera*

AXS 1 *Tunas Samudera*

Naval Aviation 160

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ASW 6 *Super Lynx* 300

MRH 6 AS555 *Fennec*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM *Sea Skua*

Special Forces

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (mne cdo) SF unit

Air Force 15,000

1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated Area Def Systems HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F/A-18D *Hornet*

1 sqn with Su-30MKM *Flanker*

2 sqn with *Hawk* Mk108*/Mk208*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with Beech 200T

TANKER/TRANSPORT

2 sqn with KC-130H *Hercules*; C-130H *Hercules*;

C-130H-30 *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with A400M *Atlas*

1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; BD700 *Global Express*;
F-28 *Fellowship*; Falcon 900
1 sqn with CN235M-220

TRAINING

1 unit with PC-7

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M *Super Cougar*; S-61N; S-70A
Black Hawk

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE

1 sqn (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

1 sqn with *Starburst*

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 42 combat capable

FTR (8 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*
B (MiG-29NUB) in store)

FGA 26: 8 F/A-18D *Hornet* (some serviceability in doubt);
18 Su-30MKM (some serviceability in doubt)

ISR 3 Beech 200T

TKR/TPT 4 KC-130H *Hercules*

TPT 24: **Heavy** 4 A400M *Atlas*; **Medium** 10: 2 C-130H
Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 6 CN235M-220
(incl 1 VIP and 2 being reconfigured); **PAX** 4: 1 A319CT
(VIP); 1 BD700 *Global Express*; 1 F-28 *Fellowship*; 1 Falcon
900

TRG 70: 4 *Hawk* Mk108*; 12 *Hawk* Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 30
PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II *Turbo Trainer*

HELICOPTERS

TPT 17: **Heavy** 12 H225M *Super Cougar*; **Medium** 4: 2
S-61N; 2 S-70A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 1 AW109

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Starstreak***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A
Archer); **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-
AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** AIM-7 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-120C
AMRAAM; R-77 (AA-12A *Adder*)

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B *Kedge*); Kh-
29L (RS-AS-14A *Kedge*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*);
Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*);

AShM AGM-84D *Harpoon*; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)

BOMBS

Electro-optical guided KAB-500KR; KAB-500OD

Laser-guided *Paveway* II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €22,500

Police–General Ops Force 18,000

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

5 bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bn

MANOEUVRE**Other**

19 paramilitary bn

2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn

4 indep paramilitary coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) AT105 *Saxon*

AUV €30 SB-301

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) €4,500

Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula; Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak; Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts. Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 128

PSO 4: 1 *Arau* (ex-JPN *Nojima*) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Langkawi* with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Pekan* (ex-JPN *Ojika*) with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 5 *Bagan Datuk*

PBF 56: 18 *Penggalang* 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 *Penggalang* 18; 6 *Penyelamat* 20; 16 *Penggalang* 16; 14 *Tugau*

PB 63: 15 *Gagah*; 4 *Malawali*; 2 *Nusa*; 3 *Nusa* 28; 1 *Peninjau*; 7 *Ramunia*; 2 *Rhu*; 4 *Semilang*; 8 *Icarus* 1650; 10 *Pengawal*; 4 *Penyelamat*; 2 *Perwira*; 1 *Sugut*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 *Marlin*

AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP

HELICOPTERS

SAR 3 AW139

MRH 3 AS365 *Dauphin*

Area Security Units 3,500 reservists

(Auxiliary General Ops Force)

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

89 paramilitary unit

Border Scouts 1,200 reservists

in Sabah, Sarawak

People's Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists (some 17,500 armed)

RELA

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,045; 1 mech inf bn

PHILIPPINES: IMT 11

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9

FOREIGN FORCES

Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A *Poseidon* (rotational)

Mongolia MNG

Mongolian Tugrik MNT		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MNT	37.0tr	41.6tr	
	USD	13.1bn	14.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,916	4,186	
Growth	%	-5.3	5.2	
Inflation	%	3.7	5.4	
Def bdtg	MNT	295bn	284bn	
	USD	105m	97.4m	
FMA (US)	USD	3m	0m	3m
USD1=MNT		2813.32	2912.62	



Population 3,198,913

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.7%	3.6%	3.8%	4.0%	21.7%	2.0%
Female	13.1%	3.5%	3.7%	4.1%	23.8%	3.0%

Capabilities

Mongolia's latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabilities. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues defence ties and bilateral training with regional states and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia hosts the annual *Khaan Quest* multinational peacekeeping-training exercise. The country's main exercise partners are India and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises. In 2021, Mongolia and Russia held the counter-terrorism-focused exercise *Selega*. In 2021, NATO completed a multi-year project that involved establishing a Cyber Security Centre and Cyber Incident Response Capability. Mongolia's most significant deployment is to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, followed by the MINUSMA mission in Mali. The inventory generally comprises Soviet-era equipment, supplemented by deliveries of second-hand Russian weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18–25

RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

Light

1 (rapid deployment) lt inf bn (2nd bn to form)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A

RECCE 120 BRDM-2

IFV 310 BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR-80

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm M-1944/MT-12

ARTILLERY 570

TOWED €300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937)

MRL 122mm 130 BM-21

MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125-2M *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air Force 800

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-171

AIR DEFENCE

2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

FTR 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B

TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 *Coke*; 1 An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 *Hip*; 2 Mi-171

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 active

Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total 6,000)

Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript (total 1,200)

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

4 gd unit

Construction Troops 300

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 871; 1 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

Myanmar MMR

Myanmar Kyat MMK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MMK	115tr	99.1tr	
	USD	81.3bn	66.7bn	
per capita	USD	1,527	1,246	
Growth	%	3.2	-17.9	
Inflation	%	5.7	4.1	
Def bdgt	MMK	3.39tr	3.41tr	
	USD	2.39bn	2.30bn	
USD1=MMK		1416.56	1485.07	



Population 57,069,099

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.1%	4.3%	4.2%	4.1%	20.9%	2.7%
Female	12.5%	4.1%	4.2%	4.2%	22.1%	3.6%

Capabilities

Since the country's independence struggle in the 1940s, Myanmar's large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been intimately involved in domestic politics as well as internal security. Even though the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election, the armed forces remained politically powerful. A defence white paper published in 2016 gave a 'state-building' role to the Tatmadaw, further legitimising intervention in politics. Despite the NLD winning an increased majority in the November 2020 election, the Tatmadaw declared the result illegitimate and seized power on 1 February 2021, declaring a year-long state of emergency. The 2016 white paper prioritised ending conflicts with domestic armed groups. However, widespread civil unrest and an escalation in clashes with ethnic-minority armed groups since the coup will have intensified the Tatmadaw's focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. Opposition forces in May announced the establishment of an armed wing, and there have since been a series of attacks targeting the Tatmadaw. These issues have also focused attention on force health, including morale and general cohesion; there have been reports of defections and desertion. The Tatmadaw extended the state of emergency to August 2023, with no elections to be held until then. The Tatmadaw has been accused of widespread human-rights abuses against non-combatants during counter-insurgency operations. These concerns intensified after the widely condemned actions aimed at the Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017. China and Russia are key partners in defence cooperation. Since the 1990s, the armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional-warfare capabilities, though these efforts have been called into question by renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. There is limited defence-industrial capacity. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base has assembled Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and the Tatmadaw reportedly intends to negotiate licence-production of the Chinese JF-17 combat aircraft. Myanmar

also has growing naval shipbuilding capabilities, notably through the Naval Dockyard in Yangon, which was reported in December 2020 to be building a frigate-sized ship.

ACTIVE 356,000 (Army 325,000 Navy 16,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000

Conscript liability 24-36 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €325,000

14 military regions, 7 regional op comd. Following the 2021 coup, and reports of desertions, combat losses and recruitment problems, personnel figures should be treated with caution

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 20 div HQ (military op comd)
- 10 inf div HQ
- 34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd)

MANOEUVRE

- Armoured**
- 10 armd bn
- Light**
- 100 inf bn (coy)
- 337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 7 arty bn
- 37 indep arty coy
- 6 cbt engr bn
- 54 fd engr bn
- 40 int coy
- 45 sigs bn

AIR DEFENCE

- 7 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

- MBT** 195+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type-69-II; 10+ Type-90-II (MBT-2000)
- LT TK** 105 Type-63 (€60 serviceable)
- ASLT** 24 PTL-02 mod
- RECCE** 95+: €50 AML-90; 33 BRDM-2MS (incl CP); 12+ EE-9 *Cascavel*; MAV-1
- IFV** 36+: 10+ BTR-3U; 26+ MT-LBMSH
- APC** 345+

APC (T) 305: 250 ZSD-85; 55 ZSD-90

APC (W) 30+ ZSL-92

PPV 10+: BAAC-87; Gaia *Thunder*; 10 MPV

AUV MAV-2; MAV-3

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV Type-72

VLB MT-55A

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm M40A1

GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr

ARTILLERY 440+

SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1

TOWED 282+: 105mm 150: 54 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm 100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam M-845P

MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad (reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod
MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Type-53 (M-1943)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional some *Hwasong-6* (reported)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 4+

Medium-range 12+: 12+ KS-1A (CH-SA-12); S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26); 2K12 *Kvadrat-M* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence Some 2K22 *Tunguska* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*); HN-5 (CH-SA-3) (reported); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 46

SP 57mm 12 Type-80

TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1

Navy €16,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 1

SSK 1 *Min Ye Thein Kha Thu* (ex-IND *Sindhughosh* (Project 877EKM (*Kilo*))) with 6 single 533mm TT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5

FFGHM 2 *Kyansitthar* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 sextuple Inchr with MANPAD SAM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 3 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFG 3:

1 *Aung Zeya* with 2 quad Inchr with DPRK ASHM (possibly 3M24 derivative), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

2 *Mahar Bandoola* (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (*Jianghu I*)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80

CORVETTES 3

FSGHM 1 *Tabinshwethi* (*Anawrahta* mod) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 sextuple Inchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FSG 2 *Anawrahta* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PSOH 1 *Inlay* with 1 twin 57mm gun

PCG 8: 6 Type-037-IG (*Houxin*) with 2 twin Inchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM; 2 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS

PCT 2 *Yan Nyein Aung* (Project PGG 063) with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm TLS with *Shyena* LWT

PCO 2 *Indaw*

PCC 7 Type-037 (*Hainan*) with 4 RBU 1200 *Uragan A/S* mor, 2 twin 57mm gun

PBG 4 *Myanmar* with 2 single Inchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) ASHM

PBF 7: 1 Type-201; 6 *Super Dvoora* Mk III

PB 32: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 *Myanmar*; 3 *Swift*

PBR 14: 4 *Sagu*; 9 Y-301+; 1 Y-301 (Imp)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1:

1 *Moattama* (ROK *Makassar*) (capacity 2 LCVP; 2 hel; 13 tanks; 500 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 21: LCU 5; LCM 16

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

ABU 1

AGHS 2: 1 *Innya*; 1 (near shore)

AGS 1

AH 2

AK 1

AKSL 5

AP 1 *Chindwin*

Naval Infantry 800

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bn

Air Force €15,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

4 sqn with F-7 *Airguard*; FT-7; JF-17 *Thunder*; MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29SE/SM *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with A-5C *Fantan*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with F-27 *Friendship*; FH-227; PC-6AB *Turbo Porter*

TRAINING

2 sqn with G-4 *Super Galeb**; PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**; PC-9* 1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 *Citation II*; Cessna 180 *Skywagon*; K-8 *Karakorum**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-35P *Hind*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; PZL W-3 *Sokol*; SA316 *Alouette III*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 159 combat capable

FTR 63: 21 F-7 *Airguard*; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum*; 10 MiG-29SM *Fulcrum*; 5 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 6: 4 JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2); 2 JF-17B *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)

ATK 22 A-5C *Fantan*

MP 2 ATR-42

TPT 26: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 20: 1 ATR-42; 6 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 180 *Skywagon*; 1 Cessna 550 *Citation II*; 3 F-27 *Friendship*; 5 PC-6A/B *Turbo Porter*

PAX 1+ FH-227

TRG 88: 11 G-4 *Super Galeb**; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8 *Karakorum**; 12 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**; 9 PC-9*; 12 Yak-130 *Mitten**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 9 SA316 *Alouette III*

TPT 49: Medium 10 PZL W-3 *Sokol*; Light 39: 12 Bell 205; 6 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 4 H120 *Colibri*; 17 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5E-II; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7) AShM C-802A


Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000

People's Police Force 72,000

People's Militia 35,000

Nepal NPL

Nepalese Rupee NPR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NPR	3.91tr	4.13tr	
	USD	34.0bn	34.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,178	1,173	
Growth	%	-2.1	1.8	
Inflation	%	6.2	3.6	
Def bdtg	NPR	50.1bn	49.2bn	51.0bn
	USD	435m	408m	
FMA (US)	USD	1.7m	0m	0m
USD1=NPR		115.20	120.49	



Population 30,424,878

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	14.1%	5.1%	5.2%	4.9%	16.7%	2.9%
Female	13.3%	4.9%	5.2%	5.0%	19.8%	2.9%

Capabilities

The principal role of Nepal's armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal security and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a history of deploying contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Training support is provided by several countries, including China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People's Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces. Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a challenge, in part because of topography. Nepal's logistic capability appears to be sufficient for internal-security operations; however, its contingents on UN peacekeeping operations appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support. Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defence-industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for modern equipment.

ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 96,600****FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 inf div HQ
1 (valley) comd

SPECIAL FORCES

1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech inf bn)

MANOEUVRE**Light**

18 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde
4 arty regt
5 engr bn
1 sigs bde

AIR DEFENCE

2 AD regt
4 indep AD coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 40 *Ferret*

APC 253

APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551

PPV 240: 90 *Casspir*; 150 MPV

AUV Dongfeng *Mengshi*; CS/VN3C mod 2

ARTILLERY 92+

TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer (6 non-operational)

MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op)

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60

Air Wing 320**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE+**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 BN-2T *Islander*; 1 CN235M-220; 3 M-28 *Skytruck*; 2 PA-28 *Cherokee* (trg)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 14: 1 A139; 1 Bell 407GXP (VIP); 2 *Dhruv*; 2 *Lancer*; 3 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 2 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; 1 SA315B *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 2 SA316B *Alouette III*

TPT 3: Medium 1 SA330J *Puma*; Light 2 AS350B2 *Ecureuil*

Paramilitary 15,000**Armed Police Force 15,000**

Ministry of Home Affairs

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 752; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pl

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 899; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy

IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 877; 1 mech inf bn

LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 234; 2 sy coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 202; 1 EOD coy

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,752; 2 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 409; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-)


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org)

New Zealand NZL

New Zealand Dollar NZD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NZD	322bn	350bn	
	USD	209bn	248bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	41,165	48,349	
Growth	%	-2.1	5.1	
Inflation	%	1.7	3.0	
Def bdgt	NZD	5.06bn	4.62bn	5.19bn
	USD	3.29bn	3.27bn	
USD1=NZD		1.54	1.41	



Population 4,991,442

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.0%	3.2%	3.4%	3.6%	22.4%	7.4%
Female	9.5%	3.0%	3.2%	3.5%	22.3%	8.4%

Capabilities

New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has operational experience. The June 2016 defence white paper forecast a range of challenges likely to affect the country's security in the period to 2040, including rising tension in the South and East China seas. The white paper indicated investments including improved maritime air-surveillance capability and cyber-support capability for deployed operations, but said that until 2030 defence spending was expected to remain pegged at around 1% of GDP. New Zealand's closest defence partner is Australia but the country has revived defence relations with the US. The 2016 Defence Capability Plan outlined plans including deliveries of new frigates in the late 2020s. In 2018, it was announced that four P-8 *Poseidon* maritime-patrol aircraft would be procured, while at-sea replenishment capability was revived in 2020 with the commissioning of HMNZS *Aotearoa*. A new 2019 Defence Capability Plan detailed plans to expand the army to 6,000 personnel by 2035, as well as to acquire a sealift vessel in the late 2020s. Replacement of the ANZAC frigates, both of which are being upgraded, has now been postponed until the 2030s. New Zealand has a small defence industry consisting

of numerous private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American and European companies. These companies are able to provide some maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant work is contracted to foreign companies.

ACTIVE 9,750 (Army 4,850 Navy 2,350 Air 2,550)

RESERVE 2,700 (Army 1,850 Navy 550 Air Force 300)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 4,850

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 93 NZLAV-25

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 7 NZLAV

ARV 3 LAV-R

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 60

TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun

MOR 81mm 36

Reserves

Territorial Force 1,850 reservists

Responsible for providing trained individuals for augmenting deployed forces

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt

Navy 2,350

Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFHM 2:

1 *Anzac* (GER MEKO 200) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel) (undergoing refit in Canada since 2018)

1 *Anzac* (GER MEKO 200) with 1 20-cell VLS with *Sea Ceptor* SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PSOH 2 *Otago* (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel) (ice-strengthened hull)

PCC 2 *Lake*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2

LCM 2 (operated off HMNZS *Canterbury*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 3

AGHS 1 *Manawanui* with 1 hel landing platform

AKRH 1 *Canterbury* (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite* ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops)

AORH 1 *Aotearoa* (capacity 1 NH90/SH-2G(I) hel)

Air Force 2,550**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**

1 sqn with P-3K2 *Orion*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H *Hercules* (upgraded)

ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE

1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite*

TRAINING

1 sqn with T-6C *Texan II*

1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air* (leased)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW109LUH; NH90

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable**

ASW 5 P-3K2 *Orion*

TPT 11: **Medium** 5 C-130H *Hercules* (upgraded); **Light** 4 Beech 350 *King Air* (leased); **PAX** 2 B-757-200 (upgraded)

TRG 11 T-6C *Texan II*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 8 SH-2G(I) *Super Seasprite*

TPT 13: **Medium** 8 NH90; **Light** 5 AW109LUH

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 *Penguin* Mk2 mod7**DEPLOYMENT**

EGYPT: MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit

IRAQ: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 9


MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 7

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

Pakistan PAK

Pakistani Rupee PKR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PKR	41.6tr	47.7tr	
	USD	262bn	288bn	
per capita	USD	1,255	1,209	
Growth	%	-0.5	3.9	
Inflation	%	10.7	8.9	
Def bdgt [a]	PKR	1.48tr	1.65tr	1.73tr
	USD	9.33bn	10.4bn	
USD1=PKR		158.78	158.80	

[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the Defence Division and the Defence Production Division



Population 238,181,034

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	18.2%	5.2%	4.7%	4.2%	16.6%	2.1%
Female	17.4%	5.0%	4.4%	4.0%	15.8%	2.4%

Capabilities

The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence and are the dominant voice on defence and security policy. Pakistan's nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008 counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been the forces' main effort. Although an army-led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security, terrorist attacks continue. Pakistan's leaders called for engagement with the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan, with some analysts considering that they considered the Taliban victory a policy success. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. The armed forces have a major role in disaster relief. China is Pakistan's main defence partner, with all three services employing a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the forces are well trained. The army and air force have considerable operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. Funds have been directed towards improving security on the border with Afghanistan. Major investment in military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. The navy plans to increase surface combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in collaboration with China), maritime-patrol aircraft and UAVs. This is to improve both combat capability and the protection of sea-based nuclear weapons. The air force is modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. The indigenous defence industry exports platforms, weapons and ammunition and there is considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China.

ACTIVE 651,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 21,800 Air 70,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces

Operational control rests with the National Command Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages and commands all of Pakistan's military nuclear capability. The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong military security force responsible for guarding military nuclear infrastructure

Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000–15,000

Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+
MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); Shaheen-III (in test)*
SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX)*
GLCM • Nuclear *Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII); Ra'ad (Hatf-VIII – in test)*

Air Force

1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or *Mirage 5* may be assigned a nuclear-strike role

Army 560,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

9 corps HQ
 1 (Northern) comd

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd div
 7 indep armd bde

Mechanised

2 mech inf div
 1 indep mech bde

Light

18 inf div
 5 indep inf bde

4 (Northern Command) inf bde

Other

2 sy div

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty div
 14 arty bde
 7 engr bde

AVIATION

1 VIP avn sqn
 4 avn sqn

HELICOPTER

3 atk hel sqn
 2 ISR hel sqn
 2 SAR hel sqn
 2 tpt hel sqn
 1 spec ops hel sqn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn))

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,487: 300 *Al-Khalid* (MBT 2000); ε100 *Al-Khalid I*; 315 T-80UD; ε500 *Al-Zarrar*; 400 Type-69; 268 Type-85-IIAP; 4+ VT-4; ε600 ZTZ-59

APC 3,545

APC (T) 3,200: 2,300 M113A1/A2/P; ε200 *Talha*; 600 VCC-1/VCC-2; ε100 ZSD-63

APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80

PPV 225 *Maxxpro*

AUV 10 *Dingo 2*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 262+: 175 Type-70/Type-84 (W653/W653A); *Al-Hadeed*; 52 M88A1; 35 *Maxxpro* ARV; T-54/T-55

VLB M47M; M48/60

MW *Aardvark* Mk II

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP M901 TOW; ε30 *Maaz* (HJ-8 on *Talha* chassis)

MANPATS HJ-8; TOW

RCL 75mm Type-52; **106mm** M40A1 **RL 89mm** M20

GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 4,565+

SP 498: 155mm 438: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5; 123 M109L; **203mm** 60 M110/M110A2

TOWED 1,629: **105mm** 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; **122mm** 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); **130mm** 410 Type-59-I; **155mm** 292: 144 M114; 148 M198; **203mm** 28 M115

MRL 88+: **107mm** Type-81; **122mm** 52+: 52 *Azar* (Type-83); some KRL-122; **300mm** 36 A100

MOR 2,350+: **81mm**; **120mm** AM-50

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 *Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); some Shaheen-III (in test)*

SRBM 135+: **Nuclear** 30+: ε30 *Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX); Conventional* 105 *Hatf-I*

GLCM • Nuclear some *Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII)*

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 13: 1 *Beech 350 King Air*; 3 *Cessna 208B*; 1 *Cessna 421*; 1 *Cessna 550 Citation*; 1 *Cessna 560 Citation*; 2 *Turbo Commander 690*; 4 *Y-12(II)*

TRG 87 MFI-17B *Mushshak*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S *Cobra* with TOW; 4 Mi-35M *Hind*; (1 Mi-24 *Hind* in store)

MRH 115+: 10 H125M *Fennec*; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 38+ Mi-17 *Hip H*; 2 Mi-171E *Hip*; 12 SA315B *Lama*; 20 SA319 *Alouette III*

TPT 76: **Medium** 36: 31 SA330 *Puma*; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-172; **Light** 40: 17 H125 *Ecureuil* (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

TRG 10 Hughes 300C

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 5 CH-4

ISR • Light *Bravo*; *Jasoos*; *Vector*

AIR DEFENCE**SAM 27+**

Medium-range 27 LY-80 (CH-SA-16)

Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4)

Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; *Anza-II*; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); *Mistral*; QW-18 (CH-SA-11); RBS-70

GUNS • TOWED 1,933: **14.5mm** 981; **35mm** 248 GDF-002/GDF-005 (with 134 *Skyguard* radar units); **37mm** 310 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; **40mm** 50 L/60; **57mm** 144 Type-59 (S-60); **85mm** 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12

Navy 21,800 (incl €3,200 Marines)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES 8****SSK 5:**

2 *Hashmat* (FRA *Agosta* 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with UGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/F-17P HWT

3 *Khalid* (FRA *Agosta* 90B) (of which 2 fitted with AIP) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with SM39 *Exocet* ASHM/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

SSW 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT with F-17P HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8**FFGHM 5:**

4 *Sword* (F-22P) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with ET-52C (A244/S) LWT, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 Type 730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C *Haitun* hel)

1 *Tughril* (Type-054AP (*Jiangkai II*)) with 2 twin Inchr with CM-302 (YJ-12A) ASHM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with LY-80N (HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16)) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C *Haitun* ASW hel)

FFGH 1 *Alamgir* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun

FFHM 2 *Tariq* (ex-UK *Amazon*) with 1 sextuple Inchr with LY-60N SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19

CORVETTES • FSH 2 *Yarmook* (Damen OPV 1900) (fitted for but not with 2 quad Inchr for ASHM) (capacity 1 hel)

PCG 3: 2 *Azmat* (FAC(M)) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 1 *Azmat* (FAC(M)) with 2 triple Inchr with C-602 ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS

PBG 4: 2 *Jalalat* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM; 2 *Jurrat* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM

PBF 4: 2 *Kaan* 15; 2 *Zarrar* (33)

PB 6: 1 *Larkana*; 1 *Rajshahit*; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3

MCC 3 *Munsif* (FRA *Eridan*)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8

LCM 2

LCAC 2 *Griffon* 8100TD

UCAC 4 *Griffon* 2000

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9

AGS 2: 1 *Behr Masa*; 1 *Behr Paima*

AOL 2 *Madagar*

AORH 2: 1 *Fuqing* with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 *Alouette III* hel); 1 *Moawin* (Fleet Tanker) with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 hel landing platform

AOT 2 *Gwadar*

AXS 1

Marines €3,200

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 cdo gp

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

3 mne bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable

ASW 9: 7 P-3B/C *Orion*; 2 ATR-72-500

MP 7: 6 F-27-200 MPA; 1 Lineage 1000

TPT 3: **Light** 2 ATR-72-500; **PAX** 1 Hawker 850XP

HELICOPTERS

ASW 11: 4 *Sea King* Mk45; 7 Z-9C *Haitun*

MRH 6 SA319B *Alouette III*

SAR 1 *Sea King* (ex-HAR3A)

TPT • Medium 1 *Sea King* (ex-HC4)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM AM39 *Exocet*

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL Defence**

1 ASHM regt with *Zarb* (YJ-62)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM *Zarb* (YJ-62)

Air Force 70,000

3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha), Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting Units

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG *Airguard*

1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with *Mirage* IIID/E (IIIOD/EP)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 1)

3 sqn with JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)

1 sqn with JF-17B *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2)

1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*

3 sqn with *Mirage* 5 (5PA)

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE

1 sqn with *Mirage* 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 *Exocet* ASHM

ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT

1 sqn with *Falcon* 20F

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 *Erieye*

1 sqn with ZDK-03

SEARCH & RESCUE

- 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh; AW139 (SAR/liason)
- 5 sqn with SA316 *Alouette III*
- 2 sqn with AW139

TANKER

- 1 sqn with Il-78 *Midas*

TRANSPORT

- 1 sqn with C-130B/E *Hercules*; L-100-20
- 1 sqn with CN235M-220
- 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL *Citation Excel*;
CN235M-220; F-27-200 *Friendship*; *Falcon 20E*;
Gulfstream IVSP
- 1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 *Phenom 100*; Y-12 (II)

TRAINING

- 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P *Skybolt*
- 1 OCU sqn with *Mirage III/Mirage 5*
- 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU *Fighting Falcon*
- 2 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**
- 2 sqn with MFI-17
- 2 sqn with T-37C *Tweet*

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 bty with HQ-2 (SA-2 *Guideline*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16
Gimlet)
- 6 bty with *Crotale*
- 10 bty with SPADA 2000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 416 combat capable

- FTR** 151: 46 F-7PG *Airguard*; 20 F-7P *Skybolt*; 23 F-16A
MLU *Fighting Falcon*; 21 F-16B MLU *Fighting Falcon*; 9
F-16A ADF *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16B ADF *Fighting Falcon*;
21 FT-7; 5 FT-7PG; 2 *Mirage III*B
- FGA** 217: 12 F-16C Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*; 6 F-16D Block
52 *Fighting Falcon*; 49 JF-17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 1); 61 JF-
17 *Thunder* (FC-1 Block 2); 15 JF-17B *Thunder*; 7 *Mirage*
III D (*Mirage III*OD); 30 *Mirage III*E (III EP); 25 *Mirage 5*
(5PA)/5PA2; 2 *Mirage 5*D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 *Mirage 5*PA3
(ASuW)
- ISR** 10 *Mirage III*R* (*Mirage III*RP)
- ELINT** 2 *Falcon 20*F
- AEW&C** 10: 6 Saab 2000 *Erieye*; 4 ZDK-03
- TKR** 4 Il-78 *Midas*
- TPT** 35: **Medium** 16: 5 C-130B *Hercules*; 10 C-130E
Hercules; 1 L-100-20; **Light** 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna
560XL *Citation Excel*; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 *Phenom*
100; 1 F-27-200 *Friendship*; 2 Y-12 (II); **PAX** 5: 1 B-707; 1
Falcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000
- TRG** 141: 38 K-8 *Karakorum**; 80 MFI-17B *Mushshak*; 23
T-37C *Tweet*

HELICOPTERS

- MRH** 29: 15 SA316 *Alouette III*; 14 AW139
- TPT • Medium** 4 Mi-171Sh

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

- CISR • Heavy** CH-3 (*Burraq*); CH-4 (reported)
- ISR • Medium** *Falco*

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+

- Medium-range** 6 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1)
- Short-range** 184: 144 *Crotale*; ε40 SPADA 2000
- Point-defence** 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

- AAM • IR** AIM-9L/P *Sidewinder*; U-Darter; PL-5; PL-5E-
II; SARH Super 530; **ARH** PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; *Raptor II*AShM AM39 *Exocet*

ARM MAR-1

ALCM • Nuclear *Ra'ad***BOMBS**

- INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK)
- Laser-guided *Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000 active**Airport Security Force** 9,000

Government Aviation Division

Pakistan Coast Guards

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 5:

- PBF 4
- PB 1

Frontier Corps 70,000

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

- Reconnaissance**
- 1 armd recce sqn
- Other**

11 paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC (W) 45 UR-416

Maritime Security Agency ε2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**1 sqn with BN-2T *Defender***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 19

- PSO 1 *Kashmir*
- PCC 10: 4 *Barkat*; 4 *Hingol*; 2 *Sabqat* (ex-US Island)
- PBF 5
- PB 3 *Guns*

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 BN-2T *Defender***National Guard** 185,000Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps;
Women Guards**Pakistan Rangers** 25,000

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT**ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN:** Combined Maritime
Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 1,314; 1
inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn**CYPRUS:** UN • UNFICYP 2**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN •
MONUSCO 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 217; 1 hel sqn

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 285; 1 engr coy

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13

FOREIGN FORCES

Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan

Argentina 2

Croatia 8

Italy 1

Korea, Republic of 7

Mexico 1

Philippines 6

Romania 1

Sweden 4

Switzerland 3


Thailand 5

Uruguay 3

Papua New Guinea PNG

Papua New Guinea Kina PGK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PGK	81.5bn	92.7bn	
	USD	23.3bn	26.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,651	2,952	
Growth	%	-3.9	1.2	
Inflation	%	4.9	3.6	
Def bdgt	PGK	329m	305m	
	USD	93.9m	87.2m	
USD1=PGK		3.50	3.50	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 7,399,757

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.8%	5.1%	4.8%	4.3%	18.4%	2.4%
Female	15.3%	4.9%	4.7%	4.2%	17.5%	2.6%

Capabilities

Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to perform its core roles. After personnel reductions in the 2000s, the government made efforts in the next decade to revive defence capability. A 2013 defence white paper identified core roles including defending the state and civil-emergency assistance, but noted that 'defence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent that we have alarming gaps in our land, air and maritime borders'. The white paper called for strengthening defence capability on an ambitious scale, with long-term plans calling for a 'division-sized force' of 10,000 personnel by 2030. The PNGDF continues to receive substantial external military assistance from

Australia and also from China, which has donated equipment. In late 2018, plans to build a joint US–Australia–Papua New Guinea naval base at Lombrum were announced. The PNGDF is not able to deploy outside the country without outside assistance and there have only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping missions. The PNGDF will receive four of the *Guardian*-class patrol boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific island nations. These will replace the four *Pacific*-class boats Australia donated in the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry, though there is some local maintenance capacity.

ACTIVE 4,000 (Army 3,700 Maritime Element 200 Air 100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €3,700

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

1 EOD unit

1 sigs sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3

Maritime Element €200

HQ located at Port Moresby

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3 *Guardian* (AUS Bay mod)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LCT 3 *Salamaua* (ex-AUS *Balikpapan*) (of which 1 in trg role)

Air Force €100

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 *Arava*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)†

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in store); 2 IAI-201 *Arava*

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*) non-operational)


DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Philippines PHL

Philippine Peso PHP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PHP	17.9tr	19.0tr	
	USD	361bn	386bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,323	3,492	
Growth	%	-9.6	3.2	
Inflation	%	2.6	4.3	
Def bdgt [a]	PHP	261bn	279bn	295bn
	USD	5.27bn	5.65bn	
FMA (US)	USD	40m	40m	40m
USD1=PHP		49.62	49.33	

[a] Excludes military pensions



Population 110,818,325

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	16.4%	5.1%	4.7%	4.2%	17.8%	2.0%
Female	15.7%	4.9%	4.5%	4.0%	17.8%	3.0%

Capabilities

Despite modest increases in defence funding, mainly in response to the growing challenge posed by China to Philippine interests in the South China Sea, the capabilities and procurement plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which have traditionally focused on maintaining internal security, remain limited. The National Defense Strategy 2018–22 identified policy priorities including ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and internal stability. Organisational changes have included establishing in 2018 an AFP Special Operations Command to command all special-forces units. There are also plans to upgrade anti-submarine-warfare capabilities and create a space agency with a national-security mandate. Despite occasional anti-American rhetoric from the country's president, the Philippines remains an ally of the US, which provides support for the AFP's external security role and its counter-terrorist operations. Bilateral defence relations improved in 2021 after President Duterte agreed in July to maintain the bilateral Visiting Forces Agreement. The AFP continues to host the long-running *Balikatan* exercise series with US forces, and to participate in ADMM-Plus exercises. In 2017 it began trilateral joint maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activity. The armed forces continue to be deployed on internal-security duties in the south, where Manila faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups. The second phase (2018–22) of the 'second horizon' AFP modernisation programme was approved in 2018. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, air-surveillance radars, maritime-patrol aircraft, OPVs and, in the long term, light and medium airlift. The Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation, owned by the defence department since 2019, has assembled a variety of small helicopters and aircraft for the AFP, and also provides maintenance, repair and overhaul services for military aircraft.

ACTIVE 145,300 (Army 103,200 Navy 24,500 Air 17,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300

RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air 16,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 103,200

5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital Region Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 armd div (2 mech bde (total: 3 lt armd sqn; 7 armd cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn regt; 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy))

Light

1 div (4 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)

9 div (3 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)

1 bde (1 mech inf bn; 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn)

Other

1 (Presidential) gd gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt HQ

1 MRL bty (forming)

5 engr bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SSM bty (forming)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bty

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 7 FV101 *Scorpion*

IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV

APC 387

APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2

(some with *Dragon RWS*)

APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 *Commando*; 146 *Simba*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV ACV-300; *Samson*; M578; 4 M113 ARV

ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm

M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 260+

TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/M102/Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68; 6 Soltam M-71

MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30; 120mm some *Cardom*

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 *Queen Air*; 1 Cessna 170; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light 2 R-44 *Raven II*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium

Blue Horizon

Navy 24,500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGHM 2 *Jose Rizal* (HDF-3000) with 2 quad Inchr with *Hae Sung* I AShM, 2 twin *Simbad*-RC Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with K745 *Blue*

Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 8-cell VLS) (capacity 1 AW159 *Wildcat*)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 58

CORVETTES • **FS** 1 *Conrado Yap* (ex-ROK *Po Hang* (Flight III)) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 2 76mm gun

PSOH 3 *Del Pilar* (ex-US *Hamilton*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo 105)

PCF 1 *General Mariano Alvarez* (ex-US *Cyclone*)

PCO 5: 3 *Emilio Jacinto* (ex-UK *Peacock*) with 1 76mm gun; 2 *Miguel Malvar* (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun

PBFG 3 MPAC Mk3 with 1 *Typhoon* MLS-ER quad Inchr with *Spike-ER* SSM

PBF 9: 6 MPAC Mk1/2; 3 MPAC Mk3 (to be fitted with *Spike-ER* SSM)

PB 30: 22 *Jose Andrada*; 2 *Kagitingan*; 2 *Point* (ex-US); 4 *Swift* Mk3 (ex-US)

PBR 6 Silver Ships

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2:

2 *Tarlac* (IDN *Makassar*) (capacity 2 LCVP; 3 hel; 13 tanks; 500 troops)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 4:

2 *Bacolod City* (US *Besson*) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops)

2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 15

LCM 2: 1 *Manobo*; 1 *Tagbanua* (capacity 100 tons; 200 troops)

LCT 5 *Ivatan* (ex-AUS *Balikpapan*)

LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 *Mulgae I* (ex-RoK)

LCVP 4

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4

AGOR 1 *Gregorio Velasquez* (ex-US *Melville*)

AOL 1

AP 1 *Ang Pangulo*

AWT 1 *Lake Buluan*

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 10: 3 BN-2A *Defender*; 2 Cessna 177 *Cardinal*; 5 Beech 90 *King Air* (TC-90)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 2 AW159 *Wildcat*

TPT 13: **Medium** 4 Mi-171Sh; **Light** 9: 3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105

Marines 8,300

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (force recon) spec ops bn

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • **APC (W)** 42: 19 LAV-150 *Commando*; 23 LAV-300

AAV 67: 8 AAV-7A1; 4 LVTH-6+; 55 LVTP-7

ARTILLERY 37+

TOWED 37: **105mm** 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; **155mm** 6

Soltam M-71

MOR 107mm M30

Naval Special Operations Group

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SEAL unit

1 diving unit

10 naval spec ops unit

1 special boat unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 EOD unit

Air Force 17,600

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with FA-50PH *Fighting Eagle**

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

1 sqn with OV-10A/C *Bronco**; SF-260F/TP*

ISR

1 sqn with Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; *Turbo Commander* 690A

SEARCH & RESCUE

4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M *Iroquois*); AUH-76; W-3A *Sokol*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130B/H/T *Hercules*

1 sqn with C295; F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 *Friendship*

1 sqn with N-22B *Nomad*; N-22SL *Searchmaster*; C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212i)

1 VIP sqn with C295M; F-28 *Fellowship*; Gulfstream G280

TRAINING

1 sqn with SF-260FH

1 sqn with T-41B/D/K *Mescalero*

1 sqn with S-211*

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AH-1S *Cobra*; MD-520MG

1 sqn with AW109E

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

1 sqn with S-70i *Black Hawk*

1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; S-70A *Black Hawk* (S-70A-5)

ISR UAV

1 sqn *Hermes* 450/900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 49 combat capable

FGA 12 FA-50PH *Fighting Eagle*

MP 3: 1 C-130T MP mod; 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL *Searchmaster*

ISR 11: 2 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 9 OV-10A/C *Bronco**

TPT 15: **Medium** 4: 1 C-130B *Hercules*; 2 C-130H *Hercules*; 1 C-130T *Hercules* **Light** 9: 3 C295; 1 C295M; 1 F-27-500 *Friendship*; 1 N-22B *Nomad*; 1 *Turbo Commander* 690A; 2

C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212i); **PAX** 2: 1 F-28 *Fellowship* (VIP); 1 Gulfstream G280

TRG 45: 6 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 12 S-211*; 7 SF-260FH; 10 SF-260TP*; 10 T-41B/D/K *Mescalero*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 AH-1S *Cobra*

MRH 39: 8 W-3A *Sokol*; 2 AUH-76; 8 AW109E; 8 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412HP *Twin Huey*; 11 MD-520MG

TPT 35: **Medium** 16: 1 S-70A *Black Hawk* (S-70A-5); 15 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*) (25 more non-operational)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 6: 2 *Blue Horizon II*; 1 *Hermes* 450; 3 *Hermes* 900

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9L *Sidewinder*

ASM AGM-65D *Maverick*; AGM-65G2 *Maverick*

BOMBS

INS/GPS-guided: GBU-49 *Enhanced Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300

Coast Guard 12,300

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Rodman 38 and Rodman 101 owned by Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80

PSOH 1 *Gabriela Silang* (OCEA OPV 270)

PCO 4 *San Juan* with 1 hel landing platform

PB 64: 4 *Boracay* (FPB 72 Mk II); 4 *Ilocos Norte*; 12 PCF 50 (US *Swift* Mk1/2); 10 PCF 46; 10 PCF 65 (US *Swift* Mk3); 4 Rodman 38; 10 Rodman 101; 10 *Parola* (MRRV) **PBR** 11

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • **ABU** 1 *Corregidor*

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 3: 2 BN-2 *Islander*; 1 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan* EX

HELICOPTERS • **TPT** • **Light** 4: 2 Bo-105; 2 H145

Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units 50,000 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be called up for extended periods)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 6

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES

Australia *Operation Augury* 100

Brunei IMT 8


Indonesia IMT 9

Malaysia IMT 11

United States US Pacific Command: *Operation Pacific Eagle* – *Philippines* 200

Singapore SGP

Singapore Dollar SGD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SGD	469bn	503bn	
	USD	340bn	379bn	
per capita	USD	59,795	66,263	
Growth	%	-5.4	6.0	
Inflation	%	-0.2	1.6	
Def bdtg	SGD	13.6bn	15.4bn	
	USD	9.88bn	11.6bn	
USD1=SGD		1.38	1.33	



Population 5,866,139

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	3.1%	3.9%	4.3%	24.9%	5.8%
Female	7.4%	2.8%	3.6%	3.9%	25.7%	6.7%

Capabilities

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped in South-east Asia. They are organised essentially along Israeli lines, with the air force and navy staffed mainly by professional personnel while, apart from a small core of regulars, the much larger army is based on conscripts and reservists. Although there are no publicly available defence-policy documents, it is widely presumed that the SAF's primary role is to deter attacks on the city state or interference with its vital interests – particularly its sea lines of communication – by potential regional adversaries. There is an additional focus on counter-terrorist operations. With an ageing population and declining conscript cohort, there is a significant personnel challenge, which the defence ministry is addressing by lean staffing and increased use of technology. There is routine overseas training, and plans have been announced to further improve domestic training areas. The SAF also engages extensively in bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional and international partners. Singaporean forces have gradually become more involved – albeit on a small scale – in multinational operations. While deployments have provided some operational experience, and training standards and operational readiness are high, the army's reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its capacity for sustained operations abroad. Equipment modernisation continues: plans to acquire F-35 combat aircraft, new domestically produced armoured fighting vehicles, multi-role combat vessels and multi-mission ships are intended to maintain Singapore's military edge over other Southeast Asian countries. There is a small but sophisticated defence industry. ST Engineering manufactures armoured vehicles, artillery and naval vessels for the SAF.

ACTIVE 51,000 (Army 41,000 Navy 4,000 Air 6,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400

Conscription liability 22–24 months

RESERVE 252,500 (Army 240,000 Navy 5,000 Air 7,500)

Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 41,000 (including 26,000 conscripts)**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

- 3 (combined arms) div HQ
- 1 (rapid reaction) div HQ
- 4 armd bde HQ
- 9 inf bde HQ
- 1 air mob bde HQ
- 1 amph bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 cdo bn

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

- 3 lt armd/recce bn

Armoured

- 1 armd bn

Mechanised

- 6 mech inf bn

Light

- 2 (gds) inf bn

Other

- 2 sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 2 arty bn
- 1 STA bn
- 2 engr bn
- 1 EOD bn
- 1 ptn br bn
- 1 int bn
- 2 ISR bn
- 1 CBRN bn
- 3 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 3 med bn
- 2 tpt bn
- 3 spt bn

Reserves

Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed above; 1 op reserve div with additional armd & inf bde; People's Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 inf bn

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

- 1 cdo bn

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

- 6 lt armd/recce bn

Mechanised

- 6 mech inf bn

Light

- ε56 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- ε12 arty bn

- ε8 engr bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

- MBT 96+ *Leopard* 2SG

LT TK ε50 AMX-13 SM1 (22 AMX-10 PAC 90; ε300 AMX-13 SM1 in store)

IFV 600+: 250 *Bionix* IFV-25; 250 *Bionix* IFV-40/50; ε50 *Hunter* AFV; 50+ M113A2 *Ultra*; (22 AMX-10P)

APC 1,375+

APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC *Bronco*

APC (W) 135 *Terrex* ICV; (250 LAV-150/V-200 *Commando*; 30 V-100 *Commando* in store)

PPV 140: 74 *Belrex*; 15 *MaxxPro Dash*; 51 *Peacekeeper*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 94: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 *Kodiak*; 8 M728

ARV *Bionix*; *Büffel*; LAV-150; LAV-300

VLB 72+: *Bionix*; LAB 30; *Leguan*; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60

MW 910-MCV-2; *Trailblazer*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*; *Spike*-SR; *Spike*-MR

RCL 90+: 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm 90 M40A1

ARTILLERY 798+

SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 *Primus*

TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18

FH-2000; ε18 *Pegasus*; 52 FH-88

MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS

MOR 638+

SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on *Bronco*; 50 on M113

TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12

M-58 *Tampella*

Navy 4,000 (incl 1,000 conscripts)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** • SSK 4:

2 *Archer* (ex-SWE *Västergötland*) (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 6 single 533mm TT with *Black Shark* HWT

2 *Challenger* (ex-SWE *Sjoormen*) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6

FFGHM 6 *Formidable* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* AShM, 4 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B *Sea Hawk* hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26

CORVETTES • FSM 8 *Independence* (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCGM 6 *Victory* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with *Barak*-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun

PCO 4 *Sentinel* (*Fearless* mod) with 1 76mm gun

PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4

MCC 4 *Bedok*

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 *Endurance* with 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops)

LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5

ASR 1 *Swift Rescue*

ATF 2

AX 2: 1 *Avatar*; 1 *Stet Polar*

Naval Diving Unit

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF gp

1 (diving) SF gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 EOD gp

Air Force 6,000 (incl 3,000 conscripts)

5 comds

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-15SG *Eagle*

2 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon* (some used for ISR with pods)

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with S-70B *Seahawk*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with F-50

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with G550-AEW

TANKER

1 sqn with A330 MRTT

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with KC-130B/H *Hercules*; C-130H *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15SG *Eagle*; F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 *Master*

4 (US-based) units with AH-64D *Apache*; CH-47D *Chinook*; F-15SG: F-16C/D

1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21

1 hel sqn with H120 *Colibri*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AH-64D *Apache*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with CH-47SD *Super D Chinook*

2 sqn with AS332M *Super Puma*; AS532UL *Cougar*

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Hermes 450*

2 sqn with *Heron 1*

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn with *Mistral* (opcon Army)

3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); *Mechanised Igla* (opcon Army)

1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon

1 AD sqn with SAMP/T

1 AD sqn with *Spyder-SR*

1 radar sqn with radar (mobile)

1 radar sqn with LORADS

MANOEUVRE

Other

4 (field def) sy sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 105 combat capable

FGA 100: 40 F-15SG *Eagle*; 20 F-16C Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*; 20 F-16D Block 52 *Fighting Falcon*; 20 F-16D Block 52+ *Fighting Falcon* (incl reserves)

MP 5 F-50 *Maritime Enforcer**

AEW&C 4 G550-AEW

TKR/TPT 11: 6 A330 MRTT; 4 KC-130B *Hercules*; 1 KC-130H *Hercules*

TPT 9: **Medium** 5 C-130H *Hercules* (2 ELINT); **PAX** 4 F-50

TRG 31: 12 M-346 *Master*; 19 PC-21

HELICOPTERS

ATK 19 AH-64D *Apache*

ASW 8 S-70B *Seahawk*

TPT 56: **Heavy** 21: 6 CH-47D *Chinook*; 10 CH-47SD *Super D Chinook*; 2+ CH-47F *Chinook*; 3+ H225M; **Medium** 30: 18 AS332M *Super Puma* (incl 5 SAR); 12 AS532UL *Cougar*;

Light 5 H120 *Colibri* (leased)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 17+: **Heavy** 8+ *Heron 1*; **Medium** 9+ *Hermes 450*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 4+

Long-range 4+ SAMP/T

Short-range *Spyder-SR*

Point-defence 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); *Mechanised Igla*; *Mistral*; RBS-70

GUNS 34

SP 20mm GAI-C01

TOWED 34+: **20mm** GAI-C01; **35mm** 34 GDF (with 25 *Super-Fledermaus* fire-control radar)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9P/S *Sidewinder*; *Python 4* (reported);

IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II*; **SARH** AIM-7P *Sparrow*; **ARH** (AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US)

ASM: AGM-65B/G *Maverick*; AGM-114K/L *Hellfire*;

AGM-154A/C JSOW

AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon*; AM39 *Exocet*

BOMBS

INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Laser-guided *Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400 active

Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts); 500 auxiliaries (total 6,100)

Singapore Gurkha Contingent 1,800

Under the Police

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

6 paramilitary coy

DEPLOYMENT

AUSTRALIA: 2 trg schools – 1 with 12 AS332M1 *Super Puma*/AS532UL *Cougar* (flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC-21 (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area

BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det with AS332M1 *Super Puma*

FRANCE: 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 *Master*

TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)

THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr)

UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D *Apache*; 6+ CH-47D *Chinook*


FOREIGN FORCES

United States US Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya Lebar air base

Sri Lanka LKA

Sri Lankan Rupee LKR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LKR	15.0tr	16.3tr	
	USD	80.7bn	80.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,682	3,666	
Growth	%	-3.6	3.6	
Inflation	%	4.6	5.1	
Def bdgt	LKR	312bn	308bn	
	USD	1.68bn	1.53bn	
USD1=LKR		185.54	201.32	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 23,044,123

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.6%	3.9%	3.5%	3.6%	21.5%	4.6%
Female	11.1%	3.8%	3.4%	3.5%	23.0%	6.4%

Capabilities

Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces have reoriented to a peacetime internal-security role. Support has been provided by China, in an indication of a growing military-to-military relationship. The US has eased its long-standing military trade restrictions and Japan has stated an intention to increase maritime cooperation. Sri Lanka has little capacity for force projection beyond its national territory but has sent small numbers of troops on UN missions. The navy's littoral capability, based on fast-attack and patrol boats, has been strengthened with the acquisition of offshore-patrol vessels, while the US has gifted a former US coastguard cutter and China has gifted a frigate. The army is reducing in size and there appears to have been little spending on new equipment since the end of the civil war. Sri Lanka is looking to begin a series of procurements to fill key capability gaps but ambitions are limited by budget constraints. Beyond maintenance facilities and limited fabrication, such as at Sri Lanka's shipyards, there is no defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 255,000 (Army 177,000 Navy 50,000 Air 28,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 62,200

RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 113,000; 64,00 active reservists (recalled) (total 177,000)

Regt are bn sized

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

7 region HQ
21 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 indep SF bde

MANOEVRE

Reconnaissance

3 armd recce regt

Armoured

1 armd bde(-)

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde

Light

60 inf bde

1 cdo bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air mob bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

7 arty regt

1 MRL regt

8 engr regt

6 sigs regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2

RECCE 15 *Saladin*

IFV 62+: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2; WZ-551 20mm

APC 211+

APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89

APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 *Buffel*; 20 WZ-551; 105 *Unicorn*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 16 VT-55

VLB 2 MT-55

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MANPATS HJ-8

RCL 40: 105mm ϵ 10 M-65; 106mm ϵ 30 M40

GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 908

TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46 Type-66 (D-20)

MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70

MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium 1 *Seeker*

Navy ϵ 37,000; ϵ 13,000 active reserves (total 50,000)

Seven naval areas

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1

FFH 1 *Parakramabahu* (ex-PRC Type-053H2G (*Jiangwei* I)) with 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 120

PSOH 4: 1 *Gajabahu* (ex-US *Hamilton*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel); 1 *Sayura* (ex-IND *Sukanya*); 2 *Sayurata* (IND *Samarth*)

PCO 2: 1 *Samudura* (ex-US *Reliance*); 1 *Sagara* (IND *Vikram*) with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 3: 1 *Jayasagara*; 2 *Nandimithra* (ISR *Sa'ar* 4) with 1 76mm gun

PBF 74: 26 *Colombo*; 6 *Shaldag*; 4 *Super Dvora* Mk II; 6 *Super Dvora* Mk III; 5 *Trinity Marine*; 27 *Wave Rider*

PB 11: 2 *Mihikatha* (ex-AUS *Bay*); 2 *Prathapa* (PRC mod *Haizhui*); 3 *Ranajaya* (PRC *Haizhui*); 1 *Ranarisi* (PRC mod *Shanghai* II); 3 *Weeraya* (PRC *Shanghai* II)

PBR 26

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • **LSM** 1 *Shakthi* (PRC *Yuhai*) (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 5

LCM 2

LCU 2 *Yunnan*

UCAC 1 **M** 10 (capacity 56 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: 2 **AP**; 1 **AX**

Marines €500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Special Boat Service €100

Reserve Organisations

Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force (SLVNF) 13,000 active reservists

Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt)

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with *F-7BS/G*; *FT-7*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Kfir* C-2

1 sqn with *K-8 Karakorum**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *An-32B Cline*; *C-130K Hercules*; *Cessna 421C Golden Eagle*

1 sqn with *Beech B200 King Air*; *Y-12* (II)

TRAINING

1 wg with *PT-6*, *Cessna 150L*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with *Mi-24V Hind* E; *Mi-35P Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with *Mi-17 Hip* H; *Mi-171Sh*

1 sqn with *Bell 206A/B* (incl basic trg), *Bell 212*

1 (VIP) sqn with *Bell 212*; *Bell 412 Twin Huey*

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Blue Horizon* II

1 sqn with *Searcher* MkII

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (SLAF) sy regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable

FT 5: 3 *F-7GS*; 2 *FT-7* (3 *F-7BS*; 1 *F-7GS* non-operational)

FGA 1 *Kfir* C-2 (2 *Kfir* C-2; 1 *Kfir* C-7; 2 *Kfir* TC-2; 6 *MiG-27M Flogger* J; 1 *MiG-23UB Flogger* C non-operational)

TPT 20: **Medium** 2 *C-130K Hercules*; **Light** 18: 3 *An-32B Cline*; 6 *Cessna 150L*; 1 *Cessna 421C Golden Eagle*; 6 *Y-12* (II); 2 *Y-12* (IV)

TRG 13: 7 *K-8 Karakorum**; 6 **PT-6**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11: 6 *Mi-24P Hind*; 3 *Mi-24V Hind* E; 2 *Mi-35V Hind*
MRH 18: 6 *Bell 412 Twin Huey* (VIP); 2 *Bell 412EP* (VIP); 10 *Mi-17 Hip* H

TPT 16: **Medium** 4 *Mi-171Sh*; **Light** 12: 2 *Bell 206A Jet Ranger*; 2 *Bell 206B Jet Ranger*; 8 *Bell 212*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** 2+: some *Blue Horizon* II; 2 *Searcher* MkII

AIR DEFENCE • **GUNS** • **TOWED** 27: 40mm 24 L/40; 94mm 3 (3.7in)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** PL-5E

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €62,200

Home Guard 13,000

National Guard €15,000

Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total 31,200) 30,400 reservists

Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000

Anti-guerrilla unit

Coast Guard n/k

Ministry of Defence

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28

PCO 1 *Suraksha* (ex-IND *Vikram*) with 1 hel landing platform

PBF 22: 2 *Dvora*; 4 *Super Dvora* Mk I; 3 *Killer* (ROK); 10 (Inshore Patrol Craft); 3 (Fast Patrol Craft)

PB 4: 2 *Simonneau* Type-508; 2 *Samudra Raksha*

PBR 1

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 113; 1 hel sqn

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 123; 1 inf coy

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 242; 1 sy coy

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 66; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC

New Taiwan Dollar TWD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TWD	19.8tr	22.0tr	
	USD	668bn	786bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	28,358	33,402	
Growth	%	3.1	5.9	
Inflation	%	-0.2	1.6	
Def bdtg	TWD	411bn	453bn	472bn
	USD	13.9bn	16.2bn	
USD1=TWD		29.58	27.96	



Population 23,572,052

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	6.4%	2.5%	3.2%	3.5%	26.3%	7.5%
Female	6.0%	2.3%	3.1%	3.4%	26.8%	9.1%

Capabilities

Taiwan's security policy is dominated by its relationship with China and its attempts to sustain a credible military capability. Taiwan's current focus is on air defence and deterrence in coastal areas, on both sides of the island. The 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for the first time mentioned the need to counter the grey zone threat from China's People's Liberation Army. The armed forces are well trained and exercise regularly. Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force, which the 2021 QDR credited for helping the armed forces reach its planned 'goal of [a] 90% manning ratio'. Taiwan's main security partnership is with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act from 1979 states that the US 'shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character'. In 2019, the US approved the transfer of new F-16C/D Block 70 combat aircraft to Taiwan. Taipei maintains an interest in the F-35. In late 2020 the US issued notifications regarding the possible sale of MQ-9B UAVs, HIMARS launchers and a variety of long-range precision-strike missiles which, if these sales proceeded, would significantly boost Taiwan's military capabilities. Nonetheless, Taiwan is modernising its existing holdings and developing its domestic defence industry through increased funding and the development of new weapons programmes. In 2021, the government proposed further spending amounting to USD9 billion in addition to its defence budget in order to fund domestic weapons R&D and production spending. The proposal is yet to be approved by the Legislative Yuan. The government launched a new defence-industrial policy in 2019, aimed at strengthening defence-manufacturing capacities. Taiwan's defence-industrial base has strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles.

ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 94,000 Navy 40,000 Air 35,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800

Conscript liability (19–40 years) 12 months for those born before 1993; four months for those born after 1994 (alternative service available)

RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000 Air Force 90,000)

Some obligation to age 30

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 1 *Formosat-5*

Army 94,000 (incl €5,000 MP)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

3 corps HQ
5 defence comd HQ

SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER

1 SF/hel comd (5 spec ops bn, 2 hel bde)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

4 armd bde

Mechanised

3 mech inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty gp
3 engr gp
3 CBRN gp
3 sigs gp

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 AShM bn

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

27 inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 650: 200 M60A3; 450 CM-11 *Brave Tiger* (M48H); (100 CM-12 in store)

LT TK €100 M41A3/D

IFV 257: 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon); 32 CM-34 *Yunpao*

APC 1,318

APC (T) 650 M113

APC (W) 668: 368 CM-32 *Yunpao*; 300 LAV-150 *Commando*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 18 M9

ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1

VLB 22 M3; M48A5

NBC VEHICLES 48+: BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP TOW

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; TOW

RCL 500+: **90mm** M67; **106mm** 500+: 500 M40A1; Type-51 **ARTILLERY** 2,093

SP 488: **105mm** 100 M108; **155mm** 318: 225 M109A2/A5; 48 M44T; 45 T-69; **203mm** 70 M110

TOWED 1,060+: **105mm** 650 T-64 (M101); **155mm** 340+: 90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; **203mm** 70 M115

MRL 223: **117mm** 120 *Kung Feng* VI; **126mm** 103: 60 *Kung Feng* III/*Kung Feng* IV; 43 RT 2000 *Thunder*

MOR 322+

SP 162+: 81mm 72+: M29; 72 M125; **107mm** 90 M106A2
TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; **107mm** M30; **120mm**
 K5; XT-86

COASTAL DEFENCE

ARTY 54: **127mm** ε50 US Mk32 (reported); **240mm** 4 M1
 AShM *Ching Feng*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 96: 67 AH-1W *Cobra*; 29 AH-64E *Apache*
MRH 38 OH-58D *Kiowa Warrior*
TPT 38: **Heavy** 8 CH-47SD *Super D Chinook*; **Medium** 30
 UH-60M *Black Hawk*
TRG 29 TH-67 *Creek*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light *Mastiff III*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 76+: 74 M1097 *Avenger*; 2 M48
Chaparral; FIM-92 *Stinger*

GUNS

SP 40mm M42
TOWED 40mm L/70

Navy 40,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES • SSK 4:**

2 *Hai Lung* with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L
Harpoon Block II AShM/SUT HWT
 2 *Hai Shih* (ex-US *Guppy II* (used in trg role)) with 10
 single 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26

DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 *Keelung* (ex-US *Kidd*) with
 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II AShM, 2
 twin Mk 26 GMLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 2 triple
 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70
 ASW hel)

FRIGATES 22**FFGHM 21:**

- 8 *Cheng Kung* (US *Oliver Hazard Perry* mod) with 2
 quad Inchr with *Hsiung Feng II/III* AShM, 1 Mk
 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple
 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk
 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity
 2 S-70C ASW hel)
- 2 *Meng Chuan* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1
 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84 *Harpoon* AShM/SM-
 1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B
 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel)
- 5 *Chin Yang* (ex-US *Knox*) with 1 octuple Mk 16 Inchr
 with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM/ASROC
 A/S msl, 2 triple Inchr with SM-1MR Block VI
 SAM, 2 twin Inchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2
 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun
 (capacity 1 MD-500 hel)
- 6 *Kang Ding* with 2 quad Inchr with *Hsiung Feng II*
 AShM, 1 quad Inchr with *Sea Chaparral* SAM, 2
 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,

1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun
 (capacity 1 S-70C ASW hel)

FFGH 1 *Chin Yang* (ex-US *Knox*) with 1 octuple Mk 112
 Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM, 2 twin
 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-
 500 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44

CORVETTES • FSGM 1 *Ta Jiang* (*Tuo Jiang* mod) with 4
 twin Inchr with *Hsiung Feng II* AShM, 2 twin Inchr with
Hsiung Feng III AShM, 2 octuple Inchr with *Tien Chien 2N*
 (*Sea Sword II*) SAM, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun,
 1 hel landing platform

PCFG 1 *Tuo Jiang* (*Hsun Hai*) with 4 twin Inchr with
Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin Inchr with *Hsiung Feng*
III AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 Mk 15
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS; 1 76mm gun

PCG 10:

4 *Jin Chiang* with 2 twin Inchr with *Hsiung Feng II*
 AShM, 1 76mm gun

6 *Jin Chiang* with 1 twin Inchr with *Hsiung Feng III*
 AShM, 1 76mm gun

PCC 1 *Jin Chiang* (test platform)

PBG 31 *Kwang Hua* with 2 twin Inchr with *Hsiung Feng*
 II AShM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7

MHC 6: 4 *Yung Feng*; 2 *Yung Jin* (ex-US *Osprey*)

MSO 1 *Yung Yang* (ex-US *Aggressive*)

COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 *Kao Hsiung***AMPHIBIOUS**

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 1 *Shiu Hai*
 (ex-US *Anchorage*) with 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 hel
 landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360
 troops)

LANDING SHIPS**LST 6:**

4 *Chung Hai* (ex-US LST-524) (capacity 16 tanks; 200
 troops)

2 *Chung Ho* (ex-US *Newport*) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx*
 CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23
 AFVs, 400 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 44

LCM ε32 (various)

LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops)
 (minelaying capability)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9**AGOR 1** *Ta Kuan*

AOEH 1 *Panshieh* with 1 quad Inchr with *Sea Chaparral*
 SAM, 2 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 3 med hel)

AOE 1 *Wu Yi* with 1 quad Inchr with *Sea Chaparral* SAM,
 1 hel landing platform

ARS 2: 1 *Da Hu* (ex-US *Diver*); 1 *Da Juen* (ex-US *Bolster*)

ATF 4 *Ta Tung* (ex-US *Cherokee*)

Marines 10,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

2 mne bde

Other

1 (airfield def) sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

Some cbt spt unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 100 M60A3 TTS

AAV 202: 52 AAV-7A1; 150 LVTP-5A1

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 2 AAVR-7

ANIT-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm

ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE**

2 sqn with S-70C *Seahawk* (S-70C *Defender*)

1 sqn with MD-500 *Defender*

ISR UAV

1 bn with *Chung Shyang II*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS**

ASW 20 S-70C *Seahawk* (S-70C *Defender*)

MRH 10 MD-500 *Defender*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium
ε28 *Chung Shyang II*

Air Force 35,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

3 sqn with *Mirage* 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*

3 sqn with F-16A/B *Fighting Falcon*

3 sqn with F-16V(A/B) *Fighting Falcon*

5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D *Ching Kuo*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with P-3C *Orion*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with C-130HE *Tien Gian*

ISR

1 sqn with RF-5E *Tigereye*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with E-2T *Hawkeye*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with H225; UH-60M *Black Hawk*

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*

1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50;
S-70C *Black Hawk*

TRAINING

1 sqn with AT-3A/B *Tzu-Chung**

1 sqn with Beech 1900

1 (basic) sqn with T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 474 combat capable

FTR 216: 84 F-5E/F *Tiger II* (some in store); 77 F-16A/B
Fighting Falcon; 9 *Mirage* 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 46 *Mirage*
2000-5E (2000-5EI)

FGA 191: 127 F-CK-1C/D *Ching Kuo*; 64 F-16V(A/B)
Fighting Falcon

ASW 12 P-3C *Orion*

EW 1 C-130HE *Tien Gian*

ISR 7 RF-5E *Tigereye*

AEW&C 6 E-2T *Hawkeye*

TPT 33: **Medium** 19 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 10 Beech
1900; PAX 4: 1 B-737-800; 3 F-50

TRG 97: 55 AT-3A/B *Tzu-Chung**; 42 T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • **Medium** 17: 3 H225; 14 UH-60M *Black Hawk*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9J/P *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic 2*; *Shafrir*;
Sky Sword I; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder II* MICA IR; ARH
Mica RF; ARH AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM; *Sky Sword II*

ASM AGM-65A *Maverick*

AShM AGM-84 *Harpoon*

ARM *Sky Sword IIA*

LACM **Conventional** *Wan Chien*

BOMBS • **Laser-guided** GBU-12 *Paveway II*

Air Defence and Missile Command**FORCES BY ROLE****SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE**

1 GLCM bde (2 GLCM bn with *Hsiung Feng IIE*)

AIR DEFENCE

1 (792) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with *Tien Kung III*; 2 ADA
bn)

2 (793 & 794) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with *Tien Kung II*;

1 SAM bn with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3; 1 SAM bn with
MIM-23 *Hawk*)

1 (795) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3;
2 ADA bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS**

GLCM • **Conventional** ε12 *Hsiung Feng IIE*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 202+

Long-range 122+: 72+ M902 *Patriot* PAC-3; ε50 *Tien
Kung II*

Medium-range 50 MIM-23 *Hawk*

Short-range 30 RIM-7M *Sparrow* with *Skyguard*

Point-defence *Antelope*

GUNS • **20mm** some T-82; **35mm** 20+ GDF-006 with
Skyguard

MISSILE DEFENCE *Tien Kung III*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800**Coast Guard 11,800****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 168

PSOH 5: 1 *Chiayi*; 2 *Tainan*; 2 *Yilan*

PSO 6: 4 *Miaoli* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Ho Hsing*

PCF 3 *Anping* (*Tuo Jiang* mod)

PCO 14: 2 *Kinmen*; 2 *Mou Hsing*; 1 *Shun Hu* 1; 3 *Shun Hu*
7; 4 *Taichung*; 2 *Taipei*

PBF ε58 (various)

PB 82: 1 *Shun Hu* 6; ε81 (various)


FOREIGN FORCES

Singapore 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)

Thailand THA

Thai Baht THB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	THB	15.7tr	16.1tr	
	USD	502bn	546bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,188	7,809	
Growth	%	-6.1	1.0	
Inflation	%	-0.8	0.9	
Def bdgt	THB	214bn	215bn	203bn
	USD	6.84bn	7.27bn	
FMA (US)	USD	0m	0m	10m
USD1=THB		31.29	29.50	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 69,480,520

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.4%	3.1%	3.2%	3.6%	24.6%	5.9%
Female	8.0%	2.9%	3.2%	3.5%	26.3%	7.3%

Capabilities

Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces and its air force is one of the best equipped and trained in Southeast Asia. Facing an increasingly unstable regional-security environment, the Royal Thai Armed Forces are moving towards a greater emphasis on deterring external threats, while continuing their longstanding internal-security role, particularly in the country's far south, where a Malay-nationalist insurgency continues. The Vision 2026 defence-modernisation plan, approved by the defence council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces' planned capability improvements for the next decade. Thailand is classed as a major non-NATO ally by the US, but it has also developed closer defence ties with China since 2014. The armed forces regularly take part in international military exercises, notably the multinational annual *Cobra Gold* series with the US and some of its allies and security partners. Personnel continue to be deployed to the UNMISS mission in South Sudan. The military-modernisation effort includes development of a submarine capability, as well as the strengthening of anti-submarine-warfare capability and procurement of new surface ships. The armoured-vehicle fleet has been recapitalised with deliveries from China and Ukraine. Saab 340 AEW aircraft, *Gripen* combat aircraft and a new command-and-control system have improved air capability. In January 2020, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) issued a white paper which detailed further acquisition and upgrade requirements through the 2020s, including fighters, tactical-transport and VIP aircraft. The RTAF launched a space-operations centre in August 2019, a priority identified in the National Strategy 2018–37 development programme. Under its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government indicates that expanding Thailand's presently limited defence sector could be an important way to develop military capability. More broadly, the government is making efforts to reform defence procurement and offsets by expanding the role of its Defence Technology Institute.

ACTIVE 360,850 (Army 245,000 Navy 69,850 Air 46,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 93,700

Conscription liability 24 months

RESERVE 200,000 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 45,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 130,000; €115,000 conscript (total 245,000)

Cav, lt armd, recce and tk sqn are bn sized

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 4 (regional) army HQ
- 3 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF div
- 1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 1 (3rd) mech cav div (2 tk regt (2 tk sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn)

Mechanised

- 1 (1st) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 indep mech cav sqn; 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn)
- 1 (2nd) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 (1st & 5th) mech cav regt (1 tk sqn, 2 mech cav sqn); 1 (4th) mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn)

- 1 (2nd) mech inf div (1 armd recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)

- 1 (11th) mech inf div (2 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)

Light

- 1 (1st) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (3rd) inf div (3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (4th) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (5th) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (6th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (7th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (2 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (9th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
- 1 (15th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 arty div (1 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 fd arty bn); 1 arty regt (1 MRL bn; 2 fd arty bn))

- 1 engr div

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 4 economic development div

HELICOPTER

- Some hel flt

ISR UAV

- 1 UAV bn with *Hermes 450*; *Searcher II*

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 ADA div (6 bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURIED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 370: 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; 105 M48A5; 49 T-84 *Oplot*; 38 VT-4; (50 Type-69 in store)

LT TK 194: 24 M41; 104 *Scorpion* (50 in store); 66 *Stingray*
RECCE 32 S52 *Shorland*

IFV 220: 168 BTR-3E1; 52 VN-1 (incl variants)

APC 1,190

APC (T) 880: *Bronco*; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85

APC (W) 210: 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18 *Condor*; 142 LAV-150 *Commando*; 35 M1126 *Stryker* ICV
PPV 100 REVA

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 58+: 2 BREM-84 *Atlet*; 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; WZT-4

VLB Type-84

MW *Bozena*; *Giant Viper*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK

MANPATS M47 *Dragon*

RCL 180: **75mm** 30 M20; **106mm** 150 M40

ARTILLERY 2,567

SP 155mm 42: 16 ATMOS-2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5
TOWED 525: **105mm** 296: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200 M101A1; 60 L119 Light Gun; (12 M102; 32 M618A2 in store); **155mm** 229: 90 GHN-45 A1; 118 M198; 21 M-71 (48 M114 in store)

MRL 68: **122mm** 4 SR-4; **130mm** 60 PHZ-85; **302mm** 4: 1 DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32)

MOR 1,932+: **SP 81mm** 39: 18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; **SP 107mm** M106A3; **SP 120mm** 26: 8 BTR-3M2; 6+ Elbit *Spear*; 12 M1064A3; 1,867 **81mm/107mm/120mm**

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 22: 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2 Beech 1900C; 1 C-212 *Aviocar*; 1 C295W; 3 Cessna 182T *Skylane*; 9 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 *Jetstream* 41

TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 *Star Rocket*; 22 T-41B *Mescalero*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 7 AH-1F *Cobra*

MRH 20: 8 AS550 *Fennec*; 2 AW139; 10 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT 123: **Heavy** 5 CH-47D *Chinook*; **Medium** 12: 9 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; 3 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; **Light** 106: 27 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 52 Bell 212 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A *Lakota*

TRG 53 Hughes 300C

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium 4+: 4 *Hermes* 450; *Searcher*; *Searcher* II

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 8+

Short-range *Aspide*

Point-defence 8+: 8 *Starstreak*; 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS 192

SP 54: **20mm** 24 M163 *Vulcan*; **40mm** 30 M1/M42 SP

TOWED 138: **20mm** 24 M167 *Vulcan*; **35mm** 8 GDF-007 with *Skyguard* 3; **37mm** 52 Type-74; **40mm** 48 L/70; **57mm** 6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more non-operational)

Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines, Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total 69,850)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 8

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1 *Chakri Naruebet* with 3 sextuple *Sadral* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM (capacity 6 S-70B *Seahawk* ASW hel)

FRIGATES 7

FFGHM 3:

2 *Naresuan* with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 1 8 cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* 300 hel)

1 *Bhumibol Adulyadej* (DW3000F) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFG 4:

2 *Chao Phraya* (trg role) with 4 twin Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

2 *Chao Phraya* with 4 twin Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 2 RBU 1200 *Uragan* A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 92**CORVETTES** 7:

FSGM 2 *Rattanakosin* with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with *Stingray* LWT, 1 76mm gun

FSG 1 *Krabi* (UK *River* mod) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM, 1 76mm gun

FS 4:

1 *Makut Rajakumarn* with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 114mm gun

1 *Pin Klao* (ex-US *Cannon*) (trg role) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 3 76mm gun

2 *Tapi* with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun

PSO 1 *Krabi* (UK *River* mod) with 1 76mm gun

PCFG 4: 3 *Prabparapak* with 2 single Inchr with *Gabriel* I ASHM, 1 triple Inchr with *Gabriel* I ASHM, 1 57mm gun; 1 *Ratcharit* with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PCT 3 *Khamronsin* with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with *Stingray* LWT, 1 76mm gun

PCOH 2 *Pattani* (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun

PCO 4: 3 *Hua Hin* with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun Boat with 1 76mm gun

PCC 9: 3 *Chon Buri* with 2 76mm gun; 6 *Sattahip* with 1 76mm gun

PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops)

PB 58: 1 T-11 (US PGM-71); 3 T-81; 6 T-91; 5 M36 Patrol Boat; 13 T-213; 1 T-227; 23 M21 Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; 3 T-994

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17

MCCS 1 *Thalang*

MCO 2 *Lat Ya*

MCC 2 *Bang Rachan*

MSR 12: 7 T1; 5 T6

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 *Angthong* (SGP *Endurance*) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 19 MBT; 500 troops)

LANDING SHIPS 2

LST 2 *Sichang* with 2 hel landing platform (capacity 14 MBT; 300 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 14

LCU 9: 3 *Man Nok*; 2 *Mataphun* (capacity either 3–4 MBT or 250 troops); 4 *Thong Kaeo*

LCM 2

UCAC 3 *Griffon* 1000TD

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

ABU 1 *Suriya*

AGOR 1 *Sok*

AGS 2: 1 *Chanthara*; 1 *Paruehatsabodi*

AOL 5: 1 *Matra* with 1 hel landing platform; 2 *Proet*; 1 *Prong*; 1 *Samui*

AOR 1 *Chula*

AORH 1 *Similan* (capacity 1 hel)

AWT 2

Naval Aviation 1,200**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

ASW 2 P-3A *Orion* (P-3T)

ISR 9 *Sentry* O-2-337

MP 1 F-27-200 MPA*

TPT • **Light** 15: 7 Do-228-212; 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 F-27-400M *Troopship*; 3 N-24A *Searchmaster*; 1 UP-3A *Orion* (UP-3T)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 8: 6 S-70B *Seahawk*; 2 *Super Lynx* 300

MRH 2 MH-60S *Knight Hawk*

TPT 18: **Medium** 2 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST); **Light** 16: 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 5 H145M; 5 S-76B

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM AGM-84 *Harpoon*

Marines 23,000**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

1 mne div HQ

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 recce bn

Light

2 inf regt (total: 6 bn)

Amphibious

1 amph aslt bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt (3 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

IFV 14 BTR-3E1

APC • APC (W) 24 LAV-150 *Commando*

AAV 33 LVTP-7

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 1 AAVR-7

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 10 M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW

MANPATS M47 *Dragon*; TOW

RCL • SP 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 54

SP 155mm 6 ATMOS-2000

TOWED 48: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 12 GC-45

AIR DEFENCE

SAM Point-defence QW-18

GUNS 12.7mm 14

Naval Special Warfare Command**Air Force €46,000**

4 air divs, one flying trg school

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

2 sqn with F-5E/5F *Tiger* II

3 sqn with F-16A/B *Fighting Falcon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Gripen* C/D

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Alpha Jet**

1 sqn with AU-23A *Peacemaker*

1 sqn with T-50TH *Golden Eagle**

ELINT/ISR

1 sqn with DA42 MPP *Guardian*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Saab 340B; Saab 340 *Erieye*

TRANSPORT

1 (Royal Flight) sqn with A319CJ; A340-500; B-737-800

1 sqn with ATR-72; BAe-748

1 sqn with BT-67

1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 sqn with CT-4A/B *Airtrainer*; T-41D *Mescalero*

1 sqn with CT-4E *Airtrainer*

1 sqn with PC-9

1 sqn with H135

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

1 sqn with Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; S-92A

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 123 combat capable

FTR 76: 1 F-5B *Freedom Fighter*; 20 F-5E *Tiger* II; 2 F-5F *Tiger* II (F-5E/F being upgraded); 1 F-5TH(E) *Tiger* II; 1 F-5TH(F) *Tiger* II; 37 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*; 14 F-16B *Fighting Falcon*

FGA 11: 7 *Gripen* C; 4 *Gripen* D

ATK 16 AU-23A *Peacemaker*

ISR 5 DA42 MPP *Guardian*

AEW&C 2 Saab 340 *Erieye*

ELINT 2 Saab 340 *Erieye* (COMINT/ELINT)

TPT 42: **Medium** 14: 6 C-130H *Hercules*; 6 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 Saab 340B; **Light** 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200 *King Air*; 8 BT-67; 1 *Commander* 690; 6 DA42M; **PAX** 7: 1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 3 SSJ-100-95LR (1 A310-324 in store)

TRG 87: 16 *Alpha Jet**; 13 CT-4A *Airtrainer*; 6 CT-4B *Airtrainer*; 20 CT-4E *Airtrainer*; 21 PC-9; 7 T-41D *Mescalero*; 4 T-50TH *Golden Eagle**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*; 1 Bell 412HP *Twin Huey*; 6 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

CSAR 8 H225M *Super Cougar*

TPT 23: **Medium** 3 S-92A *Super Hawk*; **Light** 20: 17 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 3 H135

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • **ISR** • **Light** U-1 AIR DEFENCE

SAM **Medium-range** 3+ KS-1C (CH-SA-12)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9P/S *Sidewinder*; *Python* 3; **IIR** IRIS-T; *Python* 5 (reported); **ARH** AIM-120 AMRAAM; *Derby* (reported)

ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*

ASHm RBS15F

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Paveway* II

INS/GPS-guided GBU-38 JDAM

Royal Security Command

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf regt (3 inf bn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €93,700

Border Patrol Police 20,000

Marine Police 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 101

PCO 1 *Srinakrin*

PCC 2 *Hameln*

PB 52: 1 *Chasanyabadee*; 3 *Cutlass*; 2 M25; 2 *Ratayapibanbancha* (*Reef Ranger*); 1 *Sriyanont*; 2 *Wasuthep*; 41 (various)

PBR 46

National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 – Reserves

Police Aviation 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable

ATK 6 AU-23A *Peacemaker*

TPT 16: **Light** 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 *Turbo-Porter*; 3 SC-7 3M *Skyvan*; 2 Short 330UTT; **PAX** 1 F-50

HELICOPTERS

MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 6 Bell 429

TPT • **Light** 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 20 Bell 212 (AB-212)

Provincial Police 50,000 (incl €500 Special Action Force)

Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000

Volunteer irregular force

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy)

DEPLOYMENT

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 5

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 276; 1 engr coy


FOREIGN FORCES

United States US Pacific Command: 100

Timor-Leste TLS

US Dollar USD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD	1.78bn	1.70bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,348	1,263	
Growth	%	-7.6	1.8	
Inflation	%	0.5	1.6	
Def bdgt	USD	41.7m	39.2m	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 1,413,958

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.4%	5.5%	4.8%	3.8%	13.5%	2.0%
Female	19.2%	5.3%	4.7%	4.0%	14.7%	2.1%

Capabilities

The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established in 2001. The F-FDTL was reconstituted in the wake of fighting between regional factions in the security forces in 2006, but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007. In 2016, the government published a Strategic Defence and Security Concept (SDSC). This outlined the roles of the F-FDTL as including the protection of the country from external threats and combating violent crime. However, this parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought it into conflict with the national police force. The SDSC also stated that the F-FDTL needs to improve its naval capabilities, owing to the size of Timor-Leste's exclusive economic zone. The origins of the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force, and continuing training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity infantry tactics, mean that the force provides a deterrent to invasion. The F-FDTL has received training from Australian and US personnel. Australia is also donating two *Guardian*-class patrol vessels as part of its Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement programme; these are due to arrive in 2023. Maintenance capacity is limited and the country has no defence industry.

ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 2,200

Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying 1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities are engaged in developing security structures with international assistance

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Light**

2 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP pl

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log spt coy


Naval Element 80**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5**PB 5: 2 *Dili* (ex-ROK); 2 *Shanghai II*; 1 *Kamenassa* (ex-ROK *Chamsuri*)**Air Component****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172

Vietnam VNM

Vietnamese Dong VND		2020	2021	2022
GDP	VND	7966tr	8390tr	
	USD	343bn	368bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,523	3,743	
Growth	%	2.9	3.8	
Inflation	%	3.2	2.0	
Def bdgt	VND	€133tr	€145tr	
	USD	€5.73bn	€6.35bn	
FMA (US)	USD	45.0m	10.9m	12.0m
USD1=VND		23217.71	22798.35	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 102,789,598

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	3.8%	3.7%	4.2%	22.9%	2.9%
Female	11.3%	3.6%	3.5%	4.0%	23.1%	4.3%

Capabilities

Vietnam has a stronger military tradition, and its armed forces have more operational experience, than many of its neighbours. Its defence efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular support, particularly in the context of tensions with China over conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a new Law on National Defence in 2018 and issued a defence white paper in 2019. The latter referred several times to Vietnam's differences with China and the need for both sides to 'put more effort into maintaining stability'. It is evident, from Hanoi's perspective, that stability will depend in good measure on Vietnam bolstering its deterrent capabilities in the South China Sea. This explains the emphasis on strengthening naval and air capabilities, including development of an advanced submarine capability and procurement of new ISR, air-defence and naval anti-surface systems to boost the capacity for anti-access/area-denial operations in Vietnam's maritime littoral. While Russia continues to be the dominant

defence supplier, Washington lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, and New Delhi and Seoul are understood to be seeking inroads into Vietnam's defence market. Long-expected orders for new combat aircraft and maritime-patrol aircraft have failed to materialise so far, though Vietnam ordered a Japanese-produced satellite-based surveillance system in April 2020 and L-39NG jet trainers from the Czech Republic in February 2021. The US Air Force also agreed to supply Vietnam with three Beechcraft T-6 *Texan II* turboprop trainers in June 2021, and has enhanced the country's coastguard capabilities with three ex-*Hamilton*-class vessels. Vietnam is developing its limited defence-industrial capacities with the launch of a defence-focused subsidiary to state-owned Viettel Military Industry and Telecoms Group. Called Viettel High Technology Industries Corporation, it focuses on defence electronics and communications.

ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air 30,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years

RESERVES Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000,000**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Space****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat

Army €412,000

8 Mil Regions (incl capital)

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

4 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt)

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

10 tk bde

Mechanised

2 mech inf div

Light

23 inf div

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

1 SRBM bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

13 arty bde

1 arty regt

11 engr bde

1 engr regt

1 EW unit

3 sigs bde

2 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

9 economic construction div

1 log regt

1 med unit

1 trg regt

AIR DEFENCE

11 AD bde

Reserve**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

9 inf div

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 1,383: 45 T-34; 850 T-54/T-55; 4+ T-54B mod; 70 T-62; 64 T-90S; 350 Type-59;

LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63

RECCE 100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

IFV 300 BMP-1/BMP-2

APC 1,380+

APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be upgraded); 80 Type-63

APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IMR-2

ARV BREM-1M

VLB TMM-3

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTUREMSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9M14 mod

RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type-51 GUNS

SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122

TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944

ARTILLERY 3,040+SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 30 2S3 *Akatsiya*; 175mm M107

TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type-54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; 155mm M114

MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 *Grad*; 140mm BM-14

MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERSSRBM • Coventional 9K72/9K77 (RS-SS-1C/D *Scud B/C*)**AIR DEFENCE**SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Ginlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*) GUNS 12,000

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm

Navy €40,000 (incl €27,000 Naval Infantry)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 8**SSK 6 *Hanoi* (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved *Kilo*)) with 6 533mm TT with 3M14E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) ASHM (*Klub-S* ASHM variant unclear)/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT SSW 2 *Yugo* (DPRK)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 75****CORVETTES 12:****FSGM 5:**1 BPS-500 with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM (manually operated), 2 twin 533mm TT, 1 RBU 1600 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun2 *Dinh Tien Hoang* (RUS *Gepard* 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 3M89E *Palma* (*Palash*) CIWS with *Sosna-R* SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform2 *Tran Hung Dao* (RUS *Gepard* 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*), 1 3M89E *Palma* (*Palash*) CIWS with *Sosna-R* SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-53M HWT, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platformFSG 1 *Po Hang* (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 76mm guns**FS 6:**3 Project 159A (ex-FSU *Petya* II) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun2 Project 159AE (ex-FSU *Petya* III) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SET-53ME HWT, 4 RBU 2500 *Smerch* 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun1 *Po Hang* (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 76mm guns**PCFGM 12:**4 Project 1241RE (*Tarantul* I) with 2 twin Inchr with P-15 *Termit-R* (RS-SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun8 Project 12418 (*Tarantul* V) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCO 7: 1 Project FC264; 6 TT-400TP with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCC 6 *Svetlyak* (Project 1041.2) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gunPBF 8 Project 205 (*Osa* II) with 4 single Inchr with P-20U (SS-N-2B *Styx*) ASHMPBFT 1+ *Shershen*† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TTPH 2 *Shtorm* (ex-FSU Project 206M (*Turya*))† with 1 twin 57mm gunPHT 3 *Shtorm* (ex-FSU Project 206M (*Turya*))† with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT, 1 twin 57mm gunPB 20: 14 *Zhuk* (*Grif-M*)†; 4 *Zhuk* (mod); 2 TP-01PBR 4 *Stolkraft***MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13**MSO 2 *Akvamaren* (Project 266 (*Yurka*))MSC 4 *Sonya* (Project 1265 (*Yakhont*))MHI 2 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yeogenya*))

MSR 5 K-8

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS 7**LST 2 *Tran Khanh Du* (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops)**LSM 5:**1 *Polnochmy* A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)2 *Polnochmy* B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)2 *Nau Dinh***LANDING CRAFT • LCM 13**

8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops)

4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops)

1 VDN-150

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22

AGS 1 *Tran Dai Nia* (Damen Research Vessel 6613)
AH 1 *Khanh Hoa* (*Truong Sa* mod)
AKR 4 Damen Stan Lander 5612
AKSL 10+
AP 1 *Truong Sa*
ASR 1 *Yết Kiêu* (Damen Rescue Gear Ship 9316)
AT 2
AWT 1
AXS 1 *Le Quy Don*

Naval Infantry €27,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK PT-76; Type-63
APC • **APC (W)** BTR-60

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

3 AshM bde
 1 coastal arty bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • **AshM** 4K44 *Redut* (RS-SSC-1B *Sepal*); 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*); K-300P *Bastion-P* (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*)

ARTILLERY • **MRL** 160mm *AccuLAR-160*; **306mm** EXTRA

Navy Air Wing**FORCES BY ROLE****ASW/SAR**

1 regt with H225; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) *Helix A*; Ka-32 *Helix C*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** • **Light** 6 DHC-6-400 *Twin Otter*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 10 Ka-28 *Helix A*
TPT • **Medium** 4: 2 H225; 2 Ka-32 *Helix C*

Air Force 30,000

3 air div, 1 tpt bde

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

3 regt with Su-22M3/M4/UM *Fitter* (some ISR)
 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK *Flanker*
 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK *Flanker*; Su-30MK2 *Flanker*
 2 regt with Su-30MK2 *Flanker*

TRANSPORT

2 regt with An-2 *Colt*; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; M-28 *Bryza*; C295M

TRAINING

1 regt with L-39 *Albatros*
 1 regt with Yak-52

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 regt with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-171; Mi-24 *Hind*

AIR DEFENCE

6 AD div HQ
 2 SAM regt with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
 3 SAM regt with *Spyder-MR*
 3 SAM regt with S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
 4 SAM regt with S-125-2TM *Pechora-2TM*

2 SAM regt with S-125M *Pechora-M*

4 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 78 combat capable

FGA 72: 26 Su-22M3/M4/UM *Fitter* (some ISR); 6 Su-27SK *Flanker*; 5 Su-27UBK *Flanker B*; 35 Su-30MK2 *Flanker G*
TPT • **Light** 12: 6 An-2 *Colt*; 3 C295M; 1 M-28 *Bryza*; 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (NC-212i)

TRG 53: 17 L-39 *Albatros*; 6 Yak-130 *Mitten**; 30 Yak-52

HELICOPTERS

MRH 6 Mi-17 *Hip H*

TPT 28: **Medium** 17: 14 Mi-8 *Hip*; 3 Mi-171; **Light** 11 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 98+:

Long-range 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

Medium-range 65: €25 S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); €30 S-125-2TM *Pechora-2TM*; €10 *Spyder-MR*

Short-range 21+: 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 21 S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)

ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

AshM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)

ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000+ active**Border Defence Corps €40,000****Coast Guard****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79+

PSOH 2 *Hamilton* (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

PSO 4 DN2000 (Damen 9014)

PCO 13+: 1 *Mazinger* (ex-ROK); 9 TT-400; 3+ other

PCC 2 *Hae Uri* (ex-ROK)

PBF 28: 26 MS-50S; 2 *Shershen*

PB 30: 1 MS-50; approx 14 TT-200; 14 TT-120; 1 other

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5

AFS 1

ATF 4 Damen Salvage Tug

AIRCRAFT • **MP** 5 C-212-400 MPA

Local Forces €5,000,000 reservists

Incl People's Self-Defence Force (urban units) and People's Militia (rural units); comprises static and mobile cbt units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty, mor and AD guns; acts as reserve

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 68; 1 fd hospital


Middle East and North Africa

- Regional defence spending declined in real terms for the fourth consecutive year. While spending is the same as in 2017, in nominal terms, inflation rates averaging 6.9% annually mean that real-terms reductions have been sizeable, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021.
- The US Global Posture Review was expected to set out Washington’s thinking on its future dispositions in the region, though little change was announced on release and the review called for further study of regional requirements.
- In July 2021, the US announced that its combat mission in Iraq would come to a close by the end of the year, though some US forces would continue to operate in an advisory role. NATO had earlier announced that it was expanding its NATO Mission Iraq.
- The Abraham Accords normalised relations between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE, presaged increased security and defence cooperation and appeared to unlock important arms deals. In January, letters

of agreement were signed concerning a proposed UAE purchase of F-35A *Lightning II* combat aircraft. There have been bilateral meetings between defence officials and, in November, a small maritime-security exercise in the Red Sea involving the US and the three states.

- There is growing defence cooperation with extra-regional states. Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE increased diplomatic coordination and took part in the *Iniochos* air exercise in April. In late year France secured a major sale of 80 *Rafale* combat aircraft to the UAE. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also sent combat aircraft to Greece to take part in exercises.
- Egypt’s naval capabilities are growing. In 2021 a new naval base was opened at Ras Gargoub, while a fourth Type-209/1400 submarine and a second FREMM frigate (built by Italy’s Fincantieri) was commissioned. In October it was announced that Egypt would buy the UK’s two decommissioned *Fort Rosalie*-class logistics ships.


Saudi Arabia, real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)*




Note: Defence budget only – excludes security expenditure

Active military personnel – top 10


(25,000 per unit)




Egypt's growing naval capabilities




Middle East and North Africa: Fighter/Fighter Ground-Attack aircraft



Heavy and Medium Combat-UAVs and ISR UAVs



US deployments to Gulf countries: 2014–21



Middle East and North Africa

Tentative de-escalation took place on many fronts in the Middle East throughout 2021. After years of military engagement and regional brinkmanship, a combination of battlefield fatigue, geopolitical stalemate, the cost of the coronavirus pandemic and a new United States administration intent on reshaping the nature of its military involvement in the Middle East had a noticeable impact on the calculations and behaviour of regional and local powers. However, it was uncertain whether this reduction in violence and tension was sustainable, or whether it could lead to local and regional settlements. The US decision on its future involvement, however, will prove consequential for regional military postures. Between 2020 and 2021, Washington removed one THAAD and four *Patriot* missile-defence batteries from Saudi Arabia and in July 2021 announced that the US combat mission in Iraq would come to a close by the end of the year (though some US forces would continue to operate in an advisory role; NATO had earlier announced that it was expanding its NATO Mission Iraq). The Biden administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance – issued in March 2021 – said that the US will not engage in 'forever wars' and that it would, in the Middle East, 'right-size our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests'. The US Global Posture Review was released in late November 2021, but little detail was made public; the Pentagon was required to conduct 'additional analysis' on the future US regional posture.

The wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen

Nonetheless, conflict persisted across the broader region. Levels of violence in Yemen remained high during 2021. Soon after taking office, the Biden administration suspended all conflict-related military assistance and arms sales to Saudi Arabia and indicated that it would seek a negotiated end to the conflict. According to analysts, Riyadh itself had been keen to reduce its military involvement after failing to achieve its main goals but was unsure how to do so. Sensing this, during the year the Houthi rebel movement sought to capture the oil-rich and

strategically important city of Marib in central Yemen, the loss of which would be a significant blow to the anti-Houthi front. The vast majority of Saudi air operations took place around Marib in support of the loyalist forces defending it. Reports indicated that Houthi casualties were high, but nonetheless Houthi forces continued attacking in strength, leading some observers to consider that the rebel group may be seeking an outright victory instead of a settlement.

In parallel, the Houthis demonstrated increased missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities, conducting dozens of attacks against military and civilian targets on Saudi territory. The deployment of these capabilities showed continuous Iranian material inflows and support, as documented by United Nations and Western reports. The possibility that an attack could cause significant damage and loss of life and escalate into a regional conflict loomed over regional politics, prompting Saudi Arabia to seek upgrades to its air defences and to enter talks with Tehran.

Fighting persisted in Syria but there was no significant change along the key front-lines following intense fighting in late 2019 and early 2020. Russian and Turkish reluctance to engage in direct fighting ensured that regular clashes along the front-lines in Idlib did not escalate, though in some places this picture began to change towards the end of 2021. Regime forces generally focused on consolidating power in former rebel-held areas and on harassing villages in Idlib through artillery and rocket fire.

Southern Syria was also the scene of regime pressure. In areas nominally under its control since 2018, but where rebel forces had been given some autonomy under Russian supervision, Iranian expansion and regime brutality stirred tensions during summer 2021, culminating in sieges of towns and the expulsion of fighters and citizens supporting the rebellion. In Deraa, Russia deployed its own forces in early September as part of a plan to halt a government offensive and try to persuade rebel fighters to relocate to the north. An uneasy relationship continued in northeastern Syria between US-supported Kurdish forces, Russian- and Iranian-backed regime units and Turkish forces backed by Syrian proxies. The Islamic

State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) jihadi organisation remained subdued, conducting insurgent operations across eastern and central Syria.

