Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Not to be confused with the Afghan Taliban.
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
Participant in the War in North-West Pakistan, the War in Afghanistan (2001–14), and the Global War on Terrorism

A flag used by the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Active December 2007 – present
Ideology
Leaders
Headquarters Kunar province
Strength 25,000[4]
Allies
Opponents

State opponents

Battles and wars

War in Afghanistan
War in North-West Pakistan

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; Urdu: تحریک طالبان پاکستان; "Taliban Movement of Pakistan"), alternatively referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, is a terrorist group which is an umbrella organization of various Sunni Islamist militant groups based in the northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border in Pakistan. Most, but not all, Pakistani Taliban groups coalesce under the TTP.[5] In December 2007 about 13 groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud to form the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.[6][7] Among the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's stated objectives are resistance against the Pakistani state, enforcement of their interpretation of sharia and a plan to unite against NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.[6][7][8]

The TTP is not directly affiliated with the Afghan Taliban movement led by Akhtar Mansour, with both groups differing greatly in their histories, strategic goals and interests although they are both predominantly Pashtun.[8][9][10] The Afghan Taliban, with the alleged support of Pakistani Taliban, operate against international coalition and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan but are strictly opposed to targeting the Pakistani state.[9] The TTP in contrast has almost exclusively targeted elements of the Pakistani state although it took credit for the 2009 Camp Chapman attack and the 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt.[11][12]

Maulana Fazlullah became the group's new leader in late 2013. In the following year the TTP fragmented into at least four groups, with the defections said to have left the group in considerable disarray.[13]

History

Roots and development

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan

The roots of the TTP as an organization began in 2002 when the Pakistani military conducted incursions into the tribal areas to originally combat foreign (Afghan, Arab and Central Asian) militants fleeing from the war in Afghanistan into the neighbouring tribal areas of Pakistan.[6][14] A 2004 article by the BBC explains:

The military offensive had been part of the overall war against al-Qaeda. ... Since the start of the operation, the [Pakistani] military authorities have firmly established that a large number of Uzbek, Chechen and Arab militants were in the area. ... It was in July 2002 that Pakistani troops, for the first time in 55 years, entered the Tirah Valley in Khyber tribal agency. Soon they were in Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and later in South Waziristan. ... This was made possible after long negotiations with various tribes, who reluctantly agreed to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen.[14]

Many of the TTP's leaders are veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan and have supported the fight against the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force by providing soldiers, training, and logistics.[8] In 2004 various tribal groups, as explained above, that would later form the TTP, effectively established their authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by concurrently engaging in military attacks and negotiating with Islamabad. By this time, the militants had killed around 200 rival tribal elders in the region to consolidate control.[7] Several Pakistani analysts also cite the inception of U.S. missile strikes in the FATA as a catalyzing factor in the rise of tribal militancy in the area. More specifically they single out an October 2006 strike on a madrassah in Bajaur that was run by the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi as a turning point.[15]

In December 2007, the existence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan was officially announced under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.[7]

On 25 August 2008, Pakistan banned the group, froze its bank accounts and assets, and barred it from media appearances. The government also announced that bounties would be placed on prominent leaders of the TTP.[16]

In late December 2008 and early January 2009, Mullah Omar sent a delegation, led by former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Abdullah Zakir, to persuade leading members of the TTP to put aside differences and aid the Afghan Taliban in combating the American presence in Afghanistan.[8] Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Maulavi Nazir agreed in February and formed the Shura Ittehadul Mujahideen (SIM), also transliterated as Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen and translated into English as the Council of United Mujahedeen.[8][17][18] In a written statement circulated in a one-page Urdu-language pamphlet, the three affirmed that they would put aside differences to fight American-led forces and reasserted their allegiance to Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden.[8][17] However, the SIM did not last very long and collapsed shortly after its announcement.[15][19]

Threats beyond Pakistan border

Qari Mehsud indicated in a video recorded in April 2010 the TTP would make cities in the United States a "main target" in response to U.S. drone attacks on TTP leaders.[20] The TTP claimed responsibility for the December 2009 suicide attack on CIA facilities in Camp Chapman in Afghanistan, as well as the attempted bombing in Times Square in May 2010.[11][12][21][22][23]

In July 2012, the TTP threatened to attack Myanmar in the wake of sectarian violence against Rohingya Muslims in the Arakan state. TTP spokesman Ehsanullah demanded the Pakistani government to sever relations with Myanmar and close down the Burmese embassy in Islamabad, and warned of attacks against Burmese interests if no action was taken. While the TTP has been conducting an insurgency in Pakistan, its ability to expand operations to other countries has been questioned. This was a rare occasion in which it warned of violence in another country.[24][25]

Leadership crisis

In August 2009, a missile strike from a suspected U.S. drone killed Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP soon held a shura to appoint his successor.[26] Government sources reported that fighting broke out during the shura between Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman. While Pakistani news channels reported that Hakimullah had been killed in the shooting, Interior Minister Rehman Malik could not confirm his death.[27] On 18 August, Pakistani security officials announced the capture of Maulvi Omar, chief spokesperson of the TTP. Omar, who had denied the death of Baitullah, retracted his previous statements and confirmed the leader's death in the missile strike. He also acknowledged turmoil among TTP leadership following the killing.[28]

After Omar's capture, Maulana Faqir Mohammed announced to the BBC that he would assume temporary leadership of the TTP and that Muslim Khan would serve as the organization's primary spokesperson. He also maintained that Baitullah had not been killed, but rather was in bad health. Faqir further elaborated that decisions over leadership of the umbrella group would only be made in consultation and consensus with a variety of different TTP leaders. "The congregation of Taliban leaders has 32 members and no important decision can be taken without their consultation," he told the BBC.[29][30] He reported to the AFP that both Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman had approved his appointment as temporary leader of the militant group.[31] Neither militant had publicly confirmed Faqir's statement, and analysts cited by Dawn News believed the assumption of leadership actually indicated a power struggle.[32]

Two days later Faqir Mohammed retracted his claims of temporary leadership and said that Hakimullah Mehsud had been selected leader of the TTP.[33] Faqir declared that the 42-member shura had also decided that Azam Tariq would serve as the TTP's primary spokesperson, rather than Muslim Khan.[34]

Under the leadership of Hakimullah, the TTP intensified its suicide campaign against the Pakistani state and against civilian (particularly Shia, Ahmedi and Sufi) targets.[15]

Designation as a terrorist organization

On 1 September 2010, the United States designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and identified Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali ur-Rehman as specially designated global terrorists. The designation of the TTP as an FTO makes it a crime to provide support or to do business with the group and also allows the U.S. to freeze its assets. The US State Department also issued a $5 million reward for information on the two individuals' locations.[35][36]

In January 2011, the British government moved to classify the TTP as a banned terrorist organization under its Terrorism Act 2000.[37]

In July 2011, the Canadian government also added the TTP to its list of banned terrorist organizations.[38]

Internal Splits

In February 2014, a group of TTP jihadists under the lead of Maulana Umar Qasmi broke away from the organisation to form the Ahrar-ul-Hind, in protest against the TTP's negotiations with the Pakistan government.[39]

In May 2014 the Mehsud faction of the TTP defected from the main group to form a breakaway unit called Tehrik-i-Taliban South Waziristan led by Khalid Mehsud. The breakaway group was unhappy with the various activities of the TTP, saying in a statement "We consider kidnapping for ransom, extortion, damage to public facilities and bombings to be un-Islamic. Tehreek-e-Taliban Mehsud group believes in stopping the oppressor from cruelty, and supporting the oppressed."[40] The Mehsuds were widely seen as the most important group in the TTP and their loss was regarded as a major blow.[41]

