Buckley v. Valeo

Buckley v. Valeo

Argued November 10, 1975
Decided January 30, 1976
Full case name James L. Buckley, et al. v. Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the United States Senate, et al.
Citations

424 U.S. 1 (more)

424 US 1 (1976), 96 S. Ct. 612; 46 L. Ed. 2d 659; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 16; 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9189
Subsequent history As amended.
Holding
The Court upheld some federal limits on campaign contributions, but held expenditure limits unconstitutional.
Court membership
Case opinions
Per curiam.
Majority Per curiam, joined by Brennan, Stewart, Powell; Marshall (in part); Blackmun (in part); Rehnquist (in part); Burger (in part); White (in part).
Concur/dissent Burger
Concur/dissent White
Concur/dissent Marshall
Concur/dissent Blackmun
Concur/dissent Rehnquist
Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I, Article II, Sec. 2, cl. 2

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) is US constitutional law case of the US Supreme Court on campaign finance. A majority of judges held limits on election spending in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 §608 were unconstitutional. The majority, in a per curiam opinion, contended that expenditure limits contravened the First Amendment provision on freedom of speech because spending money, in its view, was the same as written or verbal expression. It limited disclosure provisions, required the Federal Election Commission's composition to be changed. The lead dissenting judgment of White J contended that Congress' judgment had legitimately recognized unlimited election spending "as a mortal danger against which effective preventive and curative steps must be taken."[1]

Buckley v. Valeo was extended by the US Supreme Court significantly in the 5 to 4 decision of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti[2] and a series of further cases up to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010.[3] This held that corporations may spend from their general treasuries during elections. In 2014, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission held that aggregate limits on political giving by an individual are unconstitutional.[4] These decisions have become central to political discussion, as politicians from all parties, but especially Democrats, have committed to overturning the principles of the Supreme Court, and pledged to nominate judges to the Supreme Court committed to overturning Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo.

Facts

In 1974, Congress passed significant amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, creating the most comprehensive effort by the federal government to date to regulate federal campaign contributions and spending. President Gerald Ford signed the bill into law on October 15. The key parts of the amended law did the following:

The lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia, on January 2, 1975, by U.S. Senator James L. Buckley (a member of the Conservative Party of New York State), former U.S. Senator and 1968 presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy (a Democrat from Minnesota), the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, the Peace & Freedom Party, the Libertarian Party, and numerous other plaintiffs. The named defendant in the caption was Francis R. Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate an ex officio member of the FEC who represented the U.S. federal government. The trial court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals and finally to the Supreme Court.

The plaintiffs argued that the legislation violated the 1st and 5th Amendment rights to freedom of expression and due process, respectively.

Judgment

In a per curiam opinion, Supreme Court held that several key provisions of the Campaign Finance Act, § 608(a), which limited expenditure at election campaigns, were unconstitutional and contrary to the First Amendment. The major holdings were as follows:

The Court's opinion begins by stating certain "General Principles," and then dealing with individual parts of the law in turn.

General principles

Turning to the specific provisions of the law, the Court held as follows:

Contribution limits

Expenditure limits

Reporting and disclosure requirements

Public funding of campaigns

Make-up of FEC

Dissents

Only 8 Justices heard the case. The opinion was a per curiam opinion, that is, not authored by a single justice, but an opinion for the Court. Several justices dissented from portions of the opinion.

Justice White would have upheld all the restrictions on both contributions and expenditures, striking down only the FEC's appointment process. He said the following.[6]

Justice White (above) would have upheld the law's limits on expenditures and contributions.

Concededly, neither the limitations on contributions nor those on expenditures directly or indirectly purport to control the content of political speech by candidates or by their supporters or detractors. What the Act regulates is giving and spending money, acts that have First Amendment significance not because they are themselves communicative with respect to the qualifications of the candidate, but because money may be used to defray the expenses of speaking or otherwise communicating about the merits or demerits of federal candidates for election. The act of giving money to political candidates, however, may have illegal or other undesirable consequences: it may be used to secure the express or tacit understanding that the giver will enjoy political favor if the candidate is elected. Both Congress and this Court's cases have recognized this as a mortal danger against which effective preventive and curative steps must be taken.

[...]

I also disagree with the Court's judgment that § 608(a), which limits the amount of money that a candidate or his family may spend on his campaign, violates the Constitution. Although it is true that this provision does not promote any interest in preventing the corruption of candidates, the provision does, nevertheless, serve salutary purposes related to the integrity of federal campaigns. By limiting the importance of personal wealth, § 608(a) helps to assure that only individuals with a modicum of support from others will be viable candidates. This in turn would tend to discourage any notion that the outcome of elections is primarily a function of money. Similarly, § 608(a) tends to equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own campaigns, to run for political office.