A lack of resources meant that the Syrian Arab Army was still understaffed and underequipped, with reports of low morale. Military reform proceeded slowly and inconclusively, impeded by limited resources, the proliferation of militias, competition among security services and divergence between Iran and Russia. Moscow sought to promote leadership changes in the general staff and to empower loyal units, including the 5th Corps, which includes some former rebels, but its attempts were often countered by factions supported by Iran, most notably the Republican Guard and the 4th Division. There were similar divisions in the intelligence services: Military Intelligence, aligned with Russia, and Air Force Intelligence, backed by Iran, competed for influence, notably in southern Syria and around Damascus.

Foreign forces remained militarily active, though at a significantly lower tempo. US troops, numbering fewer than 1,000, focused on defeating ISIS, while Russia, which still maintained several thousand troops and advanced weapons systems, conducted operations in support of the Syrian regime. The Turkish Armed Forces relied on proxy forces to control territory in northern Syria but refrained from launching major operations against the Kurdish militia, which managed to consolidate its authority in eastern Syria. Israel and Iran were locked in a confrontation in which Israel conducted regular aerial attacks at night against the latter's forces and weapons shipments.

In Libya, a military stalemate emerged after eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar's campaign to seize the capital, supported by Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was beaten back in 2020 by his Tripoli-based, Turkey-backed rivals. This led to a UN-mediated, Western-supported political process that reduced violence considerably across the country throughout 2021. An internal agreement stipulated the departure of all foreign forces, but Libya remained an arena for competition. The deployment of advanced weapons systems that was observed in 2019 and 2020 mostly stopped, but Turkish and Russian forces maintained a presence in the country, while reports persist of the presence of mercenaries and personnel from private military companies. Another objective was security-sector reform and the integration of militias into a national force, but there was little movement on this, highlighting continuing mistrust

among warring factions. Much hinged on elections scheduled for December 2021, though the possibility that political brinkmanship and breakdown would lead to renewed fighting remained high.

Regional competition drives defence diplomacy and procurement

Regional states demonstrated more involvement out of area, with growing defence cooperation with external states, including participation in military exercises. The Eastern Mediterranean is a particular area of focus, having gained renewed strategic importance as Turkey competes against an informal and powerful grouping comprising Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE. Rooted in historical conflicts and territorial claims, this rivalry acquired a geopolitical boost due to the wars in Syria and Libya, the emergence of Russian military power in the arena and important gas and oil finds in the region.

Throughout 2020 and 2021, Turkey made maritime claims as part of its 'blue homeland' vision, an expansionist definition of its maritime domain that includes waters under Cypriot and Greek control. To sustain these claims, Turkey reached an agreement with the Libyan government and dispatched exploration and military vessels in contested areas. This led to several incidents, including a disagreement between France and Turkey over suspected shipments of weapons to Libya and other incidents with a NATO naval mission. In response, Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE increased diplomatic coordination and took part in the *Imiochos* air exercise in April. (Meanwhile, France and Greece agreed a strategic defence partnership that includes the purchase of naval vessels.) Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also dispatched combat aircraft to Greece to take part in exercises, while Greece sent a *Patriot* air-defence battery to Saudi Arabia for installation-protection duties.

Russia was another power demonstrating its regional military reach, as it continued to consolidate its presence in Syria. In May, Moscow deployed nuclear-capable Tu-22M3 *Backfire* C bomber aircraft at its Hmeimim air base, though the visit – and the maritime strike exercises the aircraft were reported as undertaking – could also have been timed to match the transit through the Eastern Mediterranean of the UK's Carrier Strike Group.

The Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE,

presaged increased security and defence cooperation and appeared to unlock important arms deals. The most significant was the signing in January of letters of agreement concerning a proposed UAE purchase of F-35A *Lightning* II combat aircraft, MQ-9B *Sky Guardian* UAVs and advanced missiles from the US, a deal with a potential value of USD23.27 billion. Despite some opposition in the US Congress, both the Trump and Biden administrations endorsed this sale perhaps in part to reward the UAE for its opening to Israel and in part to solidify their relations. Even then, questions were raised about whether the provision of such weaponry would erode the US commitment to maintain Israel's Qualitative Military Edge. Other critics worried that the UAE's growing relations with Russia and especially China would expose sensitive US technology to its geopolitical rivals and there were reports that the US was asking the UAE to remove Huawei equipment in advance of any sale. Nonetheless, the UAE and Saudi Arabia remained interested in deepening defence relations with both: there have been reports of contacts between Russia and the UAE concerning an unnamed combat-aircraft project, while both countries have

previously purchased Chinese systems, including missiles and UAVs (Saudi Arabia's rocket force is principally based around Chinese systems).

Air power remains a procurement focus in, for instance, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and Morocco, notably combat aircraft and rotary-wing modernisation. Examples include the significant order for 80 *Rafale* combat aircraft from France announced by the UAE in December, with an estimated value of around USD19bn, the order by the UAE for 10 AH-64E *Apache* attack helicopters and an upgrade package for 26 more, and Morocco's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract for 24 AH-64E *Apaches* in 2020. Interest in boosting regional maritime-security capacities is also growing. In September 2021, Bahrain agreed to partner with US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) to accelerate the integration of new unmanned systems into regional maritime operations. Between 2018 and 2020, Saudi Arabia placed orders for five *Avante* 2200 frigates from Spain, 39 HSI-32 patrol craft from France and four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant frigates from the US. In 2019, the UAE signed a deal for two *Gowind* 2500 frigates from France while the German Bundestag approved the sale of three

Lebanon

Lebanon's deteriorating economic situation and political paralysis have placed considerable pressure on an already strained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

With the government increasingly deprived of resources and legitimacy and facing street protests, road closures, attacks on state infrastructure and symbols, and inter-partisan scuffles, it has increasingly relied on the LAF for a variety of internal-security missions. Internal tasks like these have always been a prime role for the LAF, and the force has intervened across the country to defuse tensions and tackle local armed groups (including Islamist, Palestinian and criminal groups). Small units were dispatched across the country to defuse tensions and secure banks, bakeries and gas stations, and to deliver aid and identify traffickers. The latter task assumed greater urgency after 2020, with growing public pressure to reduce the approximately 30% of Lebanon's subsidised gasoline that was being smuggled to Syria.

The economic crisis in Lebanon began in earnest in 2019 and the country's debt levels reached 174% of GDP by the end of 2020. A liquidity crisis ensued when banks, having placed client deposits into the Central Bank (which in turn loaned it to an insolvent state), severely limited access to deposits. The IMF estimates that real GDP contracted by

7.28% in 2019 and 25.0% in 2020 as economic problems were compounded by lack of economic reform, donor fatigue and the significant financial costs of the port explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020. Debt repayments, suspended in 2020, had grown to account for one-third of Lebanon's annual budget, creating pressure on other areas of spending. The defence budget was significantly affected as a result, with knock-on effects in terms of reduced equipment investment and operational spending, lower readiness and lower morale. The defence budget was an estimated LBP2897bn (USD0.62bn) in 2020 with no details available for 2021 at the time of writing. In real terms, the 2020 budget was 37.9% lower than 2019 levels. Paid in Lebanese pounds, salaries for all public employees, including members of the military and security forces, have suffered as the currency has lost more than 90% of its value against the dollar since 2019. Rations, benefits and pensions are all reported to have been reduced. Fears were expressed that soldiers might seek additional employment or take leave to take on other jobs. In response, some politicians proposed augmenting military pay, but the proposal was shelved after an outcry over perceived unfairness, as well as inflationary risks.

In March 2021, LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun gave an unprecedented public speech to an audience of

MEKO A200 frigates to Egypt. (At least one of the frigates and 18 of the HSI-32 patrol craft will be built in Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively.) Egypt's naval capabilities continue to grow. In 2021 it inaugurated a new naval base at Ras Gargoub close to the Libyan border, commissioned its fourth Type-209/1400 submarine, commissioned the second FREMM frigate built by Italy's Fincantieri while in October it was announced that Egypt would buy the UK's two decommissioned *Fort Rosalie*-class logistics ships.

Iran showed no sign of rushing to sign arms deals, despite the expiry in October 2020 of a UN arms embargo that prevented it from importing modern weapons systems. This reflected cautious decision-making and a parlous financial situation in Tehran as well as lingering concerns in Moscow and Beijing about Iran's behaviour. Tehran may in time look to modernise its air force, acquire missile systems and deploy modern armour. Iran's prowess in deploying missiles and UAVs, its reliance on asymmetric capabilities and its maritime harassment have provided Tehran with adequate defence. The maritime harassment has persisted, with attacks on commercial vessels evident since 2019, and has been

seen as part of a confrontation between Iran and Israel. Targets have included Iranian tankers carrying oil destined for Syria, an Iranian ship off the coast of Yemen that was a base for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and merchant ships belonging to or linked to Israelis. At the end of July, the attack on the *MV Mercer Street*, a ship managed by a UK company owned by an Israeli, was an escalation, carried out using a UAV apparently originating from Iran. An embargo on the import of missile technology remained in place, though Iran has developed indigenous research-and-development (R&D) and production capabilities that limit the effect of this restriction.

Tehran has developed several land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), including the system known in the Houthi inventory as the *Quds-1* and *Quds-2*. The first version is a 700 kilometre-range ground-launched system, with the second possibly providing around a 30% range extension. The *Quds* has not been seen in Iranian service but is likely to be deployed. Furthermore, a variant of the *Meshkat*, *Soumar*, *Hoveizeh* development line of larger ground-launched LACMs may be being introduced into service. Iran remains the only regional state known to operate

officers in which he described the dire state of the LAF. Putting the responsibility on the political class, he asked 'What do you plan to do? We have warned more than once of the danger of the situation.' He also warned that the LAF could soon no longer be able to fulfil all its missions.

Fearing that the LAF would weaken and potentially lose cohesion, external funders, notably the US, the UK, France and key Arab states, began to adjust their support, prioritising food donations, medical assistance, fuel, equipment and spare parts. For instance, in July Qatar pledged to provide 70 tonnes of food per month, while France and Italy also pledged food support. Such support often came as part of a broader UN-coordinated assistance plan. Aoun defended international assistance against domestic criticism of foreign interference, stressing that 'were it not for such assistance, the situation would have been far worse'. Washington was keen to highlight its ongoing cooperation and trust in the LAF by holding joint exercises and increasing its annual support to USD120m. It also donated three refurbished *Huey* helicopters and six MD530F+ helicopters. China made its first large-scale donation in 2021, of some 100 trucks and light vehicles.

Counter-terrorism and border security continued to be the primary interests of Western partner states. Additionally,

supporting the LAF is increasingly seen as important in tackling migration and refugee flows from Lebanon into Cyprus and the European Union. Such support continued despite US congressional criticism of the LAF for its inability to restrain Hizbullah.

At an international conference convened by France in June 2021 to coordinate foreign aid and raise funds to support the LAF, Aoun reiterated his alarming assessment, saying: 'The situation is critical. If unmitigated, the economic and financial crisis will inevitably lead to the collapse of all state institutions including the LAF.'

According to press and civil-society reports, there has been some erosion of the LAF's image, with the force increasingly blamed for defending a political class deemed corrupt and inept by the reformist movement, and for using harsh tactics and military courts against protesters and critics. Its long-standing inability to restrain Hizbullah has angered local parties and damaged state sovereignty. The investigation into the August 2020 port explosion in Beirut was seen as highlighting a deficient response on the part of the upper echelon of the armed and security forces. A former LAF commander, as well as former and serving security chiefs, were called for questioning by the investigative judge but benefited from political protection and in some cases legal immunity.

ground-launched LACMs. Elsewhere, the trend has been to acquire air-launched systems most often as part of combat-aircraft procurement, with the European *SCALP EG/Storm Shadow* bought by several Gulf states.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics


The 2014–16 collapse in oil prices, and low prices since then, meant that fiscal conditions were already constrained in the region when the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic became apparent in 2020. Regional real GDP contracted by 3.8% in 2020 and the World Bank estimated that cumulative GDP losses by the end of 2021 will have reached USD227 billion. However, the regional rate masks important national variations. For instance, in 2020, countries like Iraq, Lebanon and Libya experienced double-digit reductions in real GDP, and most oil exporters in the Gulf faced contractions of 5–8%. Israel’s, Jordan’s and Qatar’s real GDP reductions were much milder (2–3%) while Egypt, a net

importer of oil, experienced real GDP growth of 3.8% in 2020. Iran’s economy also grew in 2020 as the loss in output from the pandemic was less pronounced than in other countries because the economy had already contracted by 6.0% in both 2018 and 2019.


There has been a modest recovery, but with regional real GDP growth reaching just 2.2% in 2021, it will take until at least 2022 for the region to return to pre-pandemic (i.e., 2019) levels of output, with this taking even longer for some countries. Like the economic impact of the pandemic, the economic outlook varies depending on the COVID-19 infection rates, vaccine programmes, fiscal profiles and economic fundamentals of each country, and not least on their exposure to commodities, tourism and contact-intensive sectors such as hospitality.

Countries that implemented widespread vaccination programmes relatively quickly (the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Morocco and Israel) performed better in 2021, while Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia, whose vaccine roll-outs were slower because of financial constraints or supply issues, will struggle to return to pre-pandemic levels

▼ Map 5 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending¹



¹ Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.



Note: Analysis excludes Libya, Palestinian Authority, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. © IISS

▲ **Figure 21 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021**

of output, in real terms, before 2023. Moreover, political instability and conflict in Libya, Syria and Yemen is stalling vaccine roll-out programmes and compounding the economic challenges brought by the pandemic. There are, however, signs that some regional players, including Morocco and the UAE, are acting to improve the vaccine roll-out in countries that are further behind.

On a per capita basis, GDP levels are estimated to have declined by 5.3% in 2020 with growth of just 0.6% in 2021, which will exacerbate regional inequality. The World Bank has indicated that the economic impact of the pandemic may increase the number of people in the region living in poverty to 192 million, up from 176m in 2019.

Unprecedented levels of fiscal support were implemented to mitigate the financial impact of the pandemic, but while this has alleviated some of the impact on economic growth, it has come at a cost to fiscal balance sheets. Fiscal deficits extended significantly in countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Even though Qatar maintained a fiscal surplus in 2020, this fell considerably from 4.9% to 1.3% of GDP. The recovery in the oil price has eased some of the pressure on government finances, particularly in GCC states. The price of Brent Crude fell to USD18 a barrel in April 2020 and stabilised at USD65–75 a barrel in the second half of 2021. The US Energy Information Administration projects that the oil price will average USD72 a barrel over 2021 and be maintained at this level in 2022, a level sufficient

to balance the budgets of several countries in the region.

Meanwhile, government debt levels rose from an average of 64.2% of GDP in 2019 to 73.8% in 2020. While most countries in the region will manage to reduce deficit and debt levels over time, the IMF predicts that Algeria's debt levels will continue to increase as a percentage of GDP until at least 2026 as the deficit is projected to persist at levels above 6% of GDP in the short term.


Defence economics

These economic challenges will influence the trajectory of regional defence budgets, as will uncertainty over the pace of economic recovery. Fiscal pressures and the potential for a shift in public-spending priorities towards social and healthcare sectors, where the pandemic highlighted vulnerabilities, create challenges for defence-spending growth.

Regional defence spending, already under pressure before the pandemic, declined in real terms for the fourth consecutive year in 2021. In nominal terms, regional spending has been relatively stable since 2017, hovering around USD170bn – including Foreign Military Financing allocations from the US. However, with rates of inflation averaging 6.9% annually (and in some countries exceeding 30%), real-terms reductions are sizeable, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021.

Despite a gradual recovery in oil prices in 2021, constraints on government spending remained in place, with defence spending again coming under pressure in several countries. In Saudi Arabia, the defence budget was cut in 2021 for a fourth successive year. The 2021 defence budget is 21.9% lower than the 2017 allocation in nominal terms. In real terms, spending (in constant 2015 US dollars) has fallen from USD59.0bn four years ago to USD43.0bn in 2021 – a 27.1% real reduction. Furthermore, the Saudi Ministry of Finance's 2022 pre-budget statement, released in September 2021, outlined plans to further reduce overall state spending in the next three years, suggesting that there will be little respite from the challenging budgetary environment in the medium term. Fiscal restrictions may ease if the oil price stabilises in 2022 at a level closer to that needed to balance the budget – indeed Saudi Arabia's fiscal breakeven oil price has fallen from USD89 a barrel in 2018 to USD76 a barrel in 2021 according to the IMF.

In Oman, constraints on spending remained firmly in place as the country attempted to bring its



▲ **Figure 22 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as % of GDP (average)**

large budget deficit under control. State spending on defence declined by a further 14.1% in 2021 and is now some 23.8% below its 2015 peak in nominal terms. Nevertheless, with the IMF announcing in October that it expected Muscat's fiscal balance to improve from -18.7% of GDP in 2020 to just -2.6% in 2021, and to move into surplus the following year, the worst of the country's recent fiscal challenges may now be over.

Unlike its neighbours, Kuwait increased the Ministry of Defence budget by 37.0% in real terms in 2021, with spending reaching USD9.63bn compared to USD6.82bn in 2020. The reason for the uplift remains unclear, though it may be linked to initial deliveries of the 28 Eurofighter *Typhoon* combat aircraft that were contracted in April 2016. Deliveries were due to take place between 2020 and 2023 but were delayed by the pandemic. The group of Kuwaiti *Typhoon* pilots began their Operational Conversion Unit training course with the Italian Air Force in January 2020. Despite a sizeable fiscal deficit, which extended to 8.3% of GDP in 2020, Kuwait entered the pandemic with relatively low levels of government debt (11.6% of GDP compared to the GCC average of 64.2% in 2019) and so has more headroom with which to increase borrowing in the short term. Furthermore, potential orders including for AH-64E *Apache* attack helicopters from the US may make it harder to reduce defence spending.

Meanwhile defence budgets of the oil-importing countries in North Africa continued their upward trajectory. Egypt's defence budget has shown consistent growth in real terms in recent years, averaging 4.6% annually since 2019 as the country continues to fund naval- and air-modernisation programmes. Budget increases in Tunisia have been sufficient to

counter inflation rates in excess of 6%, with the 2020 and 2021 budget remaining steady at USD1.2bn.

Moroccan spending also continued to strengthen, with a 2.5% real increase in 2021 following the significant 20.9% jump in 2020. The uplift comes amid continuing tensions with Algeria and the country funds an ambitious procurement programme that included 24 Boeing AH-64E *Apache Guardian* attack helicopters and a new ground-based air defence system. Morocco's defence budget came to USD6.35bn in 2021, comparable to levels in Oman and Qatar but still some way behind Algeria's budget of USD9.04bn. Algeria's defence budget, meanwhile, has stagnated in recent years as the oil price faltered.

Defence industry

Domestic production capabilities and ambitions vary across the region. Israel's defence industry is well established, with capabilities shaped by the country's strategic concerns and close partnership with the US. These include light weapons, missile-detection systems and the uninhabited-systems field, from development to manufacture. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have all embarked on development programmes aimed at bolstering indigenous industry and strategic autonomy while countries with smaller budgets are almost entirely reliant on imports to fulfil capability requirements.

Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 development plan, released in 2016, set a target to increase the proportion of defence procurement sourced domestically from 2% of the total to 50% by the end of the period. Progress on this localisation effort is evident including in relation to armoured vehicles and munitions. The General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI), established in 2017 to facilitate the goals of Vision 2030, stated in August 2021 that the localisation rate had increased to 8% when it launched the Military Industry Marketplace (MIM), intended to increase the visibility of procurement contracts open to the domestic supply chain.

The UAE has moved to consolidate defence-industrial enterprises in recent years, culminating in the formation of EDGE in November 2019, which has brought together more than 25 assets under one entity and now has revenues of USD5bn. As the country focused on developing high-technology sectors, domestic capabilities have emerged in autonomous systems and guided munitions beyond those already established in relation to naval construction and wheeled land systems.

ISRAEL

Domestic challenges, including from the coronavirus pandemic and a long political stalemate, arguably preoccupied Israel more than security threats during 2021. The most important event of the year was Benjamin Netanyahu's ousting as prime minister, after more than 12 consecutive years in office. The appointment of Naftali Bennett as prime minister, on 13 June, had immediate strategic implications. Israel's relationship with the Biden administration quickly improved, though some Israeli analysts speculated that this may lead some of Israel's opponents to challenge the new government, led by a young premier and relying on a slender political margin.

Instability persisted in the south as well as the north, with a 12-day military operation (*Guardian of the Walls*) in Gaza in May. There had also been, at the time of writing, six episodes of rocket fire from Lebanon, and Israeli artillery fire in response, and a further two from across the Syrian border. Meanwhile, Israel continued its campaign against Iranian military interests in the region, which included dozens of airstrikes, mostly in Syria. There were also reports of incidents of sabotage at Iranian nuclear sites, as well as the reported attacks on each other's maritime traffic in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf

Gaza

The latest escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas was the worst since the fighting during the 2014 *Operation Protective Edge*. The immediate trigger for the May 2021 conflict came when Hamas launched six rockets from Gaza into the Jerusalem area and Israel retaliated with heavy airstrikes. The Palestinian justification for the rockets had been the growing tensions around the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, which for days involved violent clashes between Israeli police and Muslim worshippers. While the fighting did not lead to an Israeli ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, over 250 Palestinians and 12 Israelis died during hostilities, most of them civilians.

In the year to September 2021, Hamas and other Palestinian organisations launched over 5,000 rockets into Israel, according to Israeli security analysts. Israeli *Iron Dome* batteries reportedly intercepted about 90% of the rockets that were projected to land in populated areas. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also managed to thwart Palestinian attacks using UAVs, tunnels and frogmen. Meanwhile,

the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed some Hamas tunnels and assassinated some of the organisation's senior operatives. However, a plan to destroy a significant part of Hamas's underground tunnel project (apparently nicknamed 'The Metro' by the IDF) was initiated prematurely which led to few Hamas casualties. Media reports asserted that Israel indicated, in advance media releases, that a ground assault was likely in the hope that Hamas personnel would then use the tunnels to deploy to their assigned positions.

Hamas proved its durability under significant military pressure from Israel and has enjoyed growing popularity in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and among Arab citizens of Israel, thousands of which were involved in riots during the May operation in Gaza. The same month also saw violence by Jewish-Israelis directed against Palestinians. The communal unrest raised worries, according to some Israeli analysts, about the ability of Jews and Arabs to coexist inside the 1967 borders. This is causing concern among the Israeli leadership. It is also alarmed by mistakes in intelligence analysis, which meant that the latest Hamas moves were not anticipated. The lack of information on Hamas's rocket arsenal within IDF intelligence has also raised concerns and there remain doubts about the army's willingness (or indeed capability) to carry out large-scale ground manoeuvres inside adversary territory. The army's and the politicians' hesitance to deploy ground forces likely also stems from a reduced willingness among the Israeli public to accept military casualties.

Syria and Iran

From the perspective of Israeli security analysts, the situation in Syria has changed little in the last year. Relations between Syria, Russia and Iran remain strained, and Israel is using this space to continue airstrikes, mostly aimed at Iranian targets in Syria. These targets include convoys smuggling weapons to Hizbullah in Lebanon, as well as pro-Iranian militia bases. Although Syrian anti-aircraft batteries have consistently targeted Israeli aircraft, they have not succeeded in hitting one since an Israeli F-16 was shot down in February 2018. Moreover, Israeli analysts understand that despite public commitments, Moscow has not delivered the relatively more modern S-300 batteries into Syrian hands, the implication being that those in-country are operated by Russian personnel. Israel also periodically attacks small Hizbullah positions near the Syrian border in

the Golan Heights. The Hizbullah fighters arrived there in late 2018, ignoring a Russian commitment to Israel to keep Iranian and allied formations at least 50 miles from the Israeli border.

Israel remains particularly concerned by Iran's continued nuclear ambitions. While Israel has recommended that the US should not return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – the Iran nuclear deal) – the IDF chief of staff said as much in January 2021 – Israeli officials are aware that if the Iranian leadership announces its willingness to renew the agreement, it is possible that the US would sign on. If the JCPOA is rekindled, Israel may ask the US for some form of compensation, both in further financial military assistance and in strengthened intelligence and security ties. It may also decide to continue its sabotage campaign against Iranian nuclear and ballistic-missile sites, though in a less transparent way. Senior Israeli officials believe it is necessary to improve the country's capabilities to unilaterally mount an attack on Iran. This is seen as an important effort in case it appears that Iran has breached its new commitments in a future agreement.

The Abraham Accords

A year after the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, normalisation with the Gulf states appears to be one of Netanyahu's most significant foreign-policy achievements. Israel has also upgraded its relationships with Morocco and Sudan but made less progress in attempts to improve the relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Normalisation in the Gulf includes improved intelligence ties, cyber-warfare and other technology deals. However, military ties are another matter, and Israeli analysts understand that regional states' dealings with Israel in this area may be limited by concern over possible Iranian retaliation. Nonetheless, in late 2020 there was discussion in the press about whether there could be future cooperation over regional missile defence, possibly including radars and interceptor capabilities, while late 2021 saw Israeli naval personnel take part in a maritime security exercise, in the Red Sea, with naval personnel from Bahrain, the UAE and the US.

More broadly, international military cooperation increased in 2021 having been limited in 2020 because of the pandemic. In July, the IAF hosted exercise *Blue Guardian*, involving UAV teams from Israel, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. In March, the IAF held an exercise with US F-35s in Israel.

The United States

Israel under Netanyahu enjoyed a close relationship with the Trump administration, which changed somewhat under Biden; for instance, the new US administration applied pressure on Israel to end the fighting in Gaza in May. In August, Bennett visited Washington, where Biden reaffirmed the 'historic partnership' between the US and Israel and conveyed his 'ironclad support' for Israel's security. In September 2021, the US moved the responsibility for military contacts with Israel from US European Command (EUCOM) to Central Command (CENTCOM). The US had resisted doing so for some years, fearing that such a move would have a negative effect on its relationships with Arab states. The Biden administration is still considering an Israeli request for an extra USD1bn to cover expenses on both air-force munitions and *Iron Dome* interceptors during the last operation in Gaza. Meanwhile, US concern about Israel's relationship with China has grown under the Biden administration, and the US has increased pressure on Israel in this regard. Washington has expressed opposition to Beijing's involvement in bids for major infrastructure projects in Israel.

The multi-year plan

For more than two years, IDF Chief of the General Staff Lt-Gen. Aviv Kochavi watched as his five-year plan for the army, *Tnufa*, was delayed because of political turmoil and various governments' failure to pass a budget. Kochavi had to transfer resources within the army budget to compensate, but military officials admitted that this solution was a long way from the original plan and realised only a few of his ambitions. The new budget, approved in August, indicated that Kochavi has managed, against expectations, to secure an increase in defence allocations despite pandemic-related economic challenges. Additionally, the government approved the army's suggestion for a mechanism that would secure relatively high pensions for senior officers and cancelled a plan to shorten mandatory military service for men by two more months (to 30 months).

Kochavi has only slightly more than one year of his term remaining to advance some of his ambitious plans for the IDF. *Tnufa* advocates a significant upgrade of the army's aerial, intelligence and technological capabilities, with an emphasis on stand-off capabilities. More funds may be available, but the risk remains that the plans could be derailed by an unanticipated crisis.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Middle East and North Africa

Significant events in 2021



FEBRUARY

UAE-UKRAINE COOPERATION

A trilateral collaboration agreement was signed in Abu Dhabi between three state-owned defence companies: the United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s EDGE and Ukraine's UkrOboronProm and Ukrspesexport. Although specific details were not disclosed, the companies stated that investments could reach USD1bn. This is not the first instance of defence-industrial cooperation between the two countries. In August 2017, they announced that they would explore the potential for collaboration on precision-guided weapons, UAVs and SIGINT equipment, as well as the production of Antonov transport aircraft for the UAE Air Force. Although little seems to have so far resulted from the 2017 agreement, earlier efforts in 2015, between Ukraine's KrAZ and UAE's Streit Group, did lead to the production of a small number of *Shrek* MRAP vehicles for Ukraine's National Guard.



FEBRUARY

SAUDI ARABIA PROCUREMENT REFORM

Saudi Arabia announced that, from 2024 onwards, it would no longer award contracts to foreign companies that have no Saudi-based regional headquarters. This is reflected in Saudi Arabia's plan to improve its domestic defence sector, within the context of the Kingdom's Vision 2030 plan, launched in April 2016, which aims to localise 50% of Saudi Arabian defence spending by 2030. In February, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) signed an agreement with Lockheed Martin to establish a joint venture. The new company will facilitate technology-and-knowledge transfer and SAMI will hold a 51% stake. SAMI also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with EDGE, the UAE's state-owned defence conglomerate, to collaborate on manufacturing NIMR's *Jais* 4x4 armoured personnel carriers.



APRIL

ELBIT SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS

Elbit Systems completed the acquisition of Florida-based air-launched sonobuoy producer Sparton Corporation for USD380m. This adds to Elbit's products in the maritime sector, which currently includes uninhabited surface vessels, combat-management systems and uninhabited air vehicles, including the *Hermes* 900, which can be configured for maritime patrol. Earlier in the month, Elbit completed the USD31m acquisition of BAE Systems' Jerusalem-based subsidiary Rokar International. Rokar manufactures guidance systems for artillery ammunition, including the *Silver Bullet* guidance kit that lost out in an Israeli Army competition in 2017 to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Elbit Systems manufactures the wheeled ATMOS 2000 howitzer, which has so far been exported to five countries.



APRIL

BAHRAIN LAUNCHES OFFSET POLICY

Bahrain published a new offset policy, the Bahrain Defence Force Economic Program (BDFEP). The new policy sets out a USD7m minimum threshold above which a defence deal has to include offsets amounting to 60% of the total contract value. To promote the 'made in Kingdom of Bahrain' goal, the BDFEP offers various bonus schemes depending on the position that the local supply chain occupies in each project, the number of highly skilled local workers employed and the complexity of each contract (based on the parameters of system design and integration, testing and final assembly services). While BDFEP seeks primarily to attract investment in the aerospace sector, the policy also indicates a desire to work on relatively new technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.



SEPTEMBER















MOROCCO'S EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION

Morocco reportedly received the first of 13 *Bayraktar* TB2 armed UAVs that were ordered from Turkey in April 2021. The end of a ceasefire with the Polisario Front in late 2020, as well as a desire to diversify weapons suppliers, has led to a series of significant contracts in the last two years. In January 2021, a contract was signed with Spain's Navantia to deliver an offshore patrol ship in 2024. In August 2020, a contract was signed with Lockheed Martin to supply 24 F-16V *Fighting Falcon* fighter aircraft by December 2026, while a contract was signed with Boeing for 24 AH-64E *Apaches* in June 2020. These helicopters will arrive from 2024. In 2019, the US government approved the upgrade of Morocco's current fleet of F-16s, although it is unclear whether this will proceed in the wake of the contract for new aircraft.

Table 10  **Kuwait: defence procurement since 2010**

After increasing in the early 2010s, Kuwait's economic growth slowed in the latter half of that decade. Despite this, low debt levels and favourable fiscal conditions have enabled Kuwait to steadily increase its defence budget (culminating in a 37% real increase in 2021) – allowing it to commit to large-scale procurements from predominantly European and American companies, most significantly the multi-billion-dollar acquisitions of the *Eurofighter* combat aircraft (from Italy's final assembly line) and F/A-18E/F *Super Hornets* from Boeing.

As a result, Kuwait's combat aircraft inventory will increase from 38 to 56. In the region, only Qatar's air force is expanding on a proportionally larger scale. Kuwait is also upgrading its *Patriot* air-defence system, replacing its M1A2 *Abrams* main battle tanks on a one-for-one basis with the M1A2K variant, and is also buying 30 H225M heavy transport helicopters from France. Deliveries of the latter were delayed due to technical issues with the first two helicopters but the resumption of deliveries after late 2020 indicates a resolution of these issues.


Contract date	Equipment	Type	Quantity	Value (USD)		Prime contractor(s)	Deliveries	Service
2010	KC-130J <i>Hercules</i>	Tanker/transport aircraft	3	569.6m		Lockheed Martin	2014	Air Force
c. 2012	<i>Pandur</i>	Infantry fighting vehicle	56+	n.k.		General Dynamics European Land Systems – Steyr	2013–14	National Guard
2012	BMP-3M	Infantry fighting vehicle	33	n.k.		Kurganmashzavod (KMZ)	2015	Army
c. 2013	C-17A <i>Globemaster III</i>	Heavy transport aircraft	2	n.k.		Boeing	2014	Air Force
c. 2015	Internal Security Vehicle (ISV)	Protected patrol vehicle	40	n.k.		Otokar	2016	National Guard
2015	<i>Sherpa Light Scout</i>	Armoured utility vehicle	120	€119.84m		Arqus (formerly Renault Trucks Defense)	2016–19	National Guard
2015	<i>Assafar</i> (ADSB 64m)	Landing craft tank	2	70.8m		Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company (ADSB)	2017–18	Navy
	<i>Abhan</i> (ADSB 42m)	Landing craft mechanised	1					
	ADSB 16m	Landing craft vehicles and personnel	5					
2016	<i>Sherpa Light Scout</i>	Armoured utility vehicle	300	298.78m		Arqus (formerly Renault Trucks Defense)	2019–ongoing	Army
2016	<i>Patriot</i> configuration 3+	Long-range surface-to-air missile system upgrade	6 bty	523.39m		Raytheon Technologies	By 2022*	Air Defence Command
2016	NBC-RS 2	Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare defence vehicles	12	n.k.		Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles (RMMW)	c. 2017–18	Army
2016	H225M <i>Caracal</i>	Heavy transport helicopter	30	1.23bn		Airbus	2020–ongoing	Army and National Guard
2016	<i>Eurofighter</i>	Fighter ground-attack aircraft	28	8.81bn		Leonardo	2020–23*	Air Force
2017	M1A2K <i>Abrams</i>	Main battle tank	218	n.k.		General Dynamics Land Systems	2021–22*	Army
2018	F/A-18E <i>Super Hornet</i>	Fighter ground-attack aircraft	22	5.2bn		Boeing	2021–n.k.	Air Force
	F/A-18F <i>Super Hornet</i>		6					

*Planned;  – multinational

Figure 23 Israel: UAV exports to armed forces since 2000


Israel reportedly first began operating uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in the form of *Frebee* UAVs imported from the United States. It was not until the late 1970s that Israel's armed forces began operating locally developed and built systems; it began exporting UAVs around the same time. Since 2000, Israel has established itself as the world's most prominent exporter of military UAVs, although today it faces a growing number of competitors, such as China and Turkey. Israel's two principal UAV manufacturers are the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and

the privately owned Elbit Systems. The former produces the large *Heron* series of UAVs as well as the medium-weight *Searcher* family. Elbit has widely exported the *Hermes* 450/900 UAVs. While most exports are entirely built and assembled in Israel, both the UK and Russia have set up local final assembly facilities for the *Watchkeeper* (a modification of the *Hermes* 450) and the *Forpost* (a variant of the *Searcher* MkII) respectively, with both aircraft built in enough quantities to make this investment economically viable.



Algeria ALG

Algerian Dinar DZD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	DZD	18.7tr	22.3tr	
	USD	148bn	164bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,337	3,638	
Growth	%	-4.9	3.4	
Inflation	%	2.4	6.5	
Def bdgt	DZD	1.23tr	1.23tr	
	USD	9.70bn	9.04bn	
USD1=DZD		126.85	136.08	



Population 43,576,691

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.0%	3.7%	3.4%	4.1%	21.4%	3.0%
Female	14.3%	3.5%	3.2%	3.9%	21.0%	3.4%

Capabilities

Algeria's armed forces are among the most capable and best equipped in North Africa. Their primary roles relate to territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability. The army retains a key political position since its instrumental role in 2019 in ending President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's two decades in power. Algeria is part of the African Union's North African Regional Capability Standby Force, hosting the force's logistics base in Algiers. There are discussions with neighbours about regional security challenges such as counter-terrorism and there is close security cooperation with Tunisia. A November 2020 referendum approved a change to the constitution that allows Algeria to send forces on UN peace-keeping missions. Long-standing tensions with Morocco increased in 2021 and both countries increased the number of soldiers deployed to the border. The conscript-based force exercises regularly, with training appearing to be of a relatively good standard. There is an ongoing attempt to professionalise the armed forces, which was reflected in the reduction of conscription liability from 18 to 12 months in 2014. The armed forces' logistics capabilities appear sufficient to support internal deployments. The army and air force inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily Russian-sourced equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, including self-propelled artillery. Algiers continues to recapitalize its fixed-wing combat-aircraft inventory, and the navy has invested in its submarine and frigate fleet. Local industry and the services are capable of equipment maintenance. Algeria is largely dependent on foreign suppliers for new equipment, but it has in recent years made significant investments towards developing a domestic defence industry. This has led to joint ventures with foreign partners, such as Italy's Leonardo and Germany's Rheinmetall.

ACTIVE 139,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 15,000 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 187,200

Conscript liability 12 months

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

6 Mil Regions

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp)

2 indep armd bde

Mechanised

2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp)

4 indep mech bde

Light

1 indep mot bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

1 AT regt

4 engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

7 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 1,495: 270 T-55AMV; 300 T-62; 325 T-72M1/M1M; 600+ T-90SA

RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with 9M133 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

IFV 980: €220 BMP-2; 760 BMP-2M with 9M133 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

APC 1,107+

APC (T) VP-6

APC (W) 1,105: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55

M3 Panhard; €400 *Fuchs* 2; 100 *Fahd*

PPV 2+: 2 *Marauder*; some *Maxxpro*

AUV Nimr *Ajban*; Nimr *Ajban* LRSOV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IMR-2

ARV BREM-1

VLB MTU-20

MW M58 MICLIC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

SP 31+: 28 9P163-3 *Kornet*-EM (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); 3+ BMPT-72

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115-2 *Metis*-M1 (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet*-E (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); Luch *Skif*; *Milan*

RCL 180: **82mm** 120 B-10; **107mm** 60 B-11

GUNS **100mm** 10 T-12

ARTILLERY 1,127

SP 224: **122mm** 140 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 30 2S3 *Akatsiya*; **155mm** €54 PLZ-45

TOWED 393: **122mm** 345: 160 D-30 (incl some truck mounted SP); 25 D-74; 100 M-1931/37; 60 M-30; **130mm**

10 M-46; **152mm** 20 M-1937 (ML-20); **155mm** 18 PLL-01

MRL 180: **122mm** 48 BM-21 *Grad*; **140mm** 48 BM-14;

220mm 36: 18+ SR5; €18 TOS-1A; **240mm** 30 BM-24;

300mm 18 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 330+: **82mm** 150 M-37; **120mm** 120 M-1943; W86;

SP **120mm** SM4; W86 (SP); **160mm** 60 M-1943

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERSSRBM 12 *Iskander*-E**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 106+

Short-range 38 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*); *Pantsir-SM***Point-defence** 68+: 48 9K33M *Osa* (RS-SA-8B *Gecko*); 20 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7A/B *Grail*)‡; QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

GUNS 425

SP 23mm 225 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 200: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4; 23mm 100 ZU-23-2

Navy 15,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES • SSK 6:**2 *Paltus* (FSU Project 877 (*Kilo*)) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT4 *Varshavyanka* (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved *Kilo*)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E *Klub-S* (RS-SS-N-27A/B) ASHM (*Klub-S* ASHM variant unclear)/TEST-71ME HWT**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5**

FFGHM 5:

3 *Adhafer* (C-28A) with 2 quad Inchr with C-802A ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with FM-90 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 Type-730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 hel)2 *Erradii* (MEKO A200AN) with 2 octuple Inchrs with RBS15 Mk3 ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Umkhonto*-IR SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* 300)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28****CORVETTES • FS 3** *Mourad Rais* (FSU Project 1159 (*Koni*)) with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun**PCGM 3** *Rais Hamidou* (FSU Project 1234E (*Nanuchka* II)) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran-E* (RS-SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 57mm gun**PCG 4:** 3 *Djebel Chenoua* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 1 *Rais Hassen Barbiar* (*Djebel Chenoua* mod) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 Type-730 (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun**PBFG 9** Project 205 (ex-FSU *Osa* II) (or which 3+) with 4 single Inchr with P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B *Styx*) ASHM**PB 9** *Kebir* with 1 76mm gun**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2****MCC 2** *El-Kasseh* (ITA *Gaeta* mod)**AMPHIBIOUS****PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 1** *Kalaat Beni Abbes* with 1 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 5 med hel; 3 LCVP; 15 MBT; 350 troops)**LANDING SHIPS 3:****LSM 1** *Polnochny B* with 1 twin AK230 CIWS (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)**LST 2** *Kalaat beni Hammad* (capacity 7 MBT; 240 troops) with 1 med hel landing platform**LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3**AGS 1 *El Idrissi*AX 1 *Daxin* with 2 AK230 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platformAXS 1 *El Mellah***Naval Infantry** 7,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 cdo bn

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

8 naval inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC(W) BTR-80

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**MRH 9: 3 AW139 (SAR); 6 *Super Lynx* 300SAR 9: 5 AW101 SAR; 4 *Super Lynx* Mk130**Coastal Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**1 ASHM regt with 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****COASTAL DEFENCE**ASHM 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*)**Coast Guard** 500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 74****PBF 6** *Baglietto* 20**PB 68:** 6 *Baglietto Mangusta*; 12 *Jebel Antar*; 40 *Deneb*; 4 *El Mounkid*; 6 *Kebir* with 1 76mm gun**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9****AR 1** *El Mourafek***ARS 3** *El Moundjid***AXL 5** *El Mouderrib* (PRC *Chui-E*) (2 more in reserve†)**Air Force 14,000****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU *Foxbat*4 sqn with MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**3 sqn with Su-30MKA *Flanker H***GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with Su-24M/MK *Fencer D***ELINT**

1 sqn with Beech 1900D

MARITIME PATROL2 sqn with Beech 200T/300 *King Air***ISR**1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E**; MiG-25RBSh *Foxbat D**

TANKER1 sqn with Il-78 *Midas***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30

1 sqn with C295M

1 sqn with Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V

1 sqn with Il-76MD/TD *Candid***TRAINING**

2 sqn with Z-142

1 sqn with Yak-130 *Mitten**2 sqn with L-39C/ZA *Albatros*1 hel sqn with PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***ATTACK HELICOPTER**3 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind* (one re-equipping with Mi-28NE *Havoc*)**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with AS355 *Ecureuil*5 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*1 sqn with Ka-27PS *Helix D*; Ka-32T *Helix***ISR UAV**1 sqn with *Seeker II***AIR DEFENCE**

3 ADA bde

3 SAM regt with S-125M/M1 *Pechora-M/M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 147 combat capableFTR 34: 11 MiG-25PDS/RU *Foxbat*; 23 MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum*FGA 57: some MiG-29M/M2 *Fulcrum*; 57 Su-30MKA *Flanker H*ATK 33 Su-24M/MK *Fencer D*ISR 7: 4 MiG-25RBSH *Foxbat D**; 3 Su-24MR *Fencer E**TKR 6 Il-78 *Midas*TPT 65: **Heavy** 11: 3 Il-76MD *Candid B*; 8 Il-76TD *Candid*;**Medium** 16: 8 C-130H *Hercules*; 6 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 L-100-30; **Light** 32: 3 Beech C90B *King Air*; 5 Beech 200T *King Air*; 6 Beech 300 *King Air*; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 5 C295M; 1 F-27 *Friendship*; PAX 6: 1 A340; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream VTRG 99: 36 L-39ZA *Albatros*; 7 L-39C *Albatros*; 16 Yak-130 *Mitten**; 40 Z-142**HELICOPTERS**ATK 72: 30 Mi-24 *Hind*; 42+ Mi-28NE/UB *Havoc*SAR 3 Ka-27PS *Helix D*MRH 85: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP; 74 Mi-8 *Hip* (med tpt)/Mi-17 *Hip H*TPT 62: **Heavy** 14 Mi-26T2 *Halo*; **Medium** 4 Ka-32T *Helix*; **Light** 44: 8 AW119KE *Koala*; 8 AS355 *Ecureuil*; 28 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR • **Heavy** CH-3; CH-4; *Yabhon United-30*ISR • **Medium** *Seeker II*; *Yabhon Flash-20***AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Long-range** 32+ S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)**Medium-range** 9K317 *Buk-M2E* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)**Short-range** 36+: 2K12 *Kvadrat* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 12 S-125M; *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); 24 S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); IR/SARH R-40/46 (RS-AA-6 *Acrid*); R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-59ME (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*); ZT-35 *Ingwe*; 9M120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9)AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*)ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** €187,200**Gendarmerie** 20,000

Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE AML-60

APC • APC (W) 210: 100 TH-390 *Fahd*; 110 Panhard M3**HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light** 12+: 12 AW109; Some PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***National Security Forces** 16,000

Directorate of National Security. Small arms

Republican Guard 1,200**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE AML-60

APC • APC (T) M3 half-track


Legitimate Defence Groups €150,000

Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)

DEPLOYMENT**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO** 2**Bahrain** BHR

Bahraini Dinar BHD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BHD	13.1bn	14.7bn	
	USD	34.7bn	39.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	23,590	26,294	
Growth	%	-5.1	2.4	
Inflation	%	-2.3	1.0	
Def bdtg [a]	BHD	528m	526m	
	USD	1.41bn	1.40bn	
FMA (US)	USD	0m	0m	4m
USD1=BHD		0.38	0.38	

[a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Agency

**Population** 1,526,929

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.3%	3.6%	4.9%	6.3%	34.6%	1.8%
Female	9.0%	3.0%	3.4%	3.9%	18.4%	1.7%

Capabilities

Bahrain is a member of the GCC and occupies a key strategic position between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. The principal roles of the armed forces are territorial defence and internal-security support. Bahrain's most critical security relationship is with Saudi Arabia, but it also has a strong defence relationship with the US and has been a US major non-NATO ally since 2002. The US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, as is the US-led Combined Maritime Forces and the UK-led International Maritime Security Construct. The armed forces for the most part still operate 1980s-era equipment, though there is incremental modernisation in some areas. The armed forces carried out a limited expeditionary deployment in support of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, notably by the special forces, and have previously commanded Combined Task Force 151. As part of a major air-force modernisation, Bahrain is in the process of acquiring new F-16V fighters and upgrading its existing F-16s to that configuration, as well as acquiring the *Patriot* air- and missile-defence system. In recent years there have been modest naval upgrades including to fire-control systems. The armed forces have organic maintenance support, but there is little in the way of a defence-industrial base beyond the limited maintenance support provided by the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard.

ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,260

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn)

Mechanised

1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn)

Light

1 (Amiri) gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty,
1 MRL bty)

1 engr coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log coy

1 tpt coy

1 med coy

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 100 M60A3; (80 more in store)

RECCE 22 AML-90

IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25

APC 303+

APC (T) 303: 300 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B

APC (W) *Arma* 6×6

AUV M-ATV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 53 *Fahd* 240

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 5 AIFV-B-*Milan*; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW;
9P163-3 *Kornet*-EM (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

MANPATS BGM-71A TOW; *Kornet*-EM (RS-AT-14
Spriggan)

RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT

ARTILLERY 175

SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2

TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198

MRL 13: 220mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS

MOR 44: 81mm 32: 12 L16; 20 EIMOS; SP 120mm 12
M113A2

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
from M270 MLRS)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 13+

Medium-range 6 MIM-23B I-*Hawk*

Short-range 7 *Crotale*

Point-defence 9K338 *Igla*-S (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

(reported); FIM-92 *Stinger*; RBS-70

GUNS 24: 35mm 12 GDF-003/-005; 40mm 12 L/70

Navy 700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1

FFGHM 1 *Sabha* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13
GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B AShM/SM-1MR
Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with
Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20

PSO 1 *Al Zubara* (ex-UK *River* (OPV) Batch 1 (mod)) with
1 hel landing platform

PCFG 4 *Ahmed el Fateh* (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin
Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* AShM, 1 76mm gun

PCG 2 *Al Manama* (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 twin Inchr
with MM40 *Exocet* AShM, 2 76mm guns, 1 hel landing
platform

PB 6: 2 *Al Jarim* (US *Swift* FPB-20); 2 *Al Riffa* (GER Lurssen
38m); 2 *Mashhoor* (US *Swiftships* 35m)

PBF 7 Mk V FPB

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 9

LCM 7: 1 *Loadmaster*; 4 *Mashtan*; 2 *Dinar* (ADSB 42m)

LCVP 2 *Sea Keeper*

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105

Air Force 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II***TRANSPORT**

1 (Royal) flt with B-737-800; B-767; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream II; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulfstream 550; S-92A

TRAINING1 sqn with *Hawk Mk129**1 sqn with T-67M *Firefly***ATTACK HELICOPTER**2 sqn with AH-1E/F *Cobra*; TAH-1P *Cobra***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*
1 sqn with UH-60M *Black Hawk*
1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A *Black Hawk*; UH-60L *Black Hawk***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 38 combat capableFTR 12: 8 F-5E *Tiger II*; 4 F-5F *Tiger II*FGA 20: 16 F-16C Block 40 *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16D Block 40 *Fighting Falcon*MRH 2+ Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*TPT 14: **Medium** 2 C-130J *Hercules*; **PAX** 12: 1 B-737-800 (VIP); 1 B-767 (VIP); 2 B-747 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream IV (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 450 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 550 (VIP); 2 BAe-146-RJ85 (VIP); 1 BAe-146-RJ100 (VIP); 1 BAe-146-RJ170 (VIP); (1 B-727 in store)TRG 9: 6 *Hawk Mk129**; 3 T-67M *Firefly***HELICOPTERS**ATK 22: 10 AH-1E *Cobra*; 12 AH-1F *Cobra*TPT 27: **Medium** 13: 3 S-70A *Black Hawk*; 1 S-92A (VIP); 1 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; 8 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; **Light** 14: 11 Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105TRG 6 TAH-1P *Cobra***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9P *Sidewinder*; SARH AIM-7 *Sparrow*;

ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65D/G *Maverick*; some TOW**BOMBBS**Laser-guided GBU-10/12 *Paveway II***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** €11,260**Police** 9,000

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**RECCE 8 S52 *Shorland*

APC • PPV Otokar ISV;

AUV *Cobra***HELICOPTERS**MRH 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*

ISR 2 Hughes 500

TPT • **Light** 1 Bo-105**National Guard** €2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**


3 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • APC (W) *Arma 6x6*; *Cobra***Coast Guard** €260

Ministry of Interior

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55PBF 26: 2 *Ares* 18; 3 *Response Boat-Medium* (RB-M); 4 *Jaris*; 6 *Saham*; 6 *Fajr*; 5 *Jarada*PB 29: 6 *Haris*; 1 *Al Muharraaq*; 10 *Deraa* (of which 4 *Halmatic* 20, 2 *Souter* 20, 4 *Rodman* 20); 10 *Saif* (of which 4 *Fairey Sword*, 6 *Halmatic* 160); 2 *Hawar***AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU** 1 *Load-master II***FOREIGN FORCES****United Kingdom** *Operation Kipion* 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHO; 1 LSD; 1 naval base**United States** US Central Command 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A *Poseidon*; 1 EP-3E *Aries II*; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE***Egypt** EGY

Egyptian Pound EGP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	EGP	5.84tr	6.26tr	
	USD	363bn	396bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,601	3,852	
Growth	%	3.6	3.3	
Inflation	%	5.7	4.5	
Def bdtg	EGP	66.0bn	76.2bn	
	USD	4.11bn	4.82bn	
FMA (US)	USD	1.3bn	1.3bn	1.3bn
USD1=EGP		16.08	15.79	

**Population** 106,437,241

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	17.4%	4.5%	4.7%	4.5%	17.8%	2.2%
Female	16.3%	4.2%	4.4%	4.3%	17.4%	2.4%

Capabilities

Egypt's armed forces are the largest in the region and are focused principally on maintaining territorial integrity and internal security, including combatting ISIS-affiliated groups in northern Sinai. The armed forces remain deeply involved in the civilian economy and retain a central role in Egyptian politics. Egypt and the US maintain a strong strategic partnership, which has seen significant US equipment deliveries and ongoing foreign military assistance. Defence relations with Russia have developed, particularly regarding procurement. Operational experience will likely have been bolstered by counter-insurgency operations in the Sinai since 2011 and contributions to several UN deployments. Training is

supplemented by regular involvement in multinational exercises. Egypt has a developing capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. It contributes to UN missions, has intervened militarily in Libya and has sent combat aircraft to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The navy's two *Mistral*-class amphibious assault ships have bolstered its capacity to deploy regionally, although Egypt currently lacks the range of maritime helicopters to utilise them fully. The armed forces' inventory primarily comprises obsolete Soviet-era systems and newer Western equipment. However, the armed forces are undertaking an extensive equipment-recapitalisation programme, which includes the delivery of Russian multi-role fighters, attack helicopters and SAM systems. Combat aircraft have also been sourced from France and armed UAVs from China. Naval recapitalisation includes submarines (from Germany) and frigates (from France, Germany and Italy). Egypt has an established domestic defence industry, supplying equipment for both the armed forces and export markets, ranging from small arms to armoured vehicles. There is a history of licensed and co-production with foreign companies, including the local assembly of M1A1 main battle tanks from US-supplied kits and the production of frigates with French assistance.

ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air 30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 397,000

Conscription liability 12–36 months (followed by refresher training over a period of up to 9 years)

RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air 20,000 Air Defence Command 70,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 1 *Egyptosat-A*

Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000 conscript (total 310,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 5 cdo gp
- 1 counter-terrorist unit
- 1 spec ops unit

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde)
- 4 indep armd bde
- 1 Republican Guard bde

Mechanised

- 8 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde)
- 4 indep mech bde

Light

- 1 inf div
- 2 indep inf bde

Air Manoeuvr

- 2 air mob bde
- 1 para bde

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

- 1 SRBM bde with FROG-7
- 1 SRBM bde with 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C *Scud-B*)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 15 arty bde
- 6 engr bde (3 engr bn)
- 2 spec ops engr bn
- 6 salvage engr bn
- 24 MP bn
- 18 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 36 log bn
- 27 med bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2,480: 1,130 M1A1 *Abrams*; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3; 200 T-62 (840 T-54/T-55; 300 T-62 all in store)

RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 *Commando Scout*

IFV 690: 390 YPR-765 25mm; 300 BMP-1

APC 5,244+

APC (T) 2,700: 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); 500 BTR-50; 200 OT-62

APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 *Fahd-30/TH 390 Fahd*; 650 *Walid*

PPV 984+: 535 *Caiman*; some REVA III; some REVA V LWB; 360 RG-33L; 89 RG-33 HAGA (amb)

AUV 95+: *Panthera T6*; 95+ *Sherpa Light Scout*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 367+: *Fahd 240*; BMR 3560.55; 12 *Maxxpro* ARV; 220 M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV

VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20

MW *Aardvark* JFSU Mk4

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with TOW-2

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*) (incl BRDM-2); HJ-73; Luch *Corsar* (reported); *Milan*; *Stugna-P* (reported); TOW-2

ARTILLERY 4,468

SP 492+: **122mm** 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; **130mm** M-46 mod; **155mm** 368: 164 M109A2; 204 M109A5

TOWED 962: **122mm** 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300 M-30; **130mm** 420 M-46; **155mm** 16 GH-52

MRL 450: **122mm** 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 *Sakr-10*; 50 *Sakr-18*; 100 *Sakr-36*; **130mm** 36 K136 *Kooryong*; **140mm** 32 BM-14; **227mm** 26 M270 MLRS; **240mm** (48 BM-24 in store)

MOR 2,564: **81mm** 50 M125A2; **82mm** 500; **SP 107mm** 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; **120mm** 1,848: 1,800 M-1943; 48 Brandt; **SP 120mm** 36 M106A3; **160mm** 30 M-160

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 *Sakr-80*; 9 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud-B*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium R4E-50 *Skyeye*; ASN-209

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 45+

Point-defence 45 *Sinai-23* with *Ayn al-Saqr*; *Ayn al-Saqr*; FIM-92 *Stinger*; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*) (reported)

GUNS 860

SP 160: **23mm** 120 ZSU-23-4; **57mm** 40 ZSU-57-2

TOWED 700: **14.5mm** 300 ZPU-4; **23mm** 200 ZU-23-2; **57mm** 200 S-60

Navy €8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 conscript (total 18,500)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK 8

4 Type-033 (PRC *Romeo*) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm/Mk 37 HWT

4 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHm/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 11

FFGHM 7:

4 *Alexandria* (ex-US *Oliver Hazard Perry*) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G *Super Seasprite* ASW hel)

2 *El Fateh* (*Gowind* 2500) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHm, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

1 *Tahya Misr* (FRA *Aquitaine* (FREMM)) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHm, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

FFGH 2 *Damyat* (ex-US *Knox*) with 1 octuple Mk 16 GMLS with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm/ASROC, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G *Super Seasprite* ASW hel)

FFHM 2 *Al-Galala* (ITA *Bergamini* (FREMM)) with 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 15/30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with *Otomat* (*Teseo*) Mk2A ASHm) (capacity 2 med hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73

CORVETTES 5

FSGM 2 *Abu Qir* (ESP *Descubierta*) (of which 1+) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHm, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with *Sting Ray* LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 76mm gun

FSG 2 *Najim Al Zaffer* (PRC Type-053HE (*Jianghu* I)) with 2 twin Inchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 *Safflower*) ASHm, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns

FS 1 *Shabab Misr* (ex-RoK *Po Hang*) with 2 76mm guns

PCFGM 4 *Ezzat* (US *Ambassador* Fast Missile Craft) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHm, 1 21-cell Mk49 Inchr with RIM-116B RAM Block 1A SAM, 1 Mk15 Mod 21 Block 1B *Phalanx* CIWS 1 76mm gun

PCFG 8:

1 Project 12418 (RUS *Tarantul* IV) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80E *Moskit* (RS-SS-N-22A *Sunburn*), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

6 *Ramadan* with 4 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHm, 1 76mm gun

1 *Tiger* with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHm, 1 76mm gun

PCF 4 *Tiger* with 1 76mm gun

PCC 15: 5 *Al-Nour* (ex-PRC *Hainan*) (3 more in reserve) with 2 triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns; 1 *Lurssen* 41m; 9 OPB 40

PBFGM 8 Project 205 (ex-YUG *Osa* I) (of which 3+) with 4 single Inchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A *Styx*) ASHm, 1 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM (manual aiming)

PBFG 9:

4 Type-024 (PRC *Hegu*) (2 additional vessels in reserve) with 2 single Inchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 *Scrubbrush*) ASHm

5 *October* (FSU *Komar*) (of which 1+) with 2 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHm (1 additional vessel in reserve)

PBFM 4 *Shershen* (FSU) with 1 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM (manual aiming), 1 12-tube BM-24 MRL

PBF 10:

6 *Kaan* 20 (TUR MRTP 20)

4 Project 205 (ex-FIN *Osa* II)

PB 6:

4 Type-062 (ex-PRC *Shanghai* II)

2 *Shershen* (FSU) (of which 1+) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube BM-21 MRL

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14

MHC 5: 2 *Al Siddiq* (ex-US *Osprey*); 3 *Dat Assawari* (US *Swiftships*)

MSI 2 *Safaga* (US *Swiftships*)

MSO 7: 3 *Assiout* (FSU T-43); 4 *Aswan* (FSU *Yurka*)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 2

Abdel Nasser (FRA *Mistral*) (capacity 16 med hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 15:

LCT 2 EDA-R

LCM 13: 4 CTM NG; 9 *Vydra* (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23

AE 1 *Halaib* (ex-GER *Westerwald*)

AKR 3 *Al Hurreya*

AOT 7 *Ayeda* (FSU *Toplivo*) (1 more in reserve)

AR 1 *Shaledin* (ex-GER *Luneberg*)

ARS 2 *Al Areesh*

ATF 5 *Al Maks+* (FSU *Okhtensky*)

AX 4: 1 *El Horriya* (also used as the presidential yacht); 1 *Al Kousser*; 1 *Intishat*; 1 other

Coastal Defence

Army tps, Navy control

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE

ARTY 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; **152mm**

ASHm 4K87 (RS-SSC-2B *Samlet*); *Otomat* MkII

Naval Aviation

All aircraft operated by Air Force

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 *Beech* 1900C (maritime surveillance)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light 2 S-100 *Camcopter*

Coast Guard 2,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 89

PBF 14: 6 *Crestitalia*; 5 *Swift Protector*; 3 *Peterson*
PB 75: 5 *Nisr*; 12 *Sea Spectre MkIII*; 25 *Swiftships*; 21
Timsah; 3 *Type-83*; 9 *Peterson*

Air Force 20,000; 10,000 conscript (total 30,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with F-16A/B *Fighting Falcon*
 8 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*
 1 sqn with *Mirage 2000B/C*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Mirage 5E2*
 2 sqn with *Rafale DM/EM*
 3 sqn with MiG-29M/M2 *Fulcrum*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with SH-2G *Super Seasprite*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with Beech 1900C

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); *Commando Mk2E* (ECM)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H *Hercules*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING

1 sqn with E-2C *Hawkeye*

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 unit with AW139

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-74TK-200A
 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 *Hercules*
 1 sqn with C295M
 1 sqn with DHC-5D *Buffalo*
 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 *Super King Air*; *Falcon 20*; *Gulfstream III*; *Gulfstream IV*; *Gulfstream IV-SP*

TRAINING

1 sqn with *Alpha Jet**
 1 sqn with DHC-5 *Buffalo*
 3 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano*
 1 sqn with Grob 115EG
 ε6 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**
 1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*; L-59E *Albatros**

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24V
 2 sqn with AH-64D *Apache*
 1 sqn with Ka-52A *Hokum B*
 2 sqn with SA-342K *Gazelle* (with HOT)
 1 sqn with SA-342L *Gazelle*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with CH-47C/D *Chinook* 1 sqn with Mi-8
 1 sqn with Mi-8/Mi-17-V1 *Hip*
 1 sqn with S-70 *Black Hawk*; UH-60A/L *Black Hawk*

UAV

Some sqn with R4E-50 *Skyeye*; *Wing Loong I*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 509 combat capable

FTR 32: 26 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*; 6 F-16B *Fighting Falcon*
FGA 274: 138 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 37 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*; 2 *Mirage 2000B*; 15 *Mirage 2000C*; 12 *Mirage 5E2*;
 ε46 MiG-29M/M2 *Fulcrum*; 16 *Rafale DM*; 8 *Rafale EM*
ELINT 2 VC-130H *Hercules*

ISR 12: ε6 AT-802 *Air Tractor**; 6 *Mirage 5R* (5SDR)*

AEW&C 7 E-2C *Hawkeye*

TPT 82: **Heavy 2** Il-76MF *Candid*; **Medium 24:** 21 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; **Light 45:** 3 An-74TK-200A; 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech 1900C; 24 C295M; 9 DHC-5D *Buffalo* (being withdrawn) **PAX 11:** 1 B-707-366C; 3 *Falcon 20*; 2 *Gulfstream III*; 1 *Gulfstream IV*; 4 *Gulfstream IV-SP*
TRG 329: 36 *Alpha Jet**; 54 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 74 Grob 115EG; 120 K-8 *Karakorum**; 10 L-39 *Albatros*; 35 L-59E*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 104: 45 AH-64D *Apache*; up to 46 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; ε13 Mi-24V *Hind E*

ASW 10 SH-2G *Super Seasprite* (opcon Navy)

ELINT 4 *Commando Mk2E* (ECM)

MRH 77: 2 AW139 (SAR); 5 AW149; 65 SA342K *Gazelle* (some with HOT); 5 SA342L *Gazelle* (opcon Navy)

TPT 96: **Heavy 19:** 3 CH-47C *Chinook*; 16 CH-47D *Chinook*; **Medium 77:** 2 AS-61; 24 *Commando* (of which 3 VIP); 40 Mi-8T *Hip*; 3 Mi-17-1V *Hip*; 4 S-70 *Black Hawk* (VIP); 4 UH-60L *Black Hawk* (VIP)

TRG 17 UH-12E

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy 4+ *Wing Loong I*

ISR • Medium R4E-50 *Skyeye*

AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9M/P *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-550 *Magic*; 9M39 *Igla-V*; **IIR** *Mica IR*; **ARH** *Mica RF*; R-77 (RS-AA-12 *Adder*); **SARH** AIM-7F/M *Sparrow*; R-530

ASM AASM; AGM-65A/D/F/G *Maverick*; AGM-114F/K *Hellfire*; AS-30L; HOT; LJ-7 (AKD-10); 9M120 *Ataka* (RS-AT-9)

LACM SCALP EG

AShM AGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II; AM39 *Exocet*; Kh-35U (RS-AS-20 *Kayak*)

ARM *Armat*; Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A *Kegler*)

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-10/12 *Paveway II*

Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript; 70,000 reservists (total 150,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

5 AD div HQ (geographically based)
 3 SAM bty with S-300V4 (RS-SA-23)
 4 SAM bty with 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/M2E (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*/RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)
 11 SAM bty with MIM-23B I-*Hawk*
 38 SAM bty with S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)
 10 SAM bty with S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)
 Some SAM bty with 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)
 2 SAM bty with 9K331/9K331ME *Tor-M1/M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)
 14 SAM bty with *Crotale*
 12 SAM bty with M48 *Chaparral*
 30 SAM bty with S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)
 18 AD bn with RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* with *Skyguard*/GDF-003 with *Skyguard*
 12 ADA bde (total: 100 ADA bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE****SAM 777****Long-range** €18 S-300V4 (RS-SA-23)**Medium-range** 323+: 40+ 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/M2E (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*/RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); €33 MIM-23B I-Hawk; €210 S-75M *Volkhov* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); €40 S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)**Short-range** 300+: 56+ 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 10 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 10+ 9K331ME *Tor-M2E* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 24+ *Crotale*; 80 RIM-7M *Sea Sparrow* with *Skyguard*; €120 S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**Point-defence** 136+: 50 M1097 *Avenger*; 50+ M48 *Chaparral*; 36+ *Sinai-23* with *Ayn al-Saqr***GUNS 910**SP • 23mm 230 ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*TOWED 680: 35mm 80 GDF-005 with *Skyguard*;

57mm 600 S-60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €397,000 active**Central Security Forces** €325,000

Ministry of Interior; includes conscripts

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLESAPC • APC (W) *Walid*AUV *Sherpa Light Scout***National Guard** €60,000

Lt wpns only

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • APC (W) 250 *Walid***Border Guard Forces** €12,000

Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

18 Border Guard regt

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 1,022; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 11**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 1,066; 1 spec ops coy; 1 sy bn; 1 MP coy**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**WESTERN SAHARA:** UN • MINURSO 25**FOREIGN FORCES**Australia MFO (*Operation Mazurka*) 27

Canada MFO 55

Colombia MFO 275; 1 inf bn

Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M

Fiji MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn

France MFO 1

Italy MFO 75; 3 PB

New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit

Norway MFO 3

United Kingdom MFO 2

United Arab Emirates €300: 12 F-16E/F *Fighting Falcon* (reported); *Wing Loong I* UAV; *Wing Loong II* UAV


United States MFO 452; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy)

Uruguay MFO 41 1 engr/tpt unit

Iran IRN

Iranian Rial IRR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	IRR	35085tr	51048tr	
	USD	835bn	1.08tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	9,928	12,725	
Growth	%	3.4	2.5	
Inflation	%	36.4	39.3	
Def bdtg [a]	IRR	€695tr	€1,180tr	
	USD	€16.5bn	€25.0bn	
USD1=IRR		41999.98	47206.72	

[a] Excludes Law Enforcement Forces (NAJA)

**Population** 85,888,910

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.2%	3.5%	3.3%	4.2%	24.6%	2.9%
Female	11.7%	3.4%	3.1%	4.0%	23.9%	3.3%

Capabilities

Iran is a major regional military power, with a military doctrine that combines territorial defence, through national mobilisation and a substantial missile arsenal, with an asymmetric forward-defence strategy. To achieve the latter objective, Iran exerts significant military effect via a range of regional allies and proxies, chiefly through their relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, as well as by the supply of weapons and other material. Iran has a key relationship with Syria and has developed significant influence in weaker regional states like Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen through a network of non-state groups, such as Hiz-bullah and Houthi forces. Tehran's direct military power-projection capabilities are based around the Middle East's largest short- and medium-range ballistic-missile inventory, as well as nascent cruise-missile and UAV capabilities. Attacks in Iraq and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated these systems' improved accuracy as well as sophisticated planning capabilities. The rest of the conventional armed forces, although large by regional standards, struggle with an increasingly obsolescent equipment inventory that ingenuity and asymmetric-warfare techniques can only partially offset. The divi-

sion of capability between the regular military services and the IRGC hampers effective command and control, although the IRGC has effectively monopolised the coordination roles in the military hierarchy. The IRGC's operational primacy, coupled with the regular armed forces' dependence on conscript personnel, has also focused combat experience in IRGC formations. In regional terms, Iran has a well-developed defence-industrial base, which has displayed the capacity to support and sustain equipment. However, it is still incapable of meeting the domestic need for major weapons systems, outside of specific sectors such as missiles and rockets systems.

ACTIVE 610,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 Navy 18,000 Air 37,000 Air Defence 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel organisations: the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps *Conscript liability* 18–21 months (reported, with variations depending on location in which service is performed)

RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service volunteers)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total 350,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

5 corps-level regional HQ

COMMAND

- 1 cdo div HQ
- 4 armd div HQ
- 2 mech div HQ
- 4 inf div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 cdo div (3 cdo bde)
- 6 cdo bde
- 1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

8 armd bde

Mechanised

14 mech bde

Light

12 inf bde

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB bde

Aviation

Some avn gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Totals incl those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some equipment serviceability in doubt

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 1,513+: 480 T-72S; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; 100 *Chieftain* Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/*Safir-74*; 168 M47/M48

LT TK 80+: 80 *Scorpion*

RECCE 35 EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV 610+: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); BMT-2 *Cobra*

APC 640+

APC (T) 340: 140 *Boragh* with 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 200 M113

APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; *Rakhsh*

PPV *Toofan*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 *Chieftain* ARV; M578; T-54/55 ARV reported

VLB 15 *Chieftain* AVLB

MW *Taftan* 1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel/Towsan-1*); *Almaz*; *Dehleavieh* (*Kornet*); I-Raad; *Saeqhe* 1; *Saeqhe* 2; *Toophan*; *Toophan* 2

RCL 200+: **75mm** M20; **82mm** B-10; **106mm** ε200 M40; **107mm** B-11

ARTILLERY 6,798+

SP 292+: **122mm** 60+: 60 2S1 *Gvozdika*; *Raad-1* (*Thunder* 1); **155mm** 150+: 150 M109A1; *Raad-2* (*Thunder* 2); **170mm** 30 M-1978; **175mm** 22 M107; **203mm** 30 M110

TOWED 2,030+; **105mm** 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; **122mm** 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); **130mm** 985 M-46; **152mm** 30 D-20; **155mm** 205: 120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; **203mm** 20 M115

MRL 1,476+: **107mm** 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB *Fadjr* 1; **122mm** 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21 *Grad*; 50 *Arash/Hadid/Noor*; **240mm** 19+: ε10 *Fadjr* 3; 9 M-1985; **330mm** *Fadjr* 5

MOR 3,000: **81mm**; **82mm**; **107mm** M30; **120mm** HM-15; HM-16; M-65

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** ε30 CH-SS-8 (175 msl); *Shahin-1/Shahin-2*; *Nazeat*; *Oghab*

AIRCRAFT • **TPT** 17 **Light** 16: 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 *Friendship*; 4 *Turbo Commander* 690; **PAX** 1 *Falcon* 20

HELICOPTERS

ATK 50 AH-1J *Cobra*

TPT 167: **Heavy** ε20 CH-47C *Chinook*; **Medium** 69: 49 Bell 214; 20 Mi-171; **Light** 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Medium** *Mohajer* 6; *Kaman* 12

ISR • **Medium** *Ababil* 2; *Ababil* 3; *Mohajer* 3; *Mohajer* 4; *Light Mohajer* 2

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range FM-80 (CH-SA-4)

Point-defence 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*); *Misaq* 1 (QW-1); *Misaq* 2 (QW-18); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*) (reported); HN-5A (CH-SA-3)

GUNS 1,122

SP 180: **23mm** 100 ZSU-23-4; **57mm** 80 ZSU-57-2

TOWED 942+: **14.5mm** ZPU-2; ZPU-4; **23mm** 300 ZU-23-2; **35mm** 92 GDF-002; **37mm** M-1939; **40mm** 50 L/70; **57mm** 200 S-60; **85mm** 300 M-1939

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Qaem*

Electro-optical guided *Qaem*

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000**Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces 150,000**

Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly manned in peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary role: external defence, in conjunction with regular armed forces

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran)

SPECIAL FORCES

3 spec ops div
1 AB bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured
2 armd div
3 armd bde

Light

8+ inf div
5+ inf bde

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines)**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SUPPORT**

Some arty bty
Some ASHM bty with HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 *Seersucker*) ASHM

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

In addition to the vessels listed, the IRGC operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes, including *Boghammar*-class vessels and small *Bavar*-class wing-in-ground effect air vehicles

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 127**PBFG 56:**

5 C14 with 2 twin Inchr with C-701 (*Kosar*)/C-704 (*Nasr*) ASHM
10 Mk13 with 2 single Inchr with C-704 (*Nasr*) ASHM, 2 single 324mm TT
10 *Thondor* (PRC *Houdong*) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802A (*Ghader*) ASHM, 2 AK230 CIWS
25 *Peykaap* II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single Inchr with C-701 (*Kosar*) ASHM/C-704 (*Nasr*), 2 single 324mm TT
6 *Zolfaghar* (*Peykaap* III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single Inchr with C-701 (*Kosar*)/C-704 (*Nasr*) ASHM

PBFT 15 *Peykaap* I (IPS-16) with 2 single 324mm TT

PBF 35: 15 *Kashdom* II; 10 *Tir* (IPS-18); ε10 *Pashe* (MIG-G-1900)

PB 21: ε20 *Ghaem*; 1 *Shahid* *Nazeri*

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 *Hormuz* 24 (*Hejaz* design for commercial use)

LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 *Hormuz* 21 (minelaying capacity)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 *Naser*

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM C-701 (*Kosar*); C-704 (*Nasr*); C-802 (*Noor*); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 *Seersucker*)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 5 Mi-171 *Hip*

TPT • Light some Bell 206 (AB-206) *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Medium *Mohajer* 6

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Qaem*

Electro-optical guided *Qaem*

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Marines 5,000+**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious
1 mne bde

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force 15,000

Controls Iran's strategic-missile force

FORCES BY ROLE**MISSILE**

ε1 bde with *Shahab-1/-2*; *Qiam-1*

ε1 bn with *Shahab-3* (IR-SS-7)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS**

MRBM • Conventional up to 50: *Shahab-3* (IR-SS-7) (mobile & silo); some *Ghadr-1* (in test); some *Emad-1* (in test); some *Sajjil-2* (in devt); some *Khorramshahr* (in devt)

SRBM • Conventional up to 100: some *Fateh-110*; some *Fateh-313*; Some *Khalij Fars* (*Fateh-110* mod ASBM); some *Shahab-1/-2*; some *Qiam-1*; some *Zelzal*; some *Zolfaghar* (IR-SS-1)

GLCM • Conventional some *Ya'ali* (*Quds-1*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy *Shahed* 129; Medium *Shahed* 181; *Shahed* 191

ISR • Medium *Ababil* 3; *Mohajer* 4; *Shahed* 123

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Medium-range *Ra'ad/3rd Khordad*; *Talash/15th Khordad*

Point-defence *Misaq* 1 (QW-1); *Misaq* 2 (QW-18)

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Sadid*

Electro-optical guided *Sadid*

Islamic Revolutionary Quds Force 5,000**Navy 18,000**

HQ at Bandar Abbas

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 17

SSK 1 *Taregh* (RUS *Paltus* (Project 877EKM (*Kilo*))) (2 more non-operational) with 6 single 533mm TT

SSC 1 *Fateh* with 4 single 533mm TT with C-704 (*Nasr-1*) ASHM/*Valfajr* HWT

SSW 15: 14 *Ghadr* (*Yono*) with 2 single 533mm TT with *Jask-2* (C-704 (*Nasr*)) ASHM/*Valfajr* HWT (additional vessels in build); 1 *Nahang*

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68**CORVETTES 7**

FSGM 3 *Jamaran* (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative – 1 more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (*Noor*) (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 single Inchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

FSG 4:

2 *Alvand* (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 114mm gun

1 *Alvand* (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 114mm gun

1 *Bayandor* (US PF-103) with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 15: up to 10 *Kaman* (FRA *Combattante* II) with 1 twin Inchr with C-802 (*Noor*) (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 76mm gun; 5+ *Sina* with 1 twin Inchr with C-802 (*Noor*) (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PBG 9:

3 *Hendijan* with 2 twin Inchr with C-802 (*Noor*) (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM

3 *Kayvan* with 2 single Inchr with C-704 (*Nasr*) ASHM

3 *Parvin* with 2 single Inchr with C-704 (*Nasr*) ASHM

PBFT 3 *Kajami* (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT

PBF 1 MIL55

PB 33: 9 C14; 8 *Hendijan*; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •

MCC 1 *Shahin*

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS 12**

LST 3 *Hengam* with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops)

LSM 3 *Farsi* (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops)

LSL 6 *Fouque*

LANDING CRAFT 11

LCT 2

LCU 1 *Liyan* 110

UCAC 8: 2 *Wellington* Mk 4; 4 *Wellington* Mk 5; 2 *Tondar* (UK *Winchester*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18

AE 2 *Delvar*

AFD 2 *Dolphin*

AG 1 *Hamzah* with 2 single Inchr with C-802 (*Noor*) (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM

AK 3 *Delvar*

AKR 1 *Makran*

AORH 2 *Bandar Abbas*

AWT 5: 4 *Kangan*; 1 *Delvar*

AX 2 *Kialas*

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM C-701 (*Kosar*); C-704 (*Nasr*); C-802 (*Noor*); C-802A (*Ghader*); *Ra'ad* (reported)

Marines 2,600**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

2 mne bde

Naval Aviation 2,600**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

TPT 16: **Light** 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 *Friendship*; 4 Turbo *Commander* 680; **PAX** 3 *Falcon* 20 (ELINT)

HELICOPTERS

ASW ε10 SH-3D *Sea King*

MCM 3 RH-53D *Sea Stallion*

TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy *Shahed* 129;

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Sadid*

Electro-optical guided *Sadid*

Air Force 37,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment

FIGHTER

1 sqn with F-7M *Airguard*; JJ-7*

2 sqn with F-14 *Tomcat*

2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Mirage* F-1B/E;

1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger* II

5 sqn with F-4D/E *Phantom* II

3 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger* II

1 sqn (forming) with Su-22M4 *Fitter* K; Su-22UM-3K *Fitter* G

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-24MK *Fencer* D

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with P-3F *Orion*

ISR

1 (det) sqn with RF-4E *Phantom* II*

SEARCH & RESCUE

Some flt with Bell 214C (AB-214C)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-707; *Falcon* 50; L-1329 *Jetstar*; Bell 412

2 sqn with C-130E/H *Hercules*

1 sqn with F-27 *Friendship*; *Falcon* 20

1 sqn with Il-76 *Candid*; An-140 (Iran-140 *Faraz*)

TRAINING

1 sqn with Beech F33A/C *Bonanza*

1 sqn with F-5B *Freedom* *Fighter*

1 sqn with PC-6

1 sqn with PC-7 *Turbo* *Trainer*

Some units with EMB-312 *Tucano*; MFI-17 *Mushshak*; TB-21 *Trinidad*; TB-200 *Tobago*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with CH-47 *Chinook*

Some units with Bell 206A *Jet Ranger* (AB-206A);

Shabaviz 2-75; *Shabaviz* 2061

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 332 combat capable

FTR 182+: 20 F-5B *Freedom Fighter*; 55+ F-5E/F *Tiger II*; 24 F-7M *Airguard*; up to 42 F-14 *Tomcat*; 35 MiG-29A/UB *Fulcrum*; up to 6 *Azarakhsh* (reported)

FGA 90: 62 F-4D/E *Phantom II*; 2 *Mirage F-1BQ*; 10 *Mirage F-1EQ*; up to 6 *Saegheh* (reported); up to 7 Su-22M4 *Fitter K*; 3+ Su-22UM-3K *Fitter G*

ATK 39: 29 Su-24MK *Fencer D*; 7 Su-25K *Frogfoot* (status unknown); 3 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot* (status unknown)

ASW 3 P-3F *Orion*

ISR: 6+ RF-4E *Phantom II**

TKR/TPT 3: €1 B-707; €2 B-747

TPT 116: **Heavy** 12 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** €19 C-130E/H *Hercules*; **Light** 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 *Faraz*); 10 F-27 *Friendship*; 1 L-1329 *Jetstar*; 10 PC-6B *Turbo Porter*; 8 TB-21 *Trinidad*; 4 TB-200 *Tobago*; 3 *Turbo Commander* 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; **PAX** 10: €1 B-707; 1 B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 *Falcon* 20; 3 *Falcon* 50

TRG 141: 25 Beech F33A/C *Bonanza*; 15 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 14 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 *Mushshak*; 12 *Parastu*; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 Bell 412

TPT 34+: **Heavy** 2+ CH-47 *Chinook*; **Medium** 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); **Light** 2+: 2 Bell 206A *Jet Ranger* (AB-206A); some *Shabaviz* 2-75 (indigenous versions in production); some *Shabaviz* 2061

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** PL-2A†; PL-7; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); AIM-9J *Sidewinder*; **IR/SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **SARH** AIM-7E-2 *Sparrow*; **ARH** AIM-54 *Phoenix*†

ASM AGM-65A *Maverick*; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-25ML (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B *Kedge*)

AShM C-801K

ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)

BOMBBS

Electro-optical guided GBU-87/B *Qassed*

Air Defence Force 15,000**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**

16 bn with MIM-23B *I-Hawk/Shahin*

4 bn with S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

5 sqn with FM-80 (CH-SA-4); *Rapier*; HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 410

Long-range 42+: 10 S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 32 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*); *Bavar-373*

Medium-range 59+: €50 MIM-23B *I-Hawk/Shahin*; 9 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); *Talash/15th Khordad*

Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (CH-SA-4); 29 9K331 *Tor-M1* (RS-SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

Point-defence 30+: 30 *Rapier*; *Misaq 1* (QW-1); *Misaq 2* (QW-18)

GUNS • **TOWED** 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm GDF-002

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000–60,000

Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000 (border and security troops); 450,000 on mobilisation (incl conscripts)

Part of armed forces in wartime

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • **PB** €90 **AIRCRAFT** • **TPT** • **Light** 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna 185/Cessna 310

HELICOPTERS • **TPT** • **Light** €24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/AB-206 (Bell 206) *Jet Ranger*

Basij Resistance Force €600,000 on mobilisation

Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6 million; €600,000 combat capable

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

2,500 militia bn(-) (claimed, limited permanent membership)

DEPLOYMENT

GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN: Navy: 1 FSG; 1 LST


MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

SYRIA: 1,500

Iraq IRQ

Iraqi Dinar IQD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	IQD	202tr	292tr	
	USD	169bn	201bn	
per capita	USD	4,223	4,893	
Growth	%	-15.7	3.6	
Inflation	%	0.6	6.4	
Def bdtg [a]	IQD	€12.1tr	€10.7tr	
	USD	€10.2bn	€7.4bn	
FMA (US)	USD	0m	0m	250m
USD1=IQD		1190.81	1450.00	

[a] Excludes Ministry of the Interior and National Security Council budget



Population 39,650,145

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	18.6%	5.4%	4.7%	3.9%	16.1%	1.5%
Female	17.8%	5.2%	4.5%	3.9%	16.2%	1.9%

Capabilities

While the armed forces' capabilities and morale have generally improved since the collapse of several divisions in the face of the ISIS advance in the north in 2014, there remains concern about

Baghdad's ability to independently sustain this level of operational effectiveness. The continuing reliance on a relatively small number of key formations for offensive operations, particularly the well-regarded Counter-Terrorism Service, has resulted in these forces suffering disproportionately high levels of attrition. Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship between the official government forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilisation Units militias remains an unresolved issue. The government's most critical security relationship has been with the US, on whom Iraqi forces remain largely dependent for training and ISR support, as well as contractor maintenance. Political pressure from nationalist and Iran-aligned political parties, and continuing attacks on US forces by Iranian-supported militia units, have strained this relationship in recent years, and the US has begun drawing down its presence in the country. The NATO Mission Iraq remains, with a focus on training and capacity-building. The armed forces' inventory comprises a heterogeneous mix of Soviet-era and Russian equipment combined with newer European- and US-sourced platforms, and significant shortcomings in logistics support remain a problem. Barring military maintenance facilities, Iraq's defence industry has only limited capacity, focusing on the manufacture of light weapons and ammunition.

ACTIVE 193,000 (Army 180,000 Navy 3,000 Air 5,000 Air Defence 5,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 266,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €180,000

Includes Counter Terrorism Service

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 3 SF bde
- 1 ranger bde (3 ranger bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 1 (9th) armd div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)

Mechanised

- 3 (5th, 8th & 10th) mech div (4 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (7th) mech div (2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)

Light

- 1 (6th) mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
- 1 (14th) mot div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
- 1 (1st) inf div (2 inf bde)
- 1 (11th) inf div (3 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
- 1 (15th) inf div (5 inf bde)
- 1 (16th) inf div (2 inf bde)
- 1 (17th Cdo) inf div (4 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
- 1 inf bde

Other

- 1 (PM SF) sy div (3 inf bde)

HELICOPTER

- 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-28NE *Havoc*
- 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-35M *Hind*
- 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*)
- 3 atk hel sqn with Bell T407; H135M

- 3 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-171Sh
- 1 ISR sqn with SA342M *Gazelle*
- 2 trg sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C *Kiowa*
- 1 trg sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*)
- 1 trg sqn with Mi-17 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

- MBT 391+**: €100 M1A1 *Abrams*; 168+ T-72M/M1; €50 T-55; 73 T-90S
- RECCE 453**: €400 *Akrep*; 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 *Cascavel*;
- IFV 650**: €400 BMP-1; €90 BMP-3M; €60 BTR-4 (inc variants); 100 BTR-80A
- APC 1,592+**
 - APC (T) 900**: €500 M113A2/*Talha*; €400 MT-LB
 - PPV 692+**: 12 *Barracuda*; 250 *Caiman*; *Gorets-M*; €400 *ILAV Badger*; *Mamba*; 30 *Maxxpro*
 - AUV 20+**: M-ATV; 20 *Commando*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- ARV 222+**: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; 7 *Maxxpro* ARV; T-54/55 ARV; Type-653; VT-55A

NBC VEHICLES 20 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

- MSL • MANPATS 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)** (reported)

ARTILLERY 1,064+

- SP 48+**: **152mm** 18+ Type-83; **155mm** 30: 6 M109A1; 24 M109A5
- TOWED 60+**: **130mm** M-46/Type-59; **152mm** D-20; Type-83; **155mm** €60 M198
- MRL 6+**: **122mm** some BM-21 *Grad*; **220mm** 6+ TOS-1A
- MOR 950+**: **81mm** €500 M252; **120mm** €450 M120; **240mm** M-240

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 35**: 11 Mi-28NE *Havoc*; 4 Mi-28UB *Havoc*; 20+ Mi-35M *Hind*
- MRH 63+**: 4+ SA342 *Gazelle*; 17 Bell IA407; 23 H135M; €19 Mi-17 *Hip H*/Mi-171Sh
- ISR 10** OH-58C *Kiowa*
- TPT • Light 44**: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*); 10 Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger*; €18 Bell T407

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR Heavy 12 CH-4+

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 *Shturm* (RS-AT-6 *Spiral*); AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1; *Ingwe*

Navy 3,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32

- PCF (2 *Musa ibn Nusayr* (ITA *Assad*) with 1 76mm gun non operational)**
- PCO 2 *Al Basra* (US *River Hawk*)**
- PCC 4 *Fateh* (ITA *Diciotti*)**
- PB 20**: 12 *Swiftships* 35; 5 *Predator* (PRC 27m); 3 *Al Faw*
- PBR 6**: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010

Marines 1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

- 2 mne bn

Air Force €5,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon***GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with L-159A; L-159T1

ISR1 sqn with CH-2000 *Sama*; SB7L-360 *Seeker*1 sqn with Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; Cessna AC-208B *Combat Caravan**1 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with An-32B *Cline*1 sqn with C-130E/J-30 *Hercules***TRAINING**

1 sqn with Cessna 172, Cessna 208B

1 sqn with *Lasta-95*

1 sqn with T-6A

1 sqn with T-50IQ *Golden Eagle****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 90 combat capable**FGA** 34: 26 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 8 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*;
ATK 30: 10 L-159A; 1 L-159T1; ε19 Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*†**ISR** 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B *Combat Caravan**; 2 SB7L-360 *Seeker*; 6 Beech 350ER *King Air***TPT** 29: **Medium** 15: 3 C-130E *Hercules*; 6 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 6 An-32B *Cline* (of which 2 combat capable);**Light** 14: 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 5 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 8 Cessna 172**TRG** 57+: 8 CH-2000 *Sama*; 10+ *Lasta-95*; 15 T-6A; 24 T-50IQ *Golden Eagle****AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM** • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; AIM-9M *Sidewinder*;**SARH** AIM-7M *Sparrow***ASM** AGM-114 *Hellfire***BOMBS****Laser-guided** GBU-10 *Paveway II*; GBU-12 *Paveway II*
INS/GPS-guided FT-9**Air Defence Command** €5,000**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**1 SAM bn with 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)1 SAM bn with M1097 *Avenger*1 SAM bn with 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

1 ADA bn with ZU-23-2; S-60

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE****SAM** 24+**Short-range** 24 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)**Point-defence** M1097 *Avenger*; 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)**GUNS** • **TOWED** 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** €266,000**Iraqi Federal Police** €36,000**Territorial Interdiction Force** €50,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

4 sy bde

11 sy bde (forming)

Militias €180,000

Popular Mobilisation Units include: Badr Organisation; Kataib Hezbollah; Kataib Imam Ali; Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada

FOREIGN FORCES**Australia** *Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra)* 110 • NATO Mission Iraq 2**Belgium** *Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix)* 7**Canada** *Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact)* 250; 1 SF gp; 1 hel flt with 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 *Griffon*); 1 med unit • NATO Mission Iraq 17**Czech Republic** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 60**Denmark** NATO Mission Iraq 210; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team**Estonia** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40**Fiji** UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit**Finland** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 75; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 5**France** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 3**Germany** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 80 • NATO Mission Iraq 10**Greece** NATO Mission Iraq 1**Hungary** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 138 • NATO Mission Iraq 19**Italy** *Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica)* 600; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 • NATO Mission Iraq 280**Latvia** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6**Lithuania** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 9**Nepal** UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit**Netherlands** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 2 trg units • NATO Mission Iraq 2**New Zealand** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 9**Norway** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 60; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 2**Poland** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150 • NATO Mission Iraq 30**Portugal** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 30**Romania** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 1 • NATO Mission Iraq 4**Slovakia** NATO Mission Iraq 5**Slovenia** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 6**Spain** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 1 trg units; 1 hel unit • NATO Mission Iraq 115**Sweden** *Operation Inherent Resolve* 2 • NATO Mission Iraq 1**Turkey** Army 1,000; 1 cdo unit • NATO Mission Iraq 86


United Kingdom *Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader)*

NATO Mission Iraq 100

United States *Operation Inherent Resolve* 2,000; 1 ARNG inf bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E *Apache*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper* • NATO Mission Iraq 1**Israel** ISR

New Israeli Shekel ILS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ILS	1.40tr	1.52tr	
	USD	407bn	468bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	44,181	49,840	
Growth	%	-2.2	7.1	
Inflation	%	-0.6	1.4	
Def bdtg	ILS	59.3bn	65.9bn	63.9bn
	USD	17.2bn	20.3bn	
FMA (US)	USD	3.30bn	3.30bn	3.30bn
USD1=ILS		3.44	3.25	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

**Population** 8,787,045

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.6%	4.1%	3.9%	3.6%	19.7%	5.4%
Female	13.0%	4.0%	3.7%	3.4%	19.1%	6.6%

Capabilities

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are organised for territorial defence, short-term interventions in neighbouring states and limited regional power projection. Israel is widely believed to possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Following the 2015 Plan *Gideon*, the IDF adopted a new five-year Plan *Tnuva* (Momentum) in 2020. It seeks to improve areas of relative superiority such as technology and intelligence, to ensure swifter and more decisive operations against future threats. The new government approved a defence budget in mid-2021, following two years without a new budget, which has enabled the plan to proceed. The US remains Israel's key defence partner, as well as a significant source of funding, and is instrumental in several of the IDF's equipment programmes, particularly in missile defence and combat aviation. Israel also maintains discreet ties with a number of Arab states and has recently normalised relations with several Gulf states. Personnel quality and training are generally high, despite the IDF's continuing reliance on national service. Ground-forces training is being overhauled, with new training centres under construction. Given its planned mission-set, the IDF's logistics capabilities are limited to sustaining operations within Israel itself or in immediately neighbouring territories. The largely asymmetric nature of the threats the IDF has faced in recent years has focused modernisation efforts on force-protection, missile-defence and precision-strike capabilities. Israel maintains a broad defence-industrial base, with world-class capabilities in several areas, notably armoured vehicles, uninhabited systems, guided weapons, radars and sensors, and cyber security.