In August 2014, hardline elements of the TTP from four of the seven tribal districts formed a separate group called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, led by the Mohmand Agency commander Omar Khalid Khorosani,[42] after disagreeing with Fazlullah's order to fight the Pakistani Army's Operation Zarb-e-Azb offensive in the Tribal Areas.[43] However, in March 2015, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's spokesman announced that they were rejoining the TTP.[44] Some Uzbek and Arab fighters previously working with the TTP reportedly began leaving Pakistan to go to Iraq to fight alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In the same month, Asmatullah Muawiya, the commander of the Punjabi Taliban, announced that his faction was ending their armed struggle against the Pakistani state.[45]

In October 2014, the TTP's spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, and the group's commanders in Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal regions and Peshawar and Hangu Districts defected from the TTP and pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS).[46]

Organizational structure

Overview

The TTP differs in structure to the Afghan Taliban in that it lacks a central command and is a much looser coalition of various militant groups, united by hostility towards the central government in Islamabad.[9][10][47] Several analysts describe the TTP's structure as a loose network of dispersed constituent groups that vary in size and in levels of coordination.[15] The various factions of the TTP tend to be limited to their local areas of influence and often lack the ability to expand their operations beyond that territory.[48]

In its original form, the TTP had Baitullah Mehsud as its amir. He was followed in the leadership hierarchy by Hafiz Gul Bahadur as naib amir, or deputy. Faqir Mohammed was the third most influential leader.[7] The group contained members from all of FATA's seven tribal agencies as well as several districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand.[7] Some 2008 estimates placed the total number of operatives at 30–35,000, although it is difficult to judge the reliability of such estimates.[6]

In the aftermath of Baitullah Mehsud's death, the organization experienced turmoil among its leading militants. By the end of August 2009, however, leading members in the TTP had confirmed Hakimullah Mehsud as its second amir. Government and some TTP sources told the media that Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in January 2010 by injuries sustained during a U.S. drone attack. Unconfirmed reports from Orakzai Agency stated, after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, Malik Noor Jamal, alias Maulana Toofan, had assumed leadership of the TTP until the group determined how to proceed.[49][50]

Reuters, citing a report from The Express Tribune, indicated in July 2011 that Hakimullah Mehsud's grip on the TTP leadership was weakening after the defection of Fazal Saeed Haqqani, the Taliban leader in the Kurram region, from the umbrella militant group. Haqqani cited disagreements over attacks on civilians as reason for the split. The paper quoted an associate of Mehsud's as saying that "it looks as though he is just a figurehead now... He can hardly communicate with his commanders in other parts of the tribal areas ... he is in total isolation. Only a few people within the TTP know where he is."[51] A December 2011 report published in The Express Tribune further described the network as "crumbling" with "funds dwindling and infighting intensifying." According to various TTP operatives, the difficulties stemmed from differences of opinion within TTP leadership on pursuing peace talks with Islamabad.[52] In December 2012 senior Pakistan military officials told Reuters that Hakimullah Mehsud had lost control of the group and that Wali-ur-Rehman was expected to be formally announced as the head of the TTP.[53] However a video released later in the month showed Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman seated next to each other, with Mehsud calling reports of a split between the two as propaganda.[54]

Current leaders

Pakistani Taliban but not allied to TTP

Current spokesmen

Media

The TTP's "media arm" is "Umar Media".[84] Umar Media provides a "behind the scenes" look at Taliban attacks. Video clips are made in Pashto with Urdu subtitles.[85][86] Umar Media also reportedly operated a Facebook page which had been created in September 2012 and had a few "likes" and a "handful of messages written in English". According to then TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, the page was being "temporarily" used before the TTP would plan to launch its own website. SITE Intelligence Group described the Facebook page as a "recruitment center" looking for people to edit the TTP's quarterly magazine and videos.[87][88] The page was soon removed by Facebook and the account suspended.[88]

Relations with other militant groups

In a May 2010 interview, U.S. Gen. David Petraeus described the TTP's relationship with other militant groups as difficult to decipher: "There is clearly a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, TNSM [Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi]. And it's very difficult to parse and to try to distinguish between them. They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other. But at the end of the day, there is quite a relationship between them."[11]

Director of National Intelligence and United States Navy Admiral, Dennis C. Blair, told U.S. senators that the Pakistani state and army meanwhile draw clear distinctions among different militant groups.[89] While links exist between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, the two groups are distinct enough for the Pakistani military to be able to view them very differently.[90] American officials said that the S Wing of the Pakistani ISI provided direct support to three major groups carrying out attacks in Afghanistan: the Afghan Taliban based in Quetta, Pakistan, commanded by Mullah Muhammad Omar; the militant network run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and a different group run by the guerrilla leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, all considered a strategic asset by Pakistan in contrast to the TTP run by Hakimullah Mehsud, which has engaged the Pakistani army in combat.[89]

Afghan Taliban

Main article: Taliban

The Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan differ greatly in their history, leadership and goals although they are both predominantly Pashtun.[9][10] The two groups are distinct, though linked, movements.[21][36] An Afghan Taliban spokesman told The New York Times: "We don’t like to be involved with them, as we have rejected all affiliation with Pakistani Taliban fighters ... We have sympathy for them as Muslims, but beside that, there is nothing else between us."[8][91] Peshawar-based security analyst Brigadier (retd) Muhamaad Saad believes the Taliban are not a monolithic entity. "They can be divided into three broad categories: [Afghan] Kandahari Taliban, led by Mullah Omar; [Afghan] Paktia Taliban, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani; and [Pakistani] Salfi Taliban [TTP]," he said. "It’s the Salfi Taliban who pose a real threat to Pakistan. They may not be obeying the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar."[92] Some regional experts state that the common name "Taliban" may be more misleading than illuminating. Gilles Dorronsoro of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes that "[t]he fact that they have the same name causes all kinds of confusion."[9] As the Pakistani Army began offensives against the Pakistani Taliban, many unfamiliar with the region mistakenly thought that the assault was against the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar.[9]

Although the TTP has claimed allegiance with the Afghan Taliban in the Afghan Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan, the two groups have no direct affiliation.[8] The TTP has almost exclusively targeted elements of the Pakistani state.[11] The Afghan Taliban however have historically relied on support from the Pakistani army in their campaign to control Afghanistan.[15][93] Regular Pakistani army troops fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in the War in Afghanistan (1996–2001).[94] Major leaders of the Afghan Taliban including Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Siraj Haqqani are believed to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.[95] In 2006, Jalaluddin Haqqani was called a 'Pakistani asset' by a senior official of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.[95] Pakistan regards the Haqqanis as an important force for protecting its interests in Afghanistan and therefore has been unwilling to move against them.[95]

Before the creation of the TTP some of their leaders and fighters were among the 10,000 Pakistani, Arab and Central Asian militants fighting as part of a 25,000 force in the War in Afghanistan (1996–2001) and the War in Afghanistan (2001-present) against the anti-Taliban United Islamic Front and NATO forces.[96] A 1998 U.S. State Department report stated that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers [were] Pakistani."[93] After the fall of the Afghan Taliban in late 2001, many Pakistani Taliban militants, including members of today's TTP, sought refuge in Pakistan.[97] Afghan Taliban maintaining contacts to Pakistan's ISI[97] also fled for Pakistan where they regrouped, maintain safe havens and training camps and from where they launched their insurgency in Afghanistan.[98] Members of the two groups easily cross back and forth across the border between the two countries.[21] A journalist embedded with Canadian troops in Kandahar Province in the summer of 2006 indicated that "Pakistani Taliban were routinely captured" at the time.[99] Captured fighters admitted to being recruited and trained in Pakistan.[99]

In 2007, Pakistani militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud created the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and killed around 200 rival Pakistani leaders. They officially defined goals to establish their rule over Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas subsequently engaging the Pakistani army in heavy combat operations. Intelligence analysts believe that these TTP's attacks on the Pakistani government, police and army strained relations between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban.[9] Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar asked the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 to stop attacks inside Pakistan, to change their focus as an organization and to fight the Afghan National Army and ISAF forces in Afghanistan instead.

