Epistemic virtue

The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one's own life and personal experiences. Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition. The list below substantially overlaps with his.

Being an epistemically virtuous person is often equated with being a critical thinker.[1]

Note that in this context curiosity bears the modern connotation of inquisitiveness, in contrast to the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things.

These can be contrasted to the epistemic vices such as:

Note that in this context curiosity bears the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things, in contrast to the positive studious (or perhaps inquisitive).

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Bishop, M., & Trout, J. D. 2004. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  2. ↑ Greco, John. 2011. "Virtue Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..

References

Other sources to consult

External links

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 6/4/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.