ACTIVE 169,500 (Army 126,000 Navy 9,500 Air 34,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000

Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months, women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians, Circassians and Muslims may volunteer)

RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 Air 55,000)

Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54) for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Strategic Forces**

Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability – delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, *Jericho 2* IRBM and, reportedly, *Dolphin/Tanin*-class SSKs with LACM

FORCES BY ROLE**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE**3 IRBM sqn with *Jericho 2***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS**IRBM • Nuclear: ε24 *Jericho 2***Strategic Defences****FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**3 bty with *Arrow 2* ATBM with *Green Pine/Super Green Pine* radar and *Citrus Tree* command post10 bty with *Iron Dome* (incl reserve bty)4 bty with M901 *Patriot* PAC-22 bty with *David's Sling***Space****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SATELLITES 10****COMMUNICATIONS** 3 *Amos*ISR 7: 1 EROS; 5 *Ofeq* (5, 7, 9, 10 & 16); 1 TecSAR-1 (*Polaris*)**Army 26,000; 100,000 conscript (total 126,000)**

Organisation and structure of formations may vary according to op situations. Equipment includes that required for reserve forces on mobilisation

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

3 (regional cmd) corps HQ

2 armd div HQ

1 (Multidimensional) div HQ

5 (territorial) inf div HQ

1 (home defence) cmd HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops unit)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 indep recce bn

Armoured

3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 a rmd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn)

1 (Multidimensional) armd inf/ISR bn

Mechanised

3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)

1 mech inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn)

1 indep mech inf bn

Light

1 (Border Protection) inf bde (2 ISR bn, 4 inf bn)
1 mtn inf bde
2 indep inf bn

Air Manoeuvr

1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)

Other

1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn)
1 (Border Protection) sy bde (4 sy bn; 2 ISR bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde
1 engr bde (3 engr bn, 3 EOD coy)
1 CBRN bn
1 int bde (3 int bn)
1 SIGINT unit
2 MP bn

Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

3 armd div HQ
1 AB div HQ

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

9 armd bde

Mechanised

8 mech inf bde

Light

16 (territorial/regional) inf bde

Air Manoeuvr

4 para bde

Mountain

1 mtn inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

5 arty bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

6 log unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT €400 *Merkava* MkIV (€700 *Merkava* MkIII; €200 *Merkava* MkIV all in store)

APC • APC (T) 1,190: €290 *Namer*; 500 M113A2; €400 *Nagmachon* (*Centurion* chassis); *Nakpadon* (5,100: €100 *Achzarit* (modified T-55 chassis); 5,000 M113A1/A2 all in store)

AUV *Ze'ev*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV D9R; *Namer*; *Puma*

ARV *Nemmera*; M88A1; M113 ARV

VLB *Alligator* MAB; M48/60; MTU

NBC VEHICLES €8 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP M113 with *Spike*; *Tamuz* (*Spike* NLOS)

MANPATS IMI MAPATS; *Spike* SR/MR/LR/ER

ARTILLERY 530

SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 30 M109A2; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110 all in store)

TOWED (155mm 171: 40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in store)

MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 306mm IMI *Lynx* (160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18 M270 MLRS; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store)

MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm 18 Soltam M-66 all in store)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Machbet*; FIM-92 *Stinger*

Navv 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 5**SSK** 5:

3 *Dolphin* (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/*SeaHake* (DM2A3) HWT/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/*Kaved* HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported)

2 *Tanin* (GER HDW design) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM/*SeaHake* (DM2A3) HWT/*SeaHake* mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/*Kaved* HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49**CORVETTES • FSGHM** 7:

2 *Eilat* (*Sa'ar* 5) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/*Gabriel* V ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM (being upgraded to *Barak-8*), 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* ASW hel)

1 *Eilat* (*Sa'ar* 5) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM/*Gabriel* V ASHM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak-8* SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* ASW hel)

4 *Magen* (*Sa'ar* 6) with 2 quad Inchr with *Gabriel* V ASHM, 2 20-cell VLS with *Tamir* (C-Dome) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with *Barak* LRAD, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 54 LWT (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther* ASW hel)

PCGM 8 *Hetz* (*Sa'ar* 4.5) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM (can also be fitted with up to 6 single Inchr with *Gabriel* II ASHM), 2 8-cell VLS with *Barak-1* SAM, (can be fitted with 2 triple 324mm Mk32 TT with Mk46 LWT), 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CWIS, 1 76mm gun

PBF 34: 5 *Shaldag*; 3 *Stingray*; 9 *Super Dvora* Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 *Super Dvora* Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 *Super Dvora* Mk II-I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 *Super Dvora* Mk III (SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 *Super Dvora* Mk III (SSM may be fitted)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 *Manta*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 *Bat Yam* (ex-GER Type-745)

Naval Commandos €300

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 cdo unit

Air Force 34,000

Responsible for Air and Space Coordination

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with F-15A/B/D *Eagle* (*Baz*)

1 sqn with F-15B/C/D *Eagle* (*Baz*)

1 sqn with F-15I *Ra'am*

5 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon (Barak)*

4 sqn with F-16I *Fighting Falcon (Sufa)*

2 sqn with F-35I *Adir*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with AS565SA *Panther* (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with RC-12D *Guardrail*; Beech A36 *Bonanza (Hofit)*; Beech 200 *King Air*; Beech 200T *King Air*; Beech 200CT *King Air*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 *Eitam*; Gulfstream G550 *Shavit*

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130E/H *Hercules*; KC-130H *Hercules*

1 sqn with C-130J-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with KC-707

TRAINING

1 OPFOR sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon (Barak)*

1 sqn with F-35I *Adir*

1 sqn with M-346 *Master (Lavi)*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AH-64A *Apache (Peten)*

1 sqn with AH-64D *Apache (Sarat)*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with CH-53D *Sea Stallion*

2 sqn with S-70A *Black Hawk*; UH-60A *Black Hawk*

1 medevac unit with CH-53D *Sea Stallion*

UAV

1 ISR sqn with *Hermes 450*

1 ISR sqn with *Heron (Shoval)*; *Heron TP (Eitan)*

1 ISR sqn with *Heron (Shoval)* (MP role)

AIR DEFENCE

3 bty with *Arrow 2/3*

10 bty with *Iron Dome*

4 bty with M901 *Patriot PAC-2*

2 bty with *David's Sling*

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF wg (2 SF unit, 1 CSAR unit, 1 int unit)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

3 IRBM sqn with *Jericho 2*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 339 combat capable

FGA 309: 16 F-15A *Eagle (Baz)*; 6 F-15B *Eagle (Baz)*; 17

F-15C *Eagle (Baz)*; 19 F-15D *Eagle (Baz)*; 25 F-15I *Rafam*;

ε50 F-16C *Fighting Falcon (Barak)*; 49 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*

(*Barak*); 97 F-16I *Fighting Falcon (Sufa)*; 30 F-35I *Adir*

ISR 7: 6 RC-12D *Guardrail*; 1 Gulfstream G550 *Oron*

ELINT 4: 1 EC-707; 3 Gulfstream G550 *Shavit*

AEW 4: 2 B-707 *Phalcon*; 2 Gulfstream G550 *Eitam* (1 more on order)

TKR/TPT 10: 4 KC-130H *Hercules*; 6 KC-707

TPT 65: **Medium** 18: 5 C-130E *Hercules*; 6 C-130H

Hercules; 7 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **Light** 47: 3 AT-802 *Air*

Tractor; 9 Beech 200 *King Air*; 8 Beech 200T *King Air*; 5

Beech 200CT *King Air*; 22 Beech A36 *Bonanza (Hofit)*

TRG 66: 16 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 *Master (Lavi)**; 20 T-6A

HELICOPTERS

ATK 43: 26 AH-64A *Apache (Peten)*; 17 AH-64D *Apache (Sarat)*

ASW 7 AS565SA *Panther* (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew)

ISR 12 OH-58B *Kiowa*

TPT 80: **Heavy** 25 CH-53D *Sea Stallion*; **Medium** 49: 39

S-70A *Black Hawk*; 10 UH-60A *Black Hawk*; **Light** 6 Bell

206 *Jet Ranger*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 3+: **Heavy** 3+: *Heron (Shoval)*; 3 *Heron TP (Eitan)*; RQ-5A *Hunter*; **Medium** *Hermes 450*; *Hermes 900* (22+ *Searcher MkII* in store); (an unknown number of ISR UAVs are combat capable)

LOITERING MUNITIONS *Harop*; *Harpy*

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

IRBM • **Nuclear** ε24 *Jericho 2*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 40+:

Long-range M901 *Patriot PAC-2*

Medium-range some *David's Sling*

Short-range up to 40 *Iron Dome*

Point-defence *Machbet*

GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 *Vulcan*

MISSILE DEFENCE • SAM 24 *Arrow 2/Arrow 3*;

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9 *Sidewinder*; *Python 4*; IIR *Python 5*;

ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*; AGM-62B *Walleye*; AGM-65

Maverick; *Delilah AL*; *Popeye I/II*; *Spike NLOS*

BOMBS

IIR guided *Opher*

Laser-guided *Griffin*; *Lizard*; *Paveway II*

INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-39 Small

Diameter Bomb (*Barad Had*); *Spice*

Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000 reservists)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε8,000

Border Police ε8,000

FOREIGN FORCES

UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total numbers for mission

Argentina 3

Australia 13

Austria 4

Belgium 1

Bhutan 6 • UNDOF 3

Canada 5

Chile 3

China 4

Czech Republic UNDOF 3

Denmark 10

Estonia 3

Fiji 3 • UNDOF 151; 1 inf coy

Finland 15

Ghana UNDOF 6

India 2 • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl; 1 MP pl; 1 log coy(-)

Ireland 11 • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy

Nepal 3 • UNDOF 409; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-)


Netherlands 11 • UNDOF 1
 New Zealand 7
 Norway 12
 Poland 3
 Russia 4
 Serbia 1
 Slovakia 3
 Slovenia 2
 Sweden 6
 Switzerland 13
 United States 2 • US Strategic Command; 100; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren
 Uruguay UNDOF 232; 1 mech inf coy
 Zambia 1

Jordan JOR

Jordanian Dinar JOD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	JOD	31.0bn	32.1bn	
	USD	43.8bn	45.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,286	4,394	
Growth	%	-1.6	2.0	
Inflation	%	0.4	1.6	
Def bdgt [a]	JOD	1.22bn	1.28bn	
	USD	1.72bn	1.80bn	
FMA (US)	USD	425m	500m	350m
USD1=JOD		0.71	0.71	

[a] Excludes expenditure on public order and safety

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 10,909,567

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	16.6%	5.3%	5.0%	4.7%	19.1%	1.8%
Female	15.8%	5.0%	4.4%	4.0%	16.3%	1.9%

Capabilities

The Jordanian armed forces are structured to provide border security and an armoured response to conventional threats. Efforts to restructure, review modernisation requirements and increase efficiency are ongoing. In recent years, Jordan has withdrawn some equipment from service, particularly aircraft, likely due to budgetary pressure. There has been no recent public statement of defence policy, but regional instability is a prime concern, principally the ongoing war in Syria. Jordan is a major non-NATO ally of the US and there is a close bilateral defence relationship, with Jordan receiving a minimum of USD350 million a year in Foreign Military Financing until the end of 2022. The country has developed a bespoke special-forces training centre and has hosted training for numerous state and non-state military forces. A training centre for female personnel was inaugurated in mid-2021 and aims to boost the number of women in the military to 3% of the total. Personnel are well trained, particularly aircrew and special forces, who are highly regarded internationally. Jordanian forces are able to independently deploy regionally and have participated in ISAF

operations in Afghanistan and in coalition air operations over Syria and Yemen. Jordan's inventory largely comprises older systems and procurements have typically been in small numbers, second-hand or donations. Although the state-owned Jordan Design and Development Bureau (JODDB, formerly KADDB) has demonstrated the capacity to upgrade vehicles, the army has largely recapitalised its armoured-vehicle fleet with second-hand armour from European countries. JODDB produces some light armoured vehicles for domestic use, but the company currently has little export profile.

ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 86,000 Navy 500 Air 14,000)
 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 86,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Royal Guard) SF gp (1 SF regt, 1 SF bn, 1 CT bn)
 1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops bn)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd bde

Mechanised

8 mech bde

Light

2 (Border Gd) inf bde

1 (Border Gd) inf gp

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde (3 AB bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 arty bde

4 AD bde

1 MRL bn

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 266: ϵ 80 FV4034 *Challenger* 1 (*Al Hussein*) (being withdrawn); 4+ *Leclerc*; 182 M60A3 (ϵ 300 FV4034 *Challenger* 1 (*Al Hussein*) in store)

ASLT 80 B1 *Centauro* (61 more in store)

IFV 720: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 50 *Marder* 1A3; 321 *Ratel*-20; 336

YPR-765 PRI

APC 923+

APC (T) 729: 370 M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 269 M577A2 (CP); 87 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B

PPV 194: some *Al-Wahsh*; 25 *Marauder*; 25 *Matador*; 100 *MaxxPro*; 44 *Nomad/Thunder*

AUV 35 *Cougar*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 85+: *Al Monjed*; 5 BPz-1; FV4204 *Chieftain* ARV; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; 18 YPR-806

MW 12 *Aardvark* Mk2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 115: 70 M901; 45 AIFV-B-Milan

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; TOW/TOW-2A; 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); Luch *Corsar*; *Stugna-P*

ARTILLERY 1,393+

SP 506: **155mm** 358 M109A1/A2; **203mm** 148 M110A2
TOWED 94: **105mm** 66: 54 M102; 12 M119A2; **155mm** 28:
 10 M1/M59; 18 M114; **203mm** (4 M115 in store)
MRL 16+: **227mm** 12 M142 HIMARS; **273mm** 4+ WM-80
MOR 777: **81mm** 359; **SP** **81mm** 50; **107mm** 50 M30;
120mm 300 Brandt **SP** **120mm** 18 *Agrab* Mk2

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 92+: 92 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)
GUNS • **SP** 108: **23mm** 48 ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*; **35mm** 60 *Gepard*

Navy €500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 9

PBF 2 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M)
PB 7: 4 *Abdullah* (US *Dauntless*); 3 *Al Hussein* (UK *Vosper* 30m)

Marines**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 mne unit

Air Force 14,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

ISR

1 sqn with AT-802U *Air Tractor*

1 sqn with Cessna 208B

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130E *Hercules*

TRAINING

1 OCU with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with PC-21

1 sqn with Grob 120TP

1 hel sqn with R-44 *Raven II*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with AH-1F *Cobra* (with TOW)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS332M *Super Puma*; UH-60A *Black Hawk*

1 sqn with UH-60A *Black Hawk*

1 sqn with UH-60M *Black Hawk*

1 sqn with Mi-26T2 *Halo*

1 (Royal) flt with VH-60M *Black Hawk*; AW139

ISR UAV

1 sqn with S-100 *Camcopter*

AIR DEFENCE

2 bde with MIM-23B Phase III I-*Hawk*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 57 combat capable

FGA 47: 33 F-16AM *Fighting Falcon*; 14 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon*

ATK (2 AC235 in store, offered for sale)

ISR 10 AT-802U *Air Tractor**

TPT 10: **Medium** 3 C-130E *Hercules* (1 C-130B *Hercules*; 4 C-130H *Hercules* in store); **Light** 7: 5 Cessna 208B; 2 M-28 *Skytruck* (2 C295M in store, offered for sale)

TRG 27: 15 Grob 120TP; 12 PC-21; (12 *Hawk* Mk63* in store, offered for sale)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 AH-1F *Cobra* (17 more in store, offered for sale)

MRH 14: 3 AW139; 11 H135M (Tpt/SAR) (6 MD-530F in store, offered for sale)

TPT 49: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26T2 *Halo*; **Medium** 33: 10 AS332M *Super Puma* (being WFU); 8 UH-60A *Black Hawk*; 12 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; 3 VH-60M *Black Hawk*; (8 UH-60L in store, offered for sale); **Light** 12 R-44 *Raven II*; (13 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*) in store, offered for sale)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** (some CH-4B in store, offered for sale)

ISR • **Light** up to 10 S-100 *Camcopter*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Medium-range** 24 MIM-23B Phase III I-*Hawk*

GUNS • **TOWED** **40mm** 22 L/70 (with *Flycatcher* radar)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9J/N/P *Sidewinder*; **SARH** AIM-7

Sparrow; **ARH** AIM-120C AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65D/G *Maverick*; BGM-71 TOW

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-10/12 *Paveway II*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €15,000 active**Gendarmerie** €15,000 active

3 regional comd

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Other

10 sy bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • **APC (W)** 25+: AT105 *Saxon* (reported); 25+

EE-11 *Urutu*

AUV AB2 *Al-Jawad*

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 14

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 329; 1 mech inf coy(+)

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES

France *Operation Inherent Resolve* (*Chammal*) 300; 4 *Rafale* F3


Germany *Operation Inherent Resolve* 150; 1 A400M

United States Central Command: *Operation Inherent Resolve* 2,000; 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 1 **CISR** sqn with 12 MQ-9A *Reaper*

Kuwait KWT

Kuwaiti Dinar KWD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KWD	32.4bn	40.2bn	
	USD	106bn	132bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	22,684	27,927	
Growth	%	-8.9	0.9	
Inflation	%	2.1	3.2	
Def bdgt [a]	KWD	2.09bn	2.93bn	
	USD	6.82bn	9.64bn	
USD1=KWD		0.31	0.30	

[a] Includes National Guard



Population 3,032,065

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.5%	3.3%	4.9%	7.2%	28.8%	1.3%
Female	11.5%	3.1%	3.7%	4.3%	17.7%	1.7%

Capabilities

Kuwait's armed forces are postured to provide territorial defence through a strategy of holding out against any superior aggressor until allied forces can be mobilised to assist. Kuwait is a member of the GCC, but its key defence relationship has been with the US since 1991. Washington designated Kuwait a major non-NATO ally in 2004, and a bilateral defence-cooperation agreement provides for a range of joint activities and mentoring, and the stationing and pre-positioning of significant numbers of US personnel and supplies of equipment. The US drawdown of forces from CENTCOM in 2021 means that, in future, greater emphasis for Kuwait's defence may be placed upon the country's own capabilities, as well as those of its regional GCC allies. The focus on national defence means that Kuwait has little expeditionary sustainment capacity, although it did make a small air contribution to the Saudi-led coalition at the beginning of the Yemen conflict. Air and missile defence has been the primary focus of recent modernisation actions, given Kuwait's proximity to Iran, but the Emirate has also begun to modernise its fleets of ageing land- and air-combat platforms. There is some organic maintenance capacity, though this is bolstered by contractor support. Kuwait lacks a domestic defence-industrial base and is reliant on imports, albeit with offset requirements to help stimulate the country's wider industrial sector.

ACTIVE 17,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500 Emiri Guard 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,100

Conscript liability 12 months, males 18-35 years

RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700)

Reserve obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 11,500

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 mech/recce bde

Armoured

3 armd bde

Mechanised

2 mech inf bde

Light

1 cdo bde

Other

1 (Amiri) gd bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp

1 fd hospital

Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 294: 218 M1A2 *Abrams*; 1 M1A2K *Abrams*; 75 M-84AB (75 more in store)

IFV 537: 76 BMP-2; 122 BMP-3; 103 BMP-3M; 236 *Desert Warrior*† (incl variants)

APC 260

APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 (CP)

APC (W) (40 TH 390 *Fahd* in store)

AUV 300 *Sherpa Light Scout*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 19+: 19 M88A1/2; Type-653A; *Warrior*

MW *Aardvark Mk2*

NBC VEHICLES 12 *Fuchs-2* NBC

ARTY 211

SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 Mk F3; 51 PLZ-45 (18 AU-F-1 in store)

MRL 300mm 27 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901

MANPATS 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); TOW-2

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Starburst*; FIM-92 *Stinger*

Navy €2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20

PCFG 2:

1 *Al Sanbouk* (GER Lurssen TNC 45m) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

1 *Istiqlal* (GER Lurssen TNC 57m) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PBF 10 *Al Nokatha* (US Mk V PBF)

PBG 8 *Um Almaradim* (FRA *Combattante* 1 derivative)
with 2 twin Inchr with *Sea Skua* ASHM

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8
LCT 2 *Assafar* (ADSB 64m)
LCM 1 *Abhan* (ADSB 42m)
LCVP 5 ADSB 16m

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 *Sawahil* with 1 hel landing platform

Air Force 2,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* III; KC-130J *Hercules*;
L-100-30

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with F/A-18C/D *Hornet*
1 unit with EMB-312 *Tucano**; *Hawk* Mk64*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with AH-64D *Apache*
1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 *Gazelle* with HOT

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS532 *Cougar*; H225M; SA330 *Puma*
1 (VIP) sqn with S-92A

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 47 combat capable

FGA 33: 26 F/A-18C *Hornet*; 7 F/A-18D *Hornet*

TKR/TPT 3 KC-130J *Hercules*

TPT 5: **Heavy** 2 C-17A *Globemaster* III; **Medium** 3 L-100-30

TRG 14: 6 EMB-312 *Tucano**; 8 *Hawk* Mk64* (10 EMB-312 *Tucano** in store)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 16 AH-64D *Apache*

MRH 13 SA342 *Gazelle* with HOT

TPT 19: **Heavy** 6+ H225M; **Medium** 13: 3 AS532 *Cougar*;
7 SA330 *Puma*; 3 S-92A (SAR/VIP)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic*; SARH
AIM-7F *Sparrow*; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*; AGM-114K *Hellfire*; HOT
AShM AGM-84D *Harpoon* Block IC

Air Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3)
1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with *Skyguard/Aspide*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 47

Long-range 35 M902 *Patriot* PAC-3

Short-range 12 *Aspide* with *Skyguard*

GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon GDF

Emiri Guard 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (Emiri) gd bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €7,100 active

National Guard €6,600 active

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd car bn

Other

3 security bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 20 VBL

IFV €150 *Pandur* (incl variants)

APC 67+

APC (W) 27+: 5+ *Desert Chameleon*; 22 S600 (incl variants)

PPV 40 Otokar ISV

AUV 120 *Sherpa Light Scout*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV *Pandur*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • **Heavy** 3 H225M

Coast Guard 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32

PBF 12 *Manta*

PB 20: 3 *Al Shaheed*; 4 *Inttisar* (Austal 31.5m); 3 *Kassir* (Austal 22m); 10 *Subahi*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCU 4: 2 *Al Tahaddy*; 1 *Saffar*; 1 other

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 *Sawahil*

DEPLOYMENT

SAUDI ARABIA: *Operation Restoring Hope* 4 F/A-18A *Hornet*

FOREIGN FORCES

Canada *Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact)* 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules* (CC-130J)


Italy *Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica)* 300; 4 *Tornado* ECR; 1 MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 C-27J *Spartan*; 1 KC-767A; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T

United Kingdom *Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader)* 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A *Reaper*

United States Central Command: 10,000; 1 ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cvt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B *Osprey*; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; 1 (APS) inf bde eqpt set

Lebanon LBN

Lebanese Pound LBP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LBP	95.8tr	86.2tr	
	USD	19.0bn	18.0bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,785	3,421	
Growth	%	-25.0	-10	
Inflation	%	84.9	n.k	
Def bdtg	LBP	2.90tr	€2.90tr	
	USD	575m	€579m	
FMA (US)	USD	50m	50m	160m
USD1=LBP		5039.75		



Population 5,261,372

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	10.1%	3.7%	3.7%	3.9%	24.9%	3.6%
Female	9.6%	3.6%	3.5%	3.7%	24.8%	4.8%

Capabilities

The ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to fulfil its missions remains under strain from Hizbullah's position in national politics and from the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict. Moreover, Lebanon is facing a severe and prolonged economic depression and crisis in governance, highlighted and indeed exacerbated by the port explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020. The LAF is reliant on outside assistance to continue its operations. In August 2021, the UN Security Council ordered the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission to provide the LAF with food, fuel and medicine, and a number of governments have provided other assistance. The economic crisis has left the government struggling to pay wages to troops, while inflation has eroded the value of salaries. This has led to fears that troops may have to supplement their wages with other employment. Training and operational assistance have traditionally been provided by the US, as well as by France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Reconstruction, funded by Germany, has started of the Beirut naval base. The base was damaged in the 2020 port explosion. LAF operations several years ago against ISIS demonstrated an improved capability, but how much of this remains is unclear. The LAF has no requirement for and minimal capability for extraterritorial deployment. It remains dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing equipment inventory. Barring limited organic maintenance facilities, Lebanon has no significant domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 60,000 (Army 56,600 Navy 1,800 Air 1,600)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 56,600

FORCES BY ROLE

5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, North, South)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd regt

Mechanised

11 mech inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB regt

Amphibious

1 mne cdo regt

Other

1 Presidential Guard bde

6 intervention regt 4 border sy regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty regt

1 cbt spt bde (1 engr regt, 1 AT regt, 1 sigs regt; 1 log bn)

1 MP gp

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde

1 med gp

1 construction regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 334: 92 M48A1/A5; 10 M60A2; 185 T-54; 47 T-55

RECCE 55 AML

IFV 56: 24 AIFV-B-C25; 32 M2A2 *Bradley*

APC 1,378

APC (T) 1,274 M113A1/A2 (incl variants)

APC (W) 96: 86 VAB VCT; 10 VBPT-MR *Guarani*

PPV 8 *Maxxpro*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 3 M88A1; M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV (reported)

VLB MTU-72 reported

MW *Bozena*

ARTILLERY 641

SP 155mm 12 M109A2

TOWED 313: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 35: 9 D-30;

26 M-30; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 250: 18 M114A1; 218

M198; 14 Model-50

MRL 122mm 11 BM-21

MOR 305: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 59: 29 Brandt;

30 M120

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 35 VAB with HOT

MANPATS *Milan*; TOW

RCL 106mm 113 M40A1

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium 8 *Mohajer* 4

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7B *Grail*) ‡

GUNS • TOWED 77: 20mm 20; 23mm 57 ZU-23-2

Navy 1,800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13

PCC 1 *Trablous*

PBF 1

PB 11: 1 *Aamchit* (ex-GER *Bremen*); 1 *Al Kalamoun* (ex-

FRA *Avel Gwarlarn*); 7 *Tripoli* (ex-UK *Attacker/Tracker*

Mk 2); 1 *Naquora* (ex-GER *Bremen*); 1 *Tabarja* (ex-GER

Bergen)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCT 2 *Sour* (ex-FRA EDIC – capacity 8 APC; 96 troops)

Air Force 1,600

4 air bases

FORCES BY ROLE**GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with Cessna AC-208 *Combat Caravan**

1 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA342L *Gazelle*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois/Huey II*)

1 sqn with SA330/IAR330SM *Puma*

1 trg sqn with R-44 *Raven II*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable

ISR 3 Cessna AC-208 *Combat Caravan**

TRG 9: 3 *Bulldog*; 6 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15: 1 AW139; 6 MD530F+; 8 SA342L *Gazelle* (5 SA342L *Gazelle*; 5 SA316 *Alouette III*; 1 SA318 *Alouette II* all non-operational)

TPT 41: **Medium** 13: 3 S-61N (fire fighting); 10 SA330/IAR330 *Puma*; **Light** 28: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*); 4 R-44 *Raven II* (basic trg) (11 Bell 205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational)

AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*; AGR-20A *APKWS*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €20,000 active**Internal Security Force €20,000**

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE**Other Combat Forces**

1 (police) judicial unit

1 regional sy coy

1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 *Chaimite*

Customs**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7**

PB 7: 5 *Aztec*; 2 *Tracker*

FOREIGN FORCES

Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent total numbers for the mission

Argentina 3

Armenia UNIFIL 32

Australia 13

Austria 4 • UNIFIL 172: 1 log coy

Bangladesh UNIFIL 229: 1 FSGM

Belarus UNIFIL 9

Belgium 1

Bhutan 6

Brazil UNIFIL 9

Brunei UNIFIL 31

Cambodia UNIFIL 179: 1 EOD coy

Canada 5 (*Operation Jade*)

Chile 3

China, People's Republic of 4 • UNIFIL 419: 2 engr coy; 1 med coy

Colombia UNIFIL 1

Croatia UNIFIL 1

Cyprus UNIFIL 2

Denmark 10

El Salvador UNIFIL 54: 1 inf pl

Estonia 3 • UNIFIL 1

Fiji 3 • UNIFIL 1

Finland 15 • UNIFIL 162; 1 inf coy

France UNIFIL 567: 1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB; *Mistral*

Germany UNIFIL 103: 1 FFGM

Ghana UNIFIL 877: 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn

Greece UNIFIL 111: 1 FFGHM

Guatemala UNIFIL 2

Hungary UNIFIL 16

India 2 • UNIFIL 867: 1 inf bn; 1 med coy

Indonesia UNIFIL 1,229: 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM

Ireland 11 • UNIFIL 338: 1 mech inf bn(-)

Italy MIBIL 315 • UNIFIL 906: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn

Kazakhstan UNIFIL 37

Kenya UNIFIL 4

Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 255: 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy

Macedonia, North UNIFIL 3

Malaysia UNIFIL 1,045: 1 mech inf bn

Malta UNIFIL 11

Nepal 3 • UNIFIL 877: 1 mech inf bn

Netherlands 11 • UNIFIL 1

New Zealand 7

Nigeria UNIFIL 1

Norway 12

Peru UNIFIL 1

Poland 3 • UNIFIL 192; 1 mech inf coy

Qatar UNIFIL 1

Russia 4

Serbia 1 • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy

Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3

Slovakia 3

Slovenia 2

Spain UNIFIL 625: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy

Sri Lanka UNIFIL 123: 1 inf coy

Sweden 6

Switzerland 13

Tanzania UNIFIL 125: 1 MP coy

Turkey UNIFIL 112: 1 PCFG

United States 2
Uruguay UNIFIL 1
Zambia 1 • UNIFIL 2

Libya LBY

Libyan Dinar LYD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LYD	26.6bn	121bn	
	USD	19.2bn	27.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,891	4,069	
Growth	%	-59.7	123.2	
Inflation	%	2.8	21.1	
Def bdtg	LYD	n.k.	n.k.	
	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
USD1=LYD		1.39	4.44	

Population 7,017,224

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	17.1%	4.1%	3.7%	3.5%	20.8%	1.9%
Female	16.4%	3.9%	3.5%	3.3%	19.4%	2.2%

Capabilities

The formation of a new Government of National Unity, in March 2021, unifies the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives. A UN-backed ceasefire, agreed in October 2020, is intended to see the deployment of monitors, while a follow-up resolution agreed in April 2021 called for all foreign forces and mercenaries to withdraw. Reconstruction is the new government's top priority as well as holding elections in December 2021. The new president, Mohamed Al-Menfi, promised to unify government institutions and the military forces of the GNA and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. Forces affiliated to both have relatively low levels of training. The presence in these formations of units from the former Gadhafi-era army has over the years bolstered their military capability. The GNA-affiliated forces have since 2016 benefited from several military advisory and training programmes, including EUNAVFOR-MED maritime-security training for the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. Foreign-military involvement increased in 2020. Both the GNA and the LAAF continue to be supported by foreign military forces, private military contractors and mercenaries. There are also reports of Syrian combatants paid to fight for both sides. LAAF troops have combat experience from fighting ISIS in the eastern coastal region and they have allegedly received training and combat support from external actors in the region. Equipment is mainly of Russian or Soviet origin, including items from the former Libyan armed forces, and suffers from varying degrees of obsolescence. The country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

Forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (Tripoli-based)

ACTIVE n.k.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Ground Forces n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-55; T-72

IFV BMP-2

APC

APC (T) ACV-AAPC; Steyr 4K-7FA

APC (W) *Mbombe-6*

PPV *Al-Wahsh*; *Kirpi-2*; *Vuran*

AUV Lenco *Bearcat G3*; *Nimr Ajban*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV *Centurion 105 AVRE*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 9P157-2 *Khrizantema-S* (RS-AT-15 *Springer*)

MANPATS 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

ARTILLERY

SP 155mm *Palmaria*

TOWED 122mm D-30

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11)

GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (on tch)

Navy n.k.

A number of intact naval vessels remain in Tripoli, although serviceability is questionable

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3+

CORVETTES • FSGM (1 *Al Hani* (ex-FSU Project 1159 (*Koni*)) in Malta for refit since 2013 with 2 twin Inchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C *Styx*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with 4K33 *Osa-M* (RS-SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 406mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2 A/S* mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm gun)

PBFG 1 *Sharaba* (FRA *Combattante II*) with 4 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 76mm gunt

PB 2+ PV30

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 *Ibn Harissa* (capacity 1 hel; 11 MBT; 240 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AFD 1

ARS 1 *Al Munjed* (YUG *Spasilac*)†

Air Force n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3+ combat capable

FGA 2 MiG-23BN

ATK 1 J-21 *Jastreb*†

TRG 9+: 3 G-2 *Galeb**; ε5 L-39ZO*; 1+ SF-260ML*

HELICOPTERS

ATK Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT • Medium Mi-17 *Hip*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-24 (RS-AA-7 *Apex*)

Paramilitary n.k.

Coast Guard n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PCC 1 Damen Stan 2909 with 1 sextuple 122mm MRL

PBF 6: 4 *Bigliani*; 2 *Fezzan* (ex-ITA *Corrubia*)

PB 3: 1 *Burdi* (Damen Stan 1605); 1 *Hamelin*; 1 *Ikrimah* (FRA RPB 20)

FOREIGN FORCES

Italy MIASIT 400; 1 inf coy; 1 CBRN unit; 1 trg unit

Nepal UNSMIL 234; 2 sy coy

Turkey €500; ACV-AAPC; *Kirpi*; 1 arty unit with T-155 *Firtina*; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B *Hawk*; *Korkut*; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with *Bayraktar TB2*

United Kingdom UNSMIL 1

United States UNSMIL 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Data here represents the de facto situation. This does not imply international recognition

ACTIVE n.k.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Libyan Arab Armed Forces n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-55; T-62; T-72

RECCE BRDM-2; EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV BMP-1; *Ratel-20*

APC

APC (T) M113

APC (W) *Al-Mared*; BTR-60PB; *Mbombe-6*; *Nimr Jais*; *Puma*

PPV *Al-Wahsh*; *Caiman*; *Streit Spartan*; *Streit Typhoon*; *Vuran*; *Titan-DS*

AUV *Panthera T6*; *Panthera F9*; *Terrier LT-79*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 9P157-2 *Khrizantema-S* (status unknown)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111

Fagot (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5

Spandrel); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); *Milan*

RCL: 106mm M40A1; 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Goodzika*; **155mm** G5

TOWED 122mm D-30

MRL 107mm Type-63; **122mm** BM-21 *Grad*

MOR M106

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 2K12 *Kvadrat* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS • **SP 14.5mm** ZPU-2 (on tch); **23mm** ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*; ZU-23-2 (on tch)

Navy n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+

PB: 7+ *Burdi* (Damen Stan 1605); 1 *Burdi* (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 73mm gun; 2 *Ikrimah* (FRA RPB20); 1 *Hamelin*; 1+ PV30

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFD 1

Air Force n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable

FGA 13: €10 MiG-21MF *Fishbed*; 1 *Mirage F-1AD*; 1

Mirage F-1ED; 1 Su-22UM3 *Fitter G*

TRG 12: €10 L-39ZO *Albatros**; 1+ MiG-21UM *Mongol B*; 1 SF-260ML*

HELICOPTERS

ATK Mi-24/35 *Hind*

TPT • **Medium** 3: up to 3 H215 (AS332L) *Super Puma*; Mi-8/Mi-17 *Hip*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **AAM** • **IR** R-3 (AA-2 *Atoll*)‡; R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*)


FOREIGN FORCES

United Arab Emirates UH-60M; *Pantsir-S1*

Wagner Group 3,000; Ural-432007 PPV; *Tigr*; *Pantsir-S1*; 12 MiG-29; 4 Su-24M

Mauritania MRT

Mauritanian Ouguiya		2020	2021	2022
MRU				
GDP	MRU	294bn	336bn	
	USD	8.11bn	9.16bn	
per capita	USD	1,956	2,161	
Growth	%	-1.8	2.7	
Inflation	%	2.3	2.7	
Def bdtg	MRU	7.53bn	7.77bn	
	USD	207m	212m	
USD1=MRU		36.30	36.67	



Population 4,079,284

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	18.5%	5.1%	4.5%	3.9%	14.4%	1.8%
Female	18.4%	5.2%	4.8%	4.3%	16.8%	2.4%

Capabilities

The country's small and modestly equipped armed forces are tasked with maintaining territorial integrity and internal security. In light of the regional threat from extremist Islamist groups, border security is also a key role for the armed forces, which are accustomed to counter-insurgency operations in the desert. In early 2021, the cabinet approved a draft decree establishing a defence area along the northern border to counter incursions by the Polisario Front. This followed the group's closure of a border crossing for several weeks in late 2020. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and in late 2021 the armed forces of Mauritania and Senegal signed an agreement to jointly patrol offshore gas fields. Mauritania's armed forces take part in the US-led special-operations *Flintlock* training exercise. The country also benefits from training with French armed forces. Deployment capabilities are limited to neighbouring countries without external support, but the armed forces have demonstrated mobility and sustain-

ability in desert regions. Mauritania has a limited and ageing equipment inventory, which hampers operational capability. Despite some recent acquisitions, including small ISR aircraft, aviation resources are insufficient considering the country's size. Naval equipment is geared toward coastal-surveillance missions and China's donation of a landing ship has helped establish a basic sealift capability. There is no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 15,000

FORCES BY ROLE

6 mil regions

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd recce bn

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

7 mot inf bn

8 (garrison) inf bn

Air Manoeuvr

1 cdo/para bn

Other

2 (camel corps) bn

1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bn

4 ADA bty

1 engr coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 35 T-54/T-55

RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 *Saladin*

APC • APC (W) 32: 5 FV603 *Saracen*; 7 *Bastion* APC; ε20

Panhard M3

AUV 12 *Cobra*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/55 ARV reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

RCL • 106mm ε90 M40A1

ARTILLERY 180

TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20

D-30; 24 D-74

MRL 10: 107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81

MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence ε4 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*) (reported); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60; 100mm 12 KS-19

Navy ε600

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17

PCO 1 *Voum-Legleita*

PCC 7: 1 *Abourbekr Ben Amer* (FRA OPV 54); 1 *Arguin*; 2 *Conejera*; 1 *Limam El Hidrami* (PRC); 2 *Timbédra* (PRC *Huangpu Mod*)

PB 9: 1 *El Nasr†* (FRA *Patra*); 4 *Mandovi*; 2 *Saeta-12*; 2 *Megsem Bakkar* (FRA RPB20 – for SAR duties)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 1

LSM 1 *Nimlane* (PRC)

Fusiliers Marins

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne unit

Air Force 250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

ISR 2 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*

TPT 9: Light 8: 2 BN-2 *Defender*; 1 C-212; 1 CN235; 2

PA-31T *Cheyenne II*; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 BT-67 (with sensor turret)

TRG 9: 3 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 2 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 4 SF-260E

HELICOPTERS

MRH 3: 1 SA313B *Alouette II*; 2 Z-9

TPT • Light 2 AW109

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε5,000 active

Gendarmerie ε3,000

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

6 regional sy coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2

Rodman 55M

National Guard 2,000

Ministry of Interior

Customs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1

Dah Ould Bah (FRA *Amgram 14*); 1 *Yaboub Ould Rajel* (FRA RPB18)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 464; 1 inf bn(-)


MALI: UN • MINUSMA 7

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1

Morocco MOR

Moroccan Dirham MAD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MAD	1.09tr	1.16tr	
	USD	115bn	126bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,188	3,471	
Growth	%	-6.3	5.7	
Inflation	%	0.6	1.4	
Def bdtg [a]	MAD	56.6bn	58.6bn	61.5bn
	USD	5.95bn	6.35bn	
FMA (US)	USD	10m	0m	10m
USD1=MAD		9.51	9.23	

[a] Includes autonomous defence spending (SEGMA) and Treasury funding for 'Acquisitions and Repair of Equipment for Royal Armed Forces'



Population 35,892,951

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.6%	4.3%	3.9%	3.8%	20.6%	3.6%
Female	13.1%	4.2%	4.0%	3.8%	21.2%	3.8%

Capabilities

Regional security challenges are a key concern for Morocco's armed forces. A 30-year ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended in late 2020 and the UN has reported that hostilities have resumed, albeit at a low level. Morocco maintains defence ties with France and the US, receiving military training and equipment from both. There is also close cooperation with NATO, and in 2016 Morocco was granted access to the Alliance's Interoperability Platform in order to strengthen the defence and security sectors and bring the armed forces up to NATO standards. In 2017, Morocco rejoined the African Union. The armed forces have also gained experience from UN peacekeeping deployments and from multinational exercises. Conscription was reintroduced in early 2019. The armed forces have some capacity to deploy independently within the region and on UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa, although they lack heavy sealift and airlift capabilities. Morocco has also deployed overseas in a combat role, contributing F-16 aircraft to the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen from 2015 to early 2019. The inventory primarily comprises ageing French and US equipment. However, there are plans to re-equip all the services and to invest significantly in the navy. Morocco operates two Earth-observation satellites, meeting some surveillance requirements. Morocco relies on imports and donations for major defence equipment. However, its relative stability has attracted Western defence companies, such as Airbus, Safran and Thales, to establish aerospace manufacturing and servicing facilities in the country.

ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air 13,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000

Conscript liability 12 months for men aged 19-25

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000)

Reserve obligation to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 2 *Mohammed VI*

Army 175,000

FORCES BY ROLE

2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde

11 armd bn

Mechanised

3 mech inf bde

Mechanised/Light

8 mech/mot inf regt (2-3 bn)

Light

1 lt sy bde

3 (camel corps) mot inf bn

35 lt inf bn

4 cdo unit

Air Manoeuvre

2 para bde

2 AB bn

Mountain

1 mtn inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

11 arty bn

7 engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

Royal Guard 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 gd bn

2 cav sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 656: 222 M1A1SA *Abrams*; 220 M60A1 *Patton*; 120 M60A3 *Patton*; 40 T-72B; 54 Type-90-II (MBT-2000); (€200 M48A5 *Patton* & €60 T-72B in store)

LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 *Kuerassier*

ASLT 80 AMX-10RC

RECCE 284: 38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 40 EBR-75; 16 *Eland*

IFV 238: 10 AMX-10P; 30 *Ratel* Mk3-20; 30 *Ratel* Mk3-90; 45 VAB VCI; 123 YPR-765

APC 1,225

APC (T) 905: 400 M113A1/A2; 419 M113A3; 86 M577A2 (CP)

APC (W) 320 VAB VTT

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 85+: 10 *Greif*; 55 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 80 M901

MANPATS 9K11 *Maljutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); HJ-8L;

M47 *Dragon*; *Milan*; TOW

RCL 106mm 350 M40A1

GUNS • SP 36: 90mm 28 M56; 100mm 8 SU-100

ARTILLERY 2,317

SP 355: 105mm 5 AMX Mk 61; 155mm 290: €130 M109A1/A1B/A2/A3/A4; 70 M109A5; 90 Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110

TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101; 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114

MRL 47: 122mm 35 BM-21 *Grad*; 300mm 12+ PHL-03

MOR 1,797: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; SP 107mm 36 M106A2; 120mm 550 Brandt; SP 120mm 110: 20 (VAB APC); 91 M1064A3

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium R4E-50 *Skyeye*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 67+

Medium-range 18 *Tianlong-50*

Short-range DK-9 (CH-SA-5)

Point-defence 49+: 12 2K22M *Tunguska-M* (RS-SA-19 *Grison*); 37 M48 *Chaparral*; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS 390

SP 20mm 60 M163 *Vulcan*

TOWED 330: 14.5mm 200: 150–180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-4; 20mm 40 M167 *Vulcan*; 23mm 75–90 ZU-23-2; 35mm some PG-99

Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3

FFGHM 1 *Mohammed VI* (FRA FREMM) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther*)

FFGH 2 *Mohammed V* (FRA *Floreal*) with 2 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with *Simbad* SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther*)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53

CORVETTES 4

FSGHM 3:

2 *Sultan Moulay Ismail* (NLD SIGMA 9813) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2/3 ASHM, 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther*)

1 *Tarik ben Ziyad* (NLD SIGMA 10513) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA *Panther*)

FSM 1 *Lt Col Errhamani* (ESP *Descubierto*) with 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun

PSO 1 *Bin an Zaran* (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun

PCG 4 *Cdt El Khattabi* (ESP *Lazaga* 58m) with 4 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PCO 5 *Rais Bargach* (under control of fisheries dept)

PCC 12:

4 *El Hahiq* (DNK *Osprey* 55, incl 2 with customs)

6 *LV Rabhi* (ESP 58m B-200D)

2 *Okba* (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun

PB 27: 6 *El Wacil* (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 Rodman 101; 1 other (UK *Bird*)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 *Ben Aicha* (FRA *Champlain* BATRAL) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 2:

LCT 1 *Sidi Ifni*

LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9

AG 1 *Damen* 3011

AGHS 1 *Dar Al Beida* (FRA BHO2M)

AGOR 1 *Abou Barakat Albarbarit* (ex-US *Robert D. Conrad*)

AGS 1 *Damen Stan Tender* 1504

AK 2

AX 1 *Essaouira*

AXS 2

Marines 1,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

2 naval inf bn

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • MP 2 *Beech* 350ER *King Air*

HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA *Panther*

Air Force 13,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F *Tiger II*

3 sqn with F-16C/D *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with *Mirage* F-1C (F-1CH)

1 sqn with *Mirage* F-1E (F-1EH)

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with EC-130H *Hercules*; *Falcon* 20 (ELINT)

MARITIME PATROL

1 flt with Do-28

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with CN235

1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; *Beech* 200/300 *King Air*; *Falcon* 50; *Gulfstream* II/III/V-SP/G550

TRAINING

1 sqn with *Alpha Jet**

1 sqn T-6C

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA342L *Gazelle* (some with HOT)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); Bell 212 (AB-212)

1 sqn with CH-47D *Chinook*

1 sqn with SA330 *Puma*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable

FTR 22: 19 F-5E *Tiger II*; 3 F-5F *Tiger II*

FGA 49: 15 F-16C *Fighting Falcon*; 8 F-16D *Fighting Falcon*; 15 *Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)*; 11 *Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)*

ELINT 1 EC-130H *Hercules*

TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H *Hercules*

TPT 47: Medium 17: 4 C-27J *Spartan*; 13 C-130H *Hercules*;

Light 19: 4 Beech 100 *King Air*; 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 Beech 200C *King Air*; 2 Beech 300 *King Air*; 3 Beech 350 *King Air*; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; **PAX** 11: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 *Falcon* 20; 2 *Falcon* 20 (ELINT); 1 *Falcon* 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream G550

TRG 80: 12 AS-202 *Bravo*; 19 *Alpha Jet**; 2 CAP-10; 24 T-6C *Texan*; 9 T-34C *Turbo Mentor*; 14 T-37B *Tweet*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 19 SA342L *Gazelle* (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)

TPT 76: Heavy 10 CH-47D *Chinook*; **Medium** 24 SA330 *Puma*; **Light** 42: 24 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** *Wing Loong* (reported)

ISR • **Heavy** *Heron*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** AIM-9J *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic*; *Mica* IR; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; **ARH** AIM-120C7 AMRAAM; *Mica* RF

ASM AASM; AGM-65 *Maverick*; HOT

ARM AGM-88B *HARM*

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Paveway* II; GBU-54 *Laser JDAM*

INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 *JDAM*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 active

Gendarmerie Royale 20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr

1 para sqn

Other

1 paramilitary bde

4 (mobile) paramilitary gp

1 coast guard unit

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • **PB** 15 *Arcor* 53

AIRCRAFT • **TRG** 2 R-235 *Guerrier*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 14: 3 SA315B *Lama*; 2 SA316 *Alouette* III; 3 SA318 *Alouette* II; 6 SA342K *Gazelle*

TPT 8: **Medium** 6 SA330 *Puma*; **Light** 2 SA360 *Dauphin*

Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps)

Customs/Coast Guard

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

PB 36: 4 *Erraid*; 18 *Arcor* 46; 14 (other SAR craft)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 767; 1 inf bn


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Oman OMN

Omani Rial OMR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	OMR	24.4bn	31.0bn	
	USD	63.4bn	80.6bn	
per capita	USD	14,255	17,633	
Growth	%	-2.8	2.5	
Inflation	%	-0.9	3.0	
Def bdtg [a]	OMR	2.88bn	2.47bn	
	USD	7.48bn	6.43bn	
USD1=OMR		0.38	0.38	

[a] Excludes security funding



Population 3,694,755

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.3%	4.1%	4.8%	5.7%	22.2%	1.8%
Female	14.6%	3.8%	4.2%	4.5%	17.0%	2.0%

Capabilities

The principal task for Oman's armed forces is ensuring territorial integrity, with a particular focus on maritime security, given the country's long coastline. A defence and security review is currently underway with support from the UK, a country with which Muscat has a close and long-standing defence and security relationship. Oman does not host a significant permanent presence of US or other foreign forces, in contrast to other GCC states, but UK forces are frequently deployed to the country for training. In addition, both the US and the UK make use of Omani air- and naval-logistics facilities, most notably the port at Duqm. Whilst Oman is a member of the GCC, it has not participated in the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen. Although Muscat has recently maintained the highest level of defence spending as a percentage of GDP in the GCC, the defence budget was reduced in 2021. Nonetheless, Oman has recently recapitalised its core air and maritime inventory, including acquisitions of combat aircraft and patrol and high-speed support vessels, and is now looking to do the same in the land domain. Oman has very limited indigenous defence-industrial capacity, but it has begun local production of various types of ammunition.

ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 25,000

FORCES BY ROLE

(Regt are bn size)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt)

Light

1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt)

1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt)

1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 tpt regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURIED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 117: 38 *Challenger 2*; 6 M60A1 *Patton*; 73 M60A3 *Patton*

LT TK 37 FV101 *Scorpion*

RECCE 149: 13 FV105 *Sultan* (CP); 12 *Pars* III 6×6; 124 VBL

IFV 72 *Pars* III 8×8

APC 262

APC (T) 10 FV4333 *Stormer*

APC (W) 252: 15 *Pars* III 6×6 (incl 10 CP; 1 trg); 47 *Pars* III 8×8 (38 CP; 8 amb; 1 trg); 175 *Piranha* (incl variants); 15 AT-105 *Saxon*

AUV 6 FV103 *Spartan*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 6 *Pars* III AEV

ARV 19: 4 *Challenger ARV*; 2 M88A1; 8 *Pars* III ARV; 2 *Piranha ARV*; 3 *Samson*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 8 VBL with TOW

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; BGM-71 TOW/TOW-2A

ARTILLERY 245

SP 155mm 24 G-6

TOWED 108: **105mm** 42 L118 Light Gun; **122mm** 30

D-30; **130mm** 24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; **155mm** 12 FH-70

MOR 113: **81mm** 69; **107mm** 20 M30; **120mm** 12 Brandt;

SP 120mm 12 *Pars* III

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 8 *Mistral* 2; *Javelin*; 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Graïl*)‡

GUNS 26: **23mm** 4 ZU-23-2; **35mm** 10 GDF-005 (with *Skyguard*); **40mm** 12 L/60 (Towed)

Navy 4,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3

FFGHM 3 *Al-Shamikh* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11

CORVETTES • FSGM 2:

2 *Qahir Al Amwaj* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* AShM, 1 octuple Inchr with *Crotale* SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG 1 *Dhofar* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* AShM, 1 76mm gun

PCO 4 *Al Ofouq* with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCC 3 *Al Bushra* (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun

PBF 1 1400 FIC

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 *Nasr el Bahr*† with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (in refit since 2017)

LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 1 LCT; 3 LCM

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

AGS 1 *Al Makhirah*

AK 1 *Al Sultana*

AP 2 *Shinas* (commercial tpt – auxiliary military role only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps)

AX 1 *Al-Mabrukah*

AXS 1 *Shabab Oman* II

EPF 2 *Al Mubshir* (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops)

Air Force 5,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 *Fighting Falcon*

1 sqn with *Hawk* Mk103; *Hawk* Mk203; *Hawk* Mk166

1 sqn with *Typhoon*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with C295MPA

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130H/J/J-30 *Hercules*

1 sqn with C295M

TRAINING

1 sqn with MFI-17B *Mushshak*; PC-9*; Bell 206 (AB-206) *Jet Ranger*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 (med) sqn; Bell 212 (AB-212); NH-90; *Super Lynx* Mk300 (maritime/SAR)

AIR DEFENCE

2 sqn with NASAMS

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable

FGA 35: 17 F-16C Block 50 *Fighting Falcon*; 6 F-16D Block 50 *Fighting Falcon*; 12 *Typhoon*

MP 4 C295MPA

TPT 12: **Medium** 6: 3 C-130H *Hercules*; 2 C-130J *Hercules*; 1 C-130J-30 *Hercules* (VIP); **Light** 4 C295M; **PAX** 2 A320-300

TRG 43: 4 *Hawk* Mk103*; 7 *Hawk* Mk166; 12 *Hawk* Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B *Mushshak*; 12 PC-9*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15 *Super Lynx* Mk300 (maritime/SAR)

TPT 26+ **Medium** 20 NH90 TTH; **Light** 6: 3 Bell 206 (AB-206) *Jet Ranger*; 3 Bell 212 (AB-212)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Short-range NASAMS

MSL

AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65D/G *Maverick*
AShM AGM-84D *Harpoon*

BOMBS

Laser-guided EGBU-10 *Paveway* II; EGBU-12 *Paveway* II
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Royal Household 6,400

(incl HQ staff)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF regt

Royal Guard Brigade 5,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

ASLT 9 *Centauro* MGS (9 VBC-90 in store)

IFV 14 VAB VCI

APC • APC (W) ϵ 50 Type-92

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM • Point-defence *Javelin*

GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA

Royal Yacht Squadron 150**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3**

AP 1 *Fulk Al Salamah* (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332
Super Puma hel

Royal Flight 250**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 7: 1 747-400; 1 747-8; 1 B-747SP;
 1 A319; 1 A320; 2 Gulfstream IV

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6 EC225LP *Super Puma*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400 active**Tribal Home Guard 4,000**

org in teams of ϵ 100

Police Coast Guard 400**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32**

PCO 2 *Haras*

PBF 3 *Haras* (US Mk V PBF)

PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 *Haras* (SWE CG27); 3 *Haras* (SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 *Zahra*

Police Air Wing**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T *Turbine Islander*; 2 CN235M; 1 Do-228

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST)

FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom 90

Palestinian Territories PT

New Israeli Shekel ILS	2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD		
<i>per capita</i>	USD		
Growth	%		
Inflation	%		
USD1=ILS			

Population 4,906,308

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.3%	5.7%	5.0%	4.4%	14.7%	1.6%
Female	18.3%	5.5%	4.9%	4.4%	14.6%	1.7%

Capabilities

The Palestinian Territories remain effectively divided between the Palestinian Authority-run West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza. Each organisation controls its own security forces, principally the National Security Forces (NSF) in the West Bank and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza. Both have generally proved effective at maintaining internal security in their respective territories. The Palestinian Authority has received support from the EU, Jordan and the US. NSF battalions, as well as the Presidential Guard and Civil Police, conduct US-funded internal-security training at the Jordan International Police Training Center. Israel claims that a small number of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades personnel have received military training in Iran and Syria. None of the Palestinian security organisations conduct external military deployments, and they lack a formal military-logistics structure. Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority lack heavy military equipment, although the former has retained a substantial arsenal of improvised rocket and mortar capabilities, as well as some portable guided weapons. During renewed conflict in mid-2021, Hamas demonstrated a loitering-munition capability as well as new missiles with a claimed range of 250 km. No formal defence industry exists, although Hamas can acquire light or improvised weapons, either smuggled into Gaza or of local construction.

ACTIVE 0 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k.

Precise personnel-strength figures for the various Palestinian groups are not known

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

There is little available data on the status of the organisations mentioned below. Following internal fighting in June 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto control of Hamas, while the West Bank is controlled by the Palestinian Authority. In October 2017, both sides agreed a preliminary reconciliation deal on control of Gaza.

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Palestinian Authority n.k.

Presidential Security €3,000

Special Forces €1,200

Police €9,000

National Security Force €10,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

9 paramilitary bn

Preventative Security €4,000

Civil Defence €1,000

The al-Aqsa Brigades n.k.

Profess loyalty to the Fatah group that dominates the Palestinian Authority

Hamas n.k.

Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades €15,000–20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

6 bde HQ (regional)

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 cdo unit (Nukhba)

27 paramilitary bn

100 paramilitary coy

COMBAT SUPPORT Some engr units

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Some log units

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL •

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*) (reported);

Dehlavieh (*Kornet*) (reported)

ARTILLERY

MRL • *Qassam* rockets (multiple calibres); **122mm** some; **240mm** some *Fadjr* 3 (reported); **330mm** some *Fadjr* 5 (reported)

MOR some (multiple calibres)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS


SRBM • **Conventional** some *Ayyash-250*

Martime Police €600

Qatar QTR

Qatari Riyal QAR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	QAR	529bn	616bn	
	USD	145bn	169bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	54,185	61,791	
Growth	%	-3.6	1.9	
Inflation	%	-2.7	2.5	
Def bdgt [a]	QAR	23.5bn	22.8bn	
	USD	6.47bn	6.26bn	
USD1=QAR		3.64	3.64	

[a] 2020 estimate derived from analysis of public spending breakdown, procurement programme announcements, force size and structure, and operational tempo. 2021 estimate derived from Defence and Security allocation in 'Public Budget Statement 2021'



Population 2,479,995

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	6.5%	2.4%	5.8%	10.3%	51.3%	0.8%
Female	6.4%	1.6%	1.8%	2.6%	9.9%	0.4%

Capabilities

Qatar is attempting to transform its military capabilities and regional defence standing based on significant equipment acquisitions, including platforms with power-projection capability. The scale of the equipment plan is increasing personnel requirements and suggests that Qatar will need significant foreign help to integrate and operate its new capabilities. Combat-aircraft procurements will dramatically increase the size of the air force, where Qatar faces most questions about its ability to develop and sustain the necessary infrastructure, maintenance and personnel. The diplomatic crisis with several of its GCC neighbours brought Qatar and Turkey closer together in their limited but significant defence cooperation, which includes a small Turkish military presence in-country. The crisis appears not to have affected the significant Qatar-US military relationship, including the presence of forces from the US and other Western states at Al-Udeid airbase, and the key US-run coalition air-operations centre. Qatar has begun deploying its own *Patriot* air- and missile-defence systems, and its AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar is approaching completion. The Italian Navy is supporting training for new Italian-built vessels and a joint Qatar-UK Eurofighter *Typhoon* squadron has begun training flights. Qatar currently has a limited indigenous defence-industrial capability, including in ship repair.

ACTIVE 16,500 (Army 12,000 Navy 2,500 Air 2,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000

Conscript liability 12 months, males 18–35 years. Voluntary national service for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • **COMMUNICATIONS** 1 *Es'hail-2*

Army 12,000 (including Emiri Guard)**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF coy

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mor sqn, 1 AT bn)

Mechanised

3 mech inf bn

1 (Emiri Guard) bde (3 mech regt)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 SP arty bn

1 fd arty bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**MBT 62 *Leopard* 2A7+ASLT 48: 12 AMX-10RC; 36 *Piranha* II 90mmRECCE 56: 32 *Fennek*; 8 V-150 *Chaimite*; 16 VBL

IFV 40 AMX-10P

APC 340

APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI

APC (W) 160 VAB

PPV 172+: 170+ *Ejder Yalcin*; 2+ *Kirpi-2*; RG-31AUV 14+: 14 *Dingo* 2; NMS**ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**AEV 6 *Wisent* 2ARV 3: 1 AMX-30D; 2 *Piranha***ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL**SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT; *Ejder Yalcin* with *Stugna-P*;NMS with *Stugna-P*MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; *Kornet-EM*RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf***ARTILLERY 89+**

SP 155mm 24 PzH 2000

TOWED 155mm 12 G-5

MRL 8+: 107mm PH-63; 122mm 2+ (30-tube); 127mm 6

ASTROS II Mk3

MOR 45: 81mm 26 L16; SP 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81; 120mm 15 Brandt

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 8+ BP-12A (CH-SS-14 mod 2)

AIR DEFENCESAM • Point-defence NMS with *Igla***Navy 2,500 (incl Coast Guard)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1**FFGHM 1 *Al Zubarah* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A50 VLS with *Aster* 30 SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11**PCFGM 4 *Barzan* (UK *Vita*) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 sextuple *Sadral* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gunPCFG 3 *Damsah* (FRA *Combattante* III) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PBF 3 MRTP 16

PB 1 MRTP 34

Coast Guard**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12**

PBF 4 DV 15

PB 8: 4 *Crestitalia* MV-45; 3 *Halmatic* M160; 1 other**Coastal Defence****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**1 bty with 3 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 12 MM40 *Exocet* ASHM**Air Force 2,000****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with *Alpha Jet**1 sqn with *Mirage* 2000D; *Mirage* 2000ED1 sqn with *Rafale* DQ/EQ1 sqn(-) with *Typhoon* (joint QTR-UK unit)

1 sqn with F-15QA (forming)

TRANSPORT1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster* III; C-130J-30 *Hercules*1 sqn with A340; B-707; B-727; *Falcon* 900**ATTACK HELICOPTER**1 ASuW sqn with *Commando* Mk3 with *Exocet*1 sqn with SA341 *Gazelle*; SA342L *Gazelle* with HOT**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with *Commando* Mk2A; *Commando* Mk2C

1 sqn with AW139

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable**FGA 47: 5 F-15QA; 9 *Mirage* 2000ED; 3 *Mirage* 2000D; 9 *Rafale* DQ; 21 *Rafale* EQTPT 18: **Heavy** 8 C-17A *Globemaster* III; **Medium** 4 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; **PAX** 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2 *Falcon* 900TRG 37: 6 *Alpha Jet**; 2 *Hawk* Mk167; 21 PC-21; 8 *Super Mushshak***HELICOPTERS**ATK 24 AH-64E *Apache*ASuW 8 *Commando* Mk3MRH 34: 21 AW139 (incl 3 for medevac); 2 SA341 *Gazelle*; 11 SA342L *Gazelle*TPT 5: **Medium** 4: 3 *Commando* Mk2A; 1 *Commando* Mk2C; **Light** 1 H125 *Ecureuil* (trg config)**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES**CISR • **Medium** 6 *Bayraktar* TB2**AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Long-range** M903 *Patriot* PAC-3 MSE**Point-defence** FIM-92 *Stinger*; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); *Mistral***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-550 *Magic* 2; ARH *Mica* RFASM *Apache*; AGM-114R *Hellfire*; AGR-20A APKWS; HOT ASHM AM39 *Exocet***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000****Internal Security Force up to 5,000**

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1


FOREIGN FORCES

Turkey 300 (trg team); 1 mech coy; 1 arty unit
United States US Central Command: 10,000; CAOC; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 *Rivet Joint*; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T *Stratotanker*; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A *Globemaster*; 4 C-130H/J-30 *Hercules*; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot* PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar

Saudi Arabia SAU

Saudi Riyal SAR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SAR	2.63tr	3.16tr	
	USD	700bn	843bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	19,996	23,762	
Growth	%	-4.1	2.8	
Inflation	%	3.4	3.2	
Def bdgt [a]	SAR	195bn	175bn	
	USD	52.0bn	46.7bn	
USD1=SAR		3.75	3.75	

[a] Military budget only – excludes security budget



Population 34,783,757

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	12.5%	4.1%	3.9%	4.4%	29.7%	2.0%
Female	12.0%	3.8%	3.5%	3.7%	18.6%	1.8%

Capabilities

The Saudi armed forces are among the best equipped in the region, and the Kingdom has displayed an increasing willingness to use them as part of a more assertive foreign policy. Principal roles are securing territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability. Saudi Arabia's defence posture continues to emphasise the deployment of airpower. Saudi Arabia is the leading member of the GCC. However, its most critical defence relationship is with the US. Riyadh also has significant security relationships with France and the UK, though recently there has been diversification of defence relationships, including with China. Significant training support is supplied by the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The armed forces continue to gain combat experience from their involvement in the conflict in Yemen, though the operation has exposed areas of comparative weakness and capability gaps, especially in the application of precision airpower, air-ground coordination, and in logistics support. Meanwhile, the cruise-missile and UAV attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in September 2019 exposed further capability weaknesses. Saudi Arabia's conduct of its campaign in Yemen and other associated policies have increased the controversy surrounding arms sales to the country. Equipment recapitalisation continues, with orders for combat aircraft, corvettes and multi-mission surface combatants despite concerns about austerity.

There is a modest domestic defence-industrial base, mainly in the assembly and overhaul of land systems. Riyadh has declared an intention to spend 50% of its defence outlays locally as part of its Vision 2030 initiative, and established the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries to oversee local defence production.

ACTIVE 257,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air 20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 National Guard 130,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 75,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

4 arm'd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)

Mechanised

5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)

Light

2 lt inf bde

Other

1 (Al-Saif Al-Ajrab) gd bde

1 (Royal Guard) gd regt (3 lt inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy)

Aviation

1 comd (3 hel gp)

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 1,010: 140 AMX-30; €500 M1A2/A2S *Abrams*; €370 M60A3 *Patton*

RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90

IFV 860: 380 AMX-10P; 380 M2A2 *Bradley*; 100 VAB Mk3

APC 1,340

APC (T) 1,190 M113A4 (incl variants)

APC (W) 150 Panhard M3; (€40 AF-40-8-1 *Al-Fahd* in store)

AUV 1,200+: 100 *Didgori* (amb); 1,000+ M-ATV; *Al-Shibl* 2;

100 Sherpa *Light Scout*; Terradyne *Gurkha*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 15 M728

ARV 275+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D;

Leclerc ARV; 122 M88A1; 90 M578

VLB 10 AMX-30

MW *Aardvark* Mk2

NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW;

M-ATV with *Milan*

MANPATS *Hyeongung*; *Luch Corsar* (reported); *Luch*

Skif (reported); *Stugna-P* (reported); TOW-2A

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 833

SP 155mm 224: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45
TOWED 172: **105mm** 62 LG1; (100 M101/M102 in store);
155mm 110: 50 M114; 60 M198; **203mm** (8 M115 in store)
MRL 70: **127mm** 60 ASTROS II Mk3; **220mm** 10 TOS-1A
MOR 367: **SP 81mm** 70; **SP 107mm** 150 M30; **120mm** 147:
 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535; **SP 120mm** 2R2M

HELICOPTERS

ATK 35: 11 AH-64D *Apache*; 24 AH-64E *Apache*
MRH 21: 6 AS365N *Dauphin* 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS
Combat Scout
TPT 77: **Medium** 58: 22 UH-60A *Black Hawk* (4 medevac);
 36 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; **Light** 19 Schweizer 333

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Short-range *Crotale*
Point-defence FIM-92 *Stinger*

Navy 13,500

Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western Fleet HQ at Jeddah

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6****FFGHM 6:**

3 *Al Riyadh* (FRA *La Fayette* mod) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 8-cell *Sylver* A43 VLS with *Aster* 15 SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N *Dauphin* 2 hel)
 3 *Madina* (FRA F-2000) (1 more damaged in 2017 and non-operational) with 2 quad Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with *Crotale* SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N *Dauphin* 2 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53

CORVETTES • FSG 4 *Badr* (US *Tacoma*) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PCFG 9 *Al Siddiq* (US 58m) with 2 twin Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B ASHM, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PBF 21 HSI 32
PB 19: 17 (US) *Halter Marine* 24m; 2 *Plascoa* 2200

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3

MHC 3 *Al Jawf* (UK *Sandown*)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5

LCU €2 *Al Qiaq* (US LCU 1610) (capacity 120 troops)
LCM 3 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1

AORH 1 *Boraida* (mod FRA *Durance*) (1 more non-operational and in drydock since 2017) (capacity either 2 AS365F *Dauphin* 2 hel or 1 AS332C *Super Puma*)

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**

MRH 34: 6 AS365N *Dauphin* 2; 15 AS565; 13 Bell 406CS
Combat Scout
TPT • **Medium** 12 AS332B/F *Super Puma*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AShM AM39 *Exocet*; AS-15TT

Marines 3,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops regt with (2 spec ops bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE *Bastion Patsas*
APC • **APC (W)** 135 BMR-600P

Air Force 20,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

4 sqn with F-15C/D *Eagle*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with F-15S/SA *Eagle*
 3 sqn with *Typhoon*

GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with *Tornado* IDS; *Tornado* GR1A

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with E-3A *Sentry*
 1 sqn with Saab 2000 *Erieye*

ELINT

1 sqn with RE-3A/B; Beech 350ER *King Air*

TANKER

1 sqn with KE-3A

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with KC-130H/J *Hercules*
 1 sqn with A330 MRTT

TRANSPORT

3 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; CN-235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac)
 2 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air* (forming)

TRAINING

1 OCU sqn with F-15SA *Eagle*
 3 sqn with *Hawk* Mk65*; *Hawk* Mk65A*; *Hawk* Mk165*
 1 sqn with *Jetstream* Mk31
 1 sqn with MFI-17 *Mushshak*; SR22T
 2 sqn with PC-9; PC-21

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

4 sqn with AS532 *Cougar* (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 (AB-412) *Twin Huey* (SAR)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 456 combat capable

FTR 81: 56 F-15C *Eagle*; 25 F-15D *Eagle*
FGA 222: up to 67 F-15S *Eagle* (being upgraded to F-15SA configuration); 84 F-15SA *Eagle*; 71 *Typhoon*
ATK 66 *Tornado* IDS
ISR 14+: 12 *Tornado* GR1A*; 2+ Beech 350ER *King Air*
AEW&C 7: 5 E-3A *Sentry*; 2 Saab 2000 *Erieye*
ELINT 2: 1 RE-3A; 1 RE-3B
TKR/TPT 15: 6 A330 MRTT; 7 KC-130H *Hercules*; 2 KC-130J *Hercules*
TKR 7 KE-3A
TPT 47+: **Medium** 36: 30 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 3 L-100-30; **Light** 11+: 10+ Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 *Jetstream* Mk31
TRG 194: 24 *Hawk* Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 *Hawk* Mk65A*; 35 *Hawk* Mk165*; 20 MFI-17 *Mushshak*; 20 PC-9; 55 PC-21; 24 SR22T

HELICOPTERS

MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) *Twin Huey* (SAR)
 TPT 30: **Medium** 10 AS532 *Cougar* (CSAR); **Light** 20 Bell 212 (AB-212)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • **Heavy** some *Wing Loong I* (reported); some CH-4
 ISR • **Medium** some *Falco*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9P/L *Sidewinder*; IIR AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7 *Sparrow*; AIM-7M *Sparrow*; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
 ASM AGM-65 *Maverick*; AR-1; *Brimstone*
 ASHm AGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II
 ARM ALARM
 ALCM *Storm Shadow*

BOMBS

Laser-guided GBU-10/12 *Paveway II*; *Paveway IV*
 INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; FT-9

Royal Flt**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT 24: **Medium** 8: 5 C-130H *Hercules*; 3 L-100-30; **Light** 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; **PAX** 13: 1 A340; 1 B-737-200; 2 B-737BBJ; 2 B-747SP; 4 BAe-125-800; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV
 HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+: **Medium** 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70 *Black Hawk*; **Light** some Bell 212 (AB-212)

Air Defence Forces 16,000**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**

6 bn with M902 *Patriot* PAC-3
 17 bty with *Shahine*/AMX-30SA
 16 bty with MIM-23B *I-Hawk*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 817+
 Long-range 108 M902 *Patriot* PAC-3
 Medium-range 128 MIM-23B *I-Hawk*
 Short-range 181: 40 *Crotale*; 141 *Shahine*
 Point-defence 400+: 400 M1097 *Avenger*; *Mistral*
 GUNS 218
 SP • 20mm 90 M163 *Vulcan*
 TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150 L/70 in store)

Strategic Missile Forces 2,500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****MSL • TACTICAL**

IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear)
 MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 – variant unclear) (reported)

National Guard 130,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Light

5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
 3 indep lt inf bn

Other

1 (Special Security) sy bde (3 sy bn)
 1 (ceremonial) cav sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

ASLT 239: 204 LAV-AG (90mm); 35 LAV 6.0 (105mm)
 IFV 1,115: €635 LAV-25; €480 LAV 6.0 (incl variants)
 APC 778
 APC (W) 514: 116 LAV-A (amb); 30 LAV-AC (ammo carrier); 296 LAV-CC (CP); 72 LAV-PC
 PPV 264 *Aravis*; some *Arive*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 58 LAV-E
 ARV 111 LAV-R; V-150 ARV
 MW MV5; MV10

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP 182 LAV-AT
 MANPATS TOW-2A; M47 *Dragon*

RCL • 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 363+

SP 155mm up to 136 CAESAR
 TOWED 108: 105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198
 MOR 119+: 81mm some; 120mm 119 LAV-M

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 AH-64E *Apache*
 MRH 35: 23 AH-6i *Little Bird*; 12 MD530F (trg role)
 TPT • **Medium** €50 UH-60M *Black Hawk*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM 73
 Short-range 5 VL MICA
 Point-defence 68 MPCV
 GUNS • TOWED • 20mm 30 M167 *Vulcan*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM AGM-114R *Hellfire* II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500+ active**Border Guard 15,000****FORCES BY ROLE**

Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9 subordinate regional commands

MANOEUVRE**Other**

Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units
 2 border def (patrol) units
 12 infrastructure def units
 18 harbour def units
 Some coastal def units

COMBAT SUPPORT

Some MP units

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • PPV *Caprivi* Mk1/Mk3

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 106

PCC 13 OPB 40

PBF 85: 4 *Al Jouf*; 2 *Sea Guard*; 79 *Plascoa* FIC 1650PB 8: 6 *Damen Stan Patrol 2606*; 2 *Al Jubatel***AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8:** 5 *Griffon 8000*; 3 other**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4:** 1 *AXL*; 3 *AO***Facilities Security Force 9,000+**

Subordinate to Ministry of Interior

General Civil Defence Administration Units**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10** Boeing *Vertol 107***Special Security Force 500****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • APC (W) *UR-416*AUV *Gurkha LAPV***DEPLOYMENT****YEMEN:** *Operation Restoring Hope* 2,500; 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 *Bradley*; M113A4; M-ATV; 2+ M902 *Patriot PAC-3***FOREIGN FORCES****France** 50 (radar det)**Greece** 100: 1 SAM bty with M901 *Patriot PAC-2***United Kingdom** 50 (radar det)**United States** US Central Command: 1,800; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C *Fighting Falcon***Syria SYR**

Syrian Pound SYP	2020	2021	2022
GDP	SYP		
	USD		
<i>per capita</i>	USD		
Growth	%		
Inflation	%		
Def exp	SYP		
	USD		

USD1=SYP

Population	20,384,316
Age	0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male	17.1% 4.9% 4.8% 4.0% 17.2% 2.0%
Female	16.3% 4.7% 4.8% 4.2% 17.8% 2.3%

Capabilities

The protracted civil war has significantly depleted the combat capabilities of the Syrian armed forces and transformed them into an irregularly structured militia-style organisation focused on internal security. Various nominally pro-government militias, often formed around local or religious identity, are reportedly funded by local businessmen or foreign powers, raising questions over capa-

bility and morale as well as loyalty. There is no published defence doctrine or white paper, the conflict instead dictating ad hoc requirements. Opposition groups maintain de facto control over parts of the country. Most formal pre-war structures and formations exist in name only, as resources have been channelled into the irregular network of military organisations that form the regime's most effective military capabilities. Russia is the regime's principal ally and has provided essential combat support and assistance, as well as replacement equipment. Russia is also involved in efforts to reconstitute the army's pre-war divisions, although there have been reports of corruption and Iranian attempts to subvert Russian influence in the military. Iran and Hizbullah also continue to assist in the provision and training of militias and other ground forces. Overall levels of training remain poor but combat experience has improved proficiency in select regular and irregular military formations. The armed forces lack the requisite capabilities for external deployment, although they remain able to redeploy moderate numbers of formations and capabilities within the country. Logistics support for major internal operations away from established bases remains a challenge. Before the civil war, Syria did not have a major domestic defence industry, although it possessed facilities to overhaul and maintain its existing systems. It did, however, possess some capacity in focused areas, such as ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. International efforts to verify destruction of Syria's chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities continue.

ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 130,000 Navy 4,000 Air 15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000

Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread avoidance of military service)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army €130,000****FORCES BY ROLE**

The Syrian Arab Army combines conventional formations, special forces and auxiliary militias. The main fighting units are the 4th Division, the Republican Guard, the Special Forces (including the former Tiger Forces) and the brigades assigned to the 5th Assault Corps; they receive the most attention and training. Most other formations are under-strength, at an estimated 500–1,000 personnel in brigades and regiments, but Russia has been assisting in the reconstruction and re-equipment of some divisions.

COMMAND

5 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

3 SF div(-)

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 (4th & Republican Guard) mech div

1 (1st) mech div (being reconstituted)

10 mech div(-)

7 mech bde (assigned to 5th Assault Corps)

2 indep inf bde(-)

Amphibious

1 mne unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 SSM bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equipment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much remains available for operations

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-55A; T-55AM; T-55AMV; T-62; T-62M; T-72; T-72AV; T-72B; T-72B3; T-72M1; T-90; T-90A

RECCE BRDM-2

IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-82A

APC

APC (T) BTR-152

APC (W) BTR-152; BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80

APC IVECO LMV

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55

VLB MTU; MTU-20

MW UR-77

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL

SP 9P133 Malyutka-P (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-3C *Sagger*);

9P148 *Konkurs* (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-2 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); *Milan*

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya

TOWED 122mm D-30; M-30 (M1938); 130mm M-46;

152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23

GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S

MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm some (also improvised systems of various calibres)

MOR 82mm some; **120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160; 240mm M-240**

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 8K14 (RS-SS-1C *Scud-B*); 9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1D *Scud C*) 9K72-1 (RS-SS-1E *Scud D*); *Scud* lookalike; 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scarab*); *Fateh-110/M-600*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Medium *Mohajer 3/4*; *Light Ababil*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range 9K37 *Buk* (RS-SA-11 *Gadfly*); 9K317 *Buk-M2* (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*)

Short-range 9K66 *Pantsir-S1* (RS-SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Point-defence 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*); 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*); 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19

Navy €4,000

Some personnel are likely to have been drafted into other services

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 31:**

CORVETTES • FS 1 Project 159AE (*Petya III*)† with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 *Smerch* 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun

PBFG 22:

16 Project 205 (*Osa I/II*)† with 4 single Inchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C *Styx*) ASHM

6 *Tir* with 2 single Inchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) ASHM

PB 8 Zhuk†

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7

MHC 1 Project 1265 (*Sonya*) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*)† SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS

MSO 1 *Akvamaren-M* (FSU Project 266M (*Natya*)) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*)† SAM

MSI 5 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*))

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 *Polnochny B* (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 *Al Assad*

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

1 ASHM bde with P-35 (RS-SSC-1B *Sepal*); P-15M *Termit-R* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*); C-802; K-300P *Bastion* (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM P-35 (RS-SSC-1B *Sepal*); P-15M *Termit-R* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*); C-802; K-300P *Bastion* (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*)

Naval Aviation

All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Russian deployment

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS • ASW 10: 4 Ka-28 *Helix A*; 6 Mi-14 *Haze*

Air Force €15,000(-)**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with Mig-23MF/ML/MLD/UM *Flogger*

2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB/SM *Fulcrum*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis *Fishbed*; MiG-21U *Mongol A*

2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB *Flogger*

GROUND ATTACK

4 sqn with Su-22M3/M4 *Fitter J/K*

1 sqn with Su-24MK *Fencer D*

1 sqn with L-39ZA/ZO *Albatros**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Il-76 *Candid*

1 sqn with *Falcon 20*; *Falcon 900*

1 sqn with Tu-134B-3

1 sqn with Yak-40 *Codling*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

3 sqn with Mi-24D/P *Hind D/P*

2 sqn with SA342L *Gazelle*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17 *Hip* H

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has likely reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. It is estimated that no more than 30–40% of the inventory is operational

AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable

FTR 55: €25 MiG-23MF/ML/MLD/UM *Flogger*; €30 MiG-29A/SM/UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 79: €50 MiG-21MF/bis *Fishbed* J/L; 9 MiG-21U *Mongol A*; €20 MiG-23BN/UB *Flogger*

ATK 30: 20 Su-22M3/M4 *Fitter* J/K; €10 Su-24MK *Fencer* D

TPT 23: **Heavy** 3 Il-76 *Candid*; **Light** 13: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 6 An-26 *Curl*; 2 PA-31 *Navajo*; 4 Yak-40 *Codling*; **PAX** 7: 2 *Falcon* 20; 1 *Falcon* 900; 4 Tu-134B-3

TRG 20+: €20 L-39ZA/ZO *Albatros**; some MBB-223 *Flamingot*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 20+: €20 Mi-24D *Hind* D; some Mi-24P *Hind* F

MRH 40: €20 Mi-17 *Hip* H; €20 SA342L *Gazelle*

TPT • **Medium** €10 Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11 *Archer*); **IR/SARH**; R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **ARH**; R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)

ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29T/L (RS-AS-14 *Kedge*); **HOT**

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)

Air Defence Command €20,000(-)**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**

4 AD div with S-125M/M1 *Pechora-M/M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26); 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)

3 AD regt with S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE • SAM**

Long-range S-200 *Angara* (RS-SA-5 *Gammon*); 24 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

Medium-range 36+: S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); €36 S-125-2M *Pechora-2M* (RS-SA-26)

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); S-125M/M1 *Pechora-M/M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2/2M* (RS-SA-7A/B *Grail*)‡

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €100,000**National Defence Force** €50,000

An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a variety of roles, including territorial control

Other Militias €50,000

Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support

FOREIGN FORCES

Hizbullah 7,000–8,000

Iran 1,500

Russia 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; €10 T-72B3; €20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 *Smerch*; 10 Su-24M *Fencer*; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S; 1 A-50U; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M *Hind*; 4 Mi-8AMTSh *Hip*; 1 AshM bty with 3K55 *Bastion* (RS-SSC-5 *Stooge*); 1 SAM bty with S-400 (RS-SA-21 *Growler*); 1 SAM bty with *Pantsir-S1/S2*; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Data here represents the de facto situation for selected armed opposition groups and their observed equipment

Syrian Democratic Forces €50,000

A coalition of predominantly Kurdish rebel groups in de facto control of much of northeastern Syria. Kurdish forces from the YPG/J (People's Protection Units/Women's Protection Units) provide military leadership and main combat power, supplemented by Arab militias and tribal groups.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT T-55; T-72 (reported)

IFV BMP-1

APC • **PPV** *Guardian*

AUV M-ATV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-SA-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 *Osa*

ARTILLERY

MRL 122mm BM-21 *Grad*; 9K132 *Grad-P*

MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943; improvised mortars of varying calibre

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS

SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1 ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*; ZU-23-2 (tch); 57mm S-60

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2

Syrian National Army & National Front for Liberation €70,000

In late 2019 the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the National Front for Liberation (NLF) began to merge under the SNA umbrella. The SNA formed in late 2017 from Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions operating under Turkish command in the Aleppo governate and northwestern Syria, including Afrin province. The NLF is a coalition of surviving Islamist and nationalist rebel factions formed in 2018 operating in northwestern Syria, particularly in and around Idlib.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT T-54; T-55; T-62

IFV BMP-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-T-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7); 9K115-2 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13 *Saxhorn 2*); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); BGM-71 TOW; *Milan*

RCL 73mm SPG-9; **82mm** B-10

ARTILLERY

TOWED 122mm D-30

MRL 107mm Type-63; **122mm** 9K132 *Grad-P*; BM-21 *Grad*; *Grad* (6-tube tech)

MOR 82mm 2B9 *Vasilek*; improvised mortars of varying calibre

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence MANPADS some

GUNS

SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); **23mm** ZU-23-2 (tch); ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*; **57mm** AZP S-60 **TOWED 14.5mm** ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; **23mm** ZU-23-2

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) €10,000

HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other hardline groups. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115-2 *Metis-M* (RS-AT-13); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9; **106mm** M-40

ARTILLERY

MRL 107mm Type-63

MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying calibres

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Point-defence 9K32M *Strela-2M* (RS-SA-7B *Grail*)‡

GUNS

SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; **23mm** ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60

Guardians of Religion (Huras al-Din) €2,500

An al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating in Idlib province. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government.


FOREIGN FORCES

Turkey €3,000; 3 armd BG; some cdo units; 1 gendarmerie unit

United States *Operation Inherent Resolve* 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-)

Tunisia TUN

Tunisian Dinar TND		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TND	110bn	120bn	
	USD	39.2bn	42.7bn	
per capita	USD	3,295	3,556	
Growth	%	-8.6	3.0	
Inflation	%	5.6	5.7	
Def bgt	TND	3.24bn	3.44bn	
	USD	1.15bn	1.22bn	
FMA (US)	USD	85m	40m	85m
USD1=TND		2.81	2.82	



Population 11,811,335

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.0%	3.4%	3.1%	3.5%	22.3%	4.4%
Female	12.2%	3.2%	3.1%	3.7%	23.4%	4.8%

Capabilities

Ensuring territorial sovereignty and internal security are the main tasks of the armed forces, which have limited capacities but are undergoing a modernisation process. The civil war in Libya and Islamist terrorist groups operating from there continue to pose a security concern. In the light of terrorist attacks, the armed forces are engaged in counter-terrorism operations and have been tasked with securing sensitive industrial sites. Designated a major non-NATO ally by the US in 2015, Tunisia benefits from defence and security cooperation with US AFRICOM and also with France. A ten-year military-cooperation agreement signed with the US in 2020 will provide more training and after-sales support. In 2019, Tunisia sent a *Hercules* transport aircraft to support the UN's MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali and reportedly plans to deploy an infantry battalion and military police to the mission. The deployment of a helicopter unit to the Central African Republic was approved in early 2021. The country has received training from Algeria and is a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The armed forces are involved in multinational exercises, notably those led by the US. The country is also strengthening its intelligence capabilities. Overall military capability is limited by the ageing equipment inventory, although Tunisia has been the recipient of surplus US systems, including armed utility helicopters. The country has limited defence-industrial capabilities but has recently manufactured a small number of patrol boats for the navy capabilities.

ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000

Conscript liability 12 months selective

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

1 (Sahara) SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 recce regt

Mechanised

3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 log gp)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3

LT TK 48 SK-105 *Kuerassier*RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 FV601 *Saladin*

APC 425+

APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2

APC (W) 110 Fiat 6614

PPV 180+: 4 *Bastion* APC: 71 *Ejder Yalcin*; 100+ *Kirpi*; 5 +*Vuran***ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**ARV 11: 5 *Greif*; 6 M88A1**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL**

SP 35 M901 ITV TOW

MANPATS *Milan*; TOW**ARTILLERY 276**

TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12 M114A1; 55 M198

MOR 161: 81mm 95; SP 107mm 48 M106; 120mm 18 Brandt

AIR DEFENCESAM • Point-defence 26 M48 *Chaparral*; RBS-70

GUNS 112

SP 40mm 12 M42

TOWED • 20mm 100 M-55

Navy €4,800**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37**PSO 4 *Jugurtha* (Damen Stan MSOPV 1400) (of which 2 with 1 hel landing platform)PCFG 3 *La Galite* (FRA *Combattante* III) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gunPCC 3 *Bizerte* (FRA PR 48)PCFT 6 *Albatros* (GER Type-143B) with 2 single 533mm TT, 2 76mm guns

PBF 2 20m Fast Patrol Boat

PB 19: 5 *Istiklal*; 3 *Utique* (ex-PRC Type-062 (*Haizhui* II) mod); 5 *Joumhouria*; 6 V Series**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7:**ABU 3: 2 *Tabarka* (ex-US *White Sumac*); 1 *Sisi Bou Said*AGE 1 *Hannibal*AGS 1 *Khaireddine* (ex-US *Wilkes*)AWT 1 *Ain Zaghuan* (ex-ITA *Simeto*)AX 1 *Salambo* (ex-US *Conrad*, survey)**Air Force 4,000****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F *Tiger* II**TRANSPORT**1 sqn with C-130B/H/J-30 *Hercules*; G.222; L-410 *Turbolet*

1 liaison unit with S-208A

TRAINING2 sqn with L-59 *Albatros**; MB-326B; SF-260

1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER2 sqn with AS350B *Ecureuil*; AS365 *Dauphin* 2; AB-205 (Bell 205); SA313; SA316 *Alouette* III; UH-1H *Iroquois*; UH-1N *Iroquois*

1 sqn with HH-3E

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable**FTR 11: 9 F-5E *Tiger* II; 2 F-5F *Tiger* II

ATK 3 MB-326K

ISR 12 *Maule* MX-7-180BTPT 18: **Medium** 13: 5 C-130B *Hercules*; 1 C-130H*Hercules*; 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*; 5 G.222; **Light** 5: 3 L-410 *Turbolet*; 2 S-208ATRG 30: 9 L-59 *Albatros**; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14 SF-260**HELICOPTERS**MRH 34: 1 AS365 *Dauphin* 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 *Alouette* III; 24 OH-58D *Kiowa Warrior*

SAR 11 HH-3E

TPT 39: **Medium** 8 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; **Light** 31: 6 AS350B *Ecureuil*; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205); 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N *Iroquois*)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9P *Sidewinder*ASM AGM-114R *Hellfire***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000****National Guard 12,000**

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**ASLT 2 EE-11 *Urutu* FSV

APC 29+

APC (W) 16 EE-11 *Urutu* (anti-riot); VAB Mk3PPV 13 *Streit Typhoon*


AUV IVECO LMV

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24PCC 6 *Rais el Blais* (ex-GDR *Kondor* I)PBF 7: 4 *Gabes*; 3 *Patrouiller*PB 11: 5 *Breitla* (ex-GDR *Bremse*); 4 *Rodman* 38; 2 *Socomena***HELICOPTERS**MRH 8 SA318 *Alouette* II/SA319 *Alouette* IIITPT • **Light** 3 Bell 429**DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 134; 1 hel sqn**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 13**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 87; 1 tpt flt with C-130J-30**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 3

United Arab Emirates UAE

Emirati Dirham AED		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AED	1.32tr	1.51tr	
	USD	359bn	410bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	38,661	43,538	
Growth	%	-6.1	2.2	
Inflation	%	-2.1	2.0	
Def bdtg [a]	AED	€72.8bn	€70.4bn	
	USD	€19.8bn	€19.2bn	
USD1=AED		3.67	3.67	

[a] Defence budget estimate derived from central MoD expenditure and a proportion of the Federal Services section of the Abu Dhabi budget



Population 9,856,612

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	8.3%	2.6%	2.7%	4.9%	49.5%	1.2%
Female	7.8%	2.2%	2.2%	3.1%	14.9%	0.4%

Capabilities

The UAE's armed forces are arguably the best trained and most capable of all GCC states. Iran remains a key defence concern, for reasons including the continuing dispute with Tehran over ownership of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as attacks both on tankers off the UAE coast and on oil infrastructure. However, the UAE has shown a growing willingness to take part in operations and project power and influence further abroad, including by sending an F-16 detachment to Afghanistan and involvement in the conflict in Libya. The UAE also joined the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, although it has subsequently drawn down its forces, and political disagreements with Riyadh relating to the conflict continue to complicate relations between the two GCC members. Experience gained in these operations has offered combat lessons, not least in limited amphibious operations, and has demonstrated the country's developing approach to both the use of force and the acceptance of military risk. The UAE hosts a French base and is diversifying its security relationships, including with China, India and Japan, although the US remains the country's key extra-regional defence partner. A new defence agreement with Washington came into force in May 2019 and the US Air Force continues to maintain a substantial force at the Al Dhafra airbase. The armed forces have an advanced inventory of modern equipment across the domains, including air and missile defences, and are taking steps to upgrade their airborne ISR capabilities. The UAE continues to develop its domestic defence-industrial base, having consolidated its leading defence firms into the state-owned EDGE Group in 2019, but the country remains reliant on external providers for many major weapons systems.

ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500 Presidential Guard 12,000)

Conscript liability 16-24 months, males 18-30 years dependent on education level. Voluntary service enrolment for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 4

COMMUNICATIONS 3 *Yahsat*

ISR 1 *FalconEye*

Army 44,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd bde

Mechanised

2 mech bde

Light

1 inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt)

1 engr gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 303: 45 AMX-30; 258 *Leclerc*

LT TK 76 FV101 *Scorpion*

RECCE 73: 49 AML-90; 24 VBL

IFV 524: 390 BMP-3; 134 *Rabdan*

APC 1,656

APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants)

APC (W) 185: 45 AMV 8x8 (one with BMP-3 turret);

120 EE-11 *Urutu*; 20 VAB

PPV 1,335: €460 *Caiman*; €680 *Maxxpro* LWB; 150 Nimr

Hafeet 630A (CP); 45 Nimr *Hafeet* (Amb)

AUV 650 M-ATV; Nimr *Ajban*; Nimr *Jais*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 53+: 53 ACV-AESV; *Wisent*-2

ARV 158: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85

BREM-L; 46 *Leclerc* ARV; 15 *Maxxpro* ARV

NBC VEHICLES 32: 8 Fuchs 2 BIO-RS; 16 *Fuchs* 2 NBC-RS;

8 Fuchs 2 NBC-CPS (CP)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 135: 20 HOT; 115 Nimr *Ajban* 440A with *Kornet-E*

(RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)

MANPATS FGM-148 *Javelin*; *Milan*; TOW

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 619+

SP 155mm 181: 78 G-6; 85 M109A3; 18 Mk F3

TOWED 99: 105mm 73 L118 Light Gun; 130mm 20 Type-

59-I; 155mm 6 AH-4

MRL 94+: 122mm 50+: 48 *Firos*-25 (est 24 op); 2 *Jobaria*;

Type-90 (reported); 227mm 32 M142 HIMARS; 239mm

€6 K239 *Chunmoo*; 300mm 6 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 251: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21

Brandt; SP 120mm 96 RG-31 MMP *Agrab* Mk2

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • **Conventional** 6 *Hwasong*-5 (up to 20 msl);

MGM-168 ATACMS (launched from M142 HIMARS)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • **Medium** *Seeker* II

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** *Mistral*

Navy 2,500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43****CORVETTES 7**

FSGHM 6 *Baynunah* with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 76mm gun

FSGM 1 *Abu Dhabi* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PCFGM 2 *Mubarraz* (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 sextuple *Sadral* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCGM 4:

2 *Muray Jib* (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 octuple Inchr with *Crotale* SAM, 1 *Goalkeeper* CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

2 *Ganthoot* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 2 3-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG 6 *Ban Yas* (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 76mm gun

PBFG 12 *Butinah* (*Ghannatha* mod) with 4 single Inchr with *Marte* Mk2/N ASHM

PBF 12: 6 *Ghannatha* with 1 120mm NEMO mor (capacity 42 troops); 6 *Ghannatha* (capacity 42 troops)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2

MHO 2 *Al Murjan* (ex-GER *Frankenthal* Type-332)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 *Alquwaisat* with 1 hel landing platform

LANDING CRAFT 18

LCM 5: 3 *Al Feyi* (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40 troops and additional vehicles)

LCP 4 Fast Supply Vessel (multipurpose)

LCT 9: 7 ADSB 64m; 1 *Al-Saadiyat* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Al Shareeah* (LSV 75m) with 1 hel landing platform

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3:

AFS 2 *Rmah* with 4 single 533mm TT

AX 1 *Al Semeih* with 1 hel landing platform

Air Force 4,500**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 *Fighting Falcon*

3 sqn with *Mirage* 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL

1 flt with *GlobalEye*

SEARCH & RESCUE

2 flt with AW109K2; AW139

TANKER

1 flt with A330 MRTT

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-17A *Globemaster*

1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30

1 sqn with CN235M-100

TRAINING

1 sqn with Grob 115TA

1 sqn with *Hawk* Mk102*

1 sqn with PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*

1 sqn with PC-21

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 412 *Twin Huey*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 156 combat capable

FGA 137: 54 F-16E Block 60 *Fighting Falcon* (*Desert Eagle*); 24 F-16F Block 60 *Fighting Falcon* (13 to remain in US for trg); 15 *Mirage* 2000-9DAD; 44 *Mirage* 2000-9EAD

MP 2 DHC-8 *Dash* 8 MPA

ISR 7 *Mirage* 2000 RAD*

SIGINT 1 *Global* 6000

AEW&C 3 *GlobalEye*

TPT/TKR 3 A330 MRTT

TPT 26: **Heavy** 8 C-17A *Globemaster* III; **Medium** 6: 3 C-130H *Hercules*; 1 C-130H-30 *Hercules*; 2 L-100-30; **Light**

16: 5 C295W; 5 CN235; 2 P.180 *Avanti* (MEDEVAC)

TRG 79: 12 Grob 115TA; 12 *Hawk* Mk102*; 30 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*; 25 PC-21

HELICOPTERS

MRH 21: 12 AW139; 9 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*

TPT • Light 4: 3 AW109K2; 1 Bell 407

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy *Wing Loong* I; *Wing Loong* II

ISR • Heavy RQ-1E *Predator* XP

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic*; **IIR** AIM-9X *Sidewinder* II; **IIR/ARH** *Mica*; **ARH** AIM-120B/C

AMRAAM

ASM AGM-65G *Maverick*; LJ-7; *Hakeem* 1/2/3 (A/B)

ARM AGM-88C HARM

ALCM *Black Shaheen* (*Storm Shadow*/SCALP EG variant)

BOMBS

INS/SAT guided *Al Tariq*

Laser-guided GBU-12/58 *Paveway* II

Air Defence**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**

2 AD bde (3 bn with MIM-23B I-*Hawk*; M902 *Patriot* PAC-3)

3 (short range) AD bn with *Crotale*; *Mistral*; *Rapier*; RBS-70; *Javelin*; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 96K6

Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22)

2 SAM bty with THAAD

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE**

SAM 42+

Long-range M902 *Patriot* PAC-3

Medium-range MIM-23B I-*Hawk*

Short-range 42+: *Crotale*; 42 96K6 *Pantsir*-S1 (RS-SA-22)

Point-defence 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); RBS-70; *Rapier*; *Mistral*

GUNS • Towed 35mm GDF-005

MISSILE DEFENCE 12 THAAD

Presidential Guard Command 12,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF bn
- 1 spec ops bn

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

- 1 recce sqn

Mechanised

- 1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 CSS bn)

Amphibious

- 1 mne bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

- MBT 50 *Leclerc*
- IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U *Guardian*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

- MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggin*)

Joint Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

- 1 sqn with *Archangel*; AT802 *Air Tractor*

ANTI-SURFACE/ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

- 1 sqn with AS332F *Super Puma*; AS565 *Panther*

TRANSPORT

- 1 (Spec Ops) gp with AS365F *Dauphin 2*; H125M *Fennec*; AW139; Bell 407MRH; Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; CH-47C/F *Chinook*; DHC-6-300/400 *Twin Otter*; UH-60L/M *Black Hawk*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 1 gp with AH-64D *Apache*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable

- ATK 23 *Archangel*
- ISR ε6 AT802 *Air Tractor**
- TPT • Light 14: 2 Beech 350 *King Air*; 7 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan**; 1 DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter*; 4 DHC-6-400 *Twin Otter*

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 28 AH-64D *Apache*
- ASW 7 AS332F *Super Puma* (5 in ASuW role)
- MRH 53+: 4 AS365F *Dauphin 2* (VIP); 9 H125M *Fennec*; 7 AS565 *Panther*; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316 *Alouette III*; 6+ UH-60M *Black Hawk* (ABH)
- TPT 66: Heavy 22 CH-47F *Chinook*; Medium 44: 11 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; up to 33 UH-60M *Black Hawk*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

- ASM AGM-114 *Hellfire*; *Cirit*; *Hydra-70*; HOT
- AShM AS-15TT; AM39 *Exocet*

Paramilitary

Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Agency (CICPA)

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115

- PSO 1 *Al Wtaid*

PCM 2 *Arialah* (Damen Sea Axe 6711) with 1 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCC 1 *Shujaa* (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)

PBF 58: 6 *Baglietto GC23*; 3 *Baglietto 59*; 15 DV-15; 34 MRTP 16

PB 53: 2 *Protector*; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US Camcraft 77); 6 *Watercraft 45*; 12 *Halmatic Work*; 12 *Al Saber*

DEPLOYMENT

EGYPT: ε300 12 F-16E/F *Fighting Falcon* (reported); *Wing Loong I* UAV; *Wing Loong II* UAV

LIBYA: UH-60M; *Pantsir-S1*

FOREIGN FORCES

Australia 400; 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 *Hercules*

France 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 armd inf coy; 1 aty bty); *Leclerc*; VBCI; CAESAR; 7 *Rafale F3*; • EMASOH; 1 *Atlantique-2*

Korea, Republic of 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School)

United Kingdom 200; 1 tkr/tpt flt with C-17A *Globemaster*; C-130J *Hercules*; A330 MRTT *Voyager*

United States 5,000; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2S; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G *Sentry*; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 *Global Hawk*; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 *Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE*

Yemen, Republic of YEM

Yemeni Rial YER		2020	2021	2022
GDP	YER	14.0tr	19.6tr	
	USD	18.8bn	19.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	580	585	
Growth	%	-8.5	-2.0	
Inflation	%	23.1	40.7	
Def bdgt	YER	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=YER		742.99	1004.86	

Population 30,399,243

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	18.6%	5.8%	5.1%	4.4%	15.1%	1.4%
Female	18.0%	5.6%	5.0%	4.3%	14.8%	1.7%

Capabilities

Yemen continues to be afflicted by a conflict that is, according to the UN, the world's worst humanitarian crisis. There appears to be little prospect that any of the competing forces will be able to gain a decisive upper hand. UN peace efforts have faltered as the government has continued to struggle with Houthi rebels in the north and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally loyal to it, while the proxy forces supposedly allied to the government and supported by the members of the Saudi-led coalition answer to those member

states rather than Yemeni military authorities. The rebel Houthi forces, who are assumed to receive material support from Iran, are largely tribal-based militias, along with some elements of the Yemeni armed forces who were loyal to the former Saleh regime. Al-Qaeda affiliates also appear to be active in the country. Government forces tend to be under-equipped and poorly paid compared to the proxy groups supported by the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthi rebel forces benefited from the training and capabilities of Yemeni armed forces previously loyal to former president Saleh. The Saudi-led coalition continues to provide air support for the Hadi government, although the UAE has largely drawn down its forces. The conflict appears to have been sustained by a combination of large existing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and external supplies, despite UN embargoes. There is no domestic defence industry, barring some limited maintenance and workshop facilities.

ACTIVE 40,000 (Government forces 40,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Government forces €40,000 (incl militia)

Despite a Saudi-brokered deal that has included the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in a newly formed unity government, President Hadi still only appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally allied together against the Houthis. Irregular forces, such as Tareq Saleh's National Resistance and those of the STC, are reportedly better paid and equipped than government forces.

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

up to 20 bde(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT Some M60A1; T-34t; T-54/55; T-62; T-72

RECCE some BRDM-2

IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A; Ratel-20

APC

APC (W) BTR-60

PPV Streit *Cougar*; Streit *Spartan*

AUV M-ATV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); M47 *Dragon*; TOW

GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100t

ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*

AIRCRAFT • ISR 6 AT-802 *Air Tractor**

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2

DEPLOYMENT

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

FOREIGN FORCES

All *Operation Restoring Hope* unless stated

Saudi Arabia 2,500: 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 *Bradley*;

M113A4; M-ATV; AH-64 *Apache*; M902 *Patriot* PAC-3

Sudan 650; 1 mech BG; T-72AV; BTR-70M *Kobra 2*

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Insurgent forces 20,000 (incl Houthi and tribes)

The Houthi-run de facto administration has controlled northern Yemen since 2015 and is supported by a combination of Houthi tribal militias and elements of the Yemeni armed forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following a break between the Houthis and Saleh in late 2017 that resulted in the latter's death, Saleh's former forces have become further split between those that remained affiliated with the Houthis and those who have joined his son and nephew to fight against them. Houthi forces appear to continue to receive material support from Iran, with several clandestine weapons shipments of Iranian origin intercepted in recent years.

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

up to 20 bde(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-55; T-72

IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A

APC • APC (W) Some BTR-40; BTR-60

AUV M-ATV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS M47 *Dragon*; 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5B *Spandrel/Towsan-1*); 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*); *Dehlavieh* (*Kornet*)

RCL 82mm B-10

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

SRBM • Conventional 9K79 *Tochka* (RS-SS-21 *Scrab*);

9K72 *Elbrus* (RS-SS-1C *Scud-B*); *Hwasong-5* (RS-SS-

1C *Scud-B*); *Hwasong-6* (RS-SS-1D *Scud-C*); *Borkan-1*

(extended-range *Scud* derivative); *Borkan-2H* (*Qiam-1*);

Qaher-1 (converted S-75 SAM)

GLCM • Conventional *Quds-1*; *Quds-2* (reported)

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM C-801; C-802

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES


ISR • Medium *Qasef-1*; *Qasef-2K*; *Sammad-1*; *Sammad-2*; *Sammad-3* (many of these systems have been fitted with a warhead payload to function as a form of improvised missile)

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 *Vulcan*; 23mm ZU-23-2

Latin America and the Caribbean


- Lacklustre economic performance and the absence of major external security threats still continue to constrain regional defence budgets, while social challenges and internal security concerns have increased demands for government spending in other areas. Total defence funding in the region is in real terms at the same level as in 2009. The region's defence budgets in 2021 remained stable at about 1% of GDP – a proportion smaller than in any other region.
- The continued impact of the coronavirus pandemic has required sustained military support for public-health structures during 2021, even though lockdowns and other measures were less strict than in 2020.
- With the proportion of defence funding available for investment remaining low, modernisation plans are likely to become more incremental, with most countries unable to significantly improve their military capability. Brazil remains the major exception.
- The financial costs of the pandemic have also begun to affect defence budgeting in Brazil. Fiscal-policy measures designed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic were among the more extensive in the region. Nominal allocations have risen, but the rial has depreciated against the dollar, while high inflation meant that the 2021 and 2022 defence budgets represented real terms cuts of 9.6% and 4.2%. There has been some effect on some procurement plans, including for the KC-390 transport aircraft, though the *Gripen* and submarine programmes continue.
- In Argentina, there has been a continuing focus on the incremental modernisation of the armed forces, though the budgetary situation remains bleak and there has been a continued failure to recapitalise air-combat capability.
- In Colombia, budget funds allocated to 'Defence and Police' have increased in recent years, despite wider economic difficulties, rising in real terms by 10.9% between 2018 and 2021. Currency depreciation has eroded the international purchasing power of the budget.

Latin America and the Caribbean defence spending, 2021 – top 5, including US Foreign Military Financing




Active military personnel – top 10


(15,000 per unit)




Latin America defence spending as % of GDP (average)




Caribbean and Central America patrol vessels, 2014–21




Medium and Heavy Transport aircraft, 2014–21



Tanker and Tanker/Transport aircraft, 2014–21



Argentina: Fighter Ground-Attack and Ground Attack aircraft, 2014–21



Latin America and the Caribbean

Policy and capability

The continued impact of the coronavirus pandemic has required sustained military support for public-health structures during 2021, even though lockdowns and other measures have been less strict than in 2020. However, the economic impact of the pandemic on the region's defence budgets has become more noticeable this year. With the proportion of defence funding available for investment remaining low, modernisation plans are likely to become more incremental, with almost all countries unable to significantly improve their military capability. The major exception is Brazil, which has continued to modernise its air and naval platforms, with the participation of local defence-industries, although rising inflation means its defence budget has declined in real terms since 2019.

Perhaps the most significant security challenge remains that posed by organised crime and narco-trafficking groups in Mexico and Central American states, though countries such as Peru, Colombia and Venezuela continue to face challenges including from localised insurgencies and organised crime. Venezuela's crisis is still having sub-regional effects as neighbouring states continue to host refugees from that country. Meanwhile, the fallout from protests in 2019–21 in countries including Chile and Colombia, where security forces took on a public-order role, has led to a renewed focus on levels of public trust in security institutions. More broadly, the roles undertaken by the armed forces in Latin America continue to receive attention – for instance the Brazilian armed forces' internal-security role, and concerns expressed in some quarters over possible politicisation. Meanwhile, the armed forces in Mexico have been tasked with development and infrastructure projects, and their counterparts in Peru may be given similar roles.

Mexico's security environment remains challenging, with continuing turf wars between the country's main drug-trafficking organisations. These include the *Cártel Sinaloa* and *Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación*, which are both based in the Pacific coast region but have established a presence in other parts

of the country. A revitalised Gulf Cartel and splinter groups from former cartels continue to operate in the northeast and centre of the country. Moreover, recent years have also seen a resurgence in local self-defence groups (*autodefensas*). The government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has continued efforts to bolster the National Guard, which was created as a gendarmerie-style civilian force and has been relatively heavily equipped from its inception. While it is currently under the operational control of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), there are plans to create a Joint National Defence Staff under SEDENA, including the army, air force and National Guard, and to establish a unified command for the army and air force to boost joint operational capability. Budgetary factors continue to constrain procurement, with the future of fast-jet capability one area of concern. Mexico brought some of its ageing F-5 combat aircraft back into service in 2020, and it has been suggested that a replacement programme may begin around 2025. Meanwhile, the navy's *Benito-Juárez*-class (Damen SIGMA 10514) frigate, which entered service in 2020, was in September 2021 en route to take part in the SIFOREX, UNITAS LXII and SOLIDAREX II military exercises.

Brazil's armed forces continue their modernisation drive. This has seen them obtain some of the most advanced equipment in Latin America, with some projects including technology-transfer arrangements with foreign defence firms as well as local production. However, the financial costs of the pandemic have begun to affect defence budgeting – fiscal-policy measures implemented by Brazil to mitigate the impact of the pandemic were among the more extensive in the region, estimated by the IMF to have added up to 12% of GDP in 2020. It is unlikely to derail major procurement programmes, but it has contributed to decisions to reduce some programme acquisitions. For example, it now seems likely that the air force will now procure only about half of the 28 Embraer KC-390 medium transport aircraft that it originally envisaged. In March, the finance ministry had rejected an air-force plan to acquire two transport aircraft, after the president had

indicated interest in Airbus aircraft earlier in January. However, the acquisition of two tanker/transport aircraft was finally authorised in May, with analysts suggesting the possible acquisition of used A330 MRTTs. Meanwhile, the first Saab F-39 *Gripen* (JAS-39 E) arrived in late 2020, and four more were handed over in Sweden in November 2021. The first aircraft was built in Sweden and has been tested in Brazil, including at the Gripen Flight Test Center at Embraer's facility in Gavião Peixoto in São Paulo state, which also houses the Gripen Design and Development Center. These facilities are part of the technology-transfer agreement. Fuselages are to be produced at the Saab aerostructures facility in São Bernardo do Campo in the São Paulo metropolitan area. Other developments have included the introduction of a number of new radar stations and a memorandum of understanding between Embraer and the Ministry of Defence concerning studies relating to uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) systems.

Under the PROSUB programme, which involves technology-transfer arrangements with France as well as local production, Brazil aims to procure one nuclear-powered submarine – the country's first – and four conventionally powered boats. The programme took a step forward in July 2021 when the navy's submarine staff relocated to the Ilha da Madeira submarine base at the Itaguaí naval complex, which houses the country's main submarine shipyard. Construction of the hull of Brazil's first nuclear-powered submarine (SN-BR), *Álvaro Alberto*, is moving closer, with plans for this build moving ahead. The second locally built *Scorpène*-class conventionally powered submarine (S-41 *Humaitá*) was launched in December 2020, and the final two boats are expected in 2022–23. The first vessel, S-40 *Riachuelo*, was on sea trials in late 2021 and may commission before the end of the year.

Brazil's land forces have focused mainly on modernisation projects, including for part of the fleet of M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), while also retiring older platforms including some *Leopard 1* and M60A3 main battle tanks (MBTs). The last M113s from the modernisation programme initiated in 2010 in partnership with BAE Systems Land & Armaments were handed over to the 7th Armoured Infantry Battalion in August 2020. Four upgraded M109A5 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces were handed over to the 29th SP Artillery Group in June; another batch is expected before the end of 2021. A request for proposals was issued in March for an 8×8 wheeled assault gun vehicle, based on a foreign design and

with a 105mm gun, to replace the EE-9 *Cascavel* reconnaissance vehicle.

Much international attention during the year focused on political–military relations, particularly after the resignation in March of the army, navy and air-force commanders. Tensions had reportedly risen in part because of a growing number of appointments of former military officers to political positions, giving rise to concerns about the nature of civil–military relations. In November 2020 the service chiefs had released a statement noting the importance of the separation between the armed forces and the political sphere. Their resignations came a day after the abrupt departure of defence minister Fernando Azevedo e Silva, described in some parts of the media as a resignation and in others as a sacking by President Jair Bolsonaro.


Chile's armed forces have devoted significant resources to the pandemic response, deploying widely across the country, while defence industries have produced medical equipment such as ventilators. Santiago's expenditures in the wake of the pandemic have resulted in a degree of retrenchment in defence budgeting. One example was the decision in July to postpone further modernisation of the F-16 fleet, for which over USD600 million had reportedly been earmarked. However, other modernisation plans have been approved, such as the Proaco programme (led by FAMAE) for *Leopard 2A4* MBTs and *Marder 1A3* infantry fighting vehicles, which will have their fire-control and targeting systems upgraded. FAMAE is also to upgrade the fire-control systems of the M109 self-propelled artillery fleet. Meanwhile, the VARD 7 series from Vard Marine, a Canadian subsidiary of Italian firm Fincantieri, was selected as the design for a new multi-role vessel that is likely to blend the characteristics of an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) and a transport vessel, and should also be capable of operating in the Antarctic. Construction is due to begin in late 2021.

Argentina does not face any major domestic or external security threats, but it has concerns regarding transnational organised crime and its armed forces have, like others, been involved in responding to the pandemic. There has been a continuing focus on the incremental modernisation of the armed forces, though the budgetary situation remains bleak – the 2021 budget was smaller than the previous year's in real terms. This means new developments are not taking place at a pace that would allow the country's combat capabilities to make up the ground lost in

▼ Map 6 China: defence and security exports to Latin America since the early 2000s, selected systems

In the mid-2000s, it became apparent that some states in Latin America were moving away from their traditional military equipment suppliers, Russia and the US. China had exported small quantities of equipment in the 1990s and Beijing increased its exports after the mid-2000s. Initially these consisted mainly of non-lethal items such as uniforms and communication devices, which were at times paired with equipment donations, but conventional equipment deliveries grew in number to include armoured vehicles (including for

internal security purposes) and radars. Beijing has also offered loans and competitive pricing, which has helped China's emergence as an supplier, appealing, it seems, not only to left-leaning governments in the region but also to states operating within budgetary constraints. By 2014, China had closed deals with half of the countries in the region. There have been few deals since then, reflecting regional economic problems, though China has also gifted trucks and other defence equipment.



recent decades – certainly not when compared to neighbours Brazil and Chile. A case in point is the failure to recapitalise air-combat capability, which is limited to a handful of A-4 *Skyhawk* light attack aircraft along with combat-capable trainers such as the domestically built AT-63 *Pampa II*. Earlier plans to obtain second-hand aircraft such as the *Mirage F1* and *Kfir*, as an interim measure before acquiring a fourth-generation fighter, were unsuccessful, and the most recent effort to purchase Korean FA-50 *Fighting Eagle* fighter ground-attack aircraft was derailed after the United Kingdom vetoed the export of UK-sourced components. The most recent successful fast-jet acquisition came in 2017 with the purchase of five former-French *Super Etendard Modernisé* fighter ground-attack aircraft for the naval-aviation arm. That said, there is reportedly a plan to refurbish up to ten A-4s by 2025. The navy, meanwhile, has received its third French-built *Gowind*-class OPV, ARA *Storni*, with one further vessel in the class scheduled for delivery in 2022. The army is also upgrading its M113 APCs, and negotiations have been reported with Israel to upgrade over 70 TAM MBTs.

Peru's armed forces remain engaged in military operations against the Shining Path terrorist group, particularly in the VRAEM (valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers) region, while President Pedro Castillo has announced that he plans to give the armed forces additional responsibilities, tasking them with development and infrastructure projects. Despite sustained economic growth over the past decade, recent budget constraints have restricted capability development. Acquisition plans that have been reported include three OPVs for the navy (the plan is apparently to build these in Peru) and 22 8×8 armoured fighting vehicles for the army. Early in 2021, the air force acquired a pair of second-hand KC-130H tanker/transport aircraft from Spain.

Venezuela remains mired in an economic depression that, combined with US economic sanctions, has reduced its ability to maintain its US-origin military equipment. However, defence relations with Russia (and to a lesser extent China) have allowed Caracas to procure advanced weaponry over the past decade, though the pace of modernisation has slowed in recent years and attention has turned towards the challenge of maintenance. Efforts at refurbishing obsolete (mostly Western) equipment have reportedly focused on the army's *Scorpion-90* light tanks, various types of armoured recovery vehicle, AMX-13 self-propelled artillery pieces, and

various 105mm and 155mm towed artillery pieces. The practical results of these efforts are hard to gauge. The navy also suffers from maintenance and availability issues that are affecting a number of platforms and refit ambitions. There have also been efforts to improve the country's guided-weapons capabilities, though it is unclear whether the Chinese-origin C-802A anti-ship missiles that were contracted have arrived.


DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics

According to IMF data, the economic contraction that Latin America and the Caribbean suffered in 2020 as a result of the pandemic was the most severe in the world, with regional GDP decreasing by 7%. The region was also among the worst affected in terms of infections and mortality in 2020, with 79 deaths per 100,000 people compared to the global average of 23. In 2021 the impact of the virus in many countries has been exacerbated by slow vaccine roll-outs.

Despite unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy support, strengthening commodity prices and signs of recovery in key trading partners, the regional recovery has been inhibited by the persistence of COVID-19, with many countries hit by successive waves of the virus and continued restrictions on economic activity. The IMF estimates that the region's GDP will have increased by 4.6% in 2021, and predicts growth of just 3.1% in 2022. As a result, regional income per capita will not recover to pre-pandemic level until 2024.

Economic performance varies across the region, as does the economic outlook. The relatively fast and effective vaccine roll-out in Chile, combined with extensive fiscal policy measures in response to the economic impact of the pandemic, means that the country's GDP is on course to recover to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021. Brazil's GDP, meanwhile, is unlikely to return to its pre-pandemic level until 2022, with the country facing new COVID-19 variants and the government beginning to withdraw fiscal support in response to high debt levels. The rates of economic growth in Argentina and Mexico during 2021, projected to be 5.8% and 5.0% respectively, are insufficient to make up for the contractions of 10.0% and 8.2% that they suffered in 2020. Mexico will likely take until 2023 to recover, despite spillover benefits from the US fiscal-stimulus plan, with domestic fiscal support and investment remaining weak. Finally, those Caribbean countries



that are highly dependent on tourism may take until 2024 to recover to pre-pandemic levels of GDP, with global travel restrictions continuing into 2022.

Moreover, the pandemic has exacerbated structural issues that were already inhibiting regional economic growth and sustainable development. These include low productivity, high dependence on natural resources, low levels of tax collection, insufficient investment and large informal economies. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, labour productivity in Latin America has been declining relative to the rest of the world

since the 1980s, while data from the International Labour Organization shows that real GDP per employed person has fallen every year since 2014.

Increased unemployment has also led to a rise in regional inequality and poverty. Analysis from the UN suggests that inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased by 2.9% in 2020, while the IMF estimated in early 2021 that 19 million people across the region had fallen into poverty since the start of the pandemic. Prolonged school closures are likely to have a further negative impact on productivity levels in the longer term.

In recent years, inequality and broader economic challenges have fuelled street protests in several countries. Waves of demonstrations that began in late 2019 in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were interrupted by the restrictions placed on public gatherings in 2020, but have re-emerged in 2021 as the underlying drivers of unrest have intensified in the wake of the pandemic. Those working in the informal economy found their earnings particularly hard hit by lockdowns, and were less likely to receive financial assistance from the state due to their limited access to bank accounts and the internet.


As countries in the region implement economic reforms aimed at reducing their debt levels – Colombia’s ‘Sustainable Solidarity Law’ is one example – analysts have voiced concern that such reforms may place further burdens on lower-income groups.

Defence spending

Lacklustre economic performance and the absence of major external security threats have long combined to constrain regional defence budgets, while social challenges and internal security concerns have increased demands for government spending in other areas. Across the region as a whole, total defence funding in real terms is at the same level as in 2009. Defence budgets have also fallen significantly in US-dollar terms, as several currencies – including Brazil’s real and Colombia’s peso – have fallen significantly in value against the dollar since 2018.


The slow rate of growth of Brazil’s defence budget, in nominal terms, has significantly constrained

▼ **Figure 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021**



Note: Analysis excludes Cuba, Suriname and Venezuela

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


▲ **Figure 25 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)**

overall regional spending, as Brazil has accounted for about 40% of regional defence spending over the last decade. Brazil’s defence budget during that period has fluctuated between 1.3% and 1.5% of GDP but the majority of countries in the region spend less than 0.9% of GDP. As a result, the regional budget allocation to defence has remained stable at about 1% of GDP – a proportion smaller than in any other region.

A proposal to cut Brazil’s 2020 defence budget by USD10 billion was reversed by a parliamentary amendment in August 2020, and in nominal terms the final budget allocation (BRL115bn) was marginally higher than in 2019 (BRL107bn). However, the depreciation of the real against the dollar during 2020 meant that in dollar terms the budget declined to just USD22.3bn, compared to USD27.1bn in 2019. The 2021 and 2022 budgets were maintained in nominal terms – at BRL115bn (USD21.8bn) and BRL117bn (USD22.6bn) respectively – but high rates of inflation mean they represented cuts of 9.6% and 4.2% in real terms.

In April 2021, President Bolsonaro said that BRL1.36bn (USD257m) of the 2021 budget should be frozen as ‘contingency funds’ that could only be spent if economic conditions improved, suggesting that budget difficulties remain. When the severe cut to the 2020 budget was proposed in August 2019, defence chiefs expressed concerns about where the savings could be made – a shorter working week for the army was even considered as a partial solution. With investment only accounting for around 10% of the annual defence budget, procurement and research-and-development (R&D) programmes are already under pressure and would have been



▲ Figure 26 Latin America: selected countries, gross public debt (% of GDP), 2008–26

severely constrained if the 2020 budget had cut as planned.

The outlook for Brazil's defence budget is made more challenging by underlying economic conditions. Real GDP is unlikely to recover to its pre-pandemic (2019) level until 2023, while the budget deficit rose beyond 13% of GDP in 2020 and is projected to remain above 7% of GDP until 2024. Public debt jumped from 88% to 99% of GDP between 2019 and 2020 and is expected to persist at levels close to 90% of GDP until 2026.

In Colombia, the growth in funding for 'defence and police' has strengthened, with the budgets for the years 2020 and 2021 increasing by 1.9% and 5.8% respectively in real terms to reach COP39.1 trillion (USD10.6bn). A further 3.7% real increase is projected for the 2022 budget, although currency depreciation has eroded the purchasing power of the budget internationally. In the 2021 budget, the IISS has determined that 57% (or USD6.0bn) was allocated to the armed forces and 43% to the police, which suggests that internal security has been growing in importance in relation to defence – the funding split in 2008, for example, was 64–36%.

The recent increases come despite ongoing pandemic-related economic difficulties, but they also follow a decade of stagnation in Colombian defence spending. Moreover, as with defence spending in Brazil, the depreciation of the Colombian peso against the dollar has eroded the purchasing power of an already-small investment budget, that in this case accounts for only 3–5% of the budget.

Despite nominal annual increases that have averaged 32% since 2011, Argentina's budget has plummeted in both real and US-dollar terms since

2017. Inflation, averaging 40% per year between 2018 and 2021, has created further pressure to devalue a currency that has already fallen from an exchange rate of 17 pesos to the dollar in 2017 to about 100 pesos to the dollar in 2021. Consequently, the 20% nominal defence budget increase between 2020 and 2021, from ARS205bn to ARS246bn, equates to a decrease from USD2.90bn to USD2.57bn in US dollar terms and an 18.6% cut in real terms. Indeed, in real terms the Argentinian defence budget in 2021 has almost halved since 2015. Like its neighbours, Argentina allocates less than 5% of the budget to investment, which has likely slowed the pace of recapitalisation by limiting options to purchase foreign defence equipment.

Movements in Mexico's defence budget have been volatile in recent years, with an 8.3% real-terms cut in 2019 followed by sharp increases of 14.4% and 12.1% in 2020 and 2021 respectively, reaching USD6.76bn. The recent increases stem from the armed forces' increasing role in internal security. This could lead to a further expansion of the budget, but there is also a risk of conflicting priorities and that higher spending on internal security could mask reductions in core defence capabilities.

The outlook for Mexico's defence budget is constrained by multiple points of exposure to the global impact of the pandemic, which make the economy, and consequently the public finances, vulnerable in the short term. Although Mexico's deficit, at 5.8% of GDP in 2020, was smaller than that of its neighbours, this was primarily because of a lack of comprehensive fiscal stimulus as well as strict tax collection. This was in keeping with President Obrador's promise of a balanced primary or central budget in 2020, though the limited nature of the fiscal

stimulus will affect demand and slow the economic recovery.

The annual defence budget in Peru was stable between 2015 and 2019, ranging from USD2.2bn to USD2.4bn, but there have been increasingly stringent cuts since then. The budget was reduced by 3.7% in real terms in 2019, by 4.8% in 2020, and a further 12.3% in 2021, falling to USD1.87bn. Further south, Chile's defence budget has remained relatively stable in nominal terms since 2019, despite considerable economic headwinds and political challenges. However, as with other countries in the region, cuts have been severe in real terms, reaching 4.6% and 11.7% in 2020 and 2021 respectively.

Defence industry

Brazil's ambition to develop its defence-industrial capabilities has been evident in successive national defence strategies since 2005. Its aim has been to progress from off-the-shelf purchases towards programmes that would enhance domestic capabilities and enable import substitution. Technology transfer and industrial participation have been leveraged in foreign procurement contracts to develop the domestic defence sector, resulting in a defence-industrial base that has the capability to produce modern naval and air platforms as well as rockets and artillery. According to the Ministry of Defence, Brazilian defence and security exports increased from USD3.2bn to USD3.6bn between 2018 and 2019. Meanwhile, Brazil's principal defence company, Embraer, reported that its defence and security segment saw revenues increase by 13.5% in 2020. Coming amid a 31% drop in company-wide revenues in 2020, this somewhat offset the poor performance of the commercial-aviation segment due to the dramatic decrease in global travel in the wake of the pandemic.

Beyond Brazil, the lack of any significant and sustained growth in defence spending and the low levels of funding allocated to investment (procurement plus R&D) among the major regional states – at between 2% and 10% of annual defence expenditure – constrains the development of indigenous capabilities in Latin America. Colombia's offset policy has yet to result in a wide-ranging or advanced domestic defence capability, with the country still heavily reliant on foreign imports for major programmes. Mexico, meanwhile, has established a small defence industry capable of producing small arms and light weapons, 4x4 tactical patrol vehicles, UAVs, fast interceptor craft and coastal and offshore patrol vessels.

COLOMBIA

Policy and capability

Colombia's defence policy and military capability have been shaped in recent years by the transformation of the strategic environment following the signature of the demobilisation agreement with FARC guerrillas, and budgetary challenges posed by a deteriorating economy. The armed forces' missions have changed while the resources available to meet new requirements have become more limited – a challenge made more acute by the coronavirus pandemic. Some analysts posit that reductions in military capability – with relatively low investment funding being one factor – may exacerbate security challenges. The risk is that fewer troops and less equipment might weaken territorial control, increasing border insecurity and potentially even creating the conditions for expanded drug production. Meanwhile, there are reports of continued border incursions by the Venezuelan armed forces, while military operations by Caracas within its own territory have led to further population displacement across the border.

Colombia's defence establishment formally adopted a post-conflict posture in January 2019 when it approved the 'Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity'. This document retained some traditional tasks, such as the counter-insurgency campaign against the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas, but also gave the armed forces a key role in post-conflict stabilisation and emphasised other objectives such as the protection of natural resources, deterrence against external threats and an expansion of international military cooperation. Military roles expanded further as a result of the pandemic, with the armed forces (under *Operation San Roque*) and the National Police (who come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense) employed during the country's several prolonged lockdowns. A series of riots, fuelled by the management of the public health crisis and subsequent economic problems, led to additional deployments between April and July 2021.

Personnel reductions

Colombia's armed forces have significantly reduced in size, with total personnel numbers falling from over 290,000 to around 255,000 in the five years to 2021. The reduction has been particularly steep in the army, where numbers have reduced from 225,000 to 186,000. This is due partly to a fall in conscript

numbers: early in the last decade the army was recruiting around 90,000 conscripts per year, but in recent years it has struggled to reach 60,000. The size of the professional army has also decreased slightly. As a result, Colombia's armed forces are smaller than at any point in the last 15 years, while there are also reports of 'hollow' units with actual strength falling below establishment strength. Reforms of the Army Command in 2016 and the Armed Forces General Command in 2018 have had the effect of expanding the military bureaucracy and reducing the number of officers available to lead operational units. The decrease in the size of the army has not been accompanied by an expansion of the police. Although there were plans to expand the National Police, their personnel strength has instead decreased, partly because of a change in pension regulations in 2019 that allowed several thousand middle-ranking officers to take early retirement.

Budget pressures have also affected training and participation in international exercises. Training has been reduced in order to preserve key resources, such as fuel for operations, and financial restrictions have forced the armed forces to reduce their participation in international exercises. After deploying the corvette *Almirante Padilla* to the RIMPAC exercise in 2016, the navy decided not to send a ship in 2018 or 2020, instead dispatching staff officers. Similarly, the air force reduced its participation in Exercise *Red Flag* in 2019, sending its tanker aircraft but not the combat aircraft it had also sent on previous occasions.

International cooperation

This reduced participation in exercises reflects the challenges the armed forces are facing in maintaining their ambitious programme of international cooperation, a situation compounded by the pandemic. One example is the so-called United States–Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), which aims to provide Colombian trainers and advisers to other Latin American countries and has been a central pillar of Colombia's international-security assistance. Between 2013 and 2020, this initiative provided training to thousands of military and police personnel from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. Although USCAP is funded almost entirely by the US, factors including the requirement for the Colombian defence ministry to pay special benefits to its deployed personnel have imposed limits on the scale of the programme.

Budgetary pressure has also hampered other forms of international security cooperation. Colombia became a NATO partner in 2017, but progress has so far been limited apart from a Strategic Dialogue process, set up to explore opportunities for cooperation, and NATO's certification of Colombia's International Demining Center as a training provider. However, Colombia has not taken part in any other NATO activities other than multinational exercises.

Defence economics

At first glance, the funds allocated to 'Defence and Police' in the annual budget have increased significantly in recent years, despite wider economic difficulties. Partly this is a reflection of the need to allocate greater resources to internal security in the wake of the pandemic. After ranging between COP25 trillion (USD8.47 billion) and COP30tr (USD10.2bn) between 2012 and 2017, the defence and police budget has since grown from COP32.4tr in 2018 to COP39.1tr in 2021 – a nominal increase of more than 20% and a real-terms increase of 10.9%. However, given the depreciation of the peso against the dollar, the overall budget has decreased slightly in dollar terms, from USD11.0bn in 2018 to USD10.6bn in 2021. The portion of the overall budget allocated to the armed forces (i.e., excluding funding for the National Police) is estimated by the IISS to have increased from COP18.7tr in 2018 to COP22.1tr in 2021 – but this again translates to a slight decrease in dollar terms from USD6.3bn to USD6.0bn.

The stagnation of the budget in dollar terms has had a negative effect on equipment maintenance and acquisition programmes, mainly because they often depend on foreign suppliers that have to be paid for in hard currency. Colombian firms have been given a greater role in basic maintenance in an attempt to reduce costs – for example in the case of the 32 LAV III *Gladiator* infantry fighting vehicles acquired by the army in the last decade. However, this has not prevented a decrease in operational capacity: for example, analysts reported that the readiness level of the army and police helicopter fleets was below 50% at the beginning of 2020.

Additionally, some procurement programmes have either been cancelled or postponed. Plans to replace the obsolete fleet of *Kfir* C-10/C-12 fighter aircraft were cancelled in May 2021, while the project to develop a locally built frigate, the so-called Strategic Surface Platform (PES), has been postponed. There have been a few exceptions, including the

acquisition of C-130H transport aircraft (to replace older C-130s) through the US Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programme, South Korea's donation of a *Po Hang*-class corvette to the navy in 2020, and China's donation of 75 trucks to the army in 2021.

Defence industry

The portion of the defence and police budget devoted to investment spending remains very small, ranging from 3–5% annually and therefore severely restricting the resources available for the acquisition of new equipment either from domestic or foreign suppliers. State-owned shipbuilder COTECMAR has seen not only the postponement of the PES project but also the discontinuation of the plan to build six *Piloto Pardo*-class OPVs, with only three having been built so far.

Budgetary constraints have also affected the prospects of CIAC, the aerospace company owned by the air force. The postponement of the *Kfir*-replacement plan dashed any hopes of technology-transfer opportunities as part of an offset agreement with the manufacturer of a future Colombian fighter. Additionally, production of the *Calima* T-90 basic trainer (based on a design by US manufacturer Lancair), to replace the ageing T-41D *Mescalero* and

now-retired T-34 *Mentor*, was halted after just over 20 airframes were acquired. The T-41Ds are instead being replaced by Cessna 172 *Skyhawks* that were delivered in July.

It remains to be seen whether defence exports will be able to compensate for reduced domestic demand. Although exports have increased in recent years, there is still only limited penetration of foreign markets. For example, INDUMIL, the state-owned manufacturer of light weapons and explosives, increased its foreign sales from USD2.87m in 2017 to USD23.14m in 2019, but that was due to a single contract to provide munitions to the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates. COTECMAR, meanwhile, sold only two LCU (landing craft utility) vessels – one to Honduras, one to Guatemala. The defence industry hopes to be able to penetrate new markets with products such as CIAC's short-range *Quimbaya* UAV, to be sold initially to the Colombian armed forces, and the uninhabited maritime vehicle currently being designed by COTECMAR to operate from large surface combatants. However, technological limitations and strong international competition, along with the lack of funding, cast doubt on the chances of these projects becoming export successes.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Latin America and the Caribbean

Significant events in 2021



FEBRUARY

ECUADOR PROCUREMENT PLAN

Ecuador is coming to the end of its current Strategic Defence Plan (PEI) (2017–21). The government released its annual defence procurement investment plan, which details USD72.85 million-worth of investment, including six twin-engine search-and-rescue helicopters worth USD23.08m and training aircraft worth USD15.42m. This continues the trend seen in the past decade of recapitalising transport and utility aviation. The deliveries of six Airbus H145 transport helicopters finished in 2021. Other acquisitions have included eight Grob G120TP training aircraft in 2020; three Airbus C295M transport aircraft in 2014–15; seven H125M (AS550) *Fennec* multi-role helicopters in 2012–16; and four H125 (AS350B2/AS350B3) *Ecureuil* helicopters in 2011 and 2018. In recent years the army has received little investment and continues to operate legacy French and Brazilian armoured vehicles, while naval requirements are being addressed through work at the local ASTINAVE shipyard: the yard is expected to deliver an MPV70 MKII offshore-patrol ship next year.



JUNE

PERU DEFENCE MODERNISATION

Peru's defence ministry approved a ministerial resolution (no. 0268-2021-DE) establishing a set of institutional reforms, ranging from policy development to the acquisition process. The new framework appears to acknowledge that the existing acquisition law has failed to achieve standardisation targets for defence equipment. Peru's defence procurements have tended to focus on the acquisition of small numbers of equipment platforms, because of only limited funding. This has had the effect of increasing interoperability challenges within the armed forces. The Joint Command of the Armed Forces will now act as the deciding authority on acquisition priorities and will also encourage offset agreements, particularly through technology transfer and local production.



OCTOBER

ARGENTINA LOOKS TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITIES

The chief of the general staff of Argentina's air force, Brigadier Major Xavier Julián Isaac, restated Argentina's requirement for a fourth-generation fighter aircraft. This came after the ministry of defence allocated USD664m for the acquisition of 12 fighter aircraft in its latest budget, having received offers mainly from Russia (the MiG-29 and MiG-35 *Fulcrum*) and China and Pakistan (the JF-17 *Thunder*). Buenos Aires is also waiting for possible proposals from the US, while India is reportedly preparing a bid with the *Tejas*. Plans to acquire aircraft from other sources have foundered in recent years, reportedly as a result of pressure from the UK. The National Defence Fund (Fondo Nacional de la Defensa (FONDEF)), launched in September 2020, secures funding in the overall government budget exclusively for defence procurement. Starting at 0.35% in 2020, it will grow to 0.8% by 2023 and aims to benefit local industry.



NOVEMBER

BRAZIL TO REDUCE KC-390 ORDER

The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) announced that, following the breakdown of negotiations with Embraer, it will seek to unilaterally reduce the number of KC-390 aircraft on order and decrease the production rate to two aircraft a year, down from the previous plan of eight to ten per year. This comes as budget constraints have forced the service to prioritise certain programmes. The FAB awarded Embraer a BRL7.26 billion (USD3.08bn) contract in May 2014 for 28 aircraft, with deliveries expected to begin in 2016 and estimated completion in 2026. The contract was reworked later in 2014 in order to protect the programme from currency volatility. This split the funding, so that some was paid in Brazilian reals and some in US dollars for importing subsystems and parts. Embraer has so far only secured two export orders for the aircraft (Portugal 5, Hungary 2) and although Brazilian series production deliveries began in 2019, the collapse in 2020 of a potential marketing deal with Boeing (and merger of civil aircraft production), combined with post-coronavirus budgetary constraints, could mean that KC-390 production will continue at a reduced rate into the near future.

Table 11  **Argentina: defence procurement since 2010**


Contract Date	Equipment	Type	Quantity	Value (USD)	Prime contractor	Deliveries	Second-hand?	Service
2013	H225	Medium transport helicopter	1	n.k.	 Airbus	2016	N	Coast Guard
2013	G 120TP	Training aircraft	10	26.56m	 Grob Aircraft	2013–14	N	Air Force
Feb 2013	Bell 412EP <i>Twin Huey</i>	Multi-role helicopter	2	17.43m	 Bell (through Canadian Commercial Corporation)	2015	One of two	Army
Dec 2013	Model 56 pack howitzer	105mm towed artillery	10	n.k.	 Oto Melara	2015	N	Army
2014	C-212-200	Light transport aircraft	2	10.12m	 Airbus	2016	Y	Army
Oct 2014	KC-130H <i>Hercules</i> ; C-130H <i>Hercules</i>	Tanker/transport aircraft upgrade; medium transport aircraft upgrade	2; 3	68.76m	 L3Harris Technologies	2016–ongoing	N	Air Force
Jan 2015	Cessna 550 <i>Citation</i> ; Cessna 208EX <i>Grand Caravan</i>	Light transport aircraft	1; 2	10.87m	 Textron Aviation	2015	Y	Army
2016	AW169	Light transport helicopter	1	n.k.	 Leonardo	2018	N	Gendarmerie
2016	Cessna 208EX <i>Grand Caravan</i>	Light transport aircraft	2	n.k.	 Textron Aviation	2016	Y	Army
May 2016	Bell 206B <i>Jet Ranger II</i>	Light transport helicopter	20	2.9m	 Italian government surplus	2017–18	Y	Army
Dec 2016	<i>Shaldag II</i>	Fast patrol boat	4	49m	 Israel Shipyards	2018	N	Coast Guard
Apr 2017	T-6C+ <i>Texan II</i>	Training aircraft	12	135.28m	 Textron Aviation	2017–19	N	Air Force
Jun 2017	Bell 412EP <i>Twin Huey</i>	Multi-role helicopter	4	54.45m	 Bell	2017–18	Y	Army
Nov 2017	<i>Super Etendard Modernisé</i>	Fighter ground-attack aircraft	5	16.04m	 French government surplus	2019	Y	Navy
Dec 2017	IA-63 <i>Pampa III</i>	Training aircraft	3	21.77m	 Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA)	2018	N	Air Force
Nov 2018	<i>Bouchard (Gowind OPV 90)</i>	Offshore patrol ship with hangar	4	378.39m	 Naval Group	2019–ongoing	One of four	Navy
Mar 2019	IA-63 <i>Pampa III</i>	Training aircraft	3	18.69m	 Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA)	2019–20	N	Air Force
Oct 2020	IA-63 <i>Pampa III</i>	Training aircraft	1	15.9m	 Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA)	2021	N	Air Force
Jan 2021	B-737-700	Passenger transport aircraft	1	9.75m	 Aero Capital Solutions (ACS)	2021	Y	Air Force
Apr 2021	UC-12B <i>Huron</i> ; TC-12B	Light transport aircraft; training aircraft	1; 9	16.67m	 US government surplus	2021–ongoing	Y	Air Force
May 2021	IA-63 <i>Pampa III</i>	Training aircraft	6	101.7m	 Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA)	By end of 2023	N	Air Force

 – multinational

Antigua and Barbuda ATG

East Caribbean Dollar XCD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XCD	3.70bn	3.79bn	
	USD	1.37bn	1.41bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	13,967	14,118	
Growth	%	-20.0	1.0	
Inflation	%	1.1	1.6	
Def bdgt [a]	XCD	21.3m	20.0m	
	USD	7.87m	7.40m	
USD1=XCD		2.70	2.70	

[a] Budget for the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, Immigration & Labour



Population 99,175

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.3%	3.7%	4.1%	3.7%	20.3%	4.0%
Female	11.0%	3.7%	4.2%	3.9%	24.7%	5.3%

Capabilities

The Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) focuses on internal security and disaster relief, and also contributes to regional counter-narcotics efforts. It comprises a light-infantry element, which carries out internal-security duties, and a coastguard, which is tasked with fishery protection and counter-narcotics. Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Regional Security System. There are defence ties with the UK and the US. The ABDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise, though it has no independent capacity to deploy forces other than in its immediate neighbourhood. There is no heavy land-forces equipment, while the coastguard maintains ex-US patrol vessels and a number of smaller boats. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, there is no indigenous defence industry.

ACTIVE 180 (Army 130 Coast Guard 50)

(all services form combined Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force)

RESERVE 80 (Joint 80)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 130

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bn HQ

1 inf coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt gp (1 engr unit, 1 med unit)

Coast Guard 50

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE


PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1

Dauntless; 1 *Swift*

Argentina ARG

Argentine Peso ARS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ARS	27.5tr	43.6tr	
	USD	389bn	455bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	8,572	9,929	
Growth	%	-9.9	7.5	
Inflation [a]	%	42.0	n/a	
Def bdgt	ARS	205bn	246bn	
	USD	2.90bn	2.57bn	
USD1=ARS		70.63	95.69	

[a] No inflation figure published by the IMF for 2021



Population 45,864,941

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.3%	4.0%	3.8%	3.7%	20.5%	5.2%
Female	11.6%	3.7%	3.6%	3.6%	20.9%	7.1%

Capabilities

Argentina's armed forces have sufficient training and equipment to fulfil internal-security tasks, although any power-projection ambition is limited by funding shortfalls. The armed forces principally focus on border security, surveillance and counter-narcotics operations, and there is some cooperation with Bolivia and Paraguay. In 2020, the government repealed 2018 legislation, passed under the previous administration, that had allowed greater latitude in deploying the armed forces to tackle external challenges including from organised-crime groups. There is military cooperation with the US and the armed forces participate in multinational exercises and bilateral peacekeeping exercises with neighbour Chile. There are limited deployment capabilities, and the equipment inventory is increasingly obsolete, with modernisation hampered by funding problems. The air force faces significant equipment-availability challenges and the navy has seen its capability decline in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and airborne early warning. Argentina possesses an indigenous defence-manufacturing and maintenance capacity covering land, sea and air systems, although industry fortunes have dipped in recent years because of a lack of investment.

ACTIVE 72,100 (Army 42,800 Navy 16,400 Air 12,900) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 42,800

Regt and gp are usually bn-sized

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log coy), 1 (3rd) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 2 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy, 1 int coy, 1

sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy); 1 (12th) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 1 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy), 2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy)

- 1 (3rd) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy, 1 AD gp (2 AD bn))
- 1 (Rapid Deployment Force) div (1 SF gp; 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 AB bde (1 recce sqn, 2 para regt, 1 air aslt regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy))

Light

- 1 (2nd) mtn inf div (1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 mtn inf coy, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 mtn inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 mtn inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 construction coy, 1 log coy), 1 arty gp, 1 AD bn, 1 sigs bn)
- 1 mot cav regt (presidential escort)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 engr bn
1 CBRN coy
1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
1 sigs bn
1 sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 3 maint bn

HELICOPTER

- 1 avn gp (bde) (1 avn bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 atk/ISR hel sqn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

- MBT 231: 225 TAM, 6 TAM S21
LT TK 117: 107 SK-105A1 *Kuerassier*; 6 SK-105A2 *Kuerassier*; 4 *Patagón*
RECCE 47 AML-90
IFV 232: 118 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M113A2 (20mm cannon)
APC 278
APC (T) 274: 70 M113A1-ACAV; 204 M113A2
APC (W) 4 WZ-551B1

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

- ARV *Greif*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

- MSL • SP 3 M1025 HMMWV with TOW-2A
RCL 105mm 150 M-1968

ARTILLERY 1,108

- SP 155mm 42: 23 AMX F3; 19 VCA 155 *Palmaria*
TOWED 172: 105mm 64 Model 56 pack howitzer;
155mm 108: 28 CITEFA M-77/CITEFA M-81; 80 SOFMA L-33
MRL 8: 105mm 4 SLAM *Pampero*; 127mm 4 CP-30
MOR 886: 81mm 492; SP 107mm 25 M106A2; 120mm 330 Brandt; SP 120mm 39 TAM-VCTM

AIRCRAFT

- TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 80 *Queen Air*; 3 C-212-200 *Aviocar*; 4 Cessna 208EX *Grand Caravan*; 1 Cessna 500 *Citation* (survey); 1 Cessna 550 *Citation Bravo*; 3 DA42 (to be converted to ISR role); 2 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 1 *Sabreliner 75A (Gaviao 75A)*

- TRG 5 T-41 *Mescalero*

HELICOPTERS

- MRH 5: 4 SA315B *Lama*; 1 Z-11
TPT 62: Medium 3 AS332B *Super Puma*; Light 59: 1 Bell 212; 25 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois* – 6 armed); 5 Bell 206B3; 13 UH-1H-II *Huey II*; 15 AB206B1

AIR DEFENCE

- SAM • Point-defence RBS-70

- GUNS • TOWED 229: 20mm 200 GAI-B01; 30mm 21 HS L81; 35mm 8 GDF-002 (*Skyguard* fire control)

Navy 16,400

Commands: Surface Fleet, Submarines, Naval Avn, Marines

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 (diver) SF gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK

- 1 *Santa Cruz* (GER TR-1700) (non-operational, undergoing MLU since 2015) with 6 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT; 1 *Salta* (GER T-209/1100) (non-operational since 2013) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 37/SST-4 HWT)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5

- DESTROYERS • DDH 1 *Hercules* (UK Type-42) (utilised as a fast troop-transport ship), with 1 114mm gun (capacity 2 SH-3H *Sea King* hel)

- FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 *Almirante Brown* (GER MEKO 360) (of which 1+) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* AShM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm TT with A244/S LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 AS555 *Fennec* hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24

CORVETTES 9:

- FSGH 6 *Espora* (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS555 *Fennec* hel)

- FSG 3 *Drummond* (FRA A-69) (of which 2+) with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 100mm gun

- PSOH 3 *Bouchard* (FRA OPV 87) (of which 1 ex-FRA *L'Adroit*) (capacity 1 hel)

- PSO 2: 1 *Irigoyen* (ex-US *Cherokee*); 1 *Teniente Olivieri* (ex-US oilfield tug)

- PCFGT 1 *Intrepida* (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun

- PCF 1 *Intrepida* (GER Lurssen 45m) with 1 76mm gun

- PCO 1 *Murature* (ex-US *King* – trg/river-patrol role) with 2 105mm gun

- PB 7: 4 *Baradero* (ISR *Dabur*); 2 *Punta Mogotes* (ex-US *Point*); 1 *Zurubi*

AMPHIBIOUS 6 LCVP**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16****ABU 3 Red**AFS 4 *Puerto Argentina* (ex-RUS *Neftegaz*)AGB 1 *Almirante Irizar* (damaged by fire in 2007; returned to service in mid-2017)AGHS 3: 1 *Austral* (ex-GER *Sonne*); 1 *Cormoran*; 1 *Puerto Deseado* (ice-breaking capability, used for polar research)AGOR 1 *Comodoro Rivadavia*AK 2 *Costa Sur* (capacity 4 LCVP)AOR 1 *Patagonia* (ex-FRA *Durance*) with 1 hel platformAXS 1 *Libertad***Naval Aviation 2,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable**FGA (5 *Super Etendard Modernisé* non-operational and undergoing modernisation; 11 *Super Etendard* in store)ASW 6: 2 S-2T *Tracker*; 4 P-3B *Orion*†TPT • **Light** 7 Beech 200F/M *King Air*TRG 10 T-34C *Turbo Mentor****HELICOPTERS**ASW 2 SH-3H (ASH-3H) *Sea King*MRH 1 AS555 *Fennec*TPT • **Medium** 4 UH-3H *Sea King***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-550 *Magic*AShM AM39 *Exocet***Marines 2,500****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 (fleet) force (1 cdo gp, 1 (AAV) amph bn, 1 mne bn, 1 arty bn, 1 ADA bn)

1 (fleet) force (2 mne bn, 2 navy det)

1 force (1 mne bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**RECCE 12 ERC-90F *Sagaie*

APC • APC (W) 31 VCR

AAV 11 LVTP-7

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV AAVR 7

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 105mm 30 M-1974 FMK-1

ARTILLERY 89

TOWED 19: 105mm 13 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 6 M114

MOR 70: 81mm 58; 120mm 12

AIR DEFENCESAM • **Point-defence** RBS-70

GUNS 40mm 4 Bofors 40L

Air Force 12,900

4 Major Comds – Air Operations, Personnel, Air Regions, Logistics, 8 air bde

Air Operations Command**FORCES BY ROLE****GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with A-4/OA-4 (A-4AR/OA-4AR) *Skyhawk*2 (tac air) sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano* (on loan for border surv/interdiction)**ISR**

1 sqn with Learjet 35A

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER2 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412; Mi-171, SA-315B *Lama***TANKER/TRANSPORT**1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; KC-130H *Hercules*; L-100-30**TRANSPORT**1 sqn with Beech A200 *King Air* (UC-12B *Huron*);Cessna 182 *Skylane*1 sqn with DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; Saab 3401 sqn with F-28 *Friendship*

1 sqn with Learjet 35A; Learjet 60

1 (Pres) flt with B-737-700; B-757-23ER; S-70A *Black Hawk*, S-76B**TRAINING**1 sqn with AT-63 *Pampa II*1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano*

1 sqn with Grob 120TP

1 sqn with IA-63 *Pampa III**1 sqn with T-6C *Texan II*1 hel sqn with Hughes 369; SA-315B *Lama***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**

1 sqn with Hughes 369; MD-500; MD-500D

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable**ATK 12: 10 A-4 (A-4AR) *Skyhawk* (of which 6†); 2 OA-4 (OA-4AR) *Skyhawk* (of which 1†)

ELINT 1 Learjet 35A

TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H *Hercules*TPT 22: **Medium** 4: 3 C-130H *Hercules*; 1 L-100-30;**Light** 14: 1 Beech A200 *King Air* (UC-12B *Huron*); 4Cessna 182 *Skylane*; 2 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 3 Learjet 35A (of which 2 test and calibration and 1 medevac); 1Learjet 60 (VIP); 1 PA-28-236 *Dakota*; 2 Saab 340 (jointly operated with LADE); PAX 4: 1 B-737; 1 B-737-700; 1B-757-23ER; 1 F-28 *Fellowship*TRG 45: 2 AT-63 *Pampa II** (LIFT); 11 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 9 Grob 120TP; 7 IA-63 *Pampa III**; 6 P2002JF *Sierra*; 10T-6C *Texan II* (8 EMB-312 *Tucano* in store)**HELICOPTERS**MRH 29: 6 Bell 412EP; 11 Hughes 369; 3 MD-500; 4 MD-500D; 5 SA315B *Lama*TPT 12: **Medium** 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 S-70A *Black Hawk* (VIP); **Light** 9: 7 Bell 212; 2 S-76B (VIP)**AIR DEFENCE**GUNS 88: **20mm**: 86 Oerlikon/Rh-202 with 9 Elta EL/M-2106 radar; **35mm**: 2 GDF-001 with *Skyguard* radar**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR AIM-9L *Sidewinder*; R-550 *Magic*; *Shafir* 2†**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,250****Gendarmerie 18,000**

Ministry of Security

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

7 regional comd

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE**Other**

17 paramilitary bn

Aviation

1 (mixed) avn bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**RECCE S52 *Shorland*APC (W) 87: 47 *Grenadier*; 40 UR-416**ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm****AIRCRAFT**TPT 13: **Light** 12: 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 336; 1 PA-28 *Cherokee*; 2 PC-6B *Turbo Porter*; 2 PC-12;

PAX 1 Learjet 35

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 MD-500C

TPT • **Light** 17: 3 AW119 *Koala*; 2 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger* (AB-206); 7 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 1 H135; 1 H155; 3 R-44 *Raven II*

TRG 1 S-300C

Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) 13,250

Ministry of Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 71**PCO 7: 1 *Correa Falcon*; 1 *Delfin*; 5 *Mantilla* (F30 *Halcón* – undergoing modernisation)PCC 1 *Mariano Moreno*PB 58: 1 *Dorado*; 25 *Estrelleamar*; 2 *Lynch* (US *Cape*); 18 *Mar del Plata* (Z-28); 1 *Surel*; 8 *Damen Stan 2200*; 3 *Stan Tender 1750*PBF 4 *Shaldag II*PBR 1 *Tonina***LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 11**AAR 1 *Tango*AFS 1 *Prefecto Garcia*


AG 2

ARS 1 *Prefecto Mansilla*AX 5: 1 *Mandubi*; 4 otherAXS 1 *Dr Bernardo Houssay***AIRCRAFT**MP 1 Beech 350ER *King Air*TPT • **Light** 6: 5 C-212 *Aviocar*; 1 Beech 350ER *King Air*TRG 2 Piper PA-28 *Archer III***HELICOPTERS**SAR 3 AS565MA *Panther*MRH 1 AS365 *Dauphin 2*TPT 7: **Medium** 3: 1 H225 *Puma*; 2 SA330L (AS330L) *Puma*; **Light** 4: 2 AS355 *Ecureuil II*; 2 Bell 206 (AB-206) *Jet Ranger*

TRG 4 S-300C

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2****CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 249; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt with 2 Bell 212****INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2****MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3****WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3****Bahamas BHS**

Bahamian Dollar BSD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BSD	9.91bn	10.7bn	
	USD	9.91bn	10.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	25,734	27,437	
Growth	%	-14.5	2.0	
Inflation	%	0.0	3.0	
Def bdgt	BSD	85.8m	95.4m	
	USD	85.8m	95.4m	
USD1=BSD		1.00	1.00	

**Population** 352,655

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.0%	3.6%	3.9%	4.1%	22.6%	3.6%
Female	10.7%	3.5%	3.8%	4.0%	23.7%	5.5%

Capabilities

The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) is primarily a naval force tasked with disaster relief, maritime security and counter-narcotics duties. Its single commando squadron is tasked with base protection and internal security. The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Community, and the RBDF maintains training relationships with the UK and US. The RBDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. There is little independent capacity to deploy abroad, aside from recent regional disaster-relief efforts. The RBDF's Sandy Bottom Project, the largest-ever capital investment in the service, includes the acquisition of patrol craft and the development of bases and port facilities. The maritime wing is focused around patrol vessels and smaller patrol boats, while the air wing has a small inventory of light aircraft. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the Bahamas has no indigenous defence industry.

ACTIVE 1,500**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Royal Bahamas Defence Force 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 mne coy (incl marines with internal- and base-security duties)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21**PCC 2 *Bahamas*PB 19: 4 *Arthur Dion Hanna* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 2 *Dauntless*; 4 *Lignum Vitae* (Damen 3007); 1 Safe 33; 4 Safe 44; 2 Sea Ark 12m; 2 Sea Ark 15m


LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AKR 1 *Lawrence Major*

(Damen 5612)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech A350 *King Air*; 1 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 1 P-68 *Observer***FOREIGN FORCES****Guyana Navy:** Base located at New Providence Island**Barbados BRB**

Barbados Dollar BBD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BBD	8.84bn	9.30bn	
	USD	4.42bn	4.65bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	15,346	16,105	
Growth	%	-18.0	3.3	
Inflation	%	2.9	2.5	
Def bdgt [a]	BBD	81.0m	79.6m	
	USD	40.5m	39.8m	
USD1=BBD		2.00	2.00	

[a] Defence and security expenditure



Population 301,865

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.6%	3.0%	3.0%	3.2%	24.5%	6.0%
Female	8.6%	3.0%	3.1%	3.3%	25.4%	8.4%

Capabilities

Maritime security and resource protection are the main tasks of the Barbados Defence Force (BDF), but it has a secondary public-safety role in support of the police force. The BDF has undertaken counter-narcotics work, while troops have also been tasked with supporting law enforcement. There are plans to improve disaster-relief capabilities. Barbados is a member of the Caribbean Community, and the Caribbean Regional Security System is headquartered there. The BDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. There is limited capacity to deploy independently within the region, such as on hurricane-relief duties. The inventory consists principally of a small number of patrol vessels. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Barbados has no indigenous defence industry.


ACTIVE 610 (Army 500 Coast Guard 110)**RESERVE 430 (Joint 430)****ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 500****FORCES BY ROLE**
MANOEUVRE**Light**
1 inf bn (cadre)**Coast Guard 110**

HQ located at HMBS Pelican, Spring Garden

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6****PB 6:** 1 *Dauntless*; 2 *Enterprise* (Damen Stan 1204); 3 *Trident* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)**Belize BLZ**

Belize Dollar BZD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BZD	3.41bn	3.82bn	
	USD	1.71bn	1.91bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,077	4,458	
Growth	%	-14.0	8.5	
Inflation	%	0.1	3.1	
Def bdgt [a]	BZD	49.1m	40.0m	
	USD	24.5m	20.0m	
USD1=BZD		2.00	2.00	

[a] Excludes funds allocated to Coast Guard and Police Service



Population 405,633

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	16.3%	5.4%	4.7%	4.3%	17.0%	2.2%
Female	15.6%	5.0%	4.3%	4.1%	18.4%	2.4%

Capabilities

Belize maintains a small Defence Force (BDF) and coastguard to provide national security, particularly control of the borders with Guatemala and Mexico. The National Security and Defence Strategy (2018–21) identifies territorial defence and combating transnational crime as key objectives. The UK has a long-standing security relationship with Belize and maintains a small training unit there, and the BDF also trains with US SOUTHCOM. Overall training levels are limited but generally sufficient for the BDF's tasks. Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community. The BDF does not deploy internationally and logistics support is adequate for border-security missions. The conventional equipment inventory is limited and there is no significant domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 550**RESERVE 700 (Joint 700)****ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE**
SPECIAL FORCES1 SF unit
MANOEUVRE
Light
2 inf bn (3 inf coy)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 84mm***Carl Gustaf***ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6****Air Wing****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • Light 2: 1 BN-2B *Defender*; 1 Cessna 182*Skylane*TRG 1 T-67M-200 *Firefly***HELICOPTERS**TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 Bell 407**Reserve****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 inf bn (3 inf coy)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 550**Coast Guard 550****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD


FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom BATSUB 12

Bolivia BOL

Bolivian Boliviano BOB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BOB	253bn	264bn	
	USD	36.8bn	38.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,168	3,267	
Growth	%	-8.8	5.0	
Inflation	%	0.9	1.3	
Def bdgt	BOB	3.28bn	3.26bn	
	USD	479m	476m	
USD1=BOB		6.86	6.86	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 11,758,869

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.0%	5.0%	4.6%	4.4%	17.8%	2.7%
Female	14.4%	4.8%	4.5%	4.3%	18.9%	3.5%

Capabilities

The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with maintaining sovereignty and territorial defence, though principal tasks are counter-narcotics and internal and border security. Joint task

forces have been formed and dispatched to border regions to combat smuggling, and a series of border posts have been established. Airspace control is an emerging strategic priority. The armed forces have also been playing a greater role in disaster-relief operations, with a new dedicated battalion activated in 2021. There is defence-technology cooperation with Russia, but China remains a significant supplier of military materiel. Bolivia cooperates with Peru and Paraguay on countering illicit trafficking and on providing disaster relief. The armed forces have stressed the need to improve conditions for personnel, amid greater internal deployments to border areas on counter-trafficking tasks. An aerospace R&D centre was created in 2018 in the military-engineering school, with the objective of developing munitions and ISR UAVs. There is some local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity.

ACTIVE 34,100 (Army 22,800 Navy 4,800 Air 6,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100

Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males and females

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 9,800; 13,000 conscript (total 22,800)****FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

6 mil region HQ

10 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

3 SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 mot cav gp

Armoured

1 armd bn

Mechanised

1 mech cav regt

2 mech inf regt

Light

1 (aslt) cav gp

5 (horsed) cav gp

3 mot inf regt

21 inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

2 AB regt (bn)

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

6 arty regt (bn)

6 engr bn

1 int coy

1 MP bn

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bn

AVIATION

2 avn coy

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**LT TK 54: 36 SK-105A1 *Kuerassier*; 18 SK-105A2 *Kuerassier*

RECCE 24 EE-9 *Cascavel***APC** 148+

APC (T) 87+: 50+ M113, 37 M9 half-track

APC (W) 61: 24 EE-11 *Urutu*; 22 MOWAG *Roland*; 15 V-100 *Commando*AUV 19 *Tiger* 4x4**ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**ARV 4 *Greif*; M578 LARV**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL**SP 2 *Koyak* with HJ-8

MANPATS HJ-8

RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 311+

TOWED 61: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 36 M-30 (M-1938)

MOR 250+: 81mm 250 M29; Type-W87; 107mm M30; 120mm M120

AIRCRAFTTPT • **Light** 3: 1 Fokker F-27-200; 1 Beech 90 *King Air*; 1 C-212 *Aviocar***HELICOPTERS**

MRH 6 H425

TRG 1 Robinson R44

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 37mm 18 Type-65**Navy 4,800**

Organised into six naval districts with HQ located at Puerto Guayaramerín

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 7PBR 7: 1 *Santa Cruz*; 6 Type 928 YC**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** 3AG 1 *Mojo Huayna*

AH 2

Marines 1,700 (incl 1,000 Naval Military Police)**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

1 mech inf bn

Amphibious

6 mne bn (1 in each Naval District)

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 (naval) MP bn

Air Force 6,500 (incl conscripts)**FORCES BY ROLE****GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with K-8WB *Karakorum***ISR**

1 sqn with Cessna 206; Cessna 402; Learjet 25B/25D (secondary VIP role)

SEARCH & RESCUE1 sqn with AS332B *Super Puma*; H125 *Ecureuil*; H145**TRANSPORT**

1 (TAM) sqn with B-727; B-737; MA60

1 (TAB) sqn with C-130A *Hercules*; MD-10-30F1 sqn with C-130B/H *Hercules*1 sqn with F-27-400M *Troopship*1 (VIP) sqn with Beech 90 *King Air*; Beech 200 *King Air* Beech 1900; *Falcon* 900EX; *Sabreliner* 60; *Falcon* 50EX6 sqn with Cessna 152/206; IAI-201 *Arava*; PA-32 *Saratoga*; PA-34 *Seneca***TRAINING**

1 sqn with DA40; T-25; Z-242L

1 sqn with Cessna 152/172

1 sqn with PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*1 hel sqn with R-44 *Raven II***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 (anti-drug) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)**AIR DEFENCE**

1 regt with Oerlikon; Type-65

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 21 combat capableTPT 77: **Heavy** 1 MD-10-30F; **Medium** 4: 1 C-130A *Hercules*; 2 C-130B *Hercules*; 1 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 64: 1 *Aero Commander* 690; 3 Beech 90 *King Air*; 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 Beech 250 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 3 C-212-100; 6 Cessna 152; 2 Cessna 172; 18 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 210 *Centurion*; 1 Cessna 402; 8 DA40; 1 F-27-400M *Troopship*; 4 IAI-201 *Arava*; 2 Learjet 25B/D; 2 MA60+; 1 PA-32 *Saratoga*; 4 PA-34 *Seneca*; 1 *Sabreliner* 60; **PAX** 8: 1 B-727; 3 B-737-200; 1 *Falcon* 50EX; 1 *Falcon* 900EX (VIP); 2 RJ70TRG 35: 5 K-8WB *Karakorum**; 6 T-25; 16 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**; 8 Z-242L**HELICOPTERS**MRH 1 SA316 *Alouette III*TPT 35: **Medium** 6 H215 *Super Puma*; **Light** 29: 2 H125 *Ecureuil*; 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 2 H145; 6 R-44 *Raven II***AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 18+:** 20mm Oerlikon; 37mm 18 Type-65**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100+****National Police 31,100+****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

27 frontier sy unit

9 paramilitary bde

2 (rapid action) paramilitary regt

Narcotics Police 6,000+


FOE (700) – Special Operations Forces

DEPLOYMENT**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 3**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN • MONUSCO 4**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 4**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 4

Brazil BRZ

Brazilian Real BRL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BRL	7.45tr	8.70tr	
	USD	1.44tr	1.65tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	6,823	7,741	
Growth	%	-4.1	5.2	
Inflation	%	3.2	7.7	
Def bdgt [a]	BRL	115bn	115bn	117bn
	USD	22.2bn	21.8bn	
USD1=BRL		5.16	5.28	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 213,445,417

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.6%	4.0%	4.1%	3.9%	22.6%	4.1%
Female	10.2%	3.9%	4.0%	3.8%	23.5%	5.5%

Capabilities

The armed forces are among the most capable in the region. Brazil seeks to enhance its power-projection capabilities, boost surveillance of the Amazon region and coastal waters, and further develop its defence industry. Security challenges from organised crime have seen the armed forces deploy on internal-security operations. Brazil maintains military ties with most of its neighbours including personnel exchanges and joint military training with Chile and Colombia. There is also defence cooperation with France, Sweden and the US, centred on procurement, technical advice and personnel training. Brazil's air-transport fleet enables it to independently deploy forces. It contributes small contingents to several UN missions. Brazil is attempting to modernise its equipment across all domains. Major platform developments include PROSUB (one nuclear-powered and four diesel-electric submarines) and the acquisition in 2018 of a former UK helicopter carrier. Projects to boost aerospace capabilities are also underway including the FX-2 project to procure the Saab *Gripen* combat aircraft, as well as the plan to introduce the Embraer KC-390 transport aircraft. Brazil has a well-developed defence-industrial base, across all domains, with a capability to design and manufacture equipment. Aerospace firms Avibras and Embraer also export some products. Local companies are also involved in the SISFRON border-security programme. There are industrial partnerships, including technology transfers and R&D support, with France's Naval Group (PROSUB) and Sweden's Saab (FX-2 fighter).

ACTIVE 366,500 (Army 214,000 Navy 85,000 Air 67,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 395,000

Conscript liability 12 months (can go to 18; often waived)

RESERVE 1,340,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 SGDC-1 (civil–military use)

Army 102,000; 112,000 conscript (total 214,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

8 mil comd HQ
12 mil region HQ
7 div HQ (2 with regional HQ)

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn)
1 SF coy

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 mech cav regt

Armoured

1 (5th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (6th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Mechanised

4 (1st, 3rd & 4th) mech cav bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mech cav regt, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (2nd) mech cav bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech cav regt, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (15th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn)

Light

1 (3rd) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (7th) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
1 (8th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
1 (10th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 4 mot inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)
1 (13th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1 arty bn)
1 (14th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
1 (11th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn)
10 inf bn
1 (1st) jungle inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bn, 1 arty bn)
4 (2nd, 16th, 17th & 22nd) jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf bn)
1 (23rd) jungle inf bde (1 cav sqn, 4 jungle inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde (1 cav sqn, 3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

1 (12th) air mob bde (1 cav sqn, 3 air mob bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Other

1 (9th) mot trg bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)

1 (18th) sy bde (2 sy bn, 2 sy coy)

1 sy bn

7 sy coy

3 gd cav regt

1 gd inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 SP arty bn

6 fd arty bn

1 MRL bn

1 STA bty

6 engr bn

1 engr gp (1 engr bn, 4 construction bn)

1 engr gp (4 construction bn, 1 construction coy)

2 construction bn

1 CBRN bn

1 EW coy

1 int coy

8 MP bn

2 MP coy

4 sigs bn

2 sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

5 log bn

1 tpt bn

4 spt bn

HELICOPTER

1 avn bde (3 hel bn, 1 maint bn)

1 hel bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA bde (5 ADA bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 296: 41 *Leopard* 1A1BE; 220 *Leopard* 1A5BR; 35 M60A3/TTS

LT TK 50 M41C

RECCE 408 EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV 13 VBTP-MR *Guarani* 30mm

APC 1,370

APC (T) 660: 198 M113A1; 386 M113BR; 12 M113A2; 64 M577A2

APC (W) 710: 223 EE-11 *Urutu*; 487 VBTP-MR *Guarani* 6x6

AUV IVECO LMV (LMV-BR)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 7+: *Greif*; 2 *Sabiex HART*; 5 *Pionierpanzer 2 Dach*

ARV 13+: 9 BPz-2; 4 M88A1; M578 LARV

VLB 5+: XLP-10; 5 *Leopard* 1 with *Biber*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** *Eryx*; *Milan*; MSS-1.2 AC

RCL 194+: **84mm** *Carl Gustaf*; **106mm** 194 M40A1

ARTILLERY 1,881

SP 169: **155mm** 169: 37 M109A3; 100 M109A5; 32 M109A5+

TOWED 431: **105mm** 336: 233 M101/M102; 40 L118 Light Gun; 63 Model 56 pack howitzer; **155mm** 95 M114

MRL 127mm 36: 18 *ASTROS II Mk3M*; 18 *ASTROS II Mk6*

MOR 1,245: **81mm** 1,168: 453 L16, 715 M936 AGR; **120mm** 77 M2

HELICOPTERS

MRH 51: 22 AS565 *Panther* (HM-1); 12 AS565 K2 *Panther* (HM-1); 17 AS550A2 *Fennec* (HA-1 – armed)

TPT 40: **Heavy** 13 H225M *Caracal* (HM-4); **Medium** 12: 8 AS532 *Cougar* (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36 *Black Hawk* (HM-2);

Light 15 AS350L1 *Ecureuil* (HA-1)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** RBS-70; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*)

GUNS 100:

SP 35mm 34 *Gepard* 1A2

TOWED 66: **35mm** 39 GDF-001 towed (some with *Super Fledermaus* radar); **40mm** 27 L/70 (some with BOFI)

Navy 85,000

Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande, HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ IX Manaus

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (diver) SF gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** • **SSK** 5:

2 *Tupi* (GER T-209/1400) (of which 1 in refit) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 24 *Tigerfish* HWT

2 *Tupi* (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT

1 *Tikuna* (GER T-209/1450) (in refit) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 24 *Tigerfish* HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7**FRIGATES** 7**FFGHM** 6:

1 *Greenhalgh* (ex-UK *Broadsword*) with 4 single Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 sextuple Inchr with *Sea Wolf* SAM, 2 triple 324mm STWS Mk.2 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 *Super Lynx* Mk21A hel)

5 *Niterói* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* Mk21A hel)

FFGH 1 *Barroso* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* Mk21A hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44

CORVETTES • **FSGH** 1 *Inhaúma* with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (1 *Super Lynx* Mk21A hel)

PSO 3 *Amazonas* with 1 hel landing platform

PCO 6: 4 *Bracuí* (ex-UK *River*); 1 *Imperial Marinheiro* with 1 76mm gun; 1 *Parnaíba* with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 2 *Macaé* (FRA *Vigilante*)
PCR 5: 2 *Pedro Teixeira* with 1 hel landing platform; 3 *Roraima*
PB 23: 12 *Grajaú*; 6 *Marlim* (ITA *Meatini* derivative); 5 *Piratini* (US PGM)
PBR 4 LPR-40

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3

MSC 3 *Aratù* (GER *Schutzze*)

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2

LPD 1 *Bahia* (ex-FRA *Foudre*) (capacity 4 hel; 8 LCM, 450 troops)

LPH 1 *Atlântico* (ex-UK *Ocean*) (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCVP; 40 vehs; 800 troops)

LANDING SHIPS 2

LST 1 *Mattoso Maia* (ex-US *Newport*) with 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 LCPL; 400 troops)

LSLH 1 *Almirante Sabóia* (ex-UK *Sir Bedivere*) (capacity 1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 16:

LCM 12: 10 EDVM-25; 2 *Icarai* (ex-FRA CTM)

LCT 1 *Marambaia* (ex-FRA CDIC)

LCU 3 *Guarapari* (LCU 1610)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43

ABU 5: 4 *Comandante Varella*; 1 *Fareleiro Mario Seixas*

ABUH 1 *Almirante Graça Aranha* (lighthouse tender)

AFS 1 *Potengi*

AGHS 5: 1 *Caravelas* (riverine); 4 *Rio Tocantin*

AGOS 2: 1 *Ary Rongel* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Almirante Maximiano* (capacity 2 AS350/AS355 *Ecureuil* hel)

AGS 8: 1 *Aspirante Moura*; 1 *Cruzeiro do Sul*; 1 *Antares*; 3 *Amorim do Valle* (ex-UK *River* (MCM)); 1 *Rio Branco*; 1 *Vital de Oliveira*

AGSH 1 *Sirius*

AH 5: 2 *Oswaldo Cruz* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Dr Montenegro*; 1 *Tenente Maximiano* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Soares de Meirelles*

AOR 1 *Almirante Gastão Motta*

AP 3: 1 *Almirante Leverger*; 1 *Paraguassu*; 1 *Pará* (all river transports)

ARS 3 *Mearim*

ASR 1 *Guillobel*

ATF 2 *Tritao*

AX 1 *Brasil* (*Niterói* mod) with 1 hel landing platform

AXL 3 *Nascimento*

AXS 1 *Cisne Branco*

Naval Aviation 2,100

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with A-4M (AF-1B) *Skyhawk*; TA-4M (AF-1C) *Skyhawk*

ANTI SURFACE WARFARE

1 sqn with *Super Lynx* Mk21A/B

ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with S-70B *Seahawk* (MH-16)

TRAINING

1 sqn with Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger* III

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 sqn with AS350 *Ecureuil* (armed)

1 sqn with AS350 *Ecureuil* (armed); AS355 *Ecureuil* II (armed); H135 (UH-17)

1 sqn with AS332 *Super Puma*; AS532 *Cougar* (UH-14)

1 sqn with H225M *Caracal* (UH-15)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

ATK 3: 2 A-4M (AF-1B) *Skyhawk*; 1 TA-4M (AF-1C)

Skyhawk (15 A-4 (AF-1) *Skyhawk*; 2 TA-4 (AF-1A) *Skyhawk* in store)

HELICOPTERS

ASW 18: 9 *Super Lynx* Mk21A; 3 *Super Lynx* Mk21B; 6 S-70B *Seahawk* (MH-16)

CSAR 3 H225M *Caracal* (UH-15A)

TPT 55: **Heavy 8** H225M *Caracal* (UH-15); **Medium 7:** 5 AS332 *Super Puma*; 2 AS532 *Cougar* (UH-14); **Light 40:** 15 AS350 *Ecureuil* (armed); 8 AS355 *Ecureuil* II (armed); 15 Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger* III (IH-6B); 2 H135 (UH-17)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM: AM39 *Exocet*;

Sea Skua; AGM-119 *Penguin*

Marines 16,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 amph div (1 Lt armd bn, 3 mne bn, 1 arty bn)

1 amph aslt bn

7 (regional) mne gp

1 rvn bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 18 SK-105 *Kuerassier*

APC 60

APC (T) 30 M113A1 (incl variants)

APC (W) 30 *Piranha* IIIC

AAV 47: 13 AAV-7A1; 20 AAVP-7A1 RAM/RS; 2

AAVC-7A1 RAM/RS (CP); 12 LVTP-7

ENGINEERING VEHICLES • ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7; 1

AAVR-7A1 RAM/RS

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS RB-56 *Bill*; MSS-1.2 AC

ARTILLERY 65

TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101; 155mm 8 M114

MRL 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk6

MOR 81mm 18 M29

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)

Air Force 67,500

Brazilian airspace is divided into 7 air regions, each of which is responsible for its designated air bases. Air assets are divided among 4 designated air forces (I, II, III & V) for operations (IV Air Force temporarily deactivated)

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

4 sqn with F-5EM/FM *Tiger II*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with AMX (A-1A/B)

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

4 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano* (A-29A/B)*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with P-3AM *Orion*

2 sqn with EMB-111 (P-95A/B/M)

ISR

1 sqn with AMX-R (RA-1)*

1 sqn with Learjet 35 (R-35A); EMB-110B (R-95)

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with EMB-145RS (R-99); EMB-145SA (E-99); EMB-145SA (E-99M)

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with C295M *Amazonas* (SC-105); UH-60L *Black Hawk* (H-60L)

TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130H/KC-130H *Hercules*

TRANSPORT

1 VIP sqn with A319 (VC-1A); EMB-190 (VC-2); AS355 *Ecureuil II* (VH-55); H135M (VH-35); H225M *Caracal* (VH-36)

1 VIP sqn with EMB-135BJ (VC-99B); ERJ-135LR (VC-99C); ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); Learjet 35A (VU-35);

Learjet 55C (VU-55C)

2 sqn with C-130E/H *Hercules*

2 sqn with C295M (C-105A)

7 (regional) sqn with Cessna 208/208B (C-98); Cessna 208-G1000 (C-98A); EMB-110 (C-95); EMB-120 (C-97)

1 sqn with ERJ-145 (C-99A)

1 sqn with EMB-120RT (VC-97), EMB-121 (VU-9)

TRAINING

1 sqn with EMB-110 (C-95)

2 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano* (T-27) (incl 1 air show sqn)

1 sqn with T-25A/C

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-35M *Hind* (AH-2)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with H225M *Caracal* (H-36)

1 sqn with AS350B *Ecureuil* (H-50); AS355 *Ecureuil II* (H-55)

1 sqn with Bell 205 (H-1H); H225M *Caracal* (H-36)

2 sqn with UH-60L *Black Hawk* (H-60L)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Hermes 450/900*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 186 combat capable

FTR 49: 46 F-5EM *Tiger II*; 3 F-5FM *Tiger II*

FGA 24: 15 AMX/AMX-T (A-1A/B); 8 AMX A-1M; 1 AMX A-1BM

ASW 9 P-3AM *Orion*

MP 18: 10 EMB-111 (P-95A *Bandeirulha*)*; 8 EMB-111 (P-95BM *Bandeirulha*)*

ISR: 8: 4 AMX-R (RA-1)*; 4 EMB-110B (R-95)

ELINT 6: 3 EMB-145RS (R-99); 3 Learjet 35A (R-35A)

AEW&C 5: 3 EMB-145SA (E-99); 2 EMB-145SA (E-99M)

SAR 7: 3 C295M *Amazonas* (SC-105); 4 EMB-110 (SC-95B)

TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H

TPT 185: **Medium** 24: 4 C-130E *Hercules*; 16 C-130H

Hercules; 4 KC390; **Light** 153: 11 C295M (C-105A); 7

Cessna 208 (C-98); 9 Cessna 208B (C-98); 13 Cessna 208-G1000 (C-98A); 52 EMB-110 (C-95A/B/C/M); 16 EMB-120

(C-97); 4 EMB-120RT (VC-97); 5 EMB-121 (VU-9); 7 EMB-135BJ (VC-99B); 3 EMB-201R *Ipanema* (G-19); 2 EMB-202A *Ipanema* (G-19A); 4 EMB-550 Legacy 500 (IU-50);

2 ERJ-135LR (VC-99C); 7 ERJ-145 (C-99A); 1 ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); 9 Learjet 35A (VU-35); 1 Learjet 55C (VU-55);

PAX 8: 1 A319 (VC-1A); 3 EMB-190 (VC-2); 4 Hawker 800XP (EU-93A – calibration)

TRG 213: up to 50 EMB-312 *Tucano* (T-27); 38 EMB-314 *Super Tucano* (A-29A)*; 44 EMB-314 *Super Tucano*

(A-29B)*; 81 T-25A/C

HELICOPTERS

ATK 12 Mi-35M *Hind* (AH-2)

MRH 2 H135M (VH-35)

TPT 58: **Heavy** 14 H225M *Caracal* (12 H-36 & 2 VH-36);

Medium 16 UH-60L *Black Hawk* (H-60L); **Light** 28: 24

AS350B *Ecureuil* (H-50); 4 AS355 *Ecureuil II* (H-55/VH-55)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 7: **Heavy** 2 *Heron* 1; **Medium** 5: 4 *Hermes* 450; 1 *Hermes* 900

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR MAA-1 *Piranha*; R-550 *Magic* 2; *Python* 3; **IIR** *Python* 4; **SARH** Super 530F; **ARH** *Derby*

AShM AM39 *Exocet*

ARM MAR-1 (in development)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 395,000**Public Security Forces 395,000** opcon Army

State police organisation technically under army control. However, military control is reducing, with authority reverting to individual states

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 6; UN • MINUSCA 10

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 23

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 12


SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11

Chile CHL

Chilean Peso CLP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CLP	200tr	241tr	
	USD	253bn	331bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	12,993	16,799	
Growth	%	-5.8	11.0	
Inflation	%	3.0	4.2	
Def bdtg [a]	CLP	3.21tr	3.07tr	
	USD	4.05bn	4.22bn	
USD1=CLP		792.17	727.06	

[a] Includes military pensions



Population 18,307,925

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	10.0%	3.2%	3.6%	3.9%	23.2%	5.1%
Female	9.6%	3.1%	3.5%	3.8%	23.7%	7.1%

Capabilities

Chile's 2017 defence white paper noted core roles of assuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also indicated an increasing shift towards non-traditional military roles such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. In 2021, the armed forces were also granted authority to fight people trafficking and illegal migration in border areas. There is R&D cooperation with Brazil and Colombia, as well as exchange programmes. Defence cooperation with the US is centred on procurement, technical advice and personnel training. There is routine national training, and the armed forces participate in international exercises. Chile has a limited capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. The plans to upgrade the country's F-16s to prolong service life have been temporarily suspended due to the lack of available funding. Capability priorities reflect a focus on littoral and blue-water surveillance. Two frigates were bought from Australia, arriving in 2020. Chile has a developed defence-industrial base, with ENAER conducting aircraft maintenance. ASMAR and FAMAE are key maritime and land firms respectively, with the former building a new icebreaker that will enhance Chile's ability to support operations in Antarctica. The air force is also currently contributing to the development of the first indigenously built satellite constellation.

ACTIVE 68,500 (Army 37,650 Navy 19,800 Air 11,050) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700

Conscript liability Army 12 months; Navy 18 months; Air Force 12 months. Legally, conscription can last for 2 years

RESERVE 19,100 (Army 19,100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES

ISR 1 SSOT (Sistema Satelital de Observación de la Tierra)

Army 37,650

6 military administrative regions

FORCES BY ROLE

Currently being reorganised into 1 SF bde, 4 armd bde, 1 armd det, 4 mot bde, 2 mot det, 4 mtn det and 1 avn bde

COMMAND

6 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 (mtn) SF gp, 1 para bn, 3 cdo coy, 1 log coy)

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

4 cav sqn

2 recce sqn

2 recce pl

Armoured

1 (1st) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 2 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)

2 (2nd & 3rd) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)

1 (4th) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)

1 (5th) armd det (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf coy, 1 arty gp)

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech inf regt

Light

1 (1st) mot inf bde (1 recce coy, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 3 AT coy, 1 engr bn)

1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 MRL gp, 2 AT coy, 1 engr bn)

1 (24th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy)

1 (Maipo) mot inf bde (3 mot inf regt, 1 arty regt)

1 (6th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy)

1 (10th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 2 AT coy, 1 engr bn)

1 (11th) mot inf det (1 inf bn, 1 arty gp)

1 (14th) mot inf det (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy, 1 AT coy)

4 mot inf regt

1 (3rd) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)

1 (9th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 construction bn)

2 (8th & 17th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr regt

4 sigs bn

1 sigs coy

1 int bde (7 int gp)

2 int regt

1 MP regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log div (2 log regt)

4 log regt

6 log coy

1 maint div (1 maint regt)

AVIATION

1 avn bde (1 tpt avn bn, 1 hel bn, 1 spt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 170: 30 *Leopard* 1V; 140 *Leopard* 2A4
 IFV 191: 173 *Marder* 1A3; 18 YPR-765 PRI
 APC 445

APC (T) 306 M113A1/A2

APC (W) 139: 121 *Piranha* 6×6; 18 *Piranha* 8×8

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 6 *Pionierpanzer* 2 *Dachs*

ARV 30 BPz-2

VLB 13 *Biber*

MW 8+: *Bozena* 5; 8 *Leopard* 1 MW

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Spike*-LR; *Spike*-ER

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm 213 M40A1

ARTILLERY 1,398

SP 155mm 48: 24 M109A3; 24 M109A5+

TOWED 239: 105mm 191: 87 M101; 104 Model 56 pack
 howitzer; 155mm 48 M-68

MRL 160mm 12 LAR-160

MOR 1,099: 81mm 744: 295 ECIA L65/81; 192 FAMAE;
 257 Soltam; 120mm 284: 171 ECIA L65/120; 16 FAMAE;
 97 M-65; SP 120mm 71: 35 FAMAE (on *Piranha* 6×6); 36
 Soltam (on M113A2)

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 8: 2 C-212-300 *Aviocar*; 3 *Cessna* 208
Caravan; 3 CN235

HELICOPTERS

ISR 9 MD-530F *Lifter* (armed)

TPT 17: Medium 12: 8 AS532AL *Cougar*; 2 AS532ALE
Cougar; 2 SA330 *Puma*; Light 5: 4 H125 *Ecureuil*; 1
 AS355F *Ecureuil* II

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Mistral*

GUNS 41:

SP 20mm 17 *Piranha*/TCM-20

TOWED 20mm 24 TCM-20

Navy 19,800

5 Naval Zones; 1st Naval Zone and main HQ at Valparaiso;
 2nd Naval Zone at Talcahuano; 3rd Naval Zone at Punta
 Arenas; 4th Naval Zone at Iquique; 5th Naval Zone at
 Puerto Montt

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (diver) SF comd

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES • SSK** 4:

2 *O'Higgins* (*Scorpène*) with 6 single 533mm TT with
 SM39 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM/*Black Shark* HWT

2 *Thomson* (GER T-209/1400) (of which 1 in refit) with
 8 single 533mm TT with SM39 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM/
Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8**FRIGATES • FFGHM** 8:

3 *Almirante Cochrane* (ex-UK *Norfolk* Type-23) with
 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84C *Harpoon* Block 1B
 ASHM, 1 32-cell VLS with *Sea Ceptor* SAM, 2 twin
 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 2 LWT, 1 114mm gun
 (capacity 1 AS532SC *Cougar*)

2 *Almirante Latorre* (ex-AUS *Adelaide*) with 1 Mk 13
 GMLS with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM/SM-2
 Block IIIA SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B
 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT
 with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AS532SC
Cougars)

2 *Almirante Riveros* (ex-NLD *Karel Doorman*) with 2
 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 8-cell
 Mk 48 VLS with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 4 single
 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod
 5 HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC *Cougar*)

1 *Almirante Williams* (ex-UK *Broadsword* Type-22) with 2
 quad Inchr with RGM-84 *Harpoon* ASHM, 2 8-cell VLS
 with *Barak*-1 SAM; 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC *Cougar*)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PSOH 4: 2 *Piloto Pardo*; 2 *Piloto Pardo* with 1 76mm gun
 (ice-strengthened hull)

PCG 3:

2 *Casma* (ISR *Sa'ar* 4) with 6 single Inchr with *Gabriel* I
 ASHM, 2 76mm guns

1 *Casma* (ISR *Sa'ar* 4) with 4 single Inchr with *Gabriel*
 I ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 2
 76mm guns

PCO 5 *Micalvi***AMPHIBIOUS**

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 *Sargento*
Aldea (ex-FRA *Foudre*) with 3 twin *Simbad* Inchr with
Mistral SAM (capacity 4 med hel; 1 LCT; 2 LCM; 22 tanks;
 470 troops)

LANDING SHIPS 3

LSM 1 *Elicura*

LST 2 *Maipo* (FRA *Batral*) with 1 hel landing platform
 (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 3

LCT 1 CDIC (for use in *Sargento Aldea*)

LCM 2 (for use in *Sargento Aldea*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13

ABU 1 *George Slight Marshall* with 1 hel landing platform
 AFD 3

AGOR 1 *Cabo de Hornos*

AGHS 1 *Micalvi*

AOR 2: 1 *Almirante Montt* (ex-US *Henry J. Kaiser*) with 1
 hel landing platform; 1 *Araucano*

AP 1 *Aguiles* (1 hel landing platform)

ATF 3: 1 *Janequeo*; 2 *Veritas*

AXS 1 *Esmeralda*

Naval Aviation 600**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 14 combat capable

ASW 4: 2 C295ASW *Persuader*; 2 P-3ACH *Orion*

MP 4: 1 C295MPA *Persuader*; 3 EMB-111 *Bandeirante**

ISR 7 P-68

TRG 7 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer**

HELICOPTERS

ASW 5 AS532SC *Cougar*

MRH 8 AS365 *Dauphin*

TPT 10: Medium 2 H215 (AS332L1) *Super Puma*; Light
 8: 4 Bo-105S; 2 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 2 H125

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASHM AM39 *Exocet*

Marines 3,600**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

1 amph bde (2 mne bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn)

2 coastal def unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**LT TK 15 FV101 *Scorpion*APC • APC (W) 25 MOWAG *Roland*

AAV 12 AAV-7

ARTILLERY 39

TOWED 23: 105mm 7 KH-178; 155mm 16 M-71

MOR 81mm 16

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHm MM38 *Exocet***AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 14: 4 M998***Avenger*; 10 M1097 *Avenger***Coast Guard**

Integral part of the Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55**PBF 26 *Archangel*PB 29: 18 *Alacalufe (Protector)*; 4 *Grumete Diaz (Dabor)*;6 *Pelluhue*; 1 *Ona***Air Force 11,050****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger III+*2 sqn with F-16AM/BM *Fighting Falcon***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 *Fighting Falcon (Puma)***ISR**1 (photo) flt with; DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter*; Gulfstream IV**AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING**1 flt with B-707 *Phalcon***TANKER/TRANSPORT**1 sqn with B-737-300; C-130B/H *Hercules*; KC-130R*Hercules*; KC-135 *Stratotanker***TRANSPORT**3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); C-212-200/300*Aviocar*; Cessna O-2A; Cessna 525 *Citation CJ1*; DHC-6-100/300 *Twin Otter*; PA-28-236 *Dakota*; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

1 VIP flt with B-767-300ER; B-737-500; Gulfstream IV

TRAINING1 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**1 sqn with Cirrus SR-22T; T-35A/B *Pillan***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 206B (trg); Bell412 *Twin Huey*; S-70A *Black Hawk***AIR DEFENCE**1 AD regt (5 AD sqn) with *Crotale*; NASAMS; *Mistral*;M163/M167 *Vulcan*; Oerlikon GDF-005**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 92 combat capable**FTR 48: 10 F-5E *Tigre III+*; 2 F-5F *Tigre III+*; 29 F-16AM*Fighting Falcon*; 7 F-16BM *Fighting Falcon*FGA 10: 6 F-16C Block 50 *Fighting Falcon*; 4 F-16D Block 50 *Fighting Falcon*ATK 16 C-101CC *Aviojet (A-36 Halcón)*

ISR 3 Cessna O-2A

AEW&C 1 B-707 *Phalcon*TKR 3 KC-135 *Stratotanker*TKR/TPT 2 KC-130R *Hercules*TPT 33: **Medium** 3: 1 C-130B *Hercules*; 2 C-130H*Hercules*; **Light** 24: 2 C-212-200 *Aviocar*; 1 C-212-300*Aviocar*; 4 Cessna 525 *Citation CJ1*; 3 DHC-6-100 *Twin**Otter*; 7 DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter*; 7 PA-28-236 *Dakota*; **PAX**

6: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-737-500 (VIP); 1 B-767-300ER (VIP); 3

Gulfstream IV (VIP/aerial photography)

TRG 57: 8 Cirrus SR-22T; 22 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 27T-35A/B *Pillan***HELICOPTERS**MRH 12 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*TPT 25: **Medium** 7: 1 S-70A *Black Hawk*; 6 S-70i (MH-60M) *Black Hawk*; **Light** 18: 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*);

5 Bell 206B (trg)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLESISR • **Medium** 3 *Hermes* 900**AIR DEFENCE****SAM****Short-range** 17: 5 *Crotale*; 12 NASAMS**Point-defence** *Mistral* (including some *Mygale/Aspic*)**GUNS • TOWED** 20mm M163/M167 *Vulcan*; **35mm**

Oerlikon GDF-005


AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR** AIM-9J/M *Sidewinder*; *Python* 3; *Shafrir*†; **IIR***Python* 4; **ARH** AIM-120C AMRAAM; *Derby***ASM** AGM-65G *Maverick***BOMBS****Laser-guided** *Paveway* II**INS/GPS guided** JDAM**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700****Carabineros 44,700**Ministry of Interior; 15 zones, 36 districts, 179 *comisaria***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • APC (W) 20 MOWAG *Roland***ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm****AIRCRAFT**TPT • **Light** 4: 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 Cessna 208; 1Cessna 550 *Citation V*; 1 PA-31T *Cheyenne* II**HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light** 16: 5 AW109E *Power*; 1AW139; 1 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 2 BK-117; 5 Bo-105; 2 H135**DEPLOYMENT****BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea**
8**CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP** 6**MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO** 3

Colombia COL

Colombian Peso COP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	COP	1003tr	1114tr	
	USD	272bn	301bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,391	5,892	
Growth	%	-6.8	7.6	
Inflation	%	2.5	3.2	
Def bdtg [a]	COP	20.2tr	22.1tr	23.7tr
	USD	5.48bn	5.97bn	
FMA (US)	USD	45.5m	20.0m	4.0m
USD1=COP		3693.27	3704.35	

[a] Excludes security budget

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 50,355,650

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.5%	4.0%	4.1%	4.2%	21.1%	3.6%
Female	11.9%	3.8%	3.9%	4.1%	21.9%	5.0%

Capabilities

Colombia's armed forces have improved their training and overall capabilities in recent decades. Internal security remains a priority, and the armed forces are focused on conducting counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. While the armed forces are looking towards new security roles and organisations for the post-FARC era, the emergence of a FARC splinter group in mid-2019 means that internal security remains a key concern. In response to the humanitarian and security challenge from Venezuela, Colombia is strengthening cooperation with Brazil on border controls. There are military ties with Argentina, Chile and Peru. The US is Colombia's closest international military partner, with cooperation in equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel training. In May 2018, Colombia joined NATO as a global partner. The forces train regularly, including multilateral exercises. Although the equipment inventory mainly comprises legacy systems, Colombia has the capability to independently deploy force elements beyond national borders. The army is planning to modernise its armoured vehicles, while the navy has improved its offshore-patrol capacities in recent years. The air force's ground-attack capabilities remain limited, though it is in the process of renewing its fleet of basic trainers. Colombia's defence industry is active in all domains. CIAC is developing its first indigenous UAVs, while CODALTEC is developing an air-defence system for regional export. COTECMAR has supplied patrol boats and amphibious ships for national and export markets.