In February 2009, the three dominant Pakistani Taliban leaders agreed to put aside their differences to help counter a planned increase in American troops in Afghanistan and reaffirmed their allegiance to Mullah Omar (and to Osama bin Laden).[8] The agreement among the TTP leaders was short-lived, however, and instead of fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban the rival Pakistani factions soon engaged in combat with each other.[15][19]

In early January 2012, TTP spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan announced that rival Taliban groups had made a new attempt to unite under a five-member council called the Shura-e-Murakeba at the behest of Mullah Omar. The TTP, he said, had agreed to Mullah Omar's demand to end suicide attacks, attacks against the Pakistani military, kidnappings for ransom, and the killing of innocent Pakistanis so that they could help focus on US forces in Afghanistan. Among the factions in the agreement were those led by Hakimullah Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, Waliur Rahman, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Siraj Haqqani.[100][101][102]

Recently following the TTP's Peshawar school massacre Afghan taliban leader's condemned the TTP's actions on the school, saying it was "Un-Islamic"[103] Future relations between the Afghan Taliban and TTP are unknown.

Cross-border controversy

In July 2011, after Pakistani missile attacks against Afghan provinces, Pakistani media reports alleged that senior Pakistani Taliban leaders were operating from Afghanistan to launch attacks against Pakistani border posts. According to the reports, Qari Zia-ur-Rahman hosted Faqir Muhammad in Kunar province while Sheikh Dost Muhammad, a local Afghan Taliban leader, hosted Maulana Fazlullah in Nuristan province. Faqir Muhammad, who claimed responsibility for a 4 July 2011 attack on a paramilitary checkpoint and for similar attacks in June 2011 on several border villages in Bajaur, stated during a radio broadcast, "Our fighters carried out these two attacks from Afghanistan, and we will launch more such attacks inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan." Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid strongly rejected the reports and denied the possibility of Pakistani Taliban setting up bases in Afghan Taliban-controlled areas.[104][105] Tameem Nuristani, Governor of Afghanistan's Nuristan Province, told The Express Tribune that while the "Afghan Taliban have never carried out cross-border attacks in Pakistan," TTP militants may have "safe-havens" in Kunar and Nuristan in "areas where the government’s writ does not exist".[92]

In June 2012 a spokesman from the TTP's Malakand division revealed to The Express Tribune that TTP militants "regularly move across the porous border" to stage attacks against Pakistan but had only been in Afghanistan for a few months previously, contrary to Pakistani claims that the TTP had long used Afghan territory as a staging ground.[106]

Both governments blame the other for harboring Taliban militants along the shared border.[107] In 2009 Pakistan launched offensives to force the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan from its territory in South Waziristan.[108] Some analysts say the fighting pushed TTP militants to the Nuristan and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan, where they have regrouped to threaten Pakistani border regions.[109] The Pakistani military claims "scanty presence" of NATO and Afghan forces along the border has enabled militants to use these areas as safe havens and launch repeated attacks inside Pakistan.[109] Afghan officials state that the withdrawal of US forces out of parts of Kunar province beginning in 2010 created a power vacuum that militants filled.[110] They point to the fact that the Afghan state in some areas has little control due to its war against the Afghan Taliban which are supported by Pakistan according to many international and Afghan institutions, analysts and officials.[90][111] Pakistan vehemently denies this claim,[112] although some Afghan Taliban commanders stated that their training was indeed overseen by "ISI officers in a camp in Pakistan" and that they were being armed by Pakistan to fight the Afghan state and international troops in Afghanistan.[113][114] Although the Afghan Taliban have asked the TTP to stop attacks against the Pakistani military and state and themselves do not carry out such attacks,[100][101][102] they do not fight TTP militants crossing the border.

Recently following the TTP's Peshawar school massacre Afghan taliban leader's condemned the TTP's actions on the school, saying it was "Un-Islamic".[103]

Al-Qaeda

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has close ties to Al Qaeda, sharing money and bomb experts and makers. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser, said: "It's a group that is closely allied with al-Qaeda. They train together, they plan together, they plot together. They are almost indistinguishable."[115] Ambassador-at-large Daniel Benjamin stated, "The T.T.P. and Al Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship: T.T.P. draws ideological guidance from Al Qaeda, while Al Qaeda relies on the T.T.P. for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border... This mutual cooperation gives T.T.P. access to both Al Qaeda’s global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, T.T.P. is a force multiplier for Al Qaeda."[36] Ayesha Siddiqa of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars describes the TTP as "a franchise of al Qaeda" and attributes strong ties to al-Qaeda's acquisition of "a more local character over the years."[10] Since the days of the Soviet era, some al-Qaeda operatives have established themselves in Pashtun areas and enmeshed themselves in the local culture.[47]

In 2008 Baitullah Mehsud met with Ayman al-Zawahiri in South Waziristan. Prior to this meeting the Pakistani Taliban answered to the Afghan Taliban and pro-Pakistan militant commanders. At the time Pakistani authorities believed that Mehsud was in fact an al-Qaeda operative.[48] In February 2009 Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulavi Nazir released a statement in which they reaffirmed their allegiance to Osama bin Laden.[8][17]

Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade

The Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, whose name is commonly shortened to Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force, emerged as a jihadi organization after the Lal Masjid Operation of 2007. In 2009 the Ghazi Brigade worked closely with the TTP during military operations in the Swat Valley, and the two groups jointly planned attacks on western targets in Islamabad.[116][117]

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have a long history of collaboration. At one point prior to his appointment as TTP chief, Baitullah Mehsud lived with Tohir Yo'ldosh, the IMU's former leader, who became an ideological inspiration and offered the services of his 2,500 fighters to Mehsud.[118] In April 2009 Muslim Khan listed the IMU among the TTP's allies in an interview with AP.[91] The IMU posted a video online in September 2010 that featured footage of Yo'ldosh's successor, Abu Usman Adil, meeting with Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur Rahman Mehsud.[119] On 8 June 2014, the TTP accepted responsibility for conducting the Jinnah International Airport attack. The militants who participated in the attack were Uzbeks belonging to the IMU, and the TTP described the attack as a joint operation between TTP and IMU.[120]

Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab (Urdu/Punjabi/Saraiki: تحریک طالبان پنجاب), alternatively called the Punjabi Taliban, was a network of members of banned militant groups based in South Punjab, the southernmost region of Pakistan's most populous Punjab province. The group was disbanded in September 2014 and is no longer active.[121][122] Major factions of the so-called Punjabi Taliban include operatives of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and Jaysh-i-Muhammad, who have previously supported the Kashmir insurgency against India in Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed territory administered by India that is claimed by Pakistan. TTP has significant recruits from Punjab-based sectarian organizations also called Punjabi Taliban.[123] The Punjabi Taliban have reportedly developed strong connections with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and various other groups based in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).[124][125] It has increasingly provided the foot-soldiers for violent acts and has played an important role in attacking Ahmedi, Shia, Sufi and other civilian targets in the Punjab.[15][126]

The term "Punjabi Taliban" is politically sensitive among Pakistanis,[15] given that Punjabis are the largest ethnic group in the country and have historically been disassociated with the Taliban, an organisation that has Afghan and Pashtun roots. Although the Punjabi Taliban are claimed and believed to be an established militant group, the Government of Punjab has denied and rejected their existence.[127] Shahbaz Sharif, the Punjab Chief Minister, has claimed that the term Punjabi Taliban is "an insult to the Punjabis" and accuses that it was coined by Rehman Malik purposely on ethnic grounds.[128] During a 17 March 2010 cabinet meeting Malik confirmed that Punjabi militants had joined Waziristan-based Taliban to stage attacks inside Punjab.[125] Georgetown University's C. Christine Fair writes that "the movement is composed of Pashtuns and Punjabis, among other Pakistani and even foreign elements."[15]