Since the contribution and expenditure limitations are neutral as to the content of speech and are not motivated by fear of the consequences of the political speech of particular candidates or of political speech in general, this case depends on whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal Government in regulating the use of money in political campaigns are sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of candidates and their supporters.

Justice Marshall dissented on the point of limiting personal contributions and expenditures by a candidate to his or her own campaign - he would have upheld that provision, which was stricken by the Court.[7]

One of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign. It would appear to follow that the candidate with a substantial personal fortune at his disposal is off to a significant "headstart." Of course, the less wealthy candidate can potentially overcome the disparity in resources through contributions from others. But ability to generate contributions may itself depend upon a showing of a financial base for the campaign or some demonstration of preexisting support, which, in turn, is facilitated by expenditures of substantial personal sums. Thus, the wealthy candidate's immediate access to a substantial personal fortune may give him an initial advantage that his less wealthy opponent can never overcome. And even if the advantage can be overcome, the perception that personal wealth wins elections may not only discourage potential candidates without significant personal wealth from entering the political arena, but also undermine public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.

Justice Rehnquist dissented on the application of the public funding provisions to minor parties, believing that it was unconstitutional as applied to them.

Justice Blackmun would have held that contribution limits were unconstitutional.

Chief Justice Burger would have held that contribution limits were unconstitutional, that the government financing provisions were unconstitutional, and that disclosure of small contributions to campaigns was unconstitutional.

Significance

Buckley has been criticized both for being too protective of political spending and contributions, and for not being protective enough of speech. Nevertheless, the case remains the starting point for judicial analysis of the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions. Although the decision upheld restrictions on the size of campaign contributions, by striking down limits on expenditures the Court decision left in place a demand for money. By limiting the supply of funds (contribution limits) but not the demand for funds, this may have increased fund raising pressures on candidates. The decision left intact the ability of government to offer direct funding for campaigns, but not to force candidates to accept public funding and accompanying limits on expenditures. The Court's decision also upholds the public disclosure of political contributions, but only contributions made to candidates and parties, organizations with the primary purpose of influencing campaigns, and for contributions used to directly advocate for or against a candidate.

Perhaps most important for the future development of the law was Buckley's unequivocal rejection of the promotion of equality as a basis for limiting contributions or spending. This has significantly limited any effort to promote political equality through regulation of campaign spending and contributions. In 2008, the Court further restricted attempts to equalize spending in elections for the U.S. House and Senate when it struck down the "Millionaires Amendment" in FEC v. Davis (originally Davis v. FEC). That case overturned legislation that allowed candidates to accept larger contributions if their opponent spent substantially from personal wealth. In 2010, the Court overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and part of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In Citizens United, the Court, following Buckley's holding providing more expansive First Amendment protections for independent expenditures made on a candidate's behalf, held that Congress could not ban independent expenditures by corporations. The next year, in Arizona Free Enterprise PAC v. Bennett (2011) the Court further restricted state authority to regulate campaign finance to achieve greater equality, striking down provisions of Arizona's public financing system that gave extra government money to candidates who faced high-spending opponents or high levels of independent expenditures.

Buckley's protections for political speech and activity, and skepticism of government efforts to regulate such activity, distinguish the United States from many other developed democracies. For instance, under the European Convention on Human Rights, it was held in Bowman v United Kingdom[8] that equality of citizen voice was a legitimate purpose, and spending money was not the core of freedom of expression. The leading case in Europe, Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom held that the UK's total ban on political advertising was compatible with freedom of expression "given the danger of unequal access based on wealth and to political advertising" which goes "to the heart of the democratic process."[9] In Harper v. Canada (Attorney General),[10] Canada's highest court held that rules designed to limit spending at elections are legitimate because they prevent conflicts of interest and promote political equality.

See also

Notes

  1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
  2. 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
  3. No. 08-205, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  4. 572 U.S. ___ (2014)
  5. nb Associate Justice Harry Blackmun's papers indicate that Associate Justice William Rehnquist drafted the separation-of-powers portion of the per curiam opinion.
  6. 424 US 1, 260-5 (1976)
  7. 424 US 1, 288 (1976)
  8. [1998] ECHR 4, (1998) 26 EHRR 1
  9. [2013] ECHR 362, [117] and see [2008] UKHL 15, [28]-[29] and [47]-[51]
  10. [2004] SCR 827

References

External links

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