ACTIVE 255,950 (Army 185,900, Navy 56,400 Air 13,650) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 172,400

Conscript liability 18 months' duration with upper age limit of 24, males only

RESERVE 34,950 (Army 25,050 Navy 6,500 Air 3,400)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 185,900

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF div (3 SF regt)
- 1 (anti-terrorist) SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

- 1 (1st) mech div (1 (2nd) mech bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (10th) mech bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 1 armd recce bn, 1 mech cav bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 3 sy bn, 2 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp))

Light

- 1 (2nd) inf div (1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech cav bn, 2 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (5th) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (30th) inf bde (1 mech cav bn, 2 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 AD bn; 1 sy gp (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 4 COIN bn, 3 sy bn); 1 (rapid reaction) sy bde)
- 1 (3rd) inf div (1 (3rd) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 MP bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (23rd) inf bde (1 cav gp, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (29th) mtn bde (1 mtn inf bn, 1 inf bn, 2 COIN bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 lt cav bde (2 lt cav gp); 1 mtn inf bn; 2 (rapid reaction) sy bde)
- 1 (4th) inf div (1 (7th) air mob bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 2 air mob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (22nd) jungle bde (1 air mob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (31st) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn))
- 1 (5th) inf div (1 (6th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 3 COIN bn, 1 EOD bn, 2 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (8th) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (9th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 sy bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 air mob bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 2 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp))
- 1 (6th) inf div (1 (12th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 1 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (26th) jungle bde (1 jungle inf bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (27th) jungle inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (13th) mobile sy bde; 2 COIN bn)
- 1 (7th) inf div (1 (4th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1 mech cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (11th) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 air mob bn, 1 sy bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (14th) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (15th) jungle bde (1 inf bn, 2 COIN bn, 1 engr bn); 1 (17th) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn))

1 (8th) inf div (1 (16th) Lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 1 inf bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gauila anti-kidnap gp); 1 (18th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1 air mob gp, 5 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 2 COIN, 1 spt bn); , 1 (rapid reaction) sy bde, 4 COIN bn)
3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 spt bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt engr bde (1 SF engr bn, 1 (emergency response) engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 construction bn, 1 demining bn, 1 maint bn)

1 int bde (2 SIGINT bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn, 1 tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn)

AVIATION

1 air aslt div (1 counter-narcotics bde (4 counter-narcotics bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (25th) avn bde (4 hel bn; 5 avn bn; 1 avn log bn); 1 (32nd) avn bde (1 avn bn, 2 maint bn, 1 trg bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SF avn bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 121 EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV 60: 28 *Commando Advanced*; 32 LAV III

APC 114

APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 (TPM-113A2)

APC (W) 56 EE-11 *Urutu*

PPV 4+: some *Hunter XL*; 4 RG-31 *Nyala*

AUV 38 M1117 *Guardian*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 77 *Nimrod*

MANPATS TOW; *Spike-ER*

RCL 106mm 73 M40A1

ARTILLERY 1,796

TOWED 120: 105mm 107: 22 LG1 MkIII; 85 M101; 155mm 13 155/52 APU SBT-1

MOR 1,676: 81mm 1,507; 120mm 169

AIRCRAFT

ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350 *King Air*

TPT • **Light** 23: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech B200 *King Air*; 3 Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 Beech C90 *King Air*; 2 C-212 *Aviocar* (Medevac); 8 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 1 Cessna 208B-EX *Grand Caravan*; 4 *Turbo Commander* 695A

HELICOPTERS

MRH 19: 8 Mi-17-1V *Hip*; 6 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

TPT 92: **Medium** 53: 46 UH-60L *Black Hawk*; 7 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 39: 24 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 15 Bell 212 (UH-1N *Twin Huey*)

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 40mm 4 M1A1

Navy 56,400 (incl 12,100 conscript)

HQ located at Bogotá

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 4

SSK 2 *Pijao* (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm TT each with *SeaHake* (DM2A3) HWT

SSC 2 *Intrépido* (ex-GER T-206A) each with 8 single 533mm TT each with *SeaHake* (DM2A3) HWT

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49

CORVETTES 6

FSGHM 4 *Almirante Padilla* with 2 quad Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 2 twin *Simbad* Inchr with *Mistral* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT each with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105/AS555SN *Fennec* hel)

FSG 1 *Almirante Tono* (Ex-ROK *Po Hang* (Flight IV)) 2 twin Inchr with *Hae Sung* I ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46, 2 76mm guns

FS 1 *Narino* (ex-ROK *Dong Hae*) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT

PSOH 3: 2 *20 de Julio* (CHL *Piloto Pardo*); 1 *20 de Julio* (CHL *Piloto Pardo*) with 1 76mm gun

PCR 10: 2 *Arauca* with 1 76mm guns; 8 *Nodriza* (PAF I-IV) with hel landing platform

PBR 30: 5 *Diligente*; 7 LPR-40; 3 Swiftships; 9 *Tenerife* (US Bender Marine 12m); 2 PAF-L; 4 others

AMPHIBIOUS 16

LCT 6 *Golfo de Tribuga*

LCU 2 *Morrosquillo* (LCU 1466)

UCAC 8 *Griffon* 2000TD

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9

ABU 1 *Quindio*

AG 2: 1 *Inirida*; 1 *Lunenburg* (ex-GER, depot ship for patrol vessels)

AGHS 2: 1 *Caribe*; 1 *Roncador*

AGOR 2 *Providencia*

AGS 1 *Gorgona*

AXS 1 *Gloria*

Coast Guard

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16

PCO 2: 1 *San Andres* (ex-US *Balsam*); 1 *Valle del Cauca Durable* (ex-US *Reliance*) with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 3 *Punta Espada* (CPV-46)

PB 11: 1 *11 de Noviembre* (CPV-40) (GER *Fassmer*); 2 *Castillo y Rada* (Swiftships 105); 2 *Jaime Gomez* (ex-US *Peterson* Mk 3); 1 *José Maria Palas* (Swiftships 110); 3 *Point*; 2 *Toledo* (US Bender Marine 35m)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 *Isla Albuquerque*

Naval Aviation 150

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 3 CN235 MPA *Persuader*

ISR 1 PA-31 *Navajo* (upgraded for ISR)

TPT • **Light** 11: 1 C-212 (Medevac); 4 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 1 PA-31 *Navajo*; 1 PA-34 *Seneca*; 1 Beech 350 *King Air*

HELICOPTERS

SAR 2 AS365 *Dauphin*

MRH 8: 1 AS555SN *Fennec*; 3 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 4 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

TPT • **Light** 8: 1 Bell 212; 4 Bell 212 (UH-1N); 1 BK-117; 2 Bo-105

Marines 22,250

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (4 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE**Amphibious**

1 mne bde (1 SF (Gaula) bn, 5 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)

1 mne bde (1 SF bn, 2 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)

1 rvn bde (1 SF bn, 1 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)

1 rvn bde (4 rvn bn)

1 rvn bde (3 rvn bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (6 spt bn)

1 trg bde (7 trg bn, 1 spt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • MOR 82: 81mm 74; 120mm 8

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence *Mistral*

Air Force 13,650**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with *Kfir* C-10/C-12/TC-12

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B *Dragonfly*

1 sqn with AC-47T; ECN235; IAI *Arava*

1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano**

2 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano** (A-29)

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with AC-47T *Spooky (Fantasma)*; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey* II); Cessna 208 *Grand Caravan*

1 sqn with Cessna 208 *Grand Caravan*; C-212; UH-60L *Black Hawk*

EW/ELINT

2 sqn with Beech 350 *King Air*; Cessna 208; SA 2-37; *Turbo Commander* 695

ELINT

2 sqn with Cessna 560

TRANSPORT

1 (Presidential) sqn with AW139; B-737BBJ; EMB-600 *Legacy*; Bell 412EP; F-28 *Fellowship*; UH-60L *Black Hawk*

1 sqn with B-727; B-737-400; Beech C90GTx *King Air*; C-130B/H *Hercules*; C-212; C295M; CN235M; KC-767

1 sqn with Beech 350C *King Air*; Bell 212; Cessna 208B; EMB-110P1 (C-95)

1 sqn with Beech C90 *King Air*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Cessna 172

1 sqn with Lancair *Synergy* (T-90 *Calima*)

1 sqn with T-6C *Texan* II

1 hel sqn with Bell 206B3

1 hel sqn with TH-67

HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AH-60L *Arpia* III

1 sqn with UH-60L *Black Hawk* (CSAR)

1 sqn with Hughes 500M

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey* II)

1 sqn with Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger* III

1 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey* II)

ISR UAV

1 sqn with *Hermes* 450; *Hermes* 900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable

FGA 22: 10 *Kfir* C-10; 9 *Kfir* C-12; 3 *Kfir* TC-12

ATK 12: 6 A-37B/OA-37B *Dragonfly*; 6 AC-47T *Spooky (Fantasma)*

ISR 11: 5 Cessna 560 *Citation* II; 6 SA 2-37

ELINT 13: 3 Beech 350 *King Air*; 6 Cessna 208 *Grand Caravan*; 2 Cessna 337G; 1 ECN235; 1 *Turbo Commander* 695

TKR/TPT 1 KC-767

TPT 70: **Medium** 10: 3 C-130B *Hercules*; 6 C-130H

Hercules; 1 B-737F; **Light** 49: 7 ATR-42; 2 Beech 300 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350C *King Air* (medevac); 1 Beech 350i *King Air* (VIP); 2 Beech 350 *King Air* (medevac); 2 Beech C90 *King Air*; 3 Beech C90GTx *King Air*; 4 C-212; 6 C295M; 4 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 182R; 12 Cessna 208B (medevac); 1 CN235M; 2 EMB-110P1 (C-95); 1 IAI-201 *Arava*; **PAX** 11: 2 B-727; 2 B-737-400; 1 B-737BBJ (VIP); 1 EMB-600 *Legacy*; 2 ERJ-145; 1 F-28-1000 *Fellowship*; 1 F-28-3000 *Fellowship*; 1 Learjet 60

TRG 69: 14 EMB-312 *Tucano**; 24 EMB-314 *Super Tucano* (A-29)*; 23 Lancair *Synergy* (T-90 *Calima*); 6 T-41D *Mescalero*; 2 T-6C *Texan* II

HELICOPTERS

MRH 18: 4 AH-60L *Arpia* III; 10 AH-60L *Arpia* IV; 1

AW139 (VIP); 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey* (VIP); 2 Hughes 500M

TPT 46: **Medium** 13 UH-60L *Black Hawk* (incl 1 VIP hel);

Light 33: 10 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey* II); 12 Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger* III; 11 Bell 212

TRG 60 TH-67

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium

8: 6 *Hermes* 450; 2 *Hermes* 900

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR *Python* 3; IIR *Python* 4; *Python* 5; **ARH** *Derby*; I-*Derby* ER (reported)

ASM *Spike*-ER; *Spike*-NLOS

BOMBS

Laser-guided *Paveway* II

INS/GPS guided *Spice*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 172,400**National Police Force 172,400****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

ELINT 5 C-26B *Metroliner*

TPT • **Light** 43: 5 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2

Beech 300 *King Air*; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99; 4

BT-67; 3 C-26 *Metroliner*; 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172;

9 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 2 DHC-6 *Twin*

Otter; 1 DHC-8; 3 PA-31 *Navajo*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 5: 2 Bell 407GXP; 1 Bell 412EP; 2 MD-500D

TPT 80: **Medium** 22: 10 UH-60A *Black Hawk*; 9 UH-

60L *Black Hawk*; 3 S-70i *Black Hawk*; **Light** 58: 34 Bell

205 (UH-1H-II *Huey* II); 6 Bell 206B; 5 Bell 206L/L3/L4

Long Ranger; 8 Bell 212; 5 Bell 407

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2

EGYPT: MFO 275; 1 inf bn

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES


United States US Southern Command: 50

Costa Rica CRI

Costa Rican Colon CRC		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CRC	36.2tr	37.9tr	
	USD	61.8bn	61.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	12,057	11,860	
Growth	%	-4.1	3.9	
Inflation	%	0.7	1.3	
Sy Bdgt [a]	CRC	267bn	267bn	270bn
	USD	457m	434m	
FMA (US)	USD	7.5m	0.0m	0.0m
USD1=CRC		585.03	616.14	

[a] Paramilitary budget

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 5,151,140

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	11.2%	3.6%	3.9%	4.1%	23.0%	4.2%
Female	10.7%	3.5%	3.8%	4.0%	23.0%	4.9%

Capabilities

Costa Rica's armed forces were constitutionally abolished in 1949, and the country relies on police and coastguard organisations for internal security, maritime and air domain awareness, and counter-narcotics tasks. A new National Security Strategy was adopted in 2018 in order to help tackle rising crime. Colombia and the US have provided assistance and training, focused on policing and internal-security tasks rather than conventional military operations. The Special Intervention Unit (UEI) has received specialist training from non-regional states, including the US. The Public Force, Coast Guard and Air Surveillance units have little heavy equipment, and recent modernisation has depended on donations from countries such as China and the US. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Costa Rica has no domestic defence industry.

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950****Special Intervention Unit****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops unit

Public Force 9,000

11 regional directorates

Coast Guard Unit 550**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10**

PB 10: 2 *Cabo Blanco* (US *Swift* 65); 1 *Isla del Coco* (US *Swift* 105); 3 *Libertador Juan Rafael Mora* (ex-US *Island*); 2 *Point*; 1 *Primera Dama* (US *Swift* 42); 1 *Puerto Quepos* (US *Swift* 36)

Air Surveillance Unit 400**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 14: 2 *Cessna T210 Centurion*; 4 *Cessna U206G Stationair*; 2 *PA-31 Navajo*; 2 *PA-34 Seneca*; 1 *Piper PA-23 Aztec*; 1 *Cessna 182RG*; 2 *Y-12E*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 3: 1 MD-500E; 2 MD-600N

TPT • Light 4 Bell 212 (UH-1N)

Cuba CUB

Cuban Peso CUP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD			
<i>per capita</i>	USD			
Growth				
Inflation				
Def exp	CUP			
	USD			
USD1=CUP				

Population 11,032,343

*definitive data not available

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.4%	2.9%	3.1%	3.1%	24.9%	7.3%
Female	7.9%	2.7%	2.9%	2.8%	25.2%	8.8%

Capabilities

Cuba's armed forces are principally focused on protecting territorial integrity, and rely on a mass-mobilisation system. Military capability is limited by equipment obsolescence and a largely conscript-based force. Cuba maintains military ties with China and Russia, and the latter has supplied oil and fuel following Venezuela's economic collapse. Defence cooperation with Russia is largely centred around technical and maintenance support. Cooperation with China appears to be on a smaller scale and involves training agreements and personnel exchanges. The armed forces are no longer designed for expeditionary operations and have little logistical capability to support operational deployments abroad. The inventory is almost entirely composed of legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. Serviceability appears a problem, with much equipment at a low level of availability and maintenance demands growing as fleets age. Much of the aviation fleet is reported to be in storage. Training levels are uncertain and flying hours are likely to be low due to limited availability of aircraft. It is unlikely that significant equipment recapitalisation can be financed in the near term. Cuba has little in the way of domestic defence industry, apart from some upgrade and maintenance capacity. Cuba continues to send maintenance personnel to South Africa, highlighting not just

revenue-raising requirements for its forces but also the potential effect such activities might have on remaining maintenance capacity in Cuba.

ACTIVE 49,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 3,000 Air 8,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,500

Conscript liability 2 years

RESERVE 39,000 (Army 39,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,120,000

Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and Reserve units; see also Paramilitary

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €38,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 3 regional comd HQ
- 3 army comd HQ

COMMAND

- 3 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

- Armoured**
- 1 tk div (3 tk bde)
- Mechanised**
- 2 (mixed) mech bde

Light

- 2 (frontier) bde

Air Manoeuvr

- 1 AB bde

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 ADA regt
- 1 SAM bde

Reserves 39,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

- 14 inf bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT €900 T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62

LT TK PT-76

ASLT BTR-60 100mm

RECCE BRDM-2;

AIFV €50 BMP-1/1P

APC €500 BTR-152/BTR-50/BTR-60

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 2K16 *Shmel* (RS-AT-1 *Snapper*)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

GUNS 600+: 57mm 600 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm D-44

ARTILLERY 1,715+

SP 40+: 100mm AAPMP-100; CATAP-100; 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*; AAP-T-122; AAP-BMP-122; *Jupiter III*; *Jupiter IV*; 130mm AAP-T-130; *Jupiter V*; 152mm 2S3 *Akatsiya*

TOWED 500: 122mm D-30; M-30 (M-1938); 130mm

M-46; 152mm D-1; M-1937 (ML-20)

MRL • SP 175: 122mm BM-21 *Grad*; 140mm BM-14

MOR 1,000: 82mm M-41; 82mm M-43; 120mm M-43; M-38

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Pont-defence 200+: 200 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13

Gopher); 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-

SA-9 *Gaskin*); 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310

Igla-1 (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†‡

GUNS 400

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 30mm BTR-60P SP; 57mm ZSU-57-2

TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm

S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23

Navy €3,000

Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ at Holquin

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSW 1 *Delfin*

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9

PCG 2 *Rio Damuji* with two single P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C *Styx*) ASHM, 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform

PCM 1 Project 1241PE (FSU *Pauk II*) with 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun

PBF 6 Project 205 (FSU *Osa II*)† each with 4 single Inchr (for P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B *Styx*) ASHM – missiles removed to coastal-defence units)

MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5

MHI 3 *Korund* (Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*))†

MSC 2 *Yakhont* (FSU Project 1265 (*Sonya*))†

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

ABU 1

AX 1

Coastal Defence

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 130mm

M-46; 152mm M-1937

COASTAL DEFENCE • ASHM 4+: *Bandera IV* (reported); 4 4K51 *Rubezh* (RS-SSC-3 *Styx*)

Naval Infantry 550+

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

- 2 amph aslt bn

Anti-aircraft Defence and Revolutionary Air Force €8,000 (incl conscripts)

Air assets divided between Western Air Zone and Eastern Air Zone

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with MiG-21bis/UM *Fishbed*; MiG-23ML/UB/UM *Flogger*; MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

TRANSPORT

1 (VIP) tpt sqn with An-24 *Coke*; Mi-8P *Hip*

ATTACK HELICOPTER2 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-35 *Hind***TRAINING**2 (tac trg) sqn with L-39C *Albatros* (basic); Z-142 (primary)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 31 combat capable**FTR** 26: 16 MiG-23ML *Flogger*; 1+ MiG-23UB *Flogger*; 4 MiG-23UM *Flogger*; 2 MiG-29 *Fulcrum†*; 3 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum†*; (6 MiG-23ML *Flogger*; 2 MiG-23UM *Flogger* in store)**FGA** 5: 3 MiG-21bis *Fishbed*; 2 MiG-21UM *Fishbed***ISR** 1 An-30 *Clank†***TPT** 25: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid*; **Light** 11: 1 An-24 *Coke* (Aerogaviota); 3 An-26 *Curl* (Aerogaviota); 5 ATR-42-500 (Cubana & Aerogaviota); 2 ATR-72-500 (Cubana); **PAX** 12: 6 An-158 (Cubana); 3 Il-96-300 (Cubana); 3 Tu-204E-100 (Cubana)**TRG** 25+: up to 25 L-39 *Albatros*; some Z-142C**HELICOPTERS****ATK** 4 Mi-35 *Hind†* (8 more in store)**MRH** 8 Mi-17 *Hip H* (12 more in store)**TPT** • **Medium** 2 Mi-8P *Hip***AIR DEFENCE • SAM****Medium-range** S-75 *Dvina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*); S-75 *Dvina* mod (RS-SA-2 *Guideline* – on T-55 chassis)**Short-range** S-125M/M1 *Pechora-M/M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*); S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* mod (RS-SA-3 *Goa* – on T-55 chassis)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM** • **IR** R-3† (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*); R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-23/24† (RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)**ASM** Kh-23† (RS-AS-7 *Kerry*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** 26,500 active**State Security** 20,000

Ministry of Interior


Border Guards 6,500

Ministry of Interior

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20PCC 2 *Stenka*PB 18 *Zhuk***Youth Labour Army** 70,000 reservists**Civil Defence Force** 50,000 reservists**Territorial Militia** €1,000,000 reservists**FOREIGN FORCES****United States** US Southern Command: 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay**Dominican Republic** DOM

Dominican Peso DOP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	DOP	4.46tr	5.13tr	
	USD	78.9bn	89.5bn	
per capita	USD	7,554	8,492	
Growth	%	-6.7	9.5	
Inflation	%	3.8	7.8	
Def bdgt	DOP	33.3bn	33.2bn	41.8bn
	USD	589m	579m	
USD1=DOP		56.47	57.34	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

**Population** 10,597,348

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.5%	4.6%	4.5%	4.3%	20.6%	3.1%
Female	13.0%	4.4%	4.4%	4.1%	20.0%	3.4%

Capabilities

The principal tasks for the Dominican armed forces include internal- and border-security missions, as well as disaster relief. Training and operations increasingly focus on counter-narcotics and include collaboration with the police in an inter-agency task force. The US sends training teams to the country under the terms of a 2015 military-partnership agreement, and the navy has trained with French forces. The Dominican Republic has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. The army has strengthened its presence along the border with Haiti, establishing new surveillance posts; in 2021 it deployed over 7,000 troops to its border in response to the Haiti crisis. There is little capacity to deploy and sustain forces abroad. The army's limited number of armoured vehicles are obsolete and likely difficult to maintain. The air force operates a modest number of light fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets, and the navy a small fleet of mainly ex-US patrol craft of varying sizes. Apart from maintenance facilities, the country does not have a domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 56,050 (Army 28,750 Navy 11,200 Air 16,100) Paramilitary 15,000**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army** 28,750

5 Defence Zones

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

3 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Light**

4 (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn)

2 (5th & 6th) inf bde (2 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvr1 air cav bde (1 cdo bn, 1 (6th) mtn bn, 1 hel sqn with Bell 205 (op by Air Force); OH-58 *Kiowa*; R-22; R-44 *Raven II*)

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt
1 (MoD) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt bde (1 lt armd bn; 1 arty bn; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

LT TK 12 M41B (76mm)

APC • APC (W) 8 LAV-150 *Commando*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm 20 M40A1

GUNS 37mm 20 M3

ARTILLERY 104

TOWED 105mm 16: 4 M101; 12 *Reinosa* 105/26

MOR 88: 81mm 60 M1; 107mm 4 M30; 120mm 24 Expal

Model L

HELICOPTERS

ISR 8: 4 OH-58A *Kiowa*; 4 OH-58C *Kiowa*

TPT • Light 6: 4 R-22; 2 R-44 *Raven II*

Navy 11,200

HQ located at Santo Domingo

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (SEAL) SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne sy unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18**

PCO 1 *Almirante Didiez Burgos* (ex-US *Balsam*)

PCC 2 *Tortuguero* (ex-US *White Sumac*)

PB 15: 2 *Altair* (Swiftships 35m); 4 *Bellatrix* (US *Sewart Seacraft*); 1 *Betelgeuse* (Damen Stan Patrol 2606); 2 *Canopus* (Swiftships 110); 3 *Hamal* (Damen Stan Patrol 1505); 3 *Point*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT

LCU 1 *Neyba* (ex-US LCU 1675)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1

AX 1 *Almirante Juan Bautista Cambiaso*

Air Force 16,100**FORCES BY ROLE****GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*); Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 430 (VIP); OH-58 *Kiowa* (CH-136); S-333

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-212-400 *Aviocar*; PA-31 *Navajo*

TRAINING

1 sqn with T-35B *Pillan*

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA bn with 20mm guns

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable**

ISR 1 AMT-200 *Super Ximango*

TPT • Light 13: 3 C-212-400 *Aviocar*; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 207; 1 *Commander* 690; 3 EA-100; 1 PA-31 *Navajo*; 1 P2006T

TRG 12: 8 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 4 T-35B *Pillan*

HELICOPTERS


ISR 9 OH-58 *Kiowa* (CH-136)

TPT • Light 16: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey II*); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 H155 (VIP); 2 S-333

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 4**Paramilitary 15,000****National Police 15,000****Ecuador ECU**

United States Dollar USD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD	98.8bn	104bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,643	5,884	
Growth	%	-7.8	2.8	
Inflation	%	-0.3	0.0	
Def bdgt	USD	1.55bn	1.59bn	1.58bn
FMA (US)	USD	0.0m	0.0m	5.0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 17,093,159

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.9%	4.4%	4.5%	4.2%	19.5%	4.0%
Female	12.4%	4.3%	4.3%	4.2%	20.7%	4.5%

Capabilities

Ecuador's armed forces are able to fulfil internal-security tasks, although the crisis in Venezuela and resulting refugee flows have added to existing security challenges in the northern border area. These security conditions led the armed forces to create a joint task force for counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. Defence cooperation with Peru includes demining efforts on the border. Military ties with Washington have been revived, which has led to the re-establishment of bilateral training programmes. The armed forces train regularly and have participated in multinational military exercises. There is limited capability to deploy independently beyond national borders. The equipment inventory is derived from a variety of sources, though obsolescence and low availability is a challenge. Modernisation plans are modest in scope and are currently focused on aviation as well as maritime-patrol capabilities. Ecuador's defence industries are centred on the army's Office of Industries (DINE), which produces military equipment through army-run enterprises. The state-owned shipyard ASTINAVE has some construction, maintenance and repair capabilities, although the navy's submarines are being modernised in Chile.

ACTIVE 41,250 (Army 25,650 Navy 9,400 Air 6,200)

Paramilitary 500

Conscript liability Voluntary conscription

RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000)

Ages 18-55

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 25,650

FORCES BY ROLE

gp are bn sized

COMMAND

4 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (9th) SF bde (3 SF sqn, 1 SF sqn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log comd)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (11th) armd cav bde (3 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1 engr gp)

1 (5th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 2 mech cav gp, 2 inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

Light

1 (1st) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd cav gp, 1 armd recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 med coy)

1 (3rd) inf bde (1 SF gp, 1 mech cav gp, 1 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

1 (7th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mech cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 jungle bn, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy)

1 (13th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mot cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

2 (17th & 21st) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

1 (19th) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 jungle trg bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (27th) arty bde (1 SP arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 ADA gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)

1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn)

2 indep MP coy

1 indep sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 (25th) log bde (1 log bn, 1 tpt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 med bn)

9 indep med coy

AVIATION

1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp)

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 25 AMX-13

RECCE 42: 10 EE-3 *Jararaca*; 32 EE-9 *Cascavel*

APC 151

APC (T) 102: 82 AMX-VCI; 20 M113

APC (W) 49: 17 EE-11 *Urutu*; 32 UR-416

ARTILLERY 486

SP 155mm 5 Mk F3

TOWED 106: 105mm 84: 36 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198

MRL 122mm 18 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 81mm 357 M29

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 11: 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2 C-212; 1 CN235; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 500 *Citation I*; 1 IAI-201 *Arava*; 1 M-28 *Skytruck*

TRG 4: 2 MX-7-235 *Star Rocket*; 2 T-41D *Mescalero*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 33: 7 H125M (AS550C3) *Fennec*; 6 Mi-17-1V *Hip*; 2 SA315B *Lama*; 18 SA342L *Gazelle* (13 with HOT for anti-armour role)

TPT 13: Medium 9: 5 AS332B *Super Puma*; 2 Mi-171E; 2 SA330 *Puma*; Light 4: 2 H125 (AS350B2) *Ecureuil*; 2 H125 (AS350B3) *Ecureuil*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Blowpipe*; 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS 240

SP 20mm 44 M163 *Vulcan*

TOWED 196: 14.5mm 128 ZPU-1/-2; 20mm 38: 28 M-1935, 10 M167 *Vulcan*; 40mm 30 L/70/M1A1

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT

Navy 9,400 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines and Coast Guard)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 2

SSK 2 *Shyri* (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT each with A184 mod 3 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGH 2 *Moran Valverde* (ex-UK *Leander* batch II) with 1 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS, 1 twin 114mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 230 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11

CORVETTES • FSGM 6

5 *Esmeraldas* (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 quad *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

1 *Esmeraldas* (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 quad *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

PCFG 3 *Quito* (GER Lurssen TNC-45 45m) with 4 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun (upgrade programme ongoing)

PCC 2 *Hae Uri* (ex-ROK)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8

AE 1 *Calicuchima*

AG 1 *Hualcopo* (ex-PRC *Fu Yuan Yu Leng* 999) (utilised in transport ship role)

AGOS 1 *Orion* with 1 hel landing platform

AGS 1 *Sirius*

AKL 1 *Isla Bartolome* (operated by TRANSNAVE)

ATF 1 *Chimborazo*

AWT 1 *Atahualpa*

AXS 1 *Guaybas*

Naval Aviation 380

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 1 CN235-300M

ISR 3: 2 Beech 200T *King Air*; 1 Beech 300 *Catpass King Air*

TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 Beech 300 *King Air*; 1 CN235-100

TRG 3 T-35B *Pillan*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light 9: 3 Bell 206A; 3 Bell 206B; 1 Bell 230; 2 Bell 430

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR 4: **Heavy** 2 *Heron*; **Medium** 2 *Searcher Mk.II*

Marines 1,950

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo bn

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

5 mne bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARTILLERY • **MOR** 32+ 81mm/120mm

AIR DEFENCE • **SAM** • **Point-defence** 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

Air Force 6,200

Operational Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with *Cheetah C/D*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

Military Air Transport Group

FORCES BY ROLE

ISR

1 sqn with Beech 350i *King Air*; Gulfstream G-1159; *Sabreliner* 40

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW119 *Koala*; Bell 206B *Jet Ranger* II; H145

1 sqn with Cessna 206; PA-34 *Seneca*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C295M

1 sqn with DHC-6-300 *Twin Otter*

1 sqn with B-727; B-737-200; EMB-135BJ *Legacy* 600;

L-100-30

TRAINING

1 sqn with DA20-C1

1 sqn with G-120TP

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable

TPT 20: **Medium** 1 L-100-30; (2 C-130B *Hercules*; 1 C-130H *Hercules* in store); **Light** 12: 1 Beech E90 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350i *King Air*; 3 C295M; 1 Cessna 206; 3 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 1 EMB-135BJ *Legacy* 600; 1 PA-34 *Seneca*; 1 *Sabreliner* 40; **PAX** 7: 2 A320 (operated by TAME); 2 B-727; 1 B-737-200; 1 *Falcon* 7X; 1 Gulfstream G-1159

TRG 36: 11 DA20-C1; 17 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 8 G-120TP

HELICOPTERS • **TPT** • **Light** 13: 4 AW119 *Koala*; 6 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger* II; 3 H145

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **AAM** • **IR** *Python* 3; R-550 *Magic*; **IIR** *Python* 4

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • **Point-defence** 10+: 10 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS • **TOWED** 52: **23mm** 34 ZU-23; **35mm** 18 GDF-002 (twin)

Paramilitary 500

Coast Guard 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19

PCC 5: 3 *Isla Fernandina* (*Vigilante*); 2 *Isla San Cristóbal* (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)

PB 13: 2 *Espada*; 2 *Manta* (GER Lurssen 36m); 1 *Point*; 4 *Rio Coca*; 4 *Isla Santa Cruz* (Damen Stan 2606)

PBR 1 *Rio Puyango*

DEPLOYMENT


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

El Salvador SLV

United States Dollar USD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD	24.6bn	27.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,799	4,244	
Growth	%	-7.9	9.0	
Inflation	%	-0.4	3.6	
Def bdgt	USD	172m	248m	



Population 6,528,135

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.1%	4.3%	4.9%	4.7%	17.5%	3.4%
Female	12.5%	4.1%	4.8%	4.8%	21.4%	4.4%

Capabilities

The primary challenge for El Salvador's armed forces is tackling organised crime and narcotics trafficking in support of the National Civil Police. A new Territorial Control Plan implemented in 2019 has seen mixed military and police patrols deployed to areas with high crime rates. El Salvador participates in a tri-national border task force with Guatemala and Honduras. The armed forces have long-standing training programmes, including with regional states and with the US, focused on internal security, disaster relief and support to civilian authorities. El Salvador has deployed on UN peacekeeping missions up to company strength but lacks the logistical support to sustain independent international deployments. The armed forces have received little new heavy military equipment in recent years and are dependent on an inventory of Cold War-era platforms; the majority of these are operational,

indicating adequate support and maintenance. El Salvador lacks a substantive defence industry but has successfully produced light armoured vehicles based upon commercial vehicles.

ACTIVE 24,500 (Army 20,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000)
Paramilitary 17,000

Conscript liability 12 months (selective); 11 months for officers and NCOs

RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,500

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops gp (1 SF coy, 1 para bn, 1 (naval inf) coy)

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd cav regt (2 armd cav bn)

Light

6 inf bde (3 inf bn)

Other

1 (special) sy bde (2 border gd bn, 2 MP bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde (2 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn)

1 engr comd (2 engr bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 5 AML-90 (4 more in store)

APC • APC (W) 38: 30 VAL *Cashuat* (mod); 8 UR-416

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 399: 106mm 20 M40A1 (incl 16 SP); 90mm 379 M67

ARTILLERY 229+

TOWED 66: 105mm 54: 36 M102; 18 M-56 (FRY); 155mm 12 M198

MOR 163+: 81mm 151 M29; 120mm 12+: 12 UBM 52; (some M-74 in store)

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 35: 20mm 31 M-55; 4 TCM-20

Navy 2,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PB 10: 3 Camcraft (30m); 1 Defiant 85; 1 *Point*; 1

Swiftships 77; 1 Swiftships 65; 4 Type-44 (ex-US)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4 LCM 8 (of which 3†)

Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF coy

Air Force 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B *Dragonfly*; O-2A/B *Skymaster**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with BT-67; Cessna 210 *Centurion*; Cessna 337G; *Commander* 114; IAI-202 *Arava*; SA-226T *Merlin* IIIB

TRAINING

1 sqn with R-235GT *Guerrier*; T-35 *Pillan*; T-41D *Mescalero*; TH-300

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 407; Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; MD-500E; MD-530F; UH-1M *Iroquois*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable

ATK 14 A-37B *Dragonfly*

ISR 11: 6 O-2A/B *Skymaster**; 5 OA-37B *Dragonfly**

TPT • Light 10: 2 BT-67; 2 Cessna 210 *Centurion*; 1 Cessna 337G *Skymaster*; 1 *Commander* 114; 3 IAI-201 *Arava*; 1 SA-226T *Merlin* IIIB

TRG 9: 5 R-235GT *Guerrier*; 3 T-35 *Pillan*; 1 T-41D *Mescalero*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 18: 4 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 8 MD-500E; 4+ MD-530F; 2 UH-1M *Iroquois*

TPT • Light 9: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 Bell 407 (VIP tpt, govt owned)

TRG 5 TH-300

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR *Shafirir*†

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 17,000

National Civilian Police 17,000

Ministry of Public Security

AIRCRAFT

ISR 1 O-2A *Skymaster*

TPT • Light 1 Cessna 310

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 MD-520N

TPT • Light 3: 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 2 R-44 *Raven* II

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 54; 1 inf pl

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 176; 1 hel sqn with 3 MD-500E

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1

FOREIGN FORCES

United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel)

Guatemala GUA

Guatemalan Quetzal GTQ		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GTQ	599bn	651bn	
	USD	77.6bn	83.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,317	4,542	
Growth	%	-1.5	5.5	
Inflation	%	3.2	4.8	
Def bdtg	GTQ	2.83bn	2.63bn	3.16bn
	USD	366m	337m	
USD1=GTQ		7.72	7.81	



Population 17,422,821

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	16.8%	5.0%	4.8%	4.5%	16.3%	2.2%
Female	16.2%	4.9%	4.8%	4.5%	17.3%	2.7%

Capabilities

The armed forces are refocusing on border security, having drawn down their decade-long direct support for the National Civil Police in 2018 as part of the inter-agency Plan Fortaleza. Guatemala maintains an inter-agency task force with neighbouring El Salvador and Honduras. The army has trained with US SOUTHCOM, as well as with regional partners such as Brazil and Colombia. Training for conventional military operations is limited by budget constraints and the long focus on providing internal security. Guatemala has participated in UN peacekeeping missions to company level. The equipment inventory is small and ageing. The US has provided several soft-skinned vehicles to the army, while there has been modest recapitalisation of the air force's fixed-wing transport and surveillance capacity. Funding is being sought for additional maritime- and air-patrol capabilities. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 18,050 (Army 15,550 Navy 1,500 Air 1,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 25,000

RESERVE 63,850 (Navy 650 Air 900 Armed Forces 62,300)

(National Armed Forces are combined; the army provides log spt for navy and air force)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 15,550

15 Military Zones

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 trg bn)
- 1 SF bde (1 SF coy, 1 ranger bn)
- 1 SF mtn bde

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1 log coy)

6 inf bde (1 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde with (2 AB bn)

Amphibious

1 mne bde

Other

1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn)

2 MP bde with (1 MP bn)

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

ε19 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE (7 M8 in store)

APC 47

APC (T) 10 M113 (5 more in store)

APC (W) 37: 30 *Armadillo*; 7 V-100 *Commando*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 120+: 75mm M20; 105mm 64 M-1974 FMK-1 (ARG); 106mm 56 M40A1

ARTILLERY 149

TOWED 105mm 76: 12 M101; 8 M102; 56 M-56

MOR 73: 81mm 55 M1; 107mm (12 M30 in store);

120mm 18 ECIA

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32: 20mm 32: 16 GAI-D01; 16 M-55

Navy 1,500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PB 10: 6 *Cutlass*; 1 *Dauntless*; 1 *Kukulcan* (US *Broadsword* 32m); 2 *Utatlan* (US *Sewart*)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3

LCT 1 *Quetzal* (COL *Golfo de Tribuga*)

LCP 2 *Machete*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 3

Marines 650 reservists

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

2 mne bn(-)

Air Force 1,000

2 air comd

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 90/200/300 *King Air*

1 (tactical support) sqn with Cessna 206

TRAINING

1 sqn with T-35B *Pillan*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 212 (armed); Bell 407GX; Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (armed)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Serviceability of ac is less than 50%

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 90 *King Air*; 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2 Beech 300 *King Air* (VIP); 2 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 2 PA-28 *Archer III*; 1 PA-31 *Navajo*; 2 PA-34 *Seneca*; (5 Cessna R172K *Hawk XP* in store)

TRG 1 SR22; (4 T-35B *Pillan* in store)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (armed)

TPT • Light 6: 2 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger*; 2 Bell 212 (armed); 2 Bell 407GX

Tactical Security Group

Air Military Police

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 25,000**National Civil Police 25,000****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Other**

1 (integrated task force) paramilitary unit (incl mil and treasury police)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 155; 1 spec ops coy

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

Guyana GUY

Guyanese Dollar GYD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GYD	1.14tr	1.53tr	
	USD	5.47bn	7.40bn	
per capita	USD	6,953	9,369	
Growth	%	43.5	20.4	
Inflation	%	0.7	3.2	
Def bdgt	GYD	13.7bn	14.8bn	
	USD	65.8m	71.4m	
USD1=GYD		208.51	207.22	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 787,971

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.3%	5.6%	5.8%	3.8%	20.3%	3.2%
Female	11.8%	5.4%	5.4%	3.5%	18.8%	4.1%

Capabilities

The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) is focused on border control, support for law-enforcement operations and assistance to the civil power. The government is planning to restructure the GDF to improve its flexibility. Guyana is part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. It has close military ties with Brazil, with whom it cooperates on border security via annual regional military exchange meetings. The country also has bilateral agreements with China, France and the US. The GDF trains regularly and takes part in bilateral and multinational exercises. A training initiative with China helped two Guyanese pilots to acquire air-combat certification although Guyana has no combat aircraft in its inventory. There is no expeditionary or associated logistics capability. Equipment is mostly composed of second-hand platforms, mainly of Brazilian and North American manufacture. The air force has expanded its modest air-transport capabilities with some second-hand utility aircraft. Apart from maintenance facilities, there is no defence-industrial sector.

ACTIVE 3,400 (Army 3,000 Navy 200 Air 200)

Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force

RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 3,000****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF sqn

MANOEUVRE**Light**

3 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty coy

1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bn

Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 9: 6 EE-9 *Cascavel* (reported); 3 S52 *Shorland*

ARTILLERY 54

TOWED 130mm 6 M-46†

MOR 48: 81mm 12 L16A1; 82mm 18 M-43; 120mm 18 M-43

Navy 200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5

PCO 1 *Essequibo* (ex-UK *River* (MCM))†PB 4 *Barracuda* (ex-US Type-44) (of which 1 under repair)

Air Force 200

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Bell 206; Cessna 206; Y-12 (II)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 BN-2 *Islander*; 1 Cessna206; 2 SC.7 3M *Skyvan*; 1 Y-12 (II)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*†; 1 Bell 412EPI *Twin Huey*


TPT • Light 2 Bell 206

Haiti HTI

Haitian Gourde HTG		2020	2021	2022
GDP	HTG	1.45tr	1.67tr	
	USD	14.5bn	20.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,235	1,692	
	%	-3.3	-0.7	
Growth	%	22.9	16.2	
	%			
Inflation	%	998m	2.99bn	
	%	10.0m	36.0m	
Def bdgt [a]	HTG	99.94	83.03	
	USD			
USD1=HTG				

[a] 2021 increase in defence budget due to greater investment in infrastructure and new COVID-19 responsibilities of the Haitian Armed Forces

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 11,198,240

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.3%	5.1%	5.1%	4.7%	17.2%	1.9%
Female	15.4%	5.2%	5.1%	4.7%	17.8%	2.5%

Capabilities

Haiti possesses almost no military capability. A small coastguard is tasked with maritime security and law enforcement and the country's army is still in the very early stages of development, though it is hoped this will eventually number around 5,000 personnel. Plans for military expansion were outlined in the 2015 White Paper on Security and Defence. A road map for the re-establishment of the Haitian armed forces was distributed to ministers in early 2017 and in March 2018 an army high command was established. Ecuador and Brazil have both pledged to assist with training the new army. The army's initial mandate will be to provide disaster relief and border security. However, in the wake of a presidential assassination, the armed forces' ability to defend the country has been brought into question. The armed forces also struggled to respond swiftly to the country's most recent earthquake, where their ability to deliver aid and shelter was tested. Haiti is a member of the Caribbean Community and has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. There is no heavy military equipment, and no defence industry.

ACTIVE 500 (Army 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

1 inf bn (forming)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50

Coast Guard €50

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS


PB 8: 5 *Dauntless*; 3 3812-VCF

Honduras HND

Honduran Lempira HNL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	HNL	586bn	642bn	
	USD	23.8bn	26.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,397	2,602	
	%	-9.0	4.9	
Growth	%	3.5	4.6	
	%			
Inflation	%	8.48bn	8.46bn	9.34bn
	%	345m	347m	
Def bdgt [a]	HNL	24.58	24.41	
	USD			
USD1=HNL				

[a] Defence and national security budget

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 9,346,277

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	14.9%	5.4%	5.1%	4.3%	16.5%	2.5%
Female	14.5%	5.4%	5.1%	4.6%	18.7%	3.1%

Capabilities

The armed forces have been deployed in support of the police to combat organised crime and narcotics trafficking since 2011. Honduras maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which has supplied surplus military equipment, and also receives US security assistance. Honduras hosts a US base at Soto Cano airfield and is also part of a tri-national border-security task force with neighbouring El Salvador and Guatemala. Training remains focused on internal- and border-security requirements, and training for conventional military action is limited. Honduras does not have the capability to maintain substantial overseas deployments. Most equipment is ageing, with serviceability in doubt. There have been reports of security assistance from Israel. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 14,950 (Army 7,300 Navy 1,350 Air 2,300 Military Police 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000

RESERVE 60,000 (Joint 60,000; Ex-servicemen registered)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,300

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (special tac) spec ops gp (2 spec ops bn, 1 inf bn; 1 AB bn; 1 arty bn)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn)

Light

1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)

3 inf bde (2 inf bn)

1 indep inf bn

Other

1 (Presidential) gd coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

1 sigs bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 12 FV101 *Scorpion*

RECCE 57: 1 FV105 *Sultan* (CP); 3 FV107 *Scimitar*; 40 FV601 *Saladin*; 13 RBV-1

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 50+: **84mm** *Carl Gustaf*; **106mm** 50 M40A1

ARTILLERY 118+

TOWED 28: **105mm**: 24 M102; **155mm**: 4 M198

MOR 90+: **81mm**; **120mm** 60 FMK-2; **160mm** 30 M-66

Navy 1,350

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15

PCO 1 *General Cabañas* (ISR OPV 62 *Sa'ar*)

PB 14: 2 *Lempira* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 – leased); 1 *Chamelecon* (Swiftships 85); 1 *Tegucigalpa* (US Guardian 32m); 3 *Guaymurás* (Swiftships 105); 5 *Nacaome* (Swiftships 65); 1 *Río Aguán* (Defiant 85); 1 *Río Coco* (US PB Mk III)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3

LCT 1 *Gracias a Dios* (COL *Golfo de Tribugá*)

LCM 3: 2 LCM 8; 1 *Punta Caxinas*

Marines 1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

2 mne bn

Air Force 2,300

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with A-37B *Dragonfly*

1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR/TRAINING

1 unit with Cessna 182 *Skylane*; EMB-312 *Tucano*; MXT-7-180 *Star Rocket*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 200 *King Air*; C-130A *Hercules*; Cessna 185/210; IAI-201 *Arava*; PA-42 *Cheyenne*; *Turbo Commander* 690

1 VIP flt with PA-31 *Navajo*; Bell 412EP/SP *Twin Huey*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable

FTR 11: 9 F-5E *Tiger II*+; 2 F-5F *Tiger II*+

ATK 6 A-37B *Dragonfly*

TPT 17: **Medium** 1 C-130A *Hercules*; **Light** 16: 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2 Cessna 172 *Skyhawk*; 2 Cessna 182

Skylane; 1 Cessna 185; 3 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 1

Cessna 210; 1 EMB-135 *Legacy* 600; 1 IAI-201 *Arava*; 1

L-410 (leased); 1 PA-31 *Navajo*; 1 PA-42 *Cheyenne*; 1 *Turbo Commander* 690

TRG 15: 9 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 6 MXT-7-180 *Star Rocket*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7: 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey* (VIP); 4 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*; 2 Hughes 500

TPT • **Light** 7: 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 H125 *Ecureuil*

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 48: 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM-20

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR *Shafir*†

Military Police 4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

8 sy bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000

Public Security Forces 8,000

Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional comd

DEPLOYMENT


WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10

FOREIGN FORCES

United States US Southern Command: 400; 1 avn bn with CH-47F *Chinook*; UH-60 *Black Hawk*

Jamaica JAM

Jamaican Dollar JMD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	JMD	1.98tr	2.19tr	
	USD	14.0bn	14.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,103	5,422	
Growth	%	-10.0	4.6	
Inflation	%	5.2	5.6	
Def bdgt	JMD	33.8bn	30.9bn	
	USD	238m	209m	
USD1=JMD		141.66	147.63	



Population 2,816,602

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	12.6%	4.5%	4.5%	3.9%	19.5%	4.5%
Female	12.2%	4.4%	4.4%	4.0%	20.7%	4.9%

Capabilities

The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is focused principally on maritime and internal security, including support to police operations. Jamaica maintains military ties, including for training purposes, with Canada, the UK and the US and is a member of the Caribbean Community. The defence force has participated in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. Jamaica is host to the Caribbean Special Tactics Centre, which trains special-forces units from Jamaica and other Caribbean nations. The JDF does not have any capacity to support independent deployment abroad. Funds have been allocated to procure new vehicles and helicopters, and new patrol craft are being procured. Other than limited maintenance facilities, Jamaica has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 5,950 (Army 5,400 Coast Guard 300 Air 250)
(combined Jamaican Defence Force)

RESERVE 2,580 (Army 2,500 Coast Guard 60 Air 20)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 5,400

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

4 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr regt (4 engr sqn)

1 MP bn

1 cbt spt bn (1 (PMV) lt mech inf coy)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bn (1 med coy, 1 log coy, 1 tpt coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

AUV 12 *Bushmaster*

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16A1

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 inf bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bn

Coast Guard 300

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PCC 1 *Nanny of the Maroons* (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009)

PBF 3

PB 6: 2 *County* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 4 *Dauntless*

Air Wing 250

Plus National Reserve

FORCES BY ROLE

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 flt with Beech 350ER *King Air*; BN-2A *Defender*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 flt with Bell 407

1 flt with Bell 412EP

TRAINING

1 unit with Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger*; Bell 505; DA40-180FP *Diamond Star*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 1 Beech 350ER *King Air*

TPT • Light 2 DA40-180FP *Diamond Star* (1 BN-2A *Defender* in store)

HELICOPTERS


MRH 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey* (1 more in store)

TPT • Light 13: 1 Bell 206B3 *Jet Ranger*; 3 Bell 407; 3 Bell 429; 6 Bell 505

Mexico MEX

Mexican Peso MXN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MXN	23.1tr	25.9tr	
	USD	1.07tr	1.29tr	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	8,404	9,967	
Growth	%	-8.3	6.2	
Inflation	%	3.4	5.4	
Def bdgt [a]	MXN	115bn	136bn	116bn
	USD	5.35bn	6.76bn	
USD1=MXN		21.49	20.13	

[a] National security expenditure



Population 130,207,371

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.1%	4.3%	4.2%	4.1%	19.8%	3.5%
Female	12.5%	4.1%	4.1%	4.0%	21.7%	4.4%

Capabilities

Mexico's armed forces are the most capable in Central America, though they have been committed to providing internal-security support within Mexico for nearly a decade. Under the National Plan for Peace and Security 2018–24, the armed forces are now to hand over lead responsibility for tackling drug cartels and other organised crime to the National Guard gendarmerie. Mexico has a close defence relationship with the US, which has provided equipment and training to Mexican forces under the Mérida Initiative, as well as through bilateral programmes via the Pentagon. The armed forces have a moderate capability to deploy independently, but do not do so in significant numbers. There are plans to recapitalise diverse and ageing conventional combat platforms across all three services. In 2020, Mexico brought back to service some of its ageing F-5 combat aircraft. State-owned shipyards have produced patrol craft for the navy. Army factories have produced light armoured utility vehicles for domestic use. Airbus Helicopters operates a manufacturing plant in Querétaro.

ACTIVE 216,000 (Army 157,500 Navy 50,500 Air 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 124,500

Conscript liability 12 months (partial, selection by ballot) from age 18, serving on Saturdays; voluntary for women; conscripts allocated to reserves.

RESERVE 81,500 (National Military Service)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 *Mexsat*

Army 157,500

12 regions (total: 46 army zones)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 (1st) SF bde (5 SF bn)
- 1 (2nd) SF bde (7 SF bn)
- 1 (3rd) SF bde (4 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

- 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)

25 mot recce regt

Light

- 1 (1st) inf corps (1 (1st Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 3 (2nd, 3rd & 6th) inf bde (each: 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 1 cbt engr bde (3 engr bn))

- 3 (1st, 4th & 5th) indep lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)

92 indep inf bn

25 indep inf coy

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 para bde with (1 (GAFE) SF gp, 3 bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 indep arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 255: 19 DN-5 *Toro*; 127 ERC-90F1 *Lynx* (7 trg); 40 M8; 37 MAC-1; 32 VBL

IFV 390 DNC-1 (mod AMX-VCI)

APC 309

APC (T) 73: 40 HWK-11; 33 M5A1 half-track

APC (W) 236: 95 BDX; 16 DN-4; 2 DN-6; 28 LAV-100 (*Pantera*); 26 LAV-150 ST; 25 MOWAG *Roland*; 44 VCR (3 amb; 5 cmd post)

AUV 347: 100 DN-XI; 247 *SandCat*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 7: 3 M32 *Recovery Sherman*; 4 VCR ARV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • SP 8 VBL with *Milan*

RCL • 106mm 1,187+ M40A1 (incl some SP)

GUNS 37mm 30 M3

ARTILLERY 1,390

TOWED 123: **105mm** 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1, 14 M3; 13 NORINCO M90

MOR 1,267: **81mm** 1,100: 400 M1; 400 Brandt; 300 SB

120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT-61

AIR DEFENCE • **GUNS** • **TOWED** 80: **12.7mm** 40 M55; **20mm** 40 GAI-B01

Navy 50,500

Two Fleet Commands: Gulf (6 zones), Pacific (11 zones)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1

FFGHM 1 *Benito Juárez* (Damen SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad Inchr with RGM-84L *Harpoon* Block II ASHM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 Inchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128**PSOH 8:**

- 4 *Oaxaca* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB *Panther* hel)
- 4 *Oaxaca* (mod) with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB *Panther* hel)

PCOH 16:

- 4 *Durango* with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
- 4 *Holzinger* (capacity 1 MD-902 *Explorer*)
- 3 *Sierra* with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MD-902 *Explorer*)
- 5 *Uribe* (ESP *Halcon*) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)

PCO 9: 6 *Valle* (US *Auk* MSF) with 1 76mm gun; 3 *Valle* (US *Auk* MSF) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PCGH 1 *Huracan* (ex-ISR *Aliya*) with 4 single Inchr with *Gabriel II* ASHM, 1 Mk 15 *Phalanx* CIWS

PCC 2 *Democrata*

PBF 72: 6 *Acuario*; 2 *Acuario B*; 48 *Polaris* (SWE CB90); 16 *Polaris II* (SWE IC 16M)

PB 20: 3 *Azteca*; 3 *Cabo* (ex-US *Cape Higgon*); 2 *Lago*; 2 *Punta* (US *Point*); 10 *Tenochtitlan* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS

LST 4: 2 *Monte Azules* with 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Papaloapan* (ex-US *Newport*) with 2 twin 76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 *Papaloapan* (ex-US *Newport*) with 1 hel landing platform

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26

AGOR 2 *Altair* (ex-US *Robert D. Conrad*)

AGS 8: 5 *Arrecife*; 1 *Onjuku*; 1 *Río Hondo*; 1 *Río Tuxpan*

AK 1 *Río Suchiate*

AOTL 2 *Aguascalientes*

AP 2: 1 *Isla María Madre* (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 1 *Nautla*

ATF 4 *Otomi* with 1 76mm gun

ATS 4 *Kukulkan*

AX 2 *Huasteco* (also serve as troop transport, supply and hospital ships)

AXS 1 *Cuauhtemoc*

Naval Aviation 1,250**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**

- 5 sqn with MX-7-180 *Star Rocket*; T-6C+ *Texan II*
- 1 sqn with Beech 350ER *King Air*; CN235-300 MPA *Persuader*

TRANSPORT

- 1 (VIP) sqn with DHC-8 *Dash 8*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 2 sqn with AS555 *Fennec*; AS565MB/AS565MBe *Panther*; MD-902
- 5 sqn with Mi-17-1V/V-5 *Hip*

TRAINING

- 1 sqn with Z-242L; Z-143Lsi

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

MP 6 CN235-300 MPA *Persuader*

ISR 2 Z-143Lsi

TPT 20: **Light 18:** 5 Beech 350ER *King Air* (4 used for ISR); 3 Beech 350i *King Air*; 4 C295M; 2 C295W; 1 DHC-8 *Dash 8*; 2 Learjet 31A; 1 Learjet 60; **PAX 2:** 1 CL-605 *Challenger*; 1 Gulfstream 550

TRG 47: 7 MX-7-180 *Star Rocket*; 13 T-6C+ *Texan II*; 27 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS

MRH 22: 2 AS555 *Fennec*; 16 Mi-17-1V *Hip*; 4 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

SAR 14: 4 AS565MB *Panther*; 10 AS565MBe *Panther*

TPT 26: **Heavy** 3 H225M *Caracal*; **Medium** 9 UH-60M *Black Hawk*; **Light 14:** 1 AW109SP; 5 MD-902 (SAR role); 8 S-333

TRG 4 Schweizer 300C

Marines 21,500**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

3 SF unit

MANOEUVRE**Light**

32 inf bn(-)

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB bn

Amphibious

1 amph bde (4 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp)

Other

1 (Presidential) gd bn (included in army above)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 spt bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) 29: 3 BTR-60 (APC-60); 26 BTR-70 (APC-70)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 22+

TOWED 105mm 16 M-56

MRL 122mm 6 *Firos-25*

MOR 81mm some

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 *Igla* (RS-SA-18 *Grouse*)

Air Force 8,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger II*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

4 sqn with T-6C+ *Texan II**

1 sqn with PC-7*

ISR/AEW

1 sqn with Beech 350ER *King Air*; EMB-145AEW *Erieye*; EMB-145RS

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C295M; PC-6B

1 sqn with B-737; Beech 90 *King Air*

1 sqn with C-27J *Spartan*; C-130K-30 *Hercules*; L-100-30

5 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 182

1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206

1 (Presidential) gp with AS332L *Super Puma*; AW109SP;

B-737; B-757; B-787; Gulfstream 150/450/550; H225;

Learjet 35A; Learjet 36; *Turbo Commander* 680

1 (VIP) gp with B-737; Beech 200 *King Air*; Beech 350i

King Air; Cessna 501 *Citation*; CL-605 *Challenger*;

Gulfstream 550; Learjet 35A; S-70A-24 *Black Hawk*

TRAINING

- 1 sqn with Cessna 182
- 1 sqn with PC-7; T-6C+ *Texan II*
- 1 sqn with Grob G120TP

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 4 sqn with Bell 206B; Bell 407GX
- 1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206
- 1 sqn with MD-530MF/MG
- 1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip*
- 1 sqn with H225M *Caracal*; Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*;
S-70A-24 *Black Hawk*
- 1 sqn with UH-60M *Black Hawk*

ISR UAV

- 1 unit with *Hermes 450*; *Hermes 900*; S4 *Ehécatl*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 80 combat capable

- FTR 5: 4 F-5E *Tiger II*; 1 F-5F *Tiger II*
- ISR 2 Cessna 501 *Citation*
- ELINT 8: 6 Beech 350ER *King Air*; 2 EMB-145RS
- AEW&C 1 EMB-145AEW *Erieye*
- TPT 99: **Medium** 7: 4 C-27J *Spartan*; 2 C-130K-30 *Hercules*; 1 L-100-30; **Light** 79: 2 Beech 90 *King Air*; 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350i *King Air*; 6 C295M; 2 C295W; 59 Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 501 *Citation*; 2 Learjet 35A; 1 Learjet 36; 3 PC-6B; 1 *Turbo Commander* 680;
- PAX 13: 6 B-737; 1 B-757; 1 B-787; 1 CL-605 *Challenger*; 2 Gulfstream 150; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 Gulfstream 550
- TRG 100: 25 Grob G120TP; 20 PC-7* (30 more possibly in store); 55 T-6C+ *Texan II**

HELICOPTERS

- MRH 41: 14 Bell 407GXP; 11 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 16 Mi-17 *Hip H*
- ISR 11: 3 MD-530MF; 8 MD-530MG
- TPT 109: **Heavy** 12 H225M *Caracal*; **Medium** 28: 3 AS332L *Super Puma* (VIP); 2 H225 (VIP); 6 S-70A-24 *Black Hawk*; 17 UH-60M *Black Hawk* **Light** 69: 5 AW109SP; 45 Bell 206; 13 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; 6 Bell 206L

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 9: Medium

- 4: 3 *Hermes 450*; 1 *Hermes 900*; **Light** 5 S4 *Ehécatl*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 124,500**Federal Ministerial Police 4,500****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**

- TPT • **Light** 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H); 7 Bell 212

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

- ISR • **Heavy** 2 *Dominator XP*

National Guard 102,600

Public Security Secretariat. Gendarmerie created in 2019 from elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Federal Police

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Other**

- 12 sy bde (3 sy bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS**

- MRH 5: 1+ Bell 407GX; 4 Mi-17 *Hip H*
- TPT • **Medium** 7 UH-60M *Black Hawk*

Rural Defense Militia 17,400**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

- 13 inf unit
- 13 (horsed) cav unit

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1


MALI: UN • MINUSMA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Nicaragua NIC

Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro NIO		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NIO	433bn	474bn	
	USD	12.6bn	13.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,943	2,047	
Growth	%	-2.0	5.0	
Inflation	%	3.7	4.1	
Def bdgt	NIO	2.71bn	2.74bn	
	USD	78.9m	77.4m	
USD1=NIO		34.35	35.38	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 6,243,931

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.8%	4.7%	4.9%	5.1%	18.6%	2.7%
Female	12.2%	4.6%	4.8%	5.2%	21.0%	3.4%

Capabilities

Nicaragua's armed forces are primarily a territorial light-infantry force, with limited coastal-patrol capability. They are tasked with border and internal security, as well as with support for disaster-relief efforts and ecological protection. Nicaragua has training relationships with Russia and the US, as well as with neighbouring and regional states, including Cuba and Venezuela. Training is largely focused on key internal- and border-security tasks, although the mechanised brigade has received Russian training. The armed forces do not undertake significant international deployments and lack the logistical support for large-scale military operations, although the mechanised brigade can deploy internally. Equipment primarily consists of ageing Cold War-era platforms. Russia has supplied some second-hand tanks and armoured vehicles to help re-equip the mechanised brigade and has supported the establishment of a repair workshop to maintain the vehicles in-country. There are maintenance facilities but no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €10,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde (2 SF bn)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT coy)

Light

1 regional comd (3 lt inf bn)
1 regional comd (2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn)
3 regional comd (2 lt inf bn)
2 indep lt inf bn

Other

1 comd regt (1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 int unit, 1 sigs bn)
1 (ecological) sy bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

1 tpt regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 82: 62 T-55 (65 more in store); 20 T-72B1MS

LT TK (10 PT-76 in store)

RECCE 20 BRDM-2

IFV 17+ BMP-1

APC • APC (W) 90+: 41 BTR-152 (61 more in store); 45 BTR-60 (15 more in store); 4+ BTR-70M

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV IMR

VLB TMM-3

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 12 9P133 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

RCL 82mm B-10

GUNS 281: 57mm 174 ZIS-2; (90 more in store); 76mm 83 ZIS-3; 100mm 24 M-1944

ARTILLERY 766

TOWED 12: 122mm 12 D-30; (152mm 30 D-20 in store)

MRL 151: 107mm 33 Type-63; 122mm 118: 18 BM-21 *Grad*; 100 *Grad* 1P (BM-21P) (single-tube rocket launcher, man portable)

MOR 603: 82mm 579; 120mm 24 M-43; (160mm 4 M-160 in store)

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡

Navy €800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

PB 12: 3 *Dabur*; 2 *Farrallones*; 1 *Rio Segovia* (*Zhuk* 1400ME); 4 *Rodman* 101; 2 *Soberania* (ex-JAM *Damen Stan* Patrol 4207)

Marines

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Air Force 1,200

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Beech 90 *King Air*; Cessna U206; Cessna 404 *Titan* (VIP)

TRAINING

1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 *Super Cub*; PA-28 *Cherokee*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip* H (armed)

AIR DEFENCE

1 gp with ZU-23

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 9: 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Beech 90 *King Air*; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna U206; 1 Cessna 404 *Titan* (VIP); 2 PA-28 *Cherokee*

TRG 2 PA-18 *Super Cub*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7 Mi-17 *Hip* H (armed)†

TPT • Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 Mi-8MTV-1 *Hip*


AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 23mm 18 ZU-23

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9M17 *Skorpion* (RS-AT-2 *Swatter*)

Panama PAN

Panamanian Balboa PAB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PAB	52.9bn	60.1bn	
	USD	52.9bn	60.1bn	
per capita	USD	12,373	13,861	
Growth	%	-17.9	12.0	
Inflation	%	-1.6	1.4	
Def bdtg [a]	PAB	753m	830m	
	USD	753m	830m	
USD1=PAB		1.00	1.00	

[a] Public security expenditure



Population 3,928,646

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	12.7%	4.2%	4.2%	3.9%	20.9%	4.3%
Female	12.2%	4.0%	4.1%	3.8%	20.6%	5.0%

Capabilities

Panama abolished its armed forces in 1990, but retains a border service, a police force and an air/maritime service for low-level security tasks. The primary security focus is on the southern border

with Colombia, and the majority of the border service is deployed there. Both Colombia and the US have provided training and support. Training is focused on internal and border security rather than conventional military operations and there is no capability to mount significant external deployments. None of Panama's security services maintain heavy military equipment, focusing instead on light-transport, patrol and surveillance capabilities. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 27,700

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 27,700

National Border Service 4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF gp

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 sy bde (5 sy bn(-))

1 indep sy bn

National Police Force 20,000

No hvy mil eqpt, small arms only

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (presidential) gd bn(-)

National Aeronaval Service 3,700

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-212M *Aviocar*; Cessna 210; PA-31 *Navajo*; PA-34 *Seneca*

1 (Presidential) flt with ERJ-135BJ; S-76C

TRAINING

1 unit with Cessna 152; Cessna 172; T-35D *Pillan*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW139; Bell 205; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); Bell 212; Bell 407; Bell 412EP; H145; MD-500E

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15

PCO 1 *Independencia* (ex-US *Balsam*)

PCC 1 *Saettia*

PB 13: 1 *Cocle* (ex-US *Swift*); 1 *Chiriqui* (ex-US PB MkIV);

2 *Panquiaco* (UK *Vosper* 31.5m); 5 3 *De Noviembre* (ex-US *Point*), 4 Type-200

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1

LCU 1 *General Estaban Huertas*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AG 1 *Lina Maria*

AKR 1 *Manuel Amador Guerrero* (Damen Stan Lander 5612)

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 100 *King Air*; 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 2 DHC-6-400 *Twin Otter*; 3 C-212M *Aviocar*; 1 Cessna 152, 1 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 210; 1 ERJ-135BJ; 1 PA-31 *Navajo*; 2 PA-34 *Seneca*

TRG (2 T-35D *Pillan* in store)

HELICOPTERS


MRH 10: 8 AW139; 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500E

TPT • Light 5: 1 AW109; 2 Bell 212; 2 Bell 407

Paraguay PRY

Paraguayan Guarani PYG	2020	2021	2022
GDP	PYG 242tr	255tr	
	USD 35.7bn	37.0bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD 4,918	5,028	
Growth	% -0.6	4.5	
Inflation	% 1.8	3.5	
Def bdgt	PYG 1.88tr	1.89tr	1.93tr
	USD 278m	274m	
USD1=PYG	6771.15	6900.82	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 7,272,639

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.6%	4.1%	4.4%	4.7%	21.2%	4.0%
Female	11.2%	4.0%	4.4%	4.7%	21.0%	4.4%

Capabilities

The armed forces are small by regional standards and the equipment inventory for all services is ageing and largely obsolete. The country faces internal challenges from insurgency and transnational organised crime, chiefly drug trafficking. Conscript numbers have reduced in recent years, and there are a significant number of higher ranks in the force structure. Key formations have long been under-strength. Paraguay has had a consistent if limited tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations since 2001. There is only limited ability to self-sustain forces abroad, and no effective power-projection capacity. There is a small force of river-patrol craft, and some of the oldest vessels have finally been retired. Armoured capability is very limited. Recent acquisitions of heavy equipment have been confined to small quantities of engineering and transport capabilities. There is some local maintenance capacity but the effectiveness of systems is limited by age. While there is some R&D and manufacturing cooperation with local research institutes, there is no traditional defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 13,950 (Army 7,400 Navy 3,800 Air 2,750)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,800

Conscript liability 12 months

RESERVE 164,500 (Joint 164,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,400

Much of the Paraguayan army is maintained in a cadre state during peacetime; the nominal inf and cav divs are effectively only at coy strength. Active gp/regt are usually coy sized

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Light**

3 inf corps (total: 6 inf div(-), 3 cav div(-), 6 arty bty)

Other

1 (Presidential) gd regt (1 SF bn, 1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log gp)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde with (2 arty gp, 1 ADA gp)

1 engr bde with (1 engr regt, 3 construction regt)

1 sigs bn

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

14 inf regt (cadre)

4 cav regt (cadre)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 28 EE-9 *Cascavel*

APC • APC (W) 12 EE-11 *Urutu*

ARTILLERY 99

TOWED 105mm 19 M101

MOR 81mm 80

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 22:

SP 20mm 3 M9 half track

TOWED 19: 40mm 13 M1A1, 6 L/60

Navy 3,800**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 18

PCR 1 *Itaipú* (BRZ *Roraima*) with 1 hel landing platform

PBR 17: 1 *Capitán Cabral*; 2 *Capitán Ortiz* (ROC *Hai*

Ou); 2 *Novatec*; 4 Type-701 (US *Sewart*); 3 *Croq* 15 (AUS *Armcraft*); 5 others

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3**Naval Aviation** 100**FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**

1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 150; Cessna 210 *Centurion*;
Cessna 310

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS350 *Ecureuil* (HB350 *Esquilo*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 150; 1 Cessna 210 *Centurion*; 2 Cessna 310

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AS350 *Ecureuil* (HB350 *Esquilo*)

Marines 700; 200 conscript (total 900)**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

3 mne bn(-)

ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm 2 M101

Air Force 2,750**FORCES BY ROLE****GROUND ATTACK/ISR**

1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano**

TRANSPORT

1 gp with C-212-200/400 *Aviocar*; DHC-6 *Twin Otter*

1 VIP gp with Beech 58 *Baron*; Bell 427; Cessna U206

Stationair; Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; Cessna 402B;

PA-32R *Saratoga* (EMB-721C *Sertanejo*)

TRAINING

1 sqn with T-25 *Universal*; T-35A/B *Pillan*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 gp with AS350 *Ecureuil* (HB350 *Esquilo*); Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

MANOEUVRE**Air Manoeuvr**

1 AB bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 6 combat capable

TPT 18: Light 17: 1 Beech 58 *Baron*; 4 C-212-200 *Aviocar*;

1 C-212-400 *Aviocar*; 5 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 1

Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402B; 2 Cessna U206 *Stationair*;

1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 1 PA-32R *Saratoga* (EMB-721C

Sertanejo); PAX 1 Cessna 680 *Sovereign*

TRG 21: 6 EMB-312 *Tucano**; 6 T-25 *Universal*; 6 T-35A

Pillan; 3 T-35B *Pillan*

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 11: 3 AS350 *Ecureuil*

(HB350 *Esquilo*); 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 1 Bell 407; 1

Bell 427 (VIP)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,800

Special Police Service 10,800; 4,000 conscript (total 14,800)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO 7

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

Peru PER

Peruvian Sol PEN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	PEN	718bn	853bn	
	USD	205bn	226bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	6,134	6,677	
Growth	%	-11.0	10.0	
Inflation	%	1.8	3.1	
Def bdtg	PEN	7.45bn	7.05bn	6.98bn
	USD	2.13bn	1.87bn	
USD1=PEN		3.50	3.77	



Population 32,201,224

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	12.7%	4.2%	4.3%	4.4%	19.5%	3.9%
Female	12.3%	4.1%	4.3%	4.5%	21.4%	4.4%

Capabilities

Peru's armed forces are primarily orientated towards preserving territorial integrity and security, focusing on counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, while also strengthening their disaster-relief capabilities. Their training and capabilities are sufficient to fulfil domestic-security tasks, although they are limited by economic constraints and an increasingly ageing equipment inventory. Peru maintains close ties with Colombia, including a cooperation agreement on air control, humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. The armed forces train regularly and take part in national and multilateral exercises, and Peru hosted the 2021 iteration of the UNITAS exercise. The armed forces are capable of independently deploying externally and contribute to UN missions abroad. There has been some aviation modernisation, though not across the whole fleet. Tanker/transport capabilities have been boosted with the recent acquisition of two second-hand KC-130Hs. The navy is looking to acquire new corvettes and to modernise its ageing submarines. The state-owned shipyard SIMA and aviation firm SEMAN are key players in Peru's defence industry, both in terms of manufacturing and maintenance. In 2017, SEMAN completed final assembly for the last Korean-designed KT-1 trainer, and in 2018 the navy commissioned the first locally built and South Korean-designed multipurpose vessel.

ACTIVE 81,000 (Army 47,500 Navy 24,000 Air 9,500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 77,000

Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males and females

RESERVE 188,000 (Army 188,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR PERÚSAT-1

Army 47,500

4 mil region

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 (1st) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 CT coy, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
- 1 (3rd) SF bde (1 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy)
- 1 (6th) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 MP coy)

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (9th) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1 ADA gp)

Mechanised

- 1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)

Light

- 2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn)

- 3 (1st, 7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (33rd) inf bde (4 inf bn)

- 1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)

- 1 (35th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy, 1 jungle arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 arty gp (bde) (4 arty gp, 2 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)

- 1 (3rd) arty bde (4 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)

- 1 (22nd) engr bde (3 engr bn, 1 demining coy)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 1 (1st Multipurpose) spt bde

AVIATION

- 1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt hel/tpt hel bn)

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 AD gp (regional troops)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 165 T-55; (75+ in store)

LT TK 96 AMX-13

RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1

APC 295

APC (T) 120 M113A1

APC (W) 175: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV M578

VLB GQL-111

ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 22 M1165A2 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet E (RS-AT-14 Spriggen)

MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); HJ-73C; 9K135 *Kornet E* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*); *Spike-ER*

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 1,011

SP 155mm 12 M109A2

TOWED 290: **105mm** 152: 44 M101; 24 M2A1; 60 M-56; 24 Model 56 pack howitzer; **122mm**; 36 D-30; **130mm** 36 M-46; **155mm** 66: 36 M114, 30 Model 50

MRL 122mm 35: 22 BM-21 *Grad*; 13 Type-90B

MOR 674+: **81mm/107mm** 350; **SP 107mm** 24 M106A1; **120mm** 300+ Brandt/Expal Model L

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 17: 2 An-28 *Cash*; 3 An-32B *Cline*; 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 152; 1 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 1 Cessna 560 *Citation*; 2 Cessna U206 *Stationair*; 1 PA-31T *Cheyenne II*; 1 PA-34 *Seneca*

TRG 4 IL-103

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7 Mi-17 *Hip H*

TPT 33: **Heavy** (3 Mi-26T *Halo* in store); **Medium** 21 Mi-171Sh; **Light** 12: 1 AW109K2; 9 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*; 2 R-44

TRG 4 F-28F

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS 165

SP 23mm 35 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm 130: 80 ZU-23-2; 50 ZU-23

Navy 24,000 (incl 1,000 Coast Guard)

Commands: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • SSK 6:

4 *Angamos* (GER T-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT (of which 1 in refit)

2 *Islay* (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT 264 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 7

FFGHM 7:

2 *Aguirre* (ex-ITA *Lupo*) with 8 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D *Sea King*)

2 *Aguirre* (ex-ITA *Lupo*) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 octuple Mk 29 Inchr with RIM-7P *Sea Sparrow* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D *Sea King*)

1 *Carvajal* (ITA *Lupo* mod) with 8 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D *Sea King*)

2 *Carvajal* (ITA *Lupo* mod) with 2 twin Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 3 ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D *Sea King*)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13

CORVETTES 7

FSG 6 *Velarde* (FRA PR-72 64m) with 4 single Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gun

FS 1 *Ferré* (ex-ROK *Po Hang*) with 1 76mm gun

PCR 6: 2 *Amazonas* with 1 76mm gun; 2 *Manuel Clavero*; 2 *Marañon* with 2 76mm guns

AMPHIBIOUS

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 *Pisco* (IDN *Makassar*) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hel; 24 IFV; 450 troops)

LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 *Paita* (capacity 395 troops) (ex-US *Terrebonne Parish*)

LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 7 *Griffon* 2000TD (capacity 22 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24

AG 6 *Río Napo*

AGOR 1 *Humboldt*

AGORH 1 *Carrasco*

AGS 5: 1 *Zimic* (ex-NLD *Dokkum*); 2 *Van Straelen*; 1 *La Macha*, 1 *Stiglich* (river survey vessel for the upper Amazon)

AH 4 (river hospital craft)

AO 2 *Noguera*

AORH 1 *Tacna* (ex-NLD *Amsterdam*)

ATF 1 *Morales*

AWT 1 *Caloyeras*

AXS 2: 1 *Marte*; 1 *Unión*

Naval Aviation €800

FORCES BY ROLE

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with Beech 200T; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); F-27 *Friendship*; Fokker 60; SH-2G *Super Seasprite*; SH-3D *Sea King*

TRANSPORT

1 flt with An-32B *Cline*; Cessna 206; Fokker 50

TRAINING

1 sqn with F-28F; T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

MP 8: 4 Beech 200T; 4 Fokker 60

ELINT 1 F-27 *Friendship*

TPT • Light 5: 2 An-32B *Cline*; 1 Cessna 206; 2 Fokker 50

TRG 5 T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 6: 2 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 1 SH-2G *Super Seasprite*; 3 SH-3D *Sea King*

MRH 3 Bell 412SP

TPT 10: **Medium** 7: 1 Mi-8 *Hip*; 6 UH-3H *Sea King*;

Light 3 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*

TRG 5 F-28F

MSL • ASHM AM39 *Exocet*

Marines 4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

3 cdo gp

MANOEUVRE**Light**

2 inf bn

1 inf gp

Amphibious

1 mne bde (1 SF gp, 1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp)

Jungle

1 jungle inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 7 RAM Mk3

APC • APC (W) 47+: 32 LAV II; V-100 *Commando*; 15 V-200 *Chaimite***ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm M40A1**ARTILLERY 18+**

TOWED 122mm D-30

MOR 18+: 81mm some; 120mm ε18

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm SP (twin)**Air Force 9,500**

Divided into five regions – North, Lima, South, Central and Amazon

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**1 sqn with MiG-29S/SE *Fulcrum C*; MiG-29UBM *Fulcrum B***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with *Mirage 2000E/ED (2000P/DP)*2 sqn with A-37B *Dragonfly*1 sqn with Su-25A *Frogfoot A*; Su-25UBK *Frogfoot B***ISR**1 (photo-survey) sqn with Learjet 36A; SA-227-BC *Metro III (C-26B)***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with B-737; An-32 *Cline*1 sqn with DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; DHC-6-400 *Twin Otter*; PC-6 *Turbo Porter*

1 sqn with L-100-20

TRAINING2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano*

1 sqn with MB-339A*

1 sqn with Z-242

1 hel sqn with Enstrom 280FX; Schweizer 300C

ATTACK HELICOPTER1 sqn with Mi-25/Mi-35P *Hind***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-17-1V *Hip*1 sqn with Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 *Twin Huey*

1 sqn with Bo-105LS

AIR DEFENCE6 bn with S-125 *Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa)***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable**FTR 19: 9 MiG-29S *Fulcrum C*; 3 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum C*; 5 MiG-29SMP *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UBM *Fulcrum B*FGA 12: 2 *Mirage 2000ED (2000DP)*; 10 *Mirage 2000E (2000P)* (some†)ATK 19: 15 A-37B *Dragonfly*; 2 Su-25A *Frogfoot A*; 2 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot B*; (8 Su-25A *Frogfoot A*; 6 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot B* in store)ISR 5: 2 Learjet 36A; 3 SA-227-BC *Metro III (C-26B)*TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H *Hercules*TPT 37: **Medium** 6: 4 C-27J *Spartan*; 2 L-100-20; **Light** 29:4 An-32 *Cline*; 7 Cessna 172 *Skyhawk*; 3 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*;12 DHC-6-400 *Twin Otter*; 1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 1 PA-44; 1PC-6 *Turbo-Porter*; PAX 2 B-737TRG 74: 7 CH-2000; 19 EMB-312 *Tucano*†; 20 KT-1P; 10MB-339A*; 6 T-41A/D *Mescalero*; 12 Z-242**HELICOPTERS**ATK 18: 16 Mi-25 *Hind D*; 2 Mi-35P *Hind E*MRH 12: 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; up to 10 Mi-17-1V *Hip*TPT 25: **Medium** 3 Mi-171Sh; **Light** 22: 8 Bell 206 *Jet**Ranger*; 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 6 Bo-105LS; 2 Enstrom 280FX

TRG 4 Schweizer 300C

AIR DEFENCE • SAM**Short-range** S-125 *Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa)***Point-defence** *Javelin***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*)†;R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); R-550 *Magic*; IR/SARH R-27(RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12 *Adder*)ASM AS-30; Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A *Kedge*)ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 *Kilter*)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 77,000****National Police 77,000 (100,000 reported)****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC (W) 120: 20 BMR-600; 100 MOWAG *Roland***AIRCRAFT**TPT • **Light** 5: 1 An-32B *Cline*; 1 Beech 1900C; 3 Cessna 208B**HELICOPTERS**MRH 4 Mi-17 *Hip H*TPT • **Light** 16: 5 H145; 2 Mi-171Sh; 9 UH-1H *Huey II***General Police 43,000****Security Police 21,000****Technical Police 13,000****Coast Guard 1,000**

Personnel included as part of Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45**PSOH 1 *Carvajal (ITA Lupo mod)* with 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D *Sea King*)PCC 10: 6 *Río Pativilca (ROK Tae Geuk)*; 4 *Río Nepeña*PB 13: 6 *Chicama (US Dauntless)*; 2 *Punta Sal (Defiant 45)*; 1 *Río Chira*; 1 *Río Itaya*; 3 *Río Santa*PBR 21: 1 *Río Viru*; 8 *Parachique*; 12 *Zorritos***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AH 1 Puno****AIRCRAFT**TPT • **Light** 3: 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 2 F-27 *Friendship*

Rondas Campesinas

Peasant self-defence force. Perhaps 7,000 rondas 'gp', up to pl strength, some with small arms. Deployed mainly in emergency zone

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 217; 1 engr coy

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

Suriname SUR

Suriname Dollar SRD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SRD	38.4bn	58.7bn	
	USD	2.88bn	2.82bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,787	4,620	
Growth	%	-15.9	0.7	
Inflation	%	34.9	54.4	
Def bdtg	SRD	n.k.	n.k.	
	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
USD1=SRD		13.30	20.83	

Population 614,749

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	11.6%	4.2%	4.5%	4.0%	23.0%	3.1%
Female	11.2%	4.0%	4.3%	3.8%	22.4%	3.9%

Capabilities

The armed forces are principally tasked with preserving territorial integrity. They also assist the national police in internal- and border-security missions, as well as tackling transnational criminal activity and drug trafficking and have also been involved in disaster-relief and humanitarian-assistance operations. Suriname is a member of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Ties with Brazil, China, India and the US have been crucial for the supply of equipment, including a limited number of armoured vehicles and helicopters, as well as training activity. The armed forces take part in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds* disaster-response exercise. The armed forces are not sized or equipped for power projection. Resource challenges and limited equipment serviceability means the armed forces are constrained in providing sufficient border and coastal control and surveillance. There is no capability to design and manufacture modern military equipment and Suriname has looked to its foreign-military cooperation to improve not just trade training but also maintenance capacity.

ACTIVE 1,840 (Army 1,400 Navy 240 Air 200)

(All services form part of the army)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,400

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech cav sqn

Light

1 inf bn (4 coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP bn (coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 6 EE-9 *Cascavel*

APC • APC (W) 15 EE-11 *Urutu*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6

Navy €240

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13

PB 8: 2 FPB 72 Mk II; 1 FPB 98 Mk I; 3 Rodman 101t; 2 others

PBR 5 Rodman 55

Air Force €200


EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 SA316B *Alouette III (Chetak)*

Trinidad and Tobago TTO

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar TTD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TTD	146bn	146bn	
	USD	21.6bn	21.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	15,425	15,353	
Growth	%	-7.9	-1.0	
Inflation	%	0.6	1.0	
Def bdtg	TTD	6.44bn	5.23bn	5.66bn
	USD	954m	773m	
USD1=TTD		6.75	6.76	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 1,221,047

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.4%	3.0%	2.9%	3.0%	26.6%	5.7%
Female	9.1%	2.8%	2.6%	2.8%	24.9%	7.2%

Capabilities

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) focuses on border protection and maritime security, as well as counter-narcotics tasks. A larger role in law-enforcement support is planned for the army. Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the Caribbean Community and cooperates with other countries in the region in disaster-relief efforts. There are plans to establish a joint training academy in Trinidad and a proposal for a new coastguard base in Tobago. The TTDF has taken part in US SOUTHCOM's *Tradewinds*

disaster-response exercise and has sent personnel to the US and UK for training. Trinidad and Tobago has no capacity to deploy and maintain troops abroad, and apart from limited maintenance facilities has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 4,650 (Army 3,000 Coast Guard 1,600 Air Guard 50)

(All services form the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force)

RESERVE 650

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 L16A1

Coast Guard 1,600

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 mne HQ

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17

PCO 3: 2 *Port of Spain* (AUS *Cape*); 1 *Nelson II* (ex-PRC *Shuke III*)

PCC 6: 2 *Point Lisas* (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 4 *Speyside* (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)

PB 8: 2 *Gaspar Grandet*; 6 *Scarlet Ibis* (Austal 30m)

Air Guard 50

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 2 SA-227 *Metro III* (C-26)

HELICOPTERS


MRH 4 AW139

TPT • Light 1 S-76

Uruguay URY

Uruguayan Peso UYU		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UYU	2.25tr	2.58tr	
	USD	56.6bn	60.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	16,023	16,965	
Growth	%	-5.9	3.1	
Inflation	%	9.8	7.5	
Def bdgt	UYU	21.3bn	22.5bn	22.9bn
	USD	535m	525m	
USD1=UYU		39.82	42.86	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 3,398,239

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	9.8%	3.6%	3.9%	3.9%	21.2%	6.0%
Female	9.5%	3.5%	3.8%	3.8%	22.1%	8.9%

Capabilities

Principal tasks for the armed forces are assuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 2019, parliament approved a new Military Law, which aims, among other measures, to reduce the number of senior officers and address promotion issues across all services. Uruguay and Argentina have a joint peacekeeping unit and conduct joint exercises. In 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was signed with Russia, including training exchanges. The armed forces participate regularly in multinational exercises and deployments, notably on UN missions. The air force is focused on the counter-insurgency role, but ambitions to purchase a light fighter aircraft remain hampered by funding problems. The acquisition of air-defence radars may have improved the armed forces' ability to monitor domestic airspace, but the lack of interdiction capability will continue to limit the capacity to respond to contingencies. Much equipment is second-hand, and there is little capacity for independent power projection. Maintenance work is sometimes outsourced to private companies, such as Chile's ENAER.

ACTIVE 21,100 (Army 13,500 Navy 5,000 Air 2,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 13,500

Uruguayan units are substandard size, mostly around 30%. Div are at most bde size, while bn are of reinforced coy strength. Regts are also coy size, some bn size, with the largest formation being the 2nd armd cav regt

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 mil region/div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 (1st & 2nd Cav) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech cav regt)

1 (3rd Cav) mech bde (2 mech cav regt, 1 mech inf bn)
 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Inf) mech bde (2 mech inf bn; 1 inf bn)
 1 (5th Inf) mech bde (1 armd cav regt; 1 armd inf bn; 1
 mech inf bn)

Light

1 (1st Inf) inf bde (2 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 para bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (strategic reserve) arty regt

5 fd arty gp

1 (1st) engr bde (2 engr bn)

4 cbt engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 15 *Tiran-5*

LT TK 47: 22 M41A1UR; 25 M41C

RECCE 15 EE-9 *Cascavel*

IFV 18 BMP-1

APC 376

APC (T) 27: 24 M113A1UR; 3 MT-LB

APC (W) 349: 54 *Condor*; 48 GAZ-39371 *Vodnik*; 53 OT-64; 47 OT-93; 147 *Piranha*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV MT-LB

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 106mm 69 M40A1

ARTILLERY 185

SP 122mm 6 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 44: 105mm 36: 28 M101A1; 8 M102; 155mm 8
 M114A1

MOR 135: 81mm 91: 35 M1, 56 Expal Model LN; 120mm
 44 Model SL

**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 1
*Charrua***

**AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14: 20mm 14: 6 M167
Vulcan; 8 TCM-20 (w/Elta M-2106 radar)**

Navy 5,000

HQ at Montevideo

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16**

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Uruguay* (ex-PRT *Joao Belo*) (FRA
Commandant Riviere) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32
 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 100mm gun

PB 15: 2 *Colonia* (ex-US *Cape*); 1 *Paysandu*; 9 Type-44; 3
 PS

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2

MSO 2 *Temerario* (*Kondor* II)

AMPHIBIOUS 3: 2 LCVP; 1 LCM**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10**

AAR 2 *Islas de Flores* (ex-GER *Hermann Helms*)

ABU 1 *Sirius*

AG 2: 1 *Artigas* (GER *Freiburg*, general spt ship with
 replenishment capabilities); 1 *Maldonado* (also used as
 patrol craft)

AGS 2: 1 *Helgoland*; 1 *Trieste* (in refit)

ARS 1 *Vanguardia*

AXS 2: 1 *Capitan Miranda*; 1 *Bonanza*

Naval Aviation 210**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**

1 flt with Beech 200T*; Cessna O-2A *Skymaster*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS350B2 *Ecureuil* (*Esquilo*); Bell 412SP *Twin
 Huey*

TRANSPORT/TRAINING

1 flt with T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

TRAINING

1 hel sqn with Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*; OH-58 *Kiowa*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable**

ISR 4: 2 Beech 200T*; 2 Cessna O-2A *Skymaster*

TRG 2 T-34C *Turbo Mentor*

HELICOPTERS

ISR 1 OH-58 *Kiowa*

MRH 4: 2 Bell 412 (AB-412); 2 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*

TPT • Light 1 AS350B2 *Ecureuil* (*Esquilo*)

Naval Infantry 700**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 mne bn(-)

Air Force 2,600**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with A-37B *Dragonfly*

ISR

1 flt with EMB-110 *Bandeirante*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130B *Hercules*; C-212 *Aviocar*; EMB-110C
Bandeirante; EMB-120 *Brasilia*

1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 206H; T-41D

1 (liaison) flt with Cessna 206H

TRAINING

1 sqn with PC-7U *Turbo Trainer*

1 sqn with Beech 58 *Baron* (UB-58); SF-260EU

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS365 *Dauphin*; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*);
 Bell 212

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable**

ATK 12 A-37B *Dragonfly*

ISR 4: 1 EMB-110 *Bandeirante**; 3 O-2A *Skymaster*

TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H *Hercules*

TPT 25: Medium 2 C-130B *Hercules*; Light 22: 1 BAe-
 125-700A; 2 Beech 58 *Baron* (UB-58); 6 C-212 *Aviocar*; 9
 Cessna 206H; 1 Cessna 210; 2 EMB-110C *Bandeirante*; 1
 EMB-120 *Brasilia*; PAX 1 C-29 *Hawker*

TRG 17: 5 PC-7U *Turbo Trainer*; 12 SF-260EU

HELICOPTERS

MRH 2 AS365N2 *Dauphin* II

TPT • Light 8: 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 3 Bell 212

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

Guardia Nacional Republicana 1,400

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 822; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

EGYPT: MFO 41; 1 engr/tpt unit

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1


SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 232; 1 mech inf coy

Venezuela VEN

Venezuelan Bolivar soberano VES		2020	2021	2022
GDP	VES	n.k	n.k	
	USD	47.3bn	44.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,691	1,627	
Growth	%	-30.0	-5.0	
Inflation	%	2355.2	2700.0	
Def bdtg	VES [a]	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=VES		n.k	n.k	

[a] Defence budget allocations have been difficult to track since 2017 due to high levels of currency volatility and reduced transparency in public expenditure



Population 29,069,153

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.0%	4.1%	4.0%	4.0%	20.8%	3.8%
Female	12.4%	4.0%	3.9%	4.0%	21.4%	4.6%

Capabilities

The armed forces and national guard are tasked with protecting sovereignty, assuring territorial integrity and assisting with internal-security and counter-narcotics operations. They have sufficient capabilities and funding to fulfil internal-security tasks and their regime-protection role, but economic challenges have affected equipment availability and training levels. Incidents such as the apparent assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro in 2018 and the attack on the supreme court in 2017 point to some internal stresses in the armed forces. Venezuela is almost completely isolated regionally, with frictions relating to the humanitarian crisis and to the presence of irregular Colombian armed groups leading to troop deployments near the Colombia–Venezuela border. There are close ties with China and Russia, with Caracas relying on both countries for procurements and technical support. The armed forces train regularly and civil–military cooperation has increased. Venezuela has also taken part in joint combined exercises with

China, Cuba and Russia. There is little logistics capability to support deployment abroad. Equipment is relatively modern and much is of Chinese and Russian manufacture. However, the economic crisis has affected the government's ability to sustain military expenditure. Maintenance and further procurement have suffered as a consequence. Venezuela's defence industry is based on a series of small, state-owned companies, mainly focused on the production of small arms and munitions. Local platform production has been limited to small coastal-patrol boats.