The Lahore police accused them of being responsible for the 3 March 2009 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore.[129]

The group also claimed the 2009 Lahore bombing shortly after the attack, although the attack was also claimed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,[130] and the May 2010 attacks on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore which were aimed at the Ahmadi minority sect.[131]

Pamphlets found at the scene of the March 2011 assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti implicated the Punjabi Taliban.[126][132]

On 24 August 2013, a spokesman for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed that the head of the Punjabi Taliban faction, Asmatullah Muawiya, had been stripped of his leadership for welcoming the Pakistani government’s peace talks offer. Muawiya responded by saying that the Taliban central shura (council) did not have the capacity to remove him because the Punjabi Taliban is a separate group. He added that his group has its own decision-making body to decide leadership and other matters.[133] On 13 September 2014, Muawiya announced that their faction was ending their armed struggle to implement sharia within Pakistan, however it would continue armed struggle in Afghanistan. He urged other warring groups to end violence in Pakistan.[121][122]

Other groups

US officials admitted to The New York Times that they found it increasingly difficult to separate the operations of the various Pakistani militant groups active in the tribal areas of Pakistan.[12] Individuals and groups that are believed to have a supportive relationship with the TTP include:

Allegations of foreign support

The Pakistani military and civilian leadership have repeatedly alleged that the Indian intelligence agency RAW has been funding and training TTP members using a network of Indian consulates in Afghanistan along Pakistani border.[137][138][139] According to the Pakistani allegations, when the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged Afghan and Indian intelligence were quick to seize the opportunity to infiltrate and utilize some of its elements, particularly Baitullah Mehsud’s kin, against Pakistan and its armed forces. Pakistan claims NDS officials have openly admitted to their involvement with Tehreek-e-Taliban.[140]

In December 2014, after the Peshawar school attack in which 132 children were killed, the Pakistani authorities again alleged that there were significant proofs of Pakistan National Assembly support of TTP to destabilize Pakistan and to counter Pakistan's Afghan policy.[141] Pakistan Army's official spokesman, Maj.Gen Asim Bajwa, said in the aftermath of 2014 Peshawar School attack that, "India is funding Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. He said that a banned outfit cannot function on such a big scale unless foreign powers are funding it."[141] In addition to Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing, the Pakistanis claim that Afghan intelligence agencies are also involved in the support of TTP.[142] Notably, A major TTP leader, Latif Mehsud, was caught by the American troops in Afghanistan while he was in a convoy escorted by Afghan Intelligence. American forces captured the TTP leader and handed him over to Pakistani authorities, much to the anger of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. At the time, Karzai's spokesman told the Washington Post Mehsud was traveling with a convoy of Afghan intelligence officials who wanted to recruit him for peace talks, and that the U.S forcibly removed him. Pakistanis claim this as a major proof of Afghan Intelligence agencies' support for TTP.[143] According to Pakistani Ex-President and Army Chief, Gen Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan has a history of supporting Taliban in Afghanistan, similarly, India and Afghanistan are now supporting TTP in Pakistan to counter Pakistan's efforts, giving rise to the phenomenon of Pakistan and India's proxy wars in Af/Pak.[144][145]

The Sindh Home Ministry on November 2015, wrote a letter to the Rangers and Police claiming Taliban had funded terrorist activities in Karachi. According to the letter, RAW funded around Rs 20 million for terrorist activities in Karachi. "The funding has been provided to banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat," the letter claimed.[146]

Claimed and alleged attacks

Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

The Taliban have set up camps and reinforced hundreds of fighters to Syria to fight alongside rebels opposed to Bashar al-Assad in continuity of cementation of ties with al Qaeda.[210] Taliban commanders in Pakistan said that they had decided to join the cause, saying hundreds of fighters had gone to Syria to fight alongside their "Mujahedeen friends".[210] The Taliban commander termed the Arab fighters as their friends. Media reported the visit and setup of a Pakistani Taliban base in Syria to assess "the needs of the jihad".[211] The Taliban commader said: "Since our Arab brothers have come here for our support, we are bound to help them in their respective countries and that is what we did in Syria"[212] At least 12 experts in information technology and warfare were sent to Syria in the last two months to aid the Mujahideen. The Pakistani government has not commented on the allegations.[211]

