Bounded rationality

Bounded rationality is the idea that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is limited by the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers in this view act as satisficers, seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one. Herbert A. Simon proposed bounded rationality as an alternative basis for the mathematical modeling of decision-making, as used in economics, political science and related disciplines. It complements "rationality as optimization", which views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal choice given the information available.^[1] Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors, where one blade represents "cognitive limitations" of actual humans and the other the "structures of the environment", illustrating how minds compensate for limited resources by exploiting known structural regularity in the environment.^[1]

Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that humans can be reasonably approximated or described as "rational" entities (see for example rational choice theory, or Downs Political Agency Models).^[2] Many economics models assume that people are on average rational, and can in large enough quantities be approximated to act according to their preferences. The concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice because of the intractability of natural decision problems and the finite computational resources available for making them.

Origins

The term is thought to have been coined by Herbert A. Simon. In Models of Man, Simon points out that most people are only partly rational, and are irrational in the remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information".^[3] Simon describes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be made somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These include:

limiting the types of utility functions
recognizing the costs of gathering and processing information
the possibility of having a "vector" or "multi-valued" utility function

Simon suggests that economic agents use heuristics to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation, and their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other concurrent economic activities also requiring decisions.

Model extensions

As decision-makers have to make decisions about how and when to decide, Ariel Rubinstein proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision-making procedures.^[4] This puts the study of decision procedures on the research agenda.

Gerd Gigerenzer opines that decision theorists have not really adhered to Simon's original ideas. Rather, they have considered how decisions may be crippled by limitations to rationality, or have modeled how people might cope with their inability to optimize. Gigerenzer proposes and shows that simple heuristics often lead to better decisions than theoretically optimal procedures.^[2]

Huw Dixon later argues that it may not be necessary to analyze in detail the process of reasoning underlying bounded rationality.^[5] If we believe that agents will choose an action that gets them "close" to the optimum, then we can use the notion of epsilon-optimization, which means we choose our actions so that the payoff is within epsilon of the optimum. If we define the optimum (best possible) payoff as $U^{*}$ , then the set of epsilon-optimizing options S(ε) can be defined as all those options s such that:

$U(s)\geq U^{*}-\epsilon$ .

The notion of strict rationality is then a special case (ε=0). The advantage of this approach is that it avoids having to specify in detail the process of reasoning, but rather simply assumes that whatever the process is, it is good enough to get near to the optimum.

From a computational point of view, decision procedures can be encoded in algorithms and heuristics. Edward Tsang argues that the effective rationality of an agent is determined by its computational intelligence. Everything else being equal, an agent that has better algorithms and heuristics could make "more rational" (more optimal) decisions than one that has poorer heuristics and algorithms.^[6]

Certain static and dynamic types of bounded-rational models of a potential game result in a stationary state that is the Gibbs measure, which is closely related to the quantal response equilibrium. Equilibrium analysis is then done using statistical mechanics.

Relationship to behavioral economics

Bounded rationality implicates the idea that humans take reasoning shortcuts that may lead to suboptimal decision-making. Behavioral economists engage in mapping the decision shortcuts that agents use in order to help increase the effectiveness of human decision-making. One treatment of this idea comes from Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler's Nudge.^[7]^[8] Sunstein and Thaler recommend that choice architectures are modified in light of human agents' bounded rationality. A widely cited proposal from Sunstein and Thaler urges that healthier food be placed at sight level in order to increase the likelihood that a person will opt for that choice instead of less healthy option. Some critics of Nudge have lodged attacks that modifying choice architectures will lead to people becoming worse decision-makers.^[9]

Notes

1 2 Gigerenzer, Gerd; Selten, Reinhard (2002). Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-57164-1.
1 2 Mancur Olson, Jr. ([1965] 1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, Description, Table of Contents, and preview.
↑ Oliver E. Williamson, p. 553, citing Simon.
↑ Rubinstein, Ariel (1997). Modeling bounded rationality. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262681001.
↑ Moss; Rae, eds. (1992). "Some Thoughts on Artificial Intelligence and Economic Theory". Artificial Intelligence and Economic Analysis. Edward Elgar. pp. 131–154. ISBN 185278685X.
↑ Tsang, E.P.K. (2008). "Computational intelligence determines effective rationality". International Journal on Automation and Control. 5 (1): 63–6. doi:10.1007/s11633-008-0063-6.
↑ Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R. (April 8, 2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7. OCLC 791403664.
↑ Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R. and Balz, John P. (April 2, 2010). "Choice Architecture". doi:10.2139/ssrn.1583509. SSRN 1583509.
↑ Wright, Joshua; Ginsberg, Douglas (February 16, 2012). "Free to Err?: Behavioral Law and Economics and its Implications for Liberty". Library of Law & Liberty.

External links

Wikiquote has quotations related to: Bounded rationality

Topics in game theory

Definitions	Normal-form game Extensive-form game Escalation of commitment Graphical game Cooperative game Succinct game Information set Hierarchy of beliefs Preference

Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Gibbs equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium

Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy

Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Simultaneous game Sequential game Repeated game Signaling game Screening game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global games Strictly determined game Potential game

Games	Prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock-paper-scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto games War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Prisoners and hats puzzle Trust game Princess and monster game Monty Hall problem Rendezvous problem

Theorems	Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Folk theorem Revelation principle Arrow's impossibility theorem

Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Ariel Rubinstein Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

See also	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Institutional economics

Institutional Economists	Werner Abelshauser Clarence Edwin Ayres Joe S. Bain Shimshon Bichler Robert A. Brady Daniel Bromley Ha-Joon Chang John Maurice Clark John R. Commons Richard T. Ely Robert H. Frank John Kenneth Galbraith Walton Hale Hamilton Orris C. Herfindahl Albert O. Hirschman Geoffrey Hodgson János Kornai Simon Kuznets Hunter Lewis Jesse W. Markham Wesley Clair Mitchell Gunnar Myrdal Jonathan Nitzan Warren Samuels François Simiand Herbert A. Simon Frank Stilwell George W. Stocking Sr. Lars Pålsson Syll Thorstein Veblen Edward Lawrence Wheelwright Erich Zimmermann

Key Concepts & Ideas	Accelerator effect Administered prices Barriers to entry Bounded rationality Conspicuous consumption Conspicuous leisure Conventional wisdom Countervailing power Effective competition Herfindahl index Hiding hand principle Hirschman cycle Instrumentalism Kuznets cycles Market concentration Market power Market structure Penalty of taking the lead Satisficing Shortage economy Structure–conduct–performance paradigm Technostructure Theory of two-level planning Veblen goods Veblenian dichotomy

Related Fields	Behavioral Economics Development economics Economic sociology English historical school of economics French historical school Historical school of economics Legal realism New Institutional Economics Post-Keynesian economics

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 11/26/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.