ACTIVE 123,000 (Army 63,000 Navy 25,500 Air 11,500 National Guard 23,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 220,000

Conscript liability 30 months selective, varies by region for all services

RESERVE 8,000 (Army 8,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 *Venesat-1*

Army €63,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (4th) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde, 1 AB bde, 1 arty bde)

Mechanised

1 (9th) mot cav div (1 mot cav bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sy bde)

Light

1 (1st) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty unit, 1 spt unit)

1 (2nd) inf div (1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 mtn inf bde)

1 (3rd) inf div (1 inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sigs bde, 1 MP bde)

1 (5th) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bde, 1 engr bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt engr corps (3 engr regt)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log comd (2 log regt)

AVIATION

1 avn comd (1 tpt avn bn, 1 atk hel bn, 1 ISR avn bn)

Reserve Organisations 8,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

4 inf bn

1 ranger bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

2 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 173: 81 AMX-30V; 92 T-72B1

LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 *Scorpion-90*

RECCE 121: 42 *Dragoon* 300 LfV2; 79 V-100/V-150
 IFV 237: 123 BMP-3 (incl variants); 114 BTR-80A (incl variants)
 APC 81

APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 AMX-PC (CP); 8 AMX-VCTB (Amb)

APC (W) 36 *Dragoon* 300

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; BREM-1; 2 *Dragoon* 300RV; *Samson*
 VLB *Leguan*

NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 *Fuchs* NBC

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS IMI MAPATS

RCL 106mm 175 M40A1

GUNS • SP 76mm 75 M18 *Hellcat*

ARTILLERY 515

SP 60: 152mm 48 2S19 *Msta-S*; 155mm 12 Mk F3

TOWED 92: 105mm 80: 40 M101A1; 40 Model 56 pack
 howitzer; 155mm 12 M114A1

MRL 56: 122mm 24 BM-21 *Grad*; 160mm 20 LAR SP
 (LAR-160); 300mm 12 9A52 *Smerch*

GUN/MOR 120mm 13 2S23 NONA-SVK

MOR 294: 81mm 165; SP 81mm 21 *Dragoon* 300PM;
 AMX-VTT; 120mm 108: 60 Brandt; 48 2S12

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 28: 1 Beech 90 *King Air*; 1 Beech 200 *King Air*;
 1 Beech 300 *King Air*; 1 Cessna 172; 6 Cessna 182 *Skylane*;
 2 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 207 *Stationair*; 1 IAI-201 *Arava*; 2
 IAI-202 *Arava*; 11 M-28 *Skytruck*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 9 Mi-35M2 *Hind*

MRH 32: 10 Bell 412EP; 2 Bell 412SP; 20 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT 9: Heavy 3 Mi-26T2 *Halo*; Medium 2 AS-61D; Light
 4: 3 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger*, 1 Bell 206L3 *Long Ranger II*

Navy €22,300; €3,200 conscript (total €25,500)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 1

SSK 1 *Sábalo* (in refit; 1 more non-operational) (GER
 T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2

FFGHM 2 *Mariscal Sucre* (ITA *Lupo* mod)† (1 more non-
 operational) with 8 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk2 AShM,
 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm
 ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212
 (AB-212) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PSOH 3 *Guaiqueri* with 1 *Millennium* CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBG 3 *Federación* (UK *Vosper* 37m) with 2 single Inchr
 with *Otomat* Mk2 AShM

PB 4: 3 *Constitucion* (UK *Vosper* 37m) with 1 76mm gun;
 1 *Fernando Gomez de Saa* (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 *Capana* (ROK *Alligator*)
 capacity 12 tanks; 200 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 3:

LCU 2 *Margarita* (river comd)

UCAC 1 *Griffon* 2000TD

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10

AGOR 1 *Punta Brava*

AGS 2 *Gabriela*

AKR 4 *Los Frailes*

AORH 1 *Ciudad Bolívar*

ATF 1 *Almirante Franciso de Miranda* (Damen Salvage Tug
 6014)

AXS 1 *Simón Bolívar*

Naval Aviation 500

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW)

MARITIME PATROL

1 flt with C-212-200 MPA

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 200 *King Air*; C-212 *Aviocar*; *Turbo*
Commander 980C

TRAINING

1 hel sqn with Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II*; TH-57A *Sea Ranger*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

MP 2 C-212-200 MPA*

TPT • Light 7: 1 Beech C90 *King Air*; 1 Beech 200 *King*
Air; 4 C-212 *Aviocar*; 1 *Turbo Commander* 980C

HELICOPTERS

ASW 4 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW)

MRH 12: 6 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 6 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT • Light 1 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger II* (trg)

TRG 1 TH-57A *Sea Ranger*

Marines €15,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

1 div HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

1 amph aslt bde

3 mne bde

3 (rvn) mne bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt engr bn

1 MP bde

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 10 VN-16

IFV 21: 11 VN-1; 10 VN-18

APC • APC (W) 37 EE-11 *Urutu*

AAV 11 LVTP-7

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 1 VN-16 ARV

AEV 1 AAVR7

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*; 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 30

TOWED 105mm 18 M-56

MOR 120mm 12 Brandt

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

PBR 23: 18 *Constancia*; 2 *Manauare*; 3 *Terepaima* (*Cougar*)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • 1 LCU; 1 LCM; 12 LCVP

Coast Guard 1,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22**

PSO 2 *Guaicamacuto* (1 additional vessel in build; 1 other sank April 2020) with 1 *Millennium* CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

PB 20: 12 *Gavion*; 2 *Pagalo* (Damen Stan Patrol 2606); 4 *Petrel* (US *Point*); 2 *Protector*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4

AG 1 *Los Taques* (salvage ship)

AKSL 1

AP 2

Air Force 11,500**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with F-5 *Freedom Fighter* (VF-5)

2 sqn with F-16A/B *Fighting Falcon*

4 sqn with Su-30MKV *Flanker*

2 sqn with K-8W *Karakorum**

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano**

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with *Falcon* 20DC; SA-227 *Metro III* (C-26B)

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Y-8; C-130H *Hercules*; KC-137

1 sqn with A319CJ; B-737

4 sqn with Cessna T206H; Cessna 750

1 sqn with Cessna 500/550/551; *Falcon* 20F; *Falcon* 900

1 sqn with G-222; Short 360 *Sherpa*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Cessna 182N; SF-260E

2 sqn with DA40NG; DA42VI

1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 VIP sqn with AS532UL *Cougar*; Mi-172

3 sqn with AS332B *Super Puma*; AS532 *Cougar*

2 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 81 combat capable

FTR 18: 15 F-16A *Fighting Falcon*†; 3 F-16B *Fighting Falcon*†

FGA 22 Su-30MKV *Flanker*

EW 4: 2 *Falcon* 20DC; 2 SA-227 *Metro III* (C-26B)

TKR 1 KC-137

TPT 75: **Medium** 14: 5 C-130H *Hercules* (some in store);

1 G-222; 8 Y-8; **Light** 56: 6 Beech 200 *King Air*; 2 Beech

350 *King Air*; 10 Cessna 182N *Skylane*; 12 Cessna 206

Stationair; 4 Cessna 208B *Caravan*; 1 Cessna 500 *Citation*

I; 3 Cessna 550 *Citation* II; 1 Cessna 551; 1 Cessna 750

Citation X; 2 Do-228-212; 1 Do-228-212NG; 11 Quad City

Challenger II; 2 Short 360 *Sherpa*; **PAX** 5: 1 A319CJ; 1 B-737;

1 *Falcon* 20F; 2 *Falcon* 900

TRG 83: 24 DA40NG; 6 DA42VI; 17 EMB-312 *Tucano**; 24

K-8W *Karakorum**; 12 SF-260E

HELICOPTERS

MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) *Hip H*

TPT 22: **Medium** 14: 3 AS332B *Super Puma*; 7 AS532 *Cougar*; 2 AS532UL *Cougar*; 2 Mi-172 (VIP); **Light** 8+ Enstrom 480B

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9L/P *Sidewinder*; R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); PL-5E; R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D *Alamo*); **IR** *Python* 4; **SARH** R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C *Alamo*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12 *Adder*)

ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B *Kedge*); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 *Kazoo*)

AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B *Krypton*); AM39 *Exocet*

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*)

Air Defence Command (CODAI)

Joint service command with personnel drawn from other services

FORCES BY ROLE**AIR DEFENCE**

5 AD bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde (5 log gp)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIR DEFENCE****SAM**

Long-range 12 S-300VM (RS-SA-23)

Medium-range 53: 9 9K317M2 *Buk*-M2E (RS-SA-17 *Grizzly*); 44 S-125 *Pechora*-2M (RS-SA-26)

Point-defence 9K338 *Igla*-S (RS-SA-24 *Grinch*); *ADAMS*; *Mistral*; *RBS*-70

GUNS 440+

SP 40mm 12+: 6+ *AMX*-13 *Rafaga*; 6 M42

TOWED 428+: **20mm**: 114 TCM-20; **23mm** €200 ZU-23-2; **35mm**; **40mm** 114+: 114+ L/70; Some M1

National Guard (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacion) 23,000

(Internal sy, customs) 9 regional comd

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURIED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC • APC (W) 44: 24 Fiat 6614; 20 UR-416

AUV 121 VN4

ARTILLERY • MOR 50 81mm**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**

PB 34: 12 *Protector*; 12 *Punta*; 10 *Rio Orinoco* II

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 34: 1 Beech 55 *Baron*; 1 Beech 80 *Queen Air*;

1 Beech 90 *King Air*; 1 Beech 200C *King Air*; 3 Cessna 152

Aerobat; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 402C; 4 Cessna U206

Stationair; 6 DA42 MPP; 1 IAI-201 *Arava*; 12 M-28 *Skytruck*

TRG 3: 1 PZL 106 *Kruk*; 2 PLZ M2-6 *Isquierka*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 13: 8 Bell 412EP; 5 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*

TPT • Light 18: 9 AS355F *Ecureuil* II; 4 AW109; 4 Bell

206B/L *Jet Ranger/Long Ranger*; 1 Bell 212 (AB 212);


TRG 5 F-280C

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €220,000**Bolivarian National Militia €220,000**

Sub-Saharan Africa


- Defence spending continues to reduce in sub-Saharan Africa, but the balance has shifted between its sub-regions. Defence spending in 2021 (USD16 billion) has reduced, in real terms, to the same level as that seen in 2012, but West African spending now accounts for 40.6% of total regional spending, and now exceeds Southern African states.
- France is reshaping its military posture in Africa but will retain its significant role in operations in the Sahel, as well as in security assistance more broadly. The long-running *Barkhane* operation will draw down, with emphasis instead on the special forces-focused *Takuba* mission which will feature significant French components as well as troops from European partners. Sweden took over command of *Takuba*, from France, in November 2021 and will command the mission until early 2022.
- Russia continues to make inroads into security assistance on the continent, in the form of formal military advisory roles and military assistance agreements, as well as the activities of private military contractors.
- Defence policy in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was increasingly nationalised in 2021, with tensions between states putting pressure on established multi-lateral mechanisms and agreements. The conflict in Ethiopia, meanwhile, raised fears not only for that country's broader stability but also about the effect the conflict might have on the wider region.
- Rwanda's armed forces have demonstrated their ability to operate at reach from the homeland, deploying into the Central African Republic and also sending over 1,000 troops to Mozambique in 2021, where they played a significant role in reversing the gains made by Islamist groups in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Rwanda is not part of the SADC, but deployed alongside SADC nations in support of Mozambican government forces.

Sub-Saharan Africa defence spending, 2021 – top 5




Active military personnel – top 10

(10,000 per unit)




Sub-Saharan Africa: Defence spending by sub-region, 2008–21



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France in the Sahel: from *Barkhane* to *Takuba*



*UK transport helicopter detachment; **Partners in Task Force *Takuba*: BEL, CZE, EST, FRA, ITA, SWE. Others are due to join in 2022.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

WEST AFRICA

Security remains fragile in West Africa and the Sahel. Military coups in Mali and Guinea, and continued military rule in Chad after the death of president Idriss Déby in April, highlighted established challenges to state stability, including from the weakness of defence and broader governmental institutions, economic fragility and from the continued activity of Islamist groups in the Sahel. Military activity by regional states and external actors continues in the Sahel, and while France has indicated that it is reframing the nature of its defence support, Paris continues to lead international military efforts in the region. Meanwhile, regional efforts to develop a robust institutional framework for tackling security risks have made little progress. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2020–24 Action Plan for the ‘eradication’ of terrorism, adopted in 2019 (based on another plan drafted in 2013 but not implemented), has been relatively unsuccessful, while effective coordination with and through the various regional security initiatives remains challenging. Moreover, security problems continue to transcend the boundaries established by regional organisations’ memberships. For instance, the challenge posed first by Boko Haram and now by a range of other Islamist groups concerns both ECOWAS, because of its member states Niger and Nigeria, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), due to its members Chad and Cameroon. These boundaries were straddled by the creation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force; the latter integrated Chad with other West African states.


However, attacks in the Sahel continue, with insurgent groups remaining active in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and scores of civilians and troops killed in 2021. These included personnel trained for counter-insurgency, such as Nigerien troops deployed on *Operation Almahaou* (intended to combat Islamist groups in the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). Insurgent tactics remain relatively consistent, blending guerrilla

warfare and terrorism, and exploiting mobility and dispersal through the extensive use of pickup trucks and motorcycles. This further necessitates not only good military skills and effective employment by government forces of military equipment, such as surveillance assets, but also better coordination (for instance, reducing any overlap in the differing national doctrines used by international trainers) and the effective employment of military trades, such as military intelligence. It also makes it more important that defence organisations gain the confidence of the local population to improve information gathering. This is more difficult in environments where trust in state authorities may already be low.


In June 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that *Operation Barkhane*, which has operated in the region since 2014, would end in 2022. Although this move does not herald a reduction in France’s military commitment to the region, according to French officials, it does signal a reduction in numbers and a reshaping of France’s military contribution. In the future this will be focused on the international *Takuba* task force – usually led by France and supported by other European states – designed to offer special-forces support to local armed forces. While *Operation Barkhane* has provided significant operational experience for French forces – and highlighted capability gaps (such as heavy rotary-wing airlift), as well as showcasing new equipment (such as the *Griffon* vehicles deployed in 2021) – it has also meant sustained operational costs, as well as wear and tear on both personnel and equipment. France’s decision to end the operation is, moreover, a reflection of reality on the ground. The mission has achieved tactical successes, yet the threat remains persistent, while local security forces continue to be hampered by institutional weaknesses. At a press conference in June, Macron explained, ‘we cannot secure areas that are falling back into lawlessness because states decide not to shoulder their responsibilities. It is impossible, or else it is endless work.’ France had earlier suspended cooperation with Malian forces because the government failed to commit to holding

Map 8 Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea


Maritime-security challenges persist in the Gulf of Guinea despite efforts to boost regional maritime capacity. The region accounts for 25% of African maritime traffic. The economic importance of its natural resources, such as hydrocarbons and fisheries, has helped motivate regional states to try and improve maritime security. These measures have included increased cooperation and intelligence sharing within the framework of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security, which was agreed in 2013 by Central and West African leaders. Pressure on ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to improve maritime security led to the establishment of two regional centres, CRESMAO and CRESMAC, designed to help local navies share information and coordinate activities at sea. However, financial problems continue to affect their readiness and training. Efforts to improve maritime security capacity are also supported by international partners, notably France and the United States. Both countries deploy assets to the region and have organised exercises with regional states to improve maritime capacity. Overall, enhanced coordination between local countries is important, as are better maritime capabilities, but effectively tackling maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea depends as much on addressing its underlying causes.



Attacks by pirates and bandits, by country, 2020



Attacks by pirates and bandits, by type, 2020



Source: French Navy; Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness Center, 'Worldwide Maritime Piracy and Robbery Annual Report 2020'

free elections. Paris hopes that the international community will support *Takuba* and further extend funding support to the G5 Sahel states. But the move likely also reflects frustration, not only with persistent institutional weaknesses, but also over reports of debates in some regional capitals about the possibility of negotiations with some of the armed groups. This is rejected by France, though the former chief of staff said in 2020 that ‘this does not mean, however, that we do not negotiate with an enemy. ... And so that will one day raise the question of a political agreement that will be made with people who at one time or another have been the enemies of the Barkhane force, the enemies of the Malian armed forces. It is not a choice of the military, it is a choice of politicians, starting with Malian politicians.’ International involvement in West Africa is growing in other ways. In 2019 Russia signed a defence cooperation agreement with Mali. More recently, there have been a number of apparent protests against Western military support in Mali, calling instead for cooperation with Russia. In October 2021 Washington and Paris expressed concern over reports that the government in Bamako was exploring a defence support agreement with the Russian private military company (PMC) the Wagner Group.

EAST AFRICA

International defence relationships in the Horn of Africa and East Africa changed in 2021. The United States withdrew its troops from Somalia by mid-January, although US troops continue to visit the country to deliver security cooperation, and US counter-terrorist airstrikes continue. Four months later, the US imposed restrictions on its economic and security assistance programmes for Ethiopia. France also withdrew defence support from Ethiopia, citing concerns over the conflict in Tigray. In their place, Russia has renewed relationships, including by signing a defence assistance agreement with Ethiopia in July 2021, and continues to seek Red Sea access in both Eritrea and Somaliland. China has maintained quieter support, linked to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019–21) which calls for security cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese cooperation includes military training, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts. The need for rearmament following the Ethiopian National

Defense Force (ENDF) losses to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and lessons on the utility of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), have reportedly sent Ethiopia in the direction of new suppliers, with both Iran and Turkey mentioned in media reporting. In the meantime, the United Kingdom cemented its defence relationship in the region with the signing of a new agreement with Kenya in July 2021.

In March 2021 the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was granted an extension to December 2021. The continuing lack of success in developing a coherent and effective Somali security sector, combined with the lessons of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, seems likely to guarantee the future of AMISOM at least to the end of 2022. This is under consideration by the African Union, but decisions on the nature of the mission and the troop-contributing nations are yet to be made. The 4th Session of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Special Task Force on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was held in Ethiopia in July 2021 following a series of six national consultative meetings over the previous two years. IGAD member states endorsed initiatives relating to peace and security as well as capacity-building, and recommended the development of a Common IGAD Position, Regional Plan of Action and Convention on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Intra-regional tensions

Defence policy in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was increasingly nationalised in 2021, with tensions between states putting pressure on established multi-lateral mechanisms and agreements. This has been most visible in the near-conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia over the disputed al-Fashaga triangle. This dispute is likely to endure given the Sudanese military occupation of 90% of the triangle, which was previously largely overseen by Ethiopian regional and federal forces, and the construction of new roads and bridges over the Atbara River firmly connecting the triangle to the Sudanese state and economy. Some reports have linked Sudan’s action in al-Fashaga with the tension between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the continuing Ethiopian construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For instance, although bilateral Egyptian and Sudanese military exercises in Sudan in November 2020 and April 2021 did not explicitly target Ethiopia, the exercises – which included the dispatch of Egyptian combat

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) traditionally saw its role as territorial defence against external threats, notably from Eritrea and Somalia, but also from more distant potential adversaries such as Egypt. As a result, the ENDF was organised into four commands, each focused outwards towards one of Ethiopia's borders with Eritrea, Somaliland/Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Since 2016 the tensions within Ethiopia and the widespread unrest and deployment of small (company to battalion-size) contingents to operate in support of the regional and federal police forces have resulted in a redeployment of one command from Shire to Hawassa in the south and the establishment of new commands at Addis Ababa in the centre of the country and Nekemte in western Oromia.

The ENDF has had mixed fortunes since the start of the conflict between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government in November 2020. It appears to have maintained its organisational and command and control structures despite suffering battlefield losses in two distinct phases in early November 2020 and in May and June 2021. An early loss of initiative and equipment was addressed by the extensive deployment of armed UAVs and the involvement of the Eritrean Defense Force (EDF), Amhara Special Forces (ASF) and Amhara militias from mid-November 2020. (The ASF are formally part of the Amhara region's police force, a model that has been implemented by all regions in Ethiopia for at least five years.) The ENDF's air superiority, in terms of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and UAVs, was apparent in engagements in November, when the TPLF's Tigray Defense Force (TDF) lost a series of positional battles resulting in the loss of the regional capital and re-establishment of an interim political administration in Tigray by the federal state. However, failure to subsequently locate and neutralise the key political and military leadership of the TDF, or to capture the remaining forces, allowed the TDF to transition into an insurgent campaign in which the equipment advantage of the ENDF, EDF and ASF was successfully overcome by the TDF's ability to deny freedom of movement by the use of ambushes.

In late June 2021, following the retaking of Mekele by the TDF and the declaration of a unilateral 'humanitarian ceasefire' and withdrawal of the ENDF from central Tigray by the federal government, the TDF resumed more conventional operations and attacked the Amhara and Afar regions. It remains to be seen whether the TDF can continue to prevail conventionally, and as of early September 2021 there were signs that the TDF offensive

was being held in North Gondar and North Wollo in Amhara. In the meantime, the federal government has initiated a recruiting drive for the ENDF, while reports have also emerged of new UAV acquisitions including platforms of Chinese, Iranian and Turkish design. Some ENDF armoured vehicles and equipment were returned to Ethiopia from UNAMID in Sudan via Djibouti in mid-August 2021. The Amhara regional leadership have also started to mobilise men of military age both for the ASF and as militias to defend Amhara land against TDF incursions.

Ethiopia's regional forces, and Eritrea

The close operational relationship between the ENDF and the ASF, and between other Ethiopian regional special forces, has raised questions about the constitutional legitimacy of quasi-military forces under the control of Ethiopia's regional governments. As a result, and following a study lasting over three years about the future of policing in Ethiopia (conducted latterly by the federal Ministry of Peace), there have been calls, including from the political opposition, for the regional special forces to be incorporated into the ENDF. Some elements of the Oromia and Somali regions' special forces are already reported to have been operating with the ENDF in ENDF uniform. Should the Tigray conflict be resolved, it is possible that there will be pressure from the federal government to bring the regional special forces into the Ethiopian Federal Police and the ENDF.

These regional special forces vary in their number of troops. In 2019, analysts estimated that they numbered between 3,000 and 25,000 between the nine regions and two city administrations of Ethiopia. By the start of the conflict, Tigray had reorganised its special forces, police and militia into a force perhaps up to 250,000-strong. Following battlefield losses by the ENDF and regional recruitment drives, especially in Amhara and Oromia, the regional special forces now outnumber the ENDF, though precise figures are unavailable. By their existence the regional special forces represent a challenge to federal control of the regions, and the federal government in Addis Ababa wishes to reduce their autonomy. As such, developing clearer and more formal command and control links between the ENDF and the regional forces is likely to be a priority. In order to redress the balance between the roughly 60,000 ENDF troops available in November 2020 to fight in Tigray (those in Tigray or close enough to engage) and the much larger TDF, the Ethiopian government requested the assistance of the EDF. The EDF deployed into Tigray in large numbers, with

some analysts estimating a peak perhaps of 100,000. Analysts report that relationships between the ENDF and EDF were strained and, although joint operations were conducted in central Tigray, command relationships remained national with no overall ENDF command of all forces in the field.

Lessons for the ENDF

The loss of Tigray meant that four of the ENDF's key training schools – signals, intelligence, logistics and engineering – were lost, as was the Northern Command headquarters. However, the tank, artillery, mechanised training, officer training, recruit training and air and aviation training bases are all located in central and southern Ethiopia and remain under ENDF control. The re-establishment of the Ethiopian Navy, announced at a formation ceremony in early May 2021, illustrates that the ENDF has not been solely focused on the war, while large ENDF contingents remain in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan on UN and African Union peacekeeping missions. However, building a new ENDF while concurrently fighting the war in the north will prove challenging. Until the war in Tigray, the US and France were key development partners for the ENDF, while much technical equipment was purchased from China. The suspension of Western military cooperation agreements has paved the way for non-traditional partners to offer support: a military-technical cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in July 2021.

The ENDF has been engaged in a similar conflict and on the same terrain to that fought by the army of the Ethiopian Derg regime that ruled from 1974 to 1991, but with significant differences. The Tigrayans do not now have the strategic depth afforded to them previously by Eritrea and do not have access to support and supply from Sudan. The ENDF's early successes came when it employed modern surveillance systems and precision weapons from UAVs to strike Tigrayan equipment while also denying communications. Nevertheless, the ENDF has been subjected to tactical defeats on the ground in Tigray whenever it has emulated the tactics of the Derg

army – manoeuvring on roads in hilly terrain in lightly armoured ex-Soviet vehicles with only limited air cover.

Another consideration relates to personnel strength. The recruitment drive underway in 2021 could indicate either the need to replace combat losses, or perhaps also the ENDF's intention to grow larger than its total strength of around 138,000 at the start of 2021; indeed, analysts considered that this total was insufficient when the armed forces were called on to operate across the country for an extended period of time. It is also possible that the ENDF will look to bolster its air superiority, precision weapons, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, while new UAVs will likely continue to feature in future acquisition requirements. Key precision-strike capabilities such as the A200 and PHL-03 long-range rockets were not secured by the ENDF before the conflict, were lost to the TDF and subsequently used to strike Gondar, Bahir Dar and Asmara, though efforts will have been made to either destroy or recapture these weapons. Such key capabilities will in future be held in more secure locations. Another lesson likely relates to communications. Destruction of mobile telephone and communications infrastructure has been a feature of the conflict, as has denial of internet services to areas held by TDF forces. These tactics are likely to continue in any future conflicts in Ethiopia and the ENDF will seek communications capabilities, including SATCOM, that mitigate the effects of any disruption to communications.

It remains to be seen what precise lessons will be drawn from the conflict by regional states, but it seems likely that all will have paid close attention to the use of indigenous UAV and long-range missile capabilities by the ENDF and TPLF. Possible acquisition and integration of capabilities like UAVs – particularly armed UAVs – would not only have an effect were they to be used in combat, but would also complicate the monopoly currently held by some states, such as by the US against al-Shabaab in Somalia. At the same time, it would raise similar questions about the quality and legality of the associated targeting processes and protocols as have been raised elsewhere.

aircraft to Sudan – coincided with the start of a new round of negotiations over the second filling of the GERD. Despite these exercises, Ethiopia continued filling the dam in July 2021. Meanwhile, the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) force was withdrawn from Sudan's Darfur region by the time a UN report was issued on 27 July. Some contingent equipment remained to be shipped back to various countries or redeployed

to other missions. In October, one month after a failed coup attempt in Sudan, and amid continued tensions between the armed forces and civilian authorities, the armed forces succeeded in toppling the administration and detaining the prime minister and other government figures. The military effort was apparently led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who had been chair of the administration's power-sharing Sovereign Council.

Tensions between Somalia and Kenya over issues including gas exploration rights off the coast of southern Somalia caused a public rift between the two countries in early 2021 in advance of Somali elections. This rift is exacerbated by the tripartite cooperation between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia which has divided the Horn of Africa since Ethiopia gave up the IGAD chair, handing it to Sudan in November 2019. As a result of these tensions, IGAD influence and engagement in Horn security affairs cannot be assumed. Meanwhile, the motivations underlying Eritrea's involvement in the Horn of Africa remain difficult to gauge. The 2018 peace deal with Ethiopia has continued to give Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki access and influence within the region and beyond that he did not enjoy from 2000–18. However, Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict in November 2020 was instrumental in the early defeat of the TPLF's armed forces, the Tigray Defense Forces, though reports of the Eritrean Defence Forces' (EDF) subsequent ill treatment of and crimes against Tigrayan civilians has once more placed Eritrea in the international spotlight: in August the US sanctioned the Eritrean armed forces' chief of staff and later, in November, placed the EDF itself on its sanctions list. The EDF's positions along the Ethiopia–Sudan border in the al-Fashaga area illustrate the difficult and contentious position that Eritrea continues to adopt with regional neighbours.

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The insurgency in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province continues to attract international concern and has led to the deployment of a military mission by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as by Rwandan forces.

The decision by energy firm Total to halt production and withdraw staff from its gas project at Afungi in the north of the province in April 2021, declaring 'force majeure', highlighted the gravity of the situation. Insurgents had captured the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020, and in March 2021 captured the town of Palma. Government forces lacked the strength, mobility and air support to contain the insurgency, and private military companies engaged earlier by Maputo had failed to stem the attacks. In April, the government agreed to an SADC 'technical assessment mission', which recommended deployment of SADC forces,

proposing a light infantry brigade plus a naval force to interdict supplies coming by sea.

Meanwhile, Mozambique's President Filipe Nyusi visited Rwanda in April to request assistance. From 9 July, 1,000 Rwandan troops and police, along with infantry fighting vehicles and small interceptor craft, started deploying. They immediately went on the offensive, securing the Afungi Peninsula on 10 July, the key crossroads at Awasse on 24 July, Palma on 4 August and Mocímboa da Praia on 8 August, together with elements of Mozambique's army and navy. Meanwhile, President Nyusi signed the status of forces agreement with the SADC on 16 July, and Botswana and South African special forces deployed by C-130 *Hercules* to Pemba on 21 July, with larger elements following by road, the Botswana contingent through Zimbabwe, and a South African Navy patrol vessel arrived at Pemba on 1 August. The SADC mission was formally launched by President Nyusi in Pemba on 9 August.

South Africa committed around 1,500 personnel, including an infantry battalion, a special forces group with supporting elements, a naval element and an air element with two *Oryx* helicopters and a Cessna *Caravan* deploying to Pemba in August and a C-130 *Hercules* providing transport capacity. Botswana committed 296 personnel, including special forces, and deployed using its own C-130Bs, while Lesotho deployed a company. Zimbabwe declined to join the combat force but undertook to provide 300 instructors and a staff officer, while Angola provided an Il-76 transport aircraft and ten staff officers. Tanzania had already deployed force elements along the Ruvuma River to prevent over-spill and was reported to have deployed troops to Pemba in early August. This still left the force short of two infantry battalions, and it was not clear whether South Africa would be able to deploy and sustain other maritime forces, possibly including a submarine and frigates. However, even if the full strength of some 3,000 is reached, the combined forces of the SADC and Rwanda will still face a significant task, with a premium placed on air mobility and support. Another challenge will be coordination. The SADC force has its own command structure, but must coordinate with the Rwandans, Mozambique forces and, at least to some extent, with the European Union training mission (agreed by Brussels on 12 July) and its protection force, and a US training team.

Meanwhile, instability persists elsewhere. There was a surge in violence in the Central African

Republic (CAR) at the end of 2020, which was halted by forces from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Rwandan personnel, and the Russian private military company Wagner Group. Official Russian military advisers also remain in the country. Conflict continues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in its eastern provinces, involving guerrillas from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda who use the DRC as a base, as well as local tribal militias and criminal groups. This is despite a large peacekeeping force that includes an offensive brigade but is arguably too small for the task with only minimal organic air support. There were other foreign deployments, including troops from Zambia in 2020 in Tanganyika (where there is a territorial dispute between the DRC and Zambia), while elsewhere Burundian and Rwandan troops partnered in operations with government forces. However, DRC forces continue to suffer from institutional weakness, while disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes have met only limited success.

SOUTH AFRICA

The effect of South Africa's defence funding challenges was highlighted in July 2021 when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was tasked to deploy in support of the police during unrest in the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces. Only two C-130s were available, out of a nominal total of six, reflecting an approach of maintaining only a limited number of each type for operations, cycling the fleet between operations and storage (analysts report that this has affected more than just the C-130 fleet). The deployment additionally coincided with demands on airlift related to the deployment to Mozambique as part of the SADC intervention force. In late July, the navy dispatched one of its *Warrior*-class patrol craft, while the intention apparently remains to deploy a frigate, though maintaining vessels on station will require significant sustainment capacities.

With defence funding moribund, maintaining the availability and utility of equipment is also determined by the level of funding available for operations, training and maintenance. For instance, one of the South African Navy's four frigates and one of the three submarines have been refitted, but there are few precision weapons on the *Gripen*

fighters, *Rooivalk* attack helicopters and *Super Lynx* naval helicopters. IRIS-T imaging infrared air-to-air missiles and *Paveway* II laser-guided bombs have been integrated on the *Gripen*, but it lacks beyond-visual-range missiles. The reduction in funding levels – with the 2021 budget down by 19.5% in real terms compared to 2020 figures – means that available funding has to cover day-to-day costs as well as maintenance and operational costs, not to mention modernisation and upgrades. Meanwhile, some 61% of the budget is consumed by personnel costs, partly because a large number of staff are over-age for their rank, with some at the top of their pay scales and receiving family allowances and possibly other benefits. Without funding for severance packages, however, it can prove difficult for armed forces to retire such personnel.

Low levels of funding for upgrades and acquisitions has not only meant that the SANDF has had to retain old equipment – much of the army's equipment dates from the 1970s–80s – it has also hindered its ability to address capability gaps, such as maritime surveillance aircraft. Challenges for the force include the army's infantry budget, which fell by 19.8% between 2020 and 2021 (reducing from ZAR6.71 billion to ZAR5.38bn or USD408 million to USD364m respectively) with no funding for the new *Badger* (project *Hoefyster*) infantry fighting vehicles. In the same period, the air force reduced its operational flying hours from 17,200 to 15,000, and 'air combat capability' funding was reduced by 60%, from ZAR867m (USD52.7m) in 2020 to ZAR343m (USD23.2m) in 2021. Also, the Special Defence Account, used to fund multi-year acquisition and major upgrades, is set to be reduced to zero in the 2021/22 financial year.

Meanwhile, operational employment remains high. In addition to a combat group and a mixed helicopter unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and border patrol duties, SANDF personnel deployed during 2020 to assist other government departments with their coronavirus response, dispatched 25,000 troops to deal with unrest in July and August 2021, and sent around 1,500 personnel to Mozambique as part of the SADC intervention force. The challenge of reconciling funding and commitments is becoming more pressing.

Defence industry

South Africa's defence industry continues to struggle, affected by low levels of acquisition

funding and export support among other factors. The 2017 Defence Industry Strategy envisaged an increase in acquisition funding and government support for defence exports, as well as a streamlined process for export permits, but analysts report that there has been little progress on this or the aims of the 2020 Aerospace and Defence Masterplan.

State-owned Denel, the country's primary defence manufacturer, was already facing a severe liquidity crisis before the pandemic, with the company struggling to pay staff wages since 2019. In 2019–20, Denel reported losses of ZAR1.96bn (USD119m). The company is undergoing a restructuring effort to raise funds through divestments in order to increase cash flow and improve the balance sheet. It is also reported to have lost a number of engineers, notably in its missile and UAV division, Denel Dynamics. For several years Denel reportedly resisted taking foreign partners and it remains hard to gauge the level of interest that the firm would now generate. Analysts note challenges for other local firms, though Paramount's maritime division continues to sell patrol craft to states in West Africa. Other large defence companies are foreign owned, including subsidiaries of Hensoldt, Rheinmetall and Saab, while smaller firms include Thales and ASELSAN, the latter focusing on research and development (R&D), initially in optronics. Hensoldt has started to establish a radar development arm in South Africa to complement its electronic warfare and optronics companies, working closely with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Smaller companies that provide components or services and rely on orders from the SANDF or Denel face a challenging business climate. Some, like Incomar, have secured international R&D contracts, but permit delays are reported to have hampered some export-focused firms.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Macroeconomics

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate of a 1.8% economic contraction in sub-Saharan Africa for 2020 may seem mild in comparison to the global average of 3.2%, but this estimate masks some of the challenges facing the region. The contraction represents the deepest recession since the 1960s in a region that faces continued waves of COVID-19 infections but lacks the purchasing power to fund the extensive vaccination programmes or

the generous fiscal support schemes that have been offered in advanced economies. The region is struggling to vaccinate even essential frontline workers, with widespread vaccine availability unlikely in several countries before 2023, while most have entered the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic with depleted fiscal and monetary buffers which further restricts the support options available. Access to external financing on accommodative terms is also more limited than in advanced economies.

Sub-Saharan Africa was the world's slowest-growing region in economic terms in 2021, amid an uneven global recovery. The regional real GDP growth of 3.4% and 4.1% projected for 2021 and 2022 respectively is based on expectations of an improvement in export performance with stronger external demand from trading partners like China and the US, higher commodity prices, and a mild recovery in consumption and investment. However, global output projections of 6.0% and 4.9% growth for 2021 and 2022 respectively indicate that sub-Saharan African development will continue to lag behind the rest of the world. According to the IMF, many countries across the region will not see per capita incomes return to pre-crisis levels before 2025 and cumulative output losses will amount to almost 12% of GDP over 2020–21.

The economic outlook varies across the region too. Tourism-dependent economies, such as those of Cabo Verde, Mauritius and the Seychelles, experienced double-digit contractions in real GDP in 2020 and will see sluggish growth in 2021 as global travel restrictions persist. According to the World Bank, a reduction in external demand meant that in 2020, economies contracted in many of the region's industrial and agricultural-commodity exporters, such as Angola, Mali and the Republic of Congo. However, recoveries are underway. For instance, strengthening oil prices mean that Angola's economy is expected to expand in 2021 for the first time since 2015. Meanwhile, the economies in Benin, Ethiopia and Guinea did not contract in 2020 as their COVID-19 infection rates remained low, minimising disruption to economic activity, although all experienced reduced rates of growth. IMF data suggests that the economic impact on Ethiopia was more severe in the first quarter of 2021 as continued coronavirus-related uncertainty depressed non-agricultural activity, locust swarms impacted agricultural output and the conflict with


the TPLF precipitated the closure of factories and mines at an estimated cost of USD20 million per month to Ethiopia’s economy.

More broadly, employment across the region fell by more than 8% in 2020 with more than 32m people falling into extreme poverty and longer-term prospects challenged by prolonged school closures and widespread disruption to education caused by the pandemic. According to the IMF, sub-Saharan Africa needs additional external financing to the tune of USD425 billion from 2021–25 to help strengthen coronavirus-response spending and recover the ground lost during the pandemic.

The fragile regional recovery is subject to several risks beyond the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the pandemic and vaccine programmes. The World Bank cites food insecurity as a key risk, with food inflation in some countries

exacerbated by currency depreciation. Moreover, supply-chain disruptions stemming from the pandemic meant that inflation rates spiked across the region in 2020, a situation that persisted into 2021. This increases the likelihood that regional populations (primarily in Eastern and Southern Africa) will be at a higher risk from hunger or food crises should conflict or other hazards like natural disasters further disrupt agricultural production. Meanwhile, there is also a possibility that social unrest may affect recovery efforts. For instance, the widespread protests in South Africa resulted in significant business and supply-chain disruption in summer 2019. Meanwhile, financial concerns remain acute. Fiscal pressure on governments will likely increase should sovereign borrowing costs rise, limiting their ability to provide broader domestic support.

▼ Map 9 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending¹



Defence economics

Economic constraints continue to subdue defence expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, regional defence spending accounted for 1.5% of the global total, a proportion that has steadily fallen every year since, to just 0.9% in 2021. After strong, double-digit real-terms growth in 2013 and 2014, regional spending contracted by 3.9% annually on average every year up to and including 2019. There was a brief rise in 2020, when regional spending increased by 7.5% as a result of an increase in Nigeria's budget, though this was reversed in 2021 when regional spending contracted by 7.4% in real terms. This means that regional spending has fallen to the same level as in 2012 in real terms, to USD16bn.

Nigeria's 2020 defence budget rose by 41% in real terms, to NGN878bn or USD2.44bn (compared to NGN594bn or USD1.83bn in 2019), with spending primarily directed towards army personnel costs. An emergency appropriations bill, signed in response to the coronavirus pandemic, implemented spending measures that included an increase to NGN900bn (USD2.51bn) for defence in 2020. The 2021 budget of NGN966bn (USD2.54bn) is a 7% nominal increase from 2020 but with inflation running at 16%, this translates to a 6.9% cut in real terms.


Nonetheless, Nigerian spending is still considerably higher than the levels seen over the last decade, and the real-terms cut in 2021 is offset by increases in other West African countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Senegal. As a result, West African spending has grown to account

for 39.0% of total spending in sub-Saharan Africa and now exceeds that in Southern African states. South Africa's defence budget has stagnated over the last decade and Angolan spending has declined every year since 2015, which has meant that sub-regional spending reduced from 60.7% of the regional total in 2009 to 34.3% in 2021. Indeed, Nigeria's 2021 defence budget is just USD300m less than that of South Africa, which is a fraction of the USD3bn difference that existed between the two budgets as recently as 2012. If trends continue, Nigeria's defence budget could exceed South Africa's in 2022.

South Africa's defence budget fell to ZAR46.3bn (USD3.13bn) in 2021 from ZAR54.2bn (USD3.29bn) in 2020. In real terms, the budget fell to USD2.65bn (in 2015 US dollars), almost USD1bn less than the 2012 level of USD3.84bn (in 2015 US dollars), signalling a decade of stagnation in military spending. The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to 2023/24 projects that the Department of Defence (DoD) budget will grow modestly to ZAR46.8bn (USD3.15bn) in 2022/23 and to ZAR47.2bn (USD3.18bn) in 2023/24. As such, the budget does not build in any significant growth, making a return to 2012 peak levels of defence spending unlikely until the latter half of the 2020s. Investment spending accounted for 9.7% of the budget in 2021/22 and will fall to just 2.2% in 2022/23 before recovering slightly to 4.0% by 2023/24 according to the MTEF.


Even before the pandemic, South African public spending had been restricted by a poorly

▼ Figure 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)




Note: Analysis excludes Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan

▼ Figure 28 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021



Note: Analysis excludes Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan



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▲ Figure 29 Sub-Saharan Africa: total defence spending by sub-region, 2008–21

performing economy and rising unemployment, among other factors. In the 2021 DoD Annual Performance Plan, then-minister of defence and military veterans, Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula, acknowledged that the DoD has been operating on a constrained budget in recent years and that the burden has become more pronounced as the pandemic necessitated shifts in government funding from various departments to mitigate the impact of the crisis. The minister continued that ‘this has had a dire effect on the operational effectiveness of the South African National Defence Force’ and that the current performance plan is intended as a guide to navigate through these ‘difficult times’.

Angola’s defence budget increased from AGO586bn in 2020 to AGO627bn in 2021, but this mild 7% nominal increase is not reflected in US dollar terms as the Angolan kwanza continues to devalue against the US dollar. In 2014, one US dollar was worth 98 kwanza. By 2020, the currency had fallen to AGO716 to the dollar and the currency further devalued to AGO789 to the dollar in 2021. Consequently, the defence budget fell in dollar terms from USD1.01bn in 2020 to USD0.96bn in 2021, a fraction of the 2014 high of USD6.85bn. The inflation rate in Angola has also averaged 24% annually since 2015, negating the effect of any nominal spending increases and leading to six consecutive years of real cuts to the defence budget: in 2021 it fell by 22.2% compared to 2020 spending. Angola’s financial difficulties pre-date the economic fallout of the pandemic and primarily stem from the 2014–16 collapse in oil prices. The oil sector accounts for between one-third and one-half of Angola’s annual GDP. This dependence will endure in the medium

term as plans to transform the economy from one dependent on oil prices to one based on private-sector growth will take time.

The picture is different in East Africa. Consistent spending in Tanzania, combined with a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence budget, means that the sub-region now accounts for 21.2% of total regional spending, up from 11.2% in 2010. However, spending in Central Africa continues to stagnate with the sub-region now accounting for 5.4% of the sub-Saharan Africa total, down from a high of 7.4% in 2016.

Defence industry

The lack of sustained growth in defence spending and the low proportions allocated to investment and R&D have severely restricted the development of indigenous capabilities and local defence industries. The South African DoD Strategic Plan 2020–2025 acknowledged that the economic outlook and persistently low defence budget allocations had constrained the implementation of the National Policy on Defence (the Defence Review 2015), ‘with a profound adverse impact on the availability and modernisation of required defence capabilities’. State-owned Denel, the country’s primary defence manufacturer, was already facing a severe liquidity crisis before the pandemic with the company struggling to pay staff wages in 2019. Denel reported 2019/20 losses of ZAR1.96bn (USD119m) and the company is undergoing a restructuring effort to raise funds through divestments in order to increase cash flow and improve the balance sheet.

Meanwhile, Nigeria’s efforts to bolster indigenous capabilities have also been restricted by economic conditions, such as persistently low oil prices since 2015, which have hampered investment.

Conflicting budget priorities, including the drive to professionalise the armed forces and the need to counter insurgent groups, creates a higher personnel and operational burden within the budget, further constricting R&D funds. Indeed, the personnel account was principally responsible for the 2020 surge in Nigeria's defence spending. As a result,

capital spending has fallen from 26.6% of the budget in 2019 to 12.9% in 2020 and 12.6% in 2021. Similarly, while allocations to the state-owned Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) have been maintained over the last five years, allocations have fallen proportionally, from 1.1% of the defence budget in 2016 to just 0.43% in 2021.

Arms procurements and deliveries – Sub-Saharan Africa

Significant events in 2021

DENEL AND PROJECT HOEFYSTER

MARCH



The South African parliament's joint standing committee on defence convened to discuss Project *Hoefyster*, which has been delayed for nine years, and the financial difficulties of Denel, South Africa's state-owned defence manufacturer. Project *Hoefyster* is an indigenous new-generation infantry combat vehicle programme, launched in 2006, for the procurement of 243 *Badger* infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to replace the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)'s ageing *Ratel* IFV by 2023. The project is organised in five phases, under which Denel Land Systems is to develop and acquire the *Badger* through an agreement with Finland's Patria, including the initial supply of hulls, technology transfer and local production. The first and second phases of the project have not been completed, largely due to Denel's financial problems and a lack of technical and production capacity. The committee was advised to cancel the programme. Denel has been South Africa's leading equipment supplier and 40% of Denel's order book comes from the SANDF. However, the firm's debt amounts to ZAR3.4bn (USD210.44m) despite a cash injection by the government of ZAR2.37bn (USD146.68m) in four tranches in 2007, 2013, 2020 and 2021. In August, Denel outlined plans to restructure the company's six divisions into two (engineering-and-manufacturing and maintenance) over a five-year period.

ARMSCOR ANNUAL PROCUREMENT PLAN

MARCH



South Africa's defence procurement agency, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), published its annual procurement plan containing a list of 71 tenders to be completed by April 2022. The list covers mostly industrial-equipment acquisition and infrastructure-upgrade work to modernise local industry. As part of ARMSCOR's defence-industry enterprise and supplier development (ESD) scheme, local bidders who comply with at least Level 4 of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) strategy will be preferred. The agency also placed a tender notice worth ZAR350m (USD21.66m) in August indicating that it also 'had a vested interest in the advancement of [ESD] beneficiary entities which are at least 51% black owned'. The majority (79.5%) of ARMSCOR's funding comes from the national defence budget and the agency generated a revenue of ZAR1.8bn (USD109.38m) in 2020.

TURKISH MRAP SALES TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


JULY



Turkish company Katmerciler announced it had secured a USD91.42m contract to supply Kenya with 118 *Hizir* protected patrol vehicles with deliveries to take place in 2022 and 2023. This is the company's largest export contract to date and its second *Hizir* sale to sub-Saharan Africa after a USD20.7m contract with Ghana signed in 2019. This follows a trend of growing Turkish exports to the region, with at least 57 and 40 *Cobra* armoured vehicles delivered to Ghana and Burkina Faso, respectively, since 2018. Nigeria has been the biggest customer in the region to date, taking delivery of 204 wheeled armoured vehicles from Turkey between 2007 and 2008.

NIGERIAN AIR FORCE RECAPITALISATION

AUGUST




The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) formally introduced into service the first six of 12 A-29 *Super Tucano* trainer/light attack aircraft, marking another milestone in the NAF's equipment-modernisation drive of recent years. The USD500m contract was agreed with the US government in 2018 and is currently the largest Foreign Military Sale contract in sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier in 2021, three JF-17 *Thunder* fighter aircraft, from Pakistan, entered service. These are Nigeria's first new fast jets since 2009. In the past several years, the NAF has taken delivery of attack and transport helicopters from Russia and Italy as the force has recapitalised its equipment inventory to fight the continuing insurgency in the north of the country.

▼ Figure 30 Sudan: defence imports since 2005


Erratic economic growth and high inflation have limited procurements since the end of the civil war in 2005. Defence acquisitions during this time have typically consisted of second-hand Cold War-era armoured vehicles, helicopters and attack aircraft from Belarus, Russia and, most significantly, Ukraine. However, from 2015 China has sold Sudan small numbers of fighter ground-attack aircraft, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and also an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite. No major procurement

has been observed since former president Omar al-Bashir was deposed in April 2019. A military coup in October 2021 led to weeks of mass protests and ultimately the formal reinstatement of the civilian prime minister in November 2021. Prior to the coup, the government was working with the IMF to stabilise the economy and the currency. It is likely that a resumption of procurement activity is dependent not only on improved economic circumstances, but also on greater political stability.



Angola ANG

Angolan Kwanza AOA		2020	2021	2022
GDP	AOA	33.8tr	46.1tr	
	USD	58.4bn	70.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,881	2,201	
Growth	%	-5.4	-0.7	
Inflation	%	22.3	24.4	
Def bdgt	AOA	586bn	627bn	
	USD	1.01bn	956m	
USD1=AOA		578.26	656.03	



Population 33,642,646

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	23.8%	5.2%	4.0%	3.3%	11.6%	1.0%
Female	23.8%	5.4%	4.2%	3.6%	12.8%	1.3%

Capabilities

Though numerically one of the region's largest and best-equipped armed forces, Angola's available inventory faces maintenance and readiness challenges. The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is growing attention to the protection of offshore resources and maritime-security cooperation with regional and external powers. Defence ties with Russia continue, mainly in the form of equipment deliveries, though there are plans to boost defence-industrial cooperation. There are increasing military ties with China, and Luanda is looking to Beijing for help in military modernisation and defence-industrial development. Angola retains conscription and, in recent years, force health and education have been investment priorities. The armed forces train regularly and have participated in multinational exercises. Angola is the only regional state with a strategic-airlift capacity, and though availability has been questioned, an Il-76 was employed to transport SADC personnel to Mozambique in 2021, along with a small Angolan military contingent. Improving the military-logistics system has been identified as a key requirement, but progress is unclear. Modernisation and equipment-purchasing plans have been curtailed by the fall in oil prices and a reduced defence budget, though there have nonetheless been some orders and acquisitions. The defence industry is limited to in-service maintenance facilities, but Angola has ambitions to develop greater capacity by partnering with countries such as Brazil, China, Portugal and Russia.

ACTIVE 107,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,000 Air 6,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,000

Conscript liability 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 100,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Light

1 SF bde

1 (1st) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde)

1 (2nd) div (3 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty regt)

1 (3rd) div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde)

1 (4th) div (1 tk regt, 5 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)

1 (5th) div (2 inf bde)

1 (6th) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)

COMBAT SUPPORT

Some engr units

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Some log units

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 300: €200 T-55AM2; 50 T-62; 50 T-72M1

LT TK 10 PT-76

ASLT 9+ PTL-02 *Assaulter*

RECCE 600 BRDM-2

IFV 250 BMP-1/BMP-2

APC 246

APC (T) 31 MT-LB

APC (W) 170+: €170 BTR-152/BTR-60/BTR-80; WZ-551 (CP)

PPV 45 *Casspir* NG2000

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55

MW *Bozema*

ARTILLERY 1,439+

SP 16+: **122mm** 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 4 2S3 *Akatsiya*;

203mm 12 2S7 *Pion*

TOWED 575: **122mm** 523 D-30; **130mm** 48 M-46; **152mm** 4 D-20

MRL 98+: **122mm** 98: 58 BM-21 *Grad*; 40 RM-70; **240mm** BM-24

MOR 750: **82mm** 250; **120mm** 500

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)

RCL 500: 400 **82mm** B-10/107mm B-11†; **106mm** 100 M40†

GUNS • SP **100mm** SU-100†

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡;

9K36 *Strela-3* (RS-SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4

TOWED 450+: **14.5mm** ZPU-4; **23mm** ZU-23-2; **37mm** M-1939; **57mm** S-60

Navy €1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24

PCO 2 *Ngola Kiluange* with 1 hel landing platform (Ministry of Fisheries)

PCC 5 *Rei Bula Matadi* (Ministry of Fisheries)

PBF 8: 3 HSI 32; 5 PVC-170

PB 9: 4 *Mandume*; 5 *Comandante Imperial Santana* (Ministry of Fisheries)

Coastal Defence

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COASTAL DEFENCE • AshM 4K44 *Utyos* (RS-SSC-1B *Sepal* – at Luanda)

Air Force/Air Defence 6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-21bis/MF *Fishbed*
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB/Su-30K *Flanker*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-23BN/ML/UB *Flogger*
1 sqn with Su-22 *Fitter D*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

MARITIME PATROL

1 sqn with Cessna 500 *Citation 1*; C-212 *Aviocar*

TRANSPORT

3 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; An-32 *Cline*; An-72 *Coaler*; BN-2A *Islander*; C-212 *Aviocar*; Do-28D *Skyservant*; EMB-135BJ *Legacy 600* (VIP); Il-76TD *Candid MA60*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Cessna 172K/R
1 sqn with EMB-312 *Tucano*
1 sqn with L-29 *Delfin*; L-39 *Albatros*
1 sqn with PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*; PC-9*
1 sqn with Z-142

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*; SA342M *Gazelle* (with HOT)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with AS565; SA316 *Alouette III* (IAR-316) (trg)
1 sqn with Bell 212
1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*
1 sqn with Mi-171Sh

AIR DEFENCE

5 bty with S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*);
5 coy with 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)†; 2K12-ML *Kvadrat-ML* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

AIRCRAFT 97 combat capable

FTR 36: 6 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*; 12 Su-30K *Flanker*; 18 MiG-23ML *Flogger*

FGA 41: 20 MiG-21bis/MF *Fishbed*; 8 MiG-23BN/UB *Flogger*; 13 Su-22 *Fitter D*

ATK 10: 8 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

MP 1 Cessna 500 *Citation I*

TPT 57: **Heavy** 4 Il-76TD *Candid*; **Medium** 6 An-12 *Cub*;

Light 47: 12 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-32 *Cline*; 8 An-72 *Coaler*; 8 BN-2A *Islander*; 2 C-212 *Aviocar*; 5 Cessna 172K; 6 Cessna 172R; 1 Do-28D *Skyservant*; 1 EMB-135BJ *Legacy 600* (VIP); 2 MA60

TRG 54: 13 EMB-312 *Tucano*; 6 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 12 K-8W *Karakorum*; 6 L-29 *Delfin*; 2 L-39C *Albatros*; 5 PC-7 *Turbo Trainer*; 4 PC-9*; 6 Z-142

HELICOPTERS

ATK 56: 34 Mi-24 *Hind*; 22 Mi-35 *Hind*

MRH 63: 8 AS565 *Panther*; 4 AW139; 8 SA316 *Alouette III*

(IAR-316) (incl trg); 8 SA342M *Gazelle*; 27 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17 *Hip H*; 8 Mi-171Sh *Terminator*

TPT • **Light** 10: 2+ AW109E; 8 Bell 212

AIR DEFENCE • SAM 73

Short-range 28: 16 2K12-ML *Kvadrat-ML* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*); 12 S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 45: 10 9K35 *Strela-10* (RS-SA-13 *Gopher*)†; 15 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); 20 9K31 *Strela-1* (RS-SA-9 *Gaskin*)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM

IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*)

IR/SARH R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 *Apex*)†; R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

ASM 9M17M *Falanga-M* (RS-AT-2 *Swatter*); **HOT**

ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 *Kyle*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,000

Rapid-Reaction Police 10,000


DEPLOYMENT

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 18

Benin BEN

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	9.01tr	9.89tr	
	USD	15.7bn	18.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,291	1,447	
Growth	%	3.8	5.5	
Inflation	%	3.0	3.0	
Def bdgt	XOF	32.0bn	125bn	
	USD	55.7m	228m	
USD1=XOF		574.76	547.34	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 13,301,694

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	23.0%	5.4%	4.7%	3.7%	11.4%	1.1%
Female	22.6%	5.4%	4.8%	4.0%	12.8%	1.3%

Capabilities

The armed forces focus on border- and internal-security issues, as well as combating illicit trafficking. Border patrols and security have increased following concern over the regional threat from Islamist groups. Maritime security is a priority in light of continuing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. A National Guard was reportedly created in 2020 and there have been reports of efforts to improve soldiers' living conditions. There is a military-cooperation agreement with France, whose Senegal-based forces have delivered training to boost Benin's border-surveillance capacity. Armoured vehicles have also been received from China. The US has provided

similar training to the army and national police. US forces have also delivered pre-deployment training to the armed forces and training in professional ethics, anti-corruption and accountability to the Republican Police. Benin contributes personnel to the Multi-national Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. There is a limited capacity to deploy beyond neighbouring states without external support. There is some maintenance capability but no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 6,500 Navy 500 Air 250)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800

Conscript liability 18 months (selective)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd sqn

Light

1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn

8 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

1 spt bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 18 PT-76†

RECCE 34: 3 AML-90; 14 BRDM-2; 7 M8; 10 VBL

APC 34

APC (T) 22 M113;

APC (W) 2 *Bastion* APC

PPV 10 *Casspir* NG

AUV *Dongfeng Mengshi*

ARTILLERY 16+

TOWED 105mm 16: 12 L118 Light Gun; 4 M101

MOR 81mm some; 120mm some

Navy €500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 6: 2

Matelot Brice Kpomasse (ex-PRC); 3 FPB 98; 1 27m (PRC)

Air Force 250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT 3: **Light** 1 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*†; PAX 2: 1 B-727; 1

HS-748†

TRG (1 LH-10 *Ellipse* non-operational)

HELICOPTERS

TPT • **Light** 5: 4 AW109BA; 1 AS350B *Ecureuil*†

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800

Republican Police 4,800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV *Casspir* NG

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 6

CHAD: Lake Chad Basin Commission • MNJTF 150

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 9

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 260; 1 mech inf coy(+)


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

Botswana BWA

Botswana Pula BWP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BWP	173bn	194bn	
	USD	15.1bn	17.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	6,420	7,350	
Growth	%	-8.5	9.2	
Inflation	%	1.9	5.8	
Def bdtg [a]	BWP	6.42bn	5.76bn	
	USD	560m	522m	
USD1=BWP		11.45	11.05	

[a] Defence, Justice and Security Budget



Population 2,350,667

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.2%	4.6%	4.3%	4.3%	17.3%	2.3%
Female	14.9%	4.7%	4.5%	4.4%	20.1%	3.3%

Capabilities

The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) comprises ground forces and a small but comparatively well-equipped air wing. The BDF's primary responsibility is to ensure territorial integrity; its other tasks include tackling poaching. There is a history of involvement in peace-keeping operations. The BDF has reportedly been working on a defence doctrine that is believed to be influenced by US concepts and practices. Botswana has a good relationship with the US and regularly sends its officers to train there. The armed forces also train with other African nations, including Namibia, with whom it holds biannual exercises. The operations centre for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force is located in Gaborone. Recent personnel priorities include improving conditions of service and overhauling retirement ages. Recruitment into the BDF is voluntary. Relations with China are improving, and Botswana joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2021. Some BDF military personnel have travelled to China for training. The air force has

a modest airlift capacity and the BDF is able to deploy a small force by air if required. There is interest in replacing the ageing fleet of F-5 combat aircraft, though a successor type has yet to be ordered due to financial constraints. While reports suggest a limited maintenance capacity, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 8,500 Air 500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde(-)

Light

2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 1 engr regt, 1 log bn, 2 ADA regt)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 engr coy

1 sigs coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bde(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 45: ε20 SK-105 *Kurassier*; 25 FV101 *Scorpion*

RECCE 72+: RAM-V-1; ε8 RAM-V-2; 64 VBL

IFV 22+ *Piranha* V UT-30

APC 157:

APC (W) 145: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 *Commando* (some with 90mm gun); 45 *Piranha* III

PPV 12 *Casspir*

AUV 6 FV103 *Spartan*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV *Greif*; M578

MW *Aardvark* Mk2

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP V-150 TOW

MANPATS TOW

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 78

TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam

MRL 122mm 20 APRA-40

MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range VL MICA

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 9K310

Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*); *Javelin*; *Mistral*

GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 *Vulcan*; 37mm PG-65

Air Wing 500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-5A *Freedom Fighter*; F-5D *Tiger II*

ISR

1 sqn with O-2 *Skymaster*

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with BD-700 *Global Express*; BN-2/-2B *Defender**; Beech 200 *King Air* (VIP); C-130B *Hercules*; C-212-300/400 *Aviocar*; CN-235M-100; Do-328-110 (VIP)

TRAINING

1 sqn with PC-7 MkII *Turbo Trainer**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS350B *Ecureuil*; Bell 412EP/SP *Twin Huey*; EC225LP *Super Puma*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 28 combat capable

FTR 13: 8 F-5A *Freedom Fighter*; 5 F-5D *Tiger II*

ISR 5 O-2 *Skymaster*

TPT 20: **Medium** 3 C-130B *Hercules*; **Light** 16: 4 BN-2 *Defender**; 6 BN-2B *Defender**; 1 Beech 200 *King Air* (VIP); 1 C-212-300 *Aviocar*; 1 C-212-400 *Aviocar*; 2 CN-235M-100; 1 Do-328-110 (VIP); PAX 1 BD700 *Global Express*

TRG 5 PC-7 MkII *Turbo Trainer**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 7: 2 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*; 5 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*

TPT 9: **Medium** 1 EC225LP *Super Puma*; **Light** 8 AS350B *Ecureuil*

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •


MONUSCO 3

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 110

Burkina Faso BFA

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	9.99tr	10.9tr	
	USD	17.4bn	19.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	831	926	
Growth	%	1.9	6.7	
Inflation	%	1.9	3.0	
Def bdgt	XOF	223bn	254bn	
	USD	388m	464m	
USD1=XOF		574.77	547.36	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 21,382,659

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.9%	5.6%	4.7%	3.7%	11.7%	1.4%
Female	21.3%	5.4%	4.7%	4.0%	13.8%	1.8%

Capabilities

In recent years, Burkina Faso's security forces have been challenged by an increasing terrorist threat, which has led Ouagadougou to

refocus its military efforts particularly on the north of the country. Burkina Faso is part of the G5 Sahel grouping and, as part of its support for this framework, it cooperates with Mali and Niger, particularly on border security. There is also defence cooperation with France. In July, the US donated armoured vehicles and other equipment. Aviation capacity is slowly improving with the arrival of additional helicopters, though financial challenges hinder broader capability developments. Without external support, deployment capacity is limited to neighbouring countries. While there are maintenance facilities, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 6,400 Air 600 Gendarmerie 4,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 6,400

Three military regions. In 2011, several regiments were disbanded and merged into other formations, including the new 24th and 34th *régiments interarmes*

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 cbd arms regt

Light

1 cbd arms regt

6 inf regt

Air Manoeuvr

1 AB regt (1 CT coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn (2 arty tp)

1 engr bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 91+: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 8+ *Bastion Patsas*; 24 EE-9 *Cascavel*; 30 *Ferret*; 2 M20; 8 M8

APC 100

APC (W) 25: 13 Panhard M3; 12 *Bastion* APC

PPV 75: 6 *Gila*; 31 *Puma* M26-15; 14 *Puma* M36; 24 Stark Motors *Storm*

AUV 39 *Cobra*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

MW 3 *Shrek-M*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 50+

TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6

MRL 9: 107mm ε4 Type-63; 122mm 5 APR-40

MOR 27+: 81mm Brandt; 82mm 15; 120mm 12

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM-20

Air Force 600

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING

1 sqn with SF-260WL *Warrior**; Embraer EMB-314 *Super Tucano**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with AT-802 *Air Tractor*; B-727 (VIP); Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 C295W; CN235-220; PA-34 *Seneca*; *Tetras*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS350 *Ecureuil*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip* H; Mi-35 *Hind* AW 139; UH-1Y *Huey*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable

ISR 1 DA42M (reported)

TPT 10: **Light** 9: 1 AT-802 *Air Tractor*; 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; 1 C295W; 1 CN235-220; 1 PA-34 *Seneca*; 3 *Tetras*;

PAX 1 B-727 (VIP)

TRG 5: 3 EMB-314 *Super Tucano**; 2 SF-260WL *Warrior**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-35 *Hind*

MRH 3: 2 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 1 AW139

TPT 3: **Medium** 1 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 2: 1 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 1 UH-1H *Huey*

Gendarmerie 4,200

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops gp (USIGN)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • APC (W) some *Bastion* APC

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250

People's Militia (R) 45,000 reservists (trained)

Security Company 250

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 5

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 936; 1 inf bn


FOREIGN FORCES

France *Operation Barkhane* 4000; 1 SF gp; 2 *Tiger*; 2 AS532UL; 2 H225M; 3 *Gazelle*

Burundi BDI

Burundi Franc BIF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	BIF	5.82tr	6.27tr	
	USD	3.04bn	3.19bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	256	261	
Growth	%	-1.0	1.6	
Inflation	%	7.3	5.6	
Def bdg	BIF	119bn	129bn	136bn
	USD	62.3m	65.8m	
USD1=BIF		1914.93	1962.36	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 12,241,065

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	21.9%	5.5%	4.5%	3.7%	12.8%	1.4%
Female	21.5%	5.5%	4.5%	3.7%	13.3%	1.8%

Capabilities

The political crisis in 2015 tested the cohesion of the armed forces and largely halted military-training activity with international partners. Cross-border security challenges continue, though there are signs of improving relations with Rwanda. Burundi signed a cooperation agreement with Russia in 2018 on counter-terrorism and joint training. The experience accumulated during UN operations, where troops have gained valuable military experience, boosts training levels. The armed forces have a limited capability to deploy externally and maintain a deployment to the AMISOM mission in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions help to fund the armed forces, though financial and equipment deficiencies otherwise restrict military effectiveness. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 30,050 (Army 30,000 Navy 50) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 30,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 lt armd bn (sqn)

Light

7 inf bn

Some indep inf coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 55: 6 AML-60; 12 AML-90; 30 BRDM-2; 7 S52

Shorland

APC 114

APC (W) 70: 20 BTR-40; 10 BTR-80; 10 *Fahd*-300; 9

Panhard M3; 15 Type-92; 6 *Walid*

PPV 44: 12 *Casspir*; 12 RG-31 *Nyala*; 10 RG-33L; 10

Springbuck 4x4

AUV 15 *Cougar* 4x4

ARTILLERY 120

TOWED 122mm 18 D-30

MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 90: 82mm 15 M-43; 120mm ϵ 75

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan* (reported)

RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†‡

GUNS • TOWED 150+: 14.5mm 15 ZPU-4; 135+ 23mm

ZU-23/37mm Type-55 (M-1939)

Air Wing 200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable

TPT • Light 2 Cessna 150L+

TRG 1 SF-260W *Warrior**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH 2 SA342L *Gazelle*

TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 *Hip* non-op)

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

10 inf bn (reported)

Navy 50

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4

AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 2

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ϵ 1,000

General Administration of State Security ϵ 1,000

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 760; 1 inf bn


MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1

SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

Cameroon CMR

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	23.0tr	24.6tr	
	USD	39.9bn	44.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,505	1,646	
Growth	%	-1.5	3.6	
Inflation	%	2.4	2.3	
Def bdtg	XAF	234bn	246bn	
	USD	407m	448m	
USD1=XAF		574.76	549.22	



Population 28,524,175

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.3%	5.4%	4.6%	4.0%	13.1%	1.5%
Female	20.9%	5.4%	4.6%	4.0%	13.6%	1.7%

Capabilities

Internal security is a key concern for Cameroon's armed forces, as is the cross-border challenge from Boko Haram. Cameroon is part of the Multinational Joint Task Force engaged on operations against Boko Haram. There are long-standing military ties with France, including for support and training. There is a military-assistance agreement with China and the two countries have cooperated over a floating dock at Kribi, which it is hoped will improve operational readiness. The AU maintains its continental logistics base at Douala. The armed forces are considered well organised, though allegations of abuses led the US in February 2019 to halt some military assistance. Although deployments continue to UN peace-keeping operations, there is only limited organic power-projection capability without external support. Much of the equipment inventory is ageing, but infantry fighting vehicles and protected patrol vehicles have been acquired from China and South Africa and gifted by the US. The armed forces are improving their ISR capability with fixed-wing aircraft and small UAVs. Additional patrol vessels have in recent years improved maritime capability. Cameroon has no defence-industrial capacity, bar maintenance facilities.

ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 23,500 Navy 1,500 Air 400)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 23,500

5 Mil Regions

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

- 1 rapid reaction bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 AB bn, 1 amph bn)
- 1 mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn)
- 5 mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn)
- 6 rapid reaction bn
- 4 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 cdo/AB bn

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt (5 arty bty)
5 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt (6 AD bty)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

ASLT 18: 6 AMX-10RC; ε12 PTL-02 mod (*Cara 105*)
RECCE 64: 31 AML-90; 15 *Ferret*; 8 M8; 5 RAM Mk3; 5 VBL

IFV 42: 8 LAV-150 *Commando* with 20mm gun; 14 LAV-150 *Commando* with 90mm gun; 12 *Ratel-20* (Engr); ε8 Type-07P

APC 73

APC (T) 12 M3 half-track

APC (W) 45: 24 *Bastion* APC; 21 LAV-150 *Commando*

PPV 16 *Gaia Thunder*

AUV 6+: 6 *Cougar* 4x4; *Panthera* T6

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV WZ-551 ARV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL

SP 24 TOW (on Jeeps)

MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 53: 75mm 13 Type-52 (M20); 106mm 40 M40A2

ARTILLERY 106+

SP 155mm 18 ATMOS 2000

TOWED 52: 105mm 20 M101; 130mm 24: 12 M-1982 (reported); 12 Type-59 (M-46); 155mm 8 M-71

MRL 122mm 20 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 16+: 81mm (some SP); 120mm 16 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS

SP 20mm RBY-1 with TCM-20

TOWED 54: 14.5mm 18 Type-58 (ZPU-2); 35mm 18 GDF-002; 37mm 18 Type-63

Navy ε1,500

HQ located at Douala

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16

PCC 3: 1 *Dipikar* (ex-FRA *Flamant*); 2 *Le Ntem* (PRC *Limam El Hidrami*)

PB 11: 2 *Aresa* 2400; 2 *Aresa* 3200; 2 *Rodman* 101; 4 *Rodman* 46; 1 *Quartier Maître Alfred Mottot*

PBR 2 *Swift-38*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4

LCU 2 Type-067 (*Yunnan*)

LCM 2: 1 *Aresa* 2300; 1 *Le Moungo*

Fusiliers Marin

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Amphibious

3 mne bn

Air Force 300–400

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with *Alpha Jet**†

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 *Hercules*; PA-23 *Aztec*

1 VIP unit with AS332 *Super Puma*; AS365 *Dauphin* 2;
Bell 206B *Jet Ranger*; Gulfstream III

TRAINING

1 unit with *Tetras*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA342 *Gazelle* (with HOT); Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 206L-3; Bell 412; SA319 *Alouette* III

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable

ISR 2 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*

TPT 17: **Medium** 3: 2 C-130H *Hercules*; 1 C-130H-30
Hercules; **Light** 13: 1 CN235 (1 IAI-201 *Arava* in store);
2 J.300 *Joker*; 1 MA60; 2 PA-23 *Aztec*; 7 *Tetras*; PAX 1
Gulfstream III

TRG 6 *Alpha Jet**†

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH 15: 1 AS365 *Dauphin* 2; 4 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 2

Mi-17 *Hip H*; 2 SA319 *Alouette* III; 4 SA342 *Gazelle* (with
HOT); 2 Z-9

TPT 6: **Medium** 4: 2 AS332 *Super Puma*; 2 SA330J *Puma*;

Light 2: 1 Bell 206B *Jet Ranger*; 1 Bell 206L3 *Long Ranger*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ASM HOT

Fusiliers de l'Air

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 sy bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,000

Gendarmerie 9,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

3 (regional spt) paramilitary gp

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 808; 1
inf bn


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 3

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3

Cape Verde CPV

Cape Verde Escudo CVE		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CVE	165bn	174bn	
	USD	1.71bn	1.89bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,065	3,347	
Growth	%	-14.8	4.0	
Inflation	%	0.6	1.5	
Def bdtg	CVE	1.12bn	1.12bn	
	USD	11.6m	12.1m	
USD1=CVE		96.61	92.30	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 589,451

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.7%	4.5%	4.6%	4.6%	18.9%	2.2%
Female	13.6%	4.5%	4.6%	4.7%	20.5%	3.5%

Capabilities

In its legislative programme for 2016–21, the government outlined defence priorities including territorial defence, maritime security, and EEZ and airspace protection. A new law, issued in September 2021, set out defence-ministerial structures and modernisation aspirations for the armed forces. Reports in the same year indicated an intention to improve airspace monitoring and related procurement aspirations, including for aircraft. The government is interested in greater regional and international defence engagement. International partners provide some maritime-security training support and China reportedly donated equipment including trucks and buses to the armed forces in 2021. The armed forces take part in multinational regional exercises and cooperative activities. Equipment capabilities remain limited and there is no defence industry, beyond maintenance facilities.

ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100)

Conscript liability Selective conscription (14 months)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 inf bn (gp)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 10 BRDM-2

ARTILLERY • MOR 18: 82mm 12; 120mm 6 M-1943

AIR DEFENCE


SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 30: 14.5mm 18 ZPU-1; 23mm 12 ZU-23

Coast Guard €100**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 5PCC 2: 1 *Guardião*; 1 *Kondor 1*PB 2: 1 *Espadarte*; 1 *Tainha* (PRC 27m)PBF 1 *Archangel***AIRCRAFT** • TPT • Light 1 Do-228**Air Force** up to 100**FORCES BY ROLE****MARITIME PATROL**1 sqn with An-26 *Curl***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** • TPT • Light 3 An-26 *Curl*†**Central African Republic** CAR

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	1.37tr	1.39tr	
	USD	2.39bn	2.59bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	494	526	
Growth	%	1.0	-1.0	
Inflation	%	2.3	3.7	
Def exp	XAF	23.8bn	24.0bn	
	USD	41.4m	44.5m	
USD1=XAF		574.73	538.46	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 5,357,984

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.2%	5.6%	5.0%	4.1%	13.3%	1.5%
Female	19.2%	5.2%	4.7%	4.2%	15.0%	2.0%

Capabilities

Effective military and security organisations remain largely absent in the wake of violence in 2013 and the armed forces remain unable to fully address the country's internal-security challenges. Under the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21, attempts to improve security focus on DDR and SSR. The UN's MINUSCA mission remains the principal security provider in the country. Russia has been deepening its military ties in the CAR and has donated small arms and armoured vehicles and dispatched teams of military instructors. Russian private military contractors are also active in the country. Apart from some equipment deliveries, the country remains under a UN arms embargo, though the terms of this were eased in late 2019. The armed forces receive training from UN forces and an EU training mission. Poor infrastructure and logistics capacity limit the armed forces' ability to provide security across the country. There is no independent capability to deploy troops externally, while the lack of financial resources and defence-industrial capacity makes equipment maintenance problematic.

ACTIVE 9,150 (Army 9,000 Air 150) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,000

Conscript liability Selective conscription 2 years; reserve obligation thereafter, term n.k.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army** €9,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

1 spec ops bn

7 inf bn

Amphibious

1 amph coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 3 T-55†

RECCE 28: 8 *Ferret*†; 20 BRDM-2IFV 18 *Ratel*

APC • APC (W) 14+: 4 BTR-152†; 10+ VAB†

AUV *Cobra* (reported)**ARTILLERY** • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943†**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**

RCL 106mm 14 M40†

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 9†**Air Force** 150**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** • TPT 6: **Medium** (1 C-130A *Hercules* instore); **Light** 6: 3 BN-2 *Islander*; 1 Cessna 172R *Skyhawk*; 2 J.300 *Joker***HELICOPTERS**ATK 1 Mi-24V *Hind E*MRH some SA341B *Gazelle*TPT 2: **Medium** 1 Mi-8T *Hip*; **Light** 1 AS350 *Ecureuil***FOREIGN FORCES**

MINUSCA unless stated


Argentina 2**Bangladesh** 1,301; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy**Benin** 6**Belgium** EUTM RCA 60**Bhutan** 5**Bolivia** 3**Bosnia-Herzegovina** EUTM RCA 3**Brazil** 10 • EUTM RCA 6**Burkina Faso** 7**Burundi** 760; 1 inf bn**Cambodia** 210; 1 engr coy**Cameroon** 808; 1 inf bn**Colombia** 2**Congo** 12**Côte d'Ivoire** 1**Czech Republic** 3**Egypt** 1,022; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy**France** 8 • EUTM RCA 100 • Army 160**Gabon** 43**Gambia** 10**Georgia** EUTM RCA 35**Ghana** 13**Guatemala** 4**Indonesia** 230; 1 engr coy

Italy EUTM RCA 2
 Jordan 10
 Kenya 15
 Lithuania EUTM RCA 2
 Macedonia, North EUTM RCA 2
 Mauritania 464; 1 inf bn(-)
 Mexico 2
 Moldova 4
 Morocco 767; 1 inf bn
 Nepal 752; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pl
 Niger 5
 Nigeria 5
 Pakistan 1,314; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn
 Paraguay 4
 Peru 217; 1 engr coy
 Philippines 2
 Poland EUTM RCA 1
 Portugal 189; 1 AB coy • EUTM RCA 55
 Romania EUTM RCA 13
 Russia 8
 Rwanda 1,690; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
 Senegal 9
 Serbia 76; 1 med coy • EUTM RCA 7
 Sierra Leone 5
 Slovakia EUTM RCA 2
 Spain EUTM RCA 8
 Sri Lanka 113; 1 hel sqn
 Sweden EUTM RCA 9
 Tanzania 456; 1 inf bn(-)
 Togo 10
 Tunisia 134; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 205
 United States 8
 Uruguay 3
 Vietnam 7
 Zambia 932; 1 inf bn
 Zimbabwe 2

Chad CHA

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	6.23tr	6.78tr	
	USD	10.8bn	12.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	660	730	
Growth	%	-0.8	0.9	
Inflation	%	4.5	2.6	
Def bdgt	XAF	157bn	159bn	
	USD	274m	289m	
USD1=XAF		574.74	549.23	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 17,414,108

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	23.8%	5.7%	4.4%	3.5%	11.1%	1.1%
Female	23.2%	5.6%	4.4%	3.5%	12.4%	1.4%

Capabilities

Chad's principal security concerns relate to instability in West Africa and the Sahel and counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area. Although the armed forces are combat experienced, some observers judge that improvements are required in strategy and doctrine, and command and control. The country is a key contributor to the G5 Sahel and is an important component of the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. There is close defence cooperation with France and *Operation Barkhane* is headquartered in N'Djamena. Chadian military skills are widely recognised by partners, though training levels are not uniform across the force. After the death of president Idriss Déby in 2021, his son assumed the role of leader of an interim administration. This body passed reform plans for the armed forces, which if implemented would increase the size of the army. However, implementation is now dependent on the transitional council appointed in September. A lack of logistical capacity has hindered routine rotations for deployed forces. The country's ISR capability improved with the arrival of aircraft from the US, following improvements in ground-attack and medium-airlift capability. Apart from maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 33,250 (Army 27,500 Air 350 State Security Service 5,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,900

Conscript liability Conscription authorised

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €27,500

7 Mil Regions

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

7 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 74: 60 T-55; 14 ZTZ-59G

ASLT €20 PTL-02 *Assaulter*

RECCE 318+: 132 AML-60/-90; 22 *Bastion Patsas*; €100

BRDM-2; 20 EE-9 *Cascavel*; 9 ERC-90D *Sagaie*; 4 ERC-90F *Sagaie*; 31+ RAM Mk3

IFV 131: 80 BMP-1; 42 BMP-1U; 9 LAV-150 *Commando* with 90mm gun

APC 129

APC (W) 103: 4+ *Bastion* APC; 24 BTR-80; 12 BTR-3E;

€20 BTR-60; €10 *Black Scorpion*; 25 VAB-VTT; 8 WZ-523

PPV 26: 6+ KrAZ *Cougar*; 20 Proforce *Ara 2*

AUV 30 *Terrier* LT-79

ARTILLERY 28+

SP 122mm 10 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 7: 105mm 5 M2; 122mm 2+ D-74

MRL 11+: 107mm some PH-63; 122mm 11: 6 BM-21 Grad; 5 PHL-81

MOR 81mm some; 120mm AM-50

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Eryx*; *Milan*

RCL 106mm M40A1

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 4 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)

Point-defence 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/-2/-4; 23mm ZU-23

Air Force 350

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 unit with PC-7; PC-9*; SF-260WL *Warrior**; Su-25 *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; Mi-17 *Hip* H; Mi-171

1 (Presidential) Flt with B-737BBJ; Beech 1900; DC-9-87; Gulfstream II

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS550C *Fennec*; Mi-24V *Hind*; SA316 *Alouette* III

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 sy bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable

FTR (1 MiG-29S *Fulcrum* C in store)

ATK 7: 6 Su-25 *Frogfoot* (2 more in store); 1 Su-25UB *Frogfoot* B (1 more in store)

ISR 2 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*

TPT 10: **Medium** 3: 2 C-27J *Spartan*; 1 C-130H-30

Hercules; **Light** 4: 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Beech 1900; **PAX** 3: 1 B-737BBJ; 1 DC-9-87; 1 Gulfstream II

TRG 4: 2 PC-7 (only 1*); 1 PC-9 *Turbo Trainer**; 1 SF-260WL *Warrior**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 5 Mi-24V *Hind*

MRH 8: 3 AS550C *Fennec*; 3 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 2 SA316

TPT • **Medium** 2 Mi-171

State Security Service General Direction (DGSSIE) 5,400

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,900 active

Gendarmerie 4,500

National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT) 7,400

Police Mobile Intervention Group (GMIP)

DEPLOYMENT

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,451; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn

NIGER: G5 Sahel 600; 1 inf bn

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES


Benin MNJTF 150

France *Operation Barkhane* 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 4 *Mirage* 2000D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M; 1 UAV det with 1 MQ-9A *Reaper*

Congo, Republic of COG

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	5.94tr	6.98tr	
	USD	10.3bn	12.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,206	2,656	
Growth	%	-8.2	-0.2	
Inflation	%	1.8	2.0	
Def bdtgt	XAF	179bn	174bn	164bn
	USD	311m	317m	
USD1=XAF		574.74	547.36	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 5,417,414

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	20.8%	4.8%	3.9%	3.6%	15.5%	1.5%
Female	20.4%	4.8%	3.9%	3.6%	15.4%	1.8%

Capabilities

Congo's small armed forces have low levels of training and limited overall capability, and utilise ageing equipment. They have struggled to recover from the brief but devastating civil war in the late 1990s. France provides advisory assistance and capacity-building support in military administration and military and police capability. A military-cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019. The troop contingent deployed to the CAR was withdrawn by the government in mid-2017, amid allegations of indiscipline. Deployment capability is limited to neighbouring countries without external support. The air force is effectively grounded for lack of spares and serviceable equipment. The navy is largely a riverine force, despite the need for maritime security on the country's small coastline. A modernisation effort is under way and several MRAPs have been bought. Maintenance facilities are limited and the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 8,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd bn

Light

2 inf bn (gp) each with (1 lt tk tp, 1 arty bty)
1 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 cdo/AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty gp (with MRL)
1 engr bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 40: 25 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59; (some T-34 in store)

LT TK 13: 3 PT-76; 10 Type-62

RECCE 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

APC 133+

APC (W) 78+: 28 AT-105 *Saxon*; 20 BTR-152; 30 BTR-60;
Panhard M3

PPV 55: 18 *Mamba*; 37 *Marauder*

ARTILLERY 56+

SP 122mm 3 2S1 *Gvozdika*

TOWED 15+: 122mm 10 D-30; 130mm 5 M-46; 152mm
D-20

MRL 10+: 122mm 10 BM-21 *Grad*; 140mm BM-14;

140mm BM-16

MOR 28+: 82mm; 120mm 28 M-43

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 57mm M18

GUNS 15: 57mm 5 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 100mm 10 M-1944

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2/-4; 37mm 28 M-1939; 57mm
S-60; 100mm KS-19

Navy €800**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8**

PCC 4 5 *Février 1979*

PBR 4

Air Force 1,200**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with *Mirage F-1AZ*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 *Coke*; An-32 *Cline*; CN235M-100

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

3 combat capable

AIRCRAFT

FGA up to 3 *Mirage F-1AZ*

TPT • **Light** 4: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 2 An-32 *Cline*; 1
CN235M-100

HELICOPTERS

ATK (2 Mi-35P *Hind* in store)

TPT • **Medium** (3 Mi-8 *Hip* in store)

**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2
Atoll)‡****Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000 active****Gendarmerie 2,000****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Other

20 paramilitary coy

Presidential Guard some**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Other

1 paramilitary bn

DEPLOYMENT


CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 12

Côte d'Ivoire CIV

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	35.2tr	37.8tr	
	USD	61.2bn	68.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,271	2,489	
Growth	%	2.0	6.0	
Inflation	%	2.4	3.0	
Def bdtg [a]	XOF	349bn	354bn	
	USD	608m	644m	
USD1=XOF		574.76	549.22	

[a] Defence budget only – order and security expenses excluded

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 28,088,455

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.0%	5.5%	4.7%	4.1%	15.6%	1.3%
Female	18.9%	5.5%	4.7%	4.1%	15.0%	1.6%

Capabilities

The armed forces are still regenerating and SSR initiatives continue. A 2015 law detailed defence zones and military regions as well as the creation of a general staff and general inspectorate for the armed forces. It stressed the armed forces' role in assisting societal development. In 2016 a Military Programme Law for 2016–20 was adopted. The plan was to reduce military strength in order to enable an increase in the size of the gendarmerie, though the precise outcome remains unclear. The authorities have standardised promotion and salary structures in order to boost professionalisation and are also looking to improve military infrastructure. There is close defence cooperation with France, which has a significant training mission in the country. The armed-forces school at Zambakro runs courses for Ivorian as well as regional personnel, and the second Higher Defence Studies course graduated in late 2021 with personnel from across the region. In 2021, with French assistance, Côte d'Ivoire opened the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) in Abidjan, to help develop

regional as well as Ivorian counter-terrorist capability. Except for limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 27,400 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 1,400 Special Forces 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k.
Moves to restructure and reform the armed forces continue

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €23,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

7 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 cdo/AB bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 10 T-55†

RECCE 18: 13 BRDM-2; 5 *Cayman* BRDM

IFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2†

APC 41

APC (W) 40: 9 *Bastion* APC; 6 BTR-80; 12 Panhard M3;

13 VAB

PPV 1 *Snake*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

VLB MTU

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*) (reported); 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*) (reported)

RCL 106mm €12 M40A1

ARTILLERY 36+

TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported)

MRL 122mm 6 BM-21

MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Medium 1 An-12 *Cub*†

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)† (reported)

GUNS 21+

SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA

TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60

Navy €1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PB 4: 3 *L'Emergence*; 1 *Atchan 2*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1

LCM 1 *Aby*

Air Force €1,400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

AIRCRAFT

TPT 3: Light 2: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 1 C295W; PAX 1 B-727

HELICOPTERS

ATK 3 Mi-24V *Hind E*

MRH 2 Mi-8P *Hip*

TPT • Medium 2 SA330L *Puma* (IAR-330L)

Special Forces €2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k.

Republican Guard n.k.

Gendarmerie n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 3 *Cayman* BRDM

IFV BMP-1

APC

APC (W) BTR-80; VAB

PPV RG-31 *Nyala*; *Springbuck* HD; Streit *Spartan*

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 *Bian*

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 802; 1 mech inf bn; 1 sy coy

MALI: UN • MINURSO 2


FOREIGN FORCES

France 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 1 hel unit with 1 AS555 *Fennec*; 2 SA330 *Puma*; 2 SA342 *Gazelle*

Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC

Congolese Franc CDF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	CDF	90.2tr	110tr	
	USD	48.7bn	54.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	544	594	
Growth	%	1.7	4.9	
Inflation	%	11.4	9.4	
Def bdtg	CDF	641bn	580bn	
	USD	346m	290m	
USD1=CDF		1851.50	2000.64	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 105,044,646

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	23.3%	5.2%	4.5%	3.8%	12.1%	1.1%
Female	23.0%	5.2%	4.5%	3.8%	12.2%	1.4%

Capabilities

On paper, the DRC has the largest armed forces in Central Africa. However, given the country's size and the poor levels of training, morale and equipment, they are unable to provide security throughout the country. Kinshasa has pursued several military-modernisation programmes, though plans to re-examine doctrine and organisation have seen little positive impact. When conflict finally abates in the east, significant attention to wide-ranging DDR and SSR will be required, to continue the work intermittently undertaken over the past decade. The mandate of the UN's MONUSCO mission in the DRC was renewed in December 2019 and the UN's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) remains active in the east. Training will have improved for units operating with the FIB, and there is also foreign assistance in training and capacity-building. The armed forces have incorporated a number of non-state armed groups. There remains significant scope to improve training, recruitment and retention. Deployment capability is limited and the lack of logistics vehicles significantly reduces transport capacity. The lack of sufficient tactical airlift and helicopters is a brake on military effectiveness and there is some reliance on MONUSCO capabilities, which are also insufficient given the geographical scale of the country. Much of the inventory is in poor repair and, while new equipment has been acquired, the absence of any defence sector apart from limited maintenance capability will also hinder military efficiency.

ACTIVE €134,250 (Central Staffs €14,000, Army 103,000 Republican Guard 8,000 Navy 6,700 Air 2,550)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army (Force Terrestre) €103,000

The DRC has 11 Military Regions. In 2011, all brigades in North and South Kivu provinces were consolidated into 27

new regiments, the latest in a sequence of reorganisations designed to integrate non-state armed groups. The actual combat effectiveness of many formations is doubtful

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

6 (integrated) inf bde
 €3 inf bde (non-integrated)
 27+ inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt
 1 MP bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

(includes Republican Guard eqpt)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 174: 12–17 Type-59†; 32 T-55; 25 T-64BV-1; 100 T-72AV

LT TK 40: 10 PT-76; 30 Type-62†

RECCE up to 52: up to 17 AML-60; 14 AML-90; 19 EE-9 *Cascavel*; 2 RAM-V-2

IFV 20 BMP-1

APC 104+:

APC (T) 9: 3 BTR-50; 6 MT-LB

APC (W) 95+: 30–70 BTR-60PB; 58 Panhard M3†; 7 TH 390 *Fahd*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 57mm M18; 73mm SPG-9; 75mm M20; 106mm M40A1

GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 726+

SP 16: 122mm 6 2S1 *Gvozhdika*; 152mm 10 2S3 *Akatsiya*

TOWED 125: 122mm 77 M-30 (M-1938)/D-30/Type-60; 130mm 42 Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 6 D-20 (reported)

MRL 57+: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24+: 24 BM-21 *Grad*; some RM-70; 128mm 6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; 132mm 12

MOR 528+: 81mm 100; 82mm 400; 107mm M30; 120mm 28: 10 Brandt; 18 other

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 64: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52 M-1939

Republican Guard 8,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd regt

Light

3 gd bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

Navy 6,700 (incl infantry and marines)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1

PB 1 Type-062 (*Shanghai II*)†

Air Force 2,550**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

ATK 4 Su-25 *Frogfoot*TPT 4: **Medium** 1 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 1 An-26 *Curl*;

PAX 2 B-727

HELICOPTERS

ATK 7: 4 Mi-24 *Hind*; 3 Mi-24V *Hind*TPT • **Medium** 3: 1 AS332L *Super Puma*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip***Paramilitary****National Police Force**

Incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial)

People's Defence Force**FOREIGN FORCES**

All part of MONUSCO unless otherwise specified

Algeria 2

Bangladesh 1,632; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy; 1 hel coy

Belgium 1

Benin 9

Bhutan 2

Bolivia 4

Bosnia-Herzegovina 3

Botswana 3

Brazil 23

Burkina Faso 5 Cameroon 3

Canada (*Operation Crocodile*) 8

China, People's Republic of 232; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital

Czech Republic 2

Egypt 11

France 2

Gambia 2

Ghana 20

Guatemala 155; 1 SF coy

India 1,858; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy

Indonesia 1,035; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy

Ireland 3

Jordan 14

Kenya 262

Malawi 718; 1 inf bn

Malaysia 6

Mali 4

Mongolia 2

Morocco 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital

Nepal 899; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy

Niger 3

Nigeria 10

Pakistan 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

Paraguay 7

Peru 6

Poland 2

Romania 6

Russia 10

Senegal 6

Serbia 1

Sierra Leone 3

South Africa (*Operation Mistral*) 939; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

Switzerland 1

Tanzania 854; 1 spec ops coy; 1 inf bn

Tunisia 13

Ukraine 260; 1 atk hel sqn

United Kingdom 3

United States 3

Uruguay 822; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

Zambia 7

Zimbabwe 3

Djibouti DJB

Djiboutian Franc DJF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	DJF	611bn	649bn	
	USD	3.44bn	3.65bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	3,482	3,646	
Growth	%	1.0	5.0	
Inflation	%	1.8	1.2	
Def exp	DJF	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
FMA (US)	USD	5m	5m	6m
USD1=DJF		177.71	177.70	

Population 938,413

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	14.7%	4.8%	4.7%	4.5%	15.0%	1.8%
Female	14.6%	5.0%	5.6%	5.8%	21.3%	2.2%

Capabilities

Djibouti's strategic location and relative stability have led a number of foreign states to station forces in the country. The armed forces' main responsibility is internal and border security, as well as counter-insurgency operations. The 2017 defence white paper highlighted a requirement to modernise key capabilities, but funds remain limited. Djibouti maintains close defence cooperation with France as it hosts its largest foreign military base. The US also operates its Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from Djibouti. Japan has based forces there for regional counter-piracy missions and the EU and NATO have at various times maintained a presence to support their operations. Djibouti also hosts an Italian base with a focus on anti-piracy activities. China's first overseas military base, including dock facilities, was officially opened in Djibouti in 2017. France and the US provide training assistance. EU NAVFOR Somalia has delivered maritime-security training to the navy and coastguard. Djibouti participates in a number of regional multinational exercises and contributes personnel to the AMISOM mission in Somalia but has limited capacity to independently deploy beyond its territory. Army equipment consists predominantly of older French and Soviet-era equipment. There are some maintenance facilities, but no defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 10,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250 Gendarmerie 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,650

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €8,000

FORCES BY ROLE

4 military districts (Tadjourah, Dikhil, Ali-Sabieh and Obock)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 arm'd regt (1 recce sqn, 3 arm'd sqn, 1 (anti-smuggling) sy coy)

Light

4 inf regt (3-4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
1 rapid reaction regt (4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)

Other

1 (Republican Guard) gd regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close protection) sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 arm'd pl, 1 arty pl), 1 spt sqn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt
1 demining coy
1 sigs regt
1 CIS sect

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regt
1 maint coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

ASLT 3+ PTL-02 *Assaulter*
RECCE 38: 4 AML-60+; 17 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2; 15 VBL
IFV 28: 8 BTR-80A; 16-20 *Ratel*
APC 43

APC (W) 30+: 12 BTR-60+; 4+ AT-105 *Saxon*; 14 *Puma*

PPV 13: 3 *Casspir*; 10 RG-33L

AUV 22: 10 *Cougar* 4x4 (one with 90mm gun); 2 CS/
VN3B; 10 PKSV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm 16 M40A1

ARTILLERY 76

SP 155mm 10 M109L

TOWED 122mm 9 D-30

MRL 12: 107mm 2 PKSV AUV with PH-63; 122mm 10: 6 (6-tube Toyota Land Cruiser 70 series); 2 (30-tube Iveco 110-16); 2 (30-tube)

MOR 45: 81mm 25; 120mm 20 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 15+

SP 20mm 5 M693

TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/70

Navy €200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PBF 2 Battalion-17

PB 10: 1 *Plascoat*; 2 Sea Ark 1739; 1 *Swarit*; 6 others

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1

LCT 1 EDIC 700

Air Force 250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 6: 1 Cessna U206G *Stationair*; 1 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 2 Y-12E; 1 L-410UVP *Turbolet*; 1 MA60

HELICOPTERS

ATK (2 Mi-35 *Hind* in store)

MRH 6: 4 AS365 *Dauphin*; 1 Mi-17 *Hip* H; 1 Z-9WE

TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8T *Hip*; Light 2 AS355F *Ecureuil* II

Gendarmerie 2,000+

Ministry of Defence

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AFV • AUV 2 CS/VN3B

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 1 PB

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €2,650

National Police Force €2,500

Ministry of Interior

Coast Guard 150

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 2

Khor Angar; 9 other

DEPLOYMENT

SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 1,800; 2 inf bn

FOREIGN FORCES

China 240: 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD

France 1,450: 1 SF unit; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt (2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 *Puma*; 2 SA342 *Gazelle*; 1 LCM; 1 air sqn with 4 *Mirage* 2000-5; 1 CN235M; 2 SA330 *Puma*

Italy BMIS 147

Japan 180; 2 P-3C *Orion*

Spain *Operation Atalanta* 1 P-3M *Orion*

United States US Africa Command: 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 *Hercules*; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B *Osprey*; 2 KC-130J *Hercules*; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G *Pave Hawk*; 1 CISR sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*; 1 naval air base

Equatorial Guinea EQG

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	5.77tr	6.74tr	
	USD	10.0bn	12.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,137	8,626	
Growth	%	-4.9	4.1	
Inflation	%	4.8	0.5	
Def exp	XAF	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=XAF		574.77	538.34	

Population 857,008

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	19.3%	5.4%	4.7%	4.0%	14.7%	1.7%
Female	18.8%	5.2%	4.6%	3.9%	15.2%	2.4%

Capabilities

The army dominates the armed forces, with internal security the principal task. Equatorial Guinea has been trying for several years to modernise its armed forces. France maintains a military detachment in Malabo, advising on defence-institutional development and delivering capacity-building support at the naval-focused regional school at Tica. These personnel also engage in some training activities with French forces based in Gabon and more generally in the region as part of France's *Corymbe* mission. There is only limited capability for power projection and deployments are limited to neighbouring countries without external support. Recent naval investments include both equipment and onshore-infrastructure improvements at Bata and Malabo, although naval capabilities overall remain limited. Maritime-security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea have resulted in an increased emphasis on boosting maritime-patrol capacity. There is limited maintenance capacity and no defence industrial sector.