See also

Further reading

References

  1. Rashid, Taliban (2000)
  2. "Why are Customary Pashtun Laws and Ethics Causes for Concern? | Center for Strategic and International Studies". Csis.org. 2010-10-19. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  3. "Understanding taliban through the prism of Pashtunwali code". CF2R. 2013-11-30. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  4. Bennett-Jones, Owen (25 April 2014). "Pakistan army eyes Taliban talks with unease". BBC News. Retrieved 4 July 2014.
  5. Yusufzai, Rahimullah (22 September 2008). "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: Part One – North and South Waziristan". Terrorism Monitor. 6 (18). Retrieved 30 March 2011.
  6. 1 2 3 4 Bajoria, Jayshree (6 February 2008). "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 30 March 2009.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Abbas, Hassan (January 2008). "A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan" (PDF). CTC Sentinel. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center. 1 (2): 1–4. Retrieved 8 November 2008.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Carlotta Gall, Ismail Khan, Pir Zubair Shah and Taimoor Shah (26 March 2009). "Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of U.S. Influx". New York Times. Retrieved 27 March 2009.
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Shane, Scott (22 October 2009). "Insurgents Share a Name, but Pursue Different Goals". The New York Times. The New York Times Company. Retrieved 26 January 2011.
  10. 1 2 3 4 Siddiqa, Ayesha (2011). "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies" (PDF). The Washington Quarterly. 34 (1): 149–162. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2011.538362. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 December 2010. Retrieved 8 February 2011.
  11. 1 2 3 4 Bajoria, Jayshree; Greg Bruno (6 May 2010). "Shared Goals for Pakistan's Militants". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 26 January 2011.
  12. 1 2 3 Mazzetti, Mark (6 May 2010). "Evidence Mounts for Taliban Role in Car Bomb Plot". New York Times. Retrieved 6 May 2010.
  13. "Isis ascent in Syria and Iraq weakening Pakistani Taliban". The Guardian. 23 October 2014. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
  14. 1 2 Abbas, Zaffar (10 September 2004). "Pakistan's undeclared war". BBC. The latest military offensive in which air force bombers and gunship helicopters pounded an alleged training camp of suspected al-Qaeda militants, has resulted in heavy casualties. And it has taken the conflict to an area [South Waziristan] that until now had remained relatively peaceful. ... The military offensive had been part of the overall war against al-Qaeda. ... Since the start of operation, the [Pakistani] military authorities have firmly established that a large number of Uzbek, Chechen and Arab militants were in the area. ... It was in July 2002 that Pakistani troops, for the first time in 55 years, entered the Tirah Valley in Khyber tribal agency. Soon they were in Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and later in South Waziristan. ...This was made possible after long negotiations with various tribes, who reluctantly agreed to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen.
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Fair, C. Christine (January 2011). "The Militant Challenge in Pakistan" (PDF). Asia Policy. 11 (1): 105–37. doi:10.1353/asp.2011.0010. Retrieved 17 February 2011.
  16. Shahzad, Syed Saleem (26 August 2008). "Setback for Pakistan's terror drive". Asia Times. Retrieved 26 August 2008.
  17. 1 2 3 Khan, Haji Mujtaba (23 February 2009). "Taliban rename their group". The Nation. Retrieved 30 March 2009.
  18. "Three Taliban factions form Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahiden". The News. 23 February 2009. Archived from the original on 25 November 2009. Retrieved 30 March 2009.
  19. 1 2 Roggio, Bill (16 August 2009). "South Waziristan Taliban Groups Clash". The Long War Journal. Retrieved 26 August 2009.
  20. Roggio, Bill (3 May 2010). "Hakeemullah Mehsud breaks his silence, threatens US". Long War Journal. Retrieved 6 May 2010.
  21. 1 2 3 4 "Pakistan Taliban say they carried out CIA attack". MSNBC News. Associated Press. 1 January 2010. Retrieved 1 March 2011.
  22. 1 2 Georgy, Michael (11 January 2010). "ANALYSIS – CIA bomber video publicity coup for Pakistan Taliban". Reuters. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 1 March 2011.
  23. Berger, Joseph (2 May 2010). "Pakistani Taliban Behind Times Sq. Plot, Holder Says". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 May 2010.
  24. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan threaten Myanmar over Rohingya, The Express Tribune
  25. "Pak Taliban threaten to attack Myanmar over Rohingya Muslims". 26 July 2012.
  26. Toosi, Nahal; Ishtiaq Mahsud (7 August 2009). "Pakistani Taliban head's death a blow to militant". Associated Press via Yahoo! News. Retrieved 7 August 2009.
  27. "Fighting erupts between Taliban rivals". Financial Times. 8 August 2009. Retrieved 8 August 2009. Pakistani news channels were carrying unconfirmed reports that Hakimullah Mehsud, one of the movement's most powerful commanders, had been killed at a shura, or council meeting, held to decide who would succeed slain leader Baitullah Mehsud. "The infighting was between Wali-ur-Rehman and Hakimullah Mehsud," Interior Minister Rehman Malik told Reuters. "We have information that one of them has been killed. Who was killed we will be able to say later after confirming."
  28. Khan, Ismail (18 August 2008). "Pakistan Captures Top Taliban Aide". New York Times. Retrieved 19 August 2008.
  29. "Pakistan Taliban spokesman named". BBC News. 19 August 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
  30. "Maulvi Faqeer acting Tehrik-i-Taliban chief: report". Dawn. 19 August 2009. Archived from the original on 21 August 2009. Retrieved 19 August 2009.
  31. "Faqir claims TTP leadership, Muslim Khan replaces Omer". Daily Times. 20 August 2009. Archived from the original on 22 August 2009. Retrieved 20 August 2009.
  32. "Rifts as Pakistani Taliban deputy claims leadership". Dawn News. 20 August 2009. Archived from the original on 25 August 2009. Retrieved 20 August 2009.
  33. "Hakeemullah annnounced new leader – doubts linger". Dawn News. 23 August 2009. Archived from the original on 26 August 2009. Retrieved 23 August 2009.
  34. Khan, Hasbanullah (23 August 2009). "Hakeemullah appointed Baitullah's "successor"". Daily Times. Archived from the original on 9 November 2009. Retrieved 24 August 2009.
  35. "Designations of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Two Senior Leaders". US State Department. 1 September 2010. Retrieved 15 September 2010.
  36. 1 2 3 Savage, Charlie (1 September 2010). "U.S. Adds Legal Pressure on Pakistani Taliban". The New York Times. Retrieved 1 March 2011.
  37. "Britain Moves to Ban Pakistani Taliban". VOA News. Voice of America. 18 January 2011. Retrieved 8 February 2011.
  38. Macleod, Ian (5 July 2011). "Canada bans Pakistani Taliban as a terror group". Vancouver Sun. Canada: Postmedia Network Inc. Archived from the original on 18 July 2011. Retrieved 11 July 2011.
  39. Pakistani jihadists form Ahrar-ul-Hind, vow to continue attacks - Long War Journal, February 11, 2014
  40. "Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan splits with major faction walking out". pakistannews.net. 28 May 2014. Retrieved 28 May 2014.
  41. "New Taliban group vows attacks in Pakistan". Retrieved 14 November 2014.
  42. "Hard-Line Splinter Group, Galvanized by ISIS, Emerges From Pakistani Taliban". New York Times. 26 August 2014. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  43. "Pakistan Taliban splits 'over war with Islamabad'". The Telegraph. 5 September 2014. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  44. "Pakistani splinter group rejoins Taliban amid fears of isolation". Reuters. 12 March 2015. Retrieved 13 March 2015.
  45. "Deadly Taliban group gives up armed struggle in Pakistan". The Telegraph. 14 September 2014. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  46. "Pakistan Taliban sack spokesman Shahidullah Shahid for IS vow". BBC News. 21 October 2014. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  47. 1 2 Elias, Barbara (2 November 2009). "Know Thine Enemy". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 11 February 2011.
  48. 1 2 Gall, Carlotta; Sabrina (6 May 2010). "Pakistani Taliban Are Said to Expand Alliances". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 February 2011.
  49. "Sources: Pakistani Taliban leader is dead". CNN. 9 February 2010. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
  50. "Maulana Toofan new acting TTP chief?". The News International. Jang Multimedia. 10 February 2010. Archived from the original on 10 February 2010. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
  51. "Pakistan Taliban leader "isolated," facing splits: report". Reuters. Thomson Reuters. 5 July 2011. Retrieved 10 July 2011.
  52. Khan, Zia (19 December 2011). "Twilight of the Taliban: TTP buckles under internal fissures, external pressure". The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune News Network. Retrieved 19 December 2011.
  53. Zahra-Malik, Mehreen (2012-12-06). "Exclusive: Emerging Pakistan Taliban chief to focus on Afghan war". Reuters. Retrieved December 6, 2012.
  54. Mehsud, Saud (2012-12-28). "Pakistan Taliban chief says group will negotiate, but not disarm". Reuters. Retrieved 28 December 2012.
  55. "Mullah Fazlullah threatens PML-N leaders". Dawn. 9 January 2015. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  56. Zia Ur Rehman (6 June 2014). "Realignment in Waziristan". The Friday Times. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  57. Yusufzai, Mushtaq (4 December 2013). "Taliban Shura decides to target media outlets, journalists". The News International. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  58. Roggio, Bill (12 March 2015). "Pakistani jihadist groups, Lashkar-i-Islam merge into the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan". Long War Journal. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  59. Javed, Salman (1 March 2014). "TTP Profile Series: Omar Khalid Khorasani and Mohmand Chapter". pakistankakhudahafiz.com. Retrieved 19 March 2014.
  60. "Collective front: Mangal Bagh, Jamaatul Ahrar TTP merge". The Express Tribune. 13 March 2015. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  61. Jahangiri, Hassan (14 February 2015). "FIR registered against Taliban's Geedar group". Dawn.com. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  62. Khan, Ismail; Ahmed, Azam (17 December 2014). "Pakistan Urges Afghans to Help Find Taliban Leaders Behind Massacre". The New York Times. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  63. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-taliban-idUSKCN0ZT21O
  64. Mir, Amir (3 November 2013). "TTP power struggle intensifies". The News International. Retrieved 10 November 2013.
  65. 1 2 Khan, M Ilyas (5 February 2013). "The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus". BBC News. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  66. Sherazi, Zahir Shah (25 October 2014). "Taliban's Mehsud faction condemns attack on JUI-F chief". Dawn.com. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  67. "Hafiz Gul Bahadur will be eliminated on sight: Maj Gen Zafarullah Khan". The Express Tribune. 9 July 2014. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  68. "TTP names new head for Mohmand Agency". The News International. 10 November 2014. Retrieved 2 April 2015.
  69. Khan, Tahir (7 April 2015). "Switching loyalties: TTP chief in Bajaur and his deputy quit". The Express Tribune. Retrieved 8 April 2015.
  70. "JAAG TV Obtains Picture Of TTP Karachi Chief". cnbcpakistan.com. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  71. Roggio, Bill (5 February 2013). "Taliban, IMU form Ansar al Aseer to free jihadist prisoners". Long War Journal. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  72. Ali, Tahir (3 January 2013). "Taliban's Mullah Nazir killed in drone strike in Pak". rediff.com/news. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  73. Zia Ur Rehman (19 September 2014). "Punjabi Taliban will fight in Afghanistan". The Friday Times. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
  74. Zia Ur Rehman (14 November 2014). "TTP is crumbling". The Friday Times. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  75. Walsh, Declan; Khan, Ismail (10 July 2013). "Taliban Spokesman Is Ousted for 'Creating Mistrust'". The New York Times. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  76. Yusufzai, Mushtaq (13 March 2015). "Two senior TTP commanders among four killed in Afghanistan". The News International. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  77. "Lashkar-e-Islam spokesperson phones to deny death". The Express Tribune. Reuters. 26 March 2015. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  78. Sherazi, Zahir Shah (14 April 2014). "Afghan Taliban seek tribesmen's help to stop TTP infighting". dawn.com. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  79. Ali, Tahir (12 May 2014). "Confusion prevails over who leads Taliban in SWA". The Nation (Pakistan). Retrieved 13 May 2014.
  80. Bergen, Peter; Tiedemann, Katherine (2013). Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion. Oxford University Press. p. 175. ISBN 9780199893096.
  81. "List of global terrorists: TTP faction says US move validates its 'jihad'". The Express Tribune. 26 October 2014. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  82. Nasaruminallah (17 November 2014). "Hafiz Gul Bahadur's aides among 34 militants killed in N Waziristan". The Express Tribune. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  83. Mullen, Jethro; Shah, Zahir (18 March 2015). "Ex-lawyer for doctor who helped CIA in bin Laden hunt killed in Pakistan". CNN. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  84. "Pakistani Taliban release Faisal Shahzad's martyrdom tape [video]". CSMonitor.com. Retrieved 2012-12-11.
  85. "cid attack karachi wasiyat". YouTube. 2011-11-12. Retrieved 2012-11-08.
  86. "Taliban vows to unleash jihad in Kashmir, implement Sharia". Rediff. January 8, 2013. Retrieved January 10, 2013.
  87. "Pakistani Taliban recruits via Facebook". The Express Tribune. 7 December 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2012.
  88. 1 2 "Facebook shuts down Taliban account: Report". The Express Tribune. 11 December 2012. Retrieved 10 January 2013.
  89. 1 2 Mazetti, Marc; Eric Schmitt (26 March 2009). "Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides Say". New York Times.
  90. 1 2 Waldman, Matt (June 2010), "The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents" (PDF), Crisis States Discussion Papers (PDF), London: Crisis States Research Centre, p. 3, Separately, there are a wide range of Islamist militant groups, principally based in north-west Pakistan, a large number of which coalesced under the banner of Tehrik-e-Taleban-e- Pakistan, also known as the Pakistani Taliban (Franco 2009:269). Although the ISI previously supported many of these groups, since 2007 the militants have increasingly turned their fire on Pakistani state.8 Consequently, the Pakistani military has undertaken extensive operations against their strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.9 While there are undoubtedly links between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, they appear to be sufficiently distinct for the Pakistani military and ISI to treat them very differently.
  91. 1 2 3 4 "TTP says Osama welcome in Swat: Taliban reject peace accord". Lahore: Daily Times. 22 April 2009. Archived from the original on 25 April 2009. Retrieved 11 September 2009. Muslim Khan counted the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban of Afghanistan among his allies. "If we need, we can call them and if they need, they can call us," he said. He said his forces would go to help the Taliban in Afghanistan if the United States and NATO continue to fight there.
  92. 1 2 "Border incursions: Suspicions grow about Afghan support for TTP". The Express Tribune. 11 September 2011. Retrieved 11 September 2011.
  93. 1 2 "Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists". George Washington University. 2007.
  94. Marcela Grad. Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader (1 March 2009 ed.). Webster University Press. p. 310.
  95. 1 2 3 U.S. attack on Taliban kills 23 in Pakistan, The New York Times, 9 September 2008
  96. "Afghanistan resistance leader feared dead in blast". London: Ahmed Rashid in the Telegraph. 11 September 2001.
  97. 1 2 Hussain, Zahid (2007). Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam. Columbia University Press. p. 107. ISBN 0-85368-769-2.
  98. Roggio, Bill (10 June 2010). "Afghan Taliban deny being supported by Pakistan". The Long War Journal. Public Multimedia Inc. Retrieved 14 February 2011. After the US ousted Mullah Omar from power in 2001 and 2002, the Taliban and al Qaeda regrouped in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan as well as in northwestern Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban teamed up with Pakistani Taliban factions and maintain safe havens and training camps in Pakistan to this day.