ACTIVE 1,450 (Army 1,100 Navy 250 Air 100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,100

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 inf bn(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 3 T-55

RECCE 6 BRDM-2

IFV 20 BMP-1

APC 35

APC (W) 10 BTR-152

PPV 25 *Reva* (reported)

Navy €250

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1

FF 1 *Wele Nzas* with 2 MS-227 *Ogon'* 122mm MRL, 2

AK630 CIWS, 2 76mm guns

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

CORVETTES • FSG 1 *Bata* with 2 *Katran*-M RWS with

Barrier SSM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCC 2 OPV 62

PBF 2 *Shaldag* II

PB 5: 1 *Daphnet*; 2 *Estuario de Muni*; 2 *Zhuk*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

AKRH 1 *Capitán David Eyama Angue Osa* with 1 76mm gun

Air Force 100

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable

ATK 4: 2 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot* B

TPT 4: **Light** 3: 1 An-32B *Cline*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*; **PAX** 1

Falcon 900 (VIP)

TRG 2 L-39C *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 5 Mi-24P/V *Hind*

MRH 1 Mi-17 *Hip* H

TPT 4: **Heavy** 1 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 1 Ka-29 *Helix*;

Light 2 Enstrom 480

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Guardia Civil

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

2 paramilitary coy

Coast Guard n.k.

Eritrea ERI

Eritrean Nakfa ERN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ERN	31.4bn	34.0bn	
	USD	2.08bn	2.25bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	588	626	
Growth	%	-0.6	2.9	
Inflation	%	4.8	4.3	
Def exp	ERN	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=ERN		15.07	15.08	

Population 6,147,398

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	18.9%	5.8%	4.5%	3.7%	14.6%	1.6%
Female	18.7%	5.8%	4.6%	3.8%	15.4%	2.4%

Capabilities

Eritrea has maintained large armed forces mainly because of historical military tensions and conflict with Ethiopia, though tensions eased after a September 2018 peace agreement. The peace agreement may have afforded the armed forces the opportunity to consider restructuring and recapitalisation. Fighting in the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Tigray from late 2020 saw Eritrean forces deploy over the border in support of Ethiopian government forces. However, the extent of Eritrea's involvement in this conflict and the level of ongoing support for Ethiopian forces remain

unclear. Maritime insecurity, including piracy, remains a challenge. It appears that the foreign military presence and related facilities at Assab, which had been used to support Gulf states' participation in the Yemen campaign, had been wound down by mid-2021. Eritrea maintains a large army due to mandatory conscription. For some the term of service is reportedly indefinite, and significant numbers of conscripts have chosen to leave the country or otherwise evade service. These factors likely affect overall military cohesion and effectiveness. Eritrea has demonstrated limited capacity to deploy beyond its immediate borders. The armed forces' inventory primarily comprises outdated Soviet-era systems and modernisation was restricted by the UN arms embargo, until it was lifted in 2018. The arms embargo will have resulted in serviceability issues, notwithstanding allegations of external support. The navy remains capable of only limited coastal-patrol and interception operations. There is some maintenance capability, but no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 201,750 (Army 200,000 Navy 1,400 Air 350)

Conscript liability 18 months (4 months mil trg) between ages 18 and 40

RESERVE 120,000 (Army €120,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €200,000

Heavily cadreised

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 mech bde

Light

19 inf div

1 cdo div

Reserve €120,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf div

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 270 T-54/T-55

RECCE 40 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

IFV 15 BMP-1

APC 35

APC (T) 10 MT-LB†

APC (W) 25 BTR-152/BTR-60

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 reported

VLB MTU reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

GUNS 85mm D-44

ARTILLERY 258

SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 152mm 13 2S5 *Giatsint-S*

TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46

MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21 *Grad*; 220mm 9 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 150+: 82mm 50+; 120mm/160mm 100+

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS 70+

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 23mm ZU-23

Navy 1,400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PBF 9: 5 Battalion-17; 4 *Super Dvora*

PB 3 Swiftships

AMPHIBIOUS 3

LANDING SHIP 2

LST 2: 1 *Chamo†* (Ministry of Transport); 1 *Ashdod†*

LANDING CRAFT 1

LCU 1 T-4† (in harbour service)

Air Force €350

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29SE/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UBK *Flanker*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Y-12(II)

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-90 *Redigo*

1 sqn with MB-339CE*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip H*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable

FTR 8: 4 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 1 Su-27

Flanker; 1 Su-27UBK *Flanker*

FGA 2 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum*

TPT • Light 5: 1 Beech 200 *King Air*; 4 Y-12(II)

TRG 16+: 8 L-90 *Redigo*; 4 MB-339CE*; 4+ Z-143/Z-242

HELICOPTERS

MRH 8: 4 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey* (AB-412EP); 4 Mi-17

Hip H

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A


Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)

DEPLOYMENT

ETHIOPIA: Tigray: up to 20,000 (reported)

Ethiopia ETH

Ethiopian Birr ETB		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ETB	3.37tr	4.08tr	
	USD	96.6bn	92.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	994	940	
Growth	%	6.1	2.0	
Inflation	%	20.4	25.2	
Def bdgt	ETB	15.0bn	16.5bn	
	USD	429m	375m	
USD1=ETB		34.93	43.97	



Population 110,871,031

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.9%	5.3%	4.5%	3.9%	14.7%	1.6%
Female	19.6%	5.2%	4.5%	4.0%	14.9%	1.9%

Capabilities

Ethiopia's armed forces, among the region's largest and most capable, have been engaged in fighting armed groups in and around the northern province of Tigray since November 2020. This has created a humanitarian crisis, and both Tigrayan and government forces and their allies have been subject to allegations of human-rights violations. In 2021, the conflict began to involve other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, countering al-Shabaab remains an ongoing military commitment and Ethiopia continues to contribute to the AMISOM mission in Somalia and also to the UN mission in South Sudan. The armed forces are experienced by regional standards, following a history of combat operations and international peacekeeping deployments. The authorities are now trying to expand personnel numbers. The country's inventory comprises mostly Soviet-era equipment, though surplus stocks have been acquired from China, Hungary, Ukraine and the US, and modern air-defence systems purchased from Russia. Armed UAVs have recently been bought from abroad. The loss of Northern Command bases in the early fighting led to equipment losses, but reports of recent imports from other sources remain unconfirmed, as does the extent of equipment attrition during the conflict. There is a modest local defence-industrial base, with some licensed production of light armoured vehicles. There is adequate maintenance capability but only a limited capacity to support advanced platforms.

ACTIVE 138,000 (Army 135,000 Air 3,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 135,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

5 mech inf div(-)

Light

18 inf div(-)

Other

1 (Republican Guard) gd div

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 370: €180 T-55/T-62; €190 T-72B/UA1

RECCE €100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

IFV €20 BMP-1

APC 375+

APC (T) some ZSD-89

APC (W) 300+: €300 BTR-60/BTR-152; some WZ-551

PPV 75 Gaia Thunder

AUV some Ze'ev

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 ARV reported; 3 BTS-5B

VLB GQL-111; MTU reported

MW Bozena

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger);

9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggen)

RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11

GUNS 85mm D-44

ARTILLERY 450+

SP 10+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S19 Msta-S

TOWED 400+: 122mm €400 D-30/M-30 (M-1938);

130mm M-46; 155mm AH2

MRL 40+: 107mm PH-63; 122mm €40 BM-21 Grad;

300mm AR-2

MOR 81mm M1/M29; 82mm M-1937; 120mm M-1944

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Medium-range €4 S-75M3 Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline)

Short-range €4 S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)

Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310

Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); €6 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka

TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Air Force 3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger H/C

1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; C-130B

Hercules; DHC-6 Twin Otter; L-100-30; Yak-40 Codling (VIP)

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 Albatros

1 sqn with G 120TP

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H;

SA316 Alouette III

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable

FTR 11: 8 Su-27 Flanker; 3 Su-27UB Flanker

FGA 6+ MiG-23BN/UB Flogger H/C

ATK 3: 1 Su-25T Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot

TPT 14: Medium 8: 3 An-12 *Cub*; 2 C-130B *Hercules*; 2 C-130E *Hercules*; 1 L-100-30; **Light 6:** 1 An-26 *Curl*; 1 An-32 *Cline*; 3 DHC-6 *Twin Otter*; 1 Yak-40 *Codling* (VIP)
TRG 24: 12 G 120TP; 12 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 18: 15 Mi-24 *Hind*; 3 Mi-35 *Hind*
MRH 19: 1 AW139; 6 SA316 *Alouette III*; 12 Mi-8 *Hip*/
 Mi-17 *Hip H*

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

CISR • Heavy some *Wing Loong I*; **Medium** some *Mohajer 6* (reported); some *Bayraktar TB2*; some *Mohajer 6* (reported).

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **IR/SARH R-23/R-24** (RS-AA-7 *Apex*); R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*)
ASM Kh-25ML (RS-AS-12B *Kegler*); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B *Kedge*); TL-2 (reported)

BOMBS

TV-guided KAB-500KR

DEPLOYMENT

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1

SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,523; 3 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3,306; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 med bn

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Political tensions between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front resulted in the outbreak of open fighting between the Tigray Defense Force and the Ethiopian National Defense Force in November 2020. Following early reverses, federal government forces were subsequently reinforced by forces from other Ethiopian regions as well as troops from the Eritrean Defense Forces.

Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)

A significant amount of Ethiopian National Defense Force heavy equipment, including long-range rocket and missile artillery, was captured by the TDF early in the conflict. It is unclear how much of this materiel remains in operation.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-55; T-62; T-72B

APC

APC (T) ZSD-89

APC (W) WZ-551

ARTILLERY

TOWED 107mm PH-63; **122mm** D-30; **130mm** M-46; **155mm** AH-2

MRL 122mm BM-21

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range S-125M1 *Pechora-M1* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)

Point-defence 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS

TOWED 23mm ZU-23; **37mm** M-1939


FOREIGN FORCES

Eritrea Army: up to 20,000 (reported)

Gabon GAB

CFA Franc BEAC XAF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XAF	8.82tr	10.0tr	
	USD	15.3bn	18.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	7,277	8,569	
Growth	%	-1.8	1.5	
Inflation	%	1.3	2.0	
Def bdgt [a]	XAF	156bn	173bn	
	USD	272m	315m	
USD1=XAF		574.75	549.21	

[a] Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard



Population 2,284,912

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	18.2%	5.9%	5.4%	5.1%	15.2%	2.0%
Female	17.7%	5.5%	4.9%	4.3%	13.7%	2.0%

Capabilities

Oil revenues have allowed the government to support small but regionally capable armed forces, while the country has benefited from the long-term presence of French troops acting as a security guarantor. There is regular training with French forces, including with France's regionally deployed naval units, as well as with the US and other international partners. There are reports of a developing security relationship with Russia. Gabonese forces have taken part in the US Navy-led *Obangame Express* exercise. A new maritime-operations centre was built by the US in 2019. Military medicine is well regarded. The armed forces retain sufficient airlift to ensure mobility within the country, but very limited capability to project power by sea and air. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 3,200

Republican Guard under direct presidential control

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 (Republican Guard) gd gp (bn)

(1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty)

8 inf coy

Air Manoeuvre

1 cdo/AB coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**RECCE 77: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 *Jararaca*; 14 EE-9 *Cascavel*; 6 ERC-90F4 *Sagaie*; 7 RAM V-2; 14 VBLIFV 17: 12 EE-11 *Urutu* (with 20mm gun); 5 VN-1+ APC 77APC (W) 35: 9 LAV-150 *Commando*; 5 *Bastion* APC; 3 WZ-523; 5 VAB; 12 VXB-170; 1 *Pandur*PPV 42: 8 *Aravis*; 34 Ashok Leyland MPV**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 67

TOWED 105mm 4 M101

MRL 24: 107mm 16 PH-63; 140mm 8 *Teruel*

MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 41

SP 20mm 4 ERC-20

TOWED 37+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 40mm 3 L/70

Navy €500

HQ located at Port Gentil

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10**PB 10: 1 *Patrat*; 4 *Port Gentil* (FRA VCSM); 4 Rodman 66; 1 *Vice Amiral d'Escadre Jean Léonard Mbini* (PRC 66m)**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1**

LCM 1 Mk 9 (ex-UK)

Air Force 1,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with *Mirage F-1AZ***TRANSPORT**1 (Republican Guard) sqn with AS332 *Super Puma*; ATR-42F; *Falcon* 900; Gulfstream IV-SP/G650ER1 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; CN-235M-100**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (AB-412); SA330C/H *Puma*; SA342M *Gazelle***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable**FGA 6 *Mirage F-1AZ*

MP (1 EMB-111* in store)

TPT 6: **Medium** 1 C-130H *Hercules*; (1 L-100-30 in store);**Light** 2: 1 ATR-42F; 1 CN-235M-100; **PAX** 3: 1 *Falcon* 900;

1 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream G650ER

TRG 2 MB-326 *Impala* I* (4 CM-170 *Magister* in store)**HELICOPTERS**MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 *Twin Huey* (AB-412); 1 SA342M *Gazelle*; (2 SA342L *Gazelle* in store)TPT 7: **Medium** 4: 1 AS332 *Super Puma*; 3 SA330C/H *Puma*; **Light** 3: 2 H120 *Colibri*; 1 H135**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR U-Darter**
(reported)**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000****Gendarmerie 2,000****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

2 armd sqn

Other

3 paramilitary bde

11 paramilitary coy

Aviation1 unit with AS350 *Ecureuil*; AS355 *Ecureuil* II**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**HELICOPTERS • TPT • **Light** 4: 2 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 2 AS355 *Ecureuil* II**DEPLOYMENT**

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 43

FOREIGN FORCES

France 350; 1 inf bn

Gambia GAM

Gambian Dalasi GMD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GMD	96.0bn	106bn	
	USD	1.9bn	2.0bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	770	819	
Growth	%	-0.2	4.9	
Inflation	%	5.9	7.0	
Def bdtg	GMD	762m	834m	
	USD	15m	16m	
USD1=GMD		51.58	51.73	

Population 2,221,301

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	17.6%	5.2%	4.7%	4.4%	15.6%	1.7%
Female	17.5%	5.3%	4.9%	4.6%	16.4%	2.1%

Capabilities

Reform of Gambia's security structure, and the armed forces, has been a key objective of the SSR process that was implemented following political instability in 2016-17. The SSR process is supported by UN organisations, the AU, ECOWAS, EU, France, the UK and the US. A National Defence Policy is under development. Gambia's small forces have traditionally focused on maritime security and countering human trafficking. France, Germany, Turkey, the UK and US have delivered military support in recent years. There is also cooperation with neighbouring states and with the AU, which maintains a technical-support mission to assist in the SSR process, including on defence reform, military reorganisation and the rule of law. The ECOMIG deployment remains in place, with its mandate extended until the end of 2021, after which it is scheduled to transform into a police mission. The armed forces participate in some multinational exercises and have deployed

in support of UN missions in Africa. The equipment inventory is limited, with serviceability in doubt for some types. Gambia has no significant defence-industrial capabilities.

ACTIVE 4,100 (Army 3,500 Navy 300 National Guard 300)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Gambian National Army 3,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

4 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr sqn

Air Wing

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT 5: Light 2 AT-802A *Air Tractor*; PAX 3: 1 B-727; 1 CL-601; 1 Il-62M *Classic* (VIP)

Gambia Navy 300

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8

PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 *Fatimah I*

PB 4: 1 *Bolong Kantat*; 3 *Taipei* (ROC *Hai Ou*) (one additional damaged and in reserve)

Republican National Guard 300

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 gd bn (forming)

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5

FOREIGN FORCES

Ghana ECOMIG 50


Nigeria ECOMIG 197

Senegal ECOMIG 250

Ghana GHA

Ghanaian Cedi GHS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	GHS	383bn	447bn	
	USD	68.5bn	75.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,226	2,413	
Growth	%	0.4	4.7	
Inflation	%	9.9	9.3	
Def bdtg	GHS	1.54bn	2.10bn	
	USD	276m	355m	
USD1=GHS		5.60	5.92	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 32,372,889

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	19.3%	4.9%	4.2%	3.7%	14.6%	1.9%
Female	19.0%	4.9%	4.3%	4.0%	16.7%	2.4%

Capabilities

Ghana's armed forces are among the most capable in the region, with a long-term development plan covering both the current and next decade. The ability to control its EEZ is of increasing importance, and this underpins the navy's expansion plans, including the opening of a new forward-operating base. Internal and maritime security are central military tasks, along with peacekeeping missions. The US delivers training and support and there is also significant and long-standing defence engagement with the UK. Air-force training, close-air support and airlift capabilities have developed in recent years. There are plans to boost training and exercises, as well as to improve military infrastructure. The army is a regular contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. The development of forward-operating bases continues, with the principal objective of protecting energy resources. There is a limited defence-industrial base, including maintenance facilities and ammunition manufacturing as well as a more recent armoured-vehicle production capability.

ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 11,500

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 comd HQ

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd recce regt (2 recce sqn)

1 armd recce regt (forming)

Light

1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn

6 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

2 AB coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt (1 arty bty, 2 mor bty)
 1 fd engr regt (bn)
 1 sigs regt
 1 sigs sqn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp
 1 tpt coy
 2 maint coy
 1 med coy
 1 trg bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 3 EE-9 *Cascavel*
 IFV 48: 24 *Ratel-90*; 15 *Ratel-20*; 4 *Piranha* 25mm; 5+
 Type-05P 25mm
 APC 105
 APC (W) 55+: 46 *Piranha*; 9+ Type-05P
 PPV 50 Streit *Typhoon*
 AUV 73 *Cobra/Cobra II*

ARTILLERY 87+

TOWED 122mm 6 D-30
 MRL 3+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 3 Type-81
 MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

AEV 1 Type-05P AEV
 ARV *Piranha* reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†
 GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+; 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4;
 23mm 4 ZU-23-2

Navy 2,000

Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14**

PCO 2 *Anzone* (US)
 PCC 10: 2 *Achimota* (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm gun; 2 *Dzata* (GER Lurssen 45m); 4 *Snake* (PRC 47m); 2 *Yaa Asantewa* (ex-GER *Albatros*)
 PBF 1 *Stephen Otu* (ROK *Sea Dolphin*)
 PB 1 *David Hansen* (US)

Special Boat Squadron**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF unit

Air Force 2,000**FORCES BY ROLE****GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**; L-39ZO*; MB-339A*

ISR

1 unit with DA42

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with BN-2 *Defender*; C295; Cessna 172

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AW109A; Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*; Mi-17V-5
Hip H; SA319 *Alouette III*; Z-9EH

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable**

ATK (3 MB-326K in store)
 TPT 10: **Light** 10: 1 BN-2 *Defender*; 3 C295; 3 Cessna 172;
 3 DA42; (PAX 1 F-28 *Fellowship* (VIP) in store)
 TRG 8: 4 K-8 *Karakorum**; 2 L-39ZO*; 2 MB-339A*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 10: 1 Bell 412SP *Twin Huey*; 3 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*; 2
 SA319 *Alouette III*; 4 Z-9EH
 TPT 6: **Medium** 4 Mi-171Sh; **Light** 2 AW109A

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 13

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
 MONUSCO 20

GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 50

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 877; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 154; 1 engr coy

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 881; 1 inf bn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8


SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 6

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 17

Guinea GUI

Guinean Franc GNF	2020	2021	2022
GDP	GNF 147tr	172tr	
	USD 15.4bn	16.7bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD 1,102	1,168	
Growth	% 7.1	5.2	
Inflation	% 10.6	11.6	
Def bdtg	GNF 2.02tr	2.41tr	
	USD 211m	234m	
USD1=GNF	9565.11	10301.34	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 12,877,894

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	20.7%	5.3%	4.5%	3.7%	14.0%	1.8%
Female	20.4%	5.2%	4.4%	3.7%	14.1%	2.2%

Capabilities

Guinea's armed forces remain limited in size and conventional capacity. Special-forces troops toppled the government of former president Alpha Condé in September 2021, with their leader, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, sworn in as interim leader a month later.

ECOWAS has sanctioned the new leadership and called for elections within six months. Since 2010, there have been plans to bring the armed forces under political control and begin a professionalisation process. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a key concern, as is illegal trafficking and fishing. A military-programme law for the period 2015–20 was not fully implemented due to funding issues. Defence cooperation in recent years with France and the US has led to financial and training assistance, including for personnel earmarked for deployment to Mali. Much of the country's military equipment is ageing and of Soviet-era vintage; serviceability will be questionable for some types. There is limited organic airlift and France is supporting the development of a light aviation observation capability. Guinea is also attempting to improve its logistics and military-health capacities. There are no significant defence-industrial capabilities.

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,500 Navy 400 Air 800)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,600

Conscript liability 9–12 months (students, before graduation)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bn

Light

1 SF bn

5 inf bn

1 ranger bn

1 cdo bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 air mob bn

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 AD bn

1 engr bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 38: 30 T-34; 8 T-54

LT TK 15 PT-76

RECCE 27: 2 AML-90; 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

IFV 2 BMP-1

APC 59

APC (T) 10 BTR-50

APC (W) 30: 16 BTR-40; 8 BTR-60; 6 BTR-152

PPV 19: 10 *Mambati*; some *Puma* M26; 9 *Puma* M36

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111-1 *Konkurs* (RS-AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 82mm B-10

GUNS 6+: 57mm ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 6 D-44

ARTILLERY 47+

TOWED 24: 122mm 12 M-1931/37; 130mm 12 M-46

MRL 220mm 3 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 20+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 20 M-1938/M-1943

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 24+: 30mm M-53 (twin); 37mm 8 M-1939; 57mm 12 Type-59 (S-60); 100mm 4 KS-19

Navy €400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PB 4: 1 Swiftship†; 3 RPB 20

Air Force 800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

AIRCRAFT

FGA (3 MiG-21 *Fishbed* non-op)

TPT • Light 4: 2 An-2 *Colt*; 2 *Tetras*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*

MRH 5: 2 MD-500MD; 2 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; 1 SA342K *Gazelle*

TPT 2: Medium 1 SA330 *Puma*; Light 1 AS350B *Ecureuil*

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)†

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,600 active

Gendarmerie 1,000

Republican Guard 1,600

People's Militia 7,000 reservists

DEPLOYMENT

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 666; 1 mech inf bn

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3


SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

Guinea-Bissau GNB

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	824bn	874bn	
	USD	1.43bn	1.59bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	790	858	
Growth	%	-1.4	3.3	
Inflation	%	1.5	1.9	
Def bdtg	XOF	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=XOF		574.65	549.15	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 1,976,187

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	21.6%	5.5%	4.5%	3.7%	12.2%	1.3%
Female	21.4%	5.6%	4.8%	4.1%	13.5%	1.8%

Capabilities

Guinea-Bissau's armed forces have limited capabilities and are in the midst of DDR and SSR programmes. The UN expressed concern about the armed forces' role in politics, following political disputes after the late-2019 election. Defence policy is focused mainly on tackling internal-security challenges, in particular drug trafficking. The ECOWAS and UN missions withdrew before the end of 2020. Training remains limited and there are problems with recruitment and retention, as well as in developing adequate non-commissioned-officer structures. Much of the country's military equipment is ageing and maintenance likely limits military effectiveness. There is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 4,450 (Army 4,000 Navy 350 Air 100)

Conscript liability Selective conscription

Personnel and eqpt totals should be treated with caution. A number of draft laws to restructure the armed services and police have been produced

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce coy

Armoured

1 armd bn (sqn)

Light

5 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 10 T-34

LT TK 15 PT-76

RECCE 10 BRDM-2

APC • APC (W) 55: 35 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 Type-56 (BTR-152)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 82mm B-10

GUNS 85mm 8 D-44

ARTILLERY 26+

TOWED 122mm 18 D-30/M-30 (M-1938)

MOR 8+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 8 M-1943

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 34: 23mm 18 ZU-23; 37mm 6 M-1939; 57mm 10 S-60

Navy €350

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PB 4: 2 *Alfeite*†; 2 Rodman 55m

Air Force 100


EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 208B

Kenya KEN

Kenyan Shilling KES		2020	2021	2022
GDP	KES	10.8tr	12.0tr	
	USD	102bn	109bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	2,104	2,199	
Growth	%	-0.3	5.6	
Inflation	%	5.2	6.0	
Def bdtg [a]	KES	117bn	120bn	
	USD	1.11bn	1.09bn	
USD1=KES		104.98	109.38	

[a] Includes national intelligence funding



Population 54,685,051

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	19.1%	5.8%	4.7%	3.8%	15.3%	1.4%
Female	18.9%	5.7%	4.7%	3.8%	15.3%	1.7%

Capabilities

The armed forces are concerned with threats to regional stability and tackling security challenges, particularly from neighbouring Somalia, though there is also concern about the possibility of overspill from the conflict in Ethiopia. A separate coastguard service was established in late 2018 to boost maritime security. The long-standing defence and security agreement with the UK was reaffirmed with a new five-year Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2021, which has included a permanent UK training unit within the country and dedicated support for maritime security and a counter-IED training centre. There are also significant defence ties with the US and evidence of developing relationships with the Chinese and Jordanian armed forces. Regular operational deployments have increased military experience and confidence. Kenya has been a key contributor to AMISOM in Somalia, demonstrating limited capacity to project power immediately beyond its own territory. The armed forces also provide smaller contributions to other UN missions and are a leading element of the East African Standby Force. Kenya's armed forces regularly participate in multinational exercises. Involvement in regional security missions and multinational exercises may also foster improved levels of cooperation and interoperability. Training has received attention, given the need to prepare for AU deployments. Recent equipment investments have focused on improving counter-insurgency capabilities and transport capacity to support regional deployments. There is a limited defence industry focused on equipment maintenance as well as the manufacture of small arms and ammunition.

ACTIVE 24,100 (Army 20,000 Navy 1,600 Air 2,500)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bn

1 ranger regt (1 ranger bn, 1 AB bn)

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 armd bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn)

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn)

Light

3 inf bde (3 inf bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde (2 arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 mor bty)

1 engr bde (2 engr bn)

HELICOPTER

1 air cav bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****MBT** 78 Vickers Mk 3**RECCE** 92: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 *Ferret*; 8 S52 *Shorland***APC** 200**APC (W)** 95: 52 UR-416; 31 WZ-551; 12 *Bastion* APC; (10 M3 Panhard in store)**PPV** 105 *Puma* M26-15; CS/VP14**ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES****ARV** 7 Vickers ARV**MW** *Bozena***ARTILLERY** 111**SP 155mm** 2+ *Nora* B-52**TOWED 105mm** 47: 40 L118 Light Gun; 7 Model 56 pack howitzer**MOR** 62: **81mm** 50; **120mm** 12 Brandt**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL • MANPATS** *Milan***RCL 84mm** *Carl Gustaf***HELICOPTERS****MRH** 42: 2 Hughes 500D+; 12 Hughes 500M+; 10 Hughes 500MD *Scout Defender*+ (with TOW); 9 Hughes 500ME+; 6 MD-530F; 3 Z-9W**AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED** 94: **20mm** 81: 11Oerlikon; ε70 TCM-20; **40mm** 13 L/70**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM TOW****Navy** 1,600 (incl 120 marines)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 7**PCO** 1 *Jasiri* with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun**PCF** 2 *Nyayo***PCC** 3: 1 *Harambee* II (ex-FRA P400); 1 *Shujaa* with 1 76mm gun; 1 *Shujaa***PBF** 1 *Archangel***AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT** 2**LCM** 2 *Galana***LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP** 2**Air Force** 2,500**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with F-5E/F *Tiger* II**TRANSPORT**Some sqn with DHC-5D *Buffalo*+; DHC-8+; F-70+ (VIP); Y-12(II)+; C-27J *Spartan*; M-28 *Skytruck* (C-145A)**TRAINING**Some sqn with *Bulldog* 103/*Bulldog* 127+; EMB-312 *Tucano*+***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with SA330 *Pumat***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE+****AIRCRAFT** 32 combat capable**FTR** 21: 17 F-5E *Tiger* II; 4 F-5F *Tiger* II**TPT** 20: **Medium** 3 C-27J *Spartan*; **Light** 16: 4 DHC-5D *Buffalo*+; 3 DHC-8+; 2 M-28 *Skytruck* (C-145A); 7 Y-12(II)+; (6 Do-28D-2 in store); **PAX** 1 F-70 (VIP)**TRG** 33: 8 *Bulldog* 103/127+; 11 EMB-312 *Tucano*+*; 5 G 120A; 9 G 120TP**HELICOPTERS****ATK** 3 AH-1F *Cobra***MRH** 12: 3 AW139; 9 H125M (AS550) *Fennec***TPT** 19: **Medium** 11: 1 Mi-171E; 10 SA330 *Pumat*; **Light** 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Huey* II)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES****AAM • IR** AIM-9 *Sidewinder***ASM** AGM-65 *Maverick***Gendarmerie & Paramilitary** 5,000**Police General Service Unit** 5,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****APC • PPV** 25 CS/VP3**AUV** 30: some Streit *Cyclone*; 30 VN-4**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 5**PB** 5 (2 on Lake Victoria)**Air Wing****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light** 6: 2 Cessna 208B *Grand Caravan*; 3 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402**HELICOPTERS****MRH** 3 Mi-17 *Hip* H**TPT** 5: **Medium** 1 Mi-17V-5; **Light** 4: 2 AW139; 1 Bell 206L *Long Ranger*; 1 Bo-105**TRG** 1 Bell 47G**Coast Guard**

Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 1**PCC** 1 *Doria* with 1 hel landing platform**DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 15**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN •


MONUSCO 262; 1 inf coy(+)

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 4**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 10**SOMALIA:** AU • AMISOM 4,000; 3 inf bn; UN • UNSOS 1**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 19**FOREIGN FORCES**

United Kingdom BATUK 350; 1 trg unit

Lesotho LSO

Lesotho Loti LSL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LSL	32.7bn	35.4bn	
	USD	2.00bn	2.48bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	970	1,188	
Growth	%	-5.4	2.8	
Inflation	%	5.0	5.8	
Def bdtg	LSL	621m	519m	
	USD	37.9m	36.3m	
USD1=LSL		16.37	14.30	



Population 2,177,740

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	16.8%	5.2%	4.7%	4.3%	16.4%	2.0%
Female	16.6%	5.2%	4.6%	4.1%	16.8%	3.4%

Capabilities

Lesotho has a small ground force and an air wing for light transport and liaison. It is a SADC member state, and a force from that organisation deployed to the country in late 2017 to support the government following the assassination of the army chief. The mission concluded at the end of November 2018. The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) is charged with protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty and ensuring internal security. The armed forces are comprised of volunteers. India has provided training to the LDF since 2001. In April 2020 the army was briefly deployed internally by the prime minister. The armed forces, and military facilities, were also utilised in the country's coronavirus response. There is limited capacity to deploy and sustain missions beyond national borders, though Lesotho deployed personnel to Mozambique in 2021 as part of the SADC mission, with some moved by an Angolan Il-76. Lesotho's limited inventory is obsolescent by modern standards and there is little possibility of significant recapitalisation, although there is an aspiration to acquire light helicopters. Except for limited maintenance capacity, there is no defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce coy

Light

7 inf coy

Aviation

1 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bty(-)

1 spt coy (with mor)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURD FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 1 T-55

RECCE 30: 4 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2+; 6 RAM Mk3; 10

RBV-1; 8 S52 *Shorland*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm 6 M40

ARTILLERY 12

TOWED 105mm 2

MOR 81mm 10

Air Wing 110

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 3: 2 C-212-300 *Aviocar*; 1 GA-8 *Airvan*

HELICOPTERS

MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 2 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

TPT • Light 4: 1 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*; 3 H125 (AS350)


Ecureuil

DEPLOYMENT

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 71

Liberia LBR

Liberian Dollar LRD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	LRD	3.04bn	3.38bn	
	USD	3.04bn	3.38bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	647	703	
Growth	%	-3.0	3.6	
Inflation	%	17.0	5.9	
Def bdtg	LRD	12.2m	19.6m	
	USD	12.2m	19.6m	
USD1=LRD		1.00	1.00	



Population 5,214,030

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	21.8%	5.4%	4.8%	3.3%	13.2%	1.4%
Female	21.3%	5.4%	4.8%	3.4%	13.6%	1.4%

Capabilities

A revised National Security Strategy was produced in 2017, reportedly clarifying the roles of Liberia's security institutions; priorities include improving infrastructure, training, operational readiness and personnel welfare. A new National Security Agency headquarters was opened in 2021. There are plans to establish an air wing. US military assistance has in recent years focused on areas such as force health, including schemes to improve recruitment and retention, as well as maritime security and military medicine, training and the provision of spare parts (including for the coastguard). The armed forces are able to deploy and sustain small units, such as to the MINUSMA mission in Mali. Equipment recapitalisation will depend on finances and the development of a supporting force structure but will also be dictated by the armed

forces' role in national development objectives. Apart from limited maintenance-support capacities, Liberia has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 2,010 (Army 1,950, Coast Guard 60)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,950

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 (23rd) inf bde with (2 inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 trg unit (forming)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV 3+ Streit *Cougar*

Coast Guard 60

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 162; 1 inf coy


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

Madagascar MDG

Malagasy Ariary MGA	2020	2021	2022
GDP	MGA 49.9tr	54.5tr	
	USD 13.2bn	14.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD 462	499	
Growth	% -6.1	2.9	
Inflation	% 4.2	6.0	
Def bdgt	MGA 407bn	390bn	
	USD 107m	101m	
USD1=MGA	3787.80	3861.86	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 27,534,354

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.3%	5.3%	4.7%	4.2%	14.8%	1.7%
Female	18.9%	5.2%	4.7%	4.2%	14.9%	2.0%

Capabilities

Madagascar's principal defence aspirations include ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. Maritime security is also an area of focus. The army is the largest armed service. The armed forces intervened in domestic politics in 2009. Madagascar is a member of the SADC and its regional Standby Force. In 2018, the country signed an 'umbrella defence agreement' with India to explore closer defence ties and an intergovernmental agreement with

Russia on military cooperation. China has also embarked on outreach activities to foster better relations with Madagascar. There is no independent capacity to deploy and support operations beyond national borders. The equipment inventory is obsolescent, and with economic development a key government target, equipment recapitalisation is unlikely to be a key priority. A small number of second-hand transport aircraft and helicopters were acquired in 2019, modestly boosting military mobility. In 2020, UAE-manufactured protected patrol vehicles were observed at a parade.

ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100

Conscript liability 18 months (incl for civil purposes)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 12,500+

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 (intervention) inf regt

10 (regional) inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

3 engr regt

1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 ADA regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 12 PT-76

RECCE 73: €35 BRDM-2; 10 FV701 *Ferret*; €20 M3A1; 8 M8

APC • APC (T) €30 M3A1 half-track

AUV 6 *Panthera* T4

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 25+

TOWED 17: 105mm 5 M101; 122mm 12 D-30

MOR 8+: 82mm M-37; 120mm 8 M-43

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 70: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 37mm 20 PG-55 (M-1939)

Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8

PCC 1 *Trozona*

PB 7 (ex-US CG MLB)

AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (ex-FRA EDIC)

Air Force 500

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Yak-40 *Codling* (VIP)

1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 310; Cessna 337 *Skymaster*;

PA-23 *Aztec*

TRAINING

1 sqn with Cessna 172; J.300 *Joker*; *Tetras*


TRANSPORT HELICOPTER1 sqn with SA318C *Alouette II***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT 22: **Light** 20: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 4 Cessna 172; 5 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 337 *Skymaster*; 1 CN235M; 2 J.300 *Joker*; 1 PA-23 *Aztec*; 1 *Tetras*; 2 Yak-40 *Codling* (VIP); PAX 2 B-737

HELICOPTERSMRH 3 SA318C *Alouette II*TPT • **Light** 4: 3 AS350 *Ecureuil*; 1 BK117**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100****Gendarmerie 8,100****Malawi MWI**

Malawian Kwacha MWK		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MWK	8.82tr	9.77tr	
	USD	11.8bn	12.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	568	566	
Growth	%	0.9	2.2	
Inflation	%	8.6	9.5	
Def bdtg	MWK	51.1bn	65.8bn	
	USD	68.7m	81.8m	
USD1=MWK		744.10	804.42	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 20,308,502

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	19.9%	5.5%	4.7%	4.0%	13.2%	1.7%
Female	20.2%	5.7%	4.9%	4.2%	14.0%	2.0%

Capabilities

The Malawi Defence Forces (MDF) are constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. Additional tasks include providing military assistance to civil authorities and support to the police, and in recent years the army has been used to help with infrastructure development, attempts to control illegal deforestation and the government's coronavirus response. The army is the largest of the armed forces. Counter-trafficking is a role for the MDF's small air force, previously an air wing, and its naval unit. Development priorities include improving combat readiness and military medicine and engineering. Malawi is a member of the SADC and its Standby Force. The armed forces have contributed to AU and UN peacekeeping operations, including in Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC. The UK provided training and support for the deployment to the DRC (to the Force Intervention Brigade), and the UK also supports the MDF's counter-poaching operations. The armed forces have no independent capacity to deploy and support operations beyond national borders.

ACTIVE 10,700 (Army 10,500 Air Force 200)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 10,500****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

1 mech bn

Light

2 inf bde (2 inf bn)

1 inf bde (1 inf bn)

Air Manoeuvre

1 para bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 lt arty bty

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

12 log coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

RECCE 66: 30 *Eland-90*; 8 FV701 *Ferret*; 20 FV721 *Fox*; 8 RAM Mk3

APC • **PPV** 31: 14 *Casspir*; 9 *Marauder*; 8 *Puma* M26-15

ARTILLERY 107**TOWED 105mm** 9 L118 Light Gun**MOR 81mm** 98: 82 L16A1; 16 M3

AIR DEFENCE • **GUNS** • **TOWED 72: 12.7mm** 32;
14.5mm 40 ZPU-4

Navy 220**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • **PB** 3: 1 *Kasungu* (ex-FRA *Antares*)†; 2 *Mutharika* (PRC)

Air Force 200**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** • TPT • **Light** 1 Do-228

HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: **Medium** 3: 1 AS532UL *Cougar*; 1 SA330H *Puma*; 1 H215 *Super Puma* **Light** 5: 1 AS350L *Ecureuil*; 4 SA341B *Gazelle*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200**Police Mobile Service 4,200****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****RECCE** 8 S52 *Shorland***AIRCRAFT**

TPT • **Light** 4: 3 BN-2T *Defender* (border patrol); 1 SC.7 3M *Skyvan*

HELICOPTERS • **MRH** 2 AS365 *Dauphin 2***DEPLOYMENT**

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 718; 1 inf bn

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 6


SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

Mali MLI

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	10.1tr	10.7tr	
	USD	17.5bn	19.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	890	966	
Growth	%	-1.6	4.0	
Inflation	%	0.5	3.0	
Def bdgt [a]	XOF	452bn	474bn	
	USD	787m	863m	
USD1=XOF		574.77	549.22	

[a] Defence and security budget



Population 20,137,527

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	23.9%	5.2%	3.9%	3.0%	11.1%	1.5%
Female	23.6%	5.5%	4.5%	3.7%	12.5%	1.5%

Capabilities

The armed forces remain focused on countering rebel and Islamist groups. A defence-reform process is ongoing, but the objectives of the 2015–19 military-programming law have been only partly achieved. Improvements are still required in recruitment and training, as well as in basic administrative support. Mali is supported by neighbouring states in the G5 Sahel partnership, and has received training assistance from the EU, France and the US. However, two military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 have cast doubt on international support. The EU temporarily suspended its training mission after the 2020 coup, and Estonia, France and the US also temporarily suspended support. France maintains bases, personnel and equipment in Mali as part of *Operation Barkhane*, but is partly withdrawing from the northern part of the country; other states currently supporting *Barkhane* also deploy personnel and equipment in-country. The armed forces also participate in multinational exercises, particularly those focused on counter-terrorism capabilities, but still suffer from operational deficiencies as well as broader institutional weakness. Despite vehicle deliveries by external partners, and the acquisition of several aircraft, the armed forces remain under-equipped. Mali does not possess a defence-manufacturing industry and, with limited equipment and maintenance capabilities, equipment serviceability will likely be variable.

ACTIVE 21,000 (Army 19,000 Air Force 2,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €19,000

FORCES BY ROLE

The remnants of the pre-conflict Malian army are being reformed into new combined-arms battlegroups, each of which comprises one lt mech coy, three mot inf coy, one arty bty and additional recce, cdo and cbt spt elms

MANOEUVRE

Light

9 mot inf bn
1 inf coy (Special Joint Unit)
5 inf coy (ULRI)

Air Manoeuvre

1 para bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

LT TK 2+ PT-76

RECCE BRDM-2+

APC 232:

APC (W) 46+: 27 *Bastion* APC; 10+ BTR-60PB; 9 BTR-70

PPV 186: 50 *Casspir*; 13 *Marauder*; 30 *Puma* M26-15/*Puma* M36; 24 Stark Motors *Storm Light*; 30 *Streit Cougar*; 4 *Streit Gladiator*; 5+ *Streit Python*; 30 *Streit Typhoon*†

ARTILLERY 30+

TOWED 122mm D-30

MRL 122mm 30+ BM-21 *Grad*

Air Force 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with BT-67; C295W; Y-12E

TRAINING

1 sqn with *Tetras*

TRANSPORT/ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with H215; Mi-24D *Hind*; Mi-35M *Hind*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

ISR 1 Cessna 208 *Caravan*

TPT • Light 11: 1 BT-67; 1 C295W; 7 *Tetras*; 2 Y-12E (1 An-24 *Coke*; 2 An-26 *Curl*; 2 BN-2 *Islander* all in store)

TRG 3 A-29 *Super Tucano** (6 L-29 *Delfin*; 2 SF-260WL *Warrior** all in store)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6: 2 Mi-24D *Hind*; 4 Mi-35M *Hind*

TPT 7: Medium 6: 2 H215 (AS332L1) *Super Puma*; 4 Mi-171Sh *Hip*; (1 Mi-8 *Hip* in store); Light (1 AS350 *Ecureuil* in store)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 active

Gendarmerie 6,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

8 paramilitary coy

1 air tpt gp (2 sy coy; 1 tpt coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • PPV 1+ RG-31 *Nyala***National Guard 10,000**

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

6 (camel) cav coy

Light

1 inf coy (Anti-terrorist special force)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • PPV 1+ RG-31 *Nyala***National Police 1,000**

Militia 3,000

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 4**FOREIGN FORCES**


All under MINUSMA comd unless otherwise specified

Armenia 1**Australia** 1**Austria** 2 • EUTM Mali 21**Bangladesh** 1,118; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy**Belgium** 53 • *Operation Barkhane* 3 • EUTM Mali 15**Benin** 260; 1 mech inf coy**Bhutan** 5**Bosnia-Herzegovina** 2**Bulgaria** EUTM Mali 4**Burkina Faso** 936; 1 inf bn**Burundi** 1**Cambodia** 289; 2 engr coy; 1 EOD coy**Cameroon** 3**Canada** 5**Chad** 1,451; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn**China** 426; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital**Côte d'Ivoire** 802; 1 mech inf bn; 1 sy coy**Czech Republic** 4 • *Operation Barkhane* 60; 1 SF unit •
EUTM Mali 120**Denmark** 2**Egypt** 1,066; 1 SF coy; 1 sy bn; 1 MP coy**El Salvador** 176; 1 hel sqn with 3 MD-500E**Estonia** 2 • *Operation Barkhane* 75; 1 SF unit • EUTM Mali
10**Ethiopia** 1**Finland** 4 • EUTM Mali 12**France** 21 • *Operation Barkhane* 2,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log
bn; 1 tpt unit with 1 CN235M; 1 PC-6B; 1 hel unit with 5
Tiger; 5 AS532UL *Cougar*; 5 NH90 TTH; 4 SA342 *Gazelle* •
EUTM Mali 13**Gambia** 6**Georgia** EUTM Mali 1**Germany** 426; 1 obs; 1 sy coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn •
EUTM Mali 120**Ghana** 154; 1 engr coy**Greece** EUTM Mali 2**Guatemala** 2**Guinea** 666; 1 inf bn**Hungary** EUTM Mali 20**Indonesia** 9**Ireland** EUTM Mali 20**Italy** 2 • *Operation Barkhane* 100 • EUTM Mali 14**Jordan** 329; 1 mech inf coy(+)**Kenya** 10**Latvia** 1 • EUTM Mali 4**Liberia** 162; 1 sy coy**Lithuania** 45 • EUTM Mali 2**Luxembourg** EUTM Mali 15**Mauritania** 7**Mexico** 4**Moldova** EUTM Mali 3**Montenegro** EUTM Mali 2**Nepal** 202; 1 EOD coy**Netherlands** 5 • *Operation Barkhane* 4 • EUTM Mali 6**Niger** 873; 1 inf bn**Nigeria** 78; 1 fd hospital**Norway** 13; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130J**Pakistan** 217; 1 hel sqn**Portugal** 67; 1 tpt flt with 1 C295M • *Operation Barkhane* 2;
• EUTM Mali 11**Romania** 5 • EUTM Mali 1**Senegal** 1,003; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy**Sierra Leone** 18**Slovakia** EUTM Mali 15**Slovenia** EUTM Mali 8**Spain** 1 • EUTM Mali 540; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH**Sri Lanka** 242; 1 sy coy**Sweden** 187; 1 int coy • *Operation Barkhane* 150; 1 SF unit;
1 hel unit with 3 UH-60M • EUTM Mali 8**Switzerland** 6**Togo** 931; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital**Tunisia** 87; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130J-30**Ukraine** 12**United Kingdom** 256; 1 recce sqn • *Operation Barkhane* 90;
1 hel flt with 3 CH-47SD *Chinook* HC5**United States** 8**Zambia** 3

Mauritius MUS

Mauritian Rupee MUR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MUR	430bn	457bn	
	USD	10.9bn	11.0bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	8,619	8,682	
Growth	%	-14.9	5.0	
Inflation	%	2.5	5.1	
Def bdtg [a]	MUR	8.86bn	8.42bn	10.4bn
	USD	225m	203m	
USD1=MUR		39.35	41.52	

[a] Police service budget



Population 1,386,129

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.8%	3.5%	3.6%	3.8%	23.6%	4.8%
Female	9.4%	3.4%	3.5%	3.8%	24.2%	6.8%

Capabilities

The country has no standing armed forces; instead, responsibility for security lies with the Mauritius Police Force's Special Mobile Force (SMF), formed as a motorised infantry battalion. The SMF is tasked with ensuring internal and external territorial and maritime security. India provides support to the Mauritian National Coast Guard, which is also a branch of the police force, through training, equipment maintenance and leasing. The SMF trains along traditional military lines but has no ability to deploy beyond national borders. Apart from very limited maintenance facilities there is no defence industry.

ACTIVE NIL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,550

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,550

Special Mobile Force €1,750

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

2 rece coy

Light

5 (rifle) mot inf coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr sqn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt pl

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 2 VAB with 20mm gun

APC • APC (W) 12: 3 *Tactica*; 9 VAB

ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 2

Coast Guard €800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17

PCO 1 *Barracuda* with 1 hel landing platform

PCO 2 *Victory* (IND *Sarojini Naidu*)

PB 14: 10 (IND Fast Interceptor Boat); 1 P-2000; 1 SDB-Mk3; 2 *Rescuer* (FSU *Zhuk*)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T *Defender*; 3 Do-228-101

Police Air Wing

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE


HELICOPTERS

MRH 9: 1 H125 (AS555) *Fennec*; 2 *Dhruv*; 1 SA315B

Lama (*Cheetah*); 5 SA316 *Alouette III* (*Chetak*)

Mozambique MOZ

Mozambique Metical MZN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	MZN	975bn	1.06tr	
	USD	14.0bn	15.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	449	492	
Growth	%	-1.2	2.5	
Inflation	%	3.1	6.2	
Def bdtg	MZN	9.11bn	9.35bn	
	USD	131m	140m	
USD1=MZN		69.46	66.72	



Population 30,888,034

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	23.0%	5.5%	4.5%	3.6%	11.2%	1.4%
Female	22.4%	5.4%	4.6%	3.8%	13.0%	1.5%

Capabilities

Mozambique faces a growing internal threat from Islamist groups that continue to challenge national defence forces, with attacks being carried out in the country's northern province of Cabo Delgado. As a result, in 2021, SADC deployed a force comprising multiple regional states, while there has also been support from Portugal, Rwanda and the United States. The armed forces are tasked with ensuring territorial integrity and internal security, as well as tackling piracy and human trafficking. The integration of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) personnel into the military is a long-standing objective. Talks between the government and RENAMO from July 2019 resulted in most RENAMO fighters disarming, although some rebels have splintered into separate groups. Mozambique has defence relationships with China, Portugal and Russia, although US forces have delivered training to the Mozambican military in response to the growing insurgency. Private military contractors have also allegedly been hired to provide training to Mozambican forces. The armed forces have no capacity to deploy beyond Mozambique's borders without assistance. Soviet-era equipment makes up the majority of the inventory and maintaining this will be problematic, not least in the

absence of any local defence industry. Moreover, Mozambique's recent economic performance will likely limit the government's ability to recapitalise.

ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 10,000 Navy 200 Air 1,000)

Conscript liability 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €9,000–10,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

3 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Light

7 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

2-3 arty bn

2 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

Equipment estimated at 10% or less serviceability

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 60+ T-54

RECCE 30 BRDM-1/BRDM-2

IFV 40 BMP-1

APC 338

APC (T) 30 FV430

APC (W) 285: 160 BTR-60; 100 BTR-152; 25 AT-105 *Saxon*

PPV 23+: 11 *Casspir*; 12 *Marauder*; some Tata Motors

MRAP

AUV 9+ *Tiger* 4x4

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111 *Fagot* (RS-AT-4 *Spigot*)

RCL 75mm; 82mm B-10; 107mm 24 B-12

GUNS 85mm 18: 6 D-48; 12 PT-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 126

TOWED 62: 100mm 20 M-1944; 105mm 12 M101;

122mm 12 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 12 D-1

MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 *Grad*

MOR 52: 82mm 40 M-43; 120mm 12 M-43

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 290+

SP 57mm 20 ZSU-57-2

TOWED 270+: 20mm M-55; 23mm 120 ZU-23-2; 37mm 90 M-1939; (10 M-1939 in store); 57mm 60 S-60; (30 S-60 in store)

Navy €200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28

PBF 24: 20+ DV 15; 2 HSI 32; 2 *Namilti* (ex-IND C-401)

PB 4: 3 *Ocean Eagle* 43 (capacity 1 *Camcopter* S-100 UAV); 1 *Pebane* (ex-ESP *Conejera*)

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light 1 S-100 *Camcopter*

Air Force 1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with MiG-21bis *Fishbed*; MiG-21UM *Mongol* B

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; FTB-337G *Milirole*; Cessna 150B;

Cessna 172; PA-34 *Seneca*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*t

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable

FGA 8: 6 MiG-21bis *Fishbed*; 2 MiG-21UM *Mongol* B

ISR 2 FTB-337G *Milirole*

TPT 6: Light 5: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Cessna 150B; 1 Cessna 172; 1 PA-34 *Seneca*; (4 PA-32 *Cherokee* non-op); PAX 1 Hawker 850XP

TRG 3: 1 Aerostar R40S *Festival*; 2 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-24V *Hind* E

MRH 2+ SA314B *Gazelle*

TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8 *Hip*

FOREIGN FORCES

Angola SAMIM 18

Botswana SAMIM 110

Lesotho SAMIM 71

Malawi SAMIM 1

Portugal EUTM Mozambique 120

Rwanda Army: 1,500

South Africa SAMIM 272


Tanzania SAMIM 277

Zimbabwe SAMIM 1

Namibia NAM

Namibian Dollar NAD		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NAD	176bn	186bn	
	USD	10.7bn	12.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	4,276	4,693	
Growth	%	-8.0	1.3	
Inflation	%	2.2	4.0	
Def bdtg	NAD	6.23bn	5.43bn	
	USD	378m	357m	
USD1=NAD		16.46	15.20	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 2,678,191

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	17.8%	5.4%	4.8%	4.3%	15.1%	1.7%
Female	17.4%	5.3%	4.8%	4.4%	16.8%	2.2%

Capabilities

The Namibian defence authorities aim to develop a small, mobile professional force. According to the constitution, the primary mission of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is territorial defence. Secondary roles include assistance to the civil power and sup-

porting the AU, SADC and UN. The NDF Development Strategy 2012–22 states that the NDF design should be based on a conventional force with a force-projection capability. The navy exercises with the SADC as part of the SADC's Standing Maritime Committee. It also has conducted multinational training missions organised by US forces. Annual meetings of a permanent commission on defence and security between Namibia and Botswana were elevated in 2021 to a biannual commission, chaired by the two countries' heads of state. While the NDF receives a comparatively large proportion of the state budget, there have been recent problems in adequately funding training. Namibia has deployed on AU and UN missions, but there is only limited capacity for independent power projection. The NDF is equipped for the most part with ageing or obsolescent systems, but economic difficulties make recapitalisation unlikely in the near term. There is a limited defence-manufacturing sector mainly focused on armoured vehicles, tactical communications and ammunition.

ACTIVE 9,900 (Army 9,000 Navy 900) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 9,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce regt

Light

3 inf bde (total: 6 inf bn)

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde with (1 arty regt)

1 AT regt

1 engr regt

1 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT T-54/T-55+; T-34+

RECCE 12 BRDM-2

IFV 7: 5 Type-05P mod (with BMP-1 turret); 2 *Wolf Turbo* 2 mod (with BMP-1 turret)

APC 61

APC (W) 13: 10 BTR-60; 3 Type-05P

PPV 48: 20 *Casspir*; 28 *Wolf Turbo* 2

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 82mm B-10

GUNS 12+: 57mm ZIS-2; 76mm 12 ZIS-3

ARTILLERY 72

TOWED 140mm 24 G-2

MRL 122mm 8: 5 BM-21 *Grad*; 3 PHL-81

MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10)

GUNS 65

SP 23mm 15 *Zumlac*

TOWED 50+: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 57mm S-60

Navy €900

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7

PSO 1 *Elephant* with 1 hel landing platform

PCC 3: 2 *Daures* (ex-PRC *Haiqing* (Type-037-IS)) with 2

FQF-3200 A/S mor; 1 *Oryx*

PB 3: 1 *Brendan Sinbwaye* (BRZ *Grajaú*); 2 *Terrace Bay* (BRZ *Marlim*)

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 F406 *Caravan II*

HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 S-61L

Marines €700

Air Force

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NM); FT-7 (FT-7NG)

ISR

1 sqn with O-2A *Skymaster*

TRANSPORT

Some sqn with An-26 *Curl*; *Falcon* 900; Learjet 36; Y-12

TRAINING

1 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with H425; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-25 *Hind D*; SA315 *Lama* (*Cheetah*); SA316B *Alouette III* (*Chetak*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 11+ combat capable

FTR 7: 5 F-7 (F-7NM); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NG)

ISR 5 Cessna O-2A *Skymaster*

TPT 6: Light 5: 2 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Learjet 36; 2 Y-12; PAX 1 *Falcon* 900

TRG 4+ K-8 *Karakorum**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-25 *Hind D*

MRH 5: 1 H425; 1 SA315 *Lama* (*Cheetah*); 3 SA316B

Alouette III (*Chetak*)

TPT • Medium 1 Mi-8 *Hip*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,000

Police Force • Special Field Force 6,000 (incl Border Guard and Special Reserve Force)


DEPLOYMENT

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 7

Niger NER

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	7.91tr	8.56tr	
	USD	13.8bn	15.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	568	622	
Growth	%	3.6	5.4	
Inflation	%	2.9	2.9	
Def bdgt	XOF	121bn	112bn	
	USD	211m	205m	
USD1=XOF		574.77	547.36	



Population 23,605,767

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	25.3%	5.7%	4.3%	3.2%	9.8%	1.3%
Female	24.9%	5.8%	4.5%	3.3%	10.5%	1.4%

Capabilities

Principal military roles include maintaining internal and border security, in light of the regional threat from Islamist groups. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and part of the Multi-National Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. France has conducted joint counter-terrorism operations with Niger's armed forces. Niamey hosts air contingents from France, Germany (an air-transport base to supply its troops in neighbouring Mali) and the US, which maintains a detachment of UAVs. Niger's armed forces are combat experienced and relatively well trained, and there is training support from France, Italy and the US. Combat operations have also been conducted with US forces. There is limited capacity to deploy beyond neighbouring countries without external support. Operations in austere environments have demonstrated adequate sustainment and manoeuvre capacity. While there have been moves to integrate better-protected armoured vehicles, the armed forces are generally under-equipped and under-resourced. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 5,300 (Army 5,200 Air 100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 5,200

3 Mil Districts

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

4 armd recce sqn

Light

7 inf coy

Air Manoeuvre

2 AB coy

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr coy

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 132: 35 AML-20/AML-60; 90 AML-90; *Bastion Patsas*; 7 VBL

APC 148

APC (W) 55: 13 *Bastion* APC; 22 Panhard M3; 20 WZ-551

PPV 93+: 15 IAG *Guardian Xtreme*; 57 *Mamba* Mk7; 21 *Puma* M26-15; some *Puma* M36

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 14: 75mm 6 M20; 106mm 8 M40

ARTILLERY • MOR 40: 81mm 19 Brandt; 82mm 17; 120mm 4 Brandt

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 39

SP 20mm 10 Panhard M3 VDAA

TOWED 20mm 29

Air Force 100

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

ATK 2 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 6: 4 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 2 DA42 MPP *Twin Star*

TPT 8: **Medium** 2 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 5: 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Cessna 208 *Caravan*; 1 Do-28 *Skyservant*; 1 Do-228-201; PAX 1 B-737-700 (VIP)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 2 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 5: 2 Mi-17 *Hip*; 3 SA342 *Gazelle*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400

Gendarmerie 1,400

Republican Guard 2,500

National Police 1,500

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 873; 1 inf bn

FOREIGN FORCES

Belgium METT 130

Chad G5 Sahel 600; 1 inf bn


France *Operation Barkhane* 1,000; 1 FGA det with 4 *Mirage* 2000C/D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 *Atlantique* 2; 1 C-135FR; 1 C-130J-30; 1 UAV det with 6 MQ-9A *Reaper*

Italy MISIN 295; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CBRN unit; 1 med unit; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit

United States 800; 1 ISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A *Reaper*

Nigeria NGA

Nigerian Naira NGN		2020	2021	2022
GDP	NGN	154tr	183tr	
	USD	429bn	480bn	
per capita	USD	2,083	2,273	
Growth	%	-1.8	2.6	
Inflation	%	13.2	16.9	
Def bdgt	NGN	900bn	966bn	1.4tr
	USD	2.51bn	2.54bn	
USD1=NGN		359.21	380.00	



Population 219,463,862

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.1%	5.7%	4.7%	3.7%	13.7%	1.6%
Female	20.2%	5.5%	4.6%	3.7%	13.8%	1.8%

Capabilities

Nigeria is West Africa's principal military power and faces numerous security challenges, including from the Islamic State West African Province, Boko Haram and militants in the Delta. Reform initiatives have developed after relative military weaknesses were exposed during counter-insurgency operations. There have been operational changes, including attempts to implement counter-insurgency tactics, forward-operating bases and quick-reaction groups. Nigeria is part of the Multinational Joint Task Force and is a key member of the ECOWAS Standby Force. Nigeria is strengthening its cooperation with Pakistan while military and security assistance is either discussed or under way with Germany, the UK and the US. The UK bases its British Defence Staff for West Africa in Nigeria. Efforts have been made to improve training, notably in the air force with the establishment of Air Training Command and Ground Training Command. Contractors have also been used to improve training and maintenance levels. Nigeria is able to mount regional operations, though its deployment capacities remain limited. Important acquisitions have been made in every domain, including the introduction of fighter ground-attack aircraft and combat-capable trainers as well as new tanks and howitzers. Patrol boats and a number of small coastal-patrol boats have been acquired in light of security requirements in the Delta region. Nigeria is developing its defence-industrial capacity, including local production facilities for small arms and protected patrol vehicles.

ACTIVE 143,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 25,000 Air 18,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 80,000

Reserves planned, none org

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 100,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops bn

3 (mobile strike team) spec ops units

1 ranger bn

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 (3rd) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 arty bde)

Mechanised

1 (1st) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)

1 (2nd) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)

1 (81st) composite div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)

Light

1 (6th) inf div (1 amph bde, 2 inf bde)

1 (7th) inf div (1 spec ops bn, 1 recce bn(-), 1 armd bde, 7 (task force) inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)

1 (8th Task Force) inf div (2 inf bde)

1 (82nd) composite div (1 recce bn, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)

1 (Multi-National Joint Task Force) bde (2 inf bn(-))

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd bde (4 gd bn)

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 319+: 100 T-55+; 10 T-72AV; 31 T-72M1; 172 Vickers Mk 3; 6+ VT-4

LT TK 154 FV101 Scorpion

ASLT 6+ ST-1

RECCE 384: 88 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 70 EE-9 *Cascavel*; 44 ERC-90F1 *Lynx*; 50 FV721 *Fox*; 20 FV601 *Saladin* Mk2; 72 VBL

IFV 31: 9 BTR-4EN; 22 BVP-1

APC 866+

APC (T) 373: 248 4K-7FA *Steyr*; 65 MT-LB; 60 ZSD-89

APC (W) 172+: 10 FV603 *Saracen*; 110 AVGP *Grizzly* mod/*Piranha* I 6x6; 47 BTR-3UN; 5 BTR-80; some EE-11 *Urutu* (reported);

PPV 321+: 14 *Caiman*; some *Conqueror*; 160 CS/VP3; 47 *Ezuwuu*; 5+ *Isotrex Phantom II*; some *Marauder*; 7+ *Maxxpro*; 8 *Proforce Ara-1*; 13 *Proforce Ara-2*; 23 REVA III 4x4; 10 *Streit Spartan*; 9 *Streit Cougar (Igirigi)*; 25 *Streit Typhoon*

AUV 107 Cobra; FV103 *Spartan*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 17+: AVGP *Husky*; 2 *Greif*; 15 Vickers ARV

VLB MTU-20; VAB

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS Shershen

RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; **106mm M40A1**

ARTILLERY 518+

SP 43+: **105mm** 4+ SH-5; **122mm** some SH-2; **155mm** 39 *Palmaria*

TOWED 104: **105mm** 49 M-56; **122mm** 48 D-30/D-74; **130mm** 7 M-46; (**155mm** 24 FH-77B in store)

MRL 122mm 41: 9 BM-21 *Grad*; 25 APR-21; 7 RM-70

MOR 330+: **81mm** 200; **82mm** 100; **120mm** 30+

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 16+: 16 *Roland*; *Blowpipe*; 9K32 *Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)†*

GUNS 89+SP 23mm 29 ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 60+: 20mm 60+; 23mm ZU-23; 40mm L/70

Navy 25,000 (incl Coast Guard)

Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ located at Calabar; Central Comd HQ located at Brass

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES**FFGHM (1 *Aradu* (GER MEKO 360) (non-operational) with 8 single Inchr with *Otomat* Mk1 ASHM, 1 octuple *Albatros* Inchr with *Aspide* SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel))**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 122**CORVETTES • FSM (1 *Erinomi* (UK Vosper Mk 9) (non-operational) with 1 triple Inchr with *Seacat* SAM, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 76mm gun)PSOH 4: 2 *Centenary* with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9 hel); 2 *Thunder* (ex-US *Hamilton*) with 1 76mm gunPCFG 1 *Siri* (FRA *Combattante* IIIB)† with 2 twin Inchr with MM38 *Exocet* ASHM, 1 76mm gunPCF 2 *Siri* (FRA *Combattante* IIIB) with 1 76mm gunPCO 4 *Kyanwa* (ex-US CG *Balsam*)PCC 4: 2 *Ekpe* (GER *Lurssen* 57m)† with 1 76mm gun; 2 *Kano* (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 4008)PBF 26: 2 *ARESA* 1700; 4 *C-Falcon*; 12 *Manta* MkIII (Suncraft 17m); 3 *Shaldag* II; 2 *Torie* (Nautic Sentinel 17m); 3 *Wave Rider*PB 81: 1 *Andoni*; 1 *Dorina* (FPB 98); 4 FPB 110 MkII; 8 *Okpoku* (FPB 72); 1 *Karaduwa*; 1 *Sagbama*; 2 *Sea Eagle* (Suncraft 38m); 15 *Stingray* (Suncraft 16m); 40 Suncraft 12m; 4 Swiftships; 2 *Town* (of which one laid up); 2 *Yolat***MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2**MCC 2 *Ohue* (ITA *Lerici* mod)†**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4**LCVP 4 *Stingray* 20**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2**AGHS 1 *Lana* (OSV 190)AX 1 *Prosperity***Naval Aviation****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****HELICOPTERS**

MRH 2 AW139 (AB-139)

TPT • Light 3 AW109E *Powert***Special Boat Service 200****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF unit

Air Force 18,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

Very limited op capability

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)

MARITIME PATROL1 sqn with ATR-42-500 MP; Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; Do-228-100/200**TRANSPORT**2 sqn with C-130H *Hercules*; C-130H-30 *Hercules*; G-222

1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800;

Beech 350 *King Air*; Do-228-200; *Falcon* 7X; *Falcon* 900;

Gulfstream IV/V

TRAINING1 unit with *Air Beetle*†1 unit with *Alpha Jet**1 unit with L-39 *Albatros**; MB-339AN*1 unit with *Super Mushshak*; DA40NG1 hel unit with Mi-34 *Hermit* (trg)**ATTACK HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 *Hind*†**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with H215 (AS332) *Super Puma*; (AS365N)*Dauphin*; AW109LUH; H135**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**

AIRCRAFT 74 combat capable

FTR 12: 10 F-7 (F-7NI); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NI)

FGA 3 JF-17 *Thunder* Block II

ELINT 2 ATR-42-500 MP

ISR 1 Beech 350 *King Air*MP 1 Cessna 525 *Citation* CJ3 (operated on behalf of NIMASA)TPT 32: **Medium** 5: 1 C-130H *Hercules* (4 more in store)†;1 C-130H-30 *Hercules* (2 more in store); 3 G.222† (2 morein store)†; **Light** 18: 1 Beech 350 *King Air*; 1 Cessna 550*Citation*; 8 Do-128D-6 *Turbo SkyServant*; 1 Do-228-100; 2Do-228-101; 5 Do-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); **PAX** 9: 1 B-727;1 B-737BBJ; 1 BAe 125-800; 2 *Falcon* 7X; 2 *Falcon* 900; 1

Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream V

TRG 129: 58 *Air Beetle*† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 2 *Alpha**Jet A**; 10 *Alpha Jet E**; 2 DA40NG; 12 EMB-314 *Super**Tucano* (A-29B)*; 23 L-39ZA *Albatros**†; 12 MB-339AN*(all being upgraded); 10 *Super Mushshak***HELICOPTERS**ATK 16: 2 Mi-24P *Hind*; 4 Mi-24V *Hind*; 3 Mi-35 *Hind*; 2Mi-35P *Hind*; 5 Mi-35M *Hind*MRH 11+: 6 AW109LUH; 2 Bell 412EP; 3+ SA341 *Gazelle*TPT 24: **Medium** 12: 2 AW101; 5 H215 (AS332) *Super**Puma* (4 more in store); 3 AS365N *Dauphin*; 1 Mi-171Sh; 2Mi-171E; **Light** 11: 4 H125 (AS350B) *Ecureuil*; 1 AW109; 2

AW109M; 1 Bell 205; 3 H135

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 5+CISR • **Heavy** 3: 1+ CH-3; 2+ *Wing Loong* IIISR 2: **Heavy** 1+ *Yabhon Flash*-20; **Medium** (9 *Aerostar*non-operational); **Light** 1+ *Tsaigami***AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)‡; PL-9C

ASM AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1

BOMBS • INS/GPS guided FT-9**Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €80,000****Security and Civil Defence Corps 80,000****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

APC 80+

APC (W) 74+: 70+ AT105 *Saxon*†; 4 BTR-3U; UR-416PPV 6 *Springback* 4x4

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 Cessna 500 *Citation I*; 2 PA-31 *Navajo*; 1 PA-31-350 *Navajo Chieftain*
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 212 (AB-212); 2 Bell 222 (AB-222); 1 Bell 429

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10

GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 197

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 78; 1 fd hospital

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5


FOREIGN FORCES

United Kingdom 80 (trg teams)

Rwanda RWA

Rwandan Franc RWF	2020	2021	2022
GDP	RWF 9.75tr	10.4tr	
	USD 10.3bn	10.4bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD 816	802	
Growth	% -3.4	5.1	
Inflation	% 7.7	2.4	
Def bdgt	RWF 121bn	151bn	178bn
	USD 128m	150m	
USD1=RWF	943.28	1004.11	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 12,943,132

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.9%	5.5%	4.7%	3.8%	14.1%	1.1%
Female	19.5%	5.4%	4.7%	3.8%	16.0%	1.6%

Capabilities

Rwanda is one of the principal security actors in East Africa, with disciplined and well-trained armed forces. Their key missions are to defend territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The country fields a relatively large army, but units are lightly equipped, with little mechanisation. Rwanda signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Uganda in 2014 and participates in the East African Standby Force. A law on downsizing and demobilising elements of the armed forces was published in October 2015 and there have in recent years been official retirement ceremonies for those reaching rank-related retirement ages. The lack of fixed-wing aircraft limits the armed forces' ability to independently deploy much overseas beyond personnel. There have been

some acquisitions of modern artillery and armoured vehicles. There is limited maintenance capacity but no defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 33,000 (Army 32,000 Air 1,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 32,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

2 cdo bn

4 inf div (3 inf bde)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 34: 24 T-54/T-55; 10 *Tiran-5*

RECCE 106: ε90 AML-60/AML-90; 16 VBL

IFV 38+: BMP; 13+ Ratel-23; 10 *Ratel-60*; 15 *Ratel-90*

APC 60+

APC (W) 20+: BTR; *Buffalo* (Panhard M3); 20 WZ-551 (reported)

PPV 40 RG-31 *Nyala*

AUV 76 *Cobra/Cobra II*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 ARV reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • SP HJ-9A (on *Cobra*)

ARTILLERY 177+

SP 17: **122mm** 12: 6 CS/SH-1; 6 SH-3; **155mm** 5 ATMOS 2000

TOWED 35+: **105mm** some; **122mm** 6 D-30; **152mm** 29 Type-54 (D-1)†

MRL 10: **122mm** 5 RM-70; **160mm** 5 LAR-160

MOR 115: **81mm**; **82mm**; **120mm**

AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS ε150: **14.5mm**; **23mm**; **37mm**

Air Force ε1,000

FORCES BY ROLE

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17MD/Mi-17V-5/Mi-17-1V *Hip H*; Mi-24P/V *Hind*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V *Hind E*; 3 Mi-24P *Hind*

MRH 12: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 *Hip H*; 1 Mi-17MD *Hip H*; 1 Mi-17V-5 *Hip H*; 5 Mi-17-1V *Hip H*

TPT • Light 1 AW109S

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

District Administration Security Support Organ ε2,000

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,690; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital


MOZAMBIQUE: Army 1,500

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,640; 3 inf bn; 2 hel sqn

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8

Senegal SEN

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	14.2tr	15.1tr	
	USD	24.7bn	27.6bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,474	1,603	
Growth	%	1.5	4.7	
Inflation	%	2.5	2.4	
Def bdgt	XOF	199bn	263bn	
	USD	346m	479m	
USD1=XOF		574.75	549.22	



Population 16,082,442

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	19.9%	5.5%	4.7%	4.0%	12.9%	1.4%
Female	19.7%	5.4%	4.7%	4.2%	15.6%	1.9%

Capabilities

Senegal's armed forces have strong international relationships and are experienced in foreign deployments. Their focus is internal and border security, including counter-insurgency in the country's south and Islamist activity in neighbouring states, as well as combating narcotics trafficking. Under the 'Horizon 2025' programme, the defence authorities intend to reorganise and re-equip key defence organisations and renew infrastructure. Professional military education is a focus. A new navy school and National Defence Institute are under development; the latter will contain a higher war college, staff college and doctrine centre. Other areas for improvement include mobility and firepower, and air and naval modernisation. Despite limited resources, there are plans to improve operational capabilities and training. France remains Senegal's principal defence partner and retains a military presence in the country. French military forces deliver training assistance to the armed forces and gendarmerie, including training in 2021 on the SIMBAD air-defence system that will equip new patrol ships. There is also defence cooperation with Spain and the UK, while an agreement was signed with Mauritania in 2021 regarding offshore energy-related maritime security. The US also provides security assistance, including to the national police and gendarmerie. A US-funded counter-terrorism training centre was opened in September 2018. The armed forces are able to deploy personnel using organic airlift, but short-notice movements of heavy equipment would be problematic without external assistance. Apart from maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 13,600 (Army 11,900 Navy 950 Air 750)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

Conscript liability Selective conscription, 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 11,900 (incl conscripts)

7 Mil Zone HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

5 armd recce bn

Light

1 cdo bn

6 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) horse cav bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

3 construction coy

1 sigs bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bn

1 med bn

1 trg bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

ASLT 27 PTL-02 *Assaulter*

RECCE 165: 30 AML-60; 74 AML-90; 20 BRDM-2; 10 M8;

4 M20; 27 RAM Mk3

IFV 26 *Ratel*-20

APC 91

APC (T) 12 M3 half-track

APC (W) 22: 2 *Oncilla*; 16 Panhard M3; 4 WZ-551 (CP)

PPV 57: 8 *Casspir*; 39 *Puma* M26-15; 10 *Puma* M36

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 2 *Puma* M36 ARV

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • MANPATS *Milan*

ARTILLERY 82

TOWED 20: 105mm 6 HM-2/M101; 155mm 14: ε6

Model-50; 8 TR-F1

MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 *Grad* (UKR *Bastion*-1 mod)

MOR 56: 81mm 24; 120mm 32

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 14.5mm 6 ZPU-4 (tch); 20mm 21 M693; 40mm 12 L/60

Navy (incl Coast Guard) 950

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

PCO 1 *Fouladou* (OPV 190 Mk II)

PCC 1 *Njambour* (FRA SFCN 59m) with 2 76mm gun

PBF 6: 3 *Anambe* (Shaldag II); 2 *Ferlo* (RPB 33); 1 *Lac Retba* (Shaldag V)

PB 2: 1 *Conejera*; 1 *Kedougou*

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2

LCT 2 EDIC 700

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1

Air Force 750

FORCES BY ROLE

MARITIME PATROL/SEARCH & RESCUE

1 sqn with C-212 *Aviocar*; CN235; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

ISR

1 unit with BN-2T *Islander* (anti-smuggling patrols)

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with B-727-200 (VIP); F-27-400M *Troopship*

TRAINING

1 sqn with R-235 *Guerrier**; TB-30 *Epsilon*; KA-1S*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with AS355F *Ecureuil* II; Bell 206; Mi-35P *Hind*; Mi-171Sh

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable

MP 1 CN235

TPT 10: **Light 8:** 1 BN-2T *Islander* (govt owned, mil op); 1 C-212-100 *Aviocar*; 2 CN235; 2 Beech B200 *King Air*; 2 F-27-400M *Troopship* (3 more in store); **PAX 2:** 1 A319; 1 B-727-200 (VIP)

TRG 11: 4+ KA-1S*; 1 R-235 *Guerrier**; 6 TB-30 *Epsilon*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 4: 2 Mi-24V *Hind* D; 2 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 1 AW139

TPT 8: **Medium 2** Mi-171Sh; **Light 6:** 1 AS355F *Ecureuil* II; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*); 2 Bell 206; 2 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

Gendarmerie 5,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 13: 2 *Bastion Patsas*; 11 RAM Mk3

APC 56

APC (W) 24: 7 *Bastion* APC; 5 EE-11 *Urutu*; 12 VXB-170+

PPV 32: 24 *Ejder Yalcin*; 8 *Gila*

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 9

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6

GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 250

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,003; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES

France 350; 1 *Falcon* 50MI

Spain *Operation Barkhane* 65; 2 C295M

Seychelles SYC

Seychelles Rupee SCR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SCR	20.0bn	23.6bn	
	USD	1.14bn	1.29bn	
per capita	USD	11,702	13,140	
Growth	%	-12.9	6.9	
Inflation	%	1.2	10.0	
Def exp	SCR	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=SCR		17.59	18.31	

Population 96,387

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	9.5%	3.1%	3.3%	3.9%	28.4%	3.5%
Female	9.0%	2.9%	2.8%	3.4%	25.1%	5.0%

Capabilities

The Seychelles maintains one of the smallest standing armed forces in the world. Its proximity to key international shipping lanes increases its strategic significance. The Seychelles People's Defence Force (PDF) primarily focuses on maritime security and counter-piracy operations. The country hosts US military forces conducting maritime-patrol activities on a rotational basis, including the operation of unarmed UAVs. India maintains strong defence ties with the Seychelles, donating equipment, providing maintenance and supporting efforts to enhance its maritime-patrol and -surveillance capability. There are plans to improve defence cooperation with China, which has already led to some equipment deliveries. The Seychelles continues to participate in and host a number of multinational maritime-security exercises. The PDF does not deploy overseas and has a limited capacity to deploy and support troops operating in the archipelago. Modern platforms in the air force and coastguard comprise donations from China, India and the UAE. There are limited maintenance facilities but no domestic defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 420 (Land Forces 200; Coast Guard 200; Air Force 20)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

People's Defence Force

Land Forces 200

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf coy

Other

1 sy unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 MP unit

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

RECCE 6 BRDM-2+

ARTILLERY • MOR 82mm 6 M-43+

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2†; ZPU-4†; 37mm M-1939†

Coast Guard 200 (incl 80 Marines)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11

PCO 3: 1 *Andromache* (ITA *Pichiotti* 42m); 2 *Topaz* (ex-IND *Trinkat*)

PCC 1 *Zoroaster*

PBF 3: 1 *Hermes* (ex-IND *Coastal Interceptor Craft*); 2 *Wave Rider*

PB 4: 1 *Etoile* (*Shanghai II* mod); 2 *Le Vigilant* (ex-UAE *Rodman* 101); 1 *Fortune* (UK *Tyne*)

Air Force 20


EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 5: 1 DHC-6-320 *Twin Otter*; 2 Do-228; 2 Y-12

Sierra Leone SLE

Sierra Leonean Leone SLL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SLL	41.3tr	47.7tr	
	USD	4.20bn	4.41bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	527	541	
Growth	%	-2.2	3.2	
Inflation	%	13.4	11.3	
Def bdgt	SLL	70.8bn	109bn	124bn
	USD	7.19m	10.1m	
USD1=SLL		9839.13	10821.25	



Population 6,807,277

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.5%	5.1%	4.2%	3.6%	13.7%	1.6%
Female	20.5%	5.2%	4.4%	3.9%	15.0%	2.2%

Capabilities

The armed forces' primary task is to ensure internal and border security and provide forces for peacekeeping missions. With international support, there remains a focus on building defence institutions, generating formal defence documentation and improving planning functions. Canada, China, France, the UK and US are among the nations supporting military capacity-building. UK training is also intended to boost the capacity of the police force. Freetown's Horton Academy delivers professional military education training to national and regional personnel. Defence ties with China include personnel exchanges and support for the development of military infrastructure, and officers' quarters have been built with Chinese support. Other construction activities are focusing on barracks accommodation and NCO messes. The armed forces' ability to deploy anything other than small units is constrained by force size and logistics-support capacity. There are plans to generate a company-sized quick-reaction force for peace-

keeping missions. Limited capability in areas including air and maritime surveillance was modestly boosted by the arrival of additional inshore-patrol craft in 2020, donated by South Korea. There is limited maintenance capacity and no defence-manufacturing capability.

ACTIVE 8,500 (Joint 8,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Armed Forces 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce unit

Light

3 inf bde (total: 12 inf bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr regt

1 int unit

1 MP unit

1 sigs unit

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 log unit

1 fd hospital

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV 4: 3 *Casspir*; 1 *Mamba* Mk5

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 84mm *Carl Gustaf*

ARTILLERY 37

TOWED 122mm 6 PL-96 (D-30)

MOR 31: 81mm ϵ 27; 82mm 2; 120mm 2

HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17 *Hip* H/Mi-8 *Hip*†

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 3

Maritime Wing ϵ 200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2

PB 2: 1 Type-062/I (ex-PRC *Shanghai III*)†; 1 *Isle of Man*

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 18

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 10

Somalia SOM

Somali Shilling SOS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	USD	4.99bn	5.42bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
<i>Growth</i>	%	-0.7	1.6	
<i>Inflation</i>	%	n.k.	n.k.	
<i>Def bdtg</i>	USD	n.k.	n.k.	
USD1=SOS		1.00	1.00	

*Definitive economic data unavailable

Population 12,094,640

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.9%	5.3%	4.6%	3.6%	14.9%	1.0%
Female	21.0%	5.4%	4.6%	3.4%	13.8%	1.5%

Capabilities

Internal stability remains fragile following decades of conflict and insurgency, with al-Shabaab and other extremist groups still active in the country. Deployed international forces look to provide security, stabilisation and capacity-building assistance. However, continued challenges have required revisions to the 2018 transition plan under which Somali forces were to assume security responsibility in 2021, acknowledging the need for continued African Union support into 2022. The Somali National Army (SNA) remains weak in terms of both organisation and military capability, although a multi-clan US-mentored force, the Danab Brigade, has displayed greater capability and is slated for modest expansion. US forces are deployed independently to Somalia and target militant groups. Plans to professionalise, legitimise and unite the loose collections of clan-based militia groups that form the SNA have yet to be fully realised. Training programmes for enlisted and, more recently, senior commissioned personnel have been delivered by a number of countries, organisations and private security companies, but even though NATO standards were adopted as a training objective in 2018, reports indicate that coordination remains difficult in practice. Moreover, it remains difficult to grow a training staff within the SNA, to enable continuation training within the force itself. There is no capacity to deploy beyond national borders, while there is minimal national infrastructure available to support domestic operations. The equipment inventory is limited and eclectic, and government plans to re-establish and equip Somalia's air and maritime forces remain unfulfilled. There is no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 13,900 (Army 13,900)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 13,900

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 div HQ

MANOEUVRE

Light

Some cdo bn(+)

12 inf bde (3 inf bn)

2 indep inf bn

Other

1 gd bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC 73+

APC (W) 38+: 25+ AT-105 *Saxon*; 13 *Bastion* APC; Fiat 6614

PPV 35+: *Casspir*; MAV-5; 20 *Kirpi*; 9+ *Mamba* Mk5; 6 *Puma* M36; RG-31 *Nyala*

AUV 12 *Tiger* 4x4

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary

Coast Guard

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

FOREIGN FORCES

Under UNSOM command unless stated

Burundi AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn

Djibouti AMISOM 1,800; 2 inf bn

Ethiopia AMISOM 4,000; 6 inf bn

Finland EUTM Somalia 10

Ghana 1 • UNSOS 1

India 1

Italy EUTM Somalia 154

Kenya AMISOM 4,000; 3 inf bn • UNSOS 1

Mauritania UNSOS 1

Pakistan UNSOS 1

Portugal EUTM Somalia 2

Romania EUTM Somalia 1

Serbia EUTM Somalia 6

Sierra Leone 1 • UNSOS 1

Spain EUTM Somalia 20

Sweden EUTM Somalia 9

Turkey Army: 200 (trg base)

Uganda 626; 1 sy bn • AMISOM 5,800; 7 inf bn • UNSOS 1

United Kingdom 2 • UNSOS 10 • Army: 65 (trg team)

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Data presented here represents the de facto situation. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state. Much of this equipment is in poor repair or inoperable

Somaliland

Army €12,500

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

2 armd bde

Mechanised

1 mech inf bde

Light

14 inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 spt bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT T-54/55

RECCE Fiat 6616

APC • APC(W) Fiat 6614

ARTILLERY • MRL various incl BM-21 *Grad*

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 23mm ZU-23-2

Ministry of the Interior**Coast Guard 600**

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

Puntland**Army** €3,000 (to be integrated into Somali National Army)**Maritime Police Force** €1,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**


All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

AIRCRAFT • TPT 4: Light 3 Ayres S2R; PAX 1 DC-3

HELICOPTERS • MRH SA316 *Alouette III***South Africa RSA**

South African Rand ZAR		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ZAR	5.52tr	6.15tr	
	USD	335bn	415bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	5,625	6,861	
Growth	%	-6.4	5.0	
Inflation	%	3.3	4.4	
Def bdgt	ZAR	54.2bn	46.3bn	
	USD	3.29bn	3.13bn	
USD1=ZAR		16.46	14.80	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)



Population 56,978,635

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	13.9%	4.2%	4.1%	4.2%	20.4%	2.6%
Female	13.9%	4.2%	4.2%	4.4%	20.2%	3.6%

Capabilities

South Africa's armed forces are on paper the most capable in the region, but economic and structural problems are eroding capability. Principal roles include maintaining territorial integrity and supporting the police service. The Department of Defence Strategic Plan 2020–2025 is the South African National Defence Force's (SANDF) primary policy instrument. The first of six strategic-planning milestones is to arrest the decline of critical military capabilities. However, the 2019/20 Defence Annual Report said that funding constraints would negatively affect this ambition, resulting in an inability to meet future SANDF requirements and objectives outlined in the 2015 Defence Review. South Africa contributes to UN operations and has been a key component of

the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since its inception. It is a member of the SADC Standby Force. In 2021, South Africa sent 1,500 personnel to neighbouring Mozambique as part of a SADC force to combat the Islamist insurgency in the north of the country. Troops were also deployed domestically in 2021 to help counter internal unrest. Historically, South African forces have also played a key role in training and supporting other regional forces. The SANDF can independently deploy its forces and as well as peacekeeping missions it participates in national and multinational exercises. The SANDF has a credible modernisation plan on paper but reduced funding has undermined these ambitions, resulting in programmes being behind schedule and difficulties in maintaining and replacing obsolete equipment. Budget cuts are also likely to have an adverse effect on training. South Africa has the continent's most capable defence industry, including the state-owned Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and weapons manufacturer Denel, which continues to experience financial difficulties. Cuban personnel remain engaged on a project for the maintenance and refurbishment of land vehicles.

ACTIVE 74,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 6,650 Air 9,800 South African Military Health Service 7,300 Other 12,250)

RESERVE 15,050 (Army 12,250 Navy 850 Air 850 South African Military Health Service Reserve 1,100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Space****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SATELLITES • ISR 1 *Kondor-E***Army 38,000****FORCES BY ROLE**

Regt are bn sized. A new army structure is planned with 3 mixed regular/reserve divisions (1 mechanised, 1 motorised and 1 contingency) comprising 12 brigades (1 armoured, 1 mechanised, 7 motorised, 1 airborne, 1 air-landed and 1 sea landed)

COMMAND

2 bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF regt(-)

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 armd recce regt

Armoured

1 tk regt(-)

Mechanised

2 mech inf bn

Light

8 mot inf bn

1 lt inf bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bn

1 air mob bn

Amphibious

1 amph bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

- 1 engr regt
- 1 construction regt
- 3 sigs regt

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 1 engr spt regt

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 ADA regt

Reserve 12,250 reservists (under-strength)**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

- 3 armd recce regt

Armoured

- 4 tk regt

Mechanised

- 6 mech inf bn

Light

- 14 mot inf bn

- 3 lt inf bn (converting to mot inf)

Air Manoeuvre

- 1 AB bn

- 2 air mob bn

Amphibious

- 1 amph bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 7 arty regt

- 2 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

- 5 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 24 *Olifant* 2 (133 *Olifant* 1B in store)

ASLT 50 *Rooikat*-76 (126 in store)

IFV 534 *Ratel*-20/*Ratel*-60/*Ratel*-90

APC • PPV 810: 370 *Casspir*; 440 *Mamba*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV *Gemsbok*

VLB *Leguan*

MW *Husky*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE**MSL**

SP ZT-3 *Swift*

MANPATS *Milan* ADT/ER

RCL 106mm M40A1 (some SP)

ARTILLERY 1,240

SP 155mm 2 G-6 (41 in store)

TOWED 155mm 6 G-5 (66 in store)

MRL 127mm 6 *Valkiri* Mk II MARS *Bataleur*; (26 *Valkiri* Mk I and 19 *Valkiri* Mk II in store)

MOR 1,226: **81mm** 1,190 (incl some SP on *Casspir* & *Ratel*); **120mm** 36

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES

ISR • Light up to 4 *Vulture*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence *Starstreak*

GUNS 40

SP 23mm (36 *Zumlac* in store)

TOWED 35mm 40: 22 GDF-002; 18 GDF-005A/007

Navy 6,650

Fleet HQ and Naval base located at Simon's Town; Naval stations located at Durban and Port Elizabeth

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 2

SSK 2 *Heroine* (Type-209/1400 mod) (1 additional boat in refit since 2014, awaiting funds to complete) with 8 533mm TT with SUT 264 HWT

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4

FFGHM 4 *Valour* (MEKO A200) with 2 quad Inchr with MM40 *Exocet* Block 2 ASHM (upgrade to Block 3 planned); 2 16-cell VLS with *Umkhonto*-IR SAM, 1 Denel Dual Purpose Gun (DPG) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 *Super Lynx* 300 hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4

PCC 3 *Warrior* (ISR *Reshef*) with 1 76mm gun

PB 1 *Tobie* (2 additional in reserve)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3

MHC 3 *River* (GER *Navors*) (limited operational roles; training and dive support) (1 additional in reserve)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2

AGHS 1 *Protea* (UK *Hecla*) with 1 hel landing platform

AORH 1 *Drakensberg* (capacity 2 *Oryx* hels; 100 troops)

Maritime Reaction Squadron**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Amphibious**

- 1 mne patrol gp

- 1 diving gp

- 1 mne boarding gp

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 1 spt gp

Air Force 9,800

Air Force HQ, Pretoria, and 4 op gps

Command & Control: 2 Airspace Control Sectors, 1 Mobile Deployment Wg, 1 Air Force Command Post

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

- 1 sqn with *Gripen* C/D (JAS-39C/D)

GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING

- 1 sqn with *Hawk* Mk120*

TRANSPORT

- 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737 BBJ; Cessna 550 *Citation* II; *Falcon* 50; *Falcon* 900

- 1 sqn with C-47TP

2 sqn with Beech 200/300 *King Air*; C-130B/BZ; C-212

ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 1 (cvt spt) sqn with AH-2 *Rooivalk*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 4 (mixed) sqn with AW109; BK-117; *Oryx*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 50 combat capable

FGA 26: 17 *Gripen* C (JAS-39C); 9 *Gripen* D (JAS-39D)

TPT 23: **Medium** 6: 2 C-130B *Hercules*; 4 C-130BZ

Hercules; **Light** 13: 3 Beech 200C *King Air*; 1 Beech 300

King Air; 3 C-47TP (maritime); 2 C-212-200 *Aviocart*; 1

C-212-300 *Aviocart*; 2 Cessna 550 *Citation* II; 1 PC-12; (9

Cessna 208 *Caravan* in store) **PAX** 4: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 *Falcon* 50; 1 *Falcon* 900

TRG 59: 24 *Hawk* Mk120*; 35 PC-7 Mk II *Astra*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11 AH-2 *Rooivalk*

MRH 4 *Super Lynx* 300

TPT 69: **Medium** 36 *Oryx*; **Light** 33: 25 AW109; 8 BK-117

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • **AAM** • **IIR** IRIS-T

BOMBS • **Laser-guided** GBU-12 *Paveway* II

Ground Defence

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Other

12 sy sqn (SAAF regt)

South African Military Health Service 7,300

DEPLOYMENT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO • *Operation Mistral* 939; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 272


MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL: Navy • 1 FFGHM

South Sudan SSD

South Sudanese Pound SSP		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SSP	737bn	1.08tr	
	USD	4.44bn	3.26bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	322	230	
Growth	%	-6.6	5.3	
Inflation	%	24.0	23.0	
Def bdgt [a]	SSP	16.4bn	14.3bn	
	USD	98.7m	43.1m	
USD1=SSP		165.89	331.81	

[a] Security and law enforcement spending

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 10,984,074

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.2%	5.7%	5.1%	4.1%	13.8%	1.5%
Female	20.4%	5.7%	4.7%	3.5%	13.2%	1.1%

Capabilities

South Sudan's civil war formally ended in 2020. The September 2020 peace deal built on a 2018 accord that laid out a peace framework for opposition and government forces, resulting in changes to the number and demarcation of federal states, which had been a stumbling block in peace negotiations. Although major fighting between government and opposition forces has halted, skirmishes still occur, with violence also continuing between the various armed groups and militias. Progress to disarm these parties and unify them under the banner of the South Sudan People's Defence

Forces (SSPDF) remains limited. The level of progress in professionalising these rebranded government forces remains unclear, and reports of child-soldier recruitment and the use of sexual and gender-based violence continue. In 2018, South Sudan reportedly signed a defence agreement with South Africa, including scope to cooperate on procurement and training. There is no capacity to deploy and sustain military units beyond national borders. Equipment is primarily of Soviet origin with some light arms of Chinese origin, and there have been efforts to expand the small air force. Sanctions remain in place, with both the EU and UN arms embargoes widened in 2018 to include all types of military equipment. South Sudan has no established domestic defence industry but has reportedly sought to develop an ammunition-manufacturing capacity in recent years.