  99. 1 2 "Is Pakistan Doing All It Should to Secure Its Afghan Border?". 7 March 2007. Retrieved 17 February 2011. To ignore that the Taliban in Afghanistan receive very real support from Pakistan understates the severity of the problem. When thousands of Taliban from Pakistan have been positively identified as organizing, arming, training, and raiding from camps in Waziristan and Bajaur, this isn't a problem that can be easily swept under the rug. While I was embedded with the Canadian Army in Kandahar last summer, Pakistani Taliban were routinely captured. Last fall, captured fighters admitted to being recruited and trained in Pakistan. “Mullahs in Pakistan were preaching to us that we are obliged to fight jihad in Afghanistan,” said a Pakistani Taliban fighter named Alahuddin. “A Pakistani Taliban commander, Saifullah, introduced us to a guide who escorted us to Barmal.” The unit he crossed over with was largely from North Waziristan, and Maulivi Saifullah signed the Waziristan Accord. There are numerous accounts such as this.
  100. 1 2 "Taliban pledge not to target security forces". The News International. 3 January 2012. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
  101. 1 2 Mehsud, Sailab (3 January 2012). "Taliban factions regroup to fight US forces". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
  102. 1 2 Khan, Shaan (3 January 2012). "Taliban, allies form leadership council". CNN. Retrieved 3 January 2012.
  103. 1 2 Sridharan, Vasudevan (17 December 2014). "International Business Times – Afghanistan: Afghan Taliban condemned 'un-Islamic' Pakistan school carnage". IBT. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
  104. Tahir, Khan (8 July 2011). "Cross-border cooperation: Ties that bind militants persist". The Express Tribune. Retrieved 8 July 2011.
  105. Khan, Anwarullah; Abbot, Sebastian (7 July 2011). "Taliban commander back on the air in Pakistan". Seattle Times. Associated Press. Retrieved 10 July 2011.
  106. Khan, Tahir (26 June 2012). "TTP admits to having safe haven in Afghanistan". The Express Tribune. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
  107. "Afghanistan, Pakistan clash over border violence". dawn.com. AFP. 2 July 2012. Retrieved 2 July 2012.
  108. "Pakistan offensive: troops meet heavy Taliban resistance". The Daily Telegraph. London. 17 October 2009. Retrieved 9 April 2010.
  109. 1 2 "Militants from Afghanistan attack Pakistani posts". Reuters. Reuters. 27 August 2011.
  110. "What happened when US forces left Afghan hotspot?". BBC. 12 March 2011.
  111. Joscelyn, Thomas (22 September 2011). "Admiral Mullen: Pakistani ISI sponsoring Haqqani attacks". The Long War Journal. Retrieved 1 December 2011.
  112. Chris Allbritton (27 October 2011). "Pakistan strongly denied Thursday a BBC report that alleged the Pakistani military, along with its intelligence arm, supplied and protected the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda". Reuters. Retrieved 27 October 2011.
  113. "Taliban Chiefs Admit Close Links to Pakistan Intelligence". International Business Times. 26 October 2011. Retrieved 1 December 2011.
  114. Collyns, Sam (26 October 2011). "BBC News – Afghanistan: Pakistan accused of backing Taliban". BBC News. Retrieved 1 December 2011.
  115. Hennessey, Kathleen (10 August 2010). "N.Y. bomber has al Qaeda tie, White House says". The San Francisco Chronicle.
  116. Search Results vengeful new militant group emerges in Pakistan hs | Latest news, Breaking news, Pakistan News, World news, business, sport and multimedia | DAWN.COM Archived 4 July 2010 at the Wayback Machine.
  117. Roul, Animesh (10 July 2010). "Little-Known Ghazi Brigade Now a Major Player in the Punjabi Jihad?" (PDF). Terrorism Monitor. VIII (28): 5–6. Retrieved 10 February 2011.
  118. Syed Saleem Shahzad (8 August 2009). "Baitullah: Dead or alive, his battle rages". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 7 August 2009. Retrieved 7 August 2009.
  119. Anzalone, Christopher (28 January 2011). "Al Qaeda loses bridge to the West". Foreign Policy. The Slate Group. Retrieved 9 February 2011.
  120. 1 2 "Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack". BBC. 11 June 2014. Retrieved 11 June 2014.
  121. 1 2 "Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan". Dawn. Retrieved 15 September 2014.
  122. 1 2 "Deadly Taliban group gives up armed struggle in Pakistan". telegraph. 14 September 2014. Retrieved 15 September 2014.
  123. Militant Networks in North Waziristan | The Daily Outlook Afghanistan Archived 23 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
  124. Hassan, Abbas (April 2009). "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network" (PDF). CTC Sentinel. 2 (4): 1–4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 1 June 2010. Retrieved 25 January 2011.
  125. 1 2 Majidyar, Ahmad K. (June 2010). "Could the Taliban Take Over Pakistan's Punjab Province?". Middle Eastern Outlook. Archived from the original on 9 February 2011. Retrieved 11 February 2011.
  126. 1 2 "Things fall apart". The Economist. 3 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
  127. Khan, Zia (5 July 2010). "Govt may tighten anti-terror laws". The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune News Network. Retrieved 25 January 2011. However, the Punjab government is still denying the existence of "Punjabi militants" and has snubbed a demand for a crackdown on banned sectarian outfits that intelligence agencies say are now in collaboration with al Qaeda as well as the local Taliban.
  128. Khan, Aamer Ahmed (3 July 2010). "Jaag Punjabi jaag". The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune News Network. Retrieved 25 January 2011.
  129. Pakistan cricket raid suspect held. Al Jazeera English. 17 June 2009.
  130. "Pakistani Taliban claims Lahore attack". The Hindu. India. 29 May 2009. An unknown group called Tehreek-e-Taliban Punjab was also reported to have claimed the attack in a message posted on Turkish jihadist websites. SITE Intelligence, an American group tracking jihad websites, reported the claim late on Wednesday.
  131. Perlez, Jane (28 May 2010). "Attackers Hit Mosques of Islamic Sect in Pakistan". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 May 2010.
  132. "Terrorists silence another voice of interfaith harmony". Dawn. 2 March 2011. Retrieved 3 October 2013.
  133. "TTP 'expel' Punjabi Taliban leader for welcoming govt talks offer". Dawn. 24 August 2013. Retrieved 3 October 2013.
  134. 1 2 Roggio, Bill (31 August 2009). "Pakistan's most-wanted: look at who isn't listed". The Long War Journal. Public Multimedia Inc. Retrieved 2 September 2009.
  135. Mir, Amir (1 September 2009). "The top ten most wanted Jehadis". The News International. Jang Multimedia. Retrieved 26 September 2009. He later shifted his base to the Waziristan region and joined hands with Baitullah Mehsud.
  136. "Pakistan and the Taliban". The Economist. 7 August 2009. Retrieved 26 September 2009. [Baitullah Mehsud] was also associated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
  137. "India sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan, alleges Rehman Malik". Hindustan Times. 23 Sep 2009. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  138. "India helping terrorists in Pakistan: Pak Defence Minister". Indian Express. 13 Jan 2015. Retrieved 2015-02-21.
  139. "MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS,Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan". Stanford.edu. 13 Dec 2007. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  140. Akram, Munir (2015-01-04). "War in the shadows". Dawn. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  141. 1 2 "India funds TTP in FATA, Balochistan: DG ISPR". Dunya Tv. 2015-02-12. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  142. "Foreign intelligence services bankrolling terror: Report". Express Tribune. 2012-09-02. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  143. Johnson, Kay (2014-12-07). "U.S. hands Pakistan senior militant detained in Afghanistan". Reuters. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  144. "Musharraf Warns of Proxy War With India in Afghanistan". AFP/Tribune. 2014-11-18. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  145. "Musharraf Warns of Proxy War With India in Afghanistan". AFP/NDTV. 2014-11-18. Retrieved 2015-02-19.
  146. "RAW funded Rs 20 million for attacks in Karachi".
  147. Khan, Anwarullah (6 November 2008). "Bomber hits anti-militant tribal jirga; 16 dead". Dawn Media Group. Archived from the original on 10 November 2008. Retrieved 8 November 2008.
  148. 1 2 "Lahore 'was Pakistan Taleban op'". BBC News. 31 March 2009. Retrieved 31 March 2009.
  149. Ali, Mohammad Faisal (31 March 2009). "Baitullah claims responsibility for Manawan attack". Dawn Media Group. Retrieved 31 March 2009.
  150. "Pakistani Taliban chief Mehsud claims U.S. shooting". Thomson Reuters. 4 April 2009. Retrieved 4 April 2009.
  151. Shinwari, Ibrahim (28 August 2009). "Taliban claim responsibility for Khyber suicide attack". Dawn News. Archived from the original on 30 August 2009. Retrieved 28 August 2009.
  152. Ahmad, Munir; Ravi Nessman; Ishtiaq Mahsud; Hussain Afzal (6 October 2009). "Taliban claim responsibility for deadly UN blast". Yahoo! News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 8 October 2009. Retrieved 6 October 2009.