ACTIVE 53,000 (Army 53,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €53,000 (in training)

FORCES BY ROLE

3 military comd

MANOEUVRE

Light

8 inf div

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 engr corps

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 80+: some T-55†; 80 T-72AV†

APC • **PPV** *Streit Typhoon*; *Streit Cougar*; *Mamba*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

MSL • **MANPATS** HJ-73; 9K115 *Metis* (RS-AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9 (with SSLA)

ARTILLERY

SP 122mm 2S1 *Gvozdika*; **152mm** 2S3 *Akatsiya*

TOWED 130mm Some M-46

MRL 122mm BM-21 *Grad*; **107mm** PH-63

MOR 82mm; 120mm Type-55 look-alike

AIR DEFENCE

SAM

Short-range 16 S-125 *Pechora* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)†

Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†; QW-2

GUNS 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm Type-65/74

Air Force

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable

TPT • **Light** 1 Beech 1900

TRG €2 L-39 *Albatros**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V *Hind*; 3 Mi-24V-SMB *Hind*

MRH 9 Mi-17 *Hip* H

TPT 3: **Medium** 1 Mi-172 (VIP); **Light** 2 AW109 (civ livery)

FOREIGN FORCES

All UNMISS, unless otherwise indicated

Albania 2

Australia 13

Azerbaijan 2

Bangladesh 1,623; 1 inf coy; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy
 Benin 5
 Bhutan 4
 Bolivia 4
 Brazil 12
 Cambodia 86; 1 MP unit
 Canada 6
 China, People's Republic of 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
 Ecuador 3
 Egypt 4
 El Salvador 2
 Ethiopia 1,523; 3 inf bn
 Fiji 4
 Gambia 5
 Germany 14
 Ghana 881; 1 inf bn
 Guatemala 7
 Guinea 3
 India 2,372; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital
 Indonesia 4
 Japan 4
 Jordan 6
 Kenya 19
 Korea, Republic of 274; 1 engr coy
 Kyrgyzstan 2
 Liberia 2
 Moldova 5
 Mongolia 871; 1 inf bn
 Morocco 2
 Namibia 4
 Nepal 1,752; 2 inf bn
 New Zealand 3
 Nigeria 14
 Norway 14
 Pakistan 285; 1 engr coy
 Papua New Guinea 2
 Paraguay 3
 Peru 5
 Philippines 2
 Poland 1
 Romania 6
 Russia 2
 Rwanda 2,640; 3 inf bn; 2 hel sqn
 Senegal 2
 Sierra Leone 1
 Sri Lanka 66; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn
 Switzerland 1
 Tanzania 9
 Thailand 276; 1 engr coy
 Togo 2
 Tunisia 3
 Uganda 2
 Ukraine 4
 United Kingdom 4
 United States 7

Vietnam 68
 Zambia 11
 Zimbabwe 13

Sudan SDN

Sudanese Pound SDG		2020	2021	2022
GDP	SDG	5.17tr	15.60tr	
	USD	34.4bn	35.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	776	789	
Growth	%	-3.6	0.9	
Inflation	%	163.3	194.6	
Def exp	SDG	n.k	n.k	
	USD	n.k	n.k	
USD1=SDG		150.37	434.23	

Population 46,751,152

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	21.0%	5.9%	4.8%	3.7%	13.0%	1.6%
Female	20.4%	5.8%	4.7%	3.5%	13.9%	1.5%

Capabilities

Political uncertainty and internal division continue in Sudan in the wake of the October 2021 military coup. This replaced the civilian and military Sovereign Council formed to lead a transition to civilian rule following the 2019 ousting of President Omar al-Bashir after 30 years in power, though the civilian prime minister was later reinstated. The armed forces remain focused on internal security, though a peace deal was signed with five rebel groups in August 2020. Border issues remain a concern with neighbouring Ethiopia, and there have been reports of cross-border incursions amid the continuing conflict between Addis Ababa and Tigrayan forces. Sudan is part of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen. A defence agreement with Iran in 2008 reportedly included assistance in developing the domestic arms industry. Growing military cooperation with Egypt has also been demonstrated through joint exercises in 2020 and 2021. The armed forces are conscript-based and will have gained operational experience from internal-security deployments and the intervention in Yemen. By regional standards, Sudan's armed forces are relatively well equipped, with significant holdings of both ageing and modern systems. While there is a UN arms embargo in place, it is limited to equipment used within Darfur. Recent acquisitions have included Russian and Ukrainian government surplus and also new Chinese aircraft. The state-run Military Industry Corporation manufactures a range of ammunition, small arms and armoured vehicles for the domestic and export market. The majority of the corporation's products are based on older Chinese and Russian systems.

ACTIVE 104,300 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,300 Air 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

Conscript liability 2 years for males aged 18–30

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES • ISR 1 SRSS-1

Army 100,000+**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

5 SF coy

MANOEUVRE**Reconnaissance**

1 indep recce bde

Armoured

1 armd div

Mechanised

1 mech inf div

1 indep mech inf bde

Light

15+ inf div

6 indep inf bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

Amphibious

1 mne div

Other

1 (Border Guard) sy bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 indep arty bde

1 engr div (9 engr bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES****MBT** 465: 20 M60A3; 60 Type-59/Type-59D; 305 T-54/T-55; 70 T-72AV; 10 *Al-Bashier* (Type-85-IIM)**LT TK** 115: 70 Type-62; 45 Type-63**RECCE** 206: 6 AML-90; 70 BRDM-1/2; 50-80 FV701 *Ferret*; 30-50 FV601 *Saladin***IFV** 145: 135 BMP-1/-2; 10 BTR-3**APC** 405+**APC (T)** 66: 20-30 BTR-50; 36 M113**APC (W)** 339+: 50-80 BTR-152; 20 OT-62; 50 OT-64; 3+ *Rakhsh*; 10 WZ-551; WZ-523; 55-80 V-150 *Commando*; 96 *Walid***PPV** some *Sarsar-2*; some *Streit Spartan***AUV** 4+ *Nimr Ajban* 440A**ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE****MSL • MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*); HJ-8; 9K135 *Kornet* (RS-AT-14 *Spriggan*)**RCL** 106mm 40 M40A1**GUNS** 76mm ZIS-3; 100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44**ARTILLERY** 860+**SP** 66: 122mm 56 2S1 *Gvozdika*; 155mm 10 Mk F3**TOWED** 128+: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 21+: 21 D-30; D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 155mm 12 M114A1**MRL** 666+: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 188: 120 BM-21 *Grad*; 50 *Saqr*; 18 Type-81; 302mm 1+ WS-1**MOR** 81mm; 82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43; W86**AIR DEFENCE****SAM • Point-defence** 4+: 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 4+ 9K33 *Osa* (RS-SA-8 *Gecko*); FN-6 (CH-SA-10)**GUNS** 966+**SP** 20: 20mm 8 M163 *Vulcan*; 12 M3 VDAA**TOWED** 946+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU-4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16M167 *Vulcan*; 23mm 50 ZU-23-2; 37mm 80 M-1939; (30 M-1939 unserviceable); 40mm 60**Navy 1,300****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 11**PBR** 4 *Kurmuk***PB** 7: 1 13.5m; 1 14m; 2 19m; 3 41m (PRC)**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP** 5**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** 4**AG** 3**AXL** 1 *Petrushka* (ex-RUS)**Air Force 3,000****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**2 sqn with MiG-29SE/UB *Fulcrum***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with FTC-2000*

GROUND ATTACK1 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*1 sqn with Su-25K/Su-25UB *Frogfoot***TRANSPORT**Some sqn with An-30 *Clank*; An-32 *Cline*; An-72 *Coaler*; An-74TK-200/300; C-130H *Hercules*; Il-76 *Candid*; Y-81 VIP unit with *Falcon* 20F; *Falcon* 50; *Falcon* 900; F-27; Il-62M *Classic***TRAINING**1 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum****ATTACK HELICOPTER**2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-24P/Mi-24V/Mi-35P *Hind***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**2 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17 *Hip H*; Mi-171**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 59 combat capable**FTR** 22: 20 MiG-29SE *Fulcrum* C; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum* B**FGA** 6 FTC-2000G**ATK** 20: 6 Su-24M/MR *Fencer*; 14 Su-25K/UB *Frogfoot*; (15 A-5 *Fantan* in store)**ISR** 2 An-30 *Clank***TPT** 24: **Heavy** 1 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 6: 4 C-130H *Hercules*; 2 Y-8; **Light** 13: ε3 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-32 *Cline*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 4 An-74TK-200; 2 An-74TK-300; **PAX** 4: 1 *Falcon* 20F (VIP); 1 *Falcon* 50 (VIP); 1 *Falcon* 900; 1 Il-62M *Classic***TRG** 15+: 11 K-8 *Karakorum**; some SAFAT-03; 3 Utva-75**HELICOPTERS****ATK** 40: 25 Mi-24 *Hind*; 2 Mi-24P *Hind*; 7 Mi-24V *Hind* E; 6 Mi-35P *Hind***MRH** ε3 Mi-17 *Hip H***TPT** 27: **Medium** 23: 21 Mi-8 *Hip*; 2 Mi-171; **Light** 4: 1 Bell 205; 3 Bo-105**TRG** some SAFAT 02**UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES****CISR • Heavy** CH-3; CH-4**AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range**: (18 S-75M *Dvoina* (RS-SA-2 *Guideline*)‡ (non-operational))**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR** R-3 (RS-AA-2 *Atoll*)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12A *Adder*)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

The Popular Defence Forces were officially disbanded in 2019, but it is unclear if elements still exist in some form

Rapid Support Force 40,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

IFV 7 BTR-80A; WZ-523 IFV

APC • APC (W) 20+ BTR-70M *Kobra 2*

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS

SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (tch)

DEPLOYMENT

SAUDI ARABIA: *Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24M/MR Fencer*

YEMEN: *Operation Restoring Hope 650; 1 mech BG; T-72AV, BTR-70M Kobra 2*

FOREIGN FORCES

All UNISFA unless otherwise indicated

Bangladesh 3

Benin 2

Bhutan 2

Bolivia 4

Brazil 2

Burundi 4

Cambodia 1

China, People's Republic of 86; 1 hel flt

Ecuador 3

Ethiopia 3,306; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 med bn

Ghana 8

Guatemala 3

Guinea 1

India 4

Indonesia 4

Kyrgyzstan 1

Liberia 2

Malawi 3

Malaysia 2

Mongolia 4

Namibia 7

Nepal 8

Nigeria 4

Pakistan 4

Peru 3

Russia 2

Rwanda 8

Sierra Leone 10

Tanzania 1

Uganda 2

Ukraine 6

Uruguay 2


Zambia 4

Zimbabwe 11

Tanzania TZA

Tanzanian Shilling TZS		2020	2021	2022
GDP	TZS	149tr	160tr	
	USD	64.4bn	69.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,110	1,159	
Growth	%	4.8	4.0	
Inflation	%	3.3	3.2	
Def bdgt	TZS	1.85tr	1.92tr	
	USD	803m	831m	
USD1=TZS		2306.14	2314.74	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 62,092,761

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.3%	5.4%	4.5%	3.8%	13.5%	1.4%
Female	20.8%	5.3%	4.5%	3.8%	13.8%	1.9%

Capabilities

Non-state actors pose the principal threat to Tanzania's security, with terrorism, poaching and piracy of concern. A developing relationship with China has led to a series of procurements and training contacts. There are also defence-related ties with Israel, Pakistan and Russia. The armed forces take part in multinational exercises in Africa and have provided some training assistance to other African forces. Training relationships also exist with extra-regional armed forces, including the US. Tanzania's contribution to the UN's Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC, notably its special forces, will have provided lessons for force development. However, there is only a limited capacity to project power independently beyond the country's borders. Budget constraints have limited recapitalisation ambitions and, although heavy equipment is ageing, airlift capacity has improved with the delivery of new helicopters. There are local ammunition facilities, but otherwise Tanzania relies on imports for its military equipment.

ACTIVE 27,000 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 3,000)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

Conscript liability Three months basic military training combined with social service, ages 18-23

RESERVE 80,000 (Joint 80,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €23,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Light

5 inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

4 arty bn
1 mor bn
2 AT bn
1 engr regt (bn)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp

AIR DEFENCE

2 ADA bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**

MBT 45: 30 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59G
LT TK 57+: 30 FV101 *Scorpion*; 25 Type-62; 2+ Type-63A
RECCE 10 BRDM-2
APC • APC (W) 14: ε10 BTR-40/BTR-152; 4 Type-92

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)
GUNS 85mm 75 Type-56 (D-44)

ARTILLERY 344+

TOWED 130: 122mm 100: 20 D-30; 80 Type-54-1 (M-30);
130mm 30 Type-59-I
GUN/MOR 120mm 3+ Type-07PA
MRL 61+: 122mm 58 BM-21 *Grad*; 300mm 3+ A100
MOR 150: 82mm 100 M-43; 120mm 50 M-43

Navy €1,000**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14**

PCC 2 *Mwitongo* (ex-PRC *Haiqing*)
PHT 2 Type-025 (*Huchuan*) each with 2 single 533mm
ASTT
PB 10: 2 *Ngunguri*; 2 Type-062 (PRC *Shanghai II*); 2 VT
23m; 4 *Mambwe* (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 3307)

AMPHIBIOUS 3

LCT 1 *Kasa*
LCM 2 *Mbono* (ex-PRC *Yunnan*)

Air Defence Command €3,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

3 sqn with F-7/FT-7; FT-5; K-8 *Karakorum**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Cessna 404 *Titan*; DHC-5D *Buffalo*; F-28
Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable**

FTR 11: 9 F-7 (F-7TN); 2 FT-7 (FT-7N)
ISR 1 SB7L-360 *Seeker*
TPT 12: **Medium** 2 Y-8; **Light** 7: 2 Cessna 404 *Titan*; 3
DHC-5D *Buffalo*; 2 Y-12(II); **PAX** 3: 1 F-28 *Fellowship*; 1
F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550
TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 *Karakorum**

HELICOPTERS

MRH 1 Bell 412EP *Twin Huey*
TPT 2: **Medium** 1+ H225; **Light** 1 Bell 205 (AB-205)

AIR DEFENCE**SAM**

Short-range 2K12 *Kub* (RS-SA-6 *Gainful*)†
Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS 200

TOWED 14.5mm 40 ZPU-2/ZPU-4+; 23mm 40 ZU-23-
2; 37mm 120 M-1939

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400 active**Police Field Force 1,400**

18 sub-units incl Police Marine Unit

Air Wing**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna U206 *Stationair*

HELICOPTERS

TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206A *Jet Ranger* (AB-206A);
2 Bell 206L *Long Ranger*
TRG 2 Bell 47G (AB-47G)/Bell 47G2

Marine Unit 100**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 456; 1 inf
bn(-)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •

MONUSCO 854; 1 spec ops coy; 1 inf bn

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 125; 1 MP coy


MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 277

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 9

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

Togo TGO

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF		2020	2021	2022
GDP	XOF	4.36tr	4.65tr	
	USD	7.59bn	8.49bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	916	1,000	
Growth	%	1.8	4.8	
Inflation	%	1.8	2.7	
Def bdtg	XOF	66.6bn	65.6bn	
	USD	116m	120m	
USD1=XOF		574.72	547.38	



Population 8,283,189

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	20.0%	5.0%	4.1%	3.8%	14.6%	1.7%
Female	19.5%	4.9%	4.2%	3.9%	15.8%	2.4%

Capabilities

Defence authorities are increasingly concerned by the challenge from piracy and other illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, regional cooperation is now being strengthened. In 2020 Togo adopted a new military-programming law, leading to the creation of a special-forces group. France continues to deliver military training, including for Togolese peacekeeping contingents. There is also a peacekeeping training centre in Lomé. The United States' Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme has provided assistance with training. Togo's deployment capabilities are limited without external support, while financial challenges limit capability development more broadly. There are some maintenance facilities but there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 8,100 Navy 200 Air 250)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750

Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,100+

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 armd recce regt

Mechanised

1 armd bn

Light

2 cbd arms regt

2 inf regt

1 rapid reaction force

Air Manoeuvre

1 cdo/para regt (3 cdo/para coy)

Other

1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2 indep gd coy)

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 cbt spt regt (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 2 T-54/T-55

LT TK 18 FV101 *Scorpion*

RECCE 86: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 29 *Bastion Patsas*; 36

EE-9 *Cascavel*; 6 M8; 3 M20; 2 VBL

IFV 20 BMP-2

APC 86

APC (T) 4 M3A1 half-track

APC (W) 32: 2 *Mbombe* 4; 30 UR-416

PPV 50 *Mamba* Mk7

AUV 1 FV103 *Spartan*

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)/Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10)

GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2

ARTILLERY 30+

SP 122mm 6

TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2

MRL 122mm PHL-81 mod (SC6 chassis)

MOR 82mm 20 M-43

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4; 37mm 5 M-1939

Navy €200 (incl Marine Infantry unit)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3

PBF 1 *Agou* (RPB 33)

PB 2 *Kara* (FRA *Esterel*)

Air Force 250

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with Beech 200 *King Air*

1 VIP unit with DC-8; F-28-1000

TRAINING

1 sqn with TB-30 *Epsilon**

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with SA315 *Lama*; SA316 *Alouette* III; SA319

Alouette III; SA342L1 *Gazelle*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable

TPT 5: Light 2 Beech 200 *King Air*; PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2 F-28-1000 (VIP)

TRG 3 TB-30 *Epsilon** (3 *Alpha Jet**; 4 EMB-326G* in store)

HELICOPTERS

MRH 6: 2 SA315 *Lama*; 1 SA316 *Alouette* III; 1 SA319

Alouette III; 2 SA342L1 *Gazelle*

TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8T *Hip* C (1 SA330 *Puma* in store)

Special Forces Group

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750

Gendarmerie 750

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE

2 reg sections

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF unit

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

APC • PPV *Mamba* Mk7

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 931; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Uganda UGA

Ugandan Shilling UGX		2020	2021	2022
GDP	UGX	144tr	157tr	
	USD	38.1bn	43.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	925	1,018	
Growth	%	-0.8	4.7	
Inflation	%	2.8	2.2	
Def bdgt	UGX	3.62tr	4.35tr	3.87tr
	USD	960m	1.20bn	
USD1=UGX		3772.95	3630.53	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 44,712,143

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	24.2%	5.7%	4.2%	3.3%	10.2%	1.0%
Female	23.7%	5.8%	4.7%	4.0%	11.9%	1.4%

Capabilities

Uganda's armed forces are well equipped and are important contributors to East African security. Operational experience and training have led to improvements in administration and planning, as well as in military skills including counter-IED and urban patrolling. A number of years spent targeting the Lord's Resistance Army has also developed counter-insurgency experience. There are plans to establish a National Defence College. Uganda is one of the largest contributors to the East Africa Standby Force and in 2014

signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Rwanda. Training levels are adequate, particularly for the special forces, and are improving after recent experiences. There is regular training with international partners, including at Uganda's own facilities. Airlift is limited though rotary-wing aviation has improved in recent years, partly due to US assistance. Motorised infantry formations still lack sufficient transport and logistics capacity. Mechanised forces are relatively well equipped, though heavy equipment is disparate and ageing. Improvements include the arrival of MRAPs and other protected vehicles. There is limited defence-industrial capacity, though there is some manufacturing of light armoured vehicles. Uganda's 2015–19 Security Sector Development plan included the establishment of an engineering centre and a defence-research facility.

ACTIVE 45,000 (Ugandan People's Defence Force 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

RESERVE 10,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Ugandan People's Defence Force €40,000–45,000

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd bde

Light

1 cdo bn

5 inf div (total: 16 inf bde)

Other

1 (Special Forces Command) mot bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

AIR DEFENCE

2 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 279+: 140 T-54/T-55; 45 T-55AM2; 40 T-72A; 10 T-72B1; 44 T-90S; ZTZ-85-IIM

LT TK €20 PT-76

RECCE 46: 40 *Eland*-20; 6 FV701 *Ferret*

IFV 37 BMP-2

APC 185

APC (W) 58: 15 BTR-60; 20 *Buffel*; 4 OT-64; 19 *Bastion*

APC

PPV 127+: 42 *Casspir*; some *Chui*; 35 *Hizir*; 40 *Mamba*;

10 RG-33L

AUV 15 *Cougar*

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV 1 BTS-4; T-54/T-55 reported

VLB MTU reported

MW *Husky*

ARTILLERY 333+

SP 155mm 6 ATMOS 2000

TOWED 243+: 122mm M-30; 130mm 221; 155mm 22: 4 G-5; 18 M-839

MRL 6+: 107mm (12-tube); 122mm 6+: BM-21 *Grad*; 6

RM-70

MOR 78+: 81mm L16; 82mm M-43; 120mm 78 *Soltam*

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡; 9K310 *Igla-1* (RS-SA-16 *Gimlet*)

GUNS • TOWED 20+: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm 20 M-1939

Marines €400

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Amphibious

1 mne bn

Air Wing**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with Su-30MK2 *Flanker*

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Y-12

1 VIP unit with Gulfstream 550; L-100-30

TRAINING

1 unit with L-39ZA/ZO *Albatros**

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; Mi-Mi-17/171E *Hip*; Mi-24V/P *Hind* E/F; Mi-17A1 (VIP)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable

FGA 6 Su-30MK2 *Flanker* (3+ MiG-21bis *Fishbed*; 1 MiG-21UM *Mongol B* in store)

TPT 10: **Medium** 1 L-100-30; **Light** 8: 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 208B; 2 Y-12; **PAX** 1 Gulfstream 550

TRG 7 L-39ZA/ZO *Albatros**

HELICOPTERS

ATK 7 Mi-24V/P *Hind* E/F

MRH 6: 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 5 Mi-17/171E *Hip*

TPT 3: **Medium** 1 Mi-17A1 (VIP)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • **IR** R-73 (RS-AA-11A *Archer*); **SARH** R-27 (RS-AA-10 *Alamo*); **ARH** R-77 (RS-AA-12 *Adder*) (reported)

ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A *Krypton*) (reported)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary €600 active**Border Defence Unit** €600

Equipped with small arms only

DEPLOYMENT

SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 5,800; 7 inf bn; UN • UNSOM 626; 1 sy bn; UN • UNSOS 1


SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

Zambia ZMB

Zambian Kwacha ZMW		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ZMW	354bn	456bn	
	USD	19.3bn	21.7bn	
per capita	USD	1,023	1,115	
Growth	%	-3.0	1.0	
Inflation	%	15.7	22.8	
Def bdgt	ZMW	6.57bn	5.64bn	3.25bn
	USD	358m	268m	
USD1=ZMW		18.34	21.02	

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)



Population 19,077,816

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	21.9%	5.6%	4.6%	3.8%	13.0%	1.2%
Female	21.5%	5.6%	4.6%	3.8%	13.1%	1.5%

Capabilities

Zambia faces no immediate external threat, though there is a border dispute with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The armed forces' principal tasks are ensuring territorial integrity and border security, and there is also a commitment to international peacekeeping operations, though these roles could be challenged by equipment obsolescence and a comparatively small establishment strength. Ties have developed with China over the past decade, including in military training and weapons sales. There are reports that some equipment may have been procured from Israeli firms. Zambia is a member of the AU and SADC and the armed services have participated in exercises with international and regional partners including for the SADC Standby Force. Zambia's largest peacekeeping contribution is to the MINUSCA operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In April 2017, Zambia signed a defence deal with Russia for spare-parts support. The armed forces are all-volunteer. The US has provided funding and material support for army and air-force pre-deployment training for the CAR peacekeeping mission. The armed forces have limited capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond national borders. While there is a need to modernise the inventory, funds remain limited. The country has no defence-industrial base, apart from limited ammunition production.

ACTIVE 15,100 (Army 13,500 Air 1,600)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

RESERVE 3,000 (Army 3,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army** 13,500**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

3 bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 cdo bn

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt)

Light

6 inf bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn)

1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Some equipment†

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 30: 10 T-55; 20 ZTZ-59

LT TK 30 PT-76

RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (€30 serviceable)

IFV 23 *Ratel*-20

APC • APC (W) 47+: 13 BTR-60; 20 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80;

4+ WZ-551

AUV 22 *Tigr***ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES**

ARV T-54/T-55 reported

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTUREMSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M18; 75mm M20; 84mm *Carl Gustaf***ARTILLERY** 194

SP 6 Atmos M-46

TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm

25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46

MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 *Grad* (€12 serviceable)MOR 917: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12 SP 120mm 6+
Elbit *Spear* Mk2**AIR DEFENCE**SAM • MANPAD 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)‡**GUNS**SP 23mm 4 ZSU-23-4 *Shilka*

TOWED 136: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 20mm 50 M-55 (triple);

23mm ZU-23; 37mm 40 M-1939; PG-65; 40mm L/70;

57mm €30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12

Reserve 3,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Light**

3 inf bn

Air Force 1,600**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**

1 sqn with L-15*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II); Y-12(IV)

1 (VIP) unit with AW139; HS-748

1 (liaison) sqn with Do-28

TRAINING2 sqn with MB-326GB; MFI-15 *Safari***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-17 *Hip* H1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 47G; Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*/
AB-205)**AIR DEFENCE**2 bty with S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†**

Very low serviceability

AIRCRAFT 21 combat capableTPT 19: **Medium** 2 C-27J *Spartan*; **Light** 15: 1 Cessna 208B*Grand Caravan*; 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 3 Y-12(II); 4 Y-12(IV);

PAX 2: 1 Gulfstream G650ER; 1 HS-748

TRG 51: 15 K-8 *Karakorum**; 6 L-15*; 10 MB-326GB; 8MFI-15 *Safari*; 12 SF-260TW**HELICOPTERS**MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 *Hip* HTPT • **Light** 12: 9 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*/AB-205); 3

Bell 212

TRG 5 Bell 47G

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 3+ISR • **Medium** 3+ *Hermes* 450**AIR DEFENCE**SAM • **Short-range** 6 S-125M *Pechora-M* (RS-SA-3 *Goa*)**AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES**

AAM • IR PL-5E-II

ASM 9K11 *Malyutka* (RS-AT-3 *Sagger*)**Paramilitary 1,400****Police Mobile Unit 700****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

1 police bn (4 police coy)


Police Paramilitary Unit 700**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES**APC • PPV 9+: 3+ *Marauder*; 6 CS/VP3**DEPLOYMENT****CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:** UN • MINUSCA 932; 1
inf bn**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:** UN •
MONUSCO 7**LEBANON:** UN • UNIFIL 2**MALI:** UN • MINUSMA 3**MIDDLE EAST:** UN • UNTSO 1**SOUTH SUDAN:** UN • UNMISS 11**SUDAN:** UN • UNISFA 4

Zimbabwe ZWE

Zimbabwe Dollar ZWL		2020	2021	2022
GDP	ZWL	1.12tr	2.20tr	
	USD	21.9bn	25.8bn	
<i>per capita</i>	USD	1,443	1,665	
Growth	%	-4.1	5.1	
Inflation	%	557.2	92.5	
Def bdtg	ZWL	3.11bn	23.3bn	
	USD	38.9m	287m	
USD1=ZWL		80.00	81.00	



Population 14,829,988

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	18.9%	5.2%	4.6%	4.3%	14.3%	1.8%
Female	19.3%	5.4%	4.9%	4.3%	14.2%	2.7%

Capabilities

Zimbabwe's political instability and weak economy remain key challenges for the government, and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. Principal military tasks include ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity and border security, as well as providing internal-security support to the police. The armed forces take an active political role. Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the SADC and takes part in SADC Standby Force exercises. Zimbabwe has also sent military forces as part of an SADC deployment to Mozambique to combat the Islamist insurgency there. There are defence ties with China and an emergent defence relationship with Belarus, while Russia in mid-2019 reportedly said it would consider alternative payment means for military cooperation. Military leaders have identified training as a development priority. Small numbers of personnel have deployed on peacekeeping operations but there is no capacity to sustain a force far beyond national borders. Equipment recapitalisation is also a priority, though much will depend on domestic economic health and perhaps the extent to which China and Russia provide support. There are plans to revive state-owned small-arms and munitions manufacturer Zimbabwe Defence Industries, although these may be hindered by continuing US and EU sanctions.

ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000)
Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 21,800

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army €25,000

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 1 SF bde HQ
- 1 mech bde HQ
- 5 inf bde HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 armd sqn

Mechanised

1 mech inf bn

Light

15 inf bn

1 cdo bn

Air Manoeuvre

1 para bn

Other

3 gd bn

1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 fd arty regt

2 engr regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES

MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69†

RECCE 115: 20 *Eland-60/90*; 15 FV701 *Ferret*†; 80 EE-9 *Cascavel* (90mm)

IFV 2+ YW307

APC • APC (T) 30: 8 ZSD-85 (incl CP); 22 VTT-323

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 reported; ZJX-93 ARV

VLB MTU reported

ARTILLERY 254

SP 122mm 12 2S1 *Gvozhdika*

TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74)

MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70

MOR 146: 81mm/82mm €140; 120mm 6 M-43

AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Point-defence 9K32 *Strela-2* (RS-SA-7 *Grail*)†

GUNS • TOWED 116: 14.5mm 36 ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;

23mm 45 ZU-23-2; 37mm 35 M-1939

Air Force 4,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with F-7 II†; FT-7†

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with K-8 *Karakorum**

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A *Skymaster**

ISR/TRAINING

1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W *Warrior**

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with BN-2 *Islander*; CASA 212-200 *Aviocar* (VIP)

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-35P *Hind* (liaison); SA316

Alouette III; AS532UL *Cougar* (VIP)

1 trg sqn with Bell 412 *Twin Huey*, SA316 *Alouette* III

AIR DEFENCE

1 sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable

FTR 9: 7 F-7 II†; 2 FT-7†

ISR 2 O-2A *Skymaster*

TPT • **Light** 25: 5 BN-2 *Islander*; 7 C-212-200 *Aviocar*; 13 Cessna 337 *Skymaster**; (10 C-47 *Skytrain* in store)

TRG 33: 10 K-8 *Karakorum**; 5 SF-260M; 8 SF-260TP*; 5 SF-260W *Warrior**; 5 SF-260F

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6: 4 Mi-35 *Hind*; 2 Mi-35P *Hind*

MRH 8: 7 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*; 1 SA316 *Alouette III*

TPT • **Medium** 2 AS532UL *Cougar* (VIP)

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-2; PL-5 (reported)

AD • GUNS 100mm (not deployed); 37mm (not deployed); 57mm (not deployed)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 21,800

Zimbabwe Republic Police Force 19,500

incl air wg

Police Support Unit 2,300

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 1

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 13

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 11

Chapter Nine

Military cyber capabilities

The IISS methodology for assessing military cyber capability is intended to provide a rigorous foundation for data collection and the construction of meaningful indicators for the subsequent comparative analysis of military cyber forces. It primarily applies to active-duty military forces with responsibility for cyberspace operations, although information has also been gathered on some reservist units. *Military Balance* assessments focus on military-owned cyber power. To fully assess national cyber power, civil-sector and whole-of-government cyber capacities need to be considered. Moreover, information availability (and a resulting requirement to focus on operationally relevant factors) leads to a focus on select indicators. These factors are given broader context with short text summaries of national military cyber power. Three examples are given below.

Strategic documents

Strategic documents are assessed as they provide insights into national strategy developments that influence military roles in cyberspace. They include national security strategies; national cyber-security strategies; strategy documents at the national, ministry and service levels; joint command publications; military doctrines; and relevant white papers.

Cyber force structure

These indicators are intended to provide insight into force structures and command and control. A country may have multiple military cyber forces and a number of organisations structured into unified joint-service commands – as stand-alone services or as unified independent branches (the latter including structures like Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff, GRU). Defence- or military-intelligence organisations with cyber capabilities are also included in this category.

Force-structure indicators seek to help determine whether a country’s principal cyber force has the capabilities to conduct offensive cyber operations. As part of its broader work on cyber power, the IISS assesses that offensive cyber capability is determined by factors including the ability to research system vulnerabilities and develop exploits; to write

or use malware to deliver destructive, degradative and disruptive payloads; and to maintain command and control (if required) via exploited technologies, domain names of phishing pages, botnet servers and virtual private networks. These three conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to constitute the possession of offensive capabilities.

There is also assessment of whether the cyber force has ever used offensive capabilities in an operational context. Offensive cyber operations encompass the use of capabilities with payloads that deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy adversaries’ networks, computers and devices, or the information they contain. These effects can be either digital or physical. Such capabilities can be used independently or they can be integrated with more conventional capabilities. Espionage and theft are only considered as attacks when information or systems are destroyed. The methodology credits the cyber force with offensive cyber operations if these are either independently executed by the armed forces’ cyber force elements or executed by these cyber force elements in conjunction with third-party proxies. State-sponsored operations are excluded where a third party conducts an attack but government cyber forces do not play an active role in the operation.

Cyber exercises

Cyber exercises are assessed to shed light on their purposes, the development of indigenous staging capability and the degree to which an armed force is outwardly engaging in exercises.

The type of exercise forces conduct can provide lessons about the maturity of military cyber forces. For example, **tabletop exercises** rely entirely on written material and do not require modelling of threat environments; the goal is to find and document solutions to different scenarios. ‘Root cause’ pre-mortem exercises are tabletop exercises. **Synthetic training exercises** take place in a virtual training environment (isolated from real networks) using computer simulations that mimic live-fire situations. These include ‘capture the flag’ exercises, where participants or teams score points by finding ‘flags’ (e.g., lines of code) in a system or network. **Field training exercises** occur on self-contained networks, such as those

▼ Figure 31 Cyber force structures

The graphic below assesses cyber-force structures for China, Russia and the United States. It details the principal cyber force(s) for each country, and their command authorities and subordinate component commands. The graphic also details the composition of the principal cyber forces according to the roles assigned to individual units, in order to aid comparison between states and provide a proxy indicator for capability development. The data does not capture the overall size of each

force in terms of, for instance, personnel complement. Instead, the graphic captures the percentage of units with particular assigned roles in relation to the entire principal cyber force. Grey boxes indicate headquarters elements; blue represents incident-response functions; green represents intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles; yellow represents strategic-communications functions; and red represents the units responsible for producing effects in cyberspace.

United States

Principal cyber force(s)

US Cyber Command


Type

Unified Joint-Service Command

Immediate relevant components of principal force(s)

- Army Cyber Command
- Air Forces Cyber
- Fleet Cyber Command
- Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command
- Coast Guard Cyber Command
- National Guard

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units



Russia

Principal cyber force(s)

Information Operations Troops

Type

Independent Branch

Immediate relevant components of principal force(s)*

- Western Military District Cyber Center
- Southern Military District Cyber Center
- Central Military District Cyber Center
- Eastern Military District Cyber Center


Principal cyber force(s)

Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)


Type

Unified Independent Branch

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units



Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units



*It is as yet unclear whether there is a similar function within the Northern Fleet Military District

China

Principal cyber force(s)

Strategic Support Force



Type

Stand-alone Service

Immediate relevant components of principal force(s)

- Network Systems Department

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units



used in emulation ranges, or in network environments that map realistic networks and servers onto a physical network infrastructure to mirror production networks, such as the actual operating network used by the respective military service. **Live-fire exercises** entail real-time incident response by a defensive team against either an automated or human opponent. Live-fire in this context implies factors including the injection of malicious code into networks by ‘adversary’ role players. In contrast to field training exercises, live-fire exercises can have a component taking place on production networks by using overlay ranges – a network environment created to run in conjunction with production networks. Importantly, such environments are not limited to the simulation of a single security scenario and offer dynamic training experiences.

China

China is a highly capable cyber power that has shown significant improvements in its military cyber capabilities in the last decade.

China first indicated that it considered cyberspace to be a war-fighting domain in its 2015 Military Strategy. A 2019 defence white paper reiterated China’s active-defence strategy in cyberspace, which was first set out in the 2015 strategy. Though China has not published a cyber-warfare doctrine, authoritative People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings indicate that China possesses offensive cyber capabilities.

Under the overall command authority of President Xi Jinping, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force Network Systems Department has primary responsibility for the PLA’s information operations. The Network Systems Department is a sub-unified component command under the Strategic Support Force, an independent PLA service. China’s stated goal is to become a world leader in technologies including artificial intelligence and quantum information by 2035. Outside formal command structures, the PLA also utilises ‘cyber militias’ mainly for defensive missions and to improve civil–military cooperation.

China’s core cyber defences remain relatively weak, evidenced by its continued reliance on US-based corporations for core internet technology and its shortage of cyber-security professionals. It leverages the Military–Civil Fusion strategy not only for talent recruitment and training but also for cyber-related research projects. The National Cybersecurity Center is the most recent effort aimed at cultivating talent of all types – from full-time students to mid-

career cyber-security professionals. This body also supports private-sector and government research in indigenous cyber-security technologies. While China’s cyber-security industry is at an early stage of development, recent government plans to cultivate ‘high-quality’ industrial development are expected to boost military cyber defences.

The PLA has begun to integrate offensive cyber operations into its military exercises. For instance, in 2020, the Tibet military command reportedly held a field training exercise in September 2020 in which live-fire offensive cyber operations were integrated as part of joint air–ground combat drills. These developments occur within the context of broader PLA modernisation efforts set out in 2017.

Russia

Russia is a highly capable cyber power. Cyber capabilities are part of a broader framework of information operations, and strategic documents generally refer to cyber security under the rubric of ‘information security’. In July 2021, Russia released the latest update to its National Security Strategy, which devoted a section to information security and indicated attention on the further development of military cyber forces and capabilities.

In 2017, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the establishment of information-operations forces within the Russian armed forces, noting that these troops are more effective than those used in the past in countering propaganda.

The GRU takes the leading role in military cyber operations. It is a unified independent branch under the command of the General Staff and the defence minister. Offensive cyber operations have been attributed to Unit 26165 (85th Main Special Services Centre) with the monikers ‘Fancy Bear’, ‘Strontium’ and ‘APT 28’, and Unit 74455 (the Main Centre for Special Technologies) dubbed ‘Sandworm hackers’. Other paramilitary and civilian intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) also play a prominent role in carrying out cyber operations. In 2020, the armed forces announced the goal of forming an operational cyber-security centre in each military district. Their operational status is not known. Russia introduced information-security units into its Strategic Rocket Forces for the first time only in 2014. The training of military information-security specialists is mainly undertaken by Krasnodar Higher Military School.

Despite import-substitution policies, Russia's domestic cyber-defence and ICT sectors remain largely dependent on foreign suppliers and vendors. The country lags in adapting to emerging technologies and struggles with the domestic recruitment of cyber-security specialists. To these ends, in 2018 the defence ministry launched 'ERA Technopolis', a research centre and technology park intended, among other things, to create and develop military and dual-use technologies. In 2021, the US Treasury sanctioned ERA Technopolis, alleging that it supported and housed GRU units that carry out offensive cyber operations.

In September 2021, there were reports that Russia's major *Zapad* strategic-level exercise contained a cyber component. Earlier, in July 2021, the country held a multi-day exercise to operationally test Russia's internet domain, which has been labelled RuNET.

United States

The US is the world's most capable cyber power. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), raised to the level of a unified combatant command in 2018, coordinates military cyber operations and defends Department of Defense (DoD) networks. The commander of USCYBERCOM is simultaneously the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Security Service. Both are part of the Department of Defense.

USCYBERCOM's command vision, released in 2018, emphasises the need to achieve and maintain

superiority over adversaries in the cyber domain. It also describes a policy of 'persistent engagement' and a construct of 'defend forward' to deter unacceptable operations by foreign countries.

USCYBERCOM leads cyber forces across all branches of the armed forces apart from the Space Force. The bulk of these cyber forces are housed in the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. USCYBERCOM has also announced plans to expand its Cyber Mission Force (CMF) by 2024 with 14 new teams. This will expand USCYBERCOM's CMF teams from 133 to 147.

USCYBERCOM's 2022 budget request reportedly includes funds for standing up four of the 14 new CMF teams. It has recently launched a Joint Cyber Warfare Architecture to promote interoperability amongst its combat service components.

The US has several government-level higher-education initiatives aimed at increasing the number of cyber-security specialists. The Department of Homeland Security and the NSA have sponsored the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity. The DoD also launched its Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program in 2020, which is intended to include collaboration with the private sector.

USCYBERCOM conducts a range of cyber exercises annually including tabletop and live-fire exercises, also participating in international drills. The command's premier annual synthetic training exercise, *Cyber Flag*, was last held in June 2021.

Explanatory notes

The Military Balance provides an assessment of the armed forces and defence economics of 171 countries and territories. Each edition contributes to the provision of a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far back as 1959. The data in the current edition is accurate according to IISS assessments as of November 2021, unless specified. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in *The Military Balance*, or terminology or boundaries used in graphics or mapping, does not imply legal recognition or indicate support for any government or administration.

General arrangement and contents

The introduction is an assessment of global defence developments and key themes in the 2022 edition. There are three analytical essays, followed by a graphical section analysing comparative defence statistics by domain, as well as key trends in defence economics. Regional chapters begin with analysis of the military and security issues that drive national-defence policy developments, and key trends in regional defence economics. These are followed by focused analysis, for certain countries, of defence policy and capability issues, and defence economics, and then a section assessing important regional arms procurements and deliveries. Next, detailed data on regional states' military forces and equipment, and defence economics, is presented in alphabetical order. The book closes with a reference section containing comparisons of defence economics and personnel statistics.

The Military Balance wall chart

The Military Balance 2022 wall chart is an assessment of Arctic security dynamics. Using text, data and graphics, the chart assesses key security issues concerning states with territory within the Arctic Circle, or with significant interests there, within a broader context of declining sea ice levels and an increasingly competitive strategic environment. Selected military bases within the Arctic Circle are detailed, along with principal units and capabilities, information on territorial claims, Arctic-related strategy and policy documents, military exercises, and icebreakers and ice-capable patrol ships.

Using The Military Balance

The country entries assess personnel strengths, organisation and equipment holdings of the world's armed forces.

Abbreviations and definitions

Qualifier

'At least'	Total is no less than the number given
'Up to'	Total is at most the number given, but could be lower
'About'	Total could be higher than given
'Some'	Precise inventory is unavailable at time of press
'In store'	Equipment held away from front-line units; readiness and maintenance varies
Billion (bn)	1,000 million (m)
Trillion (tr)	1,000 billion
\$	US dollars unless otherwise stated
€	Estimated
*	Aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable
-	Part of a unit is detached/less than
+	Unit reinforced/more than
†	IISS assesses that the serviceability of equipment is in doubt ^a
‡	Equipment judged obsolete (weapons whose basic design is more than four decades old and which have not been significantly upgraded within the past decade) ^a

^[a] Not to be taken to imply that such equipment cannot be used

Force-strength and equipment-inventory data is based on the most accurate data available, or on the best estimate that can be made. In estimating a country's total capabilities, old equipment may be counted where it is considered that it may still be deployable. The data presented reflects judgements based on information available to the IISS at the time the book is compiled. Where information differs from previous editions, this is mainly because of changes in national forces, but it is sometimes because the IISS has reassessed the evidence supporting past entries.

Country entries

Information on each country is shown in a standard format, although the differing availability of information and differences in nomenclature result in some variations. Country entries include economic, demographic and military data. Population figures are based on demographic statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Military data includes personnel numbers, conscript liability where relevant, outline organisation, number of formations and units, and an inventory of the major equipment of each

service. Details of national forces stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the given country are also provided.

Arms procurements and deliveries

A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the regional text. These are designed to illustrate key trends, principal programmes and significant events in regional defence procurements. More detailed information on defence procurements, organised by country, equipment type and manufacturing company, can be found on the IISS Military Balance+ database (<https://www.iiss.org/militarybalanceplus>). The information in this section meets the threshold for a *Military Balance* country entry and as such does not feature information on sales of small arms and light weapons.

Defence economics

Country entries include annual defence budgets (and expenditure where applicable), selected economic-performance indicators and demographic aggregates. All country entries are subject to revision each year as new information, particularly regarding actual defence expenditure, becomes available. On pp. 521–6, there are also international comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel, giving expenditure figures for the past three years in per capita terms and as a % of gross domestic product (GDP). The aim is to provide a measure of military expenditure and the allocation of economic resources to defence.

Individual country entries show economic performance over the past two years and current demographic data. Where this data is unavailable, information from the last available year is provided. All financial data in the country entries is shown in both national currency and US dollars at current – not constant – prices. US-dollar conversions are calculated from the exchange rates listed in the entry.

The use of market exchange rates has limitations, particularly because it does not consider the varying levels of development or the differing cost of inputs (principally personnel, equipment and investment, factors that help determine a country's military capability) specific to each country's national context. An alternative approach is to make conversions using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which at least partially takes these cost differentials into account.

However, the suitability of PPP conversions depends on the extent to which a country is self-sufficient in developing and producing the armaments required by its armed forces. For Russia and China they are appropriate, as imported systems play almost no role in Russia's case and only a small and decreasing one in that of China. However, PPP conversions are less suitable when assessing the spending of countries such as India and Saudi Arabia,

which rely heavily on imports of military equipment from relatively high-cost producers. For those countries it would be necessary to adopt a hybrid approach to determine defence expenditure in dollars, with the market exchange rate used for converting defence procurement and the PPP conversion rate applied to all other defence expenditure (personnel, operations, etc.). As such, to produce standardised international comparisons, PPP conversions would have to be applied to all countries. In the absence of defence-based PPP rates, analysts would have to use the GDP-based PPP rates that are available for all countries. However, these are also statistical estimates and, as such, difficult to apply to military expenditure because they reflect the purchasing power of the wider economy, primarily civilian goods and services.

Definitions of terms

Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a standardised definition of military expenditure, many countries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often not made public). In order to present a comprehensive picture, *The Military Balance* lists three different measures of military-related spending data.

- For most countries, an official defence-budget figure is provided.
- For those countries where other military-related outlays, over and above the defence budget, are known or can be reasonably estimated, an additional measurement referred to as defence expenditure is also provided. Defence-expenditure figures will naturally be higher than official budget figures, depending on the range of additional factors included.
- For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as well as defence expenditure reported by NATO in local-currency terms and converted using IMF exchange rates, is quoted.

NATO's military-expenditure definition (the most comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The term 'armed forces' includes strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces. It also includes other forces if they are trained, structured and equipped to support defence forces and are realistically deployable. Defence expenditures are reported in four categories: Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction, Research and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure. Operating Costs include salaries and pensions for military and civilian personnel; the cost of maintaining and training units, service organisations, headquarters and support elements; and the cost of servicing and repairing

military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and Construction expenditure covers national equipment and infrastructure spending, as well as common infrastructure programmes. R&D is defence expenditure up to the point at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) contributions are also noted – primarily the IISS tracks Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations from the US.

For many non-NATO countries the issue of transparency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even fewer report real defence expenditures) to their electorates, the UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations. In the case of governments with a proven record of transparency, official figures generally conform to the standardised definition of defence budgeting, as adopted by the UN, and consistency problems are not usually a major issue. The IISS cites official defence budgets as reported by either national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the IMF.

For those countries where the official defence-budget figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total military-related spending, and appropriate additional data is available, the IISS will use data from a variety of sources to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary manipulation or falsification typically involve equipment procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment, covert weapons programmes, pensions for retired military and civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-budgetary sources of revenue for the military arising from ownership of industrial, property and land assets. There will be several countries listed in *The Military Balance* for which only an official defence-budget figure is provided but where, in reality, true defence-related expenditure is almost certainly higher.

Percentage changes in defence spending are referred to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e., inflation) on defence spending. By contrast, real terms account for inflationary effects, and may therefore be considered a more accurate representation of change over time.

The principal sources for national economic statistics cited in the country entries are the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American, Asian and African Development banks). For some countries, basic economic data is difficult to obtain. GDP figures are nominal (current) values at market prices. GDP growth is real, not nominal growth, and inflation is the year-on-year change in consumer prices. When real-terms defence-spending figures are mentioned, these are measured in constant 2015 US dollars.

Units and formation strength

Company	100–200
Battalion	500–1,000
Brigade	3,000–5,000
Division	15,000–20,000
Corps or Army	50,000–100,000

General defence data

Personnel

The 'Active' total comprises all servicemen and women on full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equivalent is under control of the defence ministry, they may be included in the active total. Only the length of conscript liability is shown; where service is voluntary there is no entry. 'Reserve' describes formations and units not fully manned or operational in peacetime, but which can be mobilised by recalling reservists in an emergency. Some countries have more than one category of reserves, often kept at varying degrees of readiness. Where possible, these differences are denoted using the national descriptive title, but always under the heading of 'Reserves' to distinguish them from full-time active forces. All personnel figures are rounded to the nearest 50, except for organisations with under 500 personnel, where figures are rounded to the nearest ten.

Other forces

Many countries maintain forces whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest that they may be used to support or replace regular military forces or be used more broadly by states to deliver militarily relevant effect. They include some forces that may have a constabulary role or are classed as gendarmerie forces, with more formal law-enforcement responsibilities. These are called 'Gendarmerie & Paramilitary' and are detailed after the military forces of each country. Their personnel numbers are not normally included in the totals at the start of each entry.

Forces by role and equipment by type

Quantities are shown by function (according to each nation's employment) and type, and represent what are believed to be total holdings, including active and reserve operational and training units. Inventory totals for missile systems relate to launchers and not to missiles. Equipment held 'in store' is not counted in the main inventory totals.

Deployments

The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and operational deployments abroad, including peacekeeping opera-

tions. Domestic deployments are not included, with the exception of overseas territories. Information in the country-data sections details troop deployments and, where available, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel figures are not generally included for embassy staff or standing multinational headquarters.

Land forces

To make international comparison easier and more consistent, *The Military Balance* categorises forces by role and translates national military terminology for unit and formation sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment holdings and organisation of formations such as brigades and divisions vary from country to country. In addition, some unit terms, such as ‘regiment’, ‘squadron’, ‘battery’ and ‘troop’, can refer to significantly different unit sizes in different countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms should be assumed to reflect standard British usage where they occur.

Naval forces

Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex. A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants revolved around a distinction between independently operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and anti-submarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, ships are increasingly performing a range of roles. Also, modern ship design has meant that the full-load displacement (FLD) of different warship types has evolved and in some cases overlaps. For these reasons, *The Military Balance* now classifies vessels by an assessed combination of role, equipment fit and displacement.

Air forces

Aircraft listed as combat capable are assessed as being equipped to deliver air-to-air or air-to-surface ordnance. The definition includes aircraft designated by type as bomber, fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack and anti-submarine warfare. Other aircraft considered to be combat capable are marked with an asterisk (*). Operational groupings of air forces are shown where known. Typical squadron aircraft strengths can vary both between aircraft types and from country to country. When assessing missile ranges, *The Military Balance* uses the following range indicators:

- Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000 km;
- Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000–3,000 km;
- Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000–5,000 km;
- Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000 km.

Cyber

The Military Balance+ database is integrating information on military-owned cyber capacities. The research taxonomy focuses on enablers, including indicators of capability from the armed forces. The methodology includes military or militarily relevant cyber strategy and doctrine; organisations and principal cyber units and military cyber exercises; with these categories framed by a brief prose assessment. However, military-owned cyber capabilities only constitute one part of national cyber capabilities and, because of this, care must be taken when looking at this information for judgements of national ‘cyber power’.

Attribution and acknowledgements

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Principal land definitions

FORCES BY ROLE

Command:	free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs).
Special Forces (SF):	elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles.
Manoeuvre:	combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows:
Reconnaissance:	combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information.
Armoured:	units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and formations intended to provide mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault guns, are classified as light armoured.
Mechanised:	units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs). They have less mounted firepower and protection than their armoured equivalents, but can usually deploy more infantry.
Light:	units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with few, if any, organic armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with soft-skinned vehicles.
Air Manoeuvre:	units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/or helicopters.
Amphibious:	amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea.
Other Forces:	includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border guards and combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration tasks.
Combat Support:	combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes artillery, engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals and information operations.
Combat Service Support (CSS):	includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and formations.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Light Weapons:	small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable anti-armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to manufacture or copy that listing them would be impractical.
Crew-Served Weapons:	crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than 80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.
Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs):	armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes, further subdivided as below:
Main Battle Tank (MBT):	armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 100mm calibre and with a combat weight of between 35 and 75 metric tonnes.
Light Tank (LTK):	armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of between 15 and 40 metric tonnes.
Wheeled Assault Gun (ASLT):	armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes.
Armoured Reconnaissance (RECCE):	armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no significant transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight of less than 15 metric tonnes, or both.
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV):	armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad and armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre.

Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC):	lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre.
Airborne Combat Vehicle (ABCV):	armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside airborne forces.
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV):	armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capability.
Armoured Utility Vehicle (AUV):	armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable of undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance and light transport.
Specialist Variants:	variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances (amb), are categorised with their parent vehicles.
Engineering and Maintenance Vehicles:	includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and recovery vehicles (ARV), assault bridging (VLB) and mine-warfare vehicles (MW).
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Vehicles (NBC):	armoured vehicles principally designed to operate in potentially contaminated terrain.
Anti-Tank/Anti-Infrastructure (AT):	guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and battlefield hardened targets.
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers (SSM):	launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles.
Artillery:	weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and above for mortars, capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire.
Coastal Defence:	land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers.
Air Defence (AD):	guns, directed-energy (DE) weapons and surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing and uninhabited aircraft. Missiles are further classified by maximum notional engagement range: point-defence (up to 10 km); short-range (10–30 km); medium-range (30–75 km); and long-range (75 km+). Systems primarily intended to intercept missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence.

Principal naval definitions

To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not always conform to national definitions, are used as guidance:

Submarines:	all vessels designed to operate primarily under water. Submarines with a dived displacement below 250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines (SSW); those below 500 tonnes are coastal submarines (SSC).
Principal Surface Combatants:	all surface ships designed for combat operations on the high seas, with an FLD above 2,200 tonnes. Aircraft carriers (CV), including smaller support carriers (CVS) embarking STOVL aircraft and helicopter carriers (CVH), are vessels with a flat deck primarily designed to carry fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft, without specialised amphibious capability. Other principal surface combatants include cruisers (C) (FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (DD) (FLD 4,500–9,749 tonnes with a primary area air-defence weapons fit and role) and frigates (FF) (FLD 2,200–9,000 tonnes and a primary anti-submarine/general-purpose weapons fit and role).

Patrol and Coastal Combatants:	surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations. These include corvettes (FS), which usually have an FLD between 500 and 2,199 tonnes and are distinguished from other patrol vessels by their heavier armaments. Also included in this category are offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft (PC), which have an FLD between 250 and 1,499 tonnes; and patrol boats (PB) with an FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots are designated as 'fast'.
Mine warfare vessels:	all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures. Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and destroy mines in an area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy individual mines; or countermeasures vessels (MC), which combine both roles.
Amphibious vessels:	vessels designed to transport combat personnel and/or equipment onto shore. These include aviation-capable amphibious assault ships (LHA), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL air assets and may have a well deck for LCACs and landing craft; aviation-capable amphibious assault ships with a well dock for LCACs and landing craft (LHD), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform helicopters (LPH), which have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but do have a well dock and carry both combat personnel and equipment; and land ships docks (LSD) with a well dock but focused more on equipment transport. Landing ships (LS) are amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are smaller vessels designed to transport personnel and equipment from a larger vessel to land or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are open vessels. Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from utility craft air cushioned (UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of vehicles and personnel.
Auxiliary vessels:	ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat ships or operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO) and solid stores (AKS)); logistics (such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS)); maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy tenders (ABU)); research (such as survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships (AGI) and ocean-going tugs (ATF)).
Weapons systems:	weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT) torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range less than 5 km and guns with a calibre less than 57mm are generally not included.
Organisations:	naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only where doing so would aid qualitative judgements.
Legacy platforms:	legacy-generation platforms, unless specifically modified for a new role, may be listed with their original designations although they may not conform fully with current guidance criteria.

Principal aviation definitions

Bomber (Bbr):	comparatively large platforms intended for the delivery of air-to-surface ordnance. Bbr units are units equipped with bomber aircraft for the air-to-surface role.
Fighter (Ftr):	aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, which may also have a limited air-to-surface capability. Ftr units are equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority, which may have a secondary and limited air-to-surface capability.
Fighter/Ground Attack (FGA):	multi-role fighter-size platforms with significant air-to-surface capability, potentially including maritime attack, and at least some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-role units equipped with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to-surface attack.
Ground Attack (Atk):	aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited or no air-to-air capability. Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft.

Attack Helicopter (Atk hel):	rotary-wing platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted with an integrated fire-control system.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):	fixed- and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage submarines, many with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capability. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW):	ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for anti-surface-warfare missions.
Maritime Patrol (MP):	fixed-wing aircraft and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime surface surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Electronic Warfare (EW):	fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR):	fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide radar, visible-light or infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Combat/Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (CISR):	aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft and/or UAVs for ISR and air-to-surface missions.
COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT:	fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT), communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence task. ELINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence.
Airborne Early Warning (& Control) (AEW (&C)):	fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing airborne early warning, with a varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Search and Rescue (SAR):	units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military personnel or civilians.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR):	units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of personnel from hostile territory.
Tanker (Tkr):	fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling. Tkr units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.
Tanker Transport (Tkr/Tpt):	platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift.
Transport (Tpt):	fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340 kg; medium up to 27,215 kg; and heavy above 27,215 kg. Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up to 2,000 kg; medium transport helicopters up to 4,535 kg; heavy transport helicopters greater than 4,535 kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for transporting cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to transport personnel or cargo.
Trainer (Trg):	fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.
Multi-Role Helicopter (MRH):	rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including light transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):	remotely piloted or controlled uninhabited fixed- or rotary-wing systems. Light UAVs are those weighing 20–150 kg; medium: 150–600 kg; and large: more than 600 kg.
Loitering Munition:	an air vehicle with an integral warhead designed to be able to fly in a search or holding pattern and to be used to identify and attack a target.

Reference

Table 12 List of abbreviations for data sections

AAA	anti-aircraft artillery	armd	armoured	CV/H/L/N/S	aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/nuclear powered/STOVL
AAM	air-to-air missile	ARS/H	rescue and salvage ship/with hangar	CW	chemical warfare/weapons
AAR	search-and-rescue vessel	arty	artillery	DD/G/H/M	destroyer/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM
AAV	amphibious assault vehicle	ARV	armoured recovery vehicle	DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
AB	airborne	AS	anti-submarine/submarine tender	DE	directed energy
ABM	anti-ballistic missile	ASBM	anti-ship ballistic missile	def	defence
ABU/H	sea-going buoy tender/with hangar	ASCM	anti-ship cruise missile	det	detachment
ABCV	airborne combat vehicle	AShM	anti-ship missile	div	division
ac	aircraft	aslt	assault	ECM	electronic countermeasures
ACV	armoured combat vehicle	ASM	air-to-surface missile	ELINT	electronic intelligence
ACS	crane ship	ASR	submarine rescue craft	elm	element/s
AD	air defence	ASTT	anti-submarine torpedo tube	engr	engineer
ADA	air-defence artillery	ASW	anti-submarine warfare	EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
adj	adjusted	ASuW	anti-surface warfare	EPF	expeditionary fast transport vessel
AE	auxiliary, ammunition carrier	AT	anti-tank	eqpt	equipment
AEM	missile support ship	ATBM	anti-tactical ballistic missile	ESB	expeditionary sea base
AEV	armoured engineer vehicle	ATF	ocean going tug	ESD	expeditionary transport dock
AEW(&C)	airborne early warning (and control)	ATGW	anti-tank guided weapon	EW	electronic warfare
AFD/L	auxiliary floating dry dock/small	Atk	attack/ground attack	excl	excludes/excluding
AFS/H	logistics ship/with hangar	ATS	tug, salvage and rescue ship	exp	expenditure/expeditionary
AFSB	afloat forward staging base	AUV	armoured utility vehicle	FAC	forward air control
AFV	armoured fighting vehicle	avn	aviation	fd	field
AG	misc auxiliary	AWT	water tanker	FF/G/H/M	frigate/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM
AGB/H	icebreaker/with hangar	AX/L/S	training craft/light/sail	FGA	fighter/ground attack
AGE/H	experimental auxiliary ship/with hangar	BA	Budget Authority (US)	FLD	full-load displacement
AGF/H	command ship/with hangar	Bbr	bomber	flt	flight
AGHS	hydrographic survey vessel	BCT	brigade combat team	FMA	Foreign Military Assistance
AGI	intelligence collection vessel	bde	brigade	FRS	fleet replacement squadron
AGM	space tracking vessel	bdgt	budget	FS/G/H/M	corvette/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM
AGOR	oceanographic research vessel	BG	battlegroup	Ftr	fighter
AGOS	oceanographic surveillance vessel	BMD	ballistic-missile defence	FTX	field training exercise
AGS/H	survey ship/with hangar	bn	battalion/billion	FY	fiscal year
AH	hospital ship	bty	battery	gd	guard
AIP	air-independent propulsion	C2	command and control	GDP	gross domestic product
AK/L	cargo ship/light	C4	command, control, communications, and computers	GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
aka	also known as	casevac	casualty evacuation	GMLS	Guided Missile Launching System
AKEH	dry cargo/ammunition ship	cav	cavalry	gp	group
AKR/H	roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with hangar	cbt	combat	GPS	Global Positioning System
AKS/L	stores ship/light	CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive	HA/DR	humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
ALBM	air-launched ballistic missile	cdo	commando	hel	helicopter
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile	C/G/H/M/N	cruiser/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM/nuclear-powered	how	howitzer
amb	ambulance	CISR	combat ISR	HQ	headquarters
amph	amphibious/amphibian	CIMIC	civil-military cooperation	HUMINT	human intelligence
AO/S	oiler/small	CIWS	close-in weapons system	HWT	heavyweight torpedo
AOE	fast combat support ship	COIN	counter-insurgency	hy	heavy
AOR/L/H	fleet replenishment oiler with RAS capability/light/with hangar	comd	command	IBU	inshore boat unit
AOT/L	oiler transport/light	COMINT	communications intelligence	ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
AP	armour-piercing/anti-personnel/transport ship	comms	communications	IFV	infantry fighting vehicle
APB	barracks ship	coy	company	IIR	imaging infrared
APC	armoured personnel carrier	CP	command post	IMINT	imagery intelligence
AR/C/D/L	repair ship/cable/dry dock/light	CPX	command post exercise	imp	improved
ARG	amphibious ready group	CS	combat support	indep	independent
ARH	active radar homing	CSAR	combat search and rescue	inf	infantry
ARL	airborne reconnaissance low	CSS	combat service support		
ARM	anti-radiation missile	CT	counter-terrorism		

info ops	information operations	MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile	sat	satellite
INS	inertial navigation system	MRH	multi-role helicopter	SDV	swimmer delivery vehicle
int	intelligence	MRL	multiple rocket launcher	SEAD	suppression of enemy air defence
IOC	initial operating capability	MS/C/D/I/O/R	mine sweeper/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean/river	SF	special forces
IR	infrared			SHORAD	short-range air defence
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile	msl	missile	SIGINT	signals intelligence
ISD	in-service date	mtn	mountain	sig	signals
ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance	MW	mine warfare	SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
ISTAR	intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance	n.a.	not applicable	SLCM	submarine-launched cruise missile
LACM	land-attack cruise missile	n.k.	not known	SLEP	service-life-extension programme
LC/A/AC/H/M/P/T/U/VP	landing craft/assault/air cushion/ heavy/medium/personnel/tank/ utility/vehicles and personnel	NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical	SP	self-propelled
		NCO	non-commissioned officer	Spec Ops	special operations
LCC	amphibious command ship	nm	nautical mile	SPAAGM	self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile system
LGB	laser-guided bomb	nuc	nuclear	spt	support
LHA	aviation-capable amphibious assault ship	O & M	operations and maintenance	sqn	squadron
LHD	aviation-capable amphibious assault ship with well dock	obs	observation/observer	SRBM	short-range ballistic missile
LIFT	lead-in ftr trainer	OCU	operational conversion unit	SS	submarine
LKA	amphibious cargo ship	OP	observation post	SSA/N	auxiliary support submarine/ nuclear-powered
LLI	long-lead items	op/ops	operational/operations	SSB/N	ballistic missile submarine/ nuclear-powered
Inchr	launcher	OPFOR	opposition training force		
LoA	letter of offer and acceptance	org	organised/organisation	SSC	coastal submarine
log	logistic	OPV	offshore patrol vessel	SSG	conventionally-powered attack submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles
LoI	letter of intent	para	paratroop/parachute	SSGN	nuclear-powered submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles
LP/D/H	landing platform/dock/helicopter	PAX	passenger/passenger transport aircraft	SSK	conventionally-powered attack submarine
LRIP	low-rate initial production	PB/F/G/I/M/R/T	patrol boat/fast/with surface-to- surface missile/inshore/with SAM/ riverine/with torpedo	SSM	surface-to-surface missile
LS/D/L/H/M/T		PC/C/F/G/H/I/M/O/R/T	patrol craft/coastal/fast/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/inshore/with CIWS missile or SAM/offshore/riverine/with torpedo	SSN	nuclear-powered attack submarine
	landing ship/dock/logistic/with hangar/medium/tank			SSR	security-sector reform
lt	light	pdr	pounder	SSW	midget submarine
LWT	lightweight torpedo	pers	personnel	str	strength
maint	maintenance	PGM	precision-guided munitions	STOVL	short take-off and vertical landing
MANPAD	man-portable air-defence system	PH/G/M/T	patrol hydrofoil/with surface-to- surface missile/with SAM/with torpedo	surv	surveillance
MANPATS	man-portable anti-tank system			sy	security
MBT	main battle tank	pl	platoon	t	tonnes
MC/C/CS/D/I/O	mine countermeasure coastal/ command and support/diving support/inshore/ocean	PoR	peacekeeping operations	tac	tactical
		PPP	programme of record	tch	technical
MCM	mine countermeasures	PPV	purchasing-power parity	temp	temporary
MCMV	mine countermeasures vessel	PRH	protected patrol vehicle	tk	tank
MD	military district	PRH	passive radar-homing	tkr	tanker
mech	mechanised	prepo	pre-positioned	TMD	theatre missile defence
med	medium/medical	PSO/H	peace support operations or offshore patrol ship/with hangar	torp	torpedo
medevac	medical evacuation	psyops	psychological operations	tpt	transport
MH/C/D/I/O	mine hunter/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean	ptn br	psychological operations	tr	trillion
		ptn	pointon bridging	trg	training
mil	military	quad	quadruple	TRV	torpedo recovery vehicle
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle	R&D	research and development	TT	torpedo tube
		RCL	recoilless launcher	UAV	uninhabited aerial vehicle
mk	mark (model number)	recce	reconnaissance	UCAC	utility craft air cushioned
ML	minelayer	regt	regiment	UCAV	uninhabited combat air vehicle
MLU	mid-life update	RFI	request for information	UGV	uninhabited ground vehicle
mne	marine	RFP	request for proposals	utl	utility
mnv	manoeuvre enhancement	RL	rocket launcher	UUV	uninhabited underwater vehicle
mod	modified/modification	ro-ro	roll-on, roll-off		
mor	mortar	RRC/F/U	rapid-reaction corps/force/unit	veh	vehicle
mot	motorised/motor	RV	re-entry vehicle	VLB	vehicle launched bridge
MoU	memorandum of understanding	rvn	riverine	VLS	vertical launch system
MP	maritime patrol/military police	SAM	surface-to-air missile	VSHORAD	very short-range air defence
MR	maritime reconnaissance/motor rifle	SAR	search and rescue	WFO	withdrawn from use
		SARH	semi-active radar homing	wg	wing

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)	Estimated reservists (000)	Active paramilitary (000)		
	2019	2020	2020	2021	2019	2020				2021	2021
North America											
Canada	18,731	20,144	518	534	612	1.08	1.23	1.15	67	34	5
United States	745,732	774,527	2,247	2,328	2,251	3.49	3.71	3.29	1,395	843	0
Total	764,463	794,671	1,383	1,431	1,432	2.28	2.47	2.22	1,462	878	5
Europe											
Albania	198	222	64	72	80	1.29	1.50	1.47	8	0	0
Austria	3,238	3,466	367	391	414	0.73	0.80	0.76	23	116	0
Belgium	4,817	5,323	414	454	543	0.90	1.03	1.10	24	6	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	165	168	43	44	51	0.82	0.85	0.89	11	6	0
Bulgaria	2,067	1,249	295	179	185	3.03	1.81	1.65	37	3	0
Croatia	1,047	997	247	236	255	1.72	1.77	1.69	17	21	3
Cyprus	402	419	321	331	408	1.61	1.76	1.97	12	50	1
Czech Republic	2,910	3,253	272	304	371	1.15	1.33	1.43	27	0	0
Denmark	4,557	4,919	780	838	919	1.31	1.38	1.37	15	44	0
Estonia	688	716	557	583	644	2.24	2.36	2.19	7	18	0
Finland	3,920	4,153	706	745	1,067	1.46	1.54	2.01	19	238	3
France	52,100	54,864	771	809	872	1.91	2.09	2.02	203	41	101
Germany	48,398	52,094	603	650	701	1.24	1.36	1.33	183	30	0
Greece	4,806	4,976	447	469	731	2.34	2.63	3.65	143	221	4
Hungary	1,824	2,000	186	205	271	1.12	1.29	1.45	34	20	12
Iceland	55	52	159	149	124	0.22	0.24	0.17	0	0	0
Ireland	1,113	1,187	217	229	245	0.28	0.28	0.25	9	1	0
Italy	27,049	29,696	434	476	542	1.35	1.58	1.59	162	18	176
Latvia	710	757	373	402	448	2.11	2.28	2.26	9	11	0
Lithuania	1,061	1,161	384	425	462	1.96	2.09	2.01	23	7	14
Luxembourg	341	390	552	620	650	0.48	0.53	0.50	0	0	1
Macedonia, North	151	188	71	88	98	1.25	1.57	1.51	8	5	8
Malta	84	81	185	177	186	0.53	0.54	0.51	2	0	0
Montenegro	74	74	120	121	143	1.42	1.65	1.58	2	3	10
Netherlands	12,060	12,594	700	729	851	1.32	1.38	1.47	34	6	7
Norway	6,689	6,476	1,234	1,184	1,353	1.65	1.79	1.67	25	40	0
Poland	11,817	12,780	308	334	351	1.98	2.14	2.05	114	0	75

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)		Estimated reservists (000)		Active paramilitary (000)	
	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021
Portugal	2,674	2,853	2,959	259	277	288	1.11	1.25	1.18	27	212	25
Romania	4,939	5,182	5,613	231	243	264	1.98	2.09	1.95	71	55	57
Serbia	903	896	1,039	128	128	149	1.75	1.69	1.71	28	50	4
Slovakia	1,871	1,847	2,010	344	339	370	1.78	1.77	1.72	18	0	0
Slovenia	628	605	670	299	288	319	1.16	1.13	1.10	7	1	0
Spain	12,630	12,729	13,767	254	254	291	0.91	0.99	0.96	123	15	76
Sweden	6,373	7,036	8,359	630	690	815	1.19	1.30	1.34	15	10	0
Switzerland	5,343	5,724	5,722	640	681	677	0.73	0.76	0.71	20	123	0
Turkey	12,082	10,885	10,160	148	133	123	1.59	1.51	1.28	355	379	157
United Kingdom*	59,438	61,473	71,627	908	935	1,084	2.10	2.27	2.30	153	75	0
Total	299,222	313,483	350,845	396	411	469	1.40	1.47	1.48	1,967	1,826	732
Russia and Eurasia												
Armenia	644	628	603	212	208	200	4.73	4.97	4.43	43	210	4
Azerbaijan	1,787	2,267	2,698	176	222	262	3.71	5.32	5.12	67	300	15
Belarus	651	601	638	69	63	68	1.01	1.00	0.97	48	290	110
Georgia	310	283	279	63	57	57	1.98	2.03	1.68	21	0	5
Kazakhstan	1,595	1,430	1,539	84	75	80	0.88	0.84	0.79	39	0	32
Kyrgyzstan	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	11	0	10
Moldova	43	44	51	12	13	15	0.36	0.37	0.41	5	58	1
Russia [a]	46,366	43,804	45,802	327	309	322	2.74	2.96	2.78	900	2,000	554
Tajikistan	89	89	93	10	10	10	1.09	1.11	1.15	9	20	8
Turkmenistan*	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	37	0	20
Ukraine	3,968	4,353	4,269	90	99	98	2.65	2.82	2.42	196	900	102
Uzbekistan	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	48	0	20
Total**	55,453	53,500	55,973	116	117	124	2.13	2.38	2.20	1,422	3,778	880
Asia												
Afghanistan	1,963	2,014	1,880	55	55	50	10.40	10.00	8.47	165	0	0
Australia	29,912	31,418	34,306	1,262	1,234	1,329	2.15	2.31	2.13	60	30	0
Bangladesh	3,652	3,786	4,059	23	23	25	1.21	1.17	1.14	163	0	64
Brunei	432	439	457	945	946	969	3.21	3.66	2.91	7	1	1
Cambodia*	1,043	1,032	1,024	62	61	59	3.85	4.10	3.93	124	0	67
China	177,075	188,597	207,340	127	135	148	1.23	1.27	1.23	2,035	510	500
Fiji	56	52	47	60	55	50	1.02	1.15	1.00	4	6	0

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)		Estimated reservists (000)		Active paramilitary (000)	
	2019	2020	2019	2020	2019	2020	2021	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021
India	63,306	63,507	48	48	2.21	2.39	1,460	1,155	1,608	1,608	1,608	1,608
Indonesia	7,600	8,098	29	30	0.68	0.77	396	400	280	280	280	280
Japan	48,229	49,762	383	396	0.94	0.99	247	56	14	14	14	14
Korea, DPR of	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	1,280	600	189	189	189	189
Korea, Republic of	40,071	40,999	776	791	2.43	2.50	555	3,100	14	14	14	14
Laos	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	29	0	100	100	100	100
Malaysia	3,698	3,706	115	114	1.01	1.10	113	52	23	23	23	23
Mongolia	98	105	31	33	0.72	0.82	10	137	8	8	8	8
Myanmar	2,132	2,390	38	42	3.10	2.94	356	0	107	107	107	107
Nepal	398	435	13	14	1.17	1.28	97	0	15	15	15	15
New Zealand	2,673	3,287	584	667	1.27	1.57	10	3	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	10,175	9,332	48	40	3.70	3.57	652	0	291	291	291	291
Papua New Guinea	79	94	11	13	0.32	0.40	4	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	4,684	5,269	44	48	1.25	1.47	145	131	12	12	12	12
Singapore	11,339	9,879	1,858	1,591	3.03	2.91	51	253	8	8	8	8
Sri Lanka	1,666	1,684	73	74	1.98	2.09	255	6	62	62	62	62
Taiwan	11,010	13,903	467	589	1.80	2.08	169	1,657	12	12	12	12
Thailand	7,315	6,839	106	99	1.34	1.36	361	200	94	94	94	94
Timor-Leste	31	42	23	30	1.87	2.66	2	0	0	0	0	0
Vietnam*	5,221	5,727	53	58	1.60	1.68	482	5,000	40	40	40	40
Total **	433,857	452,394	289	287	2.14	2.25	9,231	13,295	3,508	3,508	3,508	3,508
Middle East and North Africa												
Algeria	10,300	9,699	243	226	6.02	6.57	139	150	187	187	187	187
Bahrain	1,411	1,405	957	934	3.67	4.05	8	0	11	11	11	11
Egypt	3,353	4,106	33	39	1.54	1.49	439	479	397	397	397	397
Iran	17,189	16,549	205	195	2.96	1.98	610	350	40	40	40	40
Iraq	9,855	10,191	239	262	4.32	6.01	193	0	266	266	266	266
Israel	16,804	17,234	1,965	1,987	5.05	5.04	170	465	8	8	8	8
Jordan	1,691	1,719	158	159	4.75	4.90	101	65	15	15	15	15
Kuwait	7,820	6,823	2,645	2,279	5.74	6.44	18	24	7	7	7	7
Lebanon	1,885	575	322	105	3.80	3.29	60	0	20	20	20	20
Libya	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)		Estimated reservists (000)		Active paramilitary (000)	
	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021
Mauritania	161	207	212	41	52	52	2.04	2.56	2.31	16	0	5
Morocco	4,817	5,955	6,349	139	167	177	4.03	5.20	5.04	196	150	50
Oman	7,530	7,483	6,431	2,113	2,059	1,741	9.86	11.81	7.98	43	0	4
Palestinian Territories	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	0	0	n.k.
Qatar	6,399	6,466	6,258	2,659	2,645	2,523	3.64	4.45	3.70	17	0	5
Saudi Arabia	50,933	52,000	46,667	1,514	1,522	1,342	6.42	7.43	5.54	257	0	25
Syria	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	169	0	100
Tunisia	999	1,153	1,222	86	98	103	2.77	3.16	2.95	36	0	12
United Arab Emirates	19,329	19,826	19,159	1,964	1,984	1,944	4.63	5.52	4.67	63	0	0
Yemen	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	40	0	0
Total**	160,476	161,391	166,229	955	920	956	4.45	4.99	4.36	2,572	1,683	1,152
Latin America and the Caribbean												
Antigua and Barbuda	7	8	7	74	80	75	0.43	0.57	0.53	0	0	0
Argentina	3,281	2,904	2,572	73	64	56	0.73	0.75	0.57	72	0	31
Bahamas	92	86	95	275	254	270	0.70	0.87	0.89	2	0	0
Barbados	38	41	40	131	138	132	0.72	0.92	0.86	1	0	0
Belize	23	25	20	59	61	49	1.23	1.44	1.05	2	1	0
Bolivia	479	479	476	42	41	40	1.16	1.30	1.23	34	0	37
Brazil	27,133	22,234	21,752	129	105	102	1.44	1.54	1.32	367	1,340	395
Chile	4,416	4,049	4,219	245	223	230	1.58	1.60	1.27	69	19	45
Colombia	5,948	5,480	5,970	122	112	119	1.85	2.03	1.99	256	35	172
Costa Rica	440	457	434	87	90	84	0.70	0.75	0.71	0	0	10
Cuba	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	49	39	27
Dominican Republic	616	589	579	59	56	55	0.69	0.75	0.65	56	0	15
Ecuador	1,590	1,545	1,593	95	91	93	1.47	1.56	1.52	41	118	1
El Salvador	145	172	248	23	27	38	0.55	0.70	0.90	25	10	17
Guatemala	341	366	337	20	21	19	0.44	0.47	0.40	18	64	25
Guyana	67	66	71	90	88	91	1.30	1.20	0.97	3	1	0
Haiti	13	10	36	1	1	3	0.09	0.07	0.18	1	0	0
Honduras	348	345	347	37	37	37	1.39	1.45	1.32	15	60	8
Jamaica	262	238	209	93	85	74	1.66	1.71	1.41	6	3	0
Mexico	5,067	5,352	6,760	40	42	52	0.40	0.50	0.53	216	82	125
Nicaragua	79	79	77	13	13	12	0.62	0.63	0.58	12	0	0

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)	Estimated reservists (000)	Active paramilitary (000)		
	2019	2020	2020	2021	2019	2020				2021	
Panama	805	753	209	193	211	1.21	1.42	1.38	0	0	28
Paraguay	284	278	40	39	38	0.75	0.78	0.74	14	165	15
Peru	2,238	2,132	71	67	58	0.97	1.04	0.83	81	188	77
Suriname	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	2	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	906	954	747	789	633	3.90	4.42	3.58	5	1	0
Uruguay	423	535	125	158	154	0.68	0.95	0.87	21	0	1
Venezuela	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	123	8	220
Total**	55,044	49,176	116	115	109	1.07	1.18	1.05	1,488	2,132	1,248
Sub-Saharan Africa											
Angola	1,607	1,014	51	31	28	1.90	1.74	1.36	107	0	10
Benin	68	56	6	4	17	0.47	0.36	1.26	7	0	5
Botswana	535	560	234	242	222	3.22	3.72	2.96	9	0	0
Burkina Faso	358	388	18	19	22	2.24	2.23	2.33	11	0	0
Burundi	63	62	5	5	5	2.10	2.05	2.06	30	0	1
Cameroon	422	407	16	15	16	1.08	1.02	1.00	25	0	9
Cape Verde	11	12	19	20	21	0.54	0.68	0.64	1	0	0
Central African Rep	32	41	6	7	8	1.42	1.73	1.72	9	0	1
Chad	205	274	13	16	17	1.88	2.52	2.34	33	0	12
Congo	300	311	58	59	59	2.35	3.01	2.49	10	0	2
Côte d'Ivoire	538	608	20	22	23	0.92	0.99	0.94	27	0	n.k.
Dem Republic of the Congo	337	346	4	3	3	0.67	0.71	0.53	134	0	0
Djibouti	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	10	0	3
Equatorial Guinea	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	1	0	0
Eritrea	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	202	120	0
Ethiopia	516	429	5	4	3	0.56	0.44	0.40	138	0	0
Gabon	267	272	123	122	138	1.58	1.77	1.72	5	0	2
Gambia	14	15	7	7	7	0.80	0.79	0.79	4	0	0
Ghana	244	276	9	9	11	0.36	0.40	0.47	16	0	0
Guinea	195	211	16	17	18	1.45	1.37	1.40	10	0	3
Guinea-Bissau	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	4	0	0
Kenya	1,232	1,115	25	21	20	1.23	1.09	1.00	24	0	5
Lesotho	44	38	22	19	17	1.95	1.90	1.46	2	0	0

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

	Defence spending (current USDm)		Defence spending per capita (current USD)		Defence spending % of GDP		Active armed forces (000)		Estimated reservists (000)		Active paramilitary (000)	
	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2019	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021
Liberia	14	12	20	3	2	4	0.45	0.40	0.58	2	0	0
Madagascar	77	107	101	3	4	4	0.55	0.82	0.72	14	0	8
Malawi	68	69	82	3	3	4	0.62	0.58	0.67	11	0	4
Mali	722	787	863	38	40	43	4.18	4.50	4.41	21	0	20
Mauritius	219	225	203	159	163	146	1.56	2.06	1.84	0	0	3
Mozambique	127	131	140	5	4	5	0.82	0.94	0.89	11	0	0
Namibia	407	378	357	158	144	133	3.24	3.53	2.92	10	0	6
Niger	172	211	205	8	9	9	1.33	1.53	1.31	5	0	5
Nigeria	1,827	2,505	2,543	9	12	12	0.41	0.58	0.53	143	0	80
Rwanda	112	128	150	9	10	12	1.08	1.24	1.44	33	0	2
Senegal	342	346	479	22	22	30	1.47	1.40	1.74	14	0	5
Seychelles	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	11	7	10	2	1	1	0.26	0.17	0.23	9	0	0
Somalia	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	14	0	0
South Africa	3,495	3,292	3,126	63	58	55	0.90	0.98	0.75	74	0	15
South Sudan	68	99	43	7	9	4	1.48	2.22	1.32	53	0	0
Sudan	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	104	0	40
Tanzania	728	803	831	13	14	13	1.20	1.25	1.20	27	80	1
Togo	106	116	120	13	13	14	1.46	1.53	1.41	9	0	1
Uganda	562	960	1,199	13	22	27	1.48	2.52	2.77	45	10	1
Zambia	394	358	268	23	21	14	1.69	1.85	1.24	15	3	1
Zimbabwe	67	39	287	5	3	19	0.34	0.18	1.11	29	0	22
Total**	16,506	17,007	17,738	32	32	32	1.35	1.49	1.42	1,463	213	268
Summary												
North America	764,463	794,671	777,251	1,383	1,431	1,432	2.28	2.47	2.22	1,462	878	5
Europe	299,222	313,483	350,845	396	411	469	1.40	1.47	1.48	1,967	1,826	732
Russia and Eurasia	55,453	53,500	55,973	116	117	124	2.13	2.38	2.20	1,422	3,778	880
Asia	433,857	452,394	487,574	289	287	316	2.14	2.25	2.11	9,231	13,295	3,508
Middle East and North Africa	160,476	161,391	166,229	955	920	956	4.45	4.99	4.36	2,572	1,683	1,152
Latin America and the Caribbean	55,044	49,176	50,113	116	115	109	1.07	1.18	1.05	1,488	2,132	1,248
Sub-Saharan Africa	16,506	17,007	17,738	32	32	32	1.35	1.49	1.42	1,463	213	268
Global totals	1,785,020	1,841,624	1,905,723	297	297	319	1.83	1.99	1.85	19,605	23,803	7,793

Totals may not sum precisely due to rounding. * Estimates. ** Totals exclude defence spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is available in order to enable approximate comparisons of regional defence spending between years. Defence spending per capita (current USD) and Defence spending % of GDP totals are regional averages. [a] 'National Defence' budget chapter. Excludes other defence-related expenditures included under other budget lines (e.g., pensions) – see Table 6, p. 173. Defence spending as % of GDP includes US Foreign Military Financing programmes – other figures do not.

Table 14 Index of country/territory abbreviations

AFG	Afghanistan	GEO	Georgia	NPL	Nepal
ALB	Albania	GER	Germany	NZL	New Zealand
ALG	Algeria	GF	French Guiana	OMN	Oman
ANG	Angola	GHA	Ghana	PT	Palestinian Territories
ARG	Argentina	GIB	Gibraltar	PAN	Panama
ARM	Armenia	GNB	Guinea-Bissau	PAK	Pakistan
ATG	Antigua and Barbuda	GRC	Greece	PER	Peru
AUS	Australia	GRL	Greenland	PHL	Philippines
AUT	Austria	GUA	Guatemala	POL	Poland
AZE	Azerbaijan	GUI	Guinea	PNG	Papua New Guinea
BDI	Burundi	GUY	Guyana	PRC	China, People's Republic of
BEL	Belgium	HND	Honduras	PRT	Portugal
BEN	Benin	HTI	Haiti	PRY	Paraguay
BFA	Burkina Faso	HUN	Hungary	PYF	French Polynesia
BGD	Bangladesh	IDN	Indonesia	QTR	Qatar
BHR	Bahrain	IND	India	ROC	Taiwan (Republic of China)
BHS	Bahamas	IRL	Ireland	ROK	Korea, Republic of
BIH	Bosnia-Herzegovina	IRN	Iran	ROM	Romania
BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory	IRQ	Iraq	RSA	South Africa
BLG	Bulgaria	ISL	Iceland	RUS	Russia
BLR	Belarus	ISR	Israel	RWA	Rwanda
BLZ	Belize	ITA	Italy	SAU	Saudi Arabia
BOL	Bolivia	JAM	Jamaica	SDN	Sudan
BRB	Barbados	JOR	Jordan	SEN	Senegal
BRN	Brunei	JPN	Japan	SER	Serbia
BRZ	Brazil	KAZ	Kazakhstan	SGP	Singapore
BWA	Botswana	KEN	Kenya	SLB	Solomon Islands
CAM	Cambodia	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	SLE	Sierra Leone
CAN	Canada	KWT	Kuwait	SLV	El Salvador
CAR	Central African Republic	LAO	Laos	SOM	Somalia
CHA	Chad	LBN	Lebanon	SSD	South Sudan
CHE	Switzerland	LBR	Liberia	STP	São Tomé and Príncipe
CHL	Chile	LBY	Libya	SUR	Suriname
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	LKA	Sri Lanka	SVK	Slovakia
CMR	Cameroon	LSO	Lesotho	SVN	Slovenia
COG	Republic of Congo	LTU	Lithuania	SWE	Sweden
COL	Colombia	LUX	Luxembourg	SYC	Seychelles
CPV	Cape Verde	LVA	Latvia	SYR	Syria
CRI	Costa Rica	MDA	Moldova	TGO	Togo
CRO	Croatia	MDG	Madagascar	THA	Thailand
CUB	Cuba	MEX	Mexico	TJK	Tajikistan
CYP	Cyprus	MHL	Marshall Islands	TKM	Turkmenistan
CZE	Czech Republic	MKD	Macedonia, North	TLS	Timor-Leste
DJB	Djibouti	MLI	Mali	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago
DNK	Denmark	MLT	Malta	TUN	Tunisia
DOM	Dominican Republic	MMR	Myanmar	TUR	Turkey
DPRK	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	MNE	Montenegro	TZA	Tanzania
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	MNG	Mongolia	UAE	United Arab Emirates
ECU	Ecuador	MOR	Morocco	UGA	Uganda
EGY	Egypt	MOZ	Mozambique	UK	United Kingdom
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	MRT	Mauritania	UKR	Ukraine
ERI	Eritrea	MUS	Mauritius	URY	Uruguay
ESP	Spain	MWI	Malawi	US	United States
EST	Estonia	MYS	Malaysia	UZB	Uzbekistan
ETH	Ethiopia	NAM	Namibia	VEN	Venezuela
FIN	Finland	NCL	New Caledonia	VNM	Vietnam
FJI	Fiji	NER	Niger	YEM	Yemen, Republic of
FLK	Falkland Islands	NGA	Nigeria	ZMB	Zambia
FRA	France	NIC	Nicaragua	ZWE	Zimbabwe
GAB	Gabon	NLD	Netherlands		
GAM	Gambia	NOR	Norway		

Table 15 Index of countries and territories

Afghanistan AFG	247	Gambia GAM	472	Nicaragua NIC	423
Albania ALB	86	Georgia GEO	187	Nigeria NGA	487
Algeria ALG	332	Germany GER	109	Niger NER	486
Angola ANG	452	Ghana GHA	473	Norway NOR	132
Antigua and Barbuda ATG	392	Greece GRC	112	Oman OMN	361
Argentina ARG	392	Guatemala GUA	416	Pakistan PAK	296
Armenia ARM	181	Guinea-Bissau GNB	475	Palestinian Territories PT	363
Australia AUS	247	Guinea GUI	474	Panama PAN	424
Austria AUT	87	Guyana GUY	417	Papua New Guinea PNG	300
Azerbaijan AZE	182	Haiti HTI	418	Paraguay PRY	425
Bahamas BHS	395	Honduras HND	418	Peru PER	427
Bahrain BHR	334	Hungary HUN	115	Philippines PHL	301
Bangladesh BGD	250	Iceland ISL	116	Poland POL	134
Barbados BRB	396	India IND	265	Portugal PRT	137
Belarus BLR	185	Indonesia IDN	271	Qatar QTR	364
Belgium BEL	88	Iran IRN	340	Romania ROM	139
Belize BLZ	396	Iraq IRQ	344	Russia RUS	192
Benin BEN	453	Ireland IRL	117	Rwanda RWA	489
Bolivia BOL	397	Israel ISR	347	Saudi Arabia SAU	366
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH	90	Italy ITA	118	Senegal SEN	490
Botswana BWA	454	Jamaica JAM	420	Serbia SER	142
Brazil BRZ	399	Japan JPN	275	Seychelles SYC	491
Brunei BRN	252	Jordan JOR	350	Sierra Leone SLE	492
Bulgaria BLG	91	Kazakhstan KAZ	188	Singapore SGP	303
Burkina Faso BFA	455	Kenya KEN	476	Slovakia SVK	144
Burundi BDI	457	Korea, Democratic People's Republic of DPRK	280	Slovenia SVN	146
Cambodia CAM	253	Korea, Republic of ROK	283	Somalia SOM	493
Cameroon CMR	458	Kuwait KWT	352	South Africa RSA	494
Canada CAN	45	Kyrgyzstan KGZ	190	South Sudan SSD	496
Cape Verde CPV	459	Laos LAO	287	Spain ESP	147
Central African Republic CAR	460	Latvia LVA	122	Sri Lanka LKA	306
Chad CHA	461	Lebanon LBN	354	Sudan SDN	497
Chile CHL	403	Lesotho LSO	478	Suriname SUR	430
China, People's Republic of PRC	255	Liberia LBR	478	Sweden SWE	151
Colombia COL	406	Libya LBY	356	Switzerland CHE	153
Congo, Republic of COG	462	Lithuania LTU	124	Syria SYR	369
Costa Rica CRI	409	Luxembourg LUX	125	Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC	308
Côte d'Ivoire CIV	463	Macedonia, North MKD	126	Tajikistan TJK	208
Croatia CRO	93	Madagascar MDG	479	Tanzania TZA	499
Cuba CUB	409	Malawi MWI	480	Thailand THA	311
Cyprus CYP	94	Malaysia MYS	288	Timor-Leste TLS	314
Czech Republic CZE	96	Mali MLI	481	Togo TGO	501
Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC	465	Malta MLT	127	Trinidad and Tobago TTO	430
Denmark DNK	98	Mauritania MRT	357	Tunisia TUN	372
Djibouti DJB	466	Mauritius MUS	483	Turkey TUR	155
Dominican Republic DOM	411	Mexico MEX	421	Turkmenistan TKM	209
Ecuador ECU	412	Moldova MDA	191	Uganda UGA	502
Egypt EGY	336	Mongolia MNG	291	Ukraine UKR	211
El Salvador SLV	414	Montenegro MNE	128	United Arab Emirates UAE	374
Equatorial Guinea EQG	468	Morocco MOR	359	United Kingdom UK	158
Eritrea ERI	468	Mozambique MOZ	483	United States US	48
Estonia EST	100	Multinational Organisations	129	Uruguay URY	431
Ethiopia ETH	470	Myanmar MMR	292	Uzbekistan UZB	216
Fiji FJI	264	Namibia NAM	484	Venezuela VEN	433
Finland FIN	102	Nepal NPL	294	Vietnam VNM	315
France FRA	104	Netherlands NLD	130	Yemen, Republic of YEM	376
Gabon GAB	471	New Zealand NZL	295	Zambia ZMB	503
				Zimbabwe ZWE	505