  153. Khan, Riaz; Ishtiaq Mahsud; Babar Dogar (12 October 2009). "Pakistan says 41 killed in market bombing". Yahoo! News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 15 October 2009. Retrieved 12 October 2009.
  154. Hussain, Zahid; Rehmat Mehsud (15 October 2009). "Wave of Deadly Attacks in Pakistan". Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. Retrieved 15 October 2009. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has claimed responsibility for the Lahore attacks, according to a private TV news channel, GEO News.
  155. "Taliban Video Claims Responsibility for The Times Square Attack May 2, 2010". 2 May 2010. Retrieved 6 May 2009.
  156. "Fifty-six killed, over 100 injured in Mohmand attack". Dawn. 9 July 2010. Archived from the original on 11 July 2010. Retrieved 9 July 2010.
  157. "Taliban claim Nato tanker attack". Al Jazeera. 4 October 2010. Retrieved 7 February 2011.
  158. "Suicide bombers kill 40 in Mohmand Agency". Dawn.com. 5 December 2010. Retrieved 6 December 2010.
  159. "Taliban claims Pakistan blasts; 50 dead". UPI.com. 6 December 2010. Retrieved 6 December 2010.
  160. "Dozens killed in Pakistan blasts". Al Jazeera. 7 December 2010. Retrieved 7 February 2011.
  161. "Taliban kidnap 23 tribesmen near South Waziristan". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. 27 December 2010. Retrieved 8 February 2011.
  162. "NATO lorries torched in Pakistan". Al Jazeera. 15 January 2011. Retrieved 7 February 2011.
  163. "Senior police official among six killed in Peshawar blasts". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. 31 January 2011. Retrieved 31 January 2011.
  164. "Pakistan attack: 'Schoolboy' suicide bomber hits Mardan". BBC News. 10 February 2011. Retrieved 10 February 2011.
  165. Khan, Haq Nawaz; Karin Brulliard (11 February 2011). "Teen suicide bomber kills army recruits in Pakistan". The Washington Post. Retrieved 10 February 2011. Officials maintain that the 17-year-old bomber was the only person involved in the attack. But Umar Hassan Ihravi, a spokesman for the area's Pakistani Taliban chapter, claiming responsibility for the attack, told reporters in the area that the bombing was carried out by two militants. One, he said, served as a lookout and escaped after the attack. Ihravi did not say how old the bomber was.
  166. "Body of Col Imam found near Mir Ali". Daily Times. 21 February 2011. Archived from the original on 27 February 2011. Retrieved 4 March 2011.
  167. Yusufzai, Rahimullah (23 February 2011). "The long wait for Col Imam's body". The News International. Archived from the original on 4 November 2014.
  168. "Former ISI Colonel Imam's body found". Dawn.com. Dawn Media. 20 February 2011.
  169. "At least 32 killed in Faisalabad blast; Taliban claim responsibility". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. 8 March 2011. Retrieved 8 March 2011.
  170. Mian, Khursheed (8 March 2011). "Bomb kills 25 at Pakistan gas station, many hurt". Reuters. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 8 March 2011.
  171. "Deadly attack at Pakistan funeral procession". BBC News. BBC. 9 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
  172. "Blast kills 36 in Peshawar; Taliban claim responsibility". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. 9 March 2011. Retrieved 9 March 2011.
  173. "DG Khan shrine bombing: Death toll reaches 50". The Express Tribune. 3 April 2011.
  174. "41 killed in Pakistan shrine suicide attack". The Daily Telegraph. London. 3 April 2011.
  175. 1 2 "Bomb hits Pakistan navy bus in Karachi; 5 dead". Google News. Associated Press. 28 April 2011. Retrieved 28 April 2011.
  176. "Twin blasts kill more than 80 in Charsadda". Dawn.com. Dawn Media Group. 13 May 2011. Retrieved 13 May 2011.
  177. "Pakistan: Troops end attack on Karachi naval air base". BBC News. 23 May 2011. Retrieved 25 May 2011.
  178. "Suicide bomber kills 6 at Pakistan police building". AP. 25 May 2011. Retrieved 25 May 2011.
  179. Ali, Lehaz (14 September 2011). "Bus attack kills four boys in Pakistan". The Sydney Morning Herald. Agence France-Presse. Retrieved 13 September 2011.
  180. "TTP claims killing of peace body chief". The News International. 2 December 2011. Retrieved 2 December 2011.
  181. Dupee, Matt (2 December 2011). "Anti-Taliban tribal leader killed in northwest Pakistan". The Long War Journal. Public Multimedia Inc. Retrieved 2 December 2011.
  182. Firdous, Iftikhar (5 January 2012). "TTP claims killing of 15 abducted FC troops". The Express Tribune. Retrieved 5 January 2012.
  183. "Pakistan Taliban kill 15 kidnapped tribal police". BBC News. 5 January 2012. Retrieved 5 January 2012.
  184. "'Operation revenge': 15 abducted FC soldiers brutally tortured, slain – The Express Tribune". International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 22 January 2012.
  185. "Taliban releases horrific video of executions of 15 Pakistani soldiers | Mail Online". Daily Mail. UK. 22 January 2012. Retrieved 22 January 2012.
  186. "Taliban video shows execution of Pak soldiers". NDTV. Retrieved 22 January 2012.
  187. "Taliban video highlights revenge on Pakistan military| Reuters". Reuters. 21 January 2012. Retrieved 22 January 2012.
  188. Mehsud, Saud (25 March 2012). "Taliban faction claims French gunman trained in Pakistan". Reuters. Thompson Reuters. Retrieved 26 March 2012.
  189. "Pakistani Taliban training Frenchmen: Officials". The Times of India. 25 March 2012. Archived from the original on 25 March 2012. Retrieved 25 March 2012.
  190. "Taliban bomber kills 13 'extremists' in Khyber region". The Express Tribune. 24 March 2012. Retrieved 26 March 2012.
  191. Mirza, Shaheryar (5 April 2012). "Police targeted: Taliban claim responsibility for Karachi suicide attack". The Express Tribune. AFP. Retrieved 5 April 2012.
  192. Shahzad, Asif (5 April 2012). "Pakistan: Suicide bomber targeting police kills 2". The Boston Globe. AP. Retrieved 5 April 2012.
  193. "Bannu jailbreak: TTP had inside information, says commander". The Express Tribune. Reuters. 16 April 2012. Retrieved 16 April 2012.
  194. "Security agencies blamed for Bannu jailbreak". dawn.com. 16 April 2012. Retrieved 16 April 2012.
  195. "Bajaur bomb attack kills 24; TTP claims responsibility". Dawn.com. 4 May 2012. Retrieved 4 May 2012.
  196. "Pakistan says militants cross over from Afghanistan, kill 13 troops including 7 beheaded". The Washington Post. Associated Press. 25 June 2012. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
  197. "Cross-border attack: Six security men killed in Upper Dir ambush". The Express Tribune. 25 June 2012. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
  198. "Gunmen open fire on Pakistan television station". Google News. AFP. Archived from the original on 24 February 2014. Retrieved 28 June 2012.
  199. "Taliban attack television office in Karachi; two injured". dawn.com. Reuters. 25 June 2012. Retrieved 28 June 2012.
  200. "Pak: Militants threaten to attack govt installations". 11 July 2012.
  201. "Army camp attack: Pamphlet vows more attacks if NATO supplies continue". The Express Tribune. 11 July 2012. Retrieved 11 July 2012.
  202. "Several killed in Pakistan airbase raid". Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera. 16 August 2012. Retrieved 16 August 2012.
  203. Masood, Salman (16 August 2012). "Pakistani Taliban Kill 22 Shiites in Bus Attack". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 August 2012.
  204. Khan, Haq Nawaz; Leiby, Michele Langevine (9 October 2012). "Taliban says it shot 'infidel' Pakistani teen for advocating girls' rights". The Washington Post. Retrieved 9 October 2012.
  205. NNI (9 October 2012). "TTP claims responsibility of attack on Malala". The Nation.
  206. "Taliban use Islamic Shariah to defend Masala Attack". dawn.com. 10 October 2012. Retrieved 26 October 2012.
  207. Kearney, Seamus (16 December 2014). "Children targeted in Pakistan's deadliest militant attack in years; 132 students are killed". Euronews. Retrieved 16 December 2014.
  208. Popham, Peter (16 December 2014). "Peshawar school attack: 'I will never forget the black boots...It was like death approaching me'". The Independent. Retrieved 16 December 2014.
  209. Jon Boone, Pakistan correspondent, and Jason Burke in Delhi. "Pakistan attacks: at least 30 dead in terror raid at Bacha Khan University | World news". The Guardian. Retrieved 2016-03-28.
  210. 1 2 Golovnina, Maria (14 July 2013). "Pakistan Taliban set up camps in Syria, join anti-Assad war". Reuters. Retrieved 2013-07-14.
  211. 1 2 Wali, Ahmed (12 July 2013). "BBC News - Pakistan Taliban 'sets up a base in Syria'". Bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2013-07-14.
  212. "Pakistan Taliban set up camps in Syria, join anti-Assad war". Al Arabiya.
This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 12/